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Jamila Hamidu-Yakubu

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POUR OBTENIR LE GRADE DE
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ÉCOLE DOCTORALE SOCIÉTÉS, POLITIQUE ET SANTÉ PUBLIQUE
SPECIALITÉ SCIENCE POLITIQUE

Par **Jamila HAMIDU-YAKUBU**

**TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE
GHANAIAN DIASPORA IN LONDON AND ACCRA**

Sous la direction de : **Prof. Dominique Darbon**

Soutenue le : **26 février 2021**

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TO GOD BE THE GLORY, GREAT THINGS HE HATH DONE

Titre : Engagement politique transnationale de la diaspora ghanéenne à Londres et à Accra

Résumé :

Cette thèse s'inscrit dans la thématique de la participation politique qui continue d'être au cœur de la problématique du fonctionnement des démocraties consolidées comme de celles qui sont en voie de consolidation. Premièrement la thèse porte sur la participation politique de la diaspora ghanéenne première et deuxième générations dans la politique britannique généralement et lors de Brexit. La thèse examine le lien entre la construction de l'identité ghanéenne à Londres et l'engagement politique en Grand Bretagne. Deuxièmement elle analyse l'engagement politique transnational de la diaspora envers le Ghana, en s'appuyant sur le cas de la diaspora à Londres. Elle étudie les actes qui peuvent se traduire comme pratique politique de la diaspora ghanéenne notamment dans le cas d'absence de droit de vote de la diaspora ghanéenne à l'étranger. Troisième elle examine l'engagement politique des « retournées » au Ghana comme les gardiens de la démocratie ghanéenne. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans la notion que peu d'études ou travaux de recherche ont été réalisés sur l'engagement politique de la diaspora Ghanéenne dans le pays d'accueil et le pays d'origine. Elle a pour objectif de démontrer qu'à travers l'engagement politique, comment une communauté diasporique s'intègre dans le pays d'accueil, et à travers ce même processus d'engagement politique transnational, comment ils deviennent une force politique dans leur pays d'origine.

L'étude reconstitue l'engagement politique de la diaspora à Londres et les stratégies utilisées par les élites de la diaspora lors des élections nationales au Ghana. Elle se concentre sur l'engagement politique de cette élite diasporique une fois au Ghana, les stratégies mises en place pour consolider leur place de l'élite politique issue de la diaspora. Les villes de Londres et Accra ont été choisies pour observer :

- les interactions, aux niveaux national et international.
- les logiques véhiculées par les groupes influents ainsi que
- leur emprise sur le jeu politique, tout en rendant compte, à partir d'une étude longitudinale, ethnographique, des entretiens, discussions depuis 2010 et exploitation des questionnaires semi-directive administrés, auprès des membres de la diaspora à Londres et les « retournées » à Accra.

Les résultats de ces enquêtes de terrain ont démontré que la diaspora ghanéenne a historiquement joué un rôle important dans la construction politique et démocratique du Ghana et elle continue ainsi à jouer le rôle du développement du pays à la fois politique et économique.

Mots clés :

Mots clés : Ghana, Accra, Grand Bretagne, Brexit, Londres, diaspora, participation politique, retournées

Title: Transnational political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and Accra

Abstract:

This thesis deals with the topic of political participation, which continues to be at the core of the debates on the functioning of democratic institutions in emerging democracies as well as in consolidated democracies. Focusing specifically on the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora (first –and–second generations) in UK politics and transnational political engagement of first-generation Ghanaians towards Ghana, also returnee diaspora political engagement in Accra, Ghana. Firstly, it analyses the scope and extent to which the Ghanaian diaspora identity is formed in the UK with ties to the Black British identity and its influences on the Ghanaian community voting patterns in UK politics especially during the Brexit vote in 2016. Furthermore, how does political participation in UK politics fosters integration, or integration fosters political participation of the Ghanaian community? Secondly it examines how the Ghanaian diaspora negotiates their transnational identity and political participation towards Ghana. Being disenfranchised to exercise their external voting rights, how does it impact the power relations between Ghanaian diaspora and the Ghanaian government? Thirdly, what are the role returnee diaspora play in Ghanaian politics? Are political returnees the vanguards of Ghana’s political stability?

Drawing from a longitudinal and ethnographic field work investigations and analysis, in Accra and in London since 2010 coupled with focused group discussion in both locations. A semi-structured interviewees method and questionnaires were administered to respondents in both locations to ascertain how the diasporic and returnee population

perceive the lack of diaspora political participation in the context of Ghana's democratisation processes. The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the historic role that the Ghanaian diaspora have contributed in Ghanaian political and democratic governance and how they still contribute to Ghana's political and democratic consolidation. The fieldwork analysis has demonstrated that the Ghanaian diaspora still remains an important component of development in Ghana both politically and economically. The fieldwork results have also illustrated the contribution of Ghanaian diaspora in UK political diversity.

Keywords : Ghana, Accra, returnees diaspora, Great Britain, London, Brexit, diaspora, political participation,

Unité de recherche

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Section : 1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, governments of both host and home countries in Africa and the rest of the world have shown great interest towards their diaspora communities abroad viewing them as vanguards of development in: cultural and social change, economic development and political influences of both homelands and host countries¹. Data studies and census on international migration movements across the world shows that more than 247 million people were living outside of their countries of birth in 2013 and this has increased to over 750 million over the years². The study further indicates that in the coming decades, demographic forces, globalization and climate change will increase migration pressures both within and across borders³. Current estimates are that there are 272 million international migrants globally (or 3.5% of the world's population)⁴. While most people in the world continue to live in the country in which they were born, more people are migrating to other countries, especially those within their region⁵. Many others are migrating to high-income countries that are further afield has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a slightly faster rate than previously anticipated⁶.

¹ Sheffer, G. (2003). *Diaspora politics: At home abroad*. Cambridge University Press.p.. 10

² Migration and Remittances: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/labormarkets/brief/migration-and-remittances>


³ Migration and Remittances: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/labormarkets/brief/migration-and-remittances>

⁴ World Migration Report 2020: Chapter 2 Migration and Migrants: A Global Overview: <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2020-chapter-2>

⁵ Ibid


⁶ Ibid

Figure 0-1 Map Annual net migration 2015-2020




Source: <https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Migration/>

Figure 0-2 Map: World Migration Flows



Source: International Migration flow: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Net-International-Migration-Flow-Map-The-colours-describe-the-net-international_fig4_307896332

Figure 0-3: Map: Movement of People and Tourism



Source: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/moving-to-work-and-escape-poverty>

This interest has been brought to the forefront via the international media coverage of diaspora communities in host countries and their economic contribution towards their home countries development through remittances they send home. For example, figures on remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries rose from \$ 31.1 billion in 1990 to 76.8 billion in 2005⁷. The World Bank estimates that officially recorded remittances to developing countries amounted to \$429 billion in 2016, a decline of 2.4 percent over \$440 billion in 2015⁸. Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, contracted by 1.2 percent to \$575 billion in 2016, from \$582 billion in 2015⁹. Remittances from Ghanaians living abroad to Ghana has been on the rise since 2010, remittance flow in 2010 was \$135 million; it increased in 2011 to \$ 2.1 billion; in 2013 recorded remittance was \$1.8 billion; for 2014 remittance was \$2. billion; 2016

⁷ Migration and Development: Remittances: <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/remittances>

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Remittances to Developing Countries Decline for Second Consecutive Year, 21st April 2017: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/remittances-to-developing-countries-decline-for-second-consecutive-year>

remittance was \$3 billion. From 2017 figures has remained stable \$3.5 billion for 2017; \$3.5 billion in 2018 and 2019 \$3.5 billion¹⁰.

In keeping with an improved global economic outlook, the World Bank indicates that remittances to developing countries was expected to grow by an estimated 3.3 percent to \$483 billion in 2017¹¹. The World Bank equally estimated that officially recorded remittance flows to low-and middle-income countries reached \$ 529 billion in 2018, an increase of 9.6 percent over the previous record high of \$ 483 billion in 2017¹². Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, reached \$689 billion in 2018, up from \$ 633 billion in 2017¹³. The World Bank states that in 2019 remittance flows to low-and -middle income countries were expected to reach \$ 551 billion, which is up by 4.7 percent in comparison to 2018 figures¹⁴. According to data from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) totalled USD \$152.8 billion in 2019, a rise of 1.4% in real terms from 2018, according to preliminary data collected from official development agencies¹⁵. Bilateral Overseas Development Aid, ODA to Africa and least-developed countries rose by 1.3% and 2.6% respectively. Excluding aid spent on looking after refugees within donor countries – which was down 2% from 2018 – ODA rose by 1.7% in real terms.¹⁶ These data demonstrate, that remittance rate to developing countries exceeds Overseas development Aid, this therefore validates the idea that remittances to developing countries plays an important role in national developments of these countries.

In a World Bank Press Release on April 22, 2020, the Bank indicated that: *Global remittances are projected to decline sharply by about 20 percent in 2020 due to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdown. The projected fall, which would be the sharpest decline in recent history, is largely due to a fall in the wages and employment of migrant workers, who tend to be more vulnerable to loss of*

¹⁰ Personal remittances, received (current US\$) – Ghana 1979-2019: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=GH>

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² Record High remittance sent in 2018: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018>

¹³ *ibid*

¹⁴ Remittance World-wide, World Bank Blog 16 October 2019: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/data-release-remittances-low-and-middle-income-countries-track-reach-551-billion-2019>

¹⁵ Official Development Assistance (ODA): <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>

¹⁶ *Ibid*

employment and wages during an economic crisis in a host country. Remittances to low and middle-income countries (LMICs) are projected to fall by 19.7 percent to \$445 billion, representing a loss of a crucial financing lifeline for many vulnerable households¹⁷. All the cited remittance figures above exclude un-registered form of remittances. Registered form of remittance now amounts to over twice the amount of official development assistance and more than 10 times higher than net private capital transfer to developing countries (Kapur and McHale 2003).

A World Bank remittance brief in 2014 observed that: “remittances remain a key source of external resource flows to developing countries, far exceeding official development assistance and more stable than private debt and portfolio equity flows. For many developing countries, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange, surpassing earnings from major exports, and covering a substantial portion of imports. For example, in Nepal, remittances are nearly double the country’s revenues from exports of goods and services, while in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, they are over 50 per cent and 38 percent, respectively. In India, remittances during 2013 were \$70 billion, more than the \$65 billion earned from the country’s flagship software services exports. In Uganda, remittances are double the country’s income from its main export of coffee”¹⁸. “Remittances have become a major component of the balance of payments of nations. India led the chart of remittance flows, receiving \$70 billion last year, followed by China with \$60 billion and the Philippines with \$25 billion. There is no doubt that these flows act as an antidote to poverty and promote prosperity. Remittances and migration data are also barometers of global peace and turmoil and this is what makes the World Bank’s KNOMAD initiative to organize, analyse, and make available these data so important¹⁹,” notes Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank.

Against this backdrop, however, it is important to stress that some scholars and policymakers view remittances as the next development panacea with regards to

¹⁷ Press Release: World Bank predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History, 22 April 2020: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-history#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20remittance%20flows%20are%20expected%20to%20decline%20by%2013%20percent.&text=Remittances%20to%20countries%20in%20Europe,to%20%2465%20billion%20in%202019>.

¹⁸Remittances to developing countries to stay robust this year, despite increased deportations of migrant workers, says WB: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/11/remittances-developing-countries-deportations-migrant-workers-wb>

¹⁹ibid

transnational relations between diasporas and homeland. As stated above though diaspora remittances contribute to national development, it is nevertheless important to include other aspects of diaspora engagement in national development agenda, such as their transnational civil engagement in homeland affairs.

Home countries are relying on the return of qualified members of their diaspora in order to curb the syndrome of brain drain to brain gain²⁰. The examples of countries such as India and China attest to this trend. Both countries have been good at reversing the syndrome of brain drain and as such have benefited in recent years of the return of their qualified nationals particularly in sectors such as: academia, medicine, scientific research, Information Technology and business innovation²¹.

On the African continent, countries such as Senegal, Mali Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana are among a host of countries tapping into their diaspora resources in terms of remittance sent home and their diaspora expertise in reversing the syndrome of brain drain to brain gain and as such viewing their diaspora as the new developmental panacea²². Politically diaspora and returnee diaspora in developing countries are also noted for the role they engage in nation-building efforts, for example in post conflict countries around the world such as: Burma, Pakistan and Albania. Post conflict countries in Africa namely: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Eritrea to name a few, have all in recent times accorded important roles to their diaspora communities as partners in nation building through the lenses of political development²³.

Established migrants' communities in host countries can be viewed as an asset because of the diversity they add to the host country's demographic landscape, an example to illustrate this was during the London 2012 Olympic Games, where organizers of the Olympic Games ensured that they capitalized on London's multi-cultural communities and its diversity as an asset in view of attracting more visitors to London. As a result, London was presented and marketed to the world as home of diversity, multiculturalism and a city where every community can and could find its own²⁴. This recent development

²⁰ Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press.p.16

²¹ Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. p.16

²² Ibidem

²³ Bernal, V. (2006). Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: the Eritrean diaspora online. *Global networks*, 6(2), pp. 164

²⁴ Kiberenge, K.2012, London 2012 Olympics: How Britain's multicultural capital won the hearts of people from

of showcasing migrants' communities in host societies as value added assets has not always been the case, there has been a paradigm shift of this view, as previously migrants were considered and viewed as negative to host society social cohesion to now being viewed as a positive inclusion in host country social set-up, and as such benefits both host and homelands. Its benefit to host country is translated in labour migration and brain gain of qualified migrants in host countries. For migrants' homelands, migration is beneficial through remittances that migrants send home and the return of qualified migrants from the diaspora to their home country and qualified circular migrants who navigate between host and homeland.

For many years, emigration was seen as a loss for societies of departure, due to the fact that migration was viewed as contributing to loss of human resource through brain drain. However, in recent years, thanks to influential academic researches²⁵ and international reports,²⁶ homelands are now viewing migration as an added value to the home society's development through various forms of remittances sent home by its migrants abroad. The examples of most home countries such as India, Mexico, China and African countries such as Senegal, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire are also capitalizing on attracting their skilled and qualified diaspora to return home through the initiation of policies such as: allowing diasporas to hold dual citizenships, non-resident permit and favourable business contracts and deals to facilitate the return of their oversea nationals either on a temporal or permanent basis to aide in capacity building schemes within healthcare and education sectors²⁷.

Over the past two decades, policy analysis and written reports from international institutions and scholarly work have featured and identified migration and diaspora population as unlimited resources for national development. This enthusiasm on the beneficial impact that migration for development policies initiated in the early 1990s, has shifted from a theoretical framework to practical implementation phase particularly by

every nation. The Guardian, Sat 11 Aug 2012 : <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/aug/11/multicultural-capital-won-hearts>

²⁵ Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press.p.10

²⁶ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development: applying concepts to West Africa.p.15

²⁷ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Op.Cit.p.20

scholars of transnational migration, human geography and African diaspora field of studies²⁸.

According to Levitt and Nieve, economics (financial remittance) is not the whole story in terms of the value migrants add to national development of both host and homelands. Culture permeates all aspects of development enterprise as a challenge and opportunities²⁹. Levitt and Nieve, proposes the notion of culture remittances which includes musical, artistic and literary forms, ideas and expressions (Flores, 2009).

Levitt (2001) defines social remittances as the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from the host to the sending-country communities. They are like the social and cultural resources that migrants bring with them to the countries that receive them³⁰. The role these resources play in promoting immigrant's entrepreneurship, community development, and political integration is widely acknowledged³¹. Levitt further argues that individuals' experiences prior to migration is strongly influenced by what they do in the countries where they settle which, in turn, affects or influences what they remit back to their homelands, in terms of human resources and social capital³². According to Levitt, social remittance is transmitted in several ways: first, it is transmitted through identifiable pathways; their sources and destinations are clear as migrants and non-migrants can state how they learned of a particular idea or practice and why they decided to adopt it³³. Second, social remittance occurs when migrants speak directly to their family members about different kind of politics and encourage them to pursue reforms. In such cases, ideas are communicated intentionally to a specific recipient or group³⁴. A third distinguishing aspect of social remittance transmission is that these remittances are usually transferred by individuals who know one other personally or who are connected to one another mutual social ties³⁵. Social remittances are delivered by a familiar messenger who come "with references"³⁶

²⁸ Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist, eds. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*. Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

²⁹ Peggy Levitt and Deepak Lamba-Nieves 2011, art. Cit 16

³⁰ Levitt, P., 2001. *The transnational villagers*. Univ of California Press.p.54

³¹ Ibid

³² Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.62

³³ Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.63

³⁴ Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.63

³⁵ Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.64

³⁶ Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.64

In other words, the ideas and practices migrants bring with them to their homelands actively shape who and what they encountered in the countries where they lived. This then shapes what they send back home in the form of social remittance³⁷. Social remittances are translated and measured by their changed and changing world views, acquiring new values, new practices and know-hows, all being attributed to their migration experience abroad. The above statement on social remittances process of transmission echoes with the case of some members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. In the Ghanaian diaspora case, social remittance transfer is observed among member of the Ghanaian diaspora who are active in transnational diaspora politics (they are among the educated professionals in the diaspora) and as such acquires skills of political mobilisation in the diaspora which they in turn transmit to their mother party in Ghana. Similar observation was advanced by Dedieu et al ³⁸, with reference to the Senegalese diaspora's political engagement in New York and Paris during the 2012 presidential elections in Senegal. Where their studies illustrated a strong correlation between migrants' educational level and political capital before emigration and how that influences their likelihood to participate in transnational politics in France or in the US and also their transnational influence on their families in homeland politics³⁹.

All these forms of remittances, social and cultural are as equally important as financial remittances that migrants send from host to home countries, which encompasses ideas, practices, and narratives and which enables mobility and different forms of membership and belonging.

Social remittances that migrants and diaspora communities bring to their host country are often translated in the role that they play as bridging the gap in terms of the connections between host and home countries. An example of such "bridging the gap ties" are among elite diaspora's engagements in sectors such as: politics, diplomacy, finance and cooperate industries. The examples of Mo Ibrahim, a Black British entrepreneur of African descent (Sudanese), who has used his experience in the diaspora and his wealth to promote educational initiatives in Africa (see brief

³⁷ Levitt, P., 2001.op.cit.p.65

³⁸ Jean-Philippe Dedieu, Lisa Chauvet, Flore Gubert, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps and Étienne Smith, 2013 « Les « batailles » de Paris et de New York », *Revue française de science politique* (Vol. 63), p.10

³⁹Jean-Philippe Dedieu, Lisa Chauvet, Flore Gubert, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps and Étienne Smith, 2013 Art.Cit.p.10

biography in footnote)⁴⁰. Other such examples in the UK are Lord Paul Boateng (Ghanaian descent see brief biography in footnote ⁴¹) and Baroness Valerie Amos (Guyanese descent, see footnotes for brief biography⁴²) both Black British politicians have equally used their dual heritage to benefit their host and home countries, by occupying positions in British government with links to developmental initiatives in Africa and also with ethnic minorities groups in the UK. Others, such as Lionel Zinsou⁴³, Momar Nguer⁴⁴ both French of African descent, have equally used their dual heritage in helping with development schemes in Africa, especially within the realms of politics and in corporate sectors both in France and in Africa. Though these cited examples sheds light on the elite categories among the African diaspora population, it is nevertheless worth noting here that diaspora elite do not constitute the biggest percentage among Africans in the diaspora both in the UK and

⁴⁰ **Mohammed "Mo" Ibrahim** born 3 May 1946 is a Sudanese-British billionaire businessman. He worked for several telecommunications companies, before founding Celtel, which when sold had over 24 million mobile phone subscribers in 14 African countries. After selling Celtel in 2005 for \$3.4 billion, he set up the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to encourage better governance in Africa, as well as creating the Mo Ibrahim Index, to evaluate nations' performance. He is also a member of the Africa regional advisory board of London Business School. In 2007 he initiated the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, which awards a \$5 million initial payment, and a \$200,000 annual payment for life to African heads of state who deliver security, health, education and economic development to their constituents and democratically transfer power to their successors. Ibrahim has pledged to give at least half of his wealth to charity by joining The Giving Pledge⁴⁰.

⁴¹ **Paul Yaw Boateng, Baron Boateng** (born 14 June 1951) is a British Labour Party politician, who was the Member of Parliament (MP) for Brent South from 1987 to 2005, becoming the UK's first Black Cabinet Minister in May 2002, when he was appointed as Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Following his departure from the House of Commons, he served as the British High Commissioner to South Africa from March 2005 to May 2009. He was introduced as a member of the House of Lords on 1 July 2010⁴¹.

⁴² **Valerie Ann Amos, Baroness Amos**, CH, PC (born 13 March 1954) is a British Labour Party politician and diplomat who served as the eighth UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Before her appointment to the UN, she served as British High Commissioner to Australia. She was created a life peer in 1997, serving as Leader of the House of Lords and Lord President of the Council from 2003 to 2007⁴².

⁴³ Lionel Zinsou was born to a father from Benin (then a colony of Dahomey, in French West Africa), doctor to Léopold Sédar Senghor, and a French mother¹. He is also the nephew of the former President of the Republic, Émile Zinsou. Laurent Fabius, Prime Minister, called him to his side as his speech writer⁴. After working at BSN, Lionel Zinsou was a managing partner at Rothschild & Cie before joining the investment fund PAI Partners⁵ in 2008 and becoming its CEO in 2009.

⁴⁴ Momar Nguer, 59, is a graduate of ESSEC. In 2000, he became Vice President East Africa and Indian Ocean within Total's Refining & Marketing branch. From 2007 to 2011, Momar Nguer served as the Group's General Manager for Aviation. Since December 2011, he has been Vice President Africa - Middle East for Total's Marketing & Services branch. He was appointed to the Group Performance Committee in January 2012 and Chairman of the Diversity Council on August 1, 2015.

France. Non-elite and unskilled diaspora constitute the highest percentage among the diaspora community.

Non-elite and unskilled persons among diaspora Africans contribute a great deal to the development of both host and home countries, and in host countries they constitute the bedrock of unskilled labour force working in sectors that the indigenous population are not willing to do⁴⁵. Their contribution in host nation development is therefore articulated through the taxes they pay⁴⁶. For home countries, unskilled migrants form an important percentage in terms of the remittances they send to their families back home which helps in alleviating poverty⁴⁷. Their remittances rate exceeds that of the skilled and elite segments of migrants, as unskilled migrants' remit to homeland on a regular basis with smaller sums of money, compared to the elites and skilled migrants who remit less often but in large sums of money, than unskilled migrants⁴⁸. This therefore indicates that frequencies of remittances in cash flows exceeds volume cash remittance, hence the important role unskilled migrants play in national developments of both home and host lands⁴⁹.

Both elite and non-elite diaspora's dual heritage enables them to socially remit in both home and host countries. Their experience and local know-how of both worlds, makes them an indispensable factor for development and also advocating for vital societal changes pertaining to social justices and equality issues that affects migrant communities in their host countries and developmental challenges facing their home countries.

An example to illustrate diaspora social remittances within the context of developing countries is India, which initiated its non-resident permit to facilitate the return and settlements of its qualified diaspora. This initiative was set-up to engage the diaspora in India has multiplied at both the central government and state level. At the national level, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), established in 2004, has several special

⁴⁵ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development: applying concepts to West Africa.p.5

⁴⁶ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Art.cit. p.5

⁴⁷ Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press.p.20

⁴⁸ Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist, eds. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*. Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

⁴⁹ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001.p.7

programmes for overseas Indians⁵⁰. Initially called the Ministry of Non-Resident Indian's Affairs, its rapid name change within a year of its inception reflects the desire of India to tap into the resources of its entire diaspora, and not just Indian national's resident abroad. Two of its most successful schemes have been the introduction of a form of flexible citizenship that almost approximates the benefits of full dual nationality⁵¹. These change of nationality legislation by the Indian Authorities is not just to attract financial remittances from its overseas citizens but also to attract social remittances by including the dimension of ethnicity as a means of attracting second, third and fourth generations of Indians to their "motherland"⁵².

China, in recent years, has aggressively courted its highly skilled scientific diaspora, offering highly competitive salaries and working conditions to returnees⁵³. This approach has yielded success, in attracting a significant number of "sea turtles" as returnees are known, back into Chinese universities and research parks⁵⁴. They have also been very successful in attracting ethnic Chinese as well⁵⁵. China's massive brain drain (it is estimated that nearly 2 million Chinese students have gone overseas since the late 1970's, combined with its rapidly aging population; by the year 2050 a third of China's population will be over 60), has encouraged the government to introduce extraordinary measures in order to tempt its knowledge diaspora back⁵⁶. China's flagship programmes for attracting overseas talent are known as "1000 Talents", launched in 2008 in collaboration with governments at the provincial level, who provide half of the salary⁵⁷. This programme offers high-level academic positions to senior Chinese scholars with PhD's earned overseas at salaries up to 20 times higher than what local faculty members⁵⁸. The emphasis on return and serving "zuguo" of the mother country is emphasised across the board: a condition of national PhD scholarships granted to Chinese nationals to study

⁵⁰ Kylie Eischen, Chapter 4: Immigrants globalization of the Indian economy, p.74, in Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press.

⁵¹CARIM-India Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-ASN2012-01.pdf>

⁵² Kylie Eischen, (2013) 'Immigrants globalization of the Indian economy' in Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press. p.74,

⁵³ Min. Ye, (2013) "Miracle" in their Homeland' in: Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press. p52

⁵⁴ ibidem

⁵⁵CARIM-India Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-ASN2012-01.pdf>

⁵⁶ Min. Ye, (2013) "Miracle" in their Homeland' in: Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press. p52

⁵⁷ ibidem

⁵⁸ Ibidem

abroad is that they return to China after the completion of their studies for a minimum of two years to “serve the mother country”⁵⁹. China has created an extensive national network of entrepreneurship incubation centres for returnee entrepreneurs, as well as Special Economic Zones with special investment terms for the overseas Chinese business Community⁶⁰. Both these investments and innovation infrastructures have been instrumental in promoting both FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and entrepreneur returnees in China⁶¹.

The above policies show that China and India governments are keen to exploit as much as possible, the resources of their global diasporas, particularly their business and knowledge diasporas, in order to promote “brain circulation” and reap investment benefits. Cognisant of the fact that they cannot prevent their citizens from leaving, they are nonetheless determined, particularly in the case of China, to actively court their return, and above all to secure their emotional engagement with the “homeland” from afar. The diaspora policies of India and China demonstrate that:

- 1) although the absolute numbers of their knowledge diasporas may be small in relation to the overall size of the diaspora, (which is in general the case of most diaspora, except the case of Cape Verdian and Lebanese diaspora, whereby the percentage of nationals outside of their countries are higher than those at home) their contribution to the domestic economy can be highly disproportionate and
- 2) in order to attenuate the effects of the negative impact of brain drain, it is possible for origin countries to promote diaspora engagement policies through employing a variety of modes of flexible citizenship that allows their global diasporas to contribute without being permanent residents⁶².

Another example from an institutional standpoint on home countries looking to their diaspora as an asset and developmental partners was in the late 1990s, when the government of Mexico took the decision to invest in communication with its diaspora, which later led to the creation of a migration desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

⁵⁹ ibidem

⁶⁰ Ibidem

⁶¹ Ibidem

⁶²CARIM-India Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-ASN2012-01.pdf>

2002⁶³. The ministry worked closely with diaspora organizations such as the well-known *Tres por Uno* (3x1) programme, through which three levels of government match contributions of migrant Home Town Association organizations to infrastructure projects in their communities of origin⁶⁴.

An example to demonstrate how home country government tapping into their diaspora resources is the Thailand Reverse Brain Drain project, with the goal of using intelligence and connections of Thai professionals living overseas to help in Thailand's development, particularly in the sciences and technology sectors⁶⁵. There is also the Filipino Brain Gain Network, the goal of the project is to provide convenient platform for the diaspora to network and start new companies in the Philippines⁶⁶.

On the African continent, countries such as Mali and Senegal, have also had a long history of initiating policies to tap into their overseas diaspora resources for the purposes of national development. The example of Mali, through the UN TOKTEN (UNESCO also participated in the programme) which managed to invite expatriate Malian visiting professors from Europe, North America and Africa to fill urgent teaching and research positions in a wide range of fields which the country is in deficit ⁶⁷. Senegal on the other hand, since its independence in 1960, has automatically granted dual citizenship rights to its citizens as a means of including the diaspora in national affairs⁶⁸. The example of the first president of Senegal Léopold Sédar Senghor, who held dual citizenships of France and Senegal when he became president, this detail demonstrates that Senegal's policies and tolerance of its oversea citizens to acquire dual citizenship started as early as post-independence era ⁶⁹. An example of such was the enactment of the 1961 *Code de la Nationalité*, which stipulates the following: *le code de la nationalité prévoit dans son article premier que toute personne née sur le territoire sénégalais est sénégalaise si l'un des parents est également né sur le territoire; en outre, l'article fait supposer que c'est*

⁶³ David Scott Fitzgerald (2013) 'Immigrant impacts in Mexico: A Tale of Dissimilation', in Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press. p115

⁶⁴Rannveig Agunias and Newland. K 2012, Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diaspora in development, International Organisation for Migration and the Migratory Policy Institute p.30

⁶⁵ Ibidem

⁶⁶Ibidem

⁶⁷Johnson, B. and Sedaca, S., 2004. Diasporas, emigrés and development, economic linkages and programmatic responses. *CARANA–United States Agency for International Development*. 60.61

⁶⁸ Whitaker, B.E., 2011. The politics of home: Dual citizenship and the African diaspora. *International Migration Review*, 45(4), p.783.

⁶⁹ Whitaker, B.E., 2011. art.cit. pp.766

également le cas si la personne est dans les faits considérée comme un Sénégalais par d'autres (la personne a, dit-on, la possession d'état de national). À titre transitoire, le droit d'opter pour la nationalité sénégalaise a été également accordé à toutes les personnes originaires des anciens territoires de l'AOF et de l'AEF, du Togo, du Cameroun et du Madagascar⁷⁰. The enactment of the Senegalese Code de la Nationalité, implies that it is not rigid. The initiation of the *Haut Conseil des Seneglais de l'exterieur* established in 1995 which served as a platform to liaise between Senegalese at home and abroad ⁷¹. This has also facilitated the Senegalese government's effort in courting Senegalese diaspora's financial contribution to national development through projects in small businesses and start-up initiatives⁷². Nigeria also exemplifies this quest for home countries need to tap into their diaspora's resources, this is demonstrated by the Nigerian government efforts in acknowledging the contributions that Nigerians in the diaspora make towards national development, through financial remittances. This has resulted in the government effort to consult with Nigerians abroad on matters pertaining to their citizenship and their transnational voting rights ⁷³.

The government of Ghana's efforts to include its diaspora population in politics and policy making, saw the enactment of the Dual Citizenship Act in 2000, but it only took effect in 2002⁷⁴. It was to allow Ghanaians in the diaspora to have the right to possess another nationality in addition to their Ghanaian Nationality, which up until 2002, Ghanaians were not allowed to hold dual citizenship⁷⁵. The granting of dual citizenship also equated to extending voting rights to Ghanaians abroad, which in effect was to recognize the contribution to national development of overseas Ghanaians not only through their economic contribution via remittances, but to accord the diaspora their legal and constitutional rights to vote outside of the country⁷⁶. These notable examples above are to illustrate the importance that origin countries now place on attracting oversea diaspora and professionals in particular to return and participate in national

⁷⁰ Manby, B., 2015. La nationalité, la migration et l'apatridie en Afrique de l'Ouest'. Report pp.12

⁷¹ Whitaker, B.E., 2011. The politics of home: dual citizenship and the African diaspora. *International Migration Review*, 45(4), pp.766

⁷² Mishra, Santosh Kumar. "Mobilizing Diaspora Entrepreneurship for International Development Initiatives." (2015).

⁷³ Whitaker, B.E., 2011. Art.cit. p.759

⁷⁴ Djaba, G. 2008 "Dual Citizenship: The Benefits of Dual Citizenship to the Socio-Economic and Political Development of Ghana." *Modern Ghana*. Available at <http://www.modernghana.com/news/181803/50/dual-citizenship-the-benefits-of-dual-citizenship-.html> (Accessed January 4, 2011).

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Ibid

development. With this backdrop in mind, it has been noted that most countries in the developing world are viewing their diaspora as partners in development, and no longer as a threat to national security and peace, hence the need to adopt policies that facilitates their return, as exemplified by Chinese, Indian, Mexico, Thai, Filipino, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana and other developing countries cases. Subsequent chapters in this thesis will examine what these policies means, to who, and how it is articulated in terms of its implementation phases.

The proposed hypothesis of this thesis on the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, transnational political engagement towards Accra is as follows: a) the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and their transnational political engagement towards Accra from London is strongly linked to their identity construction and their process of integration in London b) transnational political participation of Ghanaians in London is either tied to lack of full integration in London; or c) Ghanaian diaspora transnational political engagement is motivated both by individual and collective interest of its members within the context of transnational political activities among Ghanaians in London; d) transnational voting rights of Ghanaians living abroad is highly politicised and depends on which party is in government; and e) returnee Ghanaians constitute the political elites in Ghana yet the advocacy for transnational diaspora vote has been delayed, as the implementation of the Representation of People's Amendment Act which was voted in Parliament in 2006 meant to accord Ghanaian diaspora their transnational political franchise is yet to be implemented.

This thesis will therefore attempt to answer these hypotheses by addressing the following questions:

Does participating in UK politics from a conventional and direct manner such as voting in the UK by Ghanaian expatriates in London, a form of full integration in their host country? Or full integration motivates political participation? What are the connections between the construction of a Ghanaian diaspora identity among first-and-second-generation Ghanaians and political engagement in UK politics? Is there a correlation between political engagement in London, identity formation in the diaspora and their integration process? Is participation in the host country political process motivated by not being eligible to vote transnationally towards homeland politics? Who participates in politics in the UK and transnationally towards Ghana and why? How do they participate in both host and home country politics? Does transnational political engagement foster the formation of a long-term political

diaspora identity and political class of Ghanaians in living in London via the acquisition of various forms of capitals? Is it a political strategy not to implement the transnational diaspora vote? Or is it that Ghanaians in the diaspora themselves do not collectively advocate for this right? Or it is a combination of both? And finally, what indirect means do members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London employ to engage in transnational political activities as a result of the ROPA amendment not being implemented to accord Ghanaians living abroad their political franchise?

Part one of the thesis is divided into three chapters and sub-chapters. Chapter one focuses on the literature review, theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis project. Chapter two focuses on the history of various waves of Gold Coast and Ghanaian migration to the UK, followed by Commonwealth emigration waves to the UK, and the formation of a collective ethnic minority identity and how that is connected to the construction of the Ghanaian diaspora identity in London. Chapter three examines the mapping of Ghanaian migration in the UK, the location of the Ghanaian community in London and process of the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation both collectively and individually.

Part two deals with the political making of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and the Sociological categorisation of the Ghanaian diaspora: social classification and political participation in UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana. To this end, part two is divided into five main chapters and sub chapters, with chapter one examining the shift from migrant to diaspora and how that serves as a political identity and economic resources for Ghanaian diaspora's contribution to the development of both host and home countries. This analysis on the shift from migrant to diaspora will be viewed from the lenses of social composition, resources and networks which forms the Ghanaian diaspora in London. How these social compositions contribute to the making of a distinctive identity and political class among Ghanaian diaspora despite their social disparities and strata. In this chapter we will also discuss whether there is such a thing as a political identity and a political class based on diasporisation? If so, can they stand alone as a consolidated political class and political force upon their return to Ghana?

Chapter two focuses on the political mobilization and the political engagement of the

Ghanaian diaspora in London, particularly political participation of second-generation Anglo-Ghanaians participation in UK politics and the transnational political engagement of first generation-Ghanaians towards Accra, Ghana. By assessing the strategies employed by the Ghanaian diaspora in their quest for long distance political participation in host country as a sign of full integration. Chapter two also aims at assessing the idea that transnational political practices in the diaspora is motivated by the quest to fill in the void of not being able to participate in homeland politics. Chapter three addresses the notion of return migration and political engagement in Ghana. How returnees are utilizing their accumulated capitals in the diaspora and converting it into a political and economic asset once they are back in Ghana. As such this chapter will further examine the ways in which returnees use their acquired knowledge and expertise to engage in politics in Ghana, and their economic role in Ghana's development through the classification of various types of returnees. What are the challenges these returnees face in their re-integration back into the Ghanaian society? Chapter four seeks to analyse the impact of return migration as the panacea to the formation of Ghana's middle class via the lenses of expatriation and returnees to the ties of political stability and economic growth. The focus of this chapter is to discuss the ties between middle class and economic growth, how does that translate into politics by highlighting on the idea that Ghanaian political elites are being derived through expatriation of Ghanaians abroad. Chapter five seeks to analyse the fusion between political mobilization in the UK and in Ghana. The strategies and similarities that the Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnees in Accra use to build and maintain their social capitals in both locations. Chapter five also examines whether political diaspora returnees pose a menace to Ghana's democratic consolidation?

PART I: FRAMEWORK OF THE MAKING OF A DIASPORA: THE FORMING OF A DIASPORA IDENTITY

To understand the historical account and the process of the making of the Ghanaian diaspora community in London and process of forming a collective identity. Part one

is divided into three chapters and sub-chapters, chapter one focuses on literature review, theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. Chapter two focuses on the history of various waves of Gold Coast and Ghanaian migration to the UK. Followed by commonwealth emigration waves to the UK, and the formation of a collective ethnic minority identity and how that is connected to the construction of the Ghanaian diaspora identity in London. Chapter three examines the mapping of Ghanaian migration in the UK, the location of the Ghanaian community in London and process of the Ghanaian diaspora collective identity formation.

Chapter 1 Theoretical and the Methodological framework: General literature review of diaspora concept

Defining the term diaspora from a social sciences perspective takes various interpretations. Different scholars have their own criteria and parameters for defining the term diaspora. Historically the term diaspora made reference to the Greek and Jewish diaspora, the term originates from Greek *diaspora* (*dias*, meaning “through”, and *pora*, which refers to the process of sowing)⁷⁷. The implication of ‘through’ in the first part of the definition also gives a metaphorical sense of the movement aspects of diaspora, that is “through different routes⁷⁸”. The term ‘diaspora’ is found in the Greek translation of the Bible and originates in the words ‘to sow widely’⁷⁹. For the Greeks, the expression was used to describe the colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean in the Archaic period (800–600 BC). Although there was some displacement of the ancient Greeks to Asia Minor as a result of poverty, over-population and inter-state war, ‘diaspora’ essentially had a positive connotation⁸⁰. Expansion through plunder, military conquest, colonization and migration were the predominant features of the Greek diaspora⁸¹. The Jewish diaspora is referred to that of the exile of Jews from the Holy Land and their dispersal throughout several parts of the globe⁸². Diaspora [galut] connoted deracination, legal disabilities, oppression, and

⁷⁷ Safran, W., 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora: A journal of transnational studies*, 1(1), p.89.

⁷⁸Cohen, R. (1997) *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, London: UCL Press and Seattle: University of Washington Press. Reprinted 1999,

⁷⁹ Cohen, R., 1996. Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers. *International affairs*, 72(3), p.507.

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Safran, W., 2005. The Jewish diaspora in a comparative and theoretical perspective. *Israel studies*, 10(1), p.36

an often-painful adjustment to a hostland whose hospitality was unreliable and ephemeral⁸³. It also connoted the existence on foreign soil of an expatriate community that considered its presence to be transitory. Meanwhile, it developed a set of institutions, social patterns, and ethnonational and/or religious symbols that held it together⁸⁴. These included the language, religion, values, social norms, and narratives of the homeland. Gradually, this community adjusted to the hostland environment and became itself a centre of cultural creation⁸⁵. All the while, however, it continued to cultivate the idea of return to the homeland⁸⁶. The above statements therefore explain why the Greek and the Jewish diaspora are considered the oldest diaspora because of the religious reference of their dispersion.

In Roger Brubaker's (2005) pioneer work on the notion of diaspora he noted in his book: "*The diaspora*" where he provides a critique on the increasing usage of the term diaspora, which designates migrant communities abroad. He points out that during the 1970s, the word '*diaspora*' and its cognates appeared as keywords only once or twice a year in dissertation abstracts, while the late 1980s, it appeared on average 13 times a year, and by the year 2001 alone, nearly 130 times.


⁸³ ibid

⁸⁴ ibid

⁸⁵ ibid

⁸⁶ ibid

Figure 0-1: Box 1: Evolution of Diaspora studies 1970s-2000s⁸⁷



Brubaker warned that this rapid dispersion of the term into many disciplinary discourses was stretching and diluting its meaning. He identified the journal *Diaspora* as ‘a key vehicle for the proliferation of academic diaspora talk’ but added that even its editor Khachig Tölölyan worried that diaspora ‘is in danger of becoming a promiscuously capacious category⁸⁸.’ The first issue of *Diaspora* appeared at the end of May 1991. In its introductory essay of that issue, states that the ‘semantic domain’ of the term ‘diaspora’ was being ‘share(d)’ with such terms as ‘migrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile, overseas community and ethnic community’ and that diasporas had become ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational movement’⁸⁹.’ This to him are the old diasporas, just like nations, which were being reshaped and new ones formed by the accelerating mobility across state-borders of people, money, and cultural products such as information, ideas, images and music. Ever since, other scholars ranging from

⁸⁷ Brubaker, R., 2005. The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 28(1), p.1-19.

⁸⁸See, Tölölyan K. 2012, Diaspora studies Past, present and promise, Working Papers, Paper 55, University of Oxford, International Migration Institute

⁸⁹Tölölyan K. 2012, art.cit p.50

Dominique Schnapper (2006) to Oliver Bakewell (2008) have noted and observed the further crowding of diaspora's semantic domain. Such crowding is not merely additive, but transformative. As Ferdinand de Saussure once pointed out in 1916, no term has its meaning independently, but rather acquires it in its relationship to, and nuanced difference from, related to others. Consequently, since the late 1960s, 'diaspora' has come to mean what it does in its imbrications with the terms such as transnationalism, globalization, migrancy, ethnicity, exile, the post-colonial and the nation⁹⁰. Since the 1980s, the changing meanings of 'belonging' and 'citizenship' have further complicated the conceptual situation⁹¹. Until the 1930s, the social formations known as 'diasporas' consisted of a network of communities, at times sedentary and at others quite mobile, that lived in often involuntary dispersion from their homelands and that resisted full assimilation or were denied the option of assimilating, or both at the same time⁹². Many of them existed in lamentable and precarious conditions, glorified by no one in an era when the nation state was the supreme form of polity, and diasporicity could mean second-class citizenship⁹³. In this earlier period, scholars confined the term 'diaspora' to just three groups: Jews, the paradigmatic case; Armenians (since the eleventh century); and Greeks. (Parenthetically) Transatlantic diaspora (the Afro-American and Caribbean diaspora)⁹⁴.

For many decades, diaspora was typically defined as something of a context in which people 'scattered as a result of a traumatic historical event' (Cohen 1993:5). The notion of violence as a traumatic collective experience was an inescapable element of the definition (exemplified by the Jewish and Armenian diaspora) as were the sentimental and emotional links to the home country and a strong sense of belonging⁹⁵. Most of these definitions suggested that populations were dispersed between two or more host countries⁹⁶. When discussed in this traditional sense, diaspora refers to all extreme cases of dispersion, example Palestinians, Tamils and Kurds, but does not include other forms

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵ Cohen, R., 1992. The diaspora of a diaspora: the case of the Caribbean. *Social Science Information*, 31(1), p. 159.

⁹⁶ Ibid

of contemporary migratory experiences, such as economic migrants or students (Sheffer 2003: 33).

The classic definition of diaspora rests basically on Sheffer's (1986) three proposed criteria: the dispersed group must hold a distinctive and collective identity across international locations; the group must have some internal organization of its own; the group in dispersion must keep ties with homeland, be it symbolic or real⁹⁷. Adjustment to changing realities allowed for modifications of this understanding of diaspora, first by introducing a notion of voluntary migration as in the case of Sheffer's *ethno-national* diaspora (1995:9) or Cohen *diasporic communities* (1997); and second by easing the requirement of internal organization, as proposed by Cohen, for whom its collective identity that keeps diaspora together in contemporary times. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has succeeded in reformulating the definition, and framing of diaspora as almost any *population* on the move and no longer referring to the specific *context* of their existence (Schnapper 1999; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Castles and Miller 2003). Table 1 below shows the evolving nature of defining the term diaspora.

Table 1 : Different definitions and evolution of the term diaspora

Author	Dates	Diaspora definition	Populations
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⁹⁷ Sheffer, G., 1986. A new field of study: Modern diasporas in international politics. *Modern diasporas in international politics*, p.8.

Gabriel Sheffer	(1986); (2003)	He defines diaspora as: created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as one of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homeland and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries.	Jews, the paradigmatic case; Armenians (since the eleventh century); and Greeks. (Parenthetically) Transatlantic diaspora (the Afro-American and Caribbean diaspora) ⁹⁸ . Palestinians, Tamils and Kurds
Robin Cohen	1993	Defined diaspora as people 'scattered as a result of a traumatic historical event'. The notion of violence as a traumatic collective experience was an inescapable element of the definition	Jewish and Armenian
William Safran	(1991)	Defined diaspora as <i>ethnic minority communities</i> , as opposed to <i>migrant communities</i> focusing thereby more on the degree of settlement of the group. He proposed several indicators to define diaspora including the triadic relationship of the communities and homeland, a host	Jewish, Kurds, African American and African Caribbean etc

⁹⁸See, Tölölyan K. 2012, art.cit p.52

		country or other countries of diaspora settlement ⁹⁹	
Steven Vertovec	1999	Defined diaspora as shared memory, vision and myth of the homeland, alienation from the host country and permanence of the ‘myth of return’ ¹⁰⁰	Jewish, Armenian, African American and Caribbeans
Dominique Schnapper, Vertovec and Cohen Castles and Miller	1999 2003	Schanpper 1999 ¹⁰¹ ; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Castles and Miller 2003, succeeded in reformulating the definition, and framing of diaspora as almost any <i>population</i> on the move and no longer referring to the specific <i>context</i> of their existence ¹⁰²	

⁹⁹ Safran, W., 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora: A journal of transnational studies*, 1(1), pp.83-99.


¹⁰⁰ Vertovec, S., 1999. Conceiving and researching transnationalism. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 22(2), pp.452

¹⁰¹ Schnapper, D. and Davis, D.L., 1999. From the nation-state to the transnational world: On the meaning and usefulness of diaspora as a concept. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 8(3), p.225.

¹⁰² Ibid

Van Hear, Peike and Vertovec	2004	For Van Hear, Peike and Vertovec proposes a homogeneous form of diaspora definition: <i>Populations of migrants' origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which they develop multifarious links involving flows and changes of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries.</i>	
William Safran	1991	William Safran (1991) defined diaspora as <i>ethnic minority communities</i> , as opposed to <i>migrant communities</i> focusing thereby more on the degree of settlement of the group.	
Vertovec	1999	He proposed a number of indicators to define diaspora including the triadic relationship of the communities and homeland, a host country or other countries of diaspora settlement as well as shared memory, vision and myth of the homeland, alienation from the host country and permanence of the 'myth of return'.	

Figure 0-2 Causes of diasporisation



In contemporary transnational migrant communities, diasporic involvement can range from the exclusive maintenance of family ties with the homeland to the establishment of political connections. Orozco (Orozco 2005) observes that “diasporas do not emerge solely as a consequence of dispersion, common national ancestry, or simply any kind of connection. There is a process by which groups are motivated or influenced to become diasporas” (Orozco 2005). Orozco uses the case study of Latinos in the United States to illustrate the process by which groups are influenced in becoming diaspora or the emergence of a group as diaspora. To further explain the process which motivates groups into becoming diaspora, he uses his own and de la Garza’s case study research on Latinos and their links to their homelands to demonstrate the four critical factors that enables the formation of a group into a diaspora (de la Garza and Orozco 2000) This process is as follows:

- i) the level of community – and in particular elite and activist – consciousness about the needs for a link with a homeland, ii) whether the homeland government is encouraging diasporic identification or links, iii) the perception of emigrants by the society in their

homeland, i.e. outreach policies by government in homeland countries and, finally, iv) the relationship between the homeland and host governments, on the relationships between source and destination countries¹⁰³. Among national or ethnic migrant groups an appeal to the values or interests common to those of the ancestral homeland can occur. Such an appeal or demand will depend on whether a leader or members of the community (due to some experience with the homeland or with enforcing their values or identities) find it is to the best of their interest or identity to identify with the homeland¹⁰⁴. When exile groups, for example, look for the support of the migrant community they have found it necessary to appeal to values and interests of the homeland¹⁰⁵. Even minorities, whose nexus with a homeland is rather symbolic or historically distant, may find it to their interest to appeal to common values with that homeland. This is for example the case of third generation Mexican - Americans whose ancestry is rooted in California or Texas. Invoking the homeland can increase economic or political interests that benefit their own resources. This implies that by associating with Mexican culture in the case of third generation Mexican-Americans, aspiring for political role in the US enable them to gain support from the large Mexican community in the US through invoking homeland links. For Sheffer (2003) there are basically, now two theoretical approaches to current diasporism. One approach which is called “Transnational Communities” views diasporas as imagined transnational communities, espousing deterritorialised identities and robustly influenced by post-modern, globalized, hybridizing processes, and economic developments. The main argument of this school of thought, is that diaspora entities lose their ties to their homelands and exist as independent communities in the new global environment, examples such as the Italian and Greek diaspora in America demonstrates this approach¹⁰⁶.

Currently there is a growing awareness and understanding that diasporas are neither purely “imagined” nor utterly “constructed” communities. This is because diasporas’ identities are intricate combinations of non-essentialist primordial, psychological/mythical, and instrumental elements¹⁰⁷. Over time, the cultural and social

¹⁰³ Orozco, M., 2007. Conceptualizing diasporas: Remarks about the Latino and Caribbean experience. *Living across worlds: Diaspora, development and transnational engagement*. Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM). p.6

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

¹⁰⁶ Sheffer, G., 2003. *Diaspora politics: At home abroad*. Cambridge University Press.p.128

¹⁰⁷ Sheffer, G., 2003. *Op.cit.* p.128

identities of these entities may undergo certain adaptations to changing circumstances in both their host lands and homelands, but basic elements in their ethno-national identity remain intact. Sheffer further proposes a definition of diasporas as a “*socio-political formation*”, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as one of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homeland and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries” (Sheffer 2003:10-11). Sheffer (2003) further argues that for political scientist the term diaspora implies the following: *Groups of persons of the same ethno-national origin who themselves, or their ancestors, voluntarily or under coercion migrated from one place to another, or to several other places, settled in these other places, invent and maintain their identity and various kinds of contacts with their place of origin, which could be real or imagined*¹⁰⁸. This definition puts more emphasis on the community and belonging to a group with links to home country than institutional definition which mainly places more importance on the individual and their links to home.

Van Hear, Peike and Vertovec (2004:3) on the one hand, provide an all-encompassing definition on the shift from migrant into becoming a diaspora: *Populations of migrants origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which they develop multifarious links involving flows and changes of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries*. This formulation makes diaspora hardly disguisable from a transnational perspective of migrant communities (Vertovec 1999). Gilck-Schiller (1999) on the other hand, observes that transnational communities link to homeland, can be said to be that migrant community whose members engage freely in real networks ties to their home country tend to maintain transnational links and, in that process, turning them in diaspora communities through their transnational linkages. This relationship is either mythical or visionary; it is lived through practices of everyday life.

The field of political science views the term ‘diaspora’ as often referring to the aspect of political engagement among certain groups and their process of their re-identification

¹⁰⁸Sheffer. G,2003, *Diaspora Politics: At home abroad*, Cambridge University Press, New York pp.65

(Koinova, 2010). This is to indicate that diaspora political engagement could be linked to this era of democratisation and globalization. For example, diaspora links to homelands experiencing internal or external challenges to their sovereignty would be more significant because these challenges make them more prone to act on the nationalist or radicalist side of the political spectrum¹⁰⁹. This also implies that the narrative of living in a “global village” through the usage of the internet has provided an avenue for diaspora to engage politically within the democratic process of their homelands. This also allows them to challenge homeland’s political process from afar and in turn diaspora are being viewed as a threat to national sovereignty, because diasporas are viewed as liberal creed to what social sciences refer to as ‘strong test’ this can be said of the Eritrean case ¹¹⁰. In the sphere of political practices, diaspora is presented as an overarching cognitive framework of sometimes very diverse groups (Brubaker 1996, 2005). It seems as though, *‘diaspora has moved out of the realm of abstract nouns and become a mot-clé’* to indicate quite concrete, albeit diverse concepts, such as diasporic communities, diaspora organizations and individual members of the diaspora possibly all at the same time (Brubaker 2005; De Haas 2006). For Tölölyan ‘diasporas’ are those communities of the dispersed who develop varieties of associations that endure at least into their third generations¹¹¹.

Safran further proposes a definition in the frame and process of turning migrants into diaspora, he views diaspora as: *expatriate’s minority communities, leaving their homeland and moving to at least two peripheral ‘places’*. *While their experience of the host nation is one of alienation, it is the relationship with the homeland that defines their diasporic identity and hence moving from being a migrant into a diaspora. Not only do they maintain some vision, myth, memory of their homeland and a commitment to restore or maintain it, but they also conceptualise the homeland as the place of eventual return. It is this relationship with the homeland that defines their consciousness and solidarity (Safran, 1991:83-84)*. In this account the three core elements identified as constitutive of the migrant as a diaspora are: dispersion

¹⁰⁹ Rainer. B and Faist Thomas 2010, *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, Amsterdam University Press pp. 154.

¹¹⁰ Rainer B. and Faist T 2010, art. Cit pp.155

¹¹¹See, Tölölyan K. 2012, art.cit p.52

in space, orientation to homeland and boundary maintenance (Cohen, 1996; Safran, 1991; Tölölyan, 1991)

1.1.1 Defining Diaspora from the French School of thought

Safran equally observes that the French and francophone school of thoughts on diaspora studies is relatively recent as compared to Anglophone literature. He notes that most of the works by French or Francophone authors on the topic of diaspora, are drawn from various disciplines for example: geographers such as Michel Bruneau, Yves Lacoste and Georges Prévélakis; sociologist Dominique Schnapper; Denys Cuhe and Stéphane Dufoix; Caribbeanist Christine Chivallon; anthropologist Martine Hovanessian; Pierre George and Anglicist Richard Marienstras. Dominique Schnapper, who is among the most empirically minded and politically astute among this group of French diaspora specialist. Schnapper places much emphasises on the importance of both the institutional and the cultural aspects of diaspora, but she neglects neither the element of dispersion nor that of inscriptively based on communitarian and extra political relationships. From this postulate, Dufoix draws attention to the fact that for many years, French scholarly interest in the field of diaspora studies tended to be limited to those of the Jews and Africans, and only secondarily to the Armenians and Chinese¹¹². Since the 1980s French scholars have become increasingly sensitized to the diaspora as a social reality, because their country has become an important host of displaced ethnic and religious minority communities¹¹³. Dufoix, a sociologist, who devotes a great amount of his work on the institutional aspects of diaspora and points to the importance of host land conditions that influences the creation of a locally specific universe distinguished from that of the homeland¹¹⁴. He refers to several established ethno-national communities, such as Chinatowns, Little India's, and Little Italy's, especially in urban settings within advanced industrial states. Essentially composed of immigrants and or their descendants, these communities are "diasporic" in nature because they constitute identifiable enclaves within a host society and because there is a demographic density that facilitates the maintenance of appropriate institutions.

¹¹² McDowell J & Hostetler B, 1998, *The New Tolerance*, Carol Stream IL: Tyndale House, p. 208.

¹¹³ Safran.W. 2003, Recent French conceptualisation of diaspora, *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, Number 3, Winter, (Review), Toronto University Press p.32

¹¹⁴Safran.W. 2003, art.cit. p. 35

These communities are part of what Arjun Appadurai has called an “ethnoscape”¹¹⁵ that is transnational and in which non-governmental organizations play a role in addition to that of host lands and homelands. This ethno-space is widened by the increasing tempo of migration, rapid globalisation, and a growing permeability of political boundaries that makes possible continuing interchanges among diasporas and between them and their countries of origin. To illustrate the growth of this ethno-space, Dufoix provides statistics on migration, in particular that of Africans, Chinese, Jews, and Kurds in France. Stéphan Dufoix tends to take a critical view on the way the term diaspora is utilized as a homogeneous factor. He is rather interested in the process of formation and of the construction of this identity than their internal difference. He notes : *le cas de diaspora fonctionnant sur un « mode antagonistique » et constituant une « exopolite », c'est-à-dire « un espace politique à la fois national et trans-étatique formé par les groupes refusant de reconnaître la légitimité du régime en place dans leur pays d'origine ou considérant que leur pays ou leur terre d'origine est sous occupation étrangère »* (Dufoix 2003 : 72-73).

Chivallon on other hand defines the notion of African diaspora from the Caribbean perspectives, *“la définition du terme diaspora à un assez grand consensus. Elle s'appuie sur la reconnaissance du maintien par-delà la dispersion d'une identité culturelle, résultat d'une conscience d'appartenance à une collectif qui renforce une collectivité d'histoire douloureuse comme fondateur”*¹¹⁶ ». For Chivallon, it is the collective consciences of cultural belonging based on a painful historical past that sets the basis for the definition of the Caribbean diaspora, as she also refers to the notion of hybridity that has formed this diaspora which she distinguishes clearly from the central model. For Michel Bruneau, who provides a definition of diaspora from a geographical standpoint of: *space, place and territory. Bruneau hypothesis*

¹¹⁵ Appadurai, A., 1996. Global ethnoscaes: Notes and queries for a transnational anthropology.

Ethno-scope definition: Ethnoscape characterizes the landscape of persons who make up the shifting world – as culture areas become no longer tightly territorialized spatially bounded and culturally homogenous spaces becomes harder to identify distinct cultures. Home is re-imagined.

¹¹⁶Chivallon, C, 1997, De quelques préconstruits de la notion de diaspora à partir de l'exemple antillais, Revue européenne de migrations internationales, Année 1997, Volume 13, Numéro 1p. 149 – 160

Chivallon's posit on the definition of African diaspora puts much emphasis on the Caribbean experience of slave trade and the trauma that is linked to this diaspora and collective sense of belonging. The Ghanaian diaspora is not defined by a collective trauma linked to the experience of slave trade. I defined the Ghanaian diaspora as a voluntary form of migration, so this form of emigration could be forced at some stage depending on what led to their emigration process.

*that the related concepts of diaspora and transnational community could be applied to different types of trans-border or transnational societies and thus help improve our understanding of different spatial and temporal processes involved*¹¹⁷. Bruneau further highlighted that: *“for a diaspora to be able to live and on by transmitting its identity from one generation to the other, it must have a place for periodic gathering of a religious, cultural or political nature in which it can concentrate on the main element of its ‘iconography’”*¹¹⁸.

As indicated above, French scholars in the field of diaspora studies are for the most part geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists rather than specialists in literary or cultural studies, and it is perhaps for that reason that the postmodern approach is underrepresented in France. The absences and underrepresentation of postmodern approach in cultural studies in France, is interpreted by other disciplines scepticism of Postmodernism approach, as they are of the view, that there is no such thing as truth. In other words, the truth is at the same time constructed and deconstructed as highlighted by Derrida and Foucault, as this perspective is present within the realms of philosophy which cannot be transplanted in the field of geography, anthropology and sociology¹¹⁹.

Josh McDowell and Bob Hostetler offer the following definition of postmodernism: *“A worldview characterized by the belief that truth doesn’t exist in any objective sense but is created rather than discovered. ... Truth is created by the specific culture and exists only in that culture”*¹²⁰. Therefore, any system or statement that tries to communicate truth is a power play, an effort to dominate other cultures¹²¹. Since most scholars of diaspora studies in France are mostly geographers, anthropologist and sociologist, the idea that truth does not exist and therefore constructed could be a handicap in terms of research findings within the fields of cultural studies.

From the vantage point of some of these scholars, notably anthropologists and specialists in cultural studies, diaspora is a label that can be applied to almost any subculture. Postmodernists go even further in this regard: for them, diaspora is not

¹¹⁷Bauböck R. and Faist T, 2010, *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, Amsterdam University press, Chapter 2 *Diaspora, transnational spaces and communities* by Michel Bruneau

¹¹⁸Bauböck R. and Faist T, 2010, op.cit p. 37

¹¹⁹ Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. eds., 2010. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*. Amsterdam University Press.p.46

¹²⁰ McDowell, J. and McDowell, S., 2017. *Evidence that demands a verdict: Life-changing truth for a skeptical world*. Thomas Nelson.

¹²¹ McDowell J & Hostetler B, 1998, art.cit.209

a reflection of empirical reality (i.e., dispersion and its aftermath) as observed earlier on, but a metaphor for a collective identity, often enough an alienated one, developed as a consequence of imperialism, slavery, or some other tragic experience¹²². For some postmodernists, diaspora need not connote anything negative at all; on the contrary, it may reflect an “imaginary” based on a happy sort of hybridity¹²³. Much of this position is subsumed under Dufoix’s category of the “oxymoronic.” According to such a definition, which is embraced by, *inter alia*, Stuart Hall, James Clifford, and Paul Gilroy’s, diaspora has little, if anything, to do with dispersion and everything to do with a sense of being different from the surrounding social or cultural norms and with a form of consciousness and a process of cultural creation in which a connection with the homeland of origin is irrelevant¹²⁴. Moreover, while subculture is important, it is not necessarily one marked by ethnicity or religion¹²⁵. To this effect, what these scholars in these fields aims to demonstrate is unearthing what is real facts with empirical evidence and to a large extent the “truth”. This therefore means that diaspora studies, cannot be seen as something that is abstract from reality, implying that it is intertwined with empirical evidence, which therefore explains its absences within cultural studies in France. This is reflected in the works of French postmodernist scholars such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard who have all championed postmodernist approach by highlighting the relationships between power and reality and its inter play in various aspect of societal and institutional setting i.e. hospitals, universities and prisons. The interplays between power and reality exist within the field of diaspora studies, it is nonetheless not the only central construe of this field of social sciences which is more concentrated in the relationship between the centre and the periphery. In other words, the continues inter change that constitutes the forming of diaspora identity within the periphery and links to the centre.

In the field of diaspora studies, particularly with reference to African diaspora studies, evidence-based finding in geography and anthropology is central to understanding of the process of the making and the unmaking of a diaspora community abroad and their links

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

both in host and homelands. This therefore, illustrates the absence of postmodernist approaches in diaspora studies in France, as highlighted earlier the French school of diaspora studies approaches fits within the field of geography and anthropology, whereas in Anglophone world, diaspora studies neatly fit in cultural studies and postmodernist approaches are used to illustrate and argue the power shift in relationships between the West and developing countries and between the dominant and the dominated in societal setting. It means that a shift from the centre to the periphery is necessary in understanding the notion of diaspora within the context of postmodernist approach and field of African diaspora studies.

However, there are few political scientists among French scholars of diaspora studies, primarily because members of that academic fraternity are still committed to the Jacobin ideology that makes it difficult for them to “fit” a diaspora community into the reality (or ideal) of the socio-culturally and politically homogeneous *état-nation*¹²⁶. Given this, I agree with this viewpoint as the characteristic of Jacobin ideology, as was developed at the time of the French Revolution, emphasises the following as its bedrock:

a) indivisible national sovereignty, b) the role of the state as a transformer of society, c) administrative centralization, d) the equality of citizens which is to be secured through equal legal rights, and e) uniform education for individuals to ensure a uniform political concept of the citizen¹²⁷. The idea of an active citizen with whom the nation cannot exist without the strong state. The state becomes the guarantor of the national political identity. In other words, the unification of state and nation implies that the citizens endorse the same set of political values and therefore constitute a uniform mass¹²⁸. This revolutionary concept of citizen heralded the transition from a society which rested on differences in privilege, to a contractual society which exists between the state and the nation, where the individual is no longer at the mercy of destiny but can shape his or her own future based on deliberate and voluntary support of a legal society¹²⁹. The individual choice of a national citizenry, therefore, has nothing to do with ethnic, cultural or biological criteria. It is a choice determined by will as expressed by Ernest Renan: *"The existence of a nation*

¹²⁶ Safran.W. 2003, art.cit. p.32

¹²⁷ Holm, U., 2002. *The Implication of the Concept of the French State-Nation and "Patrie" for French Discourses on (Maghrebi) Immigration*. Aalborg Universitet, Akademiet for Migrationsstudier i Danmark. p.3

¹²⁸Ibid

¹²⁹Ibid

is a daily plebiscite" (1882)¹³⁰. As a result of the concept of individual universalism, France is proud to be able to turn foreigners and immigrants into citizens such as Jewish, Basques, Corsicans, Bretons, Algerians and Senegalese are not considered as minorities. The Jacobin ideology fuses the notion of an individual's identity to the notion of *état-nation* which does not always go hand in hand with the construction of a diaspora identity, since diaspora identity is versed in the notion of a homogeneous community, a creation or construction of an ethnic minority community which binds them together in the host country and at the same time links them to homeland. To this effect, I agree with the notion that diaspora discourse is less present among French political scientist mainly due to the that the French Jacobin and *état-nation ideologies* which institutionally prohibits such social compartmentalisation and categorisation of ethnic minority groups to be formed officially in France.

Whereas in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom ethnic minority categorisation are prevalent institutionally, as such the existence of ethnic minority groups are institutionally recognised and this institutional recognition forms the bedrock of diaspora discourses within political sciences discipline in the US and in the UK.

For Safran the "French" approach to diaspora studies is reflected in the frequent references to Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Ferdinand Tönnies specifically, to the *Gemeinschaft* nature of diasporas. It is mostly reflected through the works of Black French Caribbean intellectuals namely Aimé Césaire, Édouard Glissant and Francophone African intellectuals such as: Léopold Sédar Senghor and Cheikh Hamidou Kane. The works of these Black French intellectuals on the notion of: *negritude, africanité and deraciment* brings a different dimension of Black French identity into the equation of Diaspora studies in France¹³¹. As stated above on the fact that the French approach to diaspora studies is mainly viewed from the discipline of geography and also the idea of the French model of *état-nation ideologies* which as noted previously institutionally prohibits such social compartmentalisation and categorisation of ethnic minority groups to be formed officially in France, as such this explains the limitations of a collective diaspora identity or collective ethnic minority identity to be formed, as opposed to what

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Safran, W. 2003, art.cit. p. 34

is done in the US and the UK.

My theoretical framework for defining the general concept of diaspora is based on Safran's (1991) proposed definition of the term diaspora as *ethnic minority communities*, as opposed to *migrant communities* focusing thereby more on the degree of settlement of the group and its process of becoming a diaspora in the host country. Safran further states in his definition of diaspora by including the triadic relationship of the communities and homeland, a host country or other countries of diaspora settlement¹³². In this case Safran's definition echoes with the relationship that the Ghanaian diaspora in London maintains with their homeland and their ethnic identity formation in the diaspora. To this end, I will therefore be using this definition interchangeable throughout this thesis to demonstrate the formation of the Ghanaian diaspora community and identity in London and the ties they maintain with their homeland.

The notion of long-distance nationalism would equally be used to illustrate the transnational relation that the Ghanaian diaspora employ to engage in transnational political engagement as an act of long-distance nationalism. This notion will also be used to demonstrate how the Ghanaian diaspora utilizes their transnational links to engage freely in real networks, binding them to their homeland politically and economically.

1.1.2 The field of African diaspora Studies

The field of African Diaspora literatures can be viewed through the generations of intellectual projects both in group research projects and individual research projects. The best place to find the presentation and discussion of a range of African diaspora literatures is the journal *Callaloo: A Journal of African Diaspora Arts and Letters*, which for the past 40 years has presented critical work on various African diaspora communities around the world. However, most of the work on African Diaspora communities has long been dominated by studies of the "trans-Atlantic diaspora" communities (in other words people of African descendants in the United States and the Caribbean). The most prominent of such work on African diaspora is Paul Gilroy's 1993 *the black Atlantic*, in which Paul

¹³² Safran, W., 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora: A journal of transnational studies*, 1(1), p.83-99.

Gilroy first introduced the concept of a “black Atlantic” (or black Atlantic world) in the 1990s to describe the formation of a diverse transnational cultural network of African peoples within the transatlantic spectrum¹³³.

The term gained widespread usage as a symbolic reference to the movement of intellectual production and creative innovations of black people despite conditions of exclusion and oppression. As a “unit of analysis”, the black Atlantic captures the embeddedness of Africans and people of African descent within global processes of change. It also signals their contributions to the modern world. In the context of globalization, black Atlantic points to the post-emancipation interconnections forged among diaspora communities and between them and the ancestral homeland. From a historical perspective, the black Atlantic is a product or manifestation of migration and relocation¹³⁴. It signifies the powerful appeal that a shared identity and common ancestry exerted on the imagination and aspirations of the vast African diaspora¹³⁵. It also points to the almost gravitational pull that black Africa wielded on the missionary consciousness and vision of African descendants in distant lands with momentous implications for African Christianity¹³⁶.

As highlighted above, African diaspora studies have long been associated to the trans-Atlantic diaspora experience, which basically are based on African-American diaspora and both anglophone and francophone Caribbean diaspora. In recent times, however, there has been an increasing body of literature on African diaspora from mainland Africa, who are at times classified as economic migrants, expatriates and the new African diaspora. Scholars such as Valentina Muzzucato¹³⁷, Peter Quartey¹³⁸, Emmanuel Akeampong¹³⁹, Mariama Awumbila¹⁴⁰ have all written extensively on the Ghanaian diaspora as part of the “new” African in the diaspora. Other specialist on the African

¹³³ Paul Gilroy, 1993. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

¹³⁴David Northrup, 2008. ed. *Crosscurrents in the Black Atlantic, 1770–1965: A Brief History with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, pp. 1-3

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ Mazzucato, V., 2008. The double engagement: Transnationalism and integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and the Netherlands. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 34(2), pp.199-216.

¹³⁸ Quartey, P., 2006. The impact of migrant remittances on household welfare in Ghana.

¹³⁹ Akyeampong, E., 2000. Africans in the diaspora: the diaspora and Africa. *African affairs*, 99(395), pp.183-215.

¹⁴⁰ Awumbila, M., 2017. Drivers of migration and urbanization in Africa: Key trends and issues. *International Migration*, 7(8).

Diaspora studies such as Laura Hammond¹⁴¹, who has worked extensively on the Somali and Somaliland diaspora and their transnational links to homeland. Other experts on migration and diaspora studies in Francophone Africa namely: Sylvie Braudeloup¹⁴², Etienne Smith¹⁴³, Jean Philippe Dedieu¹⁴⁴, Pap Ndiaye¹⁴⁵, Daouda Gary-Toukura¹⁴⁶ and Mahamet Timera¹⁴⁷ to name a few have mostly concentrated their work on Francophone African diaspora communities in France.

In their respective works, both anglophone and francophone scholars of African diaspora studies, focus mainly on the role that African diaspora from mainland Africa contributes to the development of their homeland both politically and economically, specifically in the cases of those working on countries such as: Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Somalia. Focusing their respective works on how their migratory trajectory can be viewed as a positive influence on national development, particularly from a political participation standpoint. Countries such as Mali and Senegal have placed particular emphasis on their diaspora's political engagement by allowing members of their overseas citizens to fully part take in national elections through their foreign missions as reiterated earlier in the introduction of this thesis. The Malian and Senegalese examples indicate that engaging African diaspora to homeland politics is possible, providing there is a political will by national governments to ensure its feasibility. This said, it is worth stressing here that not all the cited countries above view their diaspora as a political entity, countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nigeria do not view their diaspora as political actors and partners but rather more as developmental agents. In the case of specialists working on the Ghanaian diaspora, they have mostly concentrated and written extensively on the Ghanaian diaspora's contribution to national development mainly from an economic standpoint and not politically.

¹⁴¹ Hammond, L., 2013. Somali transnational activism and integration in the UK: Mutually supporting strategies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(6), pp.1001-1017.

¹⁴² Bredeloup, S., 2007. *La diams' pora du fleuve Sénégal: sociologie des migrations africaines*. Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail.

¹⁴³ Smith, É., 2015. Sénégal, la diaspora fait-elle l'élection ? *Afrique contemporaine*, (4), pp.51-72.

¹⁴⁴ Dedieu, J.P., 2003. Les élites africaines, enjeu de la diplomatie scientifique des États-Unis. *Politique étrangère*, pp.119-131.

¹⁴⁵ Ndiaye, P., 2006. Questions de couleur. Histoire, idéologie et pratiques du colorisme. *De la question sociale à la question raciale*, pp.37-54.

¹⁴⁶ Gary-Toukura, D., 2013. La gestion des migrations de retour, un paramètre négligé de la grille d'analyse de la crise malienne. *Politique africaine*, (2), pp.47-68.

¹⁴⁷ Timera, M., 2001. Les migrations des jeunes Sahéliens: affirmation de soi et émancipation. *Autrepart*, (2), pp.37-49.

1.1.3 Defining and conceptualising African and Ghanaian diaspora

The definition of the term African Diaspora refers to a general dispersion of people of African descent all over the world through the Atlantic slave trade and the voluntary migration of Africans from mainland African countries. Davies et al. 2001 states that diaspora can be seen *as a kind of a harvest of people, cultures and knowledge that comes initially out of Africa, a demographic globalization, internationalization, of African people created through centuries of migration*¹⁴⁸. Davies further points out that African diaspora people have been the product of or the recipient of this economic globalization, often as the demographic and human resource engine through which the expropriation of their labour for the advancement of current economic structures now defined as globalization. As a result, it has a different intent and political identity than the globalization created for economic oppression. Davies' viewpoint, looks at the dispersion of people of African descent or the transatlantic diaspora as form of human exploitation which globalization has benefited from¹⁴⁹.

She further notes that the dispersal that created the African diaspora occurred through: (a) voluntary means (economic and pre-Columbian exploratory journey); (b) trade, servitude, and military expeditions (early Indian Ocean trade journey from the sixth century); (c) forced migration (transatlantic slavery over at least four centuries in the modern period) in other words, 20th and 21st century migration of African people was based on world economic imbalances¹⁵⁰. These have resulted, thereby, in the relocation and redefinition of the African people in a range of international locations. While one aspect of the definition of the African diaspora is fairly constant in terms of its association with dispersal or scating, there are plurality of interpretations with regards to the nature of the result of that dispersal, that is, what constitutes the African Diaspora¹⁵¹. Scholars such as Paul Gilroy on the one hand, notes that in fact plurality is good as it allows for a multiple perspective, which engender further research and additional subject of study.

To put it differently, the term Africa diaspora can be defined from an angle of identity formation in the new world, this identity formation takes shape from two prims:

¹⁴⁸ Okpewho, I., Davies, C.B. and Mazrui, A.A. eds., 2001. *The African Diaspora: African origins and new world identities*. Indiana University Press.p.10

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ Ibid

essentialist and multiculturalist. Essentialist view of the African diaspora identity construction is strongly tied to a homeland. This homeland can be an imagined homeland or a myth, so long as this imagined homeland or myth is linked to Africa. This standpoint has long been advanced by Afrocentric scholars and one of the pioneers of the movement is the African American scholar Molefi Asante who initiated this concept of Afrocentrism in the late 1970s. For Multiculturalist, the African diaspora identity construction is a fabrication born through the experience of their current society. This implies that this identity is formed through, a fusion, synchronicity and hybridity tied to their environment and as such serves as the basis of their identity formation meaning there is no link to a concrete or an imagined homeland. This approach of African diaspora identity formation has long been advanced by Black British scholars such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy in the 1990s. For these scholars of multiculturalism, the formation of African diaspora identity is based on the hybrid presence of people of African descent i.e. African presence, American presence, European presence and Indian presence. These presences are the bedrock on which the African diaspora identity is formed from the multiculturalist perspective. This perspective of the African diaspora identity formation resonates with both Anglophone and Francophone specialist of African diaspora studies.

The first event enabling that popularity of using the term African-American diaspora was the empowerment of Black Americans as voters by the civil rights acts of 1964–5 and the subsequent emergence in the US of the Black Power movement. In academia, however, the term African diaspora took currency during a lecture by the historian George Shepperson at a Pan-African conference in Dares Salaam, Tanzania in 1964¹⁵². The dispersion of the descendants of former African slaves from the USA and Jamaica, to Brazil and the Indian Ocean, to Britain and Colombia is now a ‘diaspora’ to scholars in history and sociology, in ethnomusicology as well as in literary and cultural studies. Shepperson identifies African diaspora as being linked to the rise of black political organisation during the immediate decolonisation period beginning in the 1950s, particularly around the time of the First International Congress of Negro Writers and Artist in 1956 and the International Congress of African Historians held in Dares Salaam in October 1965. Clearly, the use of the term African Diaspora is

¹⁵²Alpers.E.A, 2001 Defining the African Diaspora, Paper presented to the Centre for Comparative Social Analysis Workshop October 25, 2001: http://www.ces.uc.pt/formacao/materiais_racismo_pos_racismo/alpers.pdf

linked to decolonisation and therefore has political intent, and that is to account for the “status and prospects” of various people of African descent scattered around the world, who are often denied their rights¹⁵³. Though, one sees at least two broad tendencies in African Diaspora studies: (a) to account for dispersal, mainly from a common source in Africa; and (b) to account for those communities that have migrated in various directions and thereby have reconfigured identities in those new-home locations¹⁵⁴. Shepperson (1993), is careful to point out, however, that although the usage of the expression *African Diaspora* began in the 20th century, the concept’s usage dates older than the 20th century definition, expanding all the way back to the Biblical reference that “*Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands*” (Psalm 68:31). This suggests that Africa is in service to the world through the slave trade. Shepperson credits Edward Wilmot Blyden with his 1880s “*Ethiopia stretching Out her hands unto God* as one of the first places to see the conceptualising of the African Diaspora in an intellectual approach.

For him, though, African Diaspora is a framework for comparative study; it must be approached through different languages. It cannot be mere statistical rendering “*loses much of its force, if it is limited to dispersal in an outward direction only*” (Shepperson, 1993, 44). George Shepperson’s (1993) “African Diaspora concept and Context” documents the usage of this particular combination and provides much of the language that is used still to define the African diaspora, identifying the origin of the term to refer to the Jewish diaspora and therefore also emphasizing on the “*homeland*” element. It was Paul Gilroy’s “*The Black Atlantic*” (Gilroy, 1993) that had a catalytic, cascade-effect witnessed in scholarship on the African diaspora. For Appadurai (2006), African diaspora in recent times, can be defined as Africans who live outside of the continent yet maintains strong ties with their homeland or mainland Africa.

Thus, in terms of the first tendency, the concept of the term African Diaspora is much older than its contemporary formulation. If we accept that based on archaeological evidence, the birthplace of human beings is Africa, and that humankind from there began

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

dispersal around the world, then we can argue logically that the African Diaspora is the first constituted formulation of human migration¹⁵⁵.

Ruth Simms Hamilton's (1995) "Conceptualizing the African Diaspora" works theoretically within the framework of world systems analysis defines, the African Diaspora as a social formation that includes a "global aggregate of actors and sub-populations differentiated in social and geographical space, yet exhibiting a commonality based on shared historical experiences conditioned by and within the world ordering system" (Hamilton 1995, 394). She however, categories three historical characteristics to identify the diaspora as distinct from other groups: (a) Geo-social displacement and the circularity of people (the historical dialectic between geographical mobility and the establishment of "root"); (b) Social oppression: relations of domination and subordination (conflict, discrimination, and inequality based primarily, although not exclusively, on race, colour and class) (c) Endorsement, resistance, and struggle: cultural and poetical action (creative actions of the people as subjects of their history; psycho cultural and ideological transformation; social networks and dynamics). Hamilton's works offers important categories for situating a range of African Diaspora movements, histories and cultural transformations; above all, it includes the issues of dominance and subordination but also resistance.

The term African Diaspora is also understood as a political and cultural category. At the political level, its primary ideological formations have been expressed as Pan-Africanism, a political philosophy articulated through a variety of congresses and projects. For some scholars, notably Tony Martin, who notes that the rudiments of Pan-Africanism are in the yearnings of Africans displaced via transatlantic slavery to return to their homelands¹⁵⁶. From the start, there has been a logic of linking Diaspora to Pan-Africanism as St. Clair Drake (1993) identifies in his analysis of the relationships between these two discourses. To this end, Brent Hayes Edward (2003), equally notes that the term African diaspora has long had a political connection, particularly between the Anglophone and the Francophone diaspora, which became importantly identified via political organization of

¹⁵⁵ Brent Hayes Edward (2003), *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black Internationalism*

¹⁵⁶ Martin, T., 1984. The Pan-African connection: From slavery to Garvey and beyond (No. 6). The Majority Press. p 37

George Padmore (Trinidad/United Kingdom/ Ghana) and Garame Kouyate (Ivory Coast/Paris)¹⁵⁷.

To this effect, diaspora can be seen as condition. Pan-Africanism on the other hand, can be seen as a political project. From Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism on the continent to Malcolm X's Organization for Afro-American Unity, and to Marcus Garvey's, "*Africa for the Africans*" and "*Back to Africa movement*" were all ideologies linked to the emancipation of people of African descendants both politically and economically to encourage their return to the mother land.

Ghanaian interest in African diaspora can be traced back to the politico- cultural movement of Pan-Africanism, which we would later discuss in detail in part two of this thesis on Ghanaian diaspora policies under various governments. Pan-Africanism has been defined as 'a political and cultural phenomenon that regards Africa, Africans, and African descent abroad as a unit' (Asante 2007:12). The movement started developing in the late 19th and early 20th century when a range of black intellectuals and politicians struggled against racism, colonisation and imperialism¹⁵⁸. Nkrumah was strongly involved in the Pan-Africanist movement during his years of study in the United States and United Kingdom and later as a politician in Ghana, viewing African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans as partners in the Pan-Africanist struggle. As Prime Minister and later president of Ghana, he offered support to African liberation movements and was a firm proponent of a political union of Africa¹⁵⁹. Likewise, Nkrumah was preoccupied with the notion of an African personality to be restored through Afro-centric art and research (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). At independence he called for assistance in the development of Ghana as the first "Black" nation south of the Sahara to break the colonial chains' (Gaines 2006, also see Essien 2008, Bob-Milliar 2009:1, Pierre 2013). When Nkrumah visited the US in 1958, he assured African- Americans, a warm welcome to Ghana, invoking the '*bonds of blood and kinship*' that link them to Ghana (Botwe-Asamoah 2005:130, Gaines 2006). African Americans and Afro- Caribbean, professionals visited or lived in Ghana during the first years of independence. These included prominent personalities such as

¹⁵⁷ Brent Hayes Edward (2003), *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black Internationalism*

¹⁵⁸ Akyeampong, E., 2000. Africans in the diaspora: the diaspora and Africa. *African affairs*, 99(395), p.200

¹⁵⁹See, Manning, Patrick 2009, *The African Diaspora: History through culture*. New York: Colombia University Press

W.E.B Du Bois, George Padmore, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and others, being drawn by Nkrumah's visions of African liberation struggles or fleeing US political repression (Gaines 2006, Pierre 2013). While African Americans were initially welcomed, assassination attempts against Nkrumah in 1962 cooled the relationship, as some African Americans were suspected of espionage for the CIA¹⁶⁰. When Nkrumah was over- thrown in a coup d'état in 1966, many African Americans were persecuted or forced to leave the country¹⁶¹. Pan-Africanism subsequently lost political importance in Ghana and official state interest did not reappear before Jerry Rawlings's military rule in the 1980s (Gaines 2006, Pierre 2013).

Moving away from the classical definition of African diaspora linked to transatlantic slavery and the experience of African-American and African-Caribbean to the notion of Black empowerment projects such as Pan-Africanism, thus making reference to these early works on African diaspora discourse in the "New World" enables me to base part of my definition of what Ghanaian diaspora and its identity formation entails.

1.1.4 Conceptual framing of the Ghanaian Diaspora

My definition of the Ghanaian diaspora is in line with Appadurai's (2006) proposed definition as observed above: *as Africans who live outside of the continent yet maintains strong ties with their homeland or mainland Africa*. On this backdrop my proposed definition of the Ghanaian diaspora is based on voluntary migration. This voluntary migration is translated in emigration of Ghanaians for the purpose of: Education, family reunifications, and labour migration of Ghanaian professionals and unskilled migrants. This is to stress that a deliberate decision was made from the onset to emigrate which could be in the form of short term and temporary migration (examples, students and professionals) to long term and permanent settlements examples of family reunification and emigration of highly qualified Ghanaians and labour migration of un-skilled Ghanaians. It is important to note that short and temporary stayers i.e., students and professionals can also in some instances become long terms stayers by settling in their host country after their initial purpose of emigrating. My definition of the term Ghanaian

¹⁶⁰ Akyeampong, E., 2000. Art. Cit, p.201

¹⁶¹ Shipley, J.W. and Pierre, J., 2007. The Intellectual and Pragmatic Legacy of Du Bois's Pan-Africanism in Contemporary Ghana1. *Re-cognizing WEB Du Bois in the Twenty-first Century: Essays on WEB Du Bois*, p.61.

diaspora as stipulated above, though is focused on voluntary migration, it is worth observing that some Ghanaian labour migrants can be considered as a form of involuntary migration. In this instance, these are Ghanaians who migrate to seek greener pastures abroad, or those who fled during the era of political instabilities from 1966-early 1980s. Meaning that their immigration abroad was not voluntary, but forced through uncertain circumstances back home.

To this end, this therefore indicates that for both voluntary and involuntary migration forms the definition of the Ghanaian diaspora. To put it differently, the forming of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK is based on migration by choice and not by constrain even in the case of forced migration of Ghanaians, a personal decision was made either to leave or to stay. Contrary to the Black Atlantic diaspora where, no voluntary decision was made, no voluntary choice was made, their up-rootedness was foisted upon them.

Furthermore, Benedict Anderson and Nina Glick Schiller idea of long-distance nationalism is relevant in validating my proposed definition of the Ghanaian diaspora and their transnational engagement towards homeland both economically and politically. For both Anderson and Glick-Schiller this concept of long-distance nationalism is viewed from two postulates. For Glick-Schiller long distance nationalism: *is a set of identity claims and practices that connects people living in different geographical locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home. Actions taken by long-distance nationalist on behalf of this reputed ancestral homeland may include: voting, demonstrating, lobbying, contributing money, creating works of art, fighting, killing and dying. Long distance nationalism is closely connected to nationalism and nation-state, that consist of people who share a common history, identity and common territory*¹⁶²

Anderson observes that: *“In general, today’s long-distance nationalism strikes one as a probably menacing portent for the future. First of all, it is the product of capitalism’s remorseless, accelerating transformation of all human societies.*

¹⁶² Schiller, N.G., Ember, M., Ember, C.R. and Skoggard, I., 2005. Long-Distance Nationalism T. *Diaspora*, 1(1), p.570.

*Secondly, it creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable*¹⁶³.

1.1.5 Institution definition of diasporas

There are no fixed criteria to defining the term diaspora from an institutional standpoint, its definition reposes on multiple criteria. Specialist in the field of migration and development studies observes the difficulties associated to agreeing on who first used the term diaspora in relation to the international development agenda. However, there is no doubt that the UN, in particular, tried to intensify debates on these issues¹⁶⁴. In their numerous resolutions on international migration has been consistently linked to development agenda. Although the UN has organized high level summits pertaining to migration and development thematic, it is however prudent in providing concise definition on the term diaspora. The UN therefore, offers the following definition of a “migrant”: *individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and this means, regular or irregular, used to migrate*¹⁶⁵.

The International Organisation for Migration, IOM (now the UN agency for Migration) completed a report on diaspora engagement for development policy in 2006. In the report Ionescu (2006) offers the utilitarian criterion in defining diaspora: *diaspora is a resource, and the ultimate defining indicator is whether actors engage in the development policy. Diaspora in the IOM sense includes practically anybody with migration background who contributes to the development of their home country, such a person can be included regardless of his or her legal status and country of birth*¹⁶⁶. *They do not need to be established in the host country as a permanent resident, do not need to have citizenship of the country of origin, do not need to be involved in any migrant association, but should maintain primarily*

¹⁶³ Anderson, B., 1998. Long-distance nationalism. *The spectre of comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the world*, p.60

¹⁶⁴See Weiner, A (2010 Instrumentalising diaspora for development: International and European policy discourse, p 80, *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods* Rainer Baubock and Thomas Faist, Amsterdam University Press.

¹⁶⁵Thematic working group Diaspora and Migrants for development <http://www.diaspora-centre.org/thematic-working-group/>

¹⁶⁶See Agnunas D and Newland K 2012 “developing a Road Map for Engaging Diaspora in Development: A handbook for policy makers and practitioners in home and host countries, International Organisation for Migration Press Geneva and Migration Policy Institute Press, Washington

*economic, not necessarily political or sentimental, ties with home country*¹⁶⁷. Consequently, she *defines diaspora as “members of ethnic and national communities, who have left but maintains links, with homelands (Ionescu 2006:13).* To this end, it is worth noting, that IOM and UN approaches define actor in the development policy as individuals, the notion of collective identity is less important, which therefore implies that a diaspora acts on a voluntary basis, following his or her own values, both see individuals as no longer linked by traumatic experience but by a pure and positive readiness to act in economic terms.

It is the African Union, however, that offers arguably the best example of an organized response to the issue of defining the term diaspora from an international institutional perspective. The debates on the definition of African diaspora were focused on four principles: African diaspora are defined by: a) bloodline or heritage, (African, not country-specific); b) must be linked to the processes of migration; c) must be historically inclusive and exclusive of people not only committed to the development goals; d) connecting them to their ancestral home. The definition that was finally agreed upon states the following: *The African diaspora consists of people of African origin living out-side the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and building of the African Union*¹⁶⁸.

It is important to highlight that this definition is very broad in the spirit of the one proposed by other international organizations. Moreover, it dismantles another classic element of the academic definitions the link to the nation or ethnicity. A pan-African approach is a basic feature of the diaspora with which the AU would like to work with¹⁶⁹. This wide approach is not necessarily shared with members of diasporic organizations, who would prefer to see the pool of participants restricted mostly to people who feel a genuinely strong link with their origins (the threshold is indicated up to the third generations) who have a strong national or ethnic identity.

¹⁶⁷Idem.

¹⁶⁸See report of the ‘Meeting of experts on the definition of African diaspora’, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11-12 April 2005 www.africa-union.org/.../Report-Expert-Diaspora%20Defn%2013april20

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

Subsequently, the African Union saw the potential and strength of the African diaspora, which led to the Union organizing its first high level conference on African Diaspora in May 2012 in Pretoria¹⁷⁰. As such, Africans in the diaspora were acknowledged to constitute the sixth region of the continent during the conference, this recognition was to highlight their numbers and the important role they contribute to the development of the continent¹⁷¹. This was to accord institutional recognition and consolidation of the African diaspora as partners in development, as such a department has been created at the African Union headquarters in 2012 with a mandate to include the African diaspora in all facades of the continents development and view them as partners in development and not a menace to the continent's development.

Presently, as emphasised earlier, international institutions view migrants and diaspora as linked to national development and a vehicle for economic growth in homelands, through remittance flows as noted earlier on. This perception of viewing migrants and diaspora as economic assets for developmental purposes, partly contributed to organising the first UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006. The UN High Level Dialogue brought about the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) with its first meeting in 2007 in Brussels (Piper, 2009:94). The UNDP reinforced the idea that migration can play a positive role in national development in its 2009 Human Development Report (Gamlén, 2010). For the past twenty years, the nexus between migration and development has always been present, it is only being re-articulated and translated into practices in both policy papers and implementation phases in recent times (Ghosh, 2006; Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004).

From an international institutional perspective, migrants and diaspora communities have long been viewed as an important component of development in both home and host countries as noted in the above sections. This observation therefore means turning migrants brain drain to brain gain discourse through mutual projects and policies designed for host and home countries to tap into their migrants communities particularly the skilled and elite members of the diaspora. As such, they are perceived by most sending countries

¹⁷⁰See Global African diaspora Summit 23-25 May 2012 in Pretoria South Africa:
<http://summits.au.int/en/diasporasummit2012>

¹⁷¹ Ibid

to be the category who sending countries are most likely to benefit from their experiences, as noted earlier with the examples of China and India implementing policies to attract its educated and skilled diaspora to return. This observation also extends and connects to a statement made by the former head of the Ghana Immigration Service who noted that: *“unskilled and undocumented migrants do not make good financial returns to Ghana, because the states spends more on them in the case of having to rescue them when they are stranded in conflict prone zones such as Libya and in the Gulf countries or when they get into trouble in places as far-fetched as Fiji and the Solomon Islands. During the Libyan crisis in 2011, the government of Ghana had to send a plane to rescue and bring back our nationals... This sort immigration can't be good for our country as they pose more problems and are a financial drain to our resources “*¹⁷². This standpoint therefore illustrates a strategic calculation on behalf of a sending countries such as Ghana, being more interested with the “top echelon” of its diaspora abroad, in other words, they are viewed for what they can give back to their home country and not what their home country can give to them. It is nonetheless vital to stress on the important role “non-top echelon” diaspora contribute to national development in the form of undocumented remittances which in some cases goes without being traced and accounted for officially.

For governments of destination countries, building trust with engaged diaspora populations involves acknowledging that their dual sense of belonging and their commitment to their homelands is compatible via integration in their adopted country. Dual citizenship is one signal governments use to demonstrate their trust to people who have multiple citizenship, to meet all obligations of full citizenship¹⁷³. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) in recent times has resulted in consulting with diaspora groups and associations in the United Kingdom to formulate DFID country assistance plans, as an example. The United Kingdom supports a Senior Executive Service drawn from diaspora members to fill in senior positions in governments of post conflict countries such was the example of post conflict reconstruction of Sierra Leone¹⁷⁴. Another partnership programme between host and home countries institutions for migrant, is “co-development”

¹⁷² Field work May 2012 Accra. Discussion with Dr. Prosper Asima, Assistant director Ghana Immigration Services

¹⁷³Idem

¹⁷⁴Idem

policy, which was introduced in the early 1990s. The concept made its debut as a theoretical framework for leveraging the resource of African migrant organizations in France to promote development in Africa. The concept of co-developing portrayed migration as benefiting both countries of origin and countries of destination¹⁷⁵. To this end, the collaboration of international institutions in identifying the potentials of skills transfer of migrants in both receiving and sending countries of migration has led Governments in both host and home countries to seize upon diaspora initiatives as part of formulating a national migration policy¹⁷⁶.

Over the past decade International Organizations have contributed in the “*vulgarisation*” process of this recent trend through initiating projects to valorise diaspora communities as an important partner of development for both host and home countries¹⁷⁷. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) for example, has designed bespoke projects since 2002 such as: Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and Diaspora Engagement Projects (DEP) specifically aimed at targeting and tapping into the human resources of qualified African migrants in the diaspora to temporary or permanently return to their home countries to aid in capacity building schemes in sectors, such as Health and educational institutions which are in deficit of expertise¹⁷⁸. To this effect, MIDA aim was to respond to the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon in African countries through the creation and strengthening of sustainable links between diasporas and countries of origin¹⁷⁹. The objective is to encourage the transfer of competencies and resources of the African Diaspora benefiting countries of origin and strengthening the capacities of local public and private institutions¹⁸⁰.

Another project in similar direction, initiated by an International body aimed at tapping into expert diaspora human resources, was the pilot project initiated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which introduced the “Transfer of

¹⁷⁵S. Plaza & D. Ratha, 2011, From Co-development to Solidarity Development: French Policies of Subsidizing Migrant Transmission Mechanisms in a Eurafrikan Context Working Paper No 2011/11 chapter forthcoming in: *Diaspora for Development* World Bank (2011):

http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp4/publications/NCCRWP11_codevelopment_panizzon_final_website.pdf

¹⁷⁶Idem

¹⁷⁷Idem

¹⁷⁸Idem

¹⁷⁹ Fieldwork data IOM Ghana mission 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁸⁰ Global forum on Migration and Development: <http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/38>

Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals” (TOKTEN) was created in 1977¹⁸¹. It was set-up as a means to counter the exodus of developing country professionals and also to aid in reducing the adverse effects of “Brain-Drain” phenomena or "reverse transfer of technology" in many developing countries¹⁸². TOKTEN according to the UN, has offered a window of opportunity for expatriate nationals with lengthy experiences in their fields of specialization to return to their home countries, for an agreed period and on voluntarily basis¹⁸³. According to the UNDP, TOKTEN’s modality is considered as an efficient development intervention as TOKTEN experts can merge their acquired learning with their familiarity of local culture and language in order to effectively transfer their knowledge and skills¹⁸⁴. According to UNDP, the aim of TOKTEN experts is to provide short-term advisory services in priority areas identified by the host governments. TOKTEN experts are professionally skilled individuals they are selected through a decentralised process of supply and demand¹⁸⁵. I will agree with the African Union’s institutional definition of the term diaspora, which stresses on the importance of people of African descent in the diaspora to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union. Although this definition appears as not being precise, it nonetheless opens the possibility for Africans in the diaspora to contribute to the development of the continent both economically and politically. Whereas the other institutional definition of the term diaspora provided above only looks at the economic aspect of the definition of the term diaspora. As such, the African Union’s institutional definition of the term diaspora fits within my thesis definition of the Ghanaian diaspora, because it accords the possibility for members of the African diaspora to contribute to the development of their homelands both economically and politically.

1.1.6 Challenges and limits of migration and development concepts and policies in Africa

The aforementioned projects of MIDA and TOKTEN initiated by the UNDP and IOM are often initiated on a short-term basis, without or with little sustainability and consolidation

¹⁸¹ Wanigaratne, R.D., 2006. An Evaluation of the UNDP transfer of technology through Expatriate National (Tokten) Program. *Kigali: UNDP Rwanda*.

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN):

http://www.undp.org/content/sudan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/dg_tokten.html

¹⁸⁵ Ibid

phases to ensure its long-term efficiency. This, therefore, translates into “half baked” projects which works on short-term basis because of it being viewed as the new developmental panacea. To this end, academics and scholars specialised in the field of Migration and development equally cast cautionary doubts or have raised radical criticism of these initiatives TOKTEN and MIDA as migration and development policies in developing countries. Scholars of transnational migration such as Glick-Schiller and Faist (2009) have criticised the notion held by various international agencies which considered migration as solution to problems of underdevelopment (UNDP, 2009). At the heart of some of these critiques is the accusation that international agencies, as well as scholars in migration studies who practice the migration-development “mantra”, have lost sight of the asymmetries in the discourse on migration and development that relegates nation-states in the Global South to a marginal role ¹⁸⁶. To address these asymmetries, Nina Glick-Schiller has proposed an alternative global framework of analysis that must exceed the “methodological nationalism” still prevalent in migration studies.

More recently, studies on the migration-development nexus from a transnational perspective have raised further criticism by addressing the assumptions that characterised the last “hype” about the nexus¹⁸⁷. This “hype” is explained by placing the migration-development nexus against the backdrop of ongoing socioeconomic, cultural and political, structural transformations, they however, question the optimism surrounding the positive impact of remittances for development (Faist, Kivisto & Faurer, 2011). According to these scholars, there are little or no data to conclude the efficacy of migrants’ remittances both financial and social on origin countries. Moreover, because migration cannot be proved to be the formula that can fix all problems of underdevelopment, social welfare and democratic governance, it follows that the basic assumption in policies that promote migration for development is simply unsubstantiated. According to Kapoor, (2004) and Gamlen (2014), who notes, that this “mantra” of migration and development as the answer to development in Africa is: “*driven by hidden political and economic agendas*”, and because it is characterised by “*simplifications and exaggerations*” (Gamlen, 2014:581). An example to attest these concerns and doubts on

¹⁸⁶ Rao, M.K.D., 2006. Gauging success of a project: a case study of the TOKTEN-India Umbrella Project. *Research Evaluation*, 15(3), p.175

¹⁸⁷ Schiller, N.G., 2012. Unravelling the migration and development web: Research and policy implications. *Int. Migr*, 50, p.92.

these UN/IOM initiated projects in Somalia is the QUESTS-MIDA, the enthusiasm that international agencies and policy makers invest in the migration-development nexus often conceals other concerns about security of North European and North American national borders and about citizenship rights and integration in migrants' host countries (Faist, Kivisto & Faurer, 2011). Most importantly, the migration-development nexus is often invoked by international policy actors as a solution to problems of underdevelopment in migrants' sending countries, but never used to address problems of labour exploitation or the concerns of racial, social, and economic discrimination, that migrants and diaspora experience in host countries ¹⁸⁸.

1.1.7 Theory of political participation

As liberal democratic cultures and values have blossomed in Western societies, it is increasingly becoming axiomatic as broad participation in the decision-making processes is a prerequisite for proper democratic governance (Dahl 1971, 1998; Pateman 1970). Historically, political theorists have claimed that all individuals ought to have an appropriately equal opportunity to influence decision-making processes (Verba et al. 1978). While electoral turnout and voting are the cornerstone of the democratic political process, in recent times it has been reportedly decreasing over the last few decades in almost all European countries (O'Toole et al. 2003). Academic experts and technocrats have been exploring alternative participation activities that could influence and shape decision-making processes, within a variety of social and cultural contexts. As a result, political participation has been proven to take diverse forms such as: being a member of a political party or community-based organisations, displaying an active role within a range of cultural or leisure interactions, contacting a politician to express ecological concerns, suggestions or ideas, signing a petition, setting public buildings on fire during demonstrations and riots (Bourne 2010), can all be classified as political participation to a large extent.

To provide a definition of political participation is equally a challenging a task as defining the term diaspora, different authors have their own parameters of defining political participation. For example, Huntington and Nelson (1976, p.3) and Verba et al. (1995, p.38) proposes the following definition for political participation:

¹⁸⁸ Fagioli-Ndlovu, M., 2015. art.cit. p.133

“activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making whereas Verba et al. (1995, p.38) characterized it as an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies.” This suggest that both definition plebiscites the same idea of political participation be it in a direct or an indirect manner they can both work together.

Political participation is often being referred to as “political engagement” or “public involvement in decision making”. As Riley, et al. (2010) have pointed out, political engagement has traditionally been thought of as: *“a set of rights and duties that involve formally organised civic and political activities (e.g., voting or joining a political party)”*. Diemer (2012) referred to political participation as an *“engagement with traditional mechanisms in the political system, such as voting in elections and joining political organisations”*. Munroe (2002) defines political participation in terms of the degree to which citizens are exercising their right to engage in political activities (e.g., to protest, to speak freely, to vote, to influence or to get more energetically involved). Such definitions repose on the lawful nature of political praxis, which implies that they clearly establish a frame of reference with the available repertoire of political praxis within the conventional political norms, although these norms are not necessarily uniform across countries or across time.

Defining political participation from the vantage point of French scholars, Philippe BRAUD, proposes the following definition : *l’ensemble des activités, individuelle ou collectives, susceptible de donner aux gouvernés une influence sur le fonctionnement du système politique. Dans des régimes ou cette norme est érigée en valeur fondamentale, elle est associée au concept de citoyenneté*. He further argued that political participation constitutes the heart of a democratic state : *à travers l’élargissement du suffrage universel et son extension, à des rythmes différents, d’un pays à l’autre tous les membres de la communauté politique, hommes comme femmes, à travers aussi son organisation juridique favorisant des partis et des*

*associations le droit d'affichage, s'efforce de mobiliser la participation des citoyens, car elle seule donne à la démocratie sa véritable légitimité*¹⁸⁹.

In other words, man constitutes a political animal, as he puts his own interest first before the interest of the masses. This therefore connects political participation to the notion of collective action as highlighted by Olson (1996) and other theorist of collective action. The notion of collective action and its ties to political participation can be viewed from two prisms: rational and irrational collective action. Rational form of collective action as advanced by Olson (1996) takes shape in an individual's action within a large group. Olson notes: “*a rational individual in large group setting will participate in a collective action for the interest of the group, as the personal price to pay in not doing so is higher or will be higher in terms of time, money etc*”. In other words, acting collectively in a rational manner benefits everyone within the group. Olson's example of the “*closed shop*” imposed by unions illustrates this compulsory participation of an action to reinforce the influence and powers of a small elite within the political party or the union, as these powers appears to be in favour of such elites. For Gabriel Tarde or G. Le Bon, who present collective action as purely influenced by the psychology of the masses, and therefore mobilisation is derived from the irrational¹⁹⁰. This means that imitation, mental contagion and emotion and that collective action is a result of social pathology which is a product of atomisation perpetrated by industrialization or urbanization which has been disruptive to the make-up of primary groups. This perspective of collective action can further be viewed from two directions: that on the one hand, mobilization is the product of frustration which therefore results into disappointment and violence¹⁹¹. On the other hand, W. Kornhauser and other authors notes that it is the masses in society who conduct these irrational mobilizations, as a result of social isolation, dislocation of collective structures ends up in producing an “*alienated population*” ready to mobilize themselves¹⁹².

¹⁸⁹Phillipe BRAUD, 2008, Op.Cit pp.47

¹⁹⁰ Le Bon, G., 2017. *The crowd*. Routledge and Tarde, G., 2010. *Gabriel Tarde on communication and social influence: Selected papers*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁹¹ Davies, J.C., Graham, H.D. and Gurr, T.R., 1969. The J-curve of rising and declining satisfactions as a cause of some great revolutions and a contained rebellion. *Violence in America: Historical and comparative perspectives, I*, p.550

¹⁹² Kornhauser, W., 2013. *Politics of mass society* (Vol. 49). Routledge.

Other authors such as Schumpeter, Dahl, Almond, Verba and Hirschman have contested this classic definition of political participation that tends to benefit very few elites within society as opposed to the majority being dominated by a minority, which paradoxically these same majorities are the ones who voted them into power through their universal suffrage. These authors, however, recognizes that regular political participation of the masses is indispensable within a democracy, as this allows the masses to hold those, they voted into government accountable. For these authors political participation can, however, be translated in other forms of collective action such as political mobilization, strikes, petitions, lobbying and local associations protest etc. Inglehart proposes political participation to be in the form of sit-ins, boycotts and social movements through social media. Milbreth and Groel, (1977) distinguishes different types of political participation, from the vantage point of protestations to electoral activism, local activism and mass political communication¹⁹³. Voting on the other hand, is the most important element of political participation, as it gives citizens the right to express their choice as to who will and can govern them.

Bourne (2010) presented the following list of participation activities as being unconventional: protests, demonstrations, barricading a community, firing at the security forces, blogging, social media and using the social commentaries on talk radio. Marsh (1990) describes activities such as “elite-challenging”, probably insinuating confrontational participation, although unconventional practices does not necessarily have to be illegal or unlawful. Opp et al. (1981) and Muller (1982) defined some of those activities as “aggressive”, whereas other scholars simply called activities such as “writing graffiti” and “damaging property at political gatherings” as illegal (Lavríc et al. 2010).

Van der Geest and Asante-Darko “*Political meaning of Highlife songs in Ghana*” is also a classic example of unconventional form of political participation where both politicians and the general public interpret lyrics of local songs to oppose to government dictatorship or to indicate social malaise which they could not overtly express during the military regime¹⁹⁴.

¹⁹³Phillipe BRAUD, 2008, Op.Cit. pp.48

¹⁹⁴See, Van der Geest and Asante-Darko, 1982, The Political Meaning of Highlife Songs in Ghana, African Studies Review, Vol. 25, No. 1

Another example of unconventional form of political participation occurred during the youth riot in the suburbs of London in August 2011, which later spread nationwide. The riots were caused by the death of Mark Duggen, who was shot by the police in Tottenham, in North London. Which in turn led to a proximate cause, as tension already existed between the police and the Black community since the Broadwater Farm riots in Tottenham in 1981. Mark Duggen's death sparked that existing anger vis-à-vis the police and the community as a whole. The youths in the area felt they were treated as social "misfits" and were constantly being labelled as failures in the society. Youths across the UK took to the streets of London and its suburbs, burning cars, looting shops and generally causing social malaise. This example can be viewed as a rational and irrational form of collective action with the need for political and policy change, regarding police brutality towards the youth. These actions of the youth were intended to draw the attention of local authorities and government to their plight of being socially discriminated and alienated. In response to this political unrest from the youth, the Prime Minister of the time David Cameron classified their action as "pure criminality" on August 15, 2011 in Oxfordshire and further indicating that Britain was a "broken society": *"Irresponsibility. Selfishness. Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. Children without fathers. Schools without discipline. Reward without effort. "Crime without punishment. Rights without responsibilities. Communities without control. Some of the worst aspects of human nature tolerated, indulged – sometimes even incentivised – by a state and its agencies that in parts have become literally de-moralised. These Social problems that have been festering for decades have exploded in our face,"* Cameron further noted that: *"These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at high street stores, not parliament. And these riots were not about poverty: that insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship, would never dream of making others suffer like this. No, this was about behaviour. "People showing indifference to right and wrong. People with a twisted moral code. People with a complete absence of self-restrain"*¹⁹⁵ notes Cameron. Whereas the then Labour Leader Ed Miliband

¹⁹⁵David Cameron on riots: broken society is top of my political agenda <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/15/david-cameron-riots-broken-society>

condemned the acts of violence even though he argued that there was an “*inconvenient truth*”, i.e. a message passed by the youth riots which had to be addressed by politicians. “*Too often we have sent a message from the top to the bottom of Britain's society that says: anything goes*”¹⁹⁶. For Miliband the youth riots were about sending a political message to Westminster by the youth, who think decisions are made from the top to the bottom with very little consideration for the youth, so the only way to make their voices heard was to take to the streets, be it through violent riots to get their message across to the elites. Cameron on the other hand dismissed the youth riots and viewed them as an act of violence, stating that these were youths with twisted moral code. These different stances from one party leader to the other equally indicates how an event is perceived depending on the political agenda that political leader want to send and how their political ideologies influences their political agenda or not. Consequently, the youth riots can be seen as events charged with a visible form of political engagement as the youths used extreme form of rioting as the platform to convey a political message, albeit acting in an unlawful manner. In other words, their political praxis was illegal, albeit symbolically effective even though justifiable drew wide condemnation from many quarters of the political establishment. This London youth riots in 2011 shows an extreme form of unconventional mode of political participation which the youth used as a means to hold politicians and policy makers accountable for their social alienation, which led to elites at the top to listen to those at the bottom i.e. the youth.

Mayrargue et al. note in their quest to search for what is and what can or could be identified as political expression is a delicate and perilous exercise, since politics and political discourses are not represented in an obvious and transparent manner. The authors observed that: *ce qui intéresse les analystes n'est pas tant de savoir ce qui est politique (surtout à l'état pur) mais plutôt ce qui peut avoir un sens politique. « Le repérage d'expression politique suppose alors d'utiliser ou de construire des outils pertinents pour ce type de démarche ».*

¹⁹⁶Full transcript Ed Miliband Speech on the riots Haverstock School 15 August 2011: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/08/society-young-heard-riots>

Political participation can also be viewed as a form of civic engagement, which in most cases comes in the form of collaboration or joint action to condition in the civil sphere.

Other definitions of civic action emphasize the political aspect of “civic”, and consequently equalise civic engagement with “activities that are not only collective but that are specifically political (i.e., that involve government action)” (Adler, Goggin 2005, 238).

A. Long distance nationalism in diaspora political participation

Diaspora political engagement can be translated as a form of long-distance nationalism.

Anderson views of diaspora political participation in the context of long distance-nationalism is articulated as: *The participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics: he is not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not even cast an absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zone of their ultimate destinations. Thirdly, his politics, unlike those of activists for global human rights or environmental causes, are neither intermittent nor serendipitous. They are deeply rooted in a consciousness that his exile is self-chosen and that the nationalism he claims on e-mails is also the ground on which an embattled ethnic identity is to be fashioned in the ethicized nation-state that he remains determined to inhabit. The same metropole that marginalizes and stigmatizes him simultaneously enables him to play in flash on the other side of the planet, a national hero.*” (Anderson 1998:72).

For Anderson, long distance nationalism and political participation of diasporic communities can be dangerous for home countries as being far away from their homeland and being protected by the distance that comes with living in another country can also serve as a platform for radicalisation of their political activities towards their homeland. In support of Anderson’s assertion, Michael Ignatieff also notes that: *“Diasporic nationalism is a dangerous phenomenon, because it is easier*

to hate from distance: You do not have to live the consequence... So, it is appropriate to say to newcomers: You have to embrace all our supposed activities. You can and should keep the memory of the injustice you have felt firmly in your heart. But the law is law. You will have to leave your murderous fantasies of revenge behind"¹⁹⁷. This statement was made in relation to the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and their support for rebel group in their homeland. The assertion of both Anderson and Ignatieff, are legitimate in validating the idea that some members of diasporic communities who engage in long distance politics do so to advance their own political career and gain visibility among the political elites in their home countries.

Glick-Schiller as opposed to Anderson, views long-distance nationalism as a positive element to the discourse of diaspora and nationalism. For Glick-Schiller, "*long distance nationalism binds migrants and their decedents, dispersed minority populations and those who continue to live within the territory, they claimed homeland into single trans-border citizenry. Long distance nationalism does not exist only in the domain of imagination and sentiments. It leads to specific actions indicates Glick-Schiller. These actions lead to dispersed population to a specific homeland and its political system*"¹⁹⁸. She further asserts the connection between *jus sanguinis* and national belonging, by using the Haitian diaspora and their engagement with their homeland. Put differently, long distance nationalism in the case of the Haitian diaspora, essentially is any action carried out by diasporans towards their homeland, be it direct or indirect, even though they have never been there physically can still be classified as an act of nationalistic belonging.

Glick-Schiller further observes that Haitian diaspora citizenship is based on the rights of *jus sanguinis*, and not *jus soli*, therefore their *jus sanguinis* rights is what binds diasporans to their homeland. In other words, it gives them the right to participate in homeland politics either through the nexus of: conventional and unconventional or symbolic mode. This blood ties with homeland is sufficient to

¹⁹⁷Ignatieff.M 2001: The hate stops
here http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/library/misc1/hate_stops.incl

¹⁹⁸ Glick Schiller, N, 2005. "Blood and Belonging: Long-Distance Nationalism and the World Beyond." In *Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture*, ed. Susan McKinnon and Sydel Silverman, p.290. Chicago University Press,

allow diaspora to partake in politics and other activities transnationally. It is equally, worth noting that the link between blood and nation is often being used by nationalist struggles, or politicization of diasporic communities such as the case of the Eritrean diaspora, Sri Lankan Tamil separatist group, the Yugoslavian nationalist groups, and the issue of Kurdish identities and its link to long-distance nationalism have been fuelled by this form of state policy¹⁹⁹. Scholars of nationalism such as Hobsbawm have emphasised the role of political leaders in creating myths of nationhood by quoting certain nationalist leaders of the nineteenth century. For example, during the first meeting of the parliament after Italy had united, Massimo d'Azeglio remarked, "*we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.*" Similarly, Colonel Piludski, the "liberator of Poland," observed, "*it is the state which makes the nation and not the nation which makes the state*" (Hobsbawm 1992:44-45).

Glick-Schiller further points out that: *members of immigrants groups, identifying themselves as "diaspora" and sometimes building on biblical images of dispersal and return, utilise: radio, television, newspapers, books, and the internet in a passionate effort to maintain their identification with distant territory they continue to call home. When identification take the form of transnational political projects to build a state, I call such an ideology and the actions it motivates, long distances nationalism* (Anderson 1993; Fuglerud 1999; Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001).

Glick-Schiller further observes that there are various actors who contribute to making and maintaining long-distance nationalism. *She highlights that in some instances, transnational state building, such as actors with diverse motivations, class, positions, and personal histories, coalesce, strengthening the collective political project and also making more complex as it becomes imbued with multiple political agenda. In other instance, different social positions are filled by the same actors, for example when political exiles or members of emigrant diasporas return home to occupy leadership roles in the homeland government while still maintaining their transnational connections with emigrant associations and family abroad. Often there are significant political differences and struggles within a single set of actors*

¹⁹⁹ Bhatt, C. and Mukta, P., 2000. Hindutva in the West: mapping the antinomies of diaspora nationalism. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 23(3), p.407

as for example among various political factions among Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka (Fuglerud 1999).

The Ghana citizenship code of 2000 accords the Ghanaian nationality through blood relations in other words, just as Haiti through the mode of *jus sanguinis*. This suggests that any form of transnational engagement by the Ghanaian diaspora can be considered as a form of long-distance nationalism just as the Haitian diaspora. To this effect, economic or human resource capital that diasporans have acquired abroad sets the precedence for their transnational political participation in local politics through the lenses of either conventional or unconventional mode of participation. This mode of transnational political participation is purely based on their blood belongings as Ghanaians, which therefore has little to do with their geographical location abroad. As highlighted above and stipulated in Ghana's 1992 constitution and the Citizenship Act of 2000, the Ghanaian citizenship rights is based one's *jus sanguine* rights and not *jus soli*: *a Ghanaian citizen is one born to parents with both or either parents having a Ghanaian citizenship at birth, this guarantees their offspring of an automatic citizenship regardless of where they were born*²⁰⁰.

With this citizenship criteria in mind, a Ghanaian national regardless of their place of birth, should in essence be able to exercise their political franchise based on the stated criteria. In practice however, Ghanaians in the diaspora are not allowed to exercise this political franchise whiles abroad, except for a few minorities working for Ghanaian foreign missions abroad, Ghanaian army and Police on peace mission duties abroad are permitted to vote transnationally via proxy-vote. The Representation of People's Amendment Law, ROPAL, which was enacted in parliament in 2006, to allow Ghanaians in the diaspora to exercise their political franchise whiles abroad. Since the enactment of the amendment in 2006, members of the Ghanaian diaspora have not been able to vote, during the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential and parliamentary election. Since the amendment was voted in parliament in 2006 no measures have been put in place for its implementation as this

²⁰⁰Ghana Citizenship Act 2000, The Law was adopted on 29 December 2000, and published in the Gazette on 5 January 2001.

delay appears to be a political calculation in the marginalization of the Ghanaian diaspora vote.

Glick-Schiller's position of long-distance nationalism seems plausible in analysing the political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora through conducting transnational political activities such as demonstrating and overseas voting towards homeland. Throughout this thesis, the terms long-distance nationalism and unconventional form of political participation will be used interchangeably to first argue that transnational activities conducted by overseas citizens can be viewed as an indirect or unconventional form of political engagement in the absence of an explicit right to vote transnationally towards homeland.

1.1.8 Empirical Analysis: Research Methodology

The research methodology for the field work involved: Longitudinal field research, Participatory Action Research and Ethnographic research.

This thesis stems from a longitudinal field study since 2010. The benefit of a longitudinal study is that it has been useful and helpful in observing the evolution of ethnic minority political engagement in the UK which includes the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement. Longitudinal field research was also used to observe the evolution of Ghanaian diaspora transnational political engagement towards Accra from London and finally returnee diaspora engagement in Ghana. According to Pettigrew (1990) practitioners of longitudinal research state that issues of time are critical and pervasive. In other words, how does the choice of the time series influence the perspective of the researcher? When does the process begin and end? When is the appropriate moment to make assessments about the outcome evaluation? Pettigrew observes that first it is the critical issue of time and perspective. As such, time sets a frame of reference for what changes are seen and how those changes are explained. This is to indicate that the more we look at the present-day events the easier it is to identify change; the longer we stay with an emergent process and further back we can disentangle its origins, the more we can identify continuities. Empirically, change and continuity are a matter of time. Any adequate empirical inquiry into change must be capable of revealing the temporal patterns, causes and

movements from continuity to change and vice versa²⁰¹. As such, longitudinal data allows the present to be explored in relation to the past and emerging future²⁰². In the context of my fieldwork research, longitudinal method was appropriate in assessing how past historical and political events have evolved in shaping present day politics among the ethnic minorities in the UK and the Ghanaian diaspora in London with reference to future political events. It was equally appropriate to use the same process of longitudinal field method to review Ghanaian governments policies on diaspora and external voting rights for Ghanaians living abroad.

A.1. Participatory Action Research

Along with longitudinal field methods, participatory action research was also used in data collection process both in London and in Accra. Participatory Action Research (PAR) can be defined as seeking to understand and improve the world by changing it²⁰³. At its heart is collective, self-reflective inquiry that researchers and participants undertake, so they can understand and improve upon the practices in which they participate and the situations in which they find themselves. The reflective process is directly linked to action, influenced by understanding of history, culture, and local context and embedded in social relationships²⁰⁴. The process of PAR should be empowering and lead to people having increased control over their lives (adapted from Minkler and Wallerstein and Grbich). PAR draws on the paradigms of critical theory and constructivism and may use a range of qualitative and quantitative methods²⁰⁵. For instance, a participatory needs assessment would include extensive engagement with local communities and may also include a survey of residents who are less centrally engaged in the participatory process²⁰⁶.

PAR differs from conventional research in three ways. Firstly, it focuses on research whose purpose is to enable action. Action is achieved through a reflective cycle, whereby participants collect and analyse data, then determine what action should follow²⁰⁷. The

²⁰¹ Compeau, D., Higgins, C.A. and Huff, S., 1999. Social cognitive theory and individual reactions to computing technology: A longitudinal study. *MIS quarterly*, p.145.

²⁰² Pettigrew, A.M., 1990. Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. *Organization science*, 1(3), p.271

²⁰³ Baum, F., MacDougall, C. and Smith, D., 2006. Participatory action research. *Journal of epidemiology and community health*, 60(10), p.854.

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Ibid

resultant action is then further researched, and an iterative reflective cycle perpetuates data collection, reflection, and action as in a corkscrew action²⁰⁸. Secondly, PAR pays careful attention to power relationships, advocating for power to be deliberately shared between the researcher and the researched: blurring the line between them until the researched become the researchers²⁰⁹. The researched cease to be objects and become partners in the whole research process: including selecting the research topic, data collection, and analysis and deciding what action should happen as a result of the research findings. Wadsworth (2006) sees PAR as an expression of “new paradigm science” that differs significantly from old paradigm or positivist science²¹⁰. The hallmark of positivist science is that it sees the world as having a single reality that can be independently observed and measured by objective scientists preferably under laboratory conditions where all variables can be controlled and manipulated to determine causal connections. By contrast new paradigm science and PAR posits that the observer has an impact on the phenomena being observed and brings to their inquiry a set of values that will exert influence on the study. Thirdly, PAR contrasts with less dynamic approaches that remove data and information from their contexts²¹¹. Most health research involves people, even if only as passive participants, as “subjects” or “respondents”. PAR advocates that those being researched should be involved in the process actively.

A.2. Ethnographic Research

According to Angrosino (2007), ethnographers search for predictable patterns in the lived human experiences by carefully observing and participating in the lives of those under study. Ethnography may also involve a full immersion of the researcher in the day-to-day lives or culture of those under study. Ethnography as a method has certain distinctive characteristics (Angrosino, 2007). First, it is conducted on-site or in a naturalistic setting in which real people live. Second, it is personalized since you as the researcher are both observer and participant in the lives of those people. Ethnography also collects data in multiple ways for triangulation over an extended period. The process is inductive, holistic and requires a long-term commitment from you²¹². Finally, ethnography is dialogic since

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ Ibid

²¹⁰ Wadsworth, Y., 2006. The mirror, the magnifying glass, the compass and the map: Facilitating participatory action research. *Handbook of action research: The concise paperback edition*, p.322

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² Angrosino, M., 2007. *Doing ethnographic and observational research*. Sage.p.5

conclusions and interpretations formed through it can be given comments or feedback from those who are under study²¹³

In effect, ethnographic research is longitudinal in nature, allowing the researcher to observe and record changes over time²¹⁴. Ethnographic research is both quantitative and qualitative mode of research²¹⁵. According to Angrosino, 2007 there are three mode of ethnographic data collection: Observation, Interviewing and Archival research.

Observation: Participant observation is unique in that it combines the researcher's participation in the lives of the people under study while also maintaining a professional distance (Fetterman, 1998). According to Angrosino (2007), observation is the act of perceiving the activities and interrelationships of people in the field setting. *Interviewing*: Interviewing is the process of directing a conversation to collect information (Angrosino, 2007). *Archival research*: This is the analysis of existing materials stored for research, service or other purposes officially and unofficially (Angrosino, 2007).

The advantages of ethnographic research method are that it permits the researcher over time to observe sorting patterns, such as putting groups into smaller sets, in order to observe the themes in those groupings and a sense establish a sense of possible connections between the information and the data collected²¹⁶. Ethnographic research methods allow to identify outliers, such as cases, situation, events or setting that do not "fit" with the rest of the findings that may be identified. An example in this case could be if one should collect more of such cases.

There are also pitfalls and disadvantages in conducting ethnographic research. Since most ethnographic research requires fieldwork, it also faces the same limitations that field research has (Singleton & Straits, 2005). First, ethnography can be very labour intensive and time consuming. Ethnographic researchers can spend years in the field, this is the longitudinal effect as stated above. Because field research is rarely an entirely detached observation, field participation often becomes a question of "how much" (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Second, balancing the requirements of both participating and observing can be very difficult (Singleton & Straits, 2005). As you become more familiar with the

²¹³ Ibid

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ Ibid

²¹⁶ Sangasubana, N., 2011. How to conduct ethnographic research. *Qualitative Report*, 16(2), pp.567-573.

setting and develops attachment and empathy for, and trust and rapport with those under study, you may be drawn into the lives of those people more as a participant than as an observer. When you become fully immersed in a culture or situation, you risk changing the events in which you observe and participate, perhaps even losing sight of your role as a researcher, thereby “going native” and over-identifying yourself with the group under study (Singleton & Straits, 2005).

To this effect, since my field work research is composed of PAR, longitudinal research method and ethnographic field observations. To this end, my fieldwork consisted of multiple sojourns spent in the field in London and in Accra: first sojourn was in Accra, July-October 2011, second sojourn January-October 2012; a short trip to Accra in April – May 2013; May-July 2017, May-June 2018 and October-November 2018. For the London part of my field work, it consisted of considerable “unofficial” back and forth trips I undertook from June 2010 onwards. The “official” first trip was in December 2012- January 2013, second trip March - April 2013, a third trip March -May 2014, and fourth trip April-August 2016. A total of 28 months was spent in the field in both locations, 18 months in Accra and 10 months in London. Both fieldworks consisted of interviewing members of the Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora in London and the returnee Ghanaian diaspora in Accra.

My fieldwork involved three stages: first stage was a comparative ethnographic study among Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnee diasporans in Accra. A total sample size of 102 respondents were interviewed: 52 interviewed in Accra and 52 interviewed in London. The second stage constituted of a comparative focus group discussion among 30 Nigerian diaspora and 30 Ghanaian diasporans in West and North London, to gauge out their political comportment in the UK in understanding the changing pattern of electoral behaviour among Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora in London. This third stage was of electoral observation and voting patterns of ethnic minority groups in West and North London during the London Mayoral elections held in May 2016 and EU Referendum vote (Brexit Vote) in June 2016. An observer participation method was used as part of my qualitative data collection process in London. For my fieldwork in Accra between 2017-2018, alongside interviews, a

focused group discussion was organised among 20 returnee diasporas on their return trajectory and reintegration process. This was to ascertain how that has influenced their political participation in Ghana. My trip to Ghana in 2017 coincided with the Second Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit organised by the Ghanaian Government. I attended the three-day diaspora summit, where the president and various government ministers made statement and declaration on the government's diaspora and returnee diaspora policies.

As stated above, these fieldwork studies were informed by qualitative ethnographic research approaches, seeking to elicit people's own interpretations of the social realities they faced and their understanding of their own private experiences of their integration in the UK via their political engagement in British politics, transnational political participation towards homeland Ghana and returnee diaspora role in Ghana's democratic governance in Accra. To this effect, an in-depth qualitative data collection was undertaken among both first- and second-generation Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnee diaspora in Accra. Data was collected through structured and unstructured semi-directive interviews alongside observational methods. The aim of these research approaches was to examine the participants in their natural settings whilst at the same time allowing their voices to come to the fore in narrating their own stories. Social and cultural anthropologists have a long tradition of sustained interaction with the research participant in their natural settings in order to investigate the social worlds of individuals under study²¹⁷. In sociology, feminist epistemological approaches for example have long argued for the centrality of people's voices in documenting their experiences, that is for the construction of knowledge and theory in grounded analysis of people's lives (Hill-Collins 1991; Ashfar and Maynard 1994; Reynolds 2002). These researchers place a value on the importance of participants using their language to construct and distinguish aspects of their identities and experience which may otherwise go unnoticed (Maynard and Ourvis 1994).

The ethnographic case studies of comparing Ghanaian diaspora communities in London and returnees in Accra, was based on a similar research design. I selected

²¹⁷ Reynolds, T., 2008. Ties that bind: Families, social capital and Caribbean second-generation return migration. *University of Sussex, Sussex Migration Working Paper, 46*.

these case studies as they exhibited comparable characteristics in terms of their demographic and socio-economic backgrounds in both host country and homeland settings these include their: ethnic orientation, educational background, electoral behaviours, professional status, marital and religious status in London and in Accra. My field work in London also constituted desk research on the history of migration and ethnic minority integration in the UK at the Centre for African Studies and at the department of Migration and Diaspora Studies both at SOAS University of London. In Accra, my field work equally constituted of documentation research at the Centre for Migration Studies and the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana, Legon, these desk research at the University of Ghana was about documentation gathering on return migration to Ghana and its impact on socio-economic and political change in Ghana, but also it involved gathering first-hand information from key research scholars who are specialist of Ghanaian migration and diaspora studies at both the Centre for migration studies and the faculty of Law at the University of Ghana Legon.

A.3.Sampling procedure

The fieldwork exercise and sampling procedure that was used was a combination of survey approach: individual interviews with respondents, small group interviews, focused group discussions and participatory Action research method as noted above earlier in the section on research methodology, where it was stated that at the heart of Participatory Action Research is a collective, self-reflective inquiry that researchers and participants undertake, so they can understand and improve upon the practices in which they participate and the situations in which they find themselves. The reflective process is directly linked to action, influenced by understanding of history, culture, and local context and embedded in social relationships²¹⁸.

An extensive networking was conducted both in Accra and in London to identify these groups to interview. For example, in Accra, in order to meet a wide range of

²¹⁸ Ibid

returnee Ghanaians from the diaspora, I registered and became a member of two Ghanaian returnee diaspora associations namely: Adventures in the Diaspora and Back to my Roots. Becoming a member of these associations in Accra was to meet returnee Ghanaians from different social backgrounds. Which in turn enabled me to gain access to individuals with similar trajectory as returnee diasporas and as such helped in the process of organising a focused group discussion session. Both Adventures in the Diaspora and Back to my Roots Associations in Accra, are associations, exclusively set-up for skilled and professional returnees to meet and network. These diaspora returnees within the aforementioned associations also included the Black Atlantic diaspora returnee from US (African Americans) and Caribbeans living in Ghana. It was important to interview these returnees both Ghanaian and the Black Atlantic diaspora returnees, in order to gauge their impression on issues relating to their experiences while they were abroad and their experiences of their “re-integration and re-adjustment” process in the Ghanaian society both from a political, professional and cultural standpoint. My participation in these returnee diaspora associations was to become an observant participant and to reassure them of their participation and not to directly or indirectly influence any potential respondent’s views regarding their responses of the questionnaire.

To gain access to institutional documentation, data and archive information, I applied for an internship position with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in Accra, Ghana, where I worked on a diaspora engagement project initiated by the IOM and the Government of Ghana. This internship and working on a diaspora project at the IOM Ghana Mission was vital in aiding me to gain access to key and prominent stakeholders within the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Finance. But also gaining access to key personnel within Government agencies such as: The Ghana Immigration Services, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. For data gathering from Academic institutions through the diaspora project at IOM Ghana, it facilitated gaining access to the Head of the Centre for Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana Legon, for interviews pertaining to Ghana Migration policies and Ghanaian diaspora policies and the implementations of various Ghanaian migration policies. Through my work with the IOM, I was also able to recruit

potential respondents for my field work from a wider socio-professional background, who are not only government officials and not only professionals and skilled returnees. My membership with the returnee diaspora associations mentioned above, only allowed me to recruit the elite segments of returnee diasporas, thus their contribution to my data was important as these social categories constitute a visible presence in Accra when dealing with returnee diaspora, nevertheless their profiles are not representative of all returnee diasporas. It was therefore necessary, to cast my net wide in order to have a representative and a wider picture of returnees for my fieldwork. To this effect, it implied the need to include various socio-professional groups in my sample of respondents, as emigration and return Ghanaians consist of various social backgrounds, hence the importance of including non-elite and professional returnees' views in order to have a balanced representation of returnees in Accra.

In terms of my sample representation, I interviewed 32 men and 20 women in London, and in Accra 30 men and 22 women. This, therefore, means that more men were interviewed in both locations, Accra and London. This imbalance of gender representation can be translated as, migration and return migration to Ghana are often dominated by Ghanaian men. This example of male dominance in both sending and receiving countries in migration is not only exclusive to the Ghanaian case, but a widely observed pattern among African migrants, as historically migration has often been associated with male as in most cases men are supposed to be the breadwinner of the household ²¹⁹. Among this sample I interviewed both first- and second-generation Ghanaians in London and Accra nearly 80% of my sample of respondents constituted Ghanaian migrants with higher educational qualification and professionals. This is because this category was the most interested in participating in my study in both locations. In terms balancing of my sample representation among respondents in Accra as noted earlier, through working with IOM Ghana on the diaspora engagement project, I was able to interview involuntary returnees, in other words deported Ghanaians from the diaspora. As prior to working with IOM, it was a challenge and quasi-impossible task of finding deported returnee

²¹⁹ Mazzucato, V., 2008. The double engagement: Transnationalism and integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and the Netherlands. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 34(2), p.200.

Ghanaians to participate in my study. Returning home as a deportee within the Ghanaian society, is viewed with social stigma and shame, since emigration in the Ghanaian social imaginary is often synonymous to prosperity and associated to upward social mobility. This therefore indicates that a deportee is viewed as somebody who has failed in his emigration pursuit. This vision is also shared by some government institution, an example to demonstrate this is a comment made by the former director of Ghana Immigration Services, who pointed out that: “*We have the category of unskilled people; that is the most difficult category who also wants to leave this country to go to other places in search of greener pastures. The way they do it, by going across the desert, means the loss of lives and... you know this comes with a great deal of uncertainties... Meaning the state will have to intervene in their rescue back home, which cost a lot.*”

Ultimately it does not make them good migrants because they are not able to get [legal] settlement and therefore get [financial] returns from their migration in order to remit home to their families. So, their contributions to the country in terms of development from their migration are really very limited²²⁰”.

This comment coupled with the Ghanaian societal image of a deportee, in part provides explanations to the difficulties in finding a deported returnee to interview. As such, working with the IOM was a steppingstone to overcoming this challenge of gaining access to few deported Ghanaians from the diaspora, through the IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return Programme AVR, (IOM assists host countries with the re-integration of deported migrants into their home country communities through specified projects to deter migrants from “re-emigrating” again). The AVR programme is aimed at the reinsertion of deportee migrants with training on skills tailored for their qualification. To this end, without my contacts at the IOM interviewing deported returnees would not have been possible as prior to that, I was only able to meet a handful deportees, who categorically declined to part take in my study. My field work sample also included relying on contacts from some family and friends both in London and in Accra who referred me to other potential respondents.

i). Data collection and interviewing method

The survey was conducted by the means of a semi-structured interview questionnaire with 29 questions for both Accra and London. Semi-structured interviews were used because of two primary considerations. Firstly, they were well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents with regards to complex and sometimes sensitive issues and best suited for probing for more information and clarifications of answers. Secondly, with varied socio-professional, educational and personal histories of the sample group precluded the use of a standardised interview schedule. As far back as 1993, Lazarsfeld discussed that the significance of question construction in sociological research, should conform to the three principles of: specification, division and tacit assumption²²¹. Specification refers to the focus of each question; division to the appropriate sequence and wording of questions; and tacit assumption to determining of the true meanings that lie behind respondent's answers²²². It was therefore important to tread carefully during the field work exercise so as to gain optimal answers from my sample of respondents including indirect answers.

The principles of specification and division were largely addressed in the construction and subsequent testing of the interview schedule on a group of members of Ghanaian political parties in the diaspora. This is discussed in more detail below. Particularly relevant here, however, is Lazarsfeld's principle of tacit assumption. A wide range of ambiguous words and phrases such as: '*they don't care about us when we are outside of Ghana*', '*we have families in Ghana*', '*we send money to Ghana*' were commonly used by respondents in almost every interview in London. Therefore, making it important to interpret the meaning of such statements during each interview.

Further, opportunities for face-to-face contact with respondents and myself stimulated those who were interested in responding to the questionnaire. Which further established a sense of rapport between respondents and me and encouraged some members of the Ghanaian diaspora communities in London and Accra who

²²¹ Lazarsfeld, P.F., 1993. *On social research and its language*. University of Chicago Press.p.10

²²² Ibid

were usually under-represented in previous studies involving the Ghanaian diaspora and transnational politics. By conducting face to face interviews was helpful in improving the validity of the final results. The use of a semi-structured interview also provided in this study with the best method to explore the perceptions and needs of advocating for external voting rights in homeland politics among a diverse group of individuals in the diaspora in different locations and countries. Informal interviews were undertaken to allow for more spontaneous responses, as some of the most interesting responses and discussions with respondents were derived from these informal interview sessions which further aided in gaining a deeper insight into their responses of the questionnaire. This also aided in shaping and testing my initial hypothesis. Semi-Structured interviews also allowed the possibility to analyse data in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

The semi-structured interview was the ideal method as it allowed probing of ambiguous responses. This was conducted through preparing open ended questionnaire which allowed probing, such as going back to respondent's incomplete answers to gently press for more information, (using terms such as, what do you mean by that, what else, please expand etc.) was an invaluable method for ensuring reliability of the data as it allows for the clarification of interesting and relevant issues raised by the respondents (Hutchinson & Skodal Wilson 1992). It provides opportunities to explore sensitive issues and elicit valuable and complete information which enabled me to explore and clarify inconsistencies within respondent's accounts on the one hand, and on the other hand, it also enabled respondents to recall information involving questions they were unsure of (Smith 1992). In addition to the primary data, I also draw on secondary sources including interviews that appeared in national and international media. In such cases the names have been identified as the material is in the public domain. Clearly this is not the kind of phenomenon or which quantitative data are available. However, this gives us an idea on how political participation and transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora is played out in the public arena.

ii) Respondent selection process: (criteria for selection)

Mouw and Verdery, (2012) define a sample from a social network *as one where current respondent help recruit new respondents through either active (when respondents “drive” recruitment by bringing in new subjects) or passive means (when they facilitate contact between researchers and would-be subjects)*²²³. Such an approach is a special case of a “link-tracing” sampling design which can be applied to sampling from any relational network, social or otherwise²²⁴. For sociologists, the motivation to sample from social networks comes from three sources: a) a generally accepted belief that respondents, even stigmatized ones, are more likely to participate and respond truthfully in surveys when they are referred by acquaintances or friends rather than randomly contacted, b) an increasing desire to understand relational network structures and a growing body of theory suggesting the importance of social influence, and c) heightened interest in understanding stigmatized and underrepresented populations²²⁵.

As such, a variety of selection process was used in recruiting respondents such as network process sampling which is a non-probability sampling technique was appropriate to use in this research when members of a population were difficult to locate both in Accra and London. A network process sampling is one in which the researcher collects data on the few members of the targeted population that he or she could locate, then asks those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members of that population whom they know²²⁶. This method was what was used, in identifying that population of people needed for interviews both in Accra and in London. Although network process sampling is hardly likely to lead to a representative sample, as noted earlier with the examples of returnee diaspora associations in Accra, there were times when it was the best or the only method available. For instance, if studying migrant and returnee communities, one is not likely to find all migrants in a specific area within the city. It is through identifying one or two members of the diaspora community in London and returnee diaspora in

²²³ Mouw, T. and Verdery, A.M., 2012. Network sampling with memory: a proposal for more efficient sampling from social networks. *Sociological methodology*, 42(1), pp.206-256.

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ WALDORF, D and BIERNACKI, P, 1981 Snowball Sampling: Problems and techniques of chain referral sampling *Sociological Methods and Research*, Vol. No.2 pp. 141-163

Accra to facilitate gaining access to the rest of members of the community, particularly in the case of locating members of the Ghanaian community in West London boroughs for example. Boroughs within West London are areas with few Ghanaian residents, as such network sampling method was best suited, as being referred to and being recommended by one Ghanaian to other Ghanaians living in the area, made it possible to find and interview some members of the community in that area. Members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London are often located and concentrated in North London boroughs, East London boroughs and South East London boroughs, as is the case of many African and Caribbean communities in London found residing in these boroughs.

To this effect, my contacts in London were drawn from my network within Ghanaian associations in London. I was once an active member of the Ghanaian community in London, as such, I participated in and attended various Ghanaian diaspora events and gatherings from 2001, though I did not hold an official membership card of any hometown association, but through the membership of my family (my parents, my aunts, uncles and siblings) and friends within these hometown associations, I was often invited along with them. As such, I actively participated in: hometown association meetings such as the Northern Ghanaian Associations meeting, Ghanaian professional association meetings. I also attended and participated in other official gatherings such as, the Ghana Independence Day celebration organised by the Ghana High Commission in London (Ghana Embassy in London) and Ghana Union Association end of year Parties held in London.

I regularly participated in Ghanaian political party branch meetings in London since 2004 and was once a card-bearing member of the New Patriotic Party Branch in the UK between 2004-2008. I attended some Ghanaian faith organisations gathering such as the Muslim Associations gathering and Ghanaian church congregation meetings. Frequenting Ghanaian restaurants, Ghanaian grocery shops and frequenting Nigerian social gathering at the Nigerian High Commission in London and Nigerian restaurants in London. Participating and attending the aforementioned diaspora gatherings in London as far back as early the 2000s, gave me a solid network of contacts that I was able to tap into for my fieldwork. As such, it facilitated some meeting schedules with some respondents. Also, through this social network, I was

referred to other networks and potential individuals who might be interested in participating in my fieldwork. Attending these gatherings such as hometown association meetings in London, was a great platform to observe and also recruit potential candidates to participate in the field work, equally with my participation in Ghanaian political party meetings in London, which was an ideal environment to observe and gather information on diaspora voting rights in London. By randomly visiting Ghanaian and Nigerian restaurants and grocery shops, Ghanaian and Nigerian hair dressing salon and barber shops in London were also an interesting place to meet different types of diaspora groups, with different socio-economic backgrounds. These places gave rise to some of the most interesting interviews conducted in an informal manner, and they were interesting places to observe the reproduction of homeland cultural values among diasporans within a transnational space.

Apart from my social network within the Ghanaian and Nigerian community in London, I was an active member of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) group of the Labour Party branch in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in West London from 2004. Through my membership of the BME group, I attended townhall and community meetings on issues involving ethnic minorities living in the area. Also, as a card-bearing member of the Labour Party, I participated in Labour Party meetings in my Local Borough of Ealing in West London, particularly between April-June 2016, during the London Mayoral elections in May 2016 and the Brexit vote in June 2016. Attending such meetings was a platform of engaging in political discussions with local residents and also local political leaders such as with my local MP Dr. Rupa Huq, (who is a second-generation Anglo-Bangladeshi scholar specialized in ethnic minorities studies and migration studies at Kingston University in London) and other local councillors. Canvassing for the Labour Party through door-to-door meetings, phone-ins with local residents during the London Mayoral elections in May 2016 and the UK referendum in June 2016 were avenues for gathering first-hand empirical evidence for my thesis.

Attending these political party meetings and gatherings of the Labour Party branch in London Boroughs of Acton and Ealing in West London, facilitated the interview process with local residents and party leaders. These meeting gave me the

opportunity to engage in national political discussions with my MP Dr. Rupa Huq, and Trade Union representatives of the Labour Party in Ealing and Acton. Many informal conversations at such gatherings also informed my analysis. Due to the nature of my research, I found individuals were much more willing to talk informally at Political Party gatherings but were at times reluctant to be recorded. Equally through my network within the Ghanaian community in London since the early 2000s facilitated my meeting with Anglo-Ghanaian political figures within the Labour Party. It was through such network that I met Lord Paul Boateng whom I interviewed for my thesis fieldwork on ethnic minority political participation in the UK. Through this same network and engagement within the Ghanaian community that I was able to meet and interview two Ghana High Commissioners to the UK (Ghana Ambassador to the UK) Ambassador Kwaku Danso-Boafo 2009-20014 and Ambassador Victor Emmanuel Smith 2014-2017

For my fieldwork sampling process in Ghana, network sampling method was also used among returnee diaspora. My sampling of respondents in Ghana included interviews with high-ranking government officials working on migration and development policies from four key government ministries such as: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Tourism. I also interviewed directors of various government agencies and institutions with links to diaspora policies such as the: deputy director of the Ghana immigration service, Head of Diaspora investment desk at the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), President of the National House of Chiefs. My sample of interviews in Accra also included academic scholars and specialist on the thematic of Ghanaian migration and diaspora topics at the University of Ghana Legon, I interviewed the director of the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana, leading professors of Migrations Laws at the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana Legon. Members and directors of local Think Tanks such as: the director of Centre for Democratic Development (CDD Ghana) and deputy director of IMANI Ghana. To this end, with reference to respondents selection criteria, respondents were selected in London on the basis of being Ghanaian first, and their descendants who either reside in London or who had

relocated to Accra after a long sojourn abroad, particularly those from the UK and especially those who lived in London before returning were more sought after in Accra.

A small sample of 52 respondents was chosen each for both London and Accra because of the difficulties experienced in recruiting the right candidates at the initial and early stage of my field work, the other reason for this sample was also to allow longer period to deeply study the community in London, their activities and their organisation. This sample of 52 respondents in both London and Accra appears or might appear as a small sample in this case study, a smaller sample size was important in gaining quality information from the fewer, than having a larger sample that might be too big to analyse. It is also important to state that this fieldwork exercise was not an attempt to have a complete representative sample, as it is often a challenge, but to have as close to being representative as possible, see chapter one in part two of this thesis with data on the characteristics of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK and returnee diaspora in Ghana. It was equally an attempt to cross examine my sample and hypotheses with past and existing works to further contribute in clarifying the debate on transnational Ghanaian diaspora engagement. To this end, in terms of employment status with my sample, 22% of the sample in London indicated that they were in self-employment, in Accra it was 41% of the sample who stated to be working in self-employment. The rest of the sample occupations in London included teachers 7%, university lecturers 15%, Lawyers 7% journalist 10%, medical doctors 20%. The Accra sample had higher representation within the occupational background, teachers 22%, university lecturers 19%, civil servant 20%. About 80% of my sample respondents in London lived in South-East London and North London. For respondents in Accra all the returnee diaspora interviewed stated that they reside in Accra. For both London and Accra most of the sample respondents interviewed were between the age brackets of 34-50 that is 80% of my sample 10% between 18-34 age brackets and the remaining 10% were over 50 years old, see chapter one of Part two of the thesis which focuses on the social composition of my sample in both London and Accra.

iii) Self-representation as an interviewer

One of the benefits of being positioned as ‘insider’ within a study as noted above, is that it provides the researcher with additional insight and knowledge of the community being studied (Sudbury 1998). I relied heavily on my ‘insider’ status, and knowledge of researching within the Black and Minority ethnic group, African diaspora community and with specific attention to the Ghanaian diaspora in London as stated in earlier section on my social network within both ethnic minority community and the Ghanaian diaspora in London and a card-bearing member of the Labour Party in England. This ‘insider’ position allowed me to play-up or play-down my ‘sameness’ and my ‘difference’ in order to access research participants. I would point out that my ‘sameness’ of being member of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, my position as a partial returnee in Accra. In both locations, London and Accra, I often referred to my Ghanaian compatriots in London and returnee diaspora in Accra as coming from the same place, as a further point of connection with my respondents. During meeting with ‘gatekeepers’ which often friends or family members of respondents and leaders of hometown associations seeking to establish control over access to research settings. In such moments I also used my ‘insider’ status to highlight my “sameness” and “differences” between us. In some instances, I played up the idea that I was researching a community that I belonged to. Yet, in other instances, I would stress my ‘outsider status’, and the fact that not being a member of the hometown association. This meant that I had to safeguard the confidentiality and anonymity of others who agreed to participate in the research. Another primary advantage of my ‘insider status’ is that I could identify and recognize many unexplained and undefined customs and practices that “gatekeepers” performed to control my access to some leaders of certain Ghanaian diaspora associations in London. For example, contacting Ghanaian political party branch leaders in London, (the NDC Party currently in opposition) I anticipated that gatekeepers would ask questions about my personal life, family background and my political affiliations and understanding the structure of the Ghanaian community in London. This understanding of the community set-up in London meant that I went to the meeting fully prepared to be questioned about my professional and personal interest in the study. To this end, my ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status enabled me to utilize both social

and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1988) to establish further contacts that would assist me with cultivating non-purposive research sample.

Probing also maximizes the potential for interactive opportunities between respondents and myself as the interviewer, which helped in establishing a sense of rapport and reduced the risk of socially desirable answers (Patton 1990). Denzin (1989) has suggested that because many interviews convey implicit demands to the respondent (i.e., social desirability) there is often an attempt to present a self that meets these demands.

For example, some respondents in Accra enquired about my personal views in relation to the debate pertaining to diaspora voting rights during the 2012 election, considering myself, a product of the “returnee Ghanaian diaspora community from London”, some wanted to know my position on that before answering the questionnaire. To this effect, I made a consciences decision to distance myself from my work, by not providing information on my views that could later jeopardize or influence the responses of any potential respondents. Self-representation as an interviewer, and personal presentation, i.e., dress, etiquette and manner were important to overcome any potential for bias towards putting the respondent at ease. Furthermore, the full use of interactive opportunities did break the ice with respondents, which reduced tensions and maintained rapport so that the respondent keeps talking. Denzin (1989) has observed that: because many interviews convey implicit demands to the respondent (i.e., social desirability) there is often an attempt to present a self that meets these demands. In other words, respondents answer in what they believe is the ‘preferred social response, whether it is true or not’ (Brink 1989).

iv). Audio tape recording

The use of audio tape was important as it allowed me to ensure that an identical replication of the contents of each interview is available which later facilitated the process of analysis. May (1989) has argued that given the dynamic nature of interviewing and the subtle problems of topic control and data interpretation, the procedures used to log data must be given considerable attention. Audio recording method was chosen, as it provided a detailed insight into the performance of both

the respondents and me as an interviewer. Further, access to the nuances of the interactions between respondent and myself (e.g., intonations, pauses) helped to verify and validate the accuracy and completeness of the information collected. By recording the interviews, also helped in reducing the potential of error, for example, recording data incorrectly, or writing an answer to a question that was not asked. These recorded interviews were also important in clarifying previous responses that the respondents gave and cross checking the accuracy of some responses.

v). The Process of designing field work questionnaire

According to (Denzin, 1989), a faulty design in the development of any research tool could distort the final results. Therefore, after the design and method had been selected, a key data collection phase of my field work was the development of an interview schedule which was both exploratory in order to elicit abstract concepts such as perceptions and sufficiently standardised to facilitate comparison between respondents during analysis. An extensive review of the literature informed the early stages of construction by delineating areas of interest and relevance that I took into consideration and covered during my field work. These broad areas were subsequently broken down into more manageable groupings with notes detailing the purpose for their inclusion prior to questioning formation. The first draft was then exposed to what Mann (1985) had called internal testing, a valuable preliminary assessment by my PhD supervisor, colleagues at IOM Ghana and CDD Ghana in which ambiguities, leading questions and general criticisms were discussed and corrected prior to administering the questionnaires.

The final pilot draft of my questionnaire was exposed to the rigours of the field under conditions similar to those anticipated in other studies to assess: **a.** whether respondents could and would answer the questions asked during the course of the interview; **b.** whether the interview schedule would elicit true differences in the perceptions, attitudes and views towards the need for, and the experiences of diaspora political engagement in British politics and advocating for external voting rights for Ghanaians living in London and returnee diaspora contribution to Ghanaian political governance, Mann (1985).

The pilot or trial phase enabled me to make informed changes and adjustments to the interview schedule before the main data collection. Analysis of the pilot data established the efficiency of the interview schedule in exploring the perceptions and needs of diaspora groups advocating for transnational political inclusion helped informed how data will respond to the analysis. The opportunity to identify each interviewer's ability to clarify inconsistencies within respondents' accounts; in the use of appropriate probing in order to obtain complete and accurate information; and in ensuring the stability of data collection in and between interviews was invaluable in developing my skills as an interviewer. As more importantly, face to face contact was important in motivating respondents to participate, those who would have otherwise not be bothered with the questionnaire, as this was the case with some respondents, when questionnaires were left to be collected later. I soon realized that some questionnaires were not answered by respondents in both fields in London and Accra, this however, prompted the need to meet respondents, face to face, which facilitated the process of interviewing, in some cases it was vital to be present as some respondents were confused as to how to answer some questions, therefore my presence was to clarify those uncertain questions that posed problems for some respondents.

Once access to the diaspora communities in London and returnee diaspora community in Accra were established, contact telephone numbers were exchanged with respondents in order to book and schedule appointment and also give background information of the field work and reassure respondents of their participation, taking into consideration that my field work in 2011 coincided with the beginning of the political campaign for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, as a result, some sections of respondents were sensitive to giving their opinions on anything relating to politics in Ghana. This was particularly the case for those who worked in government as civil servants or had some affiliation with the government. It was, therefore, important to gain their confidence via telephone conversations before the face-to-face interview. Telephone contact were used both by me and the respondents to cancel or re-arrange interviews and it became a valuable link between myself and the sample group. In this regard, all interviews were conducted face to face and not via the telephone. The outcome of this initial

telephone contact enabled me to meet respondents face to face. This high level of face-to-face contact with each potential respondent had three important outcomes:

- a. interest and confidence in the fieldwork visibly increased with several respondents as familiarity with me grew; (although I made a conscious decision to distance myself during interviews, so as to not influence respondent's answers).
- b. Some respondents who were perhaps hesitant about participating initially were able to think about the questionnaires and ask questions over a period of hours and sometimes weeks.
- c. I was able to discuss through telephone discussion with respondents who declined to participate in the study for their reasons for not wishing to participate and asked them if they would complete a brief questionnaire instead.

Firstly, some returnees in Accra and diasporas in London who were not interested in politics either because they were too busy with work or that their political awareness was not a matter of priority to them or for some the absences of political engagement coupled with the lack of formal education necessary in some cases to understand political discourse, they often expressed their surprise to be included in the study. This resulted in some respondents auto-disqualifying themselves from the study propelled me to gently encourage them and reassured them that their participation was valued and relevant just as any other person regardless of their social status and educational background. Many of these respondents would not have participated in this study without personal contact and it is unlikely that they would have completed an exploratory questionnaire about Ghanaian diaspora and political engagement in London without the encouragement and support I offered them. With this noted, there were still some respondents who categorically declined to be interviewed. Secondly, the information obtained from non-respondents was analysed and explored whether a significant relationship for example, had a correlation between non-response and socio-economic status in discussing the validity of the final results.

1.1.9 Challenges and limitations encountered during the field work

During both fieldworks in London and Accra, I encountered challenges in some cases where respondents were reluctant to be interviewed. Only twenty respondents in total in London and Accra indicated that they did not wish to complete the questionnaire and be interviewed at the initial stages. While the overall response rate has been good a few respondents were reluctant to discuss in any detail several issues raised during the interview. A few have been openly hostile even though they agreed to participate earlier on, particularly those who were members of political parties or those working with government agencies were very suspicious about taking part. Uncertainty about the fact that their views would be taken into account during and after election period in Ghana were among several reasons given by some respondents for: **a.** refusing to be interviewed, **b.** feeling apprehensive about being interviewed, **c.** not wishing to answer certain questions during the interview, **d.** refusing to have the interview audio recorded equally.

While it was impossible to always control or plan the circumstances under which a fieldwork project takes place, it was important to have a friendly approach and manner towards respondents which helped enormously with securing validity and reliability of the data. As Patton (1990) has stated: “the quality of the information obtained during an interview is largely dependent on the interviewer”. Visiting each respondent over a period of days and at times weeks to conduct interviews at respondent’s convenience at the weekends or late evening for those who worked night shift, for example amongst some respondents in London, consolidated their interest in the study and secured good response rates. Informal contact and ad hoc visits to members of the diaspora also improved the rapport between respondents and me.

The other biggest challenge I encountered during the fieldwork was the rate of refusal among some members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London who did not want to part take in the interviewing exercise, fourteen refused. The refusal percentage of respondents in London was particularly high, as some gave reasons of not having time due to work commitments, especially some of the non-professional segments of my London sample, as often they had to juggle between multiples jobs in a day, so it was a challenge to get them interviewed. On the other hand, the professionals were easy to recruit, however, when it came to interviewing, some of them

categorically declined to be interviewed citing reasons of not being interested in events in Ghana especially anything pertaining to politics and therefore, they do not think they were qualified to part-take in a study or give any opinion on such issues.

The challenges and difficulties encountered in Accra was less, as only six refused and it was more a question of identifying the right people to interview at the beginning which proved more challenging, as those who were willing to be interviewed were the elite segments of the returnee diaspora population. They were much more at ease and wanting to voice out their political disenchantment, therefore it was a matter of striking a balance in the selection of these elites' returnees, so as to not let the interview process become a platform for outspoken elites to use it for the purpose of political advocacy by some of the elite returnees. Recruiting some political returnees (i.e., returnees who came back to take part in politics) also proved difficult in 2011 and 2012 fieldwork sojourn, especially those in frontline politics also did decline in answering the questionnaire, as some stated they did not want to be mis-quoted or mis-interpreted. Recruiting in-voluntary returnees or deported returnees proved more difficult, they did not want to be identified, as they deemed to have failed in their migration pursuit and that being interviewed will expose them even more. As noted earlier, there was a need to use the IOM's, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme as a channel to recruit non-elite returnees, this was particularly important in overcoming the challenge of balancing my sample representation in Accra.

CHAPTER 2: GENERAL MIGRATION PATTERNS OF GHANAIAN MIGRANTS IN THE WORLD: A population looking towards the homeland

According to Anarfi *et al.* (2003) Ghana's international migration is characterised by four distinct phases:

The first phase, constituted of Ghana being a country of net-emigration, meaning up until the late 1960s Ghana was relatively prosperous economically as such the country attracted migrants particularly from the West African sub-region (Twum-

Baah *et al.* 1995). Ghana continued to attract migrants after its independence in 1957 due to the governments' promotion of pan-Africanism as part of its foreign policy (Anarfi *et al.* 2003). During this time emigration from Ghana was minimal, most emigrants were students or professionals who left for the UK or other English-speaking countries as a result of colonial ties with the UK. Some movements of Ghanaians also took place to other African countries, namely Nigeria, Liberia, Gambia, Botswana and Sierra Leone.

The second phase, beginning in the mid-1960s-late 1970s, Ghana became a country of outbound migration due to political instability starting with the country's first coup d'état in 1966 that overthrew Nkrumah's regime, this coupled with successive coup d'états from 1966-1981 (Twum-Baah *et al.* 1995). Economic decline, characterized by a balance of payment deficit, rising unemployment, and political instability pushed many Ghanaians to emigrate *en masse*²²⁷. Likewise, this economic crisis also contributed to a decline in immigration to Ghana, as it became an increasingly unattractive place for both foreigners and nationals²²⁸.

A third phase was early 1980s: this period was marked by two shifts in migration patterns: professionals and skilled migrants and unskilled migrants began to migrate *en masse* from the southern parts of Ghana and migratory flows spread to more distant destinations in Europe, North America and North Africa (especially Libya)²²⁹.

In the fourth phase 1970s-2000s, migration from Ghana to overseas destinations continued steadily so that in the 1990s Ghanaians came to constitute one of the main groups of 'new African diasporas' (Koser 2003). The primary destinations overseas were the UK, US, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands and these destinations have remained top migration destinations of Ghanaian migrants to date²³⁰.

²²⁷ Twum-Baah, K.A. and Nabila, J.S. eds., 1995. *Migration research study in Ghana*. Ghana Statistical Service.p.10

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰Schans. D, Mazzucato. V, Schoumaker. B, Flahaux. M.L 2013 Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration, MAFE Working Paper 20

By the mid the 2000s thereof, a particular focus on the issue of brain drain resulting from skilled migration from Ghana, notably of doctors and other health care professionals, came to the fore. Some quantitative evidence in Ghana demonstrate that their movement is often stimulated by a desire to obtain specialized training that is unavailable or difficult to access in Ghana (Anarfi, Quartey and Agyei 2010). Many educated young Ghanaians also moved in order to complete higher education, although this is increasingly a major route through which a work permit can be obtained in OECD countries (OECD 2007). Since the mid-1990s-early 2000s, there are some evidences of return migration to Ghana as a result of an improving economy in comparison to neighbouring West African countries to which many Ghanaians migrated. But also due to the tightening of immigration laws and restrictions on travelling abroad, particularly to European countries that require the possession of valid travel and employment documents (Anarfi *et al* 2003; Twum-Baah *et al.* 1995). Furthermore, Ghana regained political stability in 1992 when democratic elections were held after nearly two decades of military dictatorship. In general, though, there is relatively little data on international return migration to Ghana, both in terms of numbers and the impact on the development of the country at large (Black *et al.* 2003a).

As stated above mass emigration of Ghanaians began after the 1966 coup d'état from that period Ghana started experiencing an economic crisis of an unprecedented magnitude (Anarfi, Awusabo-Asare et al. 2000). This was manifested in a balance of payments deficit, growing unemployment and social malaise. The decline of the economy made Ghana unattractive to both foreigners and Ghanaian citizens²³¹. As shown in (figure 1 below) inflation record of Ghana's First Republic under Nkrumah was relatively low and stable, Second Republic under Busia 1969-1972 inflation was rising and with Acheampong's coup d'état in 1972 saw inflation rate skyrocketed, which plunged the economy back into recession²³². The Third Republic under Limann 1979-1981, Ghana's economy was still in recession as inflation continued to skyrocket with yet another coup


²³¹Anarfi, J. and Kwankye, S, Ababio O., and Tiemoko R. 2003, Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper, working paper C4, by the development research centre migration, globalization and poverty.

²³² Ibid

d'état in 1981. The above political crisis coupled with economic decline contributed to the exodus and massive emigration of Ghanaians from 1970-1990²³³.

Ghana's economic problems during the period of 1975 to 1995 is illustrated in figure 4²³⁴. Here gradually Ghana's debt seems to increase every 5 years up until 1995. This is indicative of the severe economic problems the country was facing during the period of military rule.

Figure 0-1 Ghana GDP Per Capita and inflation 1960-98



Source: International Monetary Fund: Ghana report 1999

By the end of the decade, many Ghanaians were travelling outside the country in search of jobs. Most of these emigrants were professionals, and included: doctors, teachers, lawyers, judges and administrators²³⁵. Some of whom were invited by countries such as Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia to assist with their national development after independence (Anarfi, Awusabo- Asare et al. 2000). Others returned to work in the countries where they were trained when the economic conditions in Ghana began to be unfavourable (Anarfi, Awusabo- Asare et al. 2000). Moreover, there were those who travelled initially for education and, or training, but stayed behind after their programme

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ Ibid

²³⁵ Ibid

of study²³⁶. There were also increasing numbers of Ghanaians who were born abroad and either stayed behind when their parents returned to Ghana or went back when they were old enough²³⁷.

This first wave of mass emigration lasted for about ten years from the late 1960s up until the end of the 1970s, there were an estimated 689,431 Ghanaians who fled the country during that period, although there are no quantifiable figures to confirm this assertion²³⁸. The second phase of the large-scale emigration began in the early 1980s and ended in the late 1990s when political refugees, unskilled and semiskilled Ghanaians emigrated out of the country in search of jobs in neighbouring West African countries (Anarfi 1982). The political refugees who fled as a result of Rawlings's last coup d'état in 1981, were mostly in Togo, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. When Ghana adopted economic reforms of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme, (SAP) which led to reduction in national expenditure and cuts in financing some public sectors, implied that many people were impacted by such economic measures. As such, it contributed to another wave of mass emigration from mid 1980s to late 1990s, the number of professionals migrating also increased in response to the demand for their labour abroad and at a time when the economy had collapsed and there were shortages of basic items including detergents and food²³⁹. Migration then became one of the basic survival strategies adopted by individuals and families to enable them to cope with difficult economic conditions. The mass emigration of Ghanaians during that period was perpetuated by political instability which later translated into an economic crisis of high inflation, low income for the household, etc. This political and economic hardship led to a mass emigration of Ghanaians in the sub-region both economic and political migrants. Economic migrants left Ghana for to seek greener pastures abroad. Political migration, concerns those who left Ghana as a result of their direct or indirect implications in various coup d'états that occurred. In sum, both economic and political mass emigration of Ghanaians during that period were perpetrated by the political instability. As already mention Ghanaian emigrants first port of call was in the West African sub region and throughout Africa.

²³⁶ Ibid

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Quartey, P., 2009. *Migration in Ghana: a country profile 2009*. International Organization for Migration. p.59

²³⁹ Quartey. P. 2009. art. cit. p.60

2.2.1: General outlook of Ghanaian migration trends in the world

A. Ghanaian immigrants in Africa

In the early 1980s unofficial figures put the average number of Ghanaians who migrated to Nigeria at about 300 per day (Anarfi, 1982). As of December 1980, about 150,000 Ghanaians had registered with the Ghana High Commission (Ghana Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria) (Anarfi, 1982). The nature of the migration was such that the country lost much of its trained personnel²⁴⁰. For example, in the early 1980s, about 13 per cent of the 163 paid up members of the Ghana Institute of Architects had addresses in Nigeria²⁴¹. It was also estimated that about 50 percent of the architects from the University of Science and Technology had migrated to Nigeria (Anarfi, Awusabo-Asare et. 2000). Similarly, the 1975 census of Côte D'Ivoire recorded over 42,000 Ghanaians were in that country (Anarfi, Awusabo-Asare et. 2000). In 1986, the number of Ghanaians in Côte D'Ivoire was estimated to be between 500,000 and 800,000 (Anarfi, Awusabo-Asare et al. 2000). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975 precipitated further Ghanaian emigration to neighbouring West African countries²⁴². One of the objectives of the regional organisation was to facilitate freedom of movement, residence and employment within the community²⁴³. It is estimated that about two million Ghanaians emigrated and benefited from these new regulations between 1974 and 1981, mainly from southern Ghana²⁴⁴.

²⁴⁰Anarfi. J. and Kwankye. S, Ababio O., and Tiemoko R. 2003, art.cit. p. 20


²⁴¹Quartey. P. 2009. Art. cit.p.62

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ Ibid

Figure 0-2:Map 4: Ghanaian Migration destination in West Africa



Map, by Valerie Alfaut, Source: IOM migration profile for Ghana

Another indication of the number of Ghanaians who travelled outside is derived from the estimated number of Ghanaians among people deported from Nigeria in 1983. It is estimated that of the two million people deported from Nigeria in 1983, between 900,000 and 1.2 million were Ghanaians²⁴⁵. This figure for deported Ghanaians from Nigeria, excludes the professionals and their dependents who were not affected by the deportation exercise, Adeku worked out the number of Ghanaian immigrants in major world regions from the 1984 census returns (Adeku 1995). The mass expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria indicates two things: on the one hand, the difficulties in Ghana that drove many to leave the country, on the other hand, was the economic pull to Nigeria due to the oil boom of the 1970s.

²⁴⁵Bump. M 2006, Ghanaian Migrants searching for opportunities Home and Abroad: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ghana-searching-opportunities-home-and-abroad>

The exodus of Ghanaians to neighbouring countries continued through the 1990s to present day. Nonetheless, the most recent phase of emigration of Ghanaians is more importantly characterised by diasporisation, which had begun in the middle of the 1980s. Initially, Nigeria became a major point of destination again for Ghanaians as stated above. But with the expulsions of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, the destination countries of migrants became more diverse, particularly for professionals. Furthermore, some professionals took advantage of the then strong value of the Nigerian Naira to travel to Europe, America and other African countries while the semi-skilled workers tried to go wherever they could. A recent study on Ghanaian migrants' population in 2005 observed that countries within the African sub-region was the main destination for Ghanaian emigration. In terms of destination, 689,431 Ghanaians over 71 per cent of the total number of Ghanaian immigrants live in ECOWAS countries (DRC, 2007). The principal destination remains Côte D'Ivoire, with 305,648 Ghanaian residents, followed by Nigeria and Burkina Faso with 125,052 and 93,320 Ghanaian residents, respectively²⁴⁶. These three nations account for 55 per cent of the total number of Ghanaian citizens residing abroad.

The characteristics of Ghanaian migration has increasingly become extra-regional, since the decline of Nigeria as a major destination pull for Ghanaian migrants in the 1980s. Although most Ghanaian immigrants (71%) still stay within the region of West Africa, a growing proportion is migrating to a diverse range of countries outside the region (DRC, 2007). Some of whom headed towards Southern African countries such as Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and newly independent Zimbabwe, Europe or other destinations (Van Hear 1998, Adepoju 2005). It has been estimated that in the early 1990s more than half of the Ghanaian elite lived outside the country (Puy-Denis 1994 in Ammassari 2009:82).

B. Ghanaians in Western Europe

Van Hear classifies Ghana as one of the ten countries involved in producing a 'new diaspora' in recent times (Van Hear 1998). Since the 1990s, large numbers of Ghanaians have moved to major cities such as London, Amsterdam, Hamburg and New York (Black, Tiemoko et al. 2003). Ghanaian diasporas are now located in various countries around the world notably in Europe and the United States and Canada. Below in Map 5 shows the top five destinations of Ghanaian migrants in the Western countries.

²⁴⁶ Ibid

The largest Ghanaian population in Europe is located in Britain. There are sizable Ghanaian populations in Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. Official German statistics state that there were more than 20,000 Ghanaian passport holders residing in Germany as of the end of 2004²⁴⁷. Ghanaians represent the third-largest African community in Germany after Moroccans and Tunisians²⁴⁸. Most of the Ghanaians who arrived in Germany between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, a time when Germany had relatively liberal asylum and work authorization procedures²⁴⁹. After 1993, Germany put in place a more restrictive migration policy, and the number of Ghanaians entering the country dropped significantly²⁵⁰. Ghanaians are a relatively new migrant group in the Netherlands²⁵¹. In contrast to more established Moroccan and Turkish migrant groups, who were welcomed to the Netherlands in the 1960s as guest workers during a period of economic growth, most Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands have informal status²⁵². According to Statistics in the Netherlands, the country was home to 18,000 Ghanaians in 2003²⁵³. However, researchers indicate that a more reliable figure is approximately 40,000, based on the number of Ghanaians residing in the Netherlands who registered to vote for Ghana's presidential elections in 2000²⁵⁴.

In Italy, as in the Netherlands, Ghanaians began to settle permanently in the 1980s in their effort to escape economic and political hardship at home. Figures on the Ghanaian population in Italy was 11,443 in 1990 by 2004 the Ghanaian population was 32,754²⁵⁵. Most Ghanaians in Italy entered illegally or became illegal by overstaying visas but were able to regularize their status by taking advantage of the numerous immigrations amnesties the Italian government has passed in the last 20 years²⁵⁶. As of January 2004, more than 3,600 Ghanaians had regularized their status under the 2002 amnesty, known as the Boss-Fini law²⁵⁷.

²⁴⁷ Ibid

²⁴⁸ Ibid

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ Mazzucato, V. 2004 Ghanaian Migrants' Livelihoods: A Transnational View of Development and Reintegration Policies,

²⁵² Ibid

²⁵³ Ibid

²⁵⁴ Ibid


²⁵⁵ Ibid

²⁵⁶ Ibid

²⁵⁷ Ibid

North America has also become an attractive destination for Ghanaians. From 1986 to 2001, 49,703 Ghanaians emigrated to the US²⁵⁸. By 2001, 104,000 Ghanaians were living in the US, whilst 114,335 were registered in Canada. According to a report written by the Migration Policy Institute in 2015 which estimated that 235,000 Ghanaian immigrants and their children (first and second generation) live in the UK²⁵⁹.

Figure 0-3: Map:5 Ghanaian migration destinations to Western countries



Map by Valerie Alfaut LAM 2015, Source: IOM migration profile for Ghana

The Ghanaian population in the UK in 2016 remains the highest in Europe. According to the UK Home Office, Ghana

was among the top ten sending countries to the UK in 1996, and in the decade of 1990–2001 about 21,485 Ghanaians entered the UK. The 2011 UK census recorded 93,312 Ghanaian-born residents in England²⁶⁰. In 2016 the UK office for National Statistics estimates that the Ghanaian-born population of the UK was 96,000²⁶¹. For the 2019 data on foreign born population in the UK, the Office for National Statistics in the UK estimated that Ghanaian-born population sits at 114,000²⁶². A study conducted by the Organisation

²⁵⁸ Arthur, J.A., 2016. *The African diaspora in the United States and Europe: the Ghanaian experience*. Routledge.

²⁵⁹ Migration Policy Institute Paper, May 2015 The Ghanaian diaspora in the United States

²⁶⁰ Office for National Statistics 2011 data on country of birth on migrants in the UK: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/census-data/2011-census-prospectus/index.html>

²⁶¹ Office for National Statistics 2016 data on migration figures in the UK: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Migration>

²⁶² Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality: individual country data: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/pop>

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2001 correlates with the UK Census figures on Ghanaians in the UK. The OECD data on Ghanaians in the UK indicates that 56,112 Ghanaian-born people living in the UK ²⁶³.

Table 2: Ghanaian nationals residing in Europe and North America 1999-2006

Country	Emigrants	Year
UK	96,650	2006
USA	67,190	2000
Italy	34,499	2005
Germany	20,636	2004
Canada	17,070	2001
Netherlands	12,196	2007
Spain	12,068	2006
France	4,096	1999

Source: www.ines.es (Spain); www.istat.it (Italy); www.ined.fr (France); www.cbc.nl (Netherlands); Labour Forces Survey 2006 (UK); Federal Statistical Office, 2004 (Germany), Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Office, 2001 (Canada); and Census Bureau, 2000 (USA)

The above table on the Ghanaian population in the UK does not correlate with the estimates that the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK 2009-2014 (Ghana ambassador to the UK) Prof. Danso-Boafo gave during an interview in London in 2010, he estimated that about 100,00 Ghanaians registered with the mission whilst this excluded those who had not made themselves known to the High Commission (Ghana Embassy). ²⁶⁴ To follow-up on these figures, in June 2016 in an interview with the new Ghana High Commissioner to the UK, Ambassador Victor Smith (2014-2017) who stated that the figures on Ghana nationals residing in the UK could surpass 600,000 he also noted that

[ulationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets](http://www.inec.org.uk/underlyingdatasheets)

²⁶³OECD data on UK migrant's country of birth 2001: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls>

²⁶⁴ Fieldwork interview with Prof. Danso-Baffoe, 10th June 2010, London


these figures could be speculative because it includes those who are not registered at the High Commission²⁶⁵.

This growth can be attributed in part to the steady growth in the number of Ghanaians who received student visas, work permits, and refugee status throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium²⁶⁶. Ghana did not feature in the 2011 UK census of top ten countries of non-British born migrants, which could partly indicate that in recent years the flow of emigration from the Ghana to Britain might have halved due to the current political stability and economic growth that the country has witnessed. As a result, Ghanaians in UK census are included “All non-UK born” category as seen in figure 3. This could also mean that Ghanaian migrants in the UK are part of the settled category than recent arrivals, hence the lack of explicit figures of Ghanaian migrants in the UK census of recent times as shown in below figure 4.

Figure 0-4: Top ten non-UK countries of birth of usual residents in England and Wales in 2011 by year of arrival

²⁶⁵ Fieldwork interview with Ambassador Victor Smith in London 27 May 2016

²⁶⁶ Quartey. P. 2009. Art. cit.p.70



Source: Office for National Statistics: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html>

Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated in 2008 that Ghanaian immigrants can be found in more than 33 countries around the world. Estimates of the Ghanaian emigrant population abroad range from 1.5 million (Twum Baah, 2005) to 3 million (Black et al., 2003). There are conflicting data as to how many Ghanaians are abroad. The government of Ghana stated in 2011, that there was an estimated figure of about 7.5 million Ghanaians residing abroad in the Constitutional Review Commission's report, which also showed that out of the 7.5 million over the half were located within the sub-region in Africa²⁶⁷. Whereas figure by the IOM and UNDP states the opposite, they estimate 3 million Ghanaians to be living abroad²⁶⁸. The government of Ghana's overestimation of the number of Ghanaians residing abroad can be explained by the lack of accurate statistics both in Ghana and at Ghana diplomatic missions abroad, also the assumption that the more Ghanaians send remittances home serve as an indicator of their numbers abroad²⁶⁹. Graph 1 shows the rise in remittances to Ghana from remittance in 2006 recorded was \$105 million, in 2007 it went up to \$ 117 million, for 2008 126 million, in 2009 it


²⁶⁷Report of the Constitutional Review Commission presented to President Mills on 20th December 2011, copy of the report was issued to me by Dr. Raymond Atuguba Executive Secretary of the Commission and senior lecturer at the faculty of Law university of Ghana Legon, on 30th September 2012 during my fieldwork in Accra.

²⁶⁸ Fieldwork data IOM Ghana 2012

²⁶⁹ Fieldwork discussions with David Appiah, IOM Ghana mission May 2012

decreased a little to \$ 114 million, this could be the result of the 2008 economic crisis in US and Europe, in 2010, and it went up to \$ 119 million.

*Figure 0-5. Ghana: Total Inward Remittance Flows *in USD Millions, 2006-2009*



Source: World Bank Migration and remittances Factbook. N.B: 2010 data refers to estimates


According to The Bank of Ghana, remittances to Ghana from individuals, hometown associations, religious organizations and NGOs in 2013 all amounted to over \$4.5 billion²⁷⁰, making it the largest source of foreign exchange for the country, thus these figures show a considerable increase from those of \$110 million in 2010 (Owusu-Ankomah 2006; see also De Hass 2007; Mazzucato et al. 2005). In figure 6. below indicates the trend of remittance follow to Ghana and from Ghana in 2012. This illustrates that there are more remittances from abroad, than sending remittance from Ghana to various parts of the world. What this indicates is that remittances from abroad to Ghana are common practice rather than the other way round.

As shown below, remittances from Ghanaians living abroad to Ghana have been on the increase since 2010, remittance flow in 2010 was 135 million; it increased in 2011 to 2.1 billion; in 2013 recorded remittance was 1.8 billion; for 2014 remittance was 2. billion; 2016 remittance was 3 billion. From 2017 figures has remained stable 3.5 billion for 2017; 3.5 billion in 2018 and 2019 3.5 billion²⁷¹.

²⁷⁰Tonah. S. 2007. art.cit pp.39

²⁷¹ [Personal remittances, received \(current US\\$\) – Ghana 1979-2019: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=GH](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=GH)


Figure 0-6: Personal remittance to Ghana 1979-2019



Source: World Bank website:


<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=GH>

Figure 0-7: Remittance Inflows to Ghana by Sending Country and the Emigrant Population, 2012



Source: Migration Policy Institute analysis of the World Bank Prospects Group tables for annual remittance inflows and outflows (October 2013 update) and the 2012 Bilateral Remittance Matrix, the World Bank's World Development indicators, and the United Nations Population Division's Matrix of Total Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination (mid-2013).

Figure 0-8: Ghana Remittance, percentage of GDP



Source : https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Ghana/remittances_percent_GDP/

A recent study on remittances to Ghana provided a data from 1979 to 2018. Which observes that the average value for Ghana during that period was 1.36 percent with a minimum of 0.01 percent in 1983 and a maximum of 10.13 percent in 2015²⁷². The latest value from 2018 is 5.37 percent²⁷³. These figures demonstrate how over the years remittances has been increasing, and therefore explains why the government overestimates and in some instances “exaggerate” the data of Ghanaians abroad due to the financial benefit migration tends to bring to the country in economic terms.

2.2.2 Waves of Ghanaian migrants in the United Kingdom: First generation (1800-1930)

Ghanaians have had a long history of travelling abroad as it has been demonstrated above, particularly to Britain this is for the purposes of education or for professional reasons. This has enabled a community to emerge in London and cities such as Birmingham, Nottingham, Bristol, Liverpool and other English cities. This historical bond between Ghana and Britain through the Commonwealth has seen many Ghanaian migrants making London their home. Ghanaians in London represent one of the largest and oldest West African communities in the capital. The vibrancy of its culture means that for many Londoners their very conception of what is African at times derives from a Ghanaian

²⁷² The Global Economy website, Ghana Remittances: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Ghana/remittances_percent_GDP/

²⁷³ Ghana: Remittances as percent of GDP: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Ghana/remittances_percent_GDP/

culture²⁷⁴. Music, sport and fashion in London are just some of the cultural forms that owe much to Ghanaian Londoners²⁷⁵. This chapter will, however, review the historical presence of Ghanaians in Britain, their immigration waves dating back from 1800, to the post World War II Ghanaian elite emigrants to the mass emigration period of post-independence years of political instabilities and the formation of a collective diasporic identity and community in London.

The first wave of migration of Ghanaians to the UK could be traced from the 17th century when young Ghanaian men from fishing towns of Takoradi and Cape Coast found themselves as seamen in the port cities of Liverpool, London, and Bristol. Along with the Sierra Leonean Kru community in these port cities, the Kru community was already a well-established community²⁷⁶. These young Ghanaian men were mainly laborers working at the docks but among these early migrants also existed a small elite group, these were children of wealthy Akan families who sent their children to study in the UK. The colonial government also recruited young men to educate them in the UK, so that they could return home and occupy positions and also play an intermediary role between the colonial regime and the locals²⁷⁷. The Church of England also played an important role in sending some of these young boys from the Gold Coast to educate them as missionaries, upon their return home, they could play a paramount role in spreading the religion²⁷⁸. The presence of Ghanaians in the UK could also be traced through the role they played during both World Wars, as there were soldiers from the Gold Coast and other Commonwealth colonies who came to fight for the metropolis alongside British soldiers in Great Britain and after the war some settled in the UK to work in manual occupations²⁷⁹. The presence of soldiers from Commonwealth countries during the war years also contributed to the presence of settled migrants' communities in the UK including Gold Coasters. This observation of early settlements of war time Commonwealth soldiers in Britain is not exclusive to Britain, there was also a similar

²⁷⁴ Fieldwork interview with Mohammed Abdul Saaka 12 December 2012

²⁷⁵ Ibid

²⁷⁶ Jenkins. R. 1985, Gold coasters overseas, 1880–1919: With specific reference to their activities in Britain, *Immigrants & Minorities: Historical Studies in Ethnicity, Migration and Diaspora*, 4:3, 5-52

²⁷⁷ Jenkins. R. 1985, Gold coasters overseas, 1880–1919: With specific reference to their activities in Britain, *Immigrants & Minorities: Historical Studies in Ethnicity, Migration and Diaspora*, 4:3, 5-52

²⁷⁸ Jenkins. R. 1985, *Gold art.cit.* p.55

²⁷⁹ Jenkins. R. 1985, *art. cit.* p.56

pattern in France during and after the war years, when soldiers from Francophone Africa and from the French West Indies who fought for France²⁸⁰. These wartime periods in France also marked the beginning of migrants' settlement in France from the colonies²⁸¹. A noticeable case of such settlement are *Les tirailleurs sénégalais* in France.

The search and struggle for education and professional qualifications was the most significant with wealthy Gold Coast families sending their children to study abroad as early 1849²⁸². About 100 pursued academic and professional courses at different institutions of higher education or advanced training in Britain, between 1880 and 1919²⁸³. This 'old' practice²⁸⁴ as it is often referred to, was initiated by expatriate European trader administrators, by sending their mixed-race offspring and 'merchant princes' to be educated in Europe²⁸⁵. A liberal education in English private schools, such as Queen's College (formerly Wesley College) served to assimilate children, in a cultural sense, and to provide them with the skills to participate in the family business or to enter local colonial administration or as unqualified licensed attorneys. This 'old' practice continued, albeit a lesser degree, by members of the established business families and the 'new' trading families, particularly in Accra locality²⁸⁶. Very well-known Ghanaian families to date such as: John Mensah Sarbah, his younger brother Joseph Dutton Sarbah, his cousin W.B. Hagan and his nephew, Kobina Sekyi, all went to Queen's College. However, most of the sons of prominent Euro-African families gained their early educational experiences in the Gold Coast, elementary and primary school at Wesleyan School, middle schools of the Basel Mission in Accra²⁸⁷. The Government primary schools in Cape Coast and Accra were also important educational bastions, particularly the latter for the children of Anglophone families in Accra.

²⁸⁰ Keaton, T.D., Sharpley-Whiting, T.D. and Stovall, T., 2012. *Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness*. Duke University Press.

²⁸¹ Ibid

²⁸² Idem

²⁸³ Idem

²⁸⁴ The old practices during the 1800, was often referred to wealthy families of Accra, central region and Western region whereby they were able to send their children to study abroad. Most became wealthy in trading products between the Coastal regions and abroad. These family were often descents of Euro-African families. This was only reserved to a certain social category who could afford to send their off springs abroad.

²⁸⁵ Jenkins. R. 1985, art. cit. p.58

²⁸⁶ Ibid

²⁸⁷ Jenkins. R. 1985, Art.cit. 52

It was the sons of Accra's wealthy families who dominated the struggle for overseas qualifications and professional experience in law, medicine and business²⁸⁸. By 1919, Euro-African families of Accra had produced twice as many lawyers as those from Cape Coast locality²⁸⁹. Euro-African doctors in the Gold Coast came exclusively from Accra-based families who were mostly educated in Britain. It is also significant to note that most of those, whose educational careers took them outside the Gold Coast, to Freetown, Lagos or Britain, were the sons of teachers and preachers in the Wesleyan and Basel Missions or 'new' traders from Anglophone Accra, meaning the educated elites could speak English²⁹⁰. The sons of established businessmen tended to go directly to Britain for secondary and then advanced education as, for example, the Hutchisons, Sarbahs, and later, the Hutton-Mills²⁹¹. Works on Gold Coasters abroad shows that the search for employment saw some Gold Coasters in 1914 to stay behind after their studies, this also demonstrates the early trend of voluntary migration of elite and non-elite Ghanaians to Britain. Gold Coasters such as James Ahuma Solomon Junior, James Hutton Brew and William Francis Hutchison, appear to have entered employment in Britain as lawyer, land company promoter and journalist, respectively²⁹². All three probably received their early education in England and all three became 'long-stay' expatriates in London²⁹³. It seems that their entry into employment and 'exile' were results, rather than the causes, of their initial visits to Britain in 1880, 1888 and 1898 respectively²⁹⁴. While Solomon's immediate purpose was apparently education and Brew's to pursue a legal case in the British courts; both men, like Hutchison, had had business interests in the Gold Coast and it is likely that these formed a strong element in their motives for travelling to Britain²⁹⁵. The career of Arthur Wharton is also illustrative of the various ways in which a temporary migration in this case, educational visit could result in an unforeseen and enforced 'exile' and, as a consequence, in the need to compete for employment in provincial Britain, during the "Great Depression"²⁹⁶.

²⁸⁸Jenkins. R. 1985, Art.Cit.56

²⁸⁹ Ibid

²⁹⁰ Ibid

²⁹¹ Ibid

²⁹² Ibid

²⁹³ Ibid

²⁹⁴ Idem

²⁹⁵ Ibid

²⁹⁶Jenkins. R. 1985, art.cit pp. 44

The presence of Gold Coasters could also be traced through the promotion of missionary work as indicated above. Gold Coasters were used by the Church of England and trained as missionaries to later return to their home countries and local villages or towns to advance the message of the church, which was also a means of gaining control over some territory through the spread of religion²⁹⁷.

The example of such early Gold Coaster missionary was Philip Quaque. Philip Quaque was the first African to be ordained as a Minister of the Church of England in 1816²⁹⁸. He was born Kweku in a town called Cape Coast, a town known as one of the first place Europeans settled in the Gold Coast, as a result, most of Ghana's early educated elites during that period emerged mostly from the Western and Central regions of today's Ghana²⁹⁹. Kweku arrived in Britain in 1754 for his education in theology alongside his two brothers after which they were meant to return and propagate the gospel to their local communities. After being baptized in 1759, Kweku changed his original Gold Coast name to Philip in London, changing his name from Kweku to Philip was equally a sign of losing his identity and embracing a new identity, this was a sign of "full" integration among Gold Coasters in Britain at the period³⁰⁰. After successfully completing his four-year study of theology, he was ordained in the Church of England in 1765³⁰¹.

Quaque later returned to the Gold Coast, where he was employed by the Royal African Company as chaplain of Cape Coast, where hailed from originally³⁰². Upon his return to his home town of Cape Coast, he attempted to work as a missionary, but having forgotten most of his native tongue, the Fante language, due to his long stay in England and having totally embraced the British way of life. It was difficult to fit back into his local community, as he was unable to communicate with people in the communities. It is important to note here that not all the local people could speak or understand English at that period, only those who had formal education

²⁹⁷ Ibid

²⁹⁸ African Travellers of the Eighteenth Century [sic]. Philip Quaque, "The Letters of Philip Quaque," 1765-1811: <http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R03771.pdf>

²⁹⁹ Ibid

³⁰⁰ Ibid

³⁰¹ Ibid

³⁰² Ibid

were able to express themselves in English. This therefore posed problem for some returnees of that period, as their quest of full integration into their host countries often made their home return and re-integration process back into their local community difficult and challenging. This might have been the contributing factor why some Gold Coasters abandoned their quest to return back and stayed behind in Britain and in turn forming a Ghanaian community or diaspora ³⁰³.

Another major era of relatively “mass” migration of Ghanaians to the UK began in 1920 onward when young, educated Ghanaians arrived in the UK to further their studies and to later return home to occupy prominent positions alongside the colonial government. By the 1940s, some of these students became more and more politicised, as they mingled with students from other Commonwealth countries who were very much against the colonial rule and were also very much influenced by the civil right movements in the US³⁰⁴. As students, these influences raised their political awareness and incited some of them to participate in politics once they returned home, mainly to contribute to the struggle for independence and to bring an end to colonial rule³⁰⁵. Subsequently, these returnee students considered themselves as the future members of the educated elites. They came back and were often referred to as “been to”, as they came back with British education, culture, etiquette and lifestyle and were proud of that (Jeanett 2004). They were part of the ‘fortunate few’ who were trained abroad and returned home to take up leadership positions in private enterprises, industry, politics, the civil services and institutions of higher education in the country (Clignet and Foster, 1966; Nieswand 2003). For those who were married to British further facilitated their integration within British society. As a result, part of this established educated and business elite, who have settled and made homes in Britain had weaker ties to Ghana as the years went by. Among them were many who considered themselves “cultured or civilized” and did not appreciate their African roots, cultures and tradition at least that was the impression they created (Ter


³⁰³African Travellers of the Eighteenth Century [sic]. Philip Quaake, "The Letters of Philip Quaake," 1765-1811: <http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R03771.pdf>

³⁰⁴Leighley, J. L and Arnold V; 1999 Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, and No.4 Nov. pp. 1092-1114

³⁰⁵Jenkinson, J 2000, Black British history and the issue of race, *Immigrants & Minorities*, 19:3, 79-91

Haar 2005: 314). As shown in Map 6 below depicting areas of the Ghanaian community in London, of recent times, these areas have had a long history of Ghanaians living there dating back from the 1920s to present day.

Figure 0-9 Map 6: Map of London Areas with highest concentration of Ghanaian migrants



Source: field work results London 2011. Map by V. Alfaut LAM 2015

Today, Ghanaians are found all round London, but they are concentrated mainly in East, North and South East London in areas such as: Dalston, Brixton, Peckham, Lewisham, Elephant and Castle, Croydon, Greenwich, Seven Sisters, Tottenham and Edmonton. These are also areas with existing Commonwealth migrants and other migrants' communities. These are equally areas where the cost of living is less expensive including finding cheaper accommodation.

So far, this chapter has been focused on the history of the presence of first-generation arrival of Ghanaians in the UK, the causes of their emigration and the early establishment of a Ghanaian community in Britain. The following sub-chapter will discuss, the arrival of the second wave -generation of Ghanaian migrants in Britain and how that influenced

their political consciousness. More so the role that these returnees second wave-generation of migrants contributed to the struggle for Ghana's independence and the formation of Ghana's political ideologies and political traditions: the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busia political traditions which has been the two main political traditions that has and continuous to govern the country since independence.

2.2.3 Political connection between Ghanaian politics and expatriation: Second-Wave Generation 1940-1960: The “pioneers” of Independence - Nkrumah and Busia

“You will ever remember that all the end of study is to make you a good man and useful citizen”.

John Adams³⁰⁶

The second phase of Ghanaian emigration to the UK, was in the 1940s-1960s. This wave of emigration in the UK was reserved for the education and the training of future elites thus few came to the UK as economic migrants. This quest for education brought many young Ghanaians to the UK, since there were no higher educational institutions such as university establishments in Ghana at the time, therefore, to pursue higher education, young Ghanaians had no choice but to travel to the UK or the US. The absence of higher educational institution in Commonwealth Africa meant that England became home to many Commonwealth African students from Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, etc. Most of these young African students in the UK gained their political consciousness and training abroad, being mostly influenced by the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s in the US and also the influence of the cold war era ³⁰⁷.

Among this clique of African students in the UK emerged political leaders such as: Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Hastings Banda and Julius Nyerere. Among this group also emerged some Ghanaian political leaders from the diaspora such as Kwame Nkrumah and Kofi Abrefa Busia and many others.

³⁰⁶ John Adam Historical Society: <http://www.john-adams-heritage.com/quotes/>

³⁰⁷ Adi. H. 2000, Pan-Africanism and West African Nationalism in Britain African Studies Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, Special Issue on the Diaspora, p.70

In this sub-chapter I will analyse and discuss emigration of educated Ghanaian elites in the UK and how that contributed to their political awakening in both their host country and upon their return to their homelands. As such, to what extent did their voyage and sojourn abroad influenced the struggle for Ghana's independence. I will first start with a brief biography of the president of Ghana's first republic, Osagyfo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and second republic Prime-Minister Kofi Abrefia Busia. This is to demonstrate how their sojourn in the UK shaped and formed their political ideologies, I will further emphasize that whilst in the UK they became the political pioneers of Ghana's diaspora politicization, and that today's bi-partisan politics in Ghana can be traced from the political ideologies of the first and second republics of Ghana. Before proceeding further to the analysis of these diaspora leaders in Ghana's politics, it is however vital to note that diaspora politicization of Ghanaians, did not start with these second-wave generations of Ghanaian migrants in the UK. It started with the first generation-wave of Gold Coast migrants as demonstrated in the previous chapter, to this end diaspora politicization gained more currency and importance with the second generation-wave. This is mainly due to the historical context in which the second generation-wave found themselves – at the height of the cold war era and the civil rights movement in the United States.

2.2.4 Nkrumah and Busia: The making of pioneer political diaspora

These two main characters who epitomize Ghana's independence struggle among many others was Osagyfo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia who were all products of the diaspora. There are close similarities between Nkrumah and Busia in terms of their life trajectory in many ways. But equally there are differences also in terms of their political ideologies.

Nkrumah's political ideology is based on the left/socialist anti-imperialist tendency, whereas Busia's is on the centre/right, pro-West. They both came from rural Ghana with a humble beginning. They both had an appetite for education with a strong religious background. This appetite for education took them from their rural areas to big cities and the capital of Ghana, Accra. They both had scholarships to study at the prestigious Achimota College in Accra. They both equally went and furthered their education in

England, where they gain their political consciences³⁰⁸. As it has been mentioned above, studying the life trajectories of these leaders, is to enable us to understand the early formation of political diaspora from Ghana. To begin we will start with Nkrumah's life and political trajectory.

Among all the major leaders of the post-war anticolonial struggle in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah stands out as both the best known and the most controversial figure in the history of the African decolonisation era³⁰⁹. Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, the country Nkrumah led to independence in 1957, owes its historical significance as the first African country to gain its independence in the 20th century as well as its political weight in African affairs to Nkrumah's outstanding qualities as a Pan-Africanist freedom fighter³¹⁰. Over the past thirty years, several biographies and auto-biographies have been written about the life and political contribution of Nkrumah in Ghana, Africa and the diaspora. Often these biographies of Nkrumah tend to treat his views as a freedom fighter, civil liberty fighter and a "great" Pan-Africanist³¹¹. However, very few of such works has really delved into Nkrumah's background in Ghana and the years he spent abroad, how that played a role in shaping his thinking. The two main works that have looked into Nkrumah's formative years in Ghana and abroad are: *Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad 1935-1947* by Marika Sherwood and *The Black Star: Nkrumah Years abroad* by Basil Davidson. These two books contrary to many others provide a rich insight into the politically formative years of Nkrumah abroad, particularly for the ten years he spent in America 1935-1945 and the crucial two years in England 1945-1947

In Marika Sherwood's (1996) book on Nkrumah's biography: *Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad 1935-1947*. Sherwood (1996) notes that Frances Nwia-Kofi Nkrumah, his given name at birth, was his mother's only child. His early schooling as a pupil and then a pupil teacher in Roman Catholic schools in rural Ghana coupled with his training at the elite Achimota Collage in Accra were indispensable to his overall intellectual development according Sherwood³¹². Sherwood further states that it was the academic training and political education received during those twelve difficult years abroad that

³⁰⁸Adi. H. 2000, Pan-Africanism and West African Nationalism in Britain African Studies Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, Special Issue on the Diaspora, pp. 69- 82

³⁰⁹ Sherwood. M 1996, Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad 1935-1947, Freedom publication Legon p.18

³¹⁰ Ibid

³¹¹ Ibid

³¹² Sherwood. M 1996, Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad 1935-1947, Freedom publication Legon p.18

formed Kwame Nkrumah into the great nationalist and Pan-Africanist leader that he became known to the world for³¹³. According to Sherwood, the first ten years were intensely academic, and were spent at two U.S. institutions of higher education, Lincoln University an African American liberal arts college, and the nearby University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia³¹⁴. Nkrumah was an outstanding student at Lincoln, graduating magnacum laude with a Bachelor's degree in sociology in 1939³¹⁵. While in the US he also worked in various capacities as a teaching assistant and as an instructor, including a one-year appointment as professor of Philosophy and Logic, Elementary Greek, and Negro Civilization and History in 1944 to 1945³¹⁶.

In addition to earning a Master of Science degree in education at the University of Pennsylvania, Nkrumah assisted in teaching African language at the Institute of Languages and Culture³¹⁷. Unfortunately, his Ph.D. dissertation in Philosophy was rejected, presumably for being "too pro-Communistic"³¹⁸. According to Sherwood, (1996) he made use of his Bachelor's degree in Sacred Theology, earned in 1942 from Lincoln University's Theological Seminary a Presbyterian seminary to obtain a licentiate from the Chester Presbytery for the purposes of preaching the gospel. He apparently preached virtually every Sunday in different churches in Philadelphia, New York, or Washington. Since the Christian ministry was not his real calling, he did not choose to move a step further by being ordained as a minister. A second extramural activity that Nkrumah engaged in, to earn a living in the US was manual labour, including work at a shipbuilding and dry dock company near Philadelphia³¹⁹.

Throughout all these years, Nkrumah remained steadfast in his single-minded determination to work for Africa's freedom from colonial rule. The testimonies of his contemporaries are unanimous on his unyielding commitment to the struggle³²⁰. Whatever he was doing was giving a sermon, writing a term paper in philosophy, etc. Nkrumah would always find a way to "twist around" to Africa (Davidson: 1973 pp. 51, 63). The opportunity to develop his interest and enthusiasm about Africa came through

³¹³Sherwood.M. 1996. op. cit. p.18

³¹⁴ Ibid

³¹⁵ Ibid

³¹⁶ Ibid

³¹⁷ Ibid

³¹⁸Davidson. B. 1973. Black Star: A view of the life and times of Kwame Nkrumah, Clarkson Doble and Brendon Ltd Plymouth pp.64

³¹⁹Sherwood. 1996. op. cit. p.20

³²⁰ Ibid

Nkrumah's involvement in the activities of African and African American political and civil rights organizations such as the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), founded by Marcus Garvey, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Council on African Affairs (CAA) and the African Students Association (ASA)³²¹. It was through this involvement that he came into contact with distinguished Pan-African leaders like Amy Ashwood Garvey, the estranged wife of Marcus Garvey, Claudia Vera Jones, W.E.B. DuBois, Paul Robeson, C.L.R. James and Alphaeus Hunton³²². These intense years in America arose Nkrumah's political awareness, particularly with his involvement as a civil right activist within the cited organisations in America. This gradually informed Nkrumah, his quest to return home to contribute to the liberation of Africa, by starting with Ghana. But his sojourns abroad and his political education, was not complete without a stopover in England, as at the time England became home to many young African students contesting against colonial rule. The second part of Nkrumah's years abroad was his London years, 1945 to 1947. It was during these two years that Nkrumah was engaged in organising the anticolonial struggle in West Africa through the West African National Secretariat (WANS) of the Pan-African movement³²³. Having helped George Padmore organize and manage the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, Nkrumah went on to concentrate on WANS activities, in collaboration with the West African Students Union (WASU) and the international working-class movement, whose representatives included members and former members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Nkrumah's membership in various trade unions while in Britain such the Gold Coaster farmers union and Sierra Leone Trade Union Congress enabled him to gain experience on different issues pertaining to the struggle for Africa's liberation from colonial rule while in the diaspora³²⁴. According to St. Clair Drake, "*by all accounts Nkrumah was thoroughly educated by Padmore, by that I mean getting political education from Padmore during his time in Britain 1945-1947*"³²⁵. Nkrumah's time in England was also crucial in terms of networking with other African Students militants for independence, he was a member of other West African student associations in the UK such as the Nigerian student associations, the Sierra Leon

³²¹ Davidson. B. 1973. Op. Cit. p. 64

³²² Ibid

³²³ Ibid

³²⁴ Ibid

³²⁵ Sherwood.M. 1996, Op. Cit p. 50

student associations and many other pan-Africanist organisations in the UK mainly from Commonwealth countries. Some of his contemporaries in the UK also later became leaders of their own countries such as: Hastings Banda of Malawi, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria³²⁶.

The leadership of the anticolonial struggle by the Nkrumahs, Azikiwes, Kenyattas, Wallace-Johnsons and many others could not have succeeded in the absence of an emerging mass nationalist movement of peasants, workers, students and civil servants that was decidedly anti-imperialist. Nkrumah recognized the strength and vibrancy of this mass base and was able to mobilize the people and to channel popular energies into a successful struggle for independence.

The analysis of the various organizations in which Nkrumah gained his political experience also suffers from the elitist bias in Sherwood's approach. However useful they were in developing strong personal bonds among people who went on to become national leaders in Africa and in initiating their members in the techniques of lobbying, issuing position papers and publishing newspapers and books, organizations such as the ASA, WASU and WANS were severely limited by their lack of a mass base³²⁷. On the other hand, the most useful lessons of Nkrumah's subsequent leadership of the Convention People's Party (CPP) must have come from his associations with the UNIA and Black workers' groups in America and in Britain³²⁸.

A better knowledge of his years abroad should prepare us for understanding the problems he would encounter later with the reactionaries of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) who invited him back home to serve as general secretary of the UGCC, on the one hand, and with Western powers which saw him as a threat, on the other³²⁹. Nkrumah's mistakes, and the increasingly authoritarian style of rule, he developed, can also be traced to the secretive and elitist world of his political education³³⁰. Overthrown in 1966 in a military coup d'état after 15 years of political power, Nkrumah died in exile in 1972 in Sekou Touré's Guinea-Conakry³³¹.

³²⁶ Sherwood.M. 1996, Op. Cit p. 50

³²⁷ Ibid

³²⁸ Ibid

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Davidson. B 1974. Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah. New York p. 20

³³¹ Ibid

Born in Wenchi in the Brong Ahafo region on 11th July 1913, Kofi Abrefa Busia was the eldest of thirteen children. With an early appetite for education, Busia began his schooling by accident. As the expected successor to his uncle the Omanhene of Wenchi, Busia was not slated for classroom education. But being informed of the young Busia's brilliance, the chief agreed to allow him to formally enrol in the school³³². When Busia was eight years old, amazed by his learning abilities, visiting missionary Reverend William Whittle and his wife Alice, stationed in Wenchi, requested that he stay with them in order to master the English language and further his education. Although treated more like a son, Busia became their houseboy, working hard in order to further his education³³³.

When later re-stationed, the Whittles took Busia with them to Kumasi³³⁴. At age nine, then living in Kumasi, Busia was chosen to hand over a golden trowel to his Excellency, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, Governor and Commander-in-chief of the Gold Coast Colony, and make a speech at the ceremony of the laying of the foundation stone for Wesley College³³⁵. Speaking on the public platform, Busia's brilliance, eloquence and fluency in English, such as had never been witnessed before in the Gold Coast in one so young, spread through the nation and he became famous as 'the prodigy bush boy from far away Wenchi' (Danso-Boafo 1996: 18). Determined to continue his education, Busia persevered and was eventually taken in by Rev. Armstrong, the head of the Methodist mission in the Gold Coast, who enrolled him in the Wesleyan mission school in Kumasi. Making a trip with his new ward to Cape Coast, Busia visited the prestigious Mfantshipim school, and hoped to return one day as a student. His family, however, did not have enough funds to afford the costly fees required³³⁶.

At age thirteen, Busia sat for the Methodist Synod scholarship examination, and won honours for the entire Ashanti region, facilitating his opportunity to attend a secondary school³³⁷. He chose Mfantshipim. Once there, Busia excelled in his studies at home with his mother, he vowed three things; to build a house in his beloved Wenchi, to go to Oxford University, which he had heard so much about from the Reverend Whittle, and to make

³³²Danso-Boafo. K. 1996, *The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia* Ghana Universities Press, Accra p. 19

³³³Danso-Boafo. K. 1996, *Op.Cit.* p. 20

³³⁴ *Ibid*

³³⁵ *Ibid*

³³⁶ *Ibid*

³³⁷ *Ibid*

the country a better place, not just for the fortunate, but for the poor and disenfranchised (Danso-Boafo 1996: 23).

Busia was then selected for an Achimota Council Scholarship, and after sitting for an external BA Honours Degree in Medieval and Modern History from London University, he was able to travel to England and study for his B.A Honours in Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Oxford University (Danso-Boafo 1996: 23) After studying for two years, instead of three, Busia received his degree in 1941, his MA in 1946 and his D. PHIL in social anthropology in 1947, all at colleges in Oxford. Dr. Busia was the first black man to attend Oxford University. His distinguished career also saw him become the first of two Africans appointed to the British Colonial Service as District Commissioner. Dr. Busia entered formal politics in Ghana in 1951 when for the first time in history national elections were held to choose African legislators. He went into exile in 1959 and returned in 1966 after the overthrow of the oppressive Nkrumah regime³³⁸. In 1969 he became a member of the Constituent, the Assembly, which wrote the 1969 Constitution and was elected Prime Minister on August 29 of that year³³⁹. The proximity between Busia and the British establishment was strong that the second republic 1969-1972 adopted the Westminster model of government, unlike Nkrumah's government which was based on a republican parliamentary model. Throughout the history of civilian rule in Ghana, the country has known only one Westminster style government which was under Busia's regime³⁴⁰. Busia unlike Nkrumah, as noted above, studied at Oxford University in relative comfort, by the virtue of being at Oxford offered him the chance to acquaint himself with members of the British political elites³⁴¹. The network he made at Oxford later helped when he returned to Ghana and was in active politics, he had strong links with Britain³⁴². It was often thought that the second republic was being run by the British from afar as a result of Busia's strong ties with the "empire" which eventually saw his government being overthrown in 1972 by the military through a coup d'état. By the time of his death in 1978, Busia was regarded as one of Africa's most influential scholars whose parallel academic and political careers were shaped by an abiding and consistent concern for the people of Africa and the principles of democratic rule (Danso-Boafo 1996: 24).

³³⁸ Ibid

³³⁹ Ibid

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Ibid

³⁴² Ibid

Nkrumah's time in Britain as narrated earlier, was a period of his political radicalisation against the empire, Nkrumah did not have any links with the British elite establishment, his networks were among young African student radicals, who wanted "self-determination and self-governance" in Africa. Nkrumah and his comrades strongly opposed to forging imperial links with the "Metropol", they advocated the idea of cutting "the umbilical cord" with the empire³⁴³. This political thought and radicalisation remained with Nkrumah, upon his return to Ghana, which in part influenced the basis of his political ideology. His experience of precarious existence in Britain further pushed him to the left of the political spectrum as compared to Busia who enjoyed a relatively comfortable life while studying in Britain. These differences in the experience of both men had in the diaspora characterized their politics and policies once back in Ghana.

To this effect, the formation of Ghanaian diaspora politics can be said to have emerged through these two personalities Nkrumah and Busia. Their political thoughts and ideology is what governs Ghanaian political ideology, political philosophy and political traditions to date and often cited and referred to as: the Nkrumahist political ideology and political tradition connected to the Convention's Peoples Party, (CPP) and the Danquah-Busia political ideology and tradition linked to the Progress Party (PP) which both emerged during the political campaign for Ghana's independence in 1957³⁴⁴. At that time both parties were in favour of Ghana's independence, thus one party had more of a liberal democratic approach to economic reform, whereas the other was tilted towards a socialist economic model of development.

This, therefore, demonstrates that as early as post-independence era, there were two competing political ideologies, political philosophies and political traditions, which has since shaped Ghana's bipartisan political traditions. The NPP Party which is the party currently in power derives its political ideology from the Danquah-Busia political philosophy and political tradition as a centre-right party.

The NDC party the main opposition party derives its political ideologies from the Nkrumahist political ideology, political philosophy and political tradition although the NDC party a centre-left party was founded by Jerry Rawlings³⁴⁵. These two converging

³⁴³Danso-Boafo. K. 1996. The political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, Ghana university Press p. 38

³⁴⁴Ibid

³⁴⁵ Gyimah-Boadi, E., 1991. Notes on Ghana's current transition to constitutional rule. *Africa Today*, 38(4), p.8.

and diverging political ideologies and traditions since independence has influenced and been the bedrock of Ghana's diaspora politics and policies. The NPP as a political party derives an important support from the diaspora, this is explained by the fact that towards the latter stages of Nkrumah's one-party regime, many of his political opponents left the country as a result of Nkrumah's repressive political stand on opposition to his rule. Most members of the opposition party at that time fled the country for Britain, this included Busia, they fled to escape being thrown into Prison without trial by Nkrumah's authoritarian regime³⁴⁶. Those who could not flee were incarcerated without trial, and this included J.B Danquah who aided in bringing Nkrumah to Ghana to lead in the fight for independence³⁴⁷. Many of the exiled opposition members only returned to Ghana in 1966 after the coup d'état that overthrew Nkrumah. Such returnees included Busia. Ghana's second republic 1969-1972 was predominately constituted of these elites diaspora returnees from Britain within the Progress Party (PP) known today as New Patriotic Party NPP. This period saw the formation of diaspora and returnee diaspora politicians mainly dominated by NPP sympathizers in Britain³⁴⁸.

History repeated itself once again, as similar patterns that saw PP members who fled Ghana during the years of Nkrumah, this time round it was mainly members of the NPP party who fled Ghana during the Rawlings regime and they formed the voice of the opposition abroad. Most of the NPP elite sympathizers who fled the country during the Rawlings years also made Britain their base and from there they organised numerous protests against Rawlings's government. We shall discuss the changing nature of diaspora policies and politics of Ghana both NDC and NPP in part two of the thesis and how that has enabled a political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnee diaspora political engagement in Accra to emerge.

This chapter has reviewed two key architects of the construction of Ghana's political ideologies structured by diasporisation and their stay abroad. By providing an account of the political trajectories of these two political leaders who emerged after independence. The account of their life trajectory in the UK, forged their political education and identity, that contributed to their politics back home once becoming leaders in Ghana and the

³⁴⁶ Ibid

³⁴⁷ Ibid

³⁴⁸ Fieldwork interview with Mohammed Abdul Saaka, founding member of the NPP UK branch, interviewed in London on 12 December 2012

legacy that it has had on Ghana particularly vis-à-vis diaspora politics in modern day Ghana. The subsequent political elites after Nkrumah and Busia also left Ghana to further their education in the UK.

To further understand the consolidation of Ghana's diaspora politicisation and political engagement both home and abroad, requires turning to the formation of the following generation of Ghanaian political elites from the diaspora. In the sub-chapter that follows, we will further examine and explain how this legacy of diaspora politics of the second generation influenced the politics of subsequent leaders and their policies in relation to the diaspora.

2.2.5 Ghanaian politics and the ties to expatriation: Third Generation-wave-political elite formation of Kufuor and Mills 1960-1970

This sub-chapter will focus on the biographical narrative of these two leaders who left the shores of Ghana to seek further education in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s: John Agyekum- Kufuor and John Atta – Mills, how their lives in the UK equally contributed to shaping their political thoughts. The educational trajectories of these two personalities also correlate with that of Nkrumah and Busia. Kufuor and Mills political ideologies have ties to the political and ideological foundation established by Nkrumah and Busia with connection to the diaspora. On the hand the Danquah-Busia political and ideological orientations is linked to the NPP, which Kufuor belongs to. On the other hand, the Nkrumahist political and ideological orientation is connected to the NDC, which is the Party Mills belongs to.

Kufuor and Mills time in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s, was a period of both political stability and political agitation in Ghana. The country was stable until the first coup d'état in 1966. Thereafter the country was plunged into a series of coup d'états and political agitation in the 1970s. Kufuor arrived in London in 1959 at the age of 20 for his studies, many African students who were studying in London at the time, were on British Council or Commonwealth scholarships, two of the educational incentives given to students in the soon-to-be independent colonies of Britain, most students on scholarships

had to work to help fund their studies³⁴⁹. Kufuor arrived in London without these difficulties, his family had paid his fees and his mother had bought a house in North-West London, near Muswell Hill, a prime area with a large Jewish community³⁵⁰. Two of his sisters were already living there, Mariam and Cecilia so he went to a family embrace³⁵¹. Kufuor had two people who influenced his life in London: one was U.V Campbell, a Jamaican who married his sister Cecilia, a well-known legal brain among Afro-Caribbean students and the British establishment. At the time he was one of the very few Black students to be awarded first class degree in Law³⁵². The second person who influenced his life in London was Professor Busia³⁵³.

Kufuor's time as a student in 1959 coincided with Professor Busia's exile in Britain³⁵⁴. Busia and Kufuor's families knew each other very well in Ghana, therefore, it was only normal that Busia took Kufuor under his wings while in England as a young student, Kufuor was nurtured and educated politically by Busia in Britain³⁵⁵. Busia helped with a recommendation letter for Kufuor to attend Oxford university, this also cemented the faith and believe he had in young Kufuor, Busia himself a former student of Oxford, where he later became a professor, used the strong network he had within the Oxford university establishment to help his young protégé, Kufuor³⁵⁶. Kufuor studied Law and later Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) at Oxford University. Kufuor worked for the Ghana commercial Bank branch in London upon finishing his studies at Oxford. While working at the Bank, it helped him to forge strong ties among Ghanaians living in London³⁵⁷.

Following Kufuor's return to Ghana in 1965 after his time in Britain, he went into private law practices for two years and later into politics. He was made deputy minister of foreign affairs in Ghana's second republic 1969 to 1972 in which Prof. Busia was the prime minister³⁵⁸. Kufuor was appointed by Busia himself to take up this position³⁵⁹. This illustrates the bond that existed between Kufuor and Busia started in the diaspora, as it was in the diaspora where they strengthened their bond. This position as a minister of

³⁴⁹ Ibid

³⁵⁰ Ibid

³⁵¹ Ibid

³⁵² Ibid

³⁵³ Ibid

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ Agyeman-Duah. I. 2003, Op.Cit. p.20

³⁵⁶ Ibid

³⁵⁷ Ibid

³⁵⁸ Ibid

³⁵⁹ Ibid

state in his late twenties showed the confidence Busia had in young Kufuor and the role he played in nurturing him politically from their days in Britain to their time in government together³⁶⁰.

His experience and encounters as a student at Oxford also informed his ideas on foreign policy when he became a minister of state during the second republic. As a president of Ghana between 2001 to 2008, Kufuor maintained strong ties with the diaspora and acknowledged the support from the diaspora during the party's years in opposition in the 1990s³⁶¹. To this effect, the NPP Party's tradition with elite diasporas dates back from the Busia era, this is to emphasise that the NPP Party derives its party rank and file partly from the diaspora. The party prides itself as the Ghanaian political party with an important percentage of professionals and educated elites within Ghana and in the diaspora. The example of the current president, Nana Akuffo Addo, an Oxford educated and a trained lawyer in the UK, who also worked for a Law firm in Paris for five years before returning to Ghana, attests to the notion that the NPP still derive its party leaders from the diaspora. Kufuor's education, work experience and other encounters in Britain aided in his political and ideological formations in the diaspora. This affinity with the diaspora explains why policies and amendments were adopted in favour of the diaspora during Kufuor's presidency³⁶². This therefore suggests two things: i) Kufuor's days as a diasporan strongly influenced his sympathy towards the diasporans; ii) Kufuor's party NPP was partly supported and financed by NPP diasporans when the party was in opposition. This point will be analysed in Part two of this thesis.

To sum up the link between Ghanaian diaspora and political leadership, according to Prof. Ali Mazuri as cited in Agyeman-Duah 2006:

“Kwame Nkrumah remains the most prolific presidential writer in Africa's post-colonial history. Busia remains one of the best educated Africans to become Head of a State. Dr. Liman brought new expertise to the highest ranks of governance in Ghana... now president J. A Kufuor has brought legal and constitutional sophistication to the highest political office in the Land³⁶³.”

³⁶⁰Agyeman-Duah. I 2003, Op.Cit.p. 31

³⁶¹Agyeman-Duah. I 2003, Op.Cit. p.33

³⁶²Agyeman-Duah. I 2003, Op.Cit. p. 35

³⁶³ Agyeman-Duah. I 2003, opt cit p. 19

John Atta-Mills left Ghana in 1967, just as Kufuor he studied at some of Britain's leading universities such as the London School of Economics and Political Science and at the School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS³⁶⁴. Mills studied for his Master of Law (LLM) at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1968³⁶⁵. He completed his PhD in Taxation Law at the age of twenty-seven, at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 1971³⁶⁶. He was on a Fulbright scholarship at the University of Stanford in the US³⁶⁷. Mills unlike Kufuor did not benefit from the mentorship of a prominent Ghanaian scholar at Oxford. Mills' years in Britain was more dedicated to his academic work and preparing him to take up a role in academia at the University of Ghana. Mills did not enter politics till the latter stages of his life, he spent twenty-five years working at the University of Ghana, as professor of taxation Law³⁶⁸. He was invited by President Jerry Rawlings to become his running mate during the 1996 presidential election and eventually becoming the vice president of Ghana from 1996-2000³⁶⁹. Mills political thoughts has always been to the left of the political spectrum, hence joining a party with ideologies leaning to the left of the political pendulum³⁷⁰. Mills political awareness was heightened while he was a student in the UK, he did not gain his political consciousness in the UK, but rather in Ghana prior to coming to the UK in 1967, which was not the case for Kufuor whose political awareness was formed and shaped in the UK³⁷¹.

Mills politics and policies towards the diaspora while in government, was not due to his experiences abroad as a student, but rather the political position that his party, the NDC had adopted during the Rawlings two terms as democratic leader³⁷². Therefore, his policies vis-à-vis the Ghanaian diaspora were merely following the party's tradition with regards to the diaspora³⁷³. Meaning that the NDC Party policies towards the diaspora has long been less favourable and at times "suspicious" of the diaspora, since a great number

³⁶⁴John Atta Mills Biography, Government of Ghana 12 August 2012, brochure on the life trajectory of the late president during his funeral

³⁶⁵ Biography of President John Atta-Mills: <https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201207/125610.php>

³⁶⁶ Ibid

³⁶⁷ Ibid

³⁶⁸ Ibid

³⁶⁹ Ibid

³⁷⁰ Ibid

³⁷¹ Ibid

³⁷² Political party activism in Ghana: Factors influencing the decision of the politically active to join a political party https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233438905_Political_party_activism_in_Ghana_Factors_influencing_the_decision_of_the_politically_active_to_join_a_political_party

³⁷³ Ibid

of the Ghanaian diaspora in England were against the NDC regime in the 1990s and served as the voice of the opposition abroad³⁷⁴.

The biographical background of the aforementioned Ghanaian political leaders all had part of their education in Britain, this shows the strong bond and ties that has always existed between Ghana and Britain through the formation of the Ghanaian political elite abroad ³⁷⁵.

In this sub chapter, I have demonstrated the continues connection that exists between Ghanaian politics and expatriation of its elites and how that is reflected in their policies vis-à-vis the Ghanaian. I have equally demonstrated here that through the examples of President Nkrumah, Prime Minister Busia, President Kufuor and President Mills life trajectories we can observe the legacy that their expatriation has had on their politics and policies in Ghana. Continuing in line with Ghanaian expatriation and the politics of the diaspora, the following sub-chapter seeks to examine the period of mass emigration of Ghanaians to Britain characterized by an intense period of politicisation of Ghanaian citizens in the UK.

2.2.6 1970s-1990s from chaotic years to the making of a Ghanaian political diaspora: Turning political diaspora into economic asset for Ghana

The periods of the 1970s and 1980s were particularly turbulent in Ghana's political history as noted at the beginning of this chapter. It was a period in which Ghana's political instability was at its apex: three coup d'états were staged during the 1970s³⁷⁶. These frequent coup d'états made Ghana unattractive to foreign investment and business, and as a result of it, economic growth slowed, which led to economic hardship.

By the 1980s the Ghanaian economy was still in the doldrums and the political situation in the country was chaotic. A politically repressive and iron-handed regime, increasing poverty and unemployment, shortages of basic commodities and the increasing

³⁷⁴ Ibid

³⁷⁵ Ibid

³⁷⁶ Nugent, P., 1995. Big men, small boys and politics in Ghana: Power, ideology and the burden of history. *Accra: Asempa Publishers*. p.20

impoverishment of large sections of the population meant that anybody who could leave the country decided to do so³⁷⁷. The early 1980s also coincided with the period during which most of the destination countries were in financial difficulties. Ghana was in the midst of a Structural Adjustment and Economic Recovery Programme and economic conditions were still dire (Boafo-Arthur 1999; Gyimah-Boadi 1990).

This heightened period of Ghana's political instabilities precipitated various forms of migration and exodus, those fleeing due to the economic hardship and others who fled as a result of their involvement in Ghanaian politics. As previously observed, Nigeria benefited from Ghana's political crisis of the period, Nigeria captured the educated Ghanaian professionals in their numbers, i.e. teachers, lecturer, architects and medical staff³⁷⁸. Most political refugees fleeing Ghana also settled in Nigeria, some political refugees first went to neighbouring francophone countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso and Côte D'Ivoire. The proximity with Ghana made it difficult for the government in these francophone countries to safeguard their security so many of these political refugees proceeded to Nigeria. From there, most left for the UK and others to the US³⁷⁹.

The francophone African countries also benefited from Ghana's political woes in that they received large numbers of skilled and unskilled Ghanaians. Ghanaian teachers of the English language were particularly sought after in the francophone countries³⁸⁰.

By the mid-1980s to early 1990s, Ghanaian emigrants who fled Ghana as a result of their engagement in politics organized Ghanaian diasporan political groups. According to the UK census of 1982, Ghana featured as one of the countries with its nationals seeking political asylum³⁸¹. The numbers of Ghanaian political asylum seekers rose significantly during the regime of Flt Lt Jerry Rawlings (1981-2000), especially after the Structural Adjustment measures overseen by the IMF hit the society and economy from 1983 (Peil 1995, Van Hear 1998). By 1991 more than 32,000 Ghanaians were living in the UK. This figure increased further in the 1990s, as was shown in the 2001 UK census, which estimated 56,000 Ghanaians residing in the UK, most citing reasons for fleeing political repression³⁸².

³⁷⁷ Arthur, J.A., 2016. *The African diaspora in the United States and Europe: the Ghanaian experience*. Routledge.p.15

³⁷⁸ Nugent, P. 1995. Op. Cit.p.35

³⁷⁹ Fieldwork interview with Mohammed Abdul-Saaka 12 December 2012

³⁸⁰ Quartey, P., 2009. *Migration in Ghana: a country profile 2009*. International Organization for Migration.p.5

³⁸¹ Peil, M., 1995. Ghanaians abroad. *African affairs*, 94(376), p.345

³⁸² Peil, M., 1995.Art. Cit.p346

In 1981 flight lieutenant Jerry Rawlings seized power in a coup d'état (his second) and established a military regime³⁸³. Rawlings ruled for the next 19 years, first as chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council, (PNDC) and then, from 1992, as a democratically elected president³⁸⁴. Though originally left-populist, the Rawlings military regime adopted IMF-induced structural adjustment programs from 1983, introducing neoliberal policies (Whitfield 2009, Pierre 2013). During this period harsh living conditions as well as political oppression spurred large emigration of the opposition and the elite, fleeing from the political persecution and looking for better economic opportunities elsewhere. As a result, a diasporic lobby emerged during the 1980s in the UK among the Ghanaian diaspora, mainly in opposition to Rawlings (Mohan 2008, Nieswand 2009). This political group later gave rise to what is now known as the NPP UK political branch, and that set the precedence for various parties in Ghana to initiate a diaspora political branch abroad, which will be analysed in detail in Part two.

While a contemporary Ghanaian diaspora thus emerged during the 1980s, Rawlings government mainly focused its diaspora policies on Pan-Africanism and African Americans diaspora. Rawlings' position on Pan-African diaspora policies stemmed from an increasing voice of the Ghanaian diaspora protesting against his regime in the UK. As Nkrumah, Rawlings had an explicit Pan-Africanist orientation. By the mid-1980s, several public memorials and research centres for prominent Pan-Africanists were established, such as the W.E.B Du Bois Memorial Centre for Pan-African Culture in Accra in 1985 and, in the 1990s, the George Padmore Research Library for African Affairs, and the Kwame Nkrumah Mausoleum (Pierre 2013:134). These initiatives thus continued and celebrated Nkrumah's emphasis on Pan-Africanist art and research, which had strong links to the transatlantic diaspora. The celebration of Pan-Africanism continued in the 1990s but changed the focus to heritage tourism and economic development³⁸⁵. These initiatives were made to shift the focus from the Ghanaian diaspora, who Rawlings' regime deemed hostile to his government, therefore gracefully, avoiding them and concentrating more on a heritage diaspora from the US and the Caribbean.

³⁸³ Asamoah, O.Y., 2014. *The political history of Ghana (1950-2013): The experience of a non-conformist*. AuthorHouse.p.50

³⁸⁴ Ibid

³⁸⁵ Pierre, J., 2009. Beyond Heritage Tourism Race and the Politics of African-Diasporic Interactions. *Social Text*, 27(1 (98)), p.70.

Although the Rawlings' government was keen on reinforcing the links between Ghana and the transatlantic diaspora, very little effort was made to encourage Ghana's nascent diaspora abroad and particularly in the UK.

Members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London who fled the country during the military rule in the 1970s, 1980s now constituted most of the opposition party in the UK, as noted earlier on. They often organised events and demonstrations to draw the attention of the international community on the lack of political transparency and the hostilities that members of the opposition party had to endure in Ghana³⁸⁶. These politicised members of the diaspora became the voices for the voiceless in Ghana's oppositions³⁸⁷. This period cemented the beginning of diaspora politicisation in London. Protests and demonstrations were often organised by the members of the diaspora during President Rawlings' state visit to Britain. Members of the diaspora started organising fundraising events to support the opposition party, which had been struggling for financial support to function properly in Ghana³⁸⁸. The lobbying and protestation that diaspora NPP Party members in London undertook during the years of opposition enabled the NPP Party to move effectively in professionalizing the political mobilisation and militancy they acquired in the diaspora, which now serves as an asset for the party today. An in-depth analysis of this point will be developed in part two of this thesis in a chapter dedicated to Ghanaian diaspora policies under various political regimes.

Diasporans could be turned into an asset, as analysed above through policies under the PNDC and NDC towards the Black Atlantic diaspora and heritage tourism. The Ghanaian diaspora role in national development is translated via the return of qualified Ghanaians' transfer of knowledge and skills in various sectors of the economy and through remittances sent home by the diaspora. A considerable amount of literature has been published on the link between remittances and the social status of migrants, as briefly discussed in the introduction of this thesis and at the beginning of this chapter. One such study conducted on the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK, the US, the Netherlands and Germany, revealed that remittances were high among professionals and blue-collar workers. The same study also showed a correlation between remittance and duration of stay in the host country, meaning the long-term professional and skilled migrants remitted

³⁸⁶ Fieldwork interview with Mohammed Abdul Saaka 10th June 2013 London

³⁸⁷ Ibid

³⁸⁸ Agyeman-Duah, I., 2003. *Between Faith and History: a biography of JA Kufuor*. Africa World Press.

more than short-term migrants³⁸⁹. Other studies contest this assertion that long-term professional and skilled migrants tend to remit more than unskilled migrant. For Numi, Ozden et al:

*“Skilled migrants tend to have higher incomes and can afford to send more remittances back to their families at home. On the other hand, they tend to come from better off families whose demand for remittances is lower relative to poorer ones. Furthermore, skilled migrants are able to bring their families along with them, as they tend to enjoy more secure legal status at the destination. All of these factors reduce the incentives to send remittances. Thus, the net impact of an increase in migrants’ level of education of remittances is ambiguous a priori Empirical studies have so far been unable to resolve the debate on this issue”*³⁹⁰. This study concludes

that remittances actually decrease with an increase in migrant’s overall education. Expatriate Ghanaians’ remittance to family and relatives back home is a significant net from brain drain. A study was conducted by Akurang-Parry on the relationships between brain drain and remittance, in which he observed that:

*“Discussants pointed out that today’s families go to great lengths to send at least one of their members overseas to serve as a financial asset. According to discussants, the aburokyire, or overseas phenomenon, is similar to the way families contributed to send one of their own to school or contributed to buy land to develop cocoa farms during the colonial period. Indeed, an exegetic assessment of the discussions reveals that brain drain is not only an individual effort to better a person's life, but also a form of cultural capital and familial investment that seeks to use aburokyirefo, or expatriates, as a means to sustain the well-being of the family”*³⁹¹. To this end, migration in some instances can contribute to brain gain, as

observed among migrants who left Ghana for the purposes of education. This is often the case of migrants from disadvantaged backgrounds who left the shores of Ghana. The return of professional and skilled migrants in general is viewed as an asset for

³⁸⁹Mazzucato, V., B. Boom and N.N. Nsowah-Nuamah. 2005. Origin and Destination of Remittances in Ghana. In: Manuh (Ed.). At Home in the World. International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana and West Africa. Sub-Saharan Publishers, Ghana.

³⁹⁰Niimi, Y., Ozden, C and Schiff, M. 2010 Remittances and the Brain Drain: Skilled Migrants Do Remit Less, Annals of Economics and Statistics, No. 97/98, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT January- June, Published by: on behalf of GENES ADRES, pp. 124

³⁹¹Akurang-Parry Kwabena O, 2002. Passionate Voices of Those Left behind: Conversations with Ghanaian Professionals on the Brain Drain and Its Net Gains, African Issues, Vol. 30, No. 1, The African "Brain Drain" to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities, p. 57

national development, particularly in sectors such as healthcare and academia where their acquired capital from the diaspora is often sought after by government to fill deficits of skilled people and professionals³⁹².

To this effect, President Kufuor paid homage to the Ghanaian diaspora during the 2001 Homecoming Summit whereby he affirmed that: *'remittance sent by expatriate Ghanaians makes a difference in the lives of their families and friends'*³⁹³. He further noted: *on the national level, there are many Ghanaian homes today that rely to some extent for their upkeep on these remittances. For many this makes the difference between a reasonable standard of living and the life of deprivation*³⁹⁴.

In recent years, Ghanaians in the diaspora are returning home in their numbers, partly as a result of political stability, which in turn has contributed to a steady economic growth that the country witnessed between 2001 to 2019. For example, in 2001 the economy grew by 4.2%, the highest growth since the year 2000s was in 2011 at the rate of 14%³⁹⁵. According to the data from the African Development Bank, Ghana's economy continued to expand in 2019, with real GDP growth estimated at 7.1%³⁹⁶. High growth momentum since 2017 has consistently placed Ghana among Africa's 10 fastest-growing economies³⁹⁷. Improvements in the macroeconomic environment were accompanied by expansion in domestic demand due to increased private consumption³⁹⁸. To this effect, Ghanaian professionals in particular have been the segment of the diaspora population who have in recent times opted to return home, being encouraged by both the political situation and economic growth. The Ghanaian government over the past fifteen years has made it a point to tap into the human resources of the diaspora. This is manifested through projects initiated at the Ghanaian diplomatic missions in Britain, the US and other European countries in setting-up Data Skills Banks, encouraging Ghanaian professionals to register, so as

³⁹² Anarfi, J., Quartey, P. and Agyei, J., 2010. Key determinants of migration among health professionals in Ghana. *Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty*. p.15

³⁹³ Homecoming Summit Ghana: <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/HOMECOMING-SUMMIT-FOR-GHANAIS-LIVING-ABROAD-14772>

³⁹⁴ Homecoming Summit Ghana: <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/HOMECOMING-SUMMIT-FOR-GHANAIS-LIVING-ABROAD-14772>

³⁹⁵ African Development Bank data on Ghana Economic Outlook: Macroeconomic performance and outlook: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economic-outlook>

³⁹⁶ Ibid

³⁹⁷ Ibid

³⁹⁸ African Development Bank data on Ghana Economic Outlook: Macroeconomic performance and outlook: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economic-outlook>

to be contacted to assist with the national development projects in Ghana³⁹⁹. These data skills bank, thus, are mainly dominated by Ghanaian professional, it is also open for non-Ghanaian citizens such as people of African descent living in the diaspora wishing to contribute their quota to the development of Africa and notably the case of Ghana⁴⁰⁰.

To reiterate, the government of Ghana's keen interest in attracting Ghanaian nationals abroad for national development schemes through skills transfer of the diaspora was evident during the first Homecoming Summit organised by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) in July 2001⁴⁰¹. The summit brought together over 1,000 expatriate Ghanaian professionals and their home-based compatriots to seek better ways to advance the country's development⁴⁰².

President Kufuor made references to this during his address at the Homecoming Summit in 2001: *"All of you Ghanaians, living abroad constitute the single most important development partner of the nation"*⁴⁰³. He indicated the importance attached to the transfer of expatriate Ghanaians skills and expertise in the country. He further stated that: *"But perhaps more important are the skills and new attitudes you have acquired. It is these skills that are required if we are to make a success of transforming our economy"*⁴⁰⁴. It is worth noting that President Kufuor's explicit appreciation of the Ghanaian diaspora's expertise contribution to Ghana stems from the support his government received from the diaspora during the years of opposition, as previously stated.

With regards to the staff composition of the NPP administration from 2001-2008, it was constituted mostly of experts and advisers from the diaspora, which to a large extent reflects the party's ties to expatriates Ghanaians, both on a political and economic front.

In 2003 the Ministry of Tourism launched, *The Strategic Action Plan – Tourism 2007* with an explicit focus on diaspora tourism. One of the stated aims of the action plan was to

³⁹⁹ Fieldwork interview with Prof. Danso-Boafo in London 12th August 2010

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid

⁴⁰¹ Homecoming Summit: The President's Speech" [July 23, 2001]; available at [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomepage/News Archive](http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomepage/NewsArchive)

⁴⁰² Homecoming Summit: The President's Speech" [July 23, 2001]; available at <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomepage/News Archive>

⁴⁰³ Idem

⁴⁰⁴ Idem

‘establish Ghana as the “Homeland” for Africans in the Diaspora’ (MTMCC 2003:16). This goal was further emphasized when the Ministry of Tourism and Modernization of the Capital City extended its portfolio and changed its name to the Ministry of Tourism and Diasporan Affairs in 2005⁴⁰⁵. These initiatives thus signalled the political importance of the African diaspora as a tourism potential with economic development potential and emphasis on making diasporas to ‘return’ in order to reconnect with their roots. The efforts culminated in 2007, the 50-year anniversary of Ghana’s independence, with an ambitious programme for PANAFEST, Emancipation Day and the Joseph Project in 2006⁴⁰⁶. For the Joseph Project in 2006, during three weeks in July and August, a range of activities took place, such as durbars, film festivals, concerts, conferences, wreath-laying and pilgrimages in major cities and important localities related to the slave trade. In a brochure, the Joseph Project was presented in the following way:

Many, many millions of people were taken from Africa and those that survived the journey were taken to Europe and the Americas to become slaves. They all passed through the ‘door of no return’: Their descendants are members of what we now call the African Diaspora. ‘The Joseph Project’ is Ghana’s invitation to the Diasporans to make the return journey, to reconnect with the land of their ancestors and their brothers and sisters in the homeland. As every Muslim must visit Mecca at least once in their lifetime, so, we want to establish a pilgrimage to Ghana, one that every African in the Diaspora must undertake at least once in their lifetime. This pilgrimage will be the re-introduction of the Diasporan African to the homeland⁴⁰⁷.

This statement clearly defines ‘the diaspora’ as descendants of the slave trade and their relationship to Ghana as their ‘homeland’ to which they ‘return’, rather than visit as any other tourist. Indeed, the Joseph Project presents this ‘return’ as a pilgrimage, comparing the trip to Ghana with the Islamic Hajj to Mecca. It is based on a premise of alienated autochthon (Hasty 2002) where alienation subsides when the ancestral belonging of the diasporan is realised through the quasi-religious experience of the pilgrimage to the homeland. This framing, accentuates spirituality, belonging and reconnection, downplaying the tourism perspective. Indeed, at an ECOWAS meeting, Mr. Jake

⁴⁰⁵Kleist. K. 2013. Flexible Politics of Belonging: Diaspora Mobilisation in Ghana, *African Studies*, 72:2, 285-306 pp. 290

⁴⁰⁶Ibidem

⁴⁰⁷The Joseph project: <http://www.africa-ata.org/gh9.htm>

Obetsebi-Lamprey, then minister of Tourism and Diasporan Affairs, declared that the Joseph Project should not be considered as a tourism project but rather it is about African unity and African strength⁴⁰⁸.

Kleist (2010) notes that an official at the ministry of Tourism, had explained that the ministry aims to make the visits of African Americans *'back to the motherland more rewarding, more comfortable, more convenient'* and make *'people pick up their roots and make Ghana their home country in an emotional way because we realized that it is a market'*⁴⁰⁹. The notion of roots that can be picked up as a commodity and the facilitation of comfortable and convenient homeland visits to exploit an emerging market show a tension between the spiritual frame of Pan-Africanist homecoming and a tourism strategy where African Americans are seen as roots consumers in need of special attention⁴¹⁰. As Paula Ebron notes in relation to an African-American 'pilgrimage' to Senegal and The Gambia sponsored by McDonalds, gathered more heritage tourist as the word 'pilgrim' has a double meaning: *for the visitor, it enables a frame of experience that privileges collective memory; for the tourist industry it represents 'an effort to carve a distinctive regional niche in the more common representation of travel to Africa'* (2002:195). Other studies have found similar tensions in the organisation and framing of Emancipation Day celebrations and disappointment among African Americans concerning the lack of Ghanaian engagement in the emotional and spiritual aspects of the events (Ebron 2002, Hasty 2002, Pierre 2013).

Events such as PANAFEST, Emancipation Day, and the Joseph Project have a dual significance. On the one hand, they constitute spectacles where the Ministry of Tourism (and other actors) demonstrate their involvement in the African diaspora through performative and narrative framings of Pan-Africanism, homecoming, pilgrimage, shared ancestry, and spirituality. On the other hand, they are income-generating projects where 'Pan-Africanism and the politics of diaspora kinship' (Pierre 2013:130) are used as resources in economic development, aiming at transforming 'occasional pilgrimages into long-term flows of capital and expertise' (Hasty 2002:59). The underlying politics of belonging is thus inherently ambivalent and flexible, simultaneously celebrating and objectifying African diaspora belonging to Ghana. While the *Right of Abode* was

⁴⁰⁸Ibidem

⁴⁰⁹Kleist, K. 2013, art. cit. pp.3011

⁴¹⁰ Ibid

introduced for diasporans in 1999, no African American had obtained it in 2012⁴¹¹. This suggests that the politics of belonging is thus not linked to (effective) rights: it rather draws upon a depoliticised framing of shared historical ancestry and alienated autochthony aiming at promoting economic development. Depoliticized framing meaning, it is not tied to any political party policies of any Ghanaian government while in power or in opposition.

At the second diaspora Homecoming Summit which was organised by the government of Ghana in July 2017 with the theme: *Development, Opportunity and Value*. President Akuffo-Addo gave a speech in which he emphasised the important role diasporas are contributing to national development through the financial and human resource capital acquired from the diaspora. He further urged members of the diaspora to return and help with the development of the country⁴¹².

In a nutshell, both Nkrumah and Rawlings linked Pan-Africanism with national development: in other words, policies they both adopted were geared towards the transatlantic diaspora. But while Nkrumah's visions were explicitly political, Rawlings' Pan-Africanist focus on heritage tourism has been characterized as 'a distinctively neoliberal and depoliticized version' (Pierre 2013:65). Rawlings's depoliticization of diaspora policies was a strategy to sideline the Ghanaian diaspora who were hostile to his regime in the UK. Under Rawlings' regime, diaspora assets were symbolic in terms of remittances from the Atlantic diaspora linkages to heritage tourism. President Kufuor's diaspora policies were targeted at the Ghanaian and Atlantic Diaspora these were presented in the form of remittances, brain gain linked to Ghanaian diaspora political support and Atlantic diaspora initiatives such as the Joseph Project. For President Mills and President Mahama diaspora policy 2009-2016 were basically following the NDC party policy of focusing on the Atlantic diaspora policies of heritage tourism and less the Ghanaian diaspora. And with President Akuffo-Addo, diaspora assets are articulated in both remittances from the Ghanaian diaspora connected to political support and the Atlantic diaspora economic ties to Ghana through heritage tourism. The example of the 2019 Year of Return initiative being organised by the Akuffo Addo government

⁴¹¹Ghana citizenship rights: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3eda135a2>

⁴¹² Field work observation Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit 2017

demonstrates this support for turning both the Ghanaian and the Atlantic diaspora resources into a resource for national development.

In summary, the chaotic years of political instability, if viewed positively, have enabled the establishment of a political diaspora abroad, which most often constitute professionals, who in turn use their expertise for national development. It also shows that in the case of Ghana, the concept of diaspora, either the transatlantic or the Ghanaian diaspora, is an asset for national development through projects such as the PANAFEST, initiated during the NDC reign the Joseph Project and the 2019 Year of Return by the NPP governments. It also indicates that both the NDC and NPP, though they have different standpoints on diaspora politics, both stand to benefit economically from the financial and social remittances that diasporans bring back home with them. A chapter in part two of this thesis has been dedicated to extending the analysis of the developmental aspects of these diaspora policies for return migrants in Ghana.

Conclusion of chapter two

This chapter focused on the various waves of Gold Coast and Ghanaian immigration and how those immigration phases have played a role in forming and shaping Ghanaian elites in general but more importantly Ghanaian political elites in the diaspora with strong ties to the UK. This chapter also showed how these diaspora elites through the various generational waves of migrations from Nkrumah to Busia contributed to Ghana's independence process and as such establishing two political ideologies, philosophies and political traditions which still governs modern day Ghana politics, as illustrated by the examples of Kufuor and Mills.

In this chapter, it has also been demonstrated that the political instability that Ghana witnessed in the mid-1960s-1990s was particularly the driving force behind the mass emigration of Ghanaians, first within the Western African sub-region to both Anglophone and Francophone countries, then to Western countries and then to UK. The differentiation of social categories determined which country they emigrated to. Equally this chapter shows that this mass emigration of Ghanaians during the chaotic years of the 1970s and 1990s played a role in the brain drain of Ghanaian professionals. This brain drain of Ghanaian professionals benefited other countries in the sub-region. Again, the period of

the 1970s to 1990s also marked Ghana's highest exodus of political refugees from Ghana coupled with economic and labour migrants which contributed to the forming of a political diaspora group in the UK.

This sub-section further discussed the economic and political role that Ghanaian and transatlantic diasporans contribute to the development of Ghana, through heritage tourism projects such as the Joseph project, the PANAFEST and the Year of Return. In this chapter, I explicitly highlighted the role and bond between diaspora and the NPP party, as the basis for diaspora politics abroad. Diaspora politics in recent times are not only attributed to the NPP, but to all the major political parties including the NDC who are courting the support of the Ghanaian diaspora both politically and economically, hence the establishment of political party chapters in major European and American cities. This point will be amply discussed in part two of this thesis. With this analysis in mind, the following chapter will focus on the construction of a Black British identity and how that is linked to the social making of Ghanaian and identity formation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. But also, to what extent does a new identity formed in the diaspora influences their political engagement both in the UK and towards Ghana.

CHAPTER 3: The Black British identity construction with ties to the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation: The notion of Communitarianism and « Black Britishness or British Blackness »

“The Black British subject is therefore born out of an imposed contradiction between Blackness and British-ness, British-ness being equated with white-ness in the dominant symbolic order. The Black British identity is one of many multiple identities emerging in the post-colonial era, both within the West and in the former colonies, and in the continuous human, cultural and material traffic between the two. (Mama 1995:114)”

Britain's experience with post-war immigration was not very different from that of other immigrant receiving countries. Like most countries in Europe, Britain experienced severe labour shortages during the early post-war period. To satisfy the increasing demand for

labour, the British government's Ministry of Labour actively recruited Irish, Polish, German, Italian and Ukrainian workers for services in sectors such as agriculture, mining and heavy industry⁴¹³. Having exhausted this initial supply of predominantly white European labour in the late 1940s, the economy began to attract workers from Britain's Commonwealth countries, particularly from the West Indies, India, and Pakistan⁴¹⁴. At first, only a minority of these immigrants expected to settle permanently and to stay in Britain for more than a few years⁴¹⁵. In 1962 the British government decided to enact a bill designed to curtail New Commonwealth immigration to the UK⁴¹⁶. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act⁴¹⁷ was passed in parliament along with a succession of other laws in 1968, 1971 and 1981 that severely restricted the entry of Caribbean and African immigrants to Britain⁴¹⁸. This Commonwealth Immigrant Act was also adopted in order to restrict general immigration to the UK.

During this period, it is widely argued⁴¹⁹ that immigrants Blacks and Asians struggled in Britain against racism and prejudice⁴²⁰. As a result, by the 1970s and partly in response to both the rise in racial intolerance and the rise of the Black Power movement abroad, "black" became detached from its negative connotations, and was reclaimed as a marker of pride: Black is beautiful⁴²¹.

In 1975, a new voice emerged for the Black London population; his name was David Pitt and he brought a new voice to the House of Lords⁴²². He spoke against racism and for equality in regard to all residents of Britain. With this new tone correspondingly came the opportunity for the Black population to elect four Black members into Parliament in 1980s. In spite of this Act, the mass Labour immigration from former commonwealth countries in the late 1940s and 1950s clearly changed the demographic, ethnic and socioeconomic profile of Great Britain. Indeed, the British tradition accords places to

⁴¹³Fryer. P 1984, *Staying Power – The History of Black people in Britain*, Pluto Press, p. 10 Pluto Press

⁴¹⁴ Ibid

⁴¹⁵ Ibid

⁴¹⁶ Ibid

⁴¹⁷See, *The migrant rights*

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/268009/immigrationacts.pdf

⁴¹⁸ Ibid

⁴²⁰ Fryer. P 1984, *Op.Cit.* p.10

⁴²¹Blair. T, *Black Britannia Roots in the 18th Century London*: <http://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/>

⁴²²Thomas A. Johnson, "British Civil Rights Group Acts to Bar New Black Power Fight", *The New York Times*, 20 January 1969.

“social orders, classes and particularistic communities”⁴²³. Since the 1970s, there has been a recognition and a valorisation of “cultural differences”⁴²⁴. The defenders of a society based on a communitarist model, which Charles Taylor notes in *Politics of recognition*: particularistic components have to be considered in terms of recognition of culture difference as a basis of society’s organisation taking into account ethnic minority groups.

As such, the British way of handling a multicultural society is different from the French one and this was clearly presented by Dominique Schnapper in “*La Communauté des citoyens*”. In it she notes that: “*the British tradition of liberal pluralism is opposed to the unitary French conception of citizenship*”. To the British conception, one is a citizen by virtue of belonging to a political community, “a status that is not incompatible with membership in a particular ethno-national community”⁴²⁵. As far as access to citizenship is concerned, one might refer to the British Nationality Act of 1948, which conferred to all who lived in the British Empire and Commonwealth, irrespective of whether they had citizenship of now independent states, the British nationality⁴²⁶. This meant that citizens of India and Pakistan, for example, were also citizens of the UK. People of migrant descent from former French colonies during the 1940s were considered French and had French citizenship⁴²⁷. As such this saw political leaders from Francophone Africa such as Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of La Côte d’Ivoire holding French citizenship⁴²⁸. This therefore indicates that citizenships laws in both France and Britain were identical with regards to members of their former colonies rights to automatic citizenship. To this end, the British multicultural setting officially allows migrant communities to organize themselves along the lines of their ethnic belonging. Hence government institutions and local authorities in the UK are permitted to categorize individuals based on their ethnic background, whereas in France ethnic categorization is prohibited by law⁴²⁹.

⁴²³Safran, W. 1991, *Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return*, *Journal of transnational studies*, volume 1, No. 1 p.85-99

⁴²⁴ Thomas A. Johnson, "British Civil Rights Group Acts to Bar New Black Power Fight", *The New York Times*, 20 January 1969.

⁴²⁵ Schnapper, D., 1994. *La communauté des citoyens* (Vol. 7). Paris: Gallimard.p.10

⁴²⁶ Owusu, K. ed., 2003. *Black British Culture and Society: A Text Reader*. Routledge.p.40

⁴²⁷ Perez, C., 2008. Note de lecture:" Pap Ndiaye, *La condition noire. Essai sur une minorité française*, Calmann-Lévy, 2008". p.57

⁴²⁸ Bleich, E., 2001. The French model: Colour-blind integration. *Colour lines: Affirmative action, immigration, and civil rights options for America*, pp.270-296.

⁴²⁹ Blum, A., 2002. Resistance to identity categorization in France. *Census and identity: The politics of race, ethnicity, and language in national censuses, I*, p.121.

The official categorisation of ethnic minority people in the UK has directly or indirectly contributed to migrant communities residing in specific areas with people of the same ethnic background⁴³⁰. This in turn has propelled the formation of a communitarian society without the need to fully assimilate and adapt to the British way of life, which is rather the opposite in France, as indicated above and earlier in chapter two. Communitarianism in Britain has contributed to the localization of various and specific diaspora communities in London.

3.3.1 London the capital of diaspora communities: discernible migrant populations

London's cosmopolitan setting and its thriving economy has been a catalyst in attracting migrants from all over the world. As a result, the capital has become home to many migrant communities such as the Irish, Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshis, Chinese, Cypriots, Jamaican, Nigerian, Ghanaian and many more.

Table 3: Migration evolution in Britain

Census	Foreign-born population	Percentage increase over previous decade	Percentage of total population
1951	2,118,600		4.2
1961	2,573,500	21.5	4.9
1971	3,190,300	24.0	5.8
1981	3,429,100	7.5	6.2
1991	3,835,400	11.8	6.7
2001	4,896,600	27.7	8.3
2011	7,505,000	53.3	11.9

Source: Census Office for National Statistics; General Register Office for Scotland; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency

Over the past two decades, the national profile of Britain's migrant population has grown rapidly and has diversified as most: Iraqis, Iranians, Afghans, Palestinians, Congolese, Colombians and many others have joined the large and well-established communities drawn from former British commonwealth colonies in the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia who were already settled in Britain's inner cities⁴³¹. In some cases, nationals of these

⁴³⁰ Bleich, E., 2003. *Race politics in Britain and France: Ideas and policymaking since the 1960s*. Cambridge University Press.p.10


⁴³¹ Bhattacharyya, G., 1998. *Riding multiculturalism*. na.p.10

countries left their home countries due to political unrest especially in the aftermath of independence, particularly in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s⁴³². Other reasons of migrants' recent arrivals to the UK were to seek asylum and refugee status in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and this is the case of refugees from non-commonwealth countries⁴³³. These new arrivals have contributed to transforming the "cultural and multicultural mosaic" of migrants' origins in London and other major British cities⁴³⁴. To understand the cosmopolitan and the multi-cultural landscape of London's migrants population, it is important to start with a brief review of these migrant communities by nationalities. This review includes migrants from both former commonwealth countries and non-commonwealth countries. The distinctive characteristics of each migrant community, their migration waves to the UK and how that has contributed to forging a community identity based on multiculturalism, but also what they bring as added value to enrich the multicultural society of the UK.

⁴³² Harper, M. and Constantine, S., 2010. *Migration and empire* (p. 168). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴³³ Dobson, J., Koser, K., McLaughlan, G. and Salt, J., 2001. International migration and the United Kingdom: Recent patterns and trends. *RDS Occasional Paper*, 75.

⁴³⁴ Ibid



Source: Office of National Statistics report 2012, Map by V. Alfaut LAM 2015

a) Commonwealth migration in the UK

Irish

Irish migration to Great Britain has a lengthy history due to the close proximity, and complex relationship between, the islands of Ireland and Great Britain coupled with various political tension between them. Today, millions of residents of Great Britain are either from Ireland or have Irish ancestry according to a 2014 census study⁴³⁵. Around six million Britons have an Irish ancestry, that is approximately 10% of the UK population. In other words, 900,000 ethnic Irish people live in London which is 12% of the city's population⁴³⁶. The changing trend of migration to the UK from 1951 to 2011 for example, indicates that Irish migration to Britain was particularly high in 1961, **(see figure 13 in p. 169)**. But this figure dropped significantly in 2001 to 473. This drop in Irish migration

⁴³⁵Migrants in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

⁴³⁶Lawton, R 1959 Irish Immigration in Ireland and Wales in the mid-nineteenth century. *Irish Geography*, Vol.4, n.1, pp.45-54

to the UK could be attributed to the change of the political environment in Ireland since peace agreements were reached in the late 1990s, and a significant economic growth might have contributed to the decline of Irish emigration to Britain in recent times⁴³⁷. Professions and occupations within the construction and hospitality sector have long been dominated by Irish migrants in London, as stated in a study by the Office of National Statistics linking occupational profile to sectors to migration trends⁴³⁸. A noted example which might be viewed as a cliché is the high percentage of London Pubs being owned by Irish or Londoners with Irish ancestry⁴³⁹. Historically people of Irish descent in London were located in areas such as Finsbury Park and Islington in North London, Hackney and Homerton in East London, Elephant and Castle in South East London and Notting Hill, North and West Kensington in West London⁴⁴⁰. This concentration of Irish diaspora in specific areas of London has contributed to the formation of a collective Irish diaspora identity in London⁴⁴¹. It is worth noting that these areas in North, East, South East and West London are no longer exclusive to Irish migrants and their descents other migrants' communities are located in those areas too.

Indian

British Indians as they were known before independence have long been one of London's largest ethnic minority groups and in 2007, over 500,000 Indians were residing in London⁴⁴². Recent studies suggest that around 7% of London's population is of Indian origin⁴⁴³. Indians have been in the British capital for generations and come from all walks of life⁴⁴⁴. Whereas the Indian born population has doubled from 157 in 1961 to 313 in 1971 (**see figure 13. in p.169**). By 2001 it had increased to 694 (**see. Figure.13. p.169**), this increase could be attributed to the recent UK migration policy of attracting highly qualified migrants from former commonwealth nations.

⁴³⁷ Gilmartin, M. and White, A., 2008. Revisiting contemporary Irish migration: new geographies of mobility and belonging. *Irish Geography*, 41(2), p.145.

⁴³⁸ Migrants in the UK Labour market: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-labour-market-overview>

⁴³⁹ Ryan, L., Leavey, G., Golden, A., Blizard, R. and King, M., 2006. Depression in Irish migrants living in London: case-control study. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 188(6), pp.560-566.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴⁴¹ Ibid

⁴⁴² Migrants in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>


⁴⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴⁴ Fisher, M. H. (2007). "Excluding and Including "Natives of India": Early-Nineteenth-Century British-Indian Race Relations in Britain". *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. 303–314

The period of 1961 and 1971 Indian migrants consistently accounted for a large proportion of the total foreign-born population in all post-1945 census. The increase for this group was between 157,000 in 1961 and 313,000 in 1971, as shown in (figure 13.p.169). By 1971, the Indian diaspora constituted 10% of foreign-born residents in the UK. As shown below in graph 3, in 2001 Indian topped countries of foreign-born migrants. In 2011, foreign born residents of Indian descent constituted 9.2% of all foreign-born residents in the UK. These figures demonstrate the continuous growth of the Indian community in the UK and particularly in London.

Figure 0-11: Most common countries of birth

Most common countries of birth outside British Isles, 2001



Source: A BBC survey on UK migration patterns: Born abroad -an immigration map of Britain:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/overview.stm

Indian community in London are noted for owning business within the retail sector specifically products for ethnic minority groups by owning grocery shops and selling beauty products to cater for the Indian, African and Caribbean communities⁴⁴⁵. Indian Labour force in London is also visible within the restaurants and entertainment sectors⁴⁴⁶. A recent Greater London Authority study showed that Indians own 4.4% of London's businesses and employ over 51,000 people (Dewani 2004).

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid

Apart from the long term settled Indians in the UK, there has been an increasing migration of highly skilled Indians to the UK⁴⁴⁷. This pattern of migration has been sought after by the British government particularly in sectors such as the health sector. The UK Minister for Immigration, Damian Green, made a statement in 2011 encouraging such migration of Indians to the UK. He further observed that: “*We want the brightest and best workers to come to the UK, make a strong contribution to our economy while here, and then return*”⁴⁴⁸. What might appear as a win-win situation for skilled Indian migrants and the UK government’s needs for qualified and skilled migrants could be interpreted as turning highly skilled Indian migrants into commodities for consumption and when they are no longer needed, they are asked to return⁴⁴⁹. Thus, highly qualified Indian migrants constitute an important percentage of Indians living in the UK⁴⁵⁰.

Highly qualified Indians are mostly found in professions such as medical doctors, IT technicians, bankers and businessmen. Of the 1.2 million, 40% live in Greater London, concentrated in West London boroughs of Brent, Ealing, Hounslow, East and South East London boroughs of Newham, Redbridge and Wandsworth in South West London⁴⁵¹. Outside London they are concentrated in cities such as Leicester, Birmingham and Manchester⁴⁵².

Pakistani

Pakistanis in London form the largest concentrated community of British Pakistanis immigration from regions which now form predate Pakistan's Independence⁴⁵³. Pakistani

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁴⁸ UK Border Agency (UKBA), 2011. Government Sets Out Proposals for Breaking the Link between Temporary and Permanent Migration. <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2011/june/12government-migration-proposals> (accessed 08.02.13).

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid

⁴⁵⁰ Kōu, A. and Bailey, A., 2014. ‘Movement is a constant feature in my life’: Contextualising migration processes of highly skilled Indians. *Geoforum*, 52, p.115

⁴⁵¹ Born Abroad: An immigration Map of Britain

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/overview.stm

⁴⁵² Ibid

⁴⁵³ Verity Salfullah Khan’s chapter on The Pakistanis: Mirpuri Villagers at Home and in Bradford, in Watson James, 1977, *Between Two Cultures*, migrants and minorities in Britain, Basil Blackwell. Oxford p. 58

migrants to the UK from 1971 recorded 136 in 1971, 182 in 1981, 225 in 1991, 308 in 2001 and 482 in 2011 (see figure 13. in p. 169). These figures indicate a gradual increase from 1971 to 2011, making them the fifth highest ranking non-UK country of birth since 1971⁴⁵⁴. This increase of Pakistanis emigration to the UK during the 1970s may partly relate to the war with India in 1965, and the ‘pull’ of employment in the UK⁴⁵⁵. Pakistanis in London just as the Indian community tend to dominate the retail sector with specific needs towards the ethnic minority community⁴⁵⁶. Restaurants and hospitality industries are equally sector with high percentage of Pakistani⁴⁵⁷. London’s Pakistani community is mainly found in outer London boroughs such as Redbridge, Newham and Waltham Forest in East and South East London accounting for nearly a third of Londoners of Pakistani descent⁴⁵⁸.

Bangladeshi

London is home to the largest Bangladeshi community outside of Bangladesh, with close to 200,000 individuals being of full Bangladeshi origin in 2007⁴⁵⁹. Most Bangladeshis fled their countries due to political unrest in the aftermath of independence⁴⁶⁰. The Bangladeshi born population more than doubled between 1981 and 1991 (see figure. 13, in p.169). The census records from 1981 to 1991, particularly that of 1991, recorded 104,000 Bangladeshi-born, compared to 48,000 in 1981 (a rise of 118 per cent)⁴⁶¹. This flow of Bangladeshi migrants was precipitated by the Bangladeshi war of independence in 1971 and subsequent military coup in 1975 causing political instability, economic hardship and poverty in the country in the 1980s and earlier⁴⁶². The increase in Bangladeshi-born migrants continued in the 1990s, rising a further 47 per cent to 153,000 in the period 1991-2001 (see figure 6. in p.143). Most Bangladeshi are often found working and operating Indian restaurants among other

⁴⁵⁴Migrants in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid

⁴⁵⁷Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An overview:

<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-labour-market-overview>

⁴⁵⁸ Sunder, D. and Uddin, L., 2007. A comparative analysis of Bangladeshi and Pakistani educational attainment in London secondary schools. *InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies*, 3(2).

⁴⁵⁹Fisher, M. H. (2006). Counter flows to Colonialism: Indian Traveler and Settler in Britain 1600-1857. *Orient Black swan*. pp. 111–9, 129–30

⁴⁶⁰ Mand, K., 2010. ‘I’ve got two houses. One in Bangladesh and one in London... everybody has’: Home, locality and belonging (s). *Childhood*, 17(2), pp.273-287.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid

⁴⁶² Ibid

retail business in areas such as Whitechapel, Aldgate East and Liverpool Street all in East London⁴⁶³. Many Bangladeshi's are settled around: Brick Lane, Bethnal Green and Whitechapel in East London Boroughs where they entered into textile trade⁴⁶⁴.

Chinese

Chinese people constitute the fourth largest Asian group in London (behind Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis); numbering 114,800 in 2007, they are spread across the entire city⁴⁶⁵. The history of the Chinese in London is long and complex, with the first Chinese people arriving in the city in the 19th century as sailors⁴⁶⁶. Chinese-born residents have more than doubled from 22,000 to 48,000 during the period 1991-2001⁴⁶⁷. There was a further marked increase to 152,000 in 2011, with China ranking eleventh highest for non-UK countries of birth in 2011⁴⁶⁸. This was the second largest absolute increase in the decade 2001-2011 for individually named countries, behind only Poland (see Figure 13. p.169). They have become successful in British life, especially when it comes to running Chinese retail shops and restaurants in areas such as China Town in central London and in other areas of London. The Chinese community in London is more dispersed compared other migrant communities, though, there is a considerable Chinese population located in Central London areas of China Town and Soho⁴⁶⁹.

Greek Cypriots

During the period of 1961, other commonwealth nations such as Cyprus, recorded a high number of migrants in the UK⁴⁷⁰. Many Cypriots fled the country following the outbreak of civil war in 1955 which continued to 1964, despite gaining independence from the UK in 1960. Since Cyprus was a Commonwealth country, many emigrating

⁴⁶³Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An overview:

<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-labour-market-overview>

⁴⁶⁴ Rochelle, T.L. and Marks, D.F., 2010. Medical pluralism of the Chinese in London: an exploratory study. *British Journal of Health Psychology*, 15(4), pp.715-728.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶⁶Watson. J, 1977, *Between two cultures: migrants and minority in Britain*, Basil Blackwell. Oxford p.185

⁴⁶⁷Migrants in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid

⁴⁷⁰ Cylwik, H., 2002. Expectations of inter-generational reciprocity among older Greek Cypriot migrants in London. *Ageing and Society*, 22, p.599.

Cypriots chose to come to the UK because of the colonial ties⁴⁷¹. There was a further phase of migration following the 1974 civil war; migration statistics identified that 20,000 Greek Cypriots subsequently entered the UK⁴⁷². Greek-Cypriots, just as the previous migrants' communities cited above, also engaged in occupational activities in retail owning clothing shops, grocery shops with Greek-Cypriot products, Turkish and Mediterranean restaurants⁴⁷³.

The overview of the above migrant community in the UK demonstrates that majority of them are found working in blue collar jobs and a small percentage work in white collar jobs. These specified sectors of occupation of migrant's community in the UK shows the diversities that these communities contribute into creating an urban and multicultural society that London, is now known to the world for. London's multicultural society is not exclusive to the aforementioned communities: it also includes the African and Caribbean community.

Figure 0-12: Map: Place of Residence of Low-Paid Workers in London



Source: Queen Mary University of London, Department of Geography

b) African and Caribbean migrants: An overview

The first groups of Blacks arrived in small numbers as sailors on the Atlantic crossings. Others were brought over as personal servants or slaves⁴⁷⁴. In the early decades of the century, their numbers increased and there were greater differences in the occupations status and positions of people within the communities⁴⁷⁵. World War II marked another period of growth of the Black communities in London⁴⁷⁶. Many Blacks from the Caribbean and West Africa arrived in small groups as wartime workers, merchants, seamen, and servicemen from the army, navy, and air forces⁴⁷⁷. For example, in February 1941, 345 West Indians came to work in factories in and around Liverpool, making munitions⁴⁷⁸. By the end of 1943 there were a further 3,312 African-American soldiers based in Maghull and Huyton, near Liverpool⁴⁷⁹. It is estimated that approximately 20,000 Black Londoners lived in communities concentrated in the dockside areas of London⁴⁸⁰.

⁴⁷⁴ Phillips, D., 1998. Black minority ethnic concentration, segregation and dispersal in Britain. *Urban Studies*, 35(10), pp.1681-1702.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷⁷ Fryer. P. 1984.op.cit. p.40

⁴⁷⁸ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.20

⁴⁷⁹ Fryer. P. 1984.op.cit. p.41

⁴⁸⁰ Fryer. P. 1984.op.cit. p.41

There are earlier records that indicate that Black people, predominantly from Jamaica, were living in London during the 17th and 18th centuries, as we will see in the following chapters on the history of and presence of Black people in Britain and the formation of a Black British identity in Britain. But it was not until the arrival of the Empire Windrush on 22 June 1948, that saw significant numbers of Caribbean, in particular Jamaicans, arrived in the capital⁴⁸¹. This has since become an important landmark in the history of modern multicultural Britain⁴⁸². During the post-World War II era, Labour migrants were required for post-war reconstruction of Britain and its economy⁴⁸³. Employers such as the British Rail, the National Health Service (NHS) and London Transport recruited almost exclusively from Jamaica and the small island of St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and the British Guyana. Some studies suggest about 250,000 Londoners are of Jamaican origin⁴⁸⁴.

In 1961, the total population of Caribbean nationals in the UK was 172,000 of which Jamaican migrants represented more than half of the total population of the Caribbean in the UK at that time. The influx of Jamaicans to the UK increased after 1961, mainly due to labour migration and family reunification were cited as the “push” factor of migration causes⁴⁸⁵.

Jamaicans

In 1961, the total Caribbean born population in England and Wales was 172,000; therefore Jamaican-born represented more than half of the total Caribbean-born population at that time⁴⁸⁶. The Jamaican-born population migrants increased from 6,000 to 100,000 between 1951 and 1961, a more than sixteen-fold increase (see figure 13. p.169). The inflow of Jamaican-born continued into the 1960s, with their number increasing another 71 percent between 1961 and 1971 to reach a peak of 171,000 in 1971⁴⁸⁷. These early figures of their emigration decline in 2001 and increased again in 2011. The influx of Jamaican migrants to the UK was mainly for Labour migration in the 1960s, 1970s, and

⁴⁸¹Mitchell, W. H., and Sawyer, L. A. (1995). *The Empire Ships*. London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd. p. 477

⁴⁸² Gilroy, P., 2007. *Black Britain: A photographic history*. Al Saqi.p.10

⁴⁸³ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Op.Cit.*p.25

⁴⁸⁴Nancy Foner's chapter on: *The Jamaicans: Cultural and social change among Migrants in Britain* p.124, in Watson J 1977, *Between two culture migrants and minorities in Britain*, Basil Blackwell, oxford

⁴⁸⁵Migrants in Britain: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid

⁴⁸⁷ ibidem

1980s, recent immigration of the 2000s were mostly motivated by economic migration or for studying in the UK⁴⁸⁸. The Jamaican community during that period were mainly located in areas such as Nothing Hill, White City, Shepherds Bush, Brent and Acton in West London and a large community are located in Brixton, Stratham, Wandsworth and Croydon in South West London⁴⁸⁹. The general occupational field where Jamaican migrants work varied, as they can be found in both blue and white collared jobs. Some can be found working for the London Underground as Tube conductors, working for Transport for London as bus drivers in blue collar jobs⁴⁹⁰. White collar jobs within the civil services, legal, media, medical and banking sector were Jamaicans can be found.

c) African Migrants

Migration waves of new Commonwealth nations (old Commonwealth nations; Australia, New Zealand and Canada) to the UK became more intensified during the period of 1971 to 1981. When most former African Commonwealth states gained independence from Britain, (some countries gained independence before 1971, Ghana for example gained its independence in 1957) some states experienced political instability.

South Africa

South Africans constitutes the largest group of African migrants in the UK⁴⁹¹. There are approximately 18,990 South African migrants in the UK, which is about 0.32% of the total UK population according to the Labour Force Survey in 2006⁴⁹². This number only includes those who were not born in the UK and are not of second, third and subsequent generation immigrants. Most of the South Africans who emigrated and continue to emigrate to the UK are people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry and working holiday makers⁴⁹³. Before the 1990s, many South Africans had left during the Apartheid era; after majority rule was established

⁴⁸⁸Migration in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

⁴⁸⁹ Stephenson, M.L., 2004. Tourism, racism and the UK Afro-Caribbean diaspora. *Tourism, diasporas and space*, p.62

⁴⁹⁰ Stephenson, M.L., 2004.p. 68

⁴⁹¹ Manik, S., Maharaj, B. and Sookrajh, R., 2006. Globalisation and transnational teachers: South African teacher migration to the UK. *Migracijske i etničke teme*, 22(1-2), p.15

⁴⁹² Ibid

⁴⁹³ Manik, S., Maharaj, B. and Sookrajh, R., 2006. Art.Cit.p.20

in 1994⁴⁹⁴. The numbers of South African-born in the UK continued to rise : 108 per cent from 64,000 in 1991 to 132,000 in 2001⁴⁹⁵. South African-born was the eighth highest ranking non-UK country of birth in the censuses of both 2001 and 2011. South African migrants' communities are scattered across London, however considerable numbers are found in West and South West London Boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, and Ealing, in areas such as North Kensington, Wandsworth, Earls Court, Fulham, Hammersmith, Shepherds Bush, Acton and Ealing⁴⁹⁶. The South African communities are found in both blue- and white-collar jobs. Some West London pubs are operated by South Africans⁴⁹⁷.

Nigeria

The second largest group of African migrants in the UK are from Nigeria⁴⁹⁸. There are approximately 14,6300 Nigerian migrants in the UK, which is about 0.25% of the total UK population according to the 2006 Labour Forces Survey⁴⁹⁹. This number just as the South African figures, only includes those who were not born in the UK and therefore are not of subsequent generations of migrants' descent. Most of the Nigerians who emigrated and still migrate to the UK are students, professionals, some asylum seekers, labour and economic migrants⁵⁰⁰. Nigerians recorded the largest percentage increase for migrants between 2001 and 2011: rising from 87,000 in 2001 to 191,000 in 2011, with most of this increase due to arrivals in the period 2004-2009⁵⁰¹. The reasons are complex, but may include the restoration of democracy in 1999, civil conflict, the economic opportunities afforded by migration to the UK and the rapid population growth in Nigeria leading to a larger

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid

⁴⁹⁵ Halvorsrud, K., 2019. The maintenance of white privilege: The case of white South African migrants in the UK. *Ethnicities*, 19(1), pp.95-116.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid

⁴⁹⁸ Ojo, S., 2013. *Diaspora entrepreneurship: A study of Nigerian entrepreneurs in London* (Doctoral dissertation, University of East London).p.10

⁴⁹⁹Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, *Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1992-2013: Secure Access* [computer file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2014. SN: 6727, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6727-6>

⁵⁰⁰ Ojo, S., 2013. *Diaspora entrepreneurship: A study of Nigerian entrepreneurs in London* (Doctoral dissertation, University of East London).p.10

⁵⁰¹Migrants in Britain: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-overview>

pool of potential migrants⁵⁰². London in particular, the southern Boroughs of London are home to the largest Nigerian community in the UK, and possibly the largest overseas Nigerian community in the world⁵⁰³. Civil and political unrest in the country also contributed to numerous refugees arriving in England (the Biafra war)⁵⁰⁴.

Packham in South East London is often referred to as Little Lagos and Yorubatown⁵⁰⁵. It is home to one of the largest overseas Nigerian communities in the world, many of the local establishments are Yoruba owned⁵⁰⁶. Nigerian churches and mosques can be found there⁵⁰⁷. The highest concentration of Nigerians is located in the London Boroughs of Southwark, Hackney, Lambeth, and Newham⁵⁰⁸. As with the other cases of the South African migrants mentioned above, there are significant divisions of ethnicity, religion and region in the diaspora, therefore it is perhaps misleading to speak of the 'Nigerian diaspora' or the 'Nigerian community' the plural of these terms is needed⁵⁰⁹. The Nigerian diaspora can equally be found in both professional and non-professional occupations in London.

Kenya

The third largest group of African migrants in the UK are from Kenya. There are approximately 12,360 Kenyan migrants in the UK, which is about 0.21% of the total UK population⁵¹⁰. Most of the Kenyans who emigrate to the UK are older flows of settled migrants (including white Britons and Asians born in Kenya), a small number of refugees and asylum seekers⁵¹¹. Britons and Asian descendants left Kenya after independence of Kenya, some cited reasons of discrimination during Jomo

⁵⁰²Van Hear, N, Pieke, F and Vertovec, S. 2004, The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction, ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford for the Department for International Development

⁵⁰³ Ojo, S., 2013. *Diaspora entrepreneurship: A study of Nigerian entrepreneurs in London* (Doctoral dissertation, University of East London).

⁵⁰⁴Casmir, L. 2008. "In America, Nigerians' education pursuit is above rest." *The Houston Chronicle*

⁵⁰⁵ Nigerians in the United Kingdom, World Remit Data:

<https://www.worldremit.com/en/stories/story/2019/10/29/nigerians-in-the-uk>

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid

⁵⁰⁸Census gives insights into characteristics of London's population:

<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/mro/news-release/census-2-1----london/census-gives-insights-into-characteristics-of-london-s-population.html>

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Jimeh Salah 6th July 2016, London

⁵¹⁰Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, *Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1992-2013: Secure Access* [computer file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2014. SN: 6727, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6727-6>

⁵¹¹Van Hear, N, Pieke, F and Vertovec, S. 2004, art.cit

Kenyatta rule⁵¹². The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) data on Kenyan diaspora mapping exercise in the UK observed in its final report in 2010 that an estimate of about 200,000 Kenyans were in the UK residing either legally or with an irregular status⁵¹³. This data estimate was made by Kenyan community representatives, who suggested that there could be as many as 300,000 Kenyans living in the UK, with approximately 80 per cent (240,000) living in London and its surroundings (IOM, 2006). As community representatives also included irregular Kenyan migrants and asylum seekers in their estimates, this number is significantly higher than those provided by UK Government sources. During IOM's mapping exercise, community representatives mentioned several areas outside London where Kenyans could be found, including Liverpool, Surrey, Milton Keynes, Sheffield, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Luton, Bradford, and Leeds⁵¹⁴. The report states that Kenyans in the UK occupied jobs requiring qualifications in both skilled and semi-skilled sectors.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe forms the fourth largest African migrant community in the UK⁵¹⁵. There are approximately 10,365 Zimbabwean migrants in the UK, which constitutes about 0.18% of the total UK population⁵¹⁶. Zimbabwean-born residents increased by 109 per cent (from 7,000 to 47,158 in 2001) over the same period owing to protracted instability during the Zimbabwean independence war of the 1970s⁵¹⁷. A second wave of Zimbabwean-born migrants arrived after 1991 as a result of political repression and ethnic discrimination, with Zimbabwean born residents in England and Wales are rising by 136 per cent in the decade 1991-2001 and a further 151 per cent in the decade 2001-2011⁵¹⁸. Asylum applications from Zimbabwe nationals

⁵¹² Ibid

⁵¹³ International Organisation for Migration mapping exercises of the Kenyan diaspora in the UK: http://kenya.iom.int/sites/default/files/Harnessing_the_Development_Potential_of_Kenyans_Living_in_the_UK.pdf

⁵¹⁴ Ibid

⁵¹⁵ Ibid

⁵¹⁶ Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, *Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1992-2013: Secure Access* [computer file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2014. SN: 6727, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6727-6>

⁵¹⁷ Office for National Statistics. 2013. art.cit

⁵¹⁸ Census: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print>

increased from 1,700 between 1992-2000 to 30,300 during 2001-2011 (see figure 15 p.170).

The Zimbabwean diaspora mapping exercise conducted in 2006 in Britain showed that Zimbabwean population in Britain are dispersed across Britain unlike other African migrant groups who tend to be concentrated largely in London. Zimbabweans in Britain are notably to be found in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Luton, Slough, Coventry, Edinburgh, Leicester, Sheffield, Doncaster, Oxford Bournemouth and Bristol (Pasura 2006).

The dispersal of asylum seekers to areas outside London and the South-East as part of the 1999 UK Immigration and Asylum Act which stipulates the settlement of Asylum-seekers all over the UK and not concentrating them all in London and its surroundings⁵¹⁹. This Immigration Act may contribute to explaining this dispersion of Zimbabweans across the UK unlike other African groups who arrived earlier having the choice to settle anywhere they wished.

Somalia

The sixth largest group of African migrants in the UK is from Somalia. According to an annual population survey in the UK in 2011 which estimated that an approximately 115,000 Somalian migrants reside in the UK⁵²⁰. A significant migration wave of Somalis occurred during the 1980s and the early 1990s civil conflict in Somalia, which led to mass emigration of Somalis in Western countries, large Somali communities have been established in London, but also in Bristol, Manchester, Birmingham and Leicester⁵²¹.

Most of the Somalians who migrate to the UK are largely composed of refugees and asylum Seekers⁵²². An IOM UK survey of the Somali diaspora revealed that out of the 119 respondents, almost half, 47.1 percent of the participants, indicated that they were employed in the public sector⁵²³. In comparison, 27.7 percent were employed

⁵¹⁹ Ibid

⁵²⁰ Hammond, L., 2013. Somali transnational activism and integration in the UK: Mutually supporting strategies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(6), pp.1001-1017.

⁵²¹ Working with Somali diaspora in London: <https://odihpn.org/magazine/working-with-somali-diaspora-organisations-in-the-uk/>

⁵²² Hermione Harris, The Somali community in the UK: What we know and how we know it Commissioned and published by The Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK (ICAR) June 2004: <http://www.icar.org.uk/somalicomunityreport.pdf>

⁵²³ Ibid

in private sector organisations. 5 percent stated that they were working in joint private-public-organisations, and 12.6 percent were employed by not-for-profit organisations; the remaining 7.6 percent of participants were seeking employment⁵²⁴. The Somali diaspora in London is dispersed, with a high concentration of Somalis located in the Boroughs of East London and South-East London in areas such as Dalton, Hackney, Peckham, Elephant and Castle. Others are located in West London Boroughs of Hammersmith and Fulham and in Ealing Borough areas such as: Acton, Southall, Greenford and South Ealing. Other areas in West London such as Shepherds Bush, Fulham White City⁵²⁵.

Uganda

The seventh largest group of African migrants in the UK are from Uganda. There are approximately 60,350 Ugandan migrants in the UK⁵²⁶. Most of the Ugandans who immigrated to the UK were largely composed of older flows of settled migrants (including Asians born in Uganda. Ugandan-born increased by 270 per cent from 12,000 to 45,000) between 1971 and 1981, owing to the forced expulsion of Ugandan-born Asians by the Amin regime in 1972; 44 per cent of the 60,000 Ugandan-born residents in 2011 arrived during the 1970s ⁵²⁷. Ugandans are dispersed in various areas in London. The old established Asian-Ugandans are found in skilled professions within the civil services, some as owners of small business⁵²⁸.

Figure 0-13: Top ten non-UK counties of birth for the resident population in England and Wales 1951-2011




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Source: 1951-2011 Census-Office of National statistics


Source: Office for National Statistics

Figure 0-14: Top ten non-UK countries of birth of usual residents in England and Wales in 2011 by year of arrival



Source: Office for National Statistics
 Source: Office for National Statistics

Figure 0-15: Arrival timeline for selected range of non-UK countries of birth in 2011 in England and Wales over the last half century and the proportion of each population resident in 2011 arriving in a particular period



Source: Office for National Statistics

d) Non-Commonwealth migrant populations

As noted with the immigration of traditional Commonwealth nations to the UK. In recent times immigration of non-Commonwealth countries to the UK has equally been significant in terms of contributing to the construction of an urban culture and identity in the UK. Countries such as the Philippines recorded 123,000 residents in 2011 (see figure.14, page .169), 64% of these arrived between the period of 2001-2009. Much of this migration may have been fuelled by economic uncertainty in the

Philippines⁵²⁹. Spanish emigration to the UK in between 2007-2009 rose to 20%, as observed in fig.15.page 169. This rapid increase could have been motivated by the collapse of the property and construction industries in Spain during that period⁵³⁰. Another strong EU migrant population in the UK is Portugal. The period between 1991-2001 saw an increase of 23% of Portuguese in the UK⁵³¹.

Migration wave to the UK in the 2000s were mainly new arrivals from other EU countries, specifically newly joined states to the Union such as Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania⁵³². The largest increase during 2001-2011 of EU migrants in the UK, was Polish-born population, with almost a tenfold increase from 58,000 to 579,000, see fig. 15. above. This was the result of Poland joining the European Union in May 2004 along with several other central-Eastern European countries⁶. This was a second wave of Polish immigration to the UK, following earlier arrivals after the Second World War and enumerated in the 1951 census (see figure 8. above)

This chapter has set out to review the general historical waves of mass migration to the UK of both Commonwealth and Non-Commonwealth states over the past seventy years. This historical review had the aim of demonstrating the causes of these earlier migration to the UK and the recent changing demographic trends of migrants' population in the UK and in London specifically. The historic account also had the aim of emphasis how these various migrants' population in London contributed to the forming of a new urban identity and a cultural mosaic that London has become known to the world. The aforementioned panoramic view of the UK migrant population indicates the heterogeneous and the multicultural richness that migration can contribute to host country demography⁵³³. To further understand the nature of these settled migrant populations in the UK and in London, it is therefore vital to delve into historical analysis of this process of forging and the formation of what we now refer to as Black British identity and how it came about.

⁵²⁹Migrants in the UK: An overview: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-labour-market-overview>

⁵³⁰ Ibid

⁵³¹ Ibid

⁵³² Ibid

⁵³³ Ibid

3.3.2 Historical account of « Black British » presence in the United Kingdom and the construction of Black and Minority Ethnic identity

The historical account of the Atlantic slave trade between Africa and the New World, set the precedence for the presence of Black people in Britain and to some extent Europe through the commerce of slaves in some European metropolis⁵³⁴. According to Olusoga in his book *Black and British: A forgotten History*, he illustrates that the presence of black people in Britain could be traced from the third century and that there have been black ‘communities’ of sorts since the 1500⁵³⁵. According to Olusoga (2016) the Black history of Britain is by its nature a global history. Yet too often it is seen as being only the history of migration, settlement and community formation in Britain⁵³⁶. He further notes that Black British history is as global as the empire⁵³⁷. It is as global as Britain’s triangular history, firmly planted in Britain, Africa and the America⁵³⁸. Olusoga observes that Black British history can be read in the crumbling stones of the forty slave fortresses that are peppered along the coast of West Africa and in old plantations and former slave markets of the British empire of North America⁵³⁹. Its imprint can be seen in stately homes, street names, statues and memorials across Britain and is intertwined with cultural and economic histories of the nation⁵⁴⁰

Slave ports cities such as Liverpool, London, Bristol and Cardiff in the UK, other slave port cities in Europe such as in France: Bordeaux, Nantes, La Rochelle and Le Havre, Lisbon in Portugal was also slave port city, just as Amsterdam in the Netherlands was equally a slave port. In the UK historically, the growth of Black urban communities was a major phenomenon of 18th century London, the burgeoning capital of world commerce and the slave trade as noted above⁵⁴¹. Close examination of the origins, occupations and settlements of newcomers from Africa, the Caribbean and the Americas reveals a distinctive pattern of Black experience in the metropolitan heart of the empire⁵⁴². Black people settled in most port cities in the UK, particularly cities such as Liverpool, Cardiff

⁵³⁴ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.21

⁵³⁵ Ibid

⁵³⁶ Ibid

⁵³⁷ Ibid

⁵³⁸ Ibid

⁵³⁹ Ibid

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid

⁵⁴¹ Ibid

⁵⁴²File. N and Power. C, 1995 *Black Settler in Britain 1555-1958*, Heinemann p. 15

and Bristol. The Black community in 18th century London was forged by their race and class status in the urban economy and society⁵⁴³. Closer investigation of their population size, origins, work and residence and spatial distribution reveals distinctive patterns of the Black urban experience⁵⁴⁴. Its size was the most striking aspect of Black London in the 18th century⁵⁴⁵.

London contained the largest concentration of Black people in Britain, larger than Liverpool, Bristol and Cardiff, the other important slave port cities. According to Linebaugh, “*the London Black community consisted of between 10,000 and 20,000 people 6-7 per cent of the population in 1500 and 1807*” (Linebaugh 1993:349). It is worth noting that these figures are to be viewed as an approximation in terms of its accuracy. It is still to be determined the exact size of Britain’s Black population, and distribution throughout the country during those periods and of recent years too, as exact figures of the black communities are still scanty.

Another important aspect of the diversity of Black Londoners was that Africa was home to all. Some, however, came directly from Africa while others came via the Caribbean with a spectrum of identities based on African, European, Asian, and Native American cultural heritages (Fraser 1993:51).

The historical chronology of Black people in Britain takes its roots from different historical stages, such as before the official commencement of the slave trade, during the period of the slave trade, plantation and slave trade in the Caribbean, the war and post-war period, colonization and decolonization era and the post-independence “voluntary” migration period to Britain⁵⁴⁶.

The presence of Black people in Britain dates back to at least the Roman occupation (Fryer 1984; Walvin, 1994: 83). There were Black entertainers such as musicians in medieval palaces, which suggests that the first Africans to come to England around the 1500s were estimated to number around 10,000⁵⁴⁷. However, it was during the 18th century that Blacks became familiar sights on the streets of London, brought there through slave trade⁵⁴⁸. The London they found had grown rich from slavery and the sugar trade⁵⁴⁹.

⁵⁴³File. N and Power. C, 1995 art. cit. p.16

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid

⁵⁴⁷ Walvin, J., 1973. *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945*. Allen Lane.p.10

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid

It is widely thought that “between 1700 and 1780, English foreign trade nearly doubled, it trebled during the next twenty years⁵⁵⁰. Shipping doubled too, all this great increase in treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of Black people in the plantations”, notes Joshua Gee in 1729, (Hill 1969:226-27). Until mass immigration following the Second World War, their numbers were estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000 between 1500 and 1807 and they did not live-in separate communities⁵⁵¹.

In terms of scientific research and literature as to the presence of Black people in Britain, Mary Dorothy George has been widely acknowledged as the first modern historian to mention the presence of Black people in London in the 18th century. *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1925)⁵⁵². Up on till then, there seem to be no other scholarly works dealing with Black people in Britain until 1948, when Kenneth Little became the first to look at the history of Black people in Britain as a distinct group. Although Little’s work mainly detailed the results of a sociological and anthropological survey into the contemporary Black community in Cardiff, there was however in his works, an account of a brief history of Black people in Britain from 1600 AD to 1948, which contained a section on the development of English racial attitudes. His works seems to have been the first to explore the development of racial prejudice⁵⁵³. Little also created a template for subsequent works such as a historical survey from 1500, a description of the events leading up to the Mansfield Judgment of 1772, the effect of scientific racism in the 19th century on the development of prejudice and discrimination, and much more detailed work on the involvement of Black people in political movements of the late 19th and 20th century⁵⁵⁴. In the 1960s Edward Scobie developed Little’s work on the history of Black people in England with more detail⁵⁵⁵. These highlighted early works in the late 19th and 20th centuries, treated Black people as part of the British or more precisely English population, not separate from them⁵⁵⁶.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵⁵¹Fryer P, 1984, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*. Pluto Press, London, p.25-30

⁵⁵²George. Dorothy. 1964 *London Life in the Eighteenth Century*, New York p. 10

⁵⁵³Little. K, 1948, *Negroes in Britain: A Study of Racial Relations in English Society*, Routledge Paul and Kegan

⁵⁵⁴Usherwood Stephane, 1981 *The Black Must Be Discharged - The Abolitionists' Debt to Lord Mansfield*, *History Today*, Volume 31 Issue 3: <http://www.historytoday.com/stephen-usherwood/black-must-be-discharged-abolitionists-debt-lord-mansfield>

⁵⁵⁵Scobie E. 1972, *Black Britannia: A History of Blacks in Britain*, Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, p.366

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid

Folarin Shyllon's books on *Black Slaves in Britain* (Oxford, 1974) and *Black People in Britain 1555–1833* (Oxford, 1977), published for the Institute of Race Relations, had a very different tone from previous works. Shyllon, who was then based in the United States, made assumptions about the experiences of Black people in Britain, which cited American writers about slavery and discrimination in the United States⁵⁵⁷. The history of Black people in America has continued to influence studies of their position in Britain, not least in assuming that Black people in Britain were enslaved, a belief that persists despite Lord Mansfield's judgment that only positive law, such as specific Acts of Parliament, could introduce it⁵⁵⁸.

Peter Fryer's *Staying Power* (London, 1984), which is generally taken to be the standard work on the subject, began the move to look at individuals. The chronological structure was similar to that of previous writers, but he took a wider view of the subject. Previous historians looked at Black people in Britain as though slavery and poverty were the only things that defined them⁵⁵⁹. Fryer's works on the other hand, dealt with slavery and political involvement but also went further in his works to view Black people not as stigmatized outsiders but their presences were woven into the English society as workers and founders of families⁵⁶⁰.

Slave trade and port cities

Tracing the presence of Black people in Britain cannot be fully examined without delving into the role that port cities in the UK played as bastions of slavery and its commerce. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, England's Black population remained small scattered from Devon to Kent, where there were a handful of Black pages and laundry maids and the likes of young slaves were used as household servants and a status symbol in the mansions of English noblemen and gentry⁵⁶¹. The planters of St Kitts, England's first successful Caribbean colony, made no bones about it. In 1680 their council told the Lords of Trade in London: "*it is a great bandage for us to cultivate our plantations without Negro slaves as it is for the Egyptians to make bricks without*

⁵⁵⁷Shyllon F. 1977, *Black people in Britain 1555-1833*, London: Oxford University Press p.38

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁵⁹ Fryer P. 1984 *Staying Power: The history of Black people in Britain*, Pluto press, London p.38

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

⁵⁶¹ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.25

straw”⁵⁶². Another planter made a similar assertion in the Nevis Island nearly 100 years later, “*it is impossible for men to make sugar without the assistance of Negroes, as it is to make bricks without straw*”⁵⁶³. Ships left London, Bristol and Liverpool, loaded with textiles made in Lancashire and slaves from Africa en route to the Caribbean and the New World⁵⁶⁴. On the African coast these commodities were bartered for slaves, who were shipped across the Atlantic, such as Barbados, the Leeward Islands, Jamaica and Surinam⁵⁶⁵. These young men were exchanged for sugar, spices, rum and tobacco, and were then carried back to Britain and sold⁵⁶⁶. Everything, in short, depended on a plentiful supply of Black labour in the great Caribbean sugar-bowl⁵⁶⁷. The planters looked on black slaves as replaceable tools for producing sugar, an attitude summed up in such remarks as “*the Negroes come here ready-made, the bags of sugar have yet to be made*”⁵⁶⁸, and so the demand for these ‘*ready-made*’ tools became more insistent and as the British slave flourished, the black population in Britain itself grew⁵⁶⁹.

For close to 150 years, young black slaves were brought to Britain as household servants by planters, who, having made their fortunes, came back home to spend them and lead a sweet life of absentee sugar baron⁵⁷⁰. It was estimated in 1774 that as many as 2,000 Jamaican annuitants and proprietors were non-residents⁵⁷¹. The slave route through Britain to the Caribbean plantation also served as an avenue of slaves being imported to Britain and settled as servants to wealthy British slave merchants.

Young black boys were brought back to Britain by officers of slave-ships. In Bristol, Liverpool and Shadwell in East London, were common places where 12-14 years old young black boys were commonly seen on the streets⁵⁷². In 1702, The Royal African Company ordered its factor in Sierra Leone to “*put on board every one of the company’s ship trading to and from England or the West Indies two negroes’ boys between the ages*

⁵⁶²Dyde B 2005, 'Out of the Crowded Vagueness: A History of the Islands of St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla', Macmillan Caribbean, Oxford.

⁵⁶³Dunn R. S 1973, 'Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713', The Norton Library, New York.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶⁶Edwards B 1793, 'The History, Civil and Commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies', 2 vols. Luke White, Dublin (reprinted Arno Press, New York, 1972).

⁵⁶⁷ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.29

⁵⁶⁸Edwards B 1793, Op. Cit.p.30

⁵⁶⁹ Walvin, J., 1973. *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945*. Allen Lane.p.15

⁵⁷⁰Ward JR 1988 'British West Indian slavery', 1750-1834, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

⁵⁷¹Ibidem

⁵⁷²Ibidem

of sixteen and twenty years of age” for the use of the ship⁵⁷³, many of these young men jumped ships when they came to Britain⁵⁷⁴. Other black slaves, Asians and Africans, were brought by government officials, army and navy officers returning from services abroad. There were also Africans who came to Britain as free seamen, recruited to take place in English Crew members who had died or deserted the ship on the African Coast⁵⁷⁵.

But the great majority of black people who came to Britain were brought as slaves and most of them were very young and mainly boys⁵⁷⁶. The official records of the arrival of the *Fountain* at Spithead from Guinea: *An agent formerly there has returned and brought with him a great many small blacks*⁵⁷⁷. Bringing back young black men from the coastal regions of Africa and the West Indies to Britain after one’s sojourns was also a status symbol, as these “little black men” were also used as objects of decoration by the British aristocrats and the royal family⁵⁷⁸. For example, a rich traveller would bring back a black child as a present for his own children to be their page and a plaything⁵⁷⁹. Black domestics, including little Black page boys, were considered an extra cachet which helped to “*effect the luxury and refinement of the upper classes*” (Linebaugh 1991:248). Nonetheless, they were slaves and “*they even wore a badge of slavery in the form of a silver collar*” (Cunnington and Lucas 1967: 177).

Caroline Bressesey’s extensive and pioneering work on the “Black presence in Britain since 1860-1920” through newspaper archive research of that period reveals that Black people were in Britain and worked during the 16th century. Most of the jobs occupied by black people during that period were menial jobs such as working as domestics, working within the entertainment business, such as musicians and on ships as stated earlier on-

According to Bressesey, as for many working people, domestic service was an important form of employment for those of African descent living in Britain. Advertisements in local newspaper do not usually carry the name of the potential employee, but they occasionally provide initials, a domestic contact address and provide an indication of the kind of work men and women expected, or hoped, to undertake. For men, the adverts

⁵⁷³Fryer P. 1984 *Staying Power: The history of Black people in Britain*, Pluto press, London p.22

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁸ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.27

⁵⁷⁹Fryer P. 1984. *Op. cit.* p.25

primarily reveal searches for employment as indoor servants, butlers, valets, grooms and coachmen. In March 1857, a '*Coloured Young Man*' offered his services as an under butler or footman in the Liverpool Mercury. The following year a 20-year-old London-based '*Indoor servant, Coloured*' advertised his willingness to work in or out of livery. In 1860 once again, a '*coloured young man*' was searching for a position as a footman or groom in The Times.

In the summer of 1872, another advert for an indoor servant was placed by a '*Coloured. Obliging, trustworthy, and good servant*'. On 17 April 1878 a '*Man-Servant. Coloured who spoke English and Portuguese*' advertised his skills as a waiter in The Times⁵⁸⁰.

Bressey further observed that for women, the advertisements reflected a long bond with the caring professions. In May 1886 a 30-year-old '*coloured woman*' with very good references advertised her desire to find a new position as a nurse⁵⁸¹. The following year a '*West Indian coloured nurse*' advertised her services⁵⁸². Men also advertised themselves to work in hotels and clubs, particularly as waiters, including for example, *the 'coloured man, age 20'* who was looking for work as a waiter in a hotel or clubhouse in 1863 in London⁵⁸³. In March 1914, a good '*plain cook*' then based in Brixton advertised for a new position that would come with the help of a kitchen maid⁵⁸⁴.

The hostilities surrounding the colour bar issues made Black people during that period to start distinguishing themselves from one another, such as a light skin superior colour black to another black person⁵⁸⁵. An example was when a female black lady looking for work described herself as a trustworthy and superior '*light coloured West Indian*'⁵⁸⁶. Bressey (2010) emphasizes that due to an increasing hostility towards black people at that period might have encouraged this form of personal demarcation of identity. Bressey's work shows several examples where those looking to employ people specify the desired skin colour to future employees.

Most of these opportunities reflect a demand for men and women to fulfil racialist and sexualized roles. For women, this is particularly reflected in requests for barmaids and for men, in roles as '*animal trainers*'. The role of the circus as an employer of black men

⁵⁸⁰Bressey. C. 2010. art.cit. p.179

⁵⁸¹ Ibid

⁵⁸² Ibid

⁵⁸³Bressey. C. 2010. art.cit. p.181

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid

has been noted by historians of the Victorian spectacle. John Turner's work on the British circus has recovered several references to black Circus artists⁵⁸⁷. They worked as lion tamers, tight rope walkers, clowns, horse riders and animal trainers⁵⁸⁸. The newspaper advertisements directed specifically at 'coloured' men or noting a preference for coloured men are mostly for animal trainers although an advert from a menagerie in Lockerby suggests that the men were not necessarily being asked to perform⁵⁸⁹.

*WANTED: A Steady Man as Animal Keeper. One that will enter the Lion's Den and give a performance if required. A Coloured Man Preferred*⁵⁹⁰.

Elegant homes' black domestic servants, house workers, and handsomely clothed retainers were a common sight in the homes of wealthier classes⁵⁹¹. Evidence of their presence is found in the many portraits of aristocratic families and their Black pages with silver collars, jewelled ear lobes, and silk and lace garments⁵⁹². Black domestics could be found in the elegant homes of the rich in fashionable areas of Westminster, Haymarket, Covent Garden, the Strand or Bloomsbury all in West London⁵⁹³.

Slowly, a respected and accepted Black leadership and public intellectuals emerged. They were lauded for their assimilation to, and integration in the ranks of London society. Literacy, oratory and the command of the English language was the key to their success⁵⁹⁴. Some were educated in schools aboard the warships on which they had served; others received tuition from friends or at their employer's expense⁵⁹⁵. It is said that by the end of the century there was a considerable literate Black population and the beginnings of a significant "a body of Afro-British writing, autobiographical and polemical" (Edwards and Dabydeen 1991).

History records well-known personalities and writers ranging from the narratives of Ignatius Sancho to the politically influential letters of Olaudah Equiano and Ottubah Cugano (Fryer 1984: 207; Edwards and Dabydeen 1991: 54). Ignatius Sancho, born a

⁵⁸⁷Turner, M. J. Twentieth century circus people: a dictionary of British circus biography: <http://www.nfa.dept.shef.ac.uk/holdings/collections/turner.html>

⁵⁸⁸Bressey, C. 2010 Looking for Work: The Black Presence in Britain 1860–1920, *Immigrants & Minorities*, 28:2-3, p. 164-182,

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid

⁵⁹¹ Ibid

⁵⁹² Walvin, J., 1973. *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945*. Allen Lane.p.35

⁵⁹³ Ibid

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid

slave in 1729 and brought to England at age two, rose from slave to a man of letters⁵⁹⁶. He saw the aristocratic life of Georgian London from both inside and outside the manor house of the Duke of Montagu⁵⁹⁷. In his notable life, Sancho rose from valet to fashionable grocer, dramatist, musician, and renowned letter-writer to Laurence Sterne and powerful personalities of his day and was the first recorded Black voter in Britain. (Sancho's World: 1997; and titles in the bibliography). Olaudah Equiano, born in Nigeria around 1750, was kidnapped into the slave trade and brought to England. After working as a servant, coal miner and ship's steward, he became an effective speaker and lobbyist in the struggle against slavery⁵⁹⁸. He published the narrative of his life in 1789 which went through 14 editions. He left an estate valued at "tens of thousands in modern money values"⁵⁹⁹.

These developments and the evolution of the presence of Black people in the UK and the occupations that they occupied between the 1600s and 1800s were important to analyse as, it demonstrates the historical presence of Black people in London and the roles they played in the embedded history between Britain, West Africa and the Caribbean, but also how that reflects their integration process which mirrors the identity and culture mosaic of modern-day Britain. The depicted occupational roles within the healthcare sectors such as Western Indian female nurses, African female and the presence of Black people generally within the entertainment industry is still relevant in present day British society.

3.3.3 Settlement of black people in 19th Century port cities: Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool and London

The presence of black people in Britain took shape in their settlement in port cities such as Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool and London as noted earlier. These were seamen from West African Coastal countries such as the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These port cities were major places for the sale of goods and slaves (Fryer1, 1984; Scobie, 1972; Shyllon, 1977; Walvin, 1973).

Apart from the commerce of slave trade, some free Africans also came to these cities as sea men who worked on the docks⁶⁰⁰. Bristol was built on the slave trade and the trade in

⁵⁹⁶ Walvin, J., 1973. *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945*. Allen Lane.p.40

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid

⁵⁹⁸ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.38

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰⁰ Walvin, J., 1973. *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945*. Allen Lane.p.48

slaves produced sugar⁶⁰¹. Its rival Liverpool was also built on slave and the trade in slave trade produced cotton. *Slavery one way or the other put Liverpool and Bristol on the map. It gave them a transfusion of wealth that, in a few decades, turned them into boom towns and great world ports. In 1833 a prominent Bristol merchant admitted that without the “slave trade, Liverpool would be a mere fishing port, thanks to slaves and sugar without the slave trade Liverpool would have remained the same as it was: ‘an insignificant seaport’, a small port of little consequences. The eighteenth century was Bristol’s golden age, as it was ranked as Britain’s second city⁶⁰² ...”* The slave trade was the pride of Liverpool, for it flooded the town with wealth which invigorated every industry, provided the capital for docks, enriched and employed the mills for Lancashire, and afforded the means for opening out new line of trade⁶⁰³. In the later part of the nineteenth century there was a build-up of small groups of Black dockside communities in port towns in London’s East end such as Canning Town, Cardiff’s Tiger Bay, with some communities in South Shields in Tyne & Wear and Glasgow⁶⁰⁴. By 1918 it was estimated that there were as many as 30,000 Black people living in Britain and mostly around port cities⁶⁰⁵. This was the direct effect of new shipping links that were established with the Caribbean and West Africa⁶⁰⁶. Trading links between the British ports and West Africa were established under various shipping companies⁶⁰⁷. The Black community in 1914 was estimated at 100,000 and it was mostly centered around London⁶⁰⁸.

With these observation in mind, it is however necessary to nuance that the presence of black people in Britain should not only to be viewed from the lenses of the Atlantic slave trade but other forms of emigration to the UK during the period of 19th and early 20th century. Green (1998) to this effect, highlights in his book *The Black Edwardian*, that wealthy African families mainly from African royal families sent their children to study in Britain. Green outlines the lives of black Edwardians of every social class⁶⁰⁹. Most

⁶⁰⁰ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.289

⁶⁰¹ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.289

⁶⁰² Freyer P. 1984.op.cit 35

⁶⁰³ Ibid

⁶⁰⁴ Bourne, S., 2014. *Black Poppies: Britain’s Black Community and the Great War*. The History Press.

⁶⁰⁵ Storm, E. and Al Tuma, A. eds., 2015. *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945: “aliens in Uniform” in Wartime Societies*. Routledge.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid

⁶⁰⁹ Green, J. 1998. *Black Edwardians: Black People in Britain 1901-1914*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass. p.35

importantly, he tells the stories of the black working class and the black poor in all likelihood, but also the black elite, which he dubs as the "*black bourgeoisie*." Green shows in detail, this latter group was highly educated and left a relatively large body of written evidence, which makes possible the reconstruction of their lives in Britain⁶¹⁰. But the cast of black characters in Green's Edwardian drama does not only have those from the extreme ends of the social hierarchy, but also an extraordinarily varied group in between⁶¹¹. For between the distinguished black lawyers, doctors, and African princes, on the one hand, and the black poor and criminal elements on the other, were Africans brought from the continent just as zebras were, to be displayed at imperial exhibitions; black visitors, simply passing through, black musicians and actors; black sportsmen and soldiers; a hapless group of "pygmies" displayed around the country and on the continent like Benin bronze⁶¹²; black children and students; black writers and agitators along with black Christianizing missionaries⁶¹³. In short, Green provides a panorama of black British life in the Edwardian era and suggests the networks that linked Caribbeans, Afro-Americans, and Africans over space and time⁶¹⁴.

3.3.4 Black British post-colonial formation: The arrival of Empire Windrush

⁶¹⁰ Ibid


⁶¹¹ Ibid

⁶¹² Ibid

⁶¹³ Ibid

⁶¹⁴ Ibid

Figure 0-16: Press-cutting: Windrush Arrival 1948-Welcome Home!



Source: The Windrush generation stories and memories: <https://www.horniman.ac.uk/story/the-windrush-generation-stories-memories-food-and-advice/>

After World War II, the largest influx of Black people in Britain occurred, mostly from the British West Indies. Over a quarter of a million West Indians, most of them from Jamaica settled in Britain in less than a decade⁶¹⁵. There were an estimated 482 passengers aboard the HMT Empire Windrush that arrived at Tilbury Docks on 22 June 1948⁶¹⁶.

In the mid-1960s, Britain had become the centre of the largest overseas population of West Indians⁶¹⁷. This mass migration is often labelled as "Windrush", a reference to

⁶¹⁵ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Un/Settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*. Zed Books.p.72

⁶¹⁶ Gilroy, P., 2007. *Black Britain: A photographic history*. Al Saqi.p.64

⁶¹⁷ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Op.cit.* p.73

the Empire Windrush, the ship that carried the first major group of Caribbean migrants to the United Kingdom in 1948. The British economy was short of labour in the aftermath of the Second World War, and needed “*these willing hands*”, therefore the doors were opened for incoming migrants⁶¹⁸. Caribbean is itself not one ethnic or political identity; for example, some of this wave of immigrants were Indo-Caribbean⁶¹⁹. The most widely used term then used was “West Indian” or sometimes “coloured”⁶²⁰.

“Black British” did not come into widespread use until the second-generations were born to post-war immigrants to the country⁶²¹. Although British by nationality, due to friction between them and the white majority, they were often being born into communities that were relatively closed, creating the roots of what would become a distinct Black British identity⁶²². By the 1950s, there was a consciousness of black people as a separate people that was not there between 1932 and 1938⁶²³. The increasing consciousness of Black British people was deeply informed by the influx of Black American culture imported by Black GIs during and after World War II⁶²⁴. Music being one central example of what Jacqueline Nassy-Brown calls “*diasporic resources*.” These close interactions between Black Americans and Black British were not only material, but also inspired by the expatriation of some Black British women to America after marrying GIs, some of whom repatriated to the UK with strong ideologies of black power⁶²⁵.

⁶¹⁸Fryer.P. 1977. op. cit. pp. 373

⁶¹⁹ Gilroy, P., 2007. *Black Britain: A photographic history*. Al Saqi.p.64

⁶²⁰ Ibid

⁶²¹ Ibid

⁶²² Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Un/Settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*. Zed Books.p.72

⁶²³ Ibid

⁶²⁴ Brown. J. N (1998), Black Liverpool, Black America, and gendering of diasporic space. *Cultural Anthropology* 13 (3), p.300

⁶²⁵ Ibid

Figure 0-17: Protest in London 2017 in support of deportation of Windrush Generations



Source: The Windrush Generation Stories: <https://www.horniman.ac.uk/story/the-windrush-generation-stories-memories-food-and-advice/>

3.3.5 Black British post-Colonial formations: The 1940s post-war Britain Black political awakening: The case of West African students in Britain

In this sub-section I seek to demonstrate how Britain became home to African students' political resistance towards colonial rule and in that process contributed to the formation of a collective Black British identity. After the period of Black presence in the United Kingdom much linked to slavery and forced migration of Blacks in England, came a different era of immigration⁶²⁶. This period of migration was mainly African students⁶²⁷. During this entire period of slavery and colonial rule, West Africans were being compelled through various circumstances to leave their homeland and sojourn in Britain⁶²⁸. Some, like the famous eighteenth-century British residents; Olaudah Equiano of Nigeria and Ottobah Cugoano of the Gold Coast, had to endure the forced migration of slavery and the slave trade before their eventual liberation⁶²⁹.

⁶²⁶ Adi Hakim 1998, *West Africans in Britain 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism* London: Lawrence and Wishart, p.5

⁶²⁷ Ibid

⁶²⁸ Ibidem

⁶²⁹ Ibid

The distinction that might be made between Africans in the diaspora and those from the continent does require careful consideration, not least because many Africans combined both statuses⁶³⁰. More important, such Africans, as sojourners abroad, were often able to play a pivotal role in the development of the politics of resistance to slavery and colonialism⁶³¹.

The history of Africans in Britain shows that there has been an important relationship between the growing political consciousness of those Africans who sojourned abroad, even if only temporarily a part of the diaspora, and the development of the political consciousness of their compatriots in Africa notes Adil (1998). It was often while they were in Britain, or because they were in Britain, that their political awareness was sharpened, and their political training began⁶³². Important networks were established, linking those overseas in Britain and those in the continent with the wider diaspora, and there has been a dialectical transfer of ideas and influences (Adi 1998). West Africans in Britain, whether they consider themselves part of the diaspora or not, have certainly been influenced by their experiences in Britain and their contact with other Africans and those of African origin from the Caribbean⁶³³. There are correlations of political awareness of Africans and people of African descent in Britain and in France⁶³⁴. As in post-World War two era in France young Students from Francophone Africa and French Caribbean students were equally influenced and seduced by the notions of pan-Africanism, Afrocentrism and *la negritude* as a political ideology, as was the case with their comrades in Britain ⁶³⁵.

These Africans in Britain were influential, particularly in the development of a wider pan-African politics and consciousness⁶³⁶. It is worth noting that West African students activist contributed to the development of radical, working-class, and anti-imperialist politics in Britain⁶³⁷. As such, there has been a long tradition of these political contributions, ranging from Equiano's membership in the radical London Corresponding Society in the eighteenth century to Desmond Buckle's lifelong membership in the British Communist

⁶³⁰ Ibid

⁶³¹ Ibid

⁶³²Adi. H. 2000, art. cit. pp. 82

⁶³³ Ibid

⁶³⁴ Ibid

⁶³⁵ Chafer. (2002), *The end of empire in French West Africa: France's successful decolonization*, Bloomsbury Publishing

⁶³⁶ Ibid

⁶³⁷ Adi Hakim 1998, *West Africans in Britain 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism* London: Lawrence and Wishart,

Party in the twentieth⁶³⁸. West Africans political identities and their political consciousness has changed over time this is related to specific historical conditions and context⁶³⁹. A pan-African consciousness, for example, can be seen in the writing and activities of Equiano, Cugoano, and other "Sons of Africa" in the eighteenth century⁶⁴⁰.

In the twentieth century, however, West Africans political identity has sometimes been subsumed under a general pan-Africanism, which in the early part of the century sometimes manifested itself as Ethiopianism⁶⁴¹. But it was also often seen in terms of an identification with a West African "nation," or in terms of an affiliation with the politics created by colonialism itself, with a narrower ethnic nationalism (often called "tribalism"), depending on the period and the historical conditions⁶⁴². Their political organizations, especially the West African Students' Union (WASU) and the West African National Secretariat (WANS), were influential in West Africa and throughout the diaspora which reflected a changing political identities, consciousness, and historical conditions⁶⁴³. Most important, they emphasized the fact that West Africans developed and maintained their own distinctive political aims, consciousness, and ideologies, while at the same time contributing to, and being influenced by those of the diaspora⁶⁴⁴. These aims and ideologies also reflected the particularities of political and social conditions in Britain, conditions that were shaped among other things, by the African presence itself (Adi 1998). This observation of African and Caribbean student political groups in Britain is equally mirrored in France with the creation of la Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France (La FEANF) as student political movement among people of African and Caribbean descent in France just as the West African Student Union (WASU) in Britain. La FEANF was initiated by African and French Caribbean students to advocate for their rights in terms of having access to student accommodation and health care⁶⁴⁵. As they became more politicised La FEANF moved on to become the voice of decolonisation movement in France⁶⁴⁶. As such La FEANF in 1950

⁶³⁸Ibid

⁶³⁹ Ibid

⁶⁴⁰"Sons of Africa" was the name by which Equiano, Cugoano, and other African abolitionists collectively referred to themselves.

⁶⁴¹Adi. H. 2000, art. cit. p. 89

⁶⁴² Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.289

⁶⁴³Adi. H. 2000, art. cit. p.85

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid

⁶⁴⁵ Françoise Blum 2007, la Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France (La FEANF): <http://maitron-en-ligne.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php?article159874>

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid

organised a succession of congresses in Bordeaux and in Lyon drawing inspiration from the Manchester Congress (Pan-African congress) organised in 1944 and 1945 by the West African Students Union in Britain to demand the end of colonial rule and advocate for the end of racial discrimination in Britain and in France⁶⁴⁷.

Figure 0-18 : Image: Manchester Congress 1945 West African and Caribbean Students



Source: The 1945 Manchester Congress: Planning the end of Europe's empires—the 1945 Pan-African Congress. In 1945 Pan-African nationalists met in Manchester to debate the fight against racism and imperialism. Only 200 people attended the event. But the meeting helped plant the seeds of revolt across a continent, writes Ken Olende: The socialist workers website: <https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/41474/Planning+the+end+of+Europes+empires+the+1945+Pan+African+Congress>

These correlations indicate that the history of black students' political movements in Britain and France occurred at the same period, but with a difference in terms of moving from a pure political ideology into a concrete political movement and a

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid

political project both in the diaspora and in Africa for Blacks in Britain and the British colonies.

This period of the 1930s and 1940s brought together a strong sentiment among people of African descent in Britain interested in the fight against colonial rule in both mainland Africa and the Caribbean. As a result, it produced Pan-Africanist radicals such as George Padmore, C.R.L James, Ras Makonnen, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Joe Appiah, Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, who all attended the Manchester Congress in 1945 to demand national liberation, self-determination, and self-government⁶⁴⁸. They further claimed they wanted to rule their own country, free from the feathers of alien domination⁶⁴⁹. Some of these leaders and Black political thinkers of the time eventually returned to their home country and became leaders of independence such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. George Padmore, Ras Makonnen and C.L.R James, were invited by Nkrumah to become his advisers on Pan-African issues when he became president⁶⁵⁰. Most of these leaders gained their political consciousness whilst they were in Britain. The arrival of Empire Windrush in 1948, as was noted earlier on, also marked the rise of Black British political consciousness and the beginning of a Black British identity formation in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

3.3.6 Conceptual framing of the Black British identity formation: The 'melting pot' of Multicultural and Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism emerged as a result of the realization originally in the USA, and then in Britain, that the melting pot doesn't melt, and that the ethnic and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generations. Multiculturalism constructs society as composed of a hegemonic homogenous majority and small un-meltable minorities with their own essentially different communities and cultures which have to be understood, accepted and basically left alone- since their differences are compatible with the hegemonic culture- in order for the society to have harmonious relations (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992:158)

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid

⁶⁴⁹ Fryer, P.1977. op. cit. pp. 348

⁶⁵⁰ Darby, P., 2013. 'Let us rally around the flag': Football, nation-building, and pan-Africanism in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana. *The Journal of African History*, 54(2), pp.221-246.

To this end the formation of the Black British identity can be viewed from the ideological notions of multicultural and multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism serves as a portmanteau term for anything from minority discourse to post - colonial critique, from gay and lesbian studies to Chicano/a fiction-has become the most charged sign for describing the scattered social contingencies that characterize contemporary kulturkritik. The multicultural has become a 'floating signifier' whose enigma lies less in itself than in the discursive uses of it to mark social processes where differentiation and condensation seem to happen almost synchronically. (Homi Bhabha 1998)

In a similar vein, Barnor (2000) distinguishes the difference between Multicultural and Multiculturalism. Multiculturalism refers to particular discourses or social forms in which it incorporates marked cultural differences and diverse ethnicities. In this sense multiculturalism can be named, valued, celebrated and repudiated from many different political perspectives. The multicultural is the signifier of the unsettled meaning of cultural differences in relation to multiculturalism as the signifier of attempts to fix their meaning in national imaginary⁶⁵¹.

According to the former Conservative Party MP Lord Tebbit, Multiculturalism in Britain should be feared he made this statement at the Conservative Party meeting in October 1997: *Multiculturalism is a divisive force. One cannot uphold two sets of ethics or be loyal to two nations, any more than a man can have two masters. It perpetuates ethnic divisions because nationality is in the long term more about culture than ethnics. Youngsters of all races born here in Britain should be taught that British history is their history, or they will forever be foreigners holding British passports and the Kingdom will become a Yugoslavia. You can't have a whole load of different cultures in one society, you have one culture for one society and if you get different societies mixed up, living close cheek-by-jowl, you will splinter our society in the way that devolution is splintering the United Kingdom* ⁶⁵².

⁶⁵¹ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Un/Settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*. Zed Books. p.3

⁶⁵² Abrams. F. 1997 Tory Conference: Anger as Tebbit questions loyalties of 'two-nation' immigrants, *The Independent*, Wednesday 8 October 1997: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/tory-conference-anger-as-tebbit-questions-loyalties-of-two-nation-immigrants-1234581.html>

Barnor (2000) interprets Lord Tebbit's views of multiculturalism as: *'Multiculturalism cannot be eliminated but it should not be repressed, hence it cannot be ignored because it refuses to go away. But it must be feared because it can re-emerge at any time; and consequently, it must be condemned because it has the capacity to unsettle what has been and needs to be settled'*⁶⁵³

To this end, May (1999), highlights that Multiculturalism is far from being a settled doctrine, as it is a deeply contested idea. It is contested by the Conservative Right, in defence of the purity and cultural integrity of the nation. It is contested by the liberals who claim that the 'cult of ethnicity' and the pursuit of differences threatens the universalism and neutrality of the liberal state undermining personal autonomy, individual liberty and formal equality⁶⁵⁴. Multiculturalism some liberals also indicate it legitimates the idea of 'group rights'⁶⁵⁵. But this subverts the dream that one nation and one citizenship can be constructed of diverse cultures of different people⁶⁵⁶. Multiculturalism is also contested by modernizers of different political persuasions. For them, the triumph of the universalism of western civilization over particularism of ethnic and racial belonging established in the Enlightenment marked a fateful and irreversible transition from Traditionalism to Modernity⁶⁵⁷. This shift must never be reversed⁶⁵⁸. Michele Wallace observes that: *everybody knows... that multiculturalism is not the promised land... However, even at its most cynical and pragmatic, there is something about multiculturalism which continues to be worth pursuing... we do need to find ways of publicly manifesting the significance of cultural diversity and of integrating the contributions of people of colour into the fabric of society. (Wallace 1994).*

Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, the relationship of Black people to the British cultural landscape has become more visible in its coherence and complexity, the idea of Black Britishness still retains the resonance of an oxymoron⁶⁵⁹. Culturally it appears to be no more than a balancing act between the racial exclusiveness of British nationalism (Gilroy,1987; Mama 1995) and the aspirational transformative cultures of Black identities

⁶⁵³ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Op. Cit.* p.5

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid

⁶⁵⁶ Kymlicka, W. and Wayland, S.V., 1996. Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 28(2), p.174.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

⁶⁵⁹ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Un/Settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*. Zed Books.p.98

in Britain (Hall 1998; Sudbury 1998). Black Britishness is a discourse whose increasing currency has yet to be conceptualised seriously⁶⁶⁰. It is noticeable within the soundbite proclivities of an unreflective public sphere that the mere evocation of Black Britishness manages to convey the profound impact of our cultural dynamic on the nation's popularization of itself, particularly in London as either multicultural or liberal or cool (Phonix 1998).

Phillips and Phillips (1998) have made the case that time has made it increasingly possible to identify a Black British appropriation of the *Windrush* as a symbol. They note that “*as if the Windrush, in spite of time and distance, had become part of our own story*”⁶⁶¹. By proclaiming the narrative of Caribbean migration to Britain as within the corresponding formation of Black British Communities, *Windrush* can now be seen to redefine these developments as critical aspects of the post-war reconstruction of Britain's public identity⁶⁶².

Hesse (2000) gives four process to summaries the politics of Black Britishness within the context of identity formation in Britain. First, Black Britishness is *discontinuity historicized*. The apparent temporal rupture which sperate the late from the early twentieth century in the institution of Black settlement, evidence by the emergent symbolization of *Windrush* and residual symbolization of Manchester 1945, is neither novel nor aberrant⁶⁶³. Since the sixteenth century the Black presence in Britain has been invariably subject to social expansion and decline in distinct historical periods with negligible generational and communal continuity between these periods (Shyllon 1977). Secondly, Black Britishness is profoundly and *disparately regionalized*. The national history of Black communities is lived primarily in terms of locality (Dennis 1998; Keith 1993). Even the ubiquitous serial ratio of the post-war migration narrative does not transcend its accentuation within the city-bounded histories and memories of London, Birmingham, Cardiff, Liverpool or Leeds. In appropriating Britishness through regional life, worlds and vernacular, the cities inhabited by British communities resemble a geography of disparate identities connected only by diverse investments in imagining a nationally expressive Black Britishness and the mobilization of diasporic affinities.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶⁶¹ Phillips, M. and Phillips, T., 1998. *Windrush: the irresistible rise of multi-racial Britain*. London: Harper Collins. p.10

⁶⁶² Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Op.cit.* p.115

⁶⁶³ Ibid

Third, it is *recurrently politicized* as forms of agency and identification in relation to the complimentary strategic resources of ‘communitarian edification’ and ‘axiological restitution’ (Hesse 1999). These terms are used to highlight the logics of *esprit de corps* that animate Black politics. Communitarian edification describes the ideal of empowerment through community formations and values in the development of Black movements for civil liberties, social justice and economic liberation⁶⁶⁴. This logic can be seen through the myriad of iconic events and campaigns which have exposed the impact of pervasiveness and disavowals of racism in Britain (Solomos 1993). From the race riots of Liverpool in 1948 and in Nothing Hill in 1958 to urban uprising against policing in the 1980s and to the campaign against the racist murder of Stephan Lawrence in the 1990s⁶⁶⁵. The political cultivation of Black identity in Britain bears testimony to a cross-generational critique of and generationally specific challenges to various forms of ‘British governmentality’ (Hesse 1997).

Fourth, Black British is *dialogically differential* around various conception of Black subjectivity, increasingly dissected by critical investments in gender, ethnic, sexual, class and religious differences have become more explicitly valorized, through both affirmation and contestation, introducing far greater complexity into the meaning of Black British constituency (Mercer 1994).

To this end Black Britishness can be viewed within the context of a global world, as it has to be understood as a form of transnationalism⁶⁶⁶. The transnational formation of migratory orbit translates Black British identities in a ‘discontinuous intertextual temporality of cultural differences’ (Bhabha 1994:38). In other words, the transnational meaning of Black Britishness is constantly renegotiated in comparative oscillations between minority status in Britain and majority status in the Caribbean or Africa as well as in relations to similarities and differences perceived in the formation of Black communities in the United States and Canada⁶⁶⁷. Hesse (2000) observes that by the end of the twentieth century, there was nothing particularly systematic about British reactivation of diasporically Black identities, although it is strategic. For example, in

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid

intellectual discourses Black Britishness draws eclectically and cross culturally from other themes of critical thoughts aligned with Black social movements such as pan-Africanism, Black Power, Black feminism, Rastafari and through other experiments with their inflections through ‘other’ intervention of western naturalism of, anti-racism, multiculturalism, (post)-Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, post-colonialism, post-structural and post-modernism⁶⁶⁸. David Olusoga points this out in the concluding remark of his book, *Black and British: A forgotten History* published in 2016. In it he states that through sports, music, cinema, fashion and television, Black Britons have become the standard-bearers of a new cultural and national identity, the globalized hybrid version of Britishness that was successfully and confidently portrayed and expressed during the London 2012 Olympic Games opening ceremony, which highlighted the rich diversity and diverse multicultural identities of modern-day Britain to the world.

3.3.7 Riots and post-riot years and the entanglement of cultures: the consolidation of the Black British Identity

With the arrival of post-war migrants in the late 1940s as analysed above, the second-generation children of those migrants who came to work in Britain after the Second World War became subject to racial discrimination on all fronts: from the search for employment to moving freely in some parts of Britain, to renting accommodation. As Chris Mullard (1973) notes in his work on second-generation Blacks in Britain. Mullard argued that the problems of his own generation (second-generation) were different from those faced by their parents, who had arrived in the 1940s and 1950s. He observed that: '*a Black man born in Britain is a shadow of a man. A form but no identity: You are not West Indian, Indian, Pakistani or African, because you were born in Britain, and know little or nothing about your parents country. Even if you wished to, you cannot pretend you are a Black immigrant, because embedded in your being is the knowledge that you are not. If you choose to ignore this then it is forced upon you by the way Black immigrants see you, treat you, and react towards you when in the presence of fellow Black immigrants or white people. Similarly, if you choose to identify with whites the same mechanism goes into reverse gear. In the end you have no alternative but to remain alone, insecure, without*

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid

*an identity of your own making*⁶⁶⁹.' This statement from Mullard's work suggests the struggles of identity crisis immigrant children of second-generation descent faced during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s where many felt disillusioned, frustrated and felt as misfits⁶⁷⁰.

The sociologist, John Rex, (1979) describes two main forms of inequality experienced by migrants in Britain⁶⁷¹. The first was inequality in the workplace. According to Rex : '*in the field of employment, even if one looks at those who are stably employed, one should also notice that the jobs in which immigrants find themselves have low initial skill requirements or require only skills learned on the job, that these are jobs which young white men do not want, but which were previously held by white people who have now reached retirement, that the jobs are often dirty and boring, that they involve a lot of shiftwork and often involve longer hours than equivalent paid work amongst white*⁶⁷²'. The second was discrimination in housing, '*When we look at the immigrant population, some ten to twenty years after their first arrival, we find that they do indeed have roofs over their heads and that they often own those roofs. But it is still the case that they are where they are primarily because of disadvantage arising out of the system of housing allocation*⁶⁷³.

Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, the British state (laws, politicians and the press) seemed to become more closed, while the community organizations became more militant in reply⁶⁷⁴. The influence of Civil Rights movements in the US and its leaders such as Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and the Black Panthers had an impression in Britain⁶⁷⁵. Policing seemed more intrusive, less tolerable. A 1971 demonstration against the Conservatives Immigration Bill, which ended the rights of non-British Commonwealth citizens to settle in Britain, was described by the Times: '*Indian, Pakistani and West Indian immigrant organizations from all over Britain marched through London protesting against the Immigration Bill. A dozen organizations including the Supreme Council of Sikhs, the Indian Workers Association and the West Indian Standing Conference took*

⁶⁶⁹Mullard. C. 1973 Blacks in Britain, Allen & Unwin; First Edition, London p. 13-14

⁶⁷⁰Mullard. C. 1973.op.cit p.16

⁶⁷¹Rex. J, 1979. 'Black Militancy and Class Conflict', in R. Miles and A. Phizaclea, *Racism and Political Action in Britain* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 72-93, here pp. 77, 78

⁶⁷²Rex. J, 1979. Op. cit. pp. 80


⁶⁷³Rex. J, 1979. Op. cit. p. 78

⁶⁷⁴Rex. J, 1979. Opt. cit. p. 80

⁶⁷⁵Mullard. C. 1973.op.cit p.20

part⁶⁷⁶.' Soon there were a plethora of Black political groups to join in Manchester, there was a Black People's Political Alliance, while the Jamaican People's National Party organized branches across Britain. The most important groups for Asian workers included the Indian Workers Association and several younger, locally based Asian Youth Movements (AYMs)⁶⁷⁷. These events marked the beginning of active political engagement of Britain's ethnic minority group.

Figure 0-19: Image : Ethnic Minority protest in Britain in 1981



source: Asian and Black Youth Association Movement in the protest on the trial of the Bradford 12: <http://history-is-made-at-night.blogspot.fr/2011/07/short-hot-summer-1981-bradford-12.html>

By the late 1970s, there was a generational gap between second generations and their parents as younger second-generation Blacks and Asians did not share their parents' sympathy with and understanding of British democracy and the principles of British justice⁶⁷⁸. An example of such a gap and disconnection between first and second-generation Black and Asian British was during the Bradford twelve trial. Tariq Mehmood was one of the defendants in the 1981 trial of the Bradford twelve, a number of young activists who were accused of stockpiling arms in order to attack the Bradford police⁶⁷⁹.

⁶⁷⁶Rex. J, 1979. Opt. cit. p. 80

⁶⁷⁷Short Hot Summer 1981: Bradford 12: <http://history-is-made-at-night.blogspot.fr/2011/07/short-hot-summer-1981-bradford-12.html>

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid

⁶⁷⁹Short Hot Summer 1981: Bradford 12: <http://history-is-made-at-night.blogspot.fr/2011/07/short-hot-summer-1981-bradford-12.html>

His autobiographical novel, *Hand on the Sun*, describes a cycle of official racism from the early 1970s onwards, in which every single source of authority worked together to keep young Blacks and Asians down⁶⁸⁰. One result was a generational conflict among the Bradford immigrants themselves. In *Hand on the Sun*, this struggle is represented by the arguments between Jalib and his father: “*Jalib is attacked by racist thugs at school and at home. He finds it almost impossible to hold down steady work. He had no understanding of the conditions back home which forced his father to leave Pakistan, the debts, the poverty of rural life. Jalib's father can no longer understand why his son is so determined to pick fights, or to get into trouble with the police. The incomprehension is mutual*”⁶⁸¹. Similar sentiment was echoed by Chris Mullard: “*we are different from our parents in many ways. Second-generation immigrants for Black Britons. Using such labelling devices, the vicious circle of racial discrimination becomes institutionalized and perpetuated. Merely of the colour of their skin, Black children became second-class citizens, a life of ostracism, exploitation and difference*”⁶⁸². One symbol of what felt wrong with Britain at the time was the response of local authorities to the organizers of the Notting Hill Carnival. Two hundred and fifty thousand people attended the 1975 event⁶⁸³. Middle-class English residents in North Kensington in West London disliked the Carnival, and in March 1976 were able to find 500 people to sign an anti-Carnival petition. By 1976, the scene was set for clashes⁶⁸⁴.

By the 1970s, a popular movement had grown up against state racism. The Jamaican writer Rodney James was one member of this younger, more radical generation. Born in 1956, he lived in Leeds and then London. He remembers well the political arguments of the late 1970s. One influence on him was Jamaican religion, ‘*Most of my generation of Afro-Caribbeans in Britain was in one way or another profoundly affected by the Rastafarian movement that swept across the Atlantic to Britain in the early 1970s*’⁶⁸⁵. Another strong influence on Rodney James was the image of Black Power, learned from the movement in America.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid

⁶⁸¹ ‘Pakistanis and Sikhs will not support march’, *Newcastle Evening Chronicle*, 7 May 1968.
<https://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/legacy/libraries/NewspaperfactsheetMarch2011.pdf>

⁶⁸² Mullard. C. 1973.op.cit p.22

⁶⁸³ Ibid

⁶⁸⁴ Mullard. C. 1973.op.cit p.30

⁶⁸⁵ Mullard. C. 1973.op.cit p.45

The historian Winston James (1993) argues that the experience of racism in Britain was a major factor in the development of a shared black identity, the racist attacks that black and Asians were subjected to by far-right groups such as National Fronts in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s⁶⁸⁶. Such attacks propelled the black community to have an organized group with its leaders to fight this discrimination and this was the bases of the creation of a collective political identity⁶⁸⁷. Institutional racism and discrimination in employment and housing all set the centre for such groups to advocate for social integration in all aspects of British society⁶⁸⁸

The forming of Black British identity was through resistance from racial and institutional discrimination which was foisted upon the first-generation migrants' community from former Commonwealth countries helped to forge a collective political identity which might not have existed if these communities did not face any racial discrimination. Institutional racism and discriminations are articulated through being overlooked for some job positions or being discriminated in terms of housing and accommodation allocation. This experience of discriminations as one first-generation Jamaican observed: *"The colour of your skin matters here. In Jamaica, it is class, not colour, that marks one's difference"*⁶⁸⁹. Another first-generation Jamaican further state: *"I think most of my friends feel Jamaican, the English helped us do it, needless to say, the English also made us to also feel Afro-Caribbean people in Britain, to feel West Indian, and feel Black as a result of being discriminated we had to come together to fight this"*⁶⁹⁰.

The second generations born in the 1960s, third generations born in the 1980s the fourth and subsequent generations born in the 1990s and 2000s of Black British descent, identity constructed is often negotiated through their social capital to borrow Bourdieu's typology: community, ethnicity, professional occupation, sports and education, representations in popular culture such as cinema, literature and urban music, all this contributed to forging or inventing an identity as a result of social exclusion and discriminations of all sorts⁶⁹¹.

⁶⁸⁶Winston.J. and Harris. C, 1993, Inside Babylon: The Caribbean Diaspora Experience in Britain, London and New York, p.88

⁶⁸⁷Winston.J. and Harris. C, 1993, Op. Cit. p.89

⁶⁸⁸ Hesse. B 2000.Op. Cit. p.110

⁶⁸⁹ Winston. J. 1986, A. Long Way from Home: On Black Identity in Britain. Immigrants & Minorities 5(3) p. 261.

⁶⁹⁰Ibid

⁶⁹¹ Ibid

It is now widely acknowledged that identity formations are not static and eternal in their constitution but profoundly dynamic, always in the process of being made, unmade and remade, as noted by Gilroy in his *Black Atlantic*⁶⁹². It is evident, moreover, that the experience of migration and the challenges of a new environment often accelerate the pace of such change. In other words, there is no such thing as one model of “Black British identity”. It is constantly changing and evolving through different lenses as various Black British generations have constructed their identities through different modes. This implies that they invent and reinvent their identities depending on each generation’s own mode of identity formation.

For example, the first and second generations constructed their collective identity through their response to social discrimination and institutional racism that was foisted upon them, as noted above. As such, it served as the basis on which their Black British identity was formed and they constantly looked at linking their identity to a certain “homeland”, be it an imagined homeland or a concrete homeland⁶⁹³. This ideal of homeland was inspired by Afrocentric ideology imported from the US. As noted earlier black Britons have often been inspired by the African American civil rights movement⁶⁹⁴. The Afrocentric ideology is considered as the basis of the way the Black diaspora identity is formed. By connecting it to Black Essentialist notions, importance is placed on the ethic of subject-to-subject communications and interactions that positions the African agency as comparable to any human in the world⁶⁹⁵.

The third generations born in the 1980s the fourth generations born in the 1990 and the fifth generations born in the 2000s have constructed their identity through a multiculturalist standpoint whereby their cultural and social diversity has now become an asset and is embedded in their identity as a distinct minority group⁶⁹⁶. An example of such is the Black British culture based on urban culture, which is distinctive of the Black community⁶⁹⁷. This mode of identity formation is often referred to as multiculturalism which has long been advanced by Black British intellectuals such as Stuart Hall and Paul

⁶⁹² Gilroy, P. 1993, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, London, Verso, p. 10

⁶⁹³ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.427

⁶⁹⁴ Owusu, K. ed., 2003. *Black British Culture and Society: A Text Reader*. Routledge.p.175

⁶⁹⁵ Conyers Jr, J.L. ed., 2011. *Afrocentric traditions* (Vol. 1). Transaction Publishers.p.8

⁶⁹⁶ Hesse, B. ed., 2000. *Un/Settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*. Zed Books. p.117

⁶⁹⁷ Owusu, K. ed., 2003. *Black British Culture and Society: A Text Reader*. Routledge.p.178

Gilroy. In Gilroy's 1993 ground-breaking book: *The Black Atlantic: Double Consciousness*, he points out that the identity of Black people in the diaspora in general is formed through hybridity, a fusion, a synchronicity and a melting pot of various identities which has very few ties to a specific "homeland", be it in Africa or in the Caribbean. The homeland is where they are presently and the experiences of living in such an environment is what determines their identity⁶⁹⁸. It is therefore necessary to examine the root causes behind the collective identity formation of Black Britons and how that is articulated in their integration process from the 1950s to the present day.

A) The causes

According to Vivekananda, the riots in Britain seem to have been the root cause of collective action and the beginning of ethnic minority identity questions in Britain. The causes of these riots were a combination of *racial-cum-economic-cum-social problems of the British society. It is imperative to adopt a multi-pronged approach to combat these problems. Racial hatred is undoubtedly an expression of dehumanization. And to launch planned attacks on innocent people in the name of their colour, to make their lives miserable and unsafe, is further degraded*⁶⁹⁹.

Figure 0-20: Press-cutting :1981 and 1985 Brixton Race Riots



Source: 1981: Brixton riots report blames racial tension:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/25/newsid_2546000/2546233.stm

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹⁹ Vivekanan.B 1982 "Riots in Britain: An Analysis", *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), January-March, pp.51-63.

Figure 0-21: Press-cutting: " Brixton Youths go on rampage as riots spreads", The Guardian, July 1981



Source: A new kind of riots? From Brixton 1981 to Tottenham 2011:

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/09/riots-1981-2011-differences>

Figure 0-22: Press-cutting: Brixton Riots, Daily Mail 11th April 1981



Source: Daily Mail: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375073/Brixton-riots-celebration-funded-cash-strapped-council.html>

Figure 0-23: Timeline of Riots in Britain: Brixton Riots 1981; Race and Youth Summer Riots 2011

Brixton Riots 1981

- Confrontation between the Metropolitan Police and protestors in Lambeth, South London
- Between 10th and 12th April 1981
- Growing unease between police and the black community of South London

Broadwater Farm Riots 1985

- 6th October 1985
- Events of the day dominated by 2 deaths –
 - Cythnia Jarett – an Afro-Caribbean woman who died the previous day of a stroke whilst police were raiding her home.
 - PC Keith Blacklock – first police officer to be killed in rioting in Britain since 1833. Blacklock tripped and fell and was surrounded by a mob armed with machetes, knives and other weapons who killed him in an attempt to decapitate him.

RIOTS – Wednesday 10th August

- David Cameron chaired another emergency meeting of COBRA, mid-morning.
- Cameron announced that plastic bullets were available to the police for use in response to the riots if necessary, and contingency plans have been put in place to make water cannon available at 24 hours notice.
- Rioting and general disorder continued but the numbers had reduced greatly from the previous few nights
- The weather played a role in dissuading rioters to take to the streets.
- By 08:05, police had made more than 1,100 arrests, including 768 in London, 35 in Liverpool, 5 in Milton Keynes, 90 in Nottingham, 13 in Leicester and 19 in Bristol.
- By 15:00, the police had made 113 arrests in Greater Manchester.

Source: Brixton Riots 1981 and 1985 and 2011 Race and Youth Riots :

<https://www.slideserve.com/teague/london-riots-2011;>

The riots in Nottingham, Liverpool, Notting Hill, Brixton, Broadwater Farm and Middlesbrough in 1958, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1986 and 1995 all paved the way for the acceptance of ethnic minorities in Britain⁷⁰⁰. Although the black community was an integral part of postcolonial British society, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the black communities experienced ‘discrimination and exclusion’ in many aspects of life, which led to the development of ‘networks of black people organizing, against the racism of employers, unions, police, local authorities, housing, political parties and others’ (see press cutting headlines of the riots above)⁷⁰¹. This discrimination and institutional racism levelled at Black people in Britain were also articulated within the political circles in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s. The example of Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate in a by-election in Smethwick in the West Midlands in 1964, fought on the slogan ‘*if you want a nigger neighbour, vote Labour*’⁷⁰². This passage demonstrates the political divide with regards to which party is pro-migrant and integration, and the other party which opposes.

Another such toxic political discourse on integration of second-generation migrants was the Conservative MP Enoch Powel’s speech on ‘Rivers of Blood’ made at a Conservative Party meeting on 20th April 1968 in Birmingham, where he made

⁷⁰⁰ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.501

⁷⁰¹ S, Kalbir. 1997 The Death of a Black Political Movement. *Community Development Journal*, 32(3), p. 233.

⁷⁰² Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.512

reference to second-generation migrant in racist language such as ‘*wide grinning piccaninnies*’. Powell believed that British born children of immigrants could never become British despite never knowing any homeland. He said “*The West Indian and the Asian does not, by being born in England, become an English man*”⁷⁰³. Powell later stated that time is running against them. He further described skin colour as being a uniform that could never be removed⁷⁰⁴. Within days of his speech, Enoch Powell was sacked from his position as a shadow cabinet minister by the leader of the opposition Edward Heath⁷⁰⁵. In 1978, Margret Thatcher, then the Opposition leader, gave an interview on a television programme *World in Action* in which she spoke of immigration⁷⁰⁶. The future Prime Minister noted that ‘*people are rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with different cultures and you know, the British character, has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world, that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in*’⁷⁰⁷. A year later in 1979 in a newspaper interview she suggested again that ‘*some people have felt swamped by immigrants. They’ve seen the whole character of their neighbourhoods change*’⁷⁰⁸. Thatcher’s words were denounced by Black British groups, and by her political opponents and criticized by some in her own political party, including Bernard Levin. At times a supporter of hers, who wrote in the *Times newspaper* that ‘*if you talk and behave as though Black men were some kind of a virus that must be kept out of the body politic, then it is the shabbiest hypocrisy to preach racial harmony at the same time*’⁷⁰⁹. As a result of this social malaise that Black and Asian youths born in Britain experienced both from the general public and with little support from the political elites, they took to the streets to protest against what they viewed as being stigmatized and singled out by British extremist groups, which at times resulted in violent riots (see above images 20-23 in page 200, of Asian and Black Youth movement). These riots occurred as a result of entrenched discrimination both institutionally and everyday racism that was meted out at the Black and Asian

⁷⁰³ Ibid

⁷⁰⁴ Olusoga, D., 2016. Op. Cit.p.515

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid

communities in employment, housing, education and an undue police stop-and-search policy towards Blacks and Asian youths⁷¹⁰. It is worth noting that the entrenched discrimination that second-generation Black and Asian were experiencing in Britain came on the backdrop of a period of economic downturn in Britain particularly in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s coupled with Thatcher's liberal economic policies, which saw the working class becoming more poorer, marginalized and living on the fringes of society⁷¹¹. In such circumstances of economic hardship, the migrant is often viewed as the 'other' and a scapegoat being used to explain both economic downturn and political hostilities by some sections of the host community, and some political figures taking advantage of the situation to advance their political interest by manipulating the British electorate without tackling the root cause of the issues of economic decline⁷¹².

The aftermath of these riots brought to the limelight the problems minority groups had been facing for a very long time, which the British government could no longer turn a blind eye to anymore⁷¹³. These violent riots forced the British government to set up a committee to investigate what had happened and to take concrete measures to address the problems. A commission was set up to investigate these riots, particularly during the 1981 Brixton riots (which was termed as the worse riot Britain had faced in its history of social uprising)⁷¹⁴. The findings of Lord Scarman Commission, which enquired into the riots, published in November 1981 a 154-page Report⁷¹⁵. The Commission was set up to extensively analyse the riots and devoted a substantial portion of its report to the social causes, especially unemployment, housing, discrimination, education and insecurity⁷¹⁶. The Report underlined the point that the racial disadvantage suffered by Britain's 2.3 million non-white population was a current fact of British life and that: "*urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease, threatening the very survival of our society*"⁷¹⁷. It also blamed the police and the community at large for the outbreak

⁷¹⁰ Gilroy, P., 1993. *The black Atlantic: Modernity and double consciousness*. Harvard University Press. p.85

⁷¹¹ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Op.Cit.* p.510

⁷¹² Ibid

⁷¹³ Hall, S., 1993. What is this "black" in black popular culture? *Social Justice*, 20(1/2 (51-52), pp.110.

⁷¹⁴ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Op.Cit.* p.510

⁷¹⁵ UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary debate Sessions, 1957-55, Vol. 585. col. 1422.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid

⁷¹⁷ UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary debate Sessions 1961-62, Vol. 619, col. 637, col. 691.

of the riots and urged the government and the local authorities to take steps and measures to eliminate racial inequality⁷¹⁸.

Most of the blame for the breakdown of community relations was laid at the doors of the police force. The report stated that their racial prejudices and consequent tough policing tactics against young Blacks, was largely responsible for the social uprising⁷¹⁹. The Brixton riots, (South West London which is only ten minutes from the seat of government, Westminster) the Report added, were “*essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police*”⁷²⁰. There was a strong racial element in the disorders, but they were not a race riot⁷²¹. In Southall, (West London) the Committee observed, the Skinheads were to be blamed⁷²². “*The disorders which ensued appear to have been a response to what the local Asian community saw as an intrusion into its area by a racially hostile group of white youths*”⁷²³. The riots in Liverpool, the Report observed further, were a case of deprivation or a segregation of movement of ethnic minorities in the inner-city areas⁷²⁴.

To forestall the recurrence of similar situations, Lord Scarman called for a new approach both from the police and the Government. His recommendations included the following:

1. *The introduction of an independent element into the police complaints procedure;*
2. *The increase of the initial police training period from 10 weeks to six months as a step to eliminate racial prejudice from the police force;*
3. *A statutory framework for police-community consultation;*
4. *Recruitment of more police officers from the ethnic minorities;*
5. *USC of existing law to ban racist marches;*
6. *Inclusion of racially prejudiced behaviour as an offence in the Police Discipline Code, normally punished by dismissal;*
6. *Review by local authorities of their housing policies to check discrimination;*

⁷¹⁸ Ibid

⁷¹⁹ Ibid

⁷²⁰ Ibid

⁷²¹ See, UK, HMSO, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981: Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Scarman, OBE, Cmnd. 8427 (1981).: <https://catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/record=b1011542~S10>

⁷²² Ibid

⁷²³ Vivekanan.B 1982, art.cit. p.10

⁷²⁴ The Brixton disorders, 10-12 April 1981: report of an enquiry / by Lord Scarman; presented to parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by command of Her Majesty, November 1981: <https://catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/record=b1011542~S10>

7. Better education for ethnic minorities⁷²⁵.

At a debate in the House of Commons on 10 December 1981, it was mentioned that if the Scarman Report was implemented, it could make a dramatic improvement in two areas of concern: in the confidence that the police enjoyed among the ethnic minorities and policy of policing in the inner-city areas⁷²⁶. David Lane, Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, called the Report a historic document which offered “a brilliant analysis of Britain’s urban and racial problems and an urgent prescription,” *The Guardian* observed that the Report had created a watershed in Britain’s policing policy⁷²⁷.

These post-riots and social-uprising measures that were initiated by the government, such as setting-up an enquiry commission into what had happened, was instrumental in appeasing the tension that has long existed between minority groups, extremist groups and the police⁷²⁸. By overtly highlighting the wrong handling by the police of such riots, the commission showed that political and institutional establishments in Britain were sending a strong message to such institutions and other racist extremist organizations that no one was above the law and such cases of discrimination would be taken seriously⁷²⁹.

These post-riots measures laid the grounds for the integration of people of ethnic minority descent in Britain and as such, by ensuring that more ethnic minority groups were represented and were visible in all spheres of British society by occupying prominent roles in civil and public services such as within the police forces, in politics, civil society and media (television, audio and written press)⁷³⁰. There were also scholarships available for bright students of minority descent to attend top British universities such as Oxford, Cambridge, School of Oriental and African Studies SOAS, and the University of London⁷³¹. Initiatives of this type were put in place to foster social integration and representation in various component of the British society⁷³². Such initiatives in later

⁷²⁵Vivekanan.B 1982, art.cit. p.12

⁷²⁶ The Brixton disorders, 10-12 April 1981: report of an enquiry / by Lord Scarman; presented to parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by command of Her Majesty, November 1981.: <https://catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/record=b1011542~S10>

⁷²⁷Seamen: 1981, “The Watershed” *The Guradian* 26 November 1981.

⁷²⁸ Cain, M. and Sadigh, S., 1982. Racism, the Police and Community Policing: a Comment on the Scarman Report. *JL & Soc’y*, 9, p.87.

⁷²⁹ Ibid

⁷³⁰ Hall, S., 1982. The Lessons of Lord Scarman. *Critical Soc. Policy*, 2, p.66.

⁷³¹ Ibid

⁷³² Ibid

years aided in the surge of the representation of Blacks and Asians in professions such as media, Business, Medical, Legal, academia and most importantly the emergence of ethnic minority politicians on both political divides from 1980s to present day. The three main political parties in the UK namely: The Conservative Party, The Labour Party and The Liberal Democrats, all now have Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) representation and Black caucuses within their party structures. Often these MPs represent the voice of the minority in their constituencies all over Britain. Historically, in Britain, political parties whose ideologies leaned to the Left, such as Labour and the communist parties but also the Trade Unions, tended to recruit BME representatives⁷³³. It was through the ranks of the Labour Party Trade Union that one of the four pioneer BME Labour MPs was elected to parliament: Bernie Grant MP for Tottenham in North London. These aspects of Black and Minority Ethnic Group caucuses within British political party system will be discussed in detail in Part two of this thesis in a chapter dedicated to the political participation of ethnic minorities in the UK, which includes the Ghanaian diaspora political participation in British politics.

Figure 0-24: Pioneer BME MPs elected to British Parliament in 1987, Bernie Grant, Paul Boateng, with Labour leader Neil Kinnock, Keith Vaz and Diane Abbott



Source: Pioneer Black MPs Bernie Grant, Paul Boateng Labour leader Neil Kinnock, Keith Vaz and Dianne Abbott, <http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/pioneering-mps-celebrated>

⁷³³ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.513

The 1987 general elections saw four BME MPs enter parliament for the first time: Paul Boateng (Anglo-Ghanaian), Diane Abbott (Anglo-Jamaican), the late Bernie Grant (Anglo-Guyanese) and Keith Vaz (Anglo-Indian). These four are often referred to as “Black Pioneer MPs”, and they were all elected on the Labour Party ticket. These pioneer BME leaders paved the way for the current 27 BME MPs in the UK parliament. On the Labour Party tickets, examples of: David Lammy (Anglo-Guyanese), Chuka Umunna (Anglo-Nigerian), Khalid Mahmood (Anglo-Pakistani), Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Anglo-Ghanaian) and Abena Oppong-Asare (Anglo Ghanaian). Sadiq Khan who is currently the Mayor of London elected in May 2016 on the ticket of the Labour Party is of Anglo-Pakistani descent, Virandra Sharma (Anglo-Indian) Rupa Huq (Anglo-Bangladeshi). On the Conservative Party’s side, MPs of ethnic minority descent include: Adam Afriyie (Anglo-Ghanaian), Sam Gyimah (Anglo-Ghanaian), Kwesi Kwarteng (Anglo-Ghanaian), Rishi Sunak (Anglo-Indian with Indian parents born in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania), Priti Patel (Anglo-Indian with Indian parents born and raised in Uganda or Indo-Ugandan descent), Sajid Javid (Anglo-Pakistani) and many more. Thus, among the UK political parties, the Labour Party still leads in terms of BME political representation in parliament. A lot has been achieved in relation to the representation of BME’s in parliament since the 1980s. Some BME MPs believe this representation is marginal as it does not reflect the current demographics of UK population in terms of the growing numbers of minority population in the country.

David Lammy, Labour MP for Tottenham and former education minister, states: *"Clearly none of the parties have any room for complacency when it comes to BME representation. Political parties should look seriously at introducing BME shortlists, following on from the success of Labour's all-women shortlists. We need bold measures to tackle this problem, not just more tinkering around the edges"*⁷³⁴. According to a study conducted by Insight Public Affairs, into the representation of Black and Minority Ethnic group in parliaments showed that the representation of BME in parliament does not reflect the growth of BME population in Britain. The studies showed that 27 BME MPs are somewhat short of the estimated 117 required for the House of Commons to be representative of the wider British population⁷³⁵. Former Labour Minister Parmjit

⁷³⁴Parliament failing to represent UK's ethnic diversity:

<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/datablog/2014/jul/31/parliament-failing-represent-uk-diversity>

⁷³⁵Ibid

Dhanda states: *"These figures should set alarm bells ringing. Ethnic minority representation in parliament has stalled when you consider the increase in the growth of BME population,"*⁷³⁶

All these examples of ethnic minority political representation emerged after the post-riots and post-uprising years as indicated above, especially after the Brixton riot of 1981, which brought institutional change in Britain vis-à-vis the integration of minority groups in Britain, as noted in Lord Scarman's Report in 1981. It is worth noting that these ethnic minority MPs do not only represent their constituencies and constituents: they also represent an identity, the interest and rights of the minority group in Britain. Their ethnic identity is also a marker of their representation in Parliament, as noted by Labour MP David Lammy, thus they are elected to represent the interest of their constituents at large. Most of the constituencies with the highest number of BME MPs are often in areas with a high concentration of minority groups and migrant population, and they are also mostly Labour constituencies.

There is no official agreement or legal obligation as to the inclusion of BMEs on UK political party shortlist, but the Labour Party has made it a priority to include BME representative wherever possible⁷³⁷. Other major Political parties in the UK have also started in recent years to include BME candidates. This unwritten accord of including BME representation in Parliament is a clear indication that most political parties in Britain acknowledge the multicultural aspect of BMEs being an integral part of the fabric of the British society through their representation in politics as being essential to social cohesion in Britain, stated by Lord Boateng during a field work interview in London in 2010⁷³⁸.

To indicate the importance that national institutions accord to BMEs, the 1991 census was the first national census to include Ethnic Minority classification in Britain. It was set up to address and better understand the changing demography of the British Society. Some of the questions it contained was population density, students being included in the population, housing and availability of cars, country of birth, ethnic group, economic position and employment status, such as health factors, social class based on occupation, classification of household and family composition⁷³⁹. The 1991 census was viewed and

⁷³⁶Ibid

⁷³⁷ Ibid

⁷³⁸Field work interview with Lord Boateng, 20 July 2011, London

⁷³⁹1991 UK census: http://census.ukdataservice.ac.uk/media/51162/1991_defs.pdf

considered as not being inclusive enough, so it was reviewed in 2001 to address some of the difficulties it encountered during the initial 1991 census. For the first time the 2001 census included Northern Ireland as ethnic minority classification.

b) Forms and expression of Black British Identity construction

The expression of the Black British identity could be viewed through The Black and Minority Ethnic Group (BMEGs), a community-based initiative funded by local authorities all over Britain. Its mandate is to liaise with leaders of a resident group of ethnic minority descent in their localities and the local authorities to raise awareness on issues affecting ethnic minority groups in their areas⁷⁴⁰. Briefly, the model of integration of minority groups by the British authority was an inclusive one based on communitarianism as has been discussed previously. This has promoted the visibility of minority groups in all spheres of British society.

In recent times, the term Black and Minority Ethnic Group has come under considerable attack by leaders of the Black British community. The former chairman of the commission for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips, gave a speech in May 2015 in which he suggested that phrases such as Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) and Black, Asian and Minority (BAME) have become outdated. He notes: “*existing purely to tidy away the messy jumble of real human beings who share only one characteristic – that they don’t have white skin*”⁷⁴¹. He argued that the acronyms could be divisive and serve to mask the disadvantages suffered by specific ethnic and cultural groups⁷⁴². Phillips proposed that the UK could potentially adopt terms commonly used in the US, such as “visible minorities” or “people of colour⁷⁴³”. Four writers of Black British descent were selected by the Guardian newspaper to discuss Phillips’ proposal on the expression of what it is to be Black and British in the 21st century:

Lola Okolosie: ‘Focusing on labels is a distraction’:

⁷⁴⁰Fieldwork interview, Lord Boateng London November 2010

⁷⁴¹ Is it time to ditch the term ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic’ (BAME)?:

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/black-asian-minority-ethnic-bame-bme-trevor-phillips-racial-minorities>

⁷⁴² Ibid

⁷⁴³ Ibid

Though I may use BME/BAME, I don't particularly like these terms. They are unwieldy and lack nuance. No one can deny that. My blackness is informed of whether or not I am Nigerian or Jamaican or half-white, poor or middle class. Blackness is no one thing, and it isn't experienced as such. That said, these labels are a necessity. They exist because society recognises that discrimination is a fact which the law must acknowledge and seek to redress. Without these labels, BAME people become separated from our racial/cultural difference and the material disadvantages it makes real are rendered invisible. This is dangerous. For example, it is through keeping a count based on such categories that we know that certain people are far more likely to be stopped and searched on our streets or in our airports⁷⁴⁴.

Joseph Harker: 'Our race terminology is struggling to keep up':

"Here are four words I haven't used in a long time: Trevor Phillips is right. Because, more and more, the differences between our minority communities are growing – including how they are affected by racism – and so it's becoming increasingly unrealistic to package us all together. I remember when all minorities were called "black". It was a hangover from the days of post-war migration, when the first people to arrive here en masse were Caribbean of African origin. When, a decade or so later, Asians began arriving in numbers, it was natural for them to be tagged on to the black identity. And in those days, when most were migrants to Britain, facing the same sort of colour-based barriers, there was a natural strong solidarity between all of us. But over time the differences, such as religion and culture, became apparent and fed into the experiences these groups had in the UK. Black people integrated more into sport and entertainment and faced regular harassment by the police; Asian people had stronger family units, set up smaller businesses, but tended to settle in areas, including northern towns, where there was more racial separation. In the late 1980s Asians started calling for a distinct, non-black identity. And then

⁷⁴⁴Lola Okolosie's contribution on the debate to change the term BME in the Guardians daily news contribution on the issues of race in the UK: Is it time to ditch the term 'black, Asian and minority ethnic' (BAME)?: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/black-asian-minority-ethnic-bame-bme-trevor-phillips-racial-minorities>

East Asians, who'd set roots here well before the Windrush arrived, began raising their voices too. So, what was once a simple black/white thing became multi-coloured. And our race terminology has been struggling to keep up ever since. And it's about more than just labels: because the issues our ethnic-minority populations face is changing too. Diversity box ticked. But the problem is far from solved.

And this really matters. Because if discrimination against certain racial groups goes unnoticed, the social issues will grow and grow, and – as we saw following the killing of Mark Duggan, and at various other points over the past 30 years – will eventually explode. So, the Black, Asian and minority ethnic classification does have some use in grouping those who are on the receiving end of racism in the UK. But when it comes to addressing the problem, those who are trying to combat discrimination should understand that the term has severe limitations”⁷⁴⁵.

Leah Green: ‘I don’t feel multiple heritage – I feel mixed race’

“The phrase “visible minority” is, to my mind, no better or worse than black and minority ethnic. Sure, let’s change it. Or let’s not. I really couldn’t care less. You see, this latest so-called issue really isn’t problematic at all. Terms such as BME are acronyms that exist solely in the world of job applications, surveys, and quotas. No one actually uses “black and minority ethnic” to describe the colour of their own skin or their heritage – it is a way of talking about a group in the abstract. Yes, it is simply code for “not white”, but sometimes – to measure representation, progression, or bias – we absolutely must lump all non-white people together. Whatever made-up, meaningless terms you want to use for that are fine by me. But BME and Bame are simply the latest politically correct terms to be cast aside as no longer good enough. In secondary school, I attended a half-day session for people with parents of different races. I learned two things: a) that someone like me (a mixed-race female being raised by a single mother) is in the group most likely to

⁷⁴⁵Joseph Harker contribution on the debate to change the term BME in the Guardians daily news contribution on the issues of race in the UK: Is it time to ditch the term ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic’ (BAME) : <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/black-asian-minority-ethnic-bame-bme-trevor-phillips-racial-minorities>

become a “dysfunctional adult”, and b) I am no longer referring to myself as mixed race, because that has become the racist. I am now Leah Green, multiple heritage.

The thing is, presenting people with a new term with which to refer to themselves, or other individuals, does not inject meaning into that term. Personally, I don't feel multiple heritage, I don't feel like a visible minority, or of dual parenthood – I feel mixed race. It's very hard to replace something that feels like your real identity with something that doesn't, and why should I have to?

Of course, language always changes and progresses as we become more politically aware, and that is a good thing. But when we are worrying that a phrase which doesn't really mean anything, that no one has ever used to talk about an actual human being, is racist, I think we need to chill out”⁷⁴⁶.

Emma Dabiri: ‘I do not identify with others on the basis that neither of us is white’

I am in full agreement with Trevor Phillips: the acronyms BME and BAME are unsuitable. Phillips's claim that they can “mask the real disadvantages suffered by some ethnic and cultural groups” would, alone, be significant enough to justify the abandonment of these terms. However, replacing these acronyms with “people of colour”, as he suggests, immediately sets alarm bells ringing. While this phrase is widely used in the US, and is gaining popularity on these shores, it is even more vague than BAME and I have many reservations about its usefulness. I understand its origins in the US, where it was first used to extend discussions about rights beyond black American feminists, to include Latino and indigenous women.

However, it applies to completely different populations here in the UK. Even more so than BME or BAME, it conflates the differences of radically diverse peoples, lumping them together by virtue of non-whiteness. I do not identify with others on the basis that neither of us is white. Identities should not be forged out of experiences of racism alone, but also through a sense of shared cultural references. “People of

⁷⁴⁶Lea Green contribution on the debate to change the term BME in the Guardians daily news contribution on the issues of race in the UK: Is it time to ditch the term ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic’ (BAME)?: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/black-asian-minority-ethnic-bame-bme-trevor-phillips-racial-minorities>

colour” erases huge cultural differences, manufacturing an alleged sense of “solidarity”, which I see little evidence of when it comes to concrete and practical gains for people of African descent.

We need policies and strategies that directly address the needs of people of African descent. I understand the limitations of the word “black”, but when so many are being murdered in the streets by virtue of being black and black alone, it is not the time to be vague in our language. Furthermore, people of colour mask the virulent anti-blackness that exists in many so-called people of colour communities. It also obscures the racial hierarchy wherein whiteness are arguably placed at the top, while black remains firmly at the bottom.

For other minority groups, located somewhere between the two, there can be very real gains in promoting and sustaining anti-blackness, as it distinguishes them from the bottom of the pile. If the language that we use, conceals the differences between black and non-black minority groups, it paves the way for a continued silence and suppression of the voices of people of African descent⁷⁴⁷.

What these four testimonies from 2015 illustrate is that minority groups in Britain are well integrated and now a visible fabric of British society, and that terms such as BME and BAME are there to serve as an institutional classification. As demonstrated above, more and more people of minority groups are distancing themselves from such social labelling and coding. As argued above, some perceive it to have a negative connotation and as not really solving the problem of race and integration issues in modern-day Britain, while others view it to be still relevant in terms of their identity formation and as such dealing with racial inequality.


What these testimonies further indicate is that there is a paradigm shift in terms of self-representation in society, where in the earlier years self-identification was strongly linked to belonging to a community, in other words the communitarian model of social composition, which aided in their identity formation in the 1980s-

⁷⁴⁷Emma Dabiri contribution on the debate to change the term BME in the Guardians daily news contribution on the issues of race in the UK: Is it time to ditch the term ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic’ (BAME)?: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/black-asian-minority-ethnic-bame-bme-trevor-phillips-racial-minorities>

1990s. However, the paradigm shift is now articulated in viewing an identity as an individual and not a collective entity. As noted earlier, identity formations and identity constructions are not a static notion: they evolve with time, and that is what these testimonies above attest to.

The construction and formation of the Black British identity can be summarized by two theoretical frameworks: Essentialist and Multiculturalism

Figure 0-25: Theoretical framing of Black British identity formation



The formation of Black British identity could also be analysed through two theoretical frameworks: Essentialism and Multiculturalism. The Essentialist paradigm within the context of Black diaspora studies refers to the notion of Afrocentric ideologies, which views the identity formation of Africans in the diaspora in general to be strongly connected to a homeland: Africa⁷⁴⁸. Put differently, African diaspora identity is constructed from the lenses of the Black Essentialist paradigm, meaning their sense of identity can exist only through their links with Africa as a homeland, be it a myth or an imaginary homeland. For it to be valid, it needs to be attached to a homeland of some sort⁷⁴⁹. The Essentialist paradigm has long been advanced by authors such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Chancellor Williams and later a host of African - American academics such as Anthropologist Molefi Asante. He democratized the use of the term Afrocentricity in the

⁷⁴⁸ Conyers Jr. J.L.(Ed). (2011). Afrocentric Traditions (vol.1). Traditions Publishers.p13

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid

1980s within academic circles to mean that Africans in the diaspora's identity can be formed only through their ancestral connections to Africa regardless of their physical absence from the continent⁷⁵⁰. The term was introduced in the 1950 and gained currency among Pan-Africanist leaders and scholars of that period. In line with Asante's views of Afrocentricity, other contemporary philosophers of African-American descent such as Haki Madhubuti and Maulana Karenga, among others, have used the term Afrocentricity as a project with the best image and interest of African people.

Asante's notes: *The Afrocentric paradigm is a revolutionary shift in thinking proposed as a structural adjustment to Black disorientation, decenteredness, and lack of agency. As a paradigm, Afrocentricity enthrones the centrality of the African, that is, black ideals and values, as expressed in the highest forms of African culture, and activates consciousness as a functional aspect of any revolutionary approach to phenomena. The cognitive and structural aspects of a paradigm are incomplete without the functional aspect. There is something more than knowing in the Afrocentric sense; there is also doing. Afrocentricity holds that all definitions are autobiographical. One of the key assumptions of the Afrocentrist is that all relationships are based on centers and margins and the distances from either the center or the margin. When Black people view themselves as centered and central in their own history, then they see themselves as agents, actors, and participants rather than as marginals on the periphery of the political or economic experience. Using this paradigm, human beings have discovered that all phenomena are expressed in the fundamental categories of space and time. Furthermore, it is then understood that relationships develop and knowledge increases to the extent we are able to appreciate the issues of space and time*⁷⁵¹.

Asante further states that Afrocentricity is a quality of thought, practice, and perspective that perceives Africans as subjects and agents of phenomena acting in their own cultural image and human interest⁷⁵². Afrocentricity is about location, precisely because African people have been operating from the fringes of Eurocentric experiences⁷⁵³. Afrocentricity

⁷⁵⁰Afrocentricity by Molafi Asante: <http://www.asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/>

⁷⁵¹Afrocentricity by Molafi Asante: <http://www.asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/>

⁷⁵² Conyers Jr. J.L(Ed). (2011). p.3

⁷⁵³ Ibid

is conscientization related to the agency of African people⁷⁵⁴. One cannot be Afrocentric without being a conscious human being. This is the key to re-orientation and re-centering⁷⁵⁵.

This Afrocentric view of identity formation which came from the US in the 1980s influenced Black British community's identity formation, particularly after the series of race riots in the UK. Community leaders sought out a common ground to construct an identity not based on being viewed as "marginal" but as "agents, subjects, actors and participants" through the framework of Essentialism. The Multiculturalist perspective, on the other hand, views Black British identity formation through a constant evolution, a fusion, being in sync with their current environment, a melting pot or to a large extent an assimilationist standpoint. Alternatively, the Multiculturalist paradigm does not view the link to a homeland as a prerequisite for the construction of a Black British diaspora identity. Scholars of Black British studies such as Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall have suggested multiculturalist notions as an alternative prism for Black British identity formation. In his book "*The Black Atlantic*", Gilroy points to the notion that British identity of Blacks can be understood and constructed only from their experiences and personal trajectory in the country they live in and not with a homeland that they have never visited. In other words, homeland should not be restricted to one's heritage, but to where one is currently situated.

3.3.8 Self representation: The construction of Black British identity

As noted above, the construction and the formation of Black British identity is rooted in two ideological prisms, Essentialism and Multiculturalism. These two prisms are reflected and represented through the Black British media and press. Prentoulis (2011) demonstrated this in her work: *The construction of Black British community in The Voice and The New Nation Newspapers*. She argues that the editorial style of the two main Black newspapers in the UK serves as a clear indication as to how a community sees itself and how it wants to be seen by outsiders or how the Black media is being used as a socio-cultural practice. According to Prentoulis, Black Newspapers emerged in the UK as a result of the race riots of the 1970s and 1980s: "a new black middle class emerged in

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid

Britain and the need for ‘black’ tabloid focusing on aspects of Black experience in Britain⁷⁵⁶. It is in this context that *The Voice Newspaper* was launched in 1982 and later in 1996 *The New Nation newspaper*⁷⁵⁷. The emergence of the Black press in Britain in the 1980s was born of the need to offer an alternative to the mainstream media representations of Black people in Britain⁷⁵⁸. Its need for a publication that would promote the civil rights concerns of Black minorities resulted in *The Voice* being launched in 1982, less than a year after the 1981 Brixton uprising. It was perceived to be the product of the anti-racist policies of the Greater London Council (GLC)⁷⁵⁹. An extract from the Guardian Newspaper on this matter highlights this point:

It was in 1981, the year of the first uprising in Brixton London’s Black community was awash with stories of people eager to see them represented in a less biased form than the mainstream press. Simultaneously, the GLC, became eager to recruit black staff. The GLC was in power, affirmative action was in vogue; the capping of profligate councils was still a twinkle in Mrs. Thatcher’s eye (G. Young, 1997)

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Brixton riots came out of the frustration and anger of the Black community after the authorities and the mainstream media failed to handle the case and misrepresented the death of 13 young Black people in a fire in New Cross South East London. The launch of *The Voice* after these events signalled a new beginning for the Black press in Britain (Benjamin, 1995; 5-6, 69-74). In the mid-1990s, *The Voice* was criticized by a section of the Black community in England as a “doom and gloom” newspaper, which prints images of black people in a negative light and presents Black people as ‘victims or marginals’. It was seen as perpetuating the stereotypical representation of the black community that the traditional mainstream media had long projected of Black people (Aitkenhead, 1996).

The launch of the *New Nation* newspaper in 1996 was welcomed in the national press as an alternative to the stereotypical representation of the Black community by the established Black press, signalling the different positioning of the Black community within Britain in the 1990s. This shift in self-representation in the media by the *New*

⁷⁵⁶Prentoulis. M. 2011, The construction of the Black British community in *The Voice* and *The New Nation*, School of Political, Social and International Studies, University of East Anglia, p.732

⁷⁵⁷ Prentoulis. M. 2011, art.cit. p.733

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid

⁷⁵⁹Ibid

Nation press is an indication of the evolution of Black British identity through the lenses of the media. One commentator stated:

A staff of about 15 journalists, recruited largely from the BBC, Fleet Street and the Black press, would produce a paper covering non-race related issues- health, education, the economy – and aspiring to the mainstream standard of quality, design, and unprecedented in Black publishing – mainstream advertising (Aitkenhead, 1996)

These examples reveal something fundamental at the heart of the process of representation: there seems to be a gap between the position of those representing the community and the subjects they speak and write for. In other words, the positions of enunciation are never identical with the subject they speak about (Hall, 1990: 222). This illustrates something about the process of representation itself. Representation has never been identical to the will of the represented. If representation is to mean the process in which somebody, the representative, substitutes for and, at the same time, embodies, the represented, this process can be perfect only if the representative acts as an intermediate, transmitting with absolute transparency the fully constituted will of the represented (Laclau, 1996:97). Prentoulis further maintains that in relation to the representation of the Black community in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s, one of the main nodal points was class categorization. Class became the focus around which ‘good’ or ‘bad’ representations could be measured⁷⁶⁰. Prentoulis suggests that *the fixity of the black British community is based on a mutual relationship between race, community and class. Other Studies of Black British community argue that traditionally, the Black British community is seen as a predominately working class. Since the late 1980s, however, the newly emerged black middle class and anti-racist institutional reforms created the conditions for the redefinition of black identities. Thus, class differentiations within the community becomes significant to any contemporary definition of “Blackness” (Back, 1996: 153).*

Moving on to the current situation of Black British identity formation, studies on Black British youth suggests that class has always functioned as an organizing principle around which ‘true Black British identity’ is constructed, negotiated and debated⁷⁶¹. According to Alexander, (1996: 91-95) many Black youths negotiate ‘their racial identity’ by

⁷⁶⁰Prentoulis. M. 2011, art.cit. p.739

⁷⁶¹Idem

subsuming it into an assumed “working class” identity. Upward mobility, although desirable, was often met with hostility since it was at odds with the working-class status of the community⁷⁶². Becoming middle class, therefore, is a sign of ‘going white’ or ceasing to be ‘truly black,’ meaning moving up the social ladder and moving out of the community⁷⁶³.

Turning now to the way the Black British identity is constructed within both *The Voice* and the *New Nation*, Prentoulis pointed out that *class persists as a nodal point around which black identities are imagined in The Voice, thus reinforcing the condition of marginalization and exclusion of the Black community. The minority media are central to this process of defining ‘us against them’. News stories of conflicts within external threats may directly and indirectly strengthen the diasporic community’s internal cohesion and their audiences ‘cultural identities’ (Bai, 2010: 392).*

Clifford (1994), concludes that:

People’s whose sense of identity is centrally defined by collective histories of displacement and violent loss cannot be ‘cured’ by merging into a new national community. This especially is true when they are victims of ongoing, structural prejudice (1994: 307-311).

The *New Nation*, on the other hand, illustrates the economic progress of the emerging Black middle class in Britain, which highlights an air of optimism spreading through the community (Ewen, 1997). The *New Nation* editorial style showcases a series of articles in the Career Focus column, highlighting career opportunities and giving advice to Black professionals, apparently blurring the sharp frontier between Black and communities⁷⁶⁴.

The construction of Black British community’s identity is seen as a distinct body within Britain as experiences of racial prejudice and injustice is a common and constant theme portrayed in *The Voice newspaper*. The Voice discusses the police treatment of Black community members in articles that emphasise the prevailing double standards: Black people are twice as likely to be Stopped and Searched by the police in Britain than White people (Macey, 1997).

⁷⁶²Alexander. C. 1996, *The of being Black*, Oxford, Oxford University Press

⁷⁶³Idem

⁷⁶⁴Prentoulis. M. 2011, art. cit. p.742

The Black Essentialist and Afrocentric paradigms are connected to The *Voice* newspaper editorial style and representation of the Black community in Britain, on one hand. On the other hand, the Multiculturalist paradigm is connected to the New *Nation* newspaper editorial style and representation of Black British in the media.

Prentoulis adds that travelling is seen as an essential component of the process of redefining one's identity. The territorial and culture boundaries imposed on Black Britons are seen as limiting the community's potential: *I am tired of being a Black Londoner. I want to be something else for a while (Adebayo, 1997 a). The discussion in the New Nation contains a sense of 'cosmopolitans', resisting choices based on 'cultural purification', tradition and separatism (Gillespie, 1995: 18-21). Adebayo admits that with The New Nation 'we feel the pressure of a centrifuge force pushing us to the Black mainstream and this force influences the choice we make, such as where we travel to'*⁷⁶⁵.

Furthermore, in *The Voice*, personal narrative becomes the narrative of the community as a whole. The individual perception and experience of structural prejudice act as the norm, exposing the 'reality' of the Black community within British society: *it is the testimony of the existence of strong solidarity bonds between members of the community. This sense of solidarity created by imaginary horizontal bonds between the members of the community is also a way to differentiate between Black and White communities in Britain*⁷⁶⁶. A cosmopolitan attitude questions the positive engagement with 'Black roots' and travelling back to the 'homelands', which up to that point had been the unifying force around which the community was constructed. Instead, *The New Nation* recognizes that this preoccupation's root may be 'enforcing a ghetto mentality' and that a more internationalist outlook might be the solution. As Adebayo argues 'Roots are good, but Routes are better'⁷⁶⁷.

In comparative terms with France, the notions of Afrocentrism as an ideological framework based on which the Black essentialist identity in Britain is constructed. In France, the notion of *La Négritude* was equally employed by its pioneers, Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor (the first president of Senegal) and Léon Damas from French Guyana. The Négritude intellectuals disavowed colonialisms and advocated

⁷⁶⁵Adebayo. D (1997) Take the right routes back to your roots. *New Nation*, 3 March p.743

⁷⁶⁶Prentoulis. M. 2011, art. cit. p.741

⁷⁶⁷Adebayo. D (1997) art. cit. p.744

a Pan-African racial identity among people of African descent worldwide⁷⁶⁸. The ideological framework of *La Négritude* was inspired by the Marxist political philosophy, as did the Afrocentric intellectuals in the Anglophone world in Britain were also inspired by the same Marxist political philosophy. The identity formation of people of African descent in both Anglophone and Francophone worlds was inspired by the same ideological framework, i.e., having one common identity that unifies the dispersed African diaspora worldwide to a common homeland which is Africa. In this context it could be assumed that the Black British and Black French diaspora identity were formed through the influences of Caribbean cultures and identities⁷⁶⁹. Hall states in his work on culture and identities that the Caribbean identity is subversive because they are strategically 'positioned' in relation to at least three 'presences': "Présence Africaine", "Présence Européenne" and "Présence Américaine"⁷⁷⁰. Because one presence is not substituted by the other, cultural identity is the result of a complex make and unmaking-up of the Caribbean identity⁷⁷¹.

In summary the construction of Black British identity through the various viewpoints articulated above such as the views of Black British scholars, and Black British media. For example, the attempt of *The Voice* to recover a 'one true self' based on a common Black history and ancestry as argued by Hall (1990), alluding to the post-colonial struggles. It is the attempt to construct an imaginary reunification of a collective subject able to resist 'against the dispersals and fragmentations of slavery, colonization and contemporary racism' (Smith, 1994: 92). For *The New Nation's* recognition of the hybrid nature of Black British culture, which avoids allusions to concepts such as separatism, tradition and cultural purification. In this sense the focus is more on cosmopolitanism, a willingness to engage with the 'other', the celebration of diverse cultural experiences, which opens up a new framework that tries to move away from the politics of the post-colonial diaspora and migration (Gillespie, 1995: 18-21).

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid

⁷⁶⁹ Hall, S., 2014. Cultural identity and diaspora. In *Diaspora and visual culture* Routledge.p.37

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷⁷¹ Hall, S., 2014. Art.Cit.p.40

3.3.9 The formation of the Ghanaian diaspora identity in London: The melting pot of a hybrid identity among Anglo-Ghanaians

Ghana constitutes the fifth largest group of African migrants in the UK. There are approximately 96,650 Ghanaian migrants in the UK, which is about 0.16% of the total UK population⁷⁷². This number includes only those who were not born in the UK and not second, third and subsequent generation immigrants. A period of political unrest and subsequent economic decline explains the high number of arrivals of Ghanaian-born residents in 1981-1990 (18%), with a peak in 1991-2000 of 22% as shown in table 2. During a fieldwork interview in 2010 with the former Ghana High Commissioner to the UK, ambassador Kwaku Danso-Boafo noted that there could be an estimated figure of over 100,000 Ghanaians living in the UK, as some Ghanaian nationals are unknown to the High Commission⁷⁷³. A similar observation was made in June 2016 by the former Ghana High Commissioner to the UK, ambassador Victor Smith, who went further in stating that the number of Ghanaian nationals in the UK could exceed 150-200,000. He noted that these estimated figures include second and subsequent generations and those who are not registered with the High Commission⁷⁷⁴. The local Ghanaian diaspora in London is mainly concentrated in the North London boroughs of Haringey, Highbury and Islington, in areas such as Finsbury Park, Seven Sisters, Edmonton, Campden, Dalston and Hackney⁷⁷⁵. There are considerable numbers equally located in the South East London boroughs of Southwark, Lambeth, Newham, in areas such as Peckham, Lewisham, Croydon Elephant and Castle, Barking and Dagenham⁷⁷⁶. Fewer are located in the West and South West London Boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, Ealing and Hounslow in areas such as North Kensington, Notting Hill, Shepherds Bush, Acton, Ealing, Chelsea, Brixton, Fulham and Chiswick⁷⁷⁷. There are much smaller populations in Birmingham and Manchester. The Ghanaian diaspora is to

⁷⁷²Ghanaians in

London:http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2005/05/27/ghanaian_london_feature.shtml

⁷⁷³ Field work interview with the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK ambassador Kwaku Danso-Boafo in 10th July 2010

⁷⁷⁴ Field work interview with the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK ambassador Victor Smith 26 May 2016

⁷⁷⁵ Field work data on localisation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London 2010-2016

⁷⁷⁶ Field work data on the localisation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London between 2010-2016

⁷⁷⁷ Field work data on the localisation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London between 2010-2016

be found in both the skilled and unskilled Labour force in the UK. Skilled professions within the healthcare sector include doctors, nurses and carers. Other skilled professions include academia, finance, media and housing sectors and professions in legal sectors such as lawyers, investment bankers, journalist and architects⁷⁷⁸. In non-skilled professions such as London transport operatives: bus drivers, tube conductors, tube station cleaners working for the London underground and other manual jobs within the building and construction sectors. Others are owners of small businesses in London⁷⁷⁹. The construction of the Ghanaian diaspora identity in the UK stems from first reviewing what sociologists refer to as the notion of “me” within the context of identity formations. The study of identity forms a critical cornerstone within modern sociological thought. Introduced by the works of Cooley and Mead, identity studies have evolved and grown central to current sociological discourse⁷⁸⁰.

Sociologists focused primarily on the formation of the “me,” exploring the ways in which interpersonal interactions mould an individual’s sense of self. Recent literature constitutes an antithesis to such concerns. Many works refocus attention from the individual to the collective; others prioritize discourse over the systematic scrutiny of behaviour; some researchers approach identity as a source of mobilization rather than a product of it; and the analysis of virtual identities now competes with research on identities established in the co-present world⁷⁸¹. Collective identity is a concept grounded in classic sociological constructs: Durkheim’s “collective conscience,” Marx’s “class consciousness,” Weber’s *Verstehen*, and Tonnies’ *Gemeinschaft*⁷⁸². It is rooted, as the notion addresses the “we-ness” of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce⁷⁸³. Earlier literature approached these attributes as “natural” or “essential” characteristics and qualities emerging from physiological traits, psychological predispositions, regional features, or the properties of structural locations⁷⁸⁴. As collective members were believed to internalize these qualities, suggesting a unified, singular social experience, a single canvas against which social actors constructed a sense of self. To this

⁷⁷⁸ Field work data on Ghanaian diaspora in London professional profiling 2010-2016

⁷⁷⁹ Field work data on Ghanaian diaspora in London professional profiling 2010-2016

⁷⁸⁰ Lundgren, D.C., 2004. Social feedback and self-appraisals: current status of the Mead-Cooley hypothesis. *Symbolic Interaction*, 27(2), p.267.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid

⁷⁸² Ibid

⁷⁸³ Ibid

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid

effect, the collective identity formation of the Ghanaian diaspora could be viewed as a collective sense of self with a common sense of belonging to a homeland: Ghana⁷⁸⁵.

Recent thinking about collective identity questions the essentialism of collective attributes and images⁷⁸⁶. Anti-essentialist inquiries promote the social construction of identity as a more viable basis of the collective self. Other works stress the problems inherent in collective categorization, presenting a postmodern challenge to arguments of unified group experiences⁷⁸⁷. This view therefore indicates that collective identity is strongly linked to the Essentialist perspective of identity formation, meaning identity are formed with a common sense of belonging to either a nations-state or a community or common ancestry and a common religious belief.

i. Identity formation as an anti-essentialist view: Social constructivist

In concert with the theories of WI Thomas, Peter Berger, Erving Goffman, Howard Becker, and others, the social constructionist approach to identity rejects any category that sets forward essential or core features as the unique property of a collective's members. From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artefact, an entity moulded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centres of power. In this view, identity formation can, therefore, be associated with the hybrid notion of multiculturalism as the bases of identity formation both within the Black British and Ghanaian diaspora setting in London. The transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnees in Accra can be understood from the standpoint of the "self" in their identity formation. The idea of the "SELF" determines their political engagement either as a collective enterprise or a singular venture⁷⁸⁸. Collective enterprise for the benefit of the group or singular venture is based on advocating and preserving one's personal interest and not that of the collective⁷⁸⁹. The theoretical understanding of the "Self" in the context of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and returnees in Accra equally explains its collective identity based on social categorisation, which influences or does not influence their process of integration in

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid

London and their ties to their political engagements both in London and Accra.

ii. The Sociological Context of Self-Construction

In sociological terms, Taylor (1989) offers a history of the modern self by demonstrating the relationship between changing senses of the self and changing moral visions. His work also examines the sociological context within which the modern assumptions regarding self and identity. For Taylor (1989, p. 111), the partitioning of the world into the inner sphere of private experience and the outer world of public experience is not a cultural universal but "rather is a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern West, but which has a beginning in time and space and may have an end." Taylor (p. 206) points out that the modern approach to identity arose because a "wide range of practices: religious, political, economic, familial, intellectual, artistic - converged and reinforced each other to produce it." In contrast, sociologists have generally taken a more limited approach to context when pursuing the social construction of self.

To this effect, self-construction has been influenced by globalisation and its process as the "new" form of global identity formation⁷⁹⁰. This new global identity and its process have been a highly contested topic within sociology, as there are important debates about its origin, scale, and trajectory (Guillen 2001). In general, it refers to the increasing dispersion of capital, people, information, and culture across international borders, a process that has been accelerated by advances in travel and communication technologies (Held & McGrew 2000). The effects of globalization on the self are seen primarily through the disruption, elaboration, and colonization of local cultures⁷⁹¹. According to Arnett (2002), the most prominent self-changes are evident in adolescents and young adults, where an increase in identity confusion has been recorded. Identity confusion occurs when the disruption of traditional practices and perspectives results in a loss of meaning (Tomlinson 1999) and the erosion of tradition. Stevenson & Zusho (2002), for example, reported that collectivist values and practices are on the decline in Japan and China because of Western influences. The same is true in some African countries such as Ghana. Global media culture and increasing rates of migration also expose actors to a

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid

⁷⁹¹ Ibid

wider set of meanings for the construction of their identity. This has resulted in the formation of bicultural identities, where the self is defined by local meanings and more traditional practices are maintained alongside a self-defined by global culture (Arnett 2002). Others see the process as more complex and have advanced the notion of a hybrid identity, where local and global meanings are not segregated but exist in a multiple, dynamic, and conflicted relationship (Hermens & Kempen 1998). Important research in this area is beginning to explore the way global cultural meanings and new ways of living are negotiated at the local level (e.g., Derne 2002). An example of this is how Ghanaian diaspora returnees living in Accra negotiate their “new” identity of global culture once in Ghana, as returning from the diaspora, they are no longer “pure” Ghanaian. That is, they are Ghanaian “plus” something else, an additional identity, their identity having become hybrid due to their emigration.

Nevertheless, not all cultural disruptions are integrated into an adaptive self-system⁷⁹². Resistance to the forces of globalization has been manifested in the construction of a wide range of oppositional identities. This can be seen, for example, in the growth of religious fundamentalisms (Marty & Appleby 1993, Swatos 2001), a resurgence of nationalist identity projects (Barber 1996), and the emergence of global protest movements where the exploitative effects of capitalism are contested by diverse political groups (Elkins 1992, Russell 2003). The Ghanaian diaspora identity can therefore be viewed from the perspective of being influenced by globalization process, both from the angle of hybrid identity influence and a resistance from the process of globalization by “holding” tight to their Ghanaian identity while in the diaspora⁷⁹³.

Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London could, however, be viewed from the perspective of “Self-construction” within the framework of collective, cultural and social identity formations, which involves the notions of Power, Reflexivity and Social Constructivism.

Power and Self as the basis of identity construction

The individual is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. Michael Foucault (1994, p. 214).

⁷⁹² Ibid

⁷⁹³ Field work interview in London with Richard Tandor of Star 100, 20 December 2013

From Foucault's perspective, the self is coerced into existence, not to become an agent but as a mechanism of control where systems of discourse work from the inside out by creating a self-regulating subject. Following Foucault, Stuart Hall (1996) stresses that there can be no true self hiding "inside" or behind the artificial or superficial because self and identity are constructed "within, not outside discourse." The analytical project, therefore, is not one of discovery but deconstruction. To deconstruct the self is to challenge essentialist assumptions and lay bare the way the self is wholly dependent upon discourse⁷⁹⁴. For Hall, this means that analysis should focus on the specific historical and institutional sites of "discourse formation."⁷⁹⁵ The Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London, cannot be formed fully without viewing it from the deconstruction of the Self in order to reconstruct a "new" Self-identity in the diaspora being influenced by multiple identity and presences, which forms a collective identity.

Rose (1996) provides alternative methodological strategies to the Foucauldian tradition. He notes that the deconstruction of the self does not lead to a social structure and personality approach that investigates how "different ages produce humans with different psychological characteristics, different emotions, beliefs, pathologies". This is because "such analysis presupposes a way of thinking that is itself an outcome of history, one that emerged only in the nineteenth century" (p. 129).

This perspective of constructing the self in identity formation linked to the deployment of history to power has demonstrated that the self is constituted within relations of control and is deeply embedded within systems of knowledge and discourse⁷⁹⁶. It is therefore an important development, one that has contributed to new directions in the study of identities associated with ethnic minority identity formation and the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London.

Mead views the 'I' is an internal experience of reflexivity that precedes the sense of linguistic reflexivity imparted by signification⁷⁹⁷. In this analysis Mead's notion of the "I" as an internal process of reflexivity can therefore be associated to both the essentialist and multiculturalist view of the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London, as the

⁷⁹⁴ Hall, S., 2014. Cultural identity and diaspora. In *Diaspora and visual culture* Routledge.p.39

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid

“I” here takes various internal process, the “I” is moulded by multiple reflexive processes⁷⁹⁸.

It has become common in reviews of the sociological self to argue that the self is both a social product and a social force (Rosenberg 1981). In the first instance, the self is examined as a bounded, structured object in Mead's "me" whereas in the second instance, the self is examined as a fluid, agentic, and creative response in Mead's "I." The distinction captures the core principle of a socially constructed self, namely that the self is a joint accomplishment, neither completely determined by the social world nor pre-given at birth.

A considerable body of research is concerned with the symbols and communication strategies employed in the construction of individual self-meanings. These resources for self-construction are conceptually diverse and include storytelling, cultural narratives, political ideologies, roles, identities, and features of the corporal body⁷⁹⁹. Although resources are often invoked in the quest for personal distinction and individuality, they should not be thought of as a private symbolic cache, nor should they be considered universal qualities of the self. Rather, they exist as part of a cultural "tool kit" (Swidler 1986), are interpersonally maintained within various cultural spheres of meaning and are deployed in social settings to accomplish social objectives. This is particularly evident in the case of storytelling and cultural narratives.

This is a point developed more fully by Altheide (2000), who notes that the influence of technological apparatuses can be seen in the establishment of "media communities" that add a new dimension to the physical and symbolic environment of our everyday lives. The evidence suggests that media apparatuses work to assist in the construction of a self that is less place bound and therefore less dependent on "the definition of the situation" (Meyrowitz 1997). It also shows how new media technology can both separate the body from the self and hide it (in the case of the Internet) or create a detached viewing that highlights the body in the case of video (Waskul 2002). In both instances, there are important implications for self-construction. For some, this can take the form of a "parallel life," as in the case of Internet users who engage in extensive, online role-playing

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid

games (Turkle 1996), where actors feel liberated in their opportunity to express different "aspects of the self." In the case of the media and the internet as a possible influence on the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation, it could be argued here that this process is being influenced by global trends in transnational space of politics and transnational political engagement.

iii. Products of Self-Construction

According to Cerulo, they are still much more likely to focus on individual "products of self-construction." By this he means the qualities of the self-observed at the level of the subject and conceptualized as a variable in the explanation of individual behaviour⁸⁰⁰. For example, Baumeister's (1998) review of the field contains discussions of self-enhancement, self-deception, self-monitoring, self-efficacy, self-regulation, self-handicapping, self-presentation, self-guides, self-verification, self-knowledge, self-control, and self-image. As these products of the self-construction process come to be employed as predictors of behaviour, there is a tendency to focus on stability, unity, and conformity and de-emphasize the sociological principles of social construction. The self that is socially constructed may congeal around a relatively stable set of cultural meanings, but these meanings can never be permanent or unchanging. Similarly, the self that is socially constructed may appear centred, unified, and singular, but this symbolic structure will be as multidimensional and diverse as the social relationships that surround it. Finally, the self that is socially constructed is never a bounded quality of the individual or a simple expression of psychological characteristics; it is a fundamentally social phenomenon, where concepts, images, and understandings are deeply determined by relations of power⁸⁰¹. Where these principles are ignored or rejected, the self is often conceptualized as a vessel for storing all the particulars of the person.

Admitting to the constructivist nature of the self, recognizing its cultural and historical origins, and accepting the self as a product of power relations does not necessarily remove the self as an object and force in society. At its core the self is defined by the reflexive process, the universal human experience of self-objectification. Yet even at the level of self-meanings, self-image, and self-concept, where the historical, cultural, and political

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid

⁸⁰¹ Callero, P.L., 2003. The sociology of the self. *Annual review of sociology*, 29(1), pp.115-133.

particulars of identity are exposed, the self continues to prosper as an important conceptual tool. In much the same way that the concept of identity has become central to a wide range of substantive concerns (Howard 2000, Cerulo 1997), so too has the self-expanded beyond the traditional boundaries of symbolic interactionism. Indeed, in many ways the self has been resurrected. In its new form we find a deeper appreciation of the historical, political, and sociological foundation of selfhood and a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the self and social action.

Identity construction can however be viewed from the prism of self-identification within the framework of collective and social identity formation. Self-identification is central to the formation of collective and social identity construction. Self-identification is viewed from: The self as a reflective process, The self as a social construction, The self as a sociological construction, Resource for self-construction, nonhuman objects as a resource of self-construction and self-construction as a product.

In brief, the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation can therefore be described within the framework of Black British identity formation in the UK. It is thus formed within such narrative of Black Britishness, it is equally different in terms of its interpretations among Anglo-Ghanaians, its distinctive history of migration to the UK equally and through that process contributes to “new” identity formed in the diaspora.

In other words, the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London is both homogenous and heterogenous, as their identity formation is stemmed from Essentialist homogeneous and Afrocentric notions linking the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation to a centre and a concrete homeland, which is Ghana. This perspective of identity formation is connected to first-generation Ghanaians regardless of their socio-professional background, some second-generation have also identified themselves to the Essentialist prism of identity formation⁸⁰². On the other hand, the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation can also have viewed from a Multiculturalist standpoint, a hybrid and heterogeneous perspective where their identity is formed through a fusion and a melting pot of various experiences in London. The multiculturalist identity formation is often linked to the second-generation diaspora.

⁸⁰² Fieldwork interview in London, 20 December 2013

3.3.10 Cultural identity and ties to the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London

According to Hall, *Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a 'production', which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. This view problematises the very authority and authenticity to which the term, 'cultural identity', lays claim*⁸⁰³.

Hall further explains that there are two separate ways of thinking about culture identity. The first position defines: *'cultural identity' in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self', hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves', which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common. Within the terms of this definition, our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people', with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history. This 'oneness', underlying all the other, more superficial differences, is the truth, the essence, of 'Caribbeanness', of the black experience*⁸⁰⁴. It is this identity which a Caribbean, a Ghanaian in the diaspora must discover, excavate, bring to light and express through personal representation⁸⁰⁵. Such a conception of cultural identity played a critical role in all the post-colonial struggles which have so profoundly reshaped our world⁸⁰⁶. It lay at the centre of the vision of the poets of 'Negritude', like Aimee Cesaire and Leopold Senghor, and of the Pan-African political project, earlier in the century⁸⁰⁷. It continues to be a powerful and creative force in emergent forms of representation amongst hitherto marginalised peoples. This definition therefore links cultural identity to a homogeneous identity with direct links to the notions of Afrocentrism and essentialism. The Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London can therefore be viewed through this lens of homogeneity in a collective cultural identity, whereby a reproduction (with some nuances) of the Ghanaian identity

⁸⁰³ Hall, S., 2014. Cultural identity and diaspora. In *Diaspora and visual culture*. Routledge p.222

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid

brought to the diaspora through migration is reproduced through transferring local knowledge of their ethnic and tribal Ghanaian culture from first-generation to subsequent generations. It is observed through the opening of Sunday school in North London to teach Ghanaian language and cultural practices to second-generation Ghanaians, to ensure that “they do not get lost and forget their ancestry”⁸⁰⁸.

The second however is related to cultural identity but from a different view. This second position recognises that *as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute 'what we really are'; or rather - since history has intervened - 'what we have become'. We cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, about 'one experience, one identity', without acknowledging its other side - the ruptures and discontinuities which constitute, precisely, the Caribbean or the Ghanaian uniqueness' in London*⁸⁰⁹.

*Cultural identity, in this second sense, is a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being'. It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a mere 'recovery' of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past*⁸¹⁰. For Hall cultural identities are about positioning. In other words, *cultural identities are the points of identification, the unstable points of identification or suture, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence but a positioning. Hence, there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position, which has no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental 'law of origin'*⁸¹¹.

Hall (2014) equally notes that the second view of cultural identity is much less familiar, and more unsettling. If identity does not proceed, in a straight, unbroken line, from some

⁸⁰⁸ Field work interview with Richard Tando of Star 100 in London, 10 December 2013

⁸⁰⁹ Hall 2014, art. cit. p.223

⁸¹⁰ Hall 2014, art. cit. p.224


⁸¹¹ Hall 2014, art. cit. p.224

fixed origin, how are we to understand its formation? We might think of black British, Ghanaian and Caribbean identities as 'framed' by two axes or vectors, simultaneously operative: the vector of similarity and continuity; and the vector of difference and rupture. Caribbean and Ghanaian identities always should be thought of in terms of the dialogic relationship between these two axes. The one gives us some grounding in, some continuity with, the past. The second reminds us that what we share is precisely the experience of a profound discontinuity: the peoples dragged into slavery, transportation, colonisation, migration, came predominantly from Africa - and when that supply ended, it was temporarily refreshed by indentured labour from the Asian subcontinent⁸¹². Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London could equally be viewed from the perspective of discontinuity and rupture. Discontinuity and rupture not in the sense of the Caribbean diaspora experience in London based on a common past of slavery. In the Ghanaian diaspora case of discontinuity and rupture, it is based on a choice that was made to emigrate which has caused this rupture and discontinuity, which both voluntary and involuntary. Hall advances the idea that diaspora experience as he intends it here is defined, *not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference*⁸¹³.

⁸¹² Hall 2014, art. cit. p.225

⁸¹³ Hall 2014, art. cit. p.223

Figure 0-26: Ghanaian Diaspora Identity formation



The Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London is therefore a multi-dimensional process: a process that is both homogeneous and heterogenous, the making and unmaking, the becoming and unbecoming, the continuity and ruptures, the self and collective process. This process is equally Essentialist, Multiculturalist and hybrid, constantly changing for those still in London or renegotiating and re-constructing their identities for returnee diasporas in Ghana. All these facets and processes contribute to the understanding of the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora both locally in the UK, transitionally towards Ghana and returnee diaspora engagement in Ghanaian politics.

Conclusion of Part 1

Situating the historical overview of migrant communities in the UK in Part I of this thesis is an important and a central element in helping to understand the organisation and

structures of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. To this effect, in this part, I have demonstrated through a historical analogy of various migrants' communities and occupations they undertake in the UK, their early presence in the UK. Through the analysis of the riots years in the UK, we saw how those years paved the way for policies on ethnic minority integration in all spheres of British society. These policies enabled the various phases of the formation of Black British and Anglo-Ghanaian identity. By using the paradigm of Essentialist and Multiculturalism as being the prism for defining and constructing Black British identity, which is constantly evolving. This was described through their media representation in the two main Black British press: *The Voice* and *The New Nation*. This formation of identity led to the institutional categorization of various ethnic minority groups in the UK, such as Black British and Asian British.

The existence of such an institutional appellation enabled the initiation of advocacy groups for ethnic minority groups such as the Black and Minority Ethnic Group BME, the Commission for Racial Equality, CRE in Britain. These institutions all aided in the process of integration of ethnic minority groups as being part of the fabric of modern-day British society, especially after the race riots years during the post-World War II era of mass emigration. The integration and acceptance of minority groups as part of British society paved the way for their representation within British political circles. This visible integration of minority community has, in turn, made it possible for various communities within these minority groups to distinguish themselves from each other by asserting their national origins while in the UK. Such distinctiveness of a community is that of the Ghanaian diaspora. The political and economic making of first -and-second wave Ghanaian migrants in the UK was focused on reviewing the educational and career trajectories of the pioneer leaders of Ghanaian politics. The profiles of Nkrumah and Busia, through to subsequent generations of political leaders such as Kufuor, Mills, to the current president Akuffo-Addo. This biographical analysis was made in order to shed light on how their sojourns abroad contributed to their political consciousness and growth in the diaspora. However, it was also important to highlight in Part I of the thesis, the direct link that has always existed between Ghanaian political elite's formation in Britain and their ties with the diaspora both Atlantic and Ghanaian diaspora. In other words, diasporisation has contributed to the making of the Ghanaian political elites, and as such Ghanaian political elites have equally contributed to forming a Ghanaian political

diaspora abroad, particularly in the UK. It is also important to stress that Ghana's rapport with its diaspora is characterized by two dogmas: economic and political. Thus far, the economic relation takes precedence over the political, as illustrated by various initiatives organized by the government of Ghana.

The historical overview of Ghanaian emigration that has been discussed in this part of the thesis enables me to now turn my focus in Part two to the sociological making of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK by examining the sociological profiles and characteristics of their organisation and structures from multiple angles. We will examine the political organisation of the diaspora, its socio-professional and demographic backgrounds, and its connections to their political participation in the UK, its transnational political engagement towards Ghana and returnee diaspora engagement in Ghanaian politics.

PART II. THE POLITICAL MAKING OF THE GHANAIAN DIASPORA IN LONDON AND RETURNEES IN ACCRA 2010-2018: TURNING MIGRANTS INTO CITIZENS

"...Ghanaians are a relatively well-established diaspora in the countries that they live in, and they simultaneously maintain strong ties with their homeland. The manifestation of diaspora linkages is observed in several ways: their global spread, their commitment to send money both over time as well as to their practical contacts with the family and community, and their financial interests in the homeland. There are other manifestations in the form of social and political organizing that produce significant feedback about social transformations on both sides."

Orozco (2005: 6)

Since the 1960s Ghanaians have been noted for emigrating to other parts of the world, as

was stated in part one of this thesis. As a well-established diaspora community in Britain, the Ghanaian diaspora engage actively in UK politics and transnational politics towards their homeland. Such political participation also contributes to economic development in their homeland directly and indirectly. Their contribution towards homeland development is recognised in Ghana via remittances that they send home. Politically however, the Ghanaian diaspora has been disenfranchised to vote transnationally since the enactment of the 1992 constitution with the birth of Ghana's 4th republic after decades of military rule. In the absence of not being able to vote in Ghanaian elections from abroad as stipulated in the Ghanaian constitution. An amendment was passed in Parliament in 2006 to allow disenfranchised Ghanaians in the diaspora to participate in transnational political processes. Part two of this thesis seeks to analyse the political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, transnational political participation towards Accra and finally returnee diaspora political participation in Accra.

This part of the thesis aims at providing answers to the question of Ghanaian diaspora engagement both in UK politics and transnational politics towards to Accra. The proposed hypothesis indicated in the general introduction on the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and transnational political engagement towards Accra is as follows: a) the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and their transnational political engagement towards Accra from London is strongly linked to their identity construction and their process of integration in London b) transnational political participation of Ghanaians is either tied to lack of full integration in London or Ghanaian diaspora transnational political engagement is motivated both by individual and collective interest of its members within the context of transnational political activities of Ghanaians in London; c) transnational voting rights of Ghanaians Living Abroad is highly politicised and depends on which party is in government; and d) returnee Ghanaians constitute the political elites of Ghana yet the advocacy for transnational diaspora vote has been delayed, as the implementation of the Representation of People's Amendment Act which was voted in Parliament in 2006 to accord the Ghanaian diaspora its transnational political franchise is yet to be implemented.

Part II of this thesis focuses on the nexuses between conventional, unconventional, direct and indirect means that the Ghanaian diaspora in London employ for their transnational political franchise in the absence of not being eligible to participate in transnational

political practices via the conventional and direct mode of political engagement which is through voting. Conventional and direct form of political participation deals with voting, being a member of a political party or a trade union. Unconventional and indirect form of political participation is centred on violent protest, graffiti etc...

To this effect, Part II seeks to address the following questions: How does the Ghanaian diaspora participation in UK politics a sign of full integration in their host country? Or it is full integration that motivates political participation of Ghanaians in UK politics? Does participating in host country political process, is due to not being eligible to vote transnationally towards homeland politics? Who, why and how do they participate in UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana? To what extent does transnational political engagement foster the formation of a long-term political identity and political class of Ghanaians in living in London via the acquisition of various forms of capitals? Is there a correlation between political engagement in London, identity formation in the diaspora and their integration process? Is it a political strategy, not to implement the transnational diaspora vote? Or is it that Ghanaians in the diaspora themselves do not collectively advocate for this right? Or it is a combination of both?

By using the discourse of long-distance nationalism, advanced by Nina Glick-Schiller⁸¹⁴ referring to migrants' transnational engagement towards homeland activities such as politics is motivated by their *jus sanguinis* rights to the nationality of their homeland. This notion will be used to analyse diaspora transnational links between Ghanaians in London and returnees in Accra with respect to their transnational political engagement. The notion of social capital advanced by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam all have different perspective of what social capital entails ⁸¹⁵. These notions will be used throughout this thesis in analysing how social capital accumulation and conversion among Ghanaian diaspora in London, plays a paramount role in the formation of a collective political diaspora identity and as such enables the emergence of returnee political elites in Ghana. Putnam's notion of

⁸¹⁴ Schiller, N.G. and Fouron, G.E., 2001. *Georges woke up laughing: Long-distance nationalism and the search for home*. Duke University Press.

⁸¹⁵ Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. In *Culture and politics* (pp. 223-234). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

social capital accumulation through participating in network groups such as voluntary associations set the centre stage for political engagement. This notion will be used to analyse how Ghanaian associations in London use this transnational space for indirect political engagement. Colman's notion of social capital through rational choice theory believes that individuals place their personal interest ahead of the group within context of collective action to promote and preserve their interest. Colman's notion of rational choice theory will be used to explain how members of the Ghanaian diaspora position their personal interest within the framework of transnational collective action. And finally, Bourdieu's notion of social capital through the narrative Habitus and social reproduction will aid in understanding how social class is formed and reproduced among Ghanaians in London and how that influences or not their political participation in UK politics, transnational engagement towards Ghana and returnee engagement in homeland politics.

The analysis on the conversions and institutionalisation of accumulated capitals by Ghanaian diaspora in London into a tangible asset for their political engagement in both London and transnationally towards Accra, will draw parallels on Bourdieu's three fundamental forms of capital: a) economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights; b) cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions into economic capital and maybe institutionalised in the form of educational qualifications; and c) social capital, made up of social obligations (connections) which is convertible in certain conditions, into economic capital and maybe institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility⁸¹⁶. Part II equally seeks to address the question of Ghanaian returnee diaspora political engagement back home and to examine the relationship between the acquisition of these various forms of capitals such as: social capital, resource capital, educational capital, financial capital, social network capital and political engagement back home.

To this end, Part II is divided into five main chapters and sub chapters, with chapter one examining the shift from migrant to diaspora and how that serves as a political identity and economic resources for Ghanaian diaspora's contribution to the development of both host and home countries. This analysis on the shift from migrant to diaspora will be

⁸¹⁶ Bourdieu, P., 1986. The forms of capital.p.47

viewed from the lenses of social composition, resources and networks which forms the Ghanaian diaspora in London. How these social compositions contribute to the making of a distinctive identity and political class among Ghanaian diaspora despite their social disparities and strata. In this chapter we will also discuss if there is such a thing as a political identity and a political class based on diasporisation. If yes, can they stand alone as a consolidated political class upon their return to Ghana?

Chapter two focuses on the political mobilization and the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, the UK and the transnational political engagement towards Accra, Ghana. By assessing the strategies employed by the Ghanaian diaspora in their quest for long-distance political participation either in their host country, as a sign of full integration or transnational political practices in the diaspora is to fill in the void of not being able to participate in homeland politics. This participation towards homeland politics from the diaspora is a result of lack of full integration in host country.

Chapter three addresses the notion of return migration and political engagement in Ghana. How returnees are utilizing their accumulated capitals in the diaspora and converting it into a political and economic asset once they are back in Ghana. As such this chapter will further examine the ways in which returnees use their acquired knowledge to engage in politics in Ghana, and their economic role in Ghana's development through the classification of various types of returnees.

In chapter four, I seek to analyse the impact of return migration as a panacea to the formation of Ghana's middle class via the lenses of expatriation and returnees to the ties of political stability and economic growth. Focusing this chapter on the ties between middle class and economic growth enables us to understand the role that returnees play within the economic market and how that transcends into politics. And as such reinforcing the idea that Ghanaian political elites are being derived from expatriation of Ghanaians abroad.

Chapter five seeks to analyse the fusion between political mobilization in the UK and in Ghana. The strategies and similarities that the Ghanaian diaspora and returnees use in London and in Accra to build their social capital both in political and economic terms. This chapter equally seeks to question the paradox of returnees in homeland politics as being both the vanguard of political stability and at the same time possibly a destabilising

factor in Ghanaian politics by citing the example of the 2019 foiled coup plot with the aim to destabilise the country politically with the alleged mastermind of the coup plotter being a returnee medical doctor and his alleged accomplices in the Army and the Police both having studied, been trained abroad or worked outside of Ghana.

Chapter 1: Sociology of the Ghanaian diaspora in London

There is no consensus on a single definition of the term ‘migrant’. According to Anderson and Blinder, migrants might be defined by foreign birth, by foreign citizenship, or by their movement into a new country to stay temporarily (sometimes for as little as a year) or to settle for the long term⁸¹⁷. In this sense the above definition of the long-term settlement of migrants resonates with the case of Ghanaian expatriates in London. From their long-term settlement in the long run emerges a transnational group and a diaspora. This transnational group and diaspora dispose of resources, be it economic, symbolic, cultural and social due to their long-term stay.

Transnationalism is defined as the “processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that tie together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994: 7). This is possible due to the broader phenomenon of globalization and the advancement of communication technologies that have compressed the distance between time and space (Giddens, 1990; Portes, 2001; Smith, 1998; Vertovec, 2004). Transnational activities could be grouped into: economic, socio-cultural and political activities that take place in both receiving and sending countries of migration (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001:618-626; Portes, 2001; Portes, Guarnizo & Landholt, 1999:222). Activities undertaken by Ghanaian migrants in London can therefore be classified as transnational activities via Ghanaian migrant associations in London vis- a- vis Ghana.

There are similarities between the terms: migrants, transnationalism and diaspora, but also distinctive differences. Faist (2010, 20) notes that a crucial similarity in the terms diaspora and transnationalism lies in both terms being extremely elastic terms, in one way or another way. This is to mean that both terms concern sustained cross-border ties

⁸¹⁷ Anderson, B. and Blinder, S., 2011. Who counts as a migrant? Definitions and their consequences. *Briefing, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*.

including regions of origin and destinations and lateral ties to other regions in which migrants reside. To Faist, both diaspora and transnationalism deal with homeland (referent- origin) and dispersed people (Dufoix 2008), but also on destination country. For example, Safran argues that diasporas exist in a triangular socio-cultural relationship with the host society and the homeland (1991: 372).

Faist further notes that there are three distinctions to what transnationalism and diaspora entails. First, 'transnationalism' is a broader term than 'diaspora' in two respects. One concerns the scope of groups. Diaspora relates most often to religious, ethnic and national groups and communities, whereas transnational approaches connect to all sorts of associative formations including the ones already mentioned, as well as the phenomena such as networks of businesspersons and social movements⁸¹⁸. Diaspora is often related to a form of transnational organisation spanning a specific country or origin and a set of host countries. In contrast 'transnational community' encompasses a broader range of phenomena, such as cross-broader village communities or borderland communities. Thus, transnational communities encompass diaspora, but not all transnational communities are diaspora⁸¹⁹.

The second dimension relates to identity and mobility. Diaspora approaches focus on aspects of collective identity, while transnational approaches take theirs from cross-border mobility. Although both diaspora and transnational approaches use both concepts, there are sometimes differences in emphasis⁸²⁰. The difference is clearly borne out by questions of identity and later brings in mobility, the latter contrasting diasporic and circular transnationalism⁸²¹.

As a general observation, diaspora deals with dispersal, whether traumatic or not and the resulting emergence and reproduction of some sort of collective identity, with varying intensities of ties to the country of emigration and the country of immigration⁸²². The issue of collective identity does also matter from the transnational perspective, for example, many analyses of cultural aspects of transnationalism build upon notions of:

⁸¹⁸ Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. eds., 2010. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*. Amsterdam University Press. p.21.

⁸¹⁹ Faist, T., 2000. Transnationalization in international migration: implications for the study of citizenship and culture. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 23(2), p.191

⁸²⁰ Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. eds., 2010. Art.cit. p. 22

⁸²¹ Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. eds., 2010. Art.cit. p. 23

⁸²² Adamson, F., 2012. Constructing the diaspora: Diaspora identity politics and transnational social movements. *Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks*, pp.25-42.

mélange, hybrid identity or cultural translations in which mobile persons are engaged⁸²³. From a transnational perspective, however, these identity changes are regarded as being derived from cross-border mobility of persons, which is always embedded in other flows of ideas and goods. Transnationalism concern with mobility is also reflected in the concept of network. In this way transnationalism literature links with the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ that posits geographical mobility as a ubiquitous phenomenon of general societal importance (Sheller and Urry 2006).

A third difference in emphasis between the use of the term diaspora and transnationalism approaches concerns time dimension. The term diaspora often refers to multi-generational patterns, whilst transnational analyst deals with recent migrant flows⁸²⁴. Diasporas have often been defined as formations reaching across generations, if not a generational *longue durée*⁸²⁵.

This chapter therefore seeks to analyse the sociological composition of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and how this sociological configuration contributes to the making of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, from the perspective of no longer being viewed as a migrant community but assuming the role of a diaspora and a transnational group.

1.1.2 Social composition, resources and features of the Ghanaian diaspora

As stated in part one of this thesis on the migration waves of Ghanaians in the UK in which it was noted through various studies such as a study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2001 which observed that 56,112 Ghanaian-born people living in the UK⁸²⁶. Whereas the 2011 UK census recorded 93, 312 Ghanaian-born residents in England⁸²⁷. Equally the UK office for National Statistics estimates that the Ghanaian-born population of the UK was 96,000 in 2016⁸²⁸.

⁸²³ Faist, T., 2010. Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, 11.

⁸²⁴ Faist, T., 2000. Art. Cit. p.192.

⁸²⁵ Faist, T., 2000. Art. Cit. p.193

⁸²⁶OECD data on UK migrant's country of birth 2001: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls>

⁸²⁷Office for National Statistics 2011 data on country of birth on migrants in the UK::

<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/census-data/2011-census-prospectus/index.html>

⁸²⁸ Office for National Statistics 2016 data on migration figures in the UK::

<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Migration>

For the 2019 data on foreign born population in the UK, the Office for National Statistics in the UK estimated that Ghanaian-born population sits at 114,000⁸²⁹.

These figures do not correlate with the estimates that the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK 2009-2014 (Ghana ambassador to the UK) Prof. Danso-Boafo gave in an interview in London in 2010, where he estimated that about 100,00 Ghanaians registered with the mission whilst this excludes those who have not made themselves known to the High Commission (Ghana Embassy).⁸³⁰ To follow-up on these figures, in June 2016 in an interview with the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK, Ambassador Victor Smith (2014-2017) who stated that the figures on Ghana nationals residing in the UK could surpass 600,000 he equally noted that these figures could be speculative because it includes those who are not registered at the High Commission.

Through the presence of earlier Gold Coasters sojourning in the UK for the purposes of education and commerce by affluent Gold Coast families, this evidence shows that the UK has long been home to people of Ghanaian descent as early as the 1900s⁸³¹. London, however, has been the bastion and home to Ghanaian immigrants and one of the oldest settled African communities in various parts of London. The localisation of the Ghanaian community as was noted in Part I of this thesis was historically heterogeneous and dispersed, as the community blended into the general panorama of the Black British community. In other words, they were located in areas with high concentrations of people of ethnic minority background in London. Since the 1990s, the sociological mapping of the Ghanaian diaspora appears to be more stratified, organized and homogenous in its localisation. As a result, people of Ghanaian descent can be found living in Greater London boroughs of: Southwark, Lambeth, Newham, Hackney, Haringey, Lewisham, Croydon and Brent, with much smaller populations in Birmingham, Manchester and Milton Keynes⁸³². Areas in London such as: Seven Sisters, Tottenham, Edmonton, Dalston, Peckham and Hounslow have the highest concentration of Ghanaians residing in those areas⁸³³. A study on Ghanaians in London equally states that the principal reason

⁸²⁹ Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality: individual country data: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets>

⁸³⁰ Fieldwork interview with Pr. Danso-Baffoe, 10th June 2010, London

⁸³¹ Rucker, W.C., 2015. *Gold Coast Diasporas: Identity, Culture, and Power*. Indiana University Press.


⁸³² Mapping exercise of Ghanaians in London by IOM UK, 2009 : https://web.archive.org/web/20120304145035/http://www.iomlondon.org/doc/mapping/IOM_GHANA.pdf

⁸³³ Fieldwork London data 2010-2016

why Ghanaians migrate to London is to work, attracted by economic factors and the existence of a strong Ghanaian community already settled in the UK⁸³⁴.

This, therefore, implies that due to the capital's resources in terms of availability of employment and the existence of a well-established Ghanaian community network, London is an attractive destination compared to smaller towns in the UK, hence the propensity to find Ghanaians settled in London rather than smaller towns outside of London, as noted in a 2010 study on Ghanaian workers in London as part of London's Labour force⁸³⁵. The results of my fieldwork data confirm this assertion that London captures the highest percentage of Ghanaian migrants in the UK as 67% of respondents stated that they have lived in London since emigrating to the UK. On the other hand, 33% noted they have lived in another part of the UK since leaving Ghana as shown in figure 27 below ⁸³⁶. This, therefore, reinforces the idea that London hosts the highest bulk of Ghanaians in the UK, as indicated in Part One of this thesis on the history of Ghanaian emigration waves to the UK.

Figure 0-27: Lived in the same area in London since arrival in the UK/Lived in same area since returning to Accra 2012



Source: field work results London and Accra, December

⁸³⁴ Vasta E, Kandilige L. 'London the Leveller': Ghanaian Work Strategies and Community Solidarity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 2010 p.2


⁸³⁵ Herbert, J., May, J., Wills, J., Datta, K., Evans, Y. and McIlwaine, C., 2008. Multicultural living? Experiences of everyday racism among Ghanaian migrants in London. *European urban and regional studies*, 15(2), pp.103-117.

⁸³⁶ Ghanaians in the UK: http://www.iomlondon.org/doc/mapping/IOM_GHANA.pdf

A study conducted by Herbert, Datta et al in 2006 on the experiences of Ghanaian workers in London revealed that 52% of Ghanaian migrants in London had acquired tertiary level education before moving to Britain⁸³⁷. A similar observation was also made with regards to the level of education of Ghanaian migrants in London among the sample of respondents I interviewed: 28% mentioned having university degrees, 21% training and college level, 14% secondary school, 12% polytechnic, 10% none, 7% primary school certificate and vocational, as shown in Fig 28 below. This, therefore, shows a correlation between educational attainment and emigration to Britain. Which in turn translates that Britain as a destination country for Ghanaian emigrants captures elite emigration from Ghana to Britain, as opposed to other destination countries in Europe for example.

It is, therefore, important to state here that in London, the social categorization and classification of Ghanaians is of less significance, as the mere fact of emigrating puts most Ghanaians on a level playing field, as everybody is on the same level socially and economically. As opposed to Accra where social classification is of great importance as to who networks with who depending on where they live in Accra.

Figure 0-28: Education background London respondents 2012



Source: Field work result findings Accra respondents July 2012

⁸³⁷ Herbert, J., May, J., Wills, J., Datta, K., Evans, Y. and McIlwaine, C., 2008. Multicultural living? Experiences of everyday racism among Ghanaian migrants in London. *European urban and regional studies*, 15(2), p.8

Table 4: Professional trajectories in Accra and London 2012

	London (%)	Accra (%)
Self-employed (Shop owner, restaurant owner, businessperson)	22	41
Teacher	7	22
University Lecturer	15	19
Lawyer	7	3
Journalist	10	3
Doctor	20	-
Nurse	4	-
Businessperson or trader		12
Civil Servant	-	-
Social work	2	-
Support worker	-	-
Customer service assistance	5	-
Restaurant manager	-	-
Banking	10	-
Voluntary work		-
Diplomat /civil servant	5	-
Other (specify) civil society, international organization, NGO	0	-
Total	100	100

Source: fieldwork results findings in London and Accra in 2012

Table.4. illustrates a cross tabulation of professional orientations of Ghanaians in Accra and in London. In terms of professional trajectory, 22% of the sample respondents stated that they were self-employed and owned businesses within the retail sector and specialized in African and Ghanaian produces, restaurants, media industry etc. This high

percentage for the self-employment sector among diasporans is attributed to the demand from the Ghanaian community to cater for the needs of the community, particularly on the consumption of produces from Ghana which in turn enables them to maintain their links with homeland (see image 5. Kumasi Market in Peckham, South East London). In Michel Cahen's observation in his study on "*Ethnicité politique*", in which he established the link between certain professions and ties to ethnic minority group and their identity. He observed that some employment sectors are dominated by migrant groups and as such their identities has come to be attached to these job industries. Cahen demonstrates this notion in reference to rural French migrants living and working in Paris who dominate specific employment sectors such as the examples of the Auvergnats who own most of Paris cafés. According to Cahen, this sector of business was once viewed as less prestigious but it is now seen as a lucrative sector. Which explains this dominance of Auvergnats in ownership of Paris cafés which is now attached to the identity of the Auvergnats in Paris. « *Les Auvergnats du moins ceux qui tiennent les cafés de Paris semblent plus tenace certainement à cause de ce monopole qui l'institue presque en caste, grâce auquel mais aussi pour lequel ils doivent rester auvergnats sous peine d'en perdre le bénéfice économique. Mais le saut qualitatif de la troisième et quatrième génération est toujours pertinent. Quant à ceux qui ne sont pas bistrotiers-limonadiers, on n'en parle guère et ce n'est sans doute pas un hasard*⁸³⁸ »

The above example of specific migrant group occupying certain professions which contributes to being associated to their identity and ethnicity, this example cannot be associated to the case study of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. Although the data sample above on the profile of Ghanaian diaspora professional orientation, demonstrates that certain professions in London are dominated by the Ghanaian community, such as owning shops that sells Ghanaian products. This noted, they do not hold sole monopoly of a particular sector of employment, which is tied to their identity and ethnicity. As often one can find shops in London being owned by Indians, Pakistanis or Nigerians yet they sell Ghanaian products.

⁸³⁸ Cahen.M., 1994 *Ethnicité politique*. Pour une lecture réaliste de l'identité Paris: L'Harmattan, p.21

Figure 0-29: Image 5 Ghanaian Grocery Shop: Kumasi Market in Peckham High Street, in South East London



Source: Field work, April 2013, London

The other sector of employment for Ghanaians in London was within the healthcare sector with 20% of respondent stating that they were doctors. This tendency of Ghanaian health professionals having a higher percentage in this data as oppose to other professions, can be explained by the fact that over the past 30 years, Ghana and some Commonwealth countries have been the sources of healthcare labour migration to the UK. This tendency is partly due to the high deficit of healthcare professionals within the UK National Health Service (the NHS) in the UK, as a result, most Ghanaian medical specialist such as: doctors, pharmacist and nurses are recruited to fill in those deficits within the healthcare sector⁸³⁹. The explanation for this specific labour migration of Ghanaian healthcare specialist to the UK is equally attributed to the fact that often times, healthcare specialist in Ghana are not very well paid in alignment to their qualifications, as a result when an opportunity is offered to either travel abroad to seek further specialization or being headhunted by international healthcare recruitment agencies, they take the opportunity and hardly return to Ghana, and when they do return it is either to set-up their own private practice or they return for retirement⁸⁴⁰.

⁸³⁹ Mensah, K., Mackintosh, M. and Henry, L., 2005. The 'skills drain' of health professionals from the developing world: a framework for policy formulation.p.5

⁸⁴⁰ Fieldwork interview with Dr. Kromoa in London 21 December 2014

This exodus of Ghanaian health care professionals emigrating to the UK has had an impact on brain drain and caused some lost to government resources, as these professionals were educated on the Ghanaian taxpayers' resources, only for some to complete medical school and leave without serving the country⁸⁴¹. As a result, the government of Ghana in 2006, initiated a policy of putting a cap, as to the number of years junior doctors and other healthcare professionals will have to serve Ghana before leaving the country for specialisation programs or even simply leaving to practice in another country. The cap stands at 6 years of service to the country, this is to curb the brain drain syndrome of healthcare professionals⁸⁴².

In terms of the exodus of Ghanaian professionals abroad, about 15% of respondent stated to be lecturers at university and colleges. Again, this brain-drain syndrome of Ghanaian university professionals leaving the country to work abroad, stemmed from the period of political instability and economic hardship, that the country witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s in particular. As during that period scholars and academics professionals were poorly paid, coupled with lack of materials to facilitate teaching, drove many to leave the country in their thousands⁸⁴³. Countries such as the UK and the US were great beneficiary of these educated elites and some Commonwealth countries in Africa such as: Nigeria, The Gambia, Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe equally benefited from the brain drain syndrome of Ghanaian academics and scholars⁸⁴⁴.

Another 10% of respondents stated that they were journalist working within mainstream British media and specialized media for people of African descent. This category is mainly dominated by second generation Ghanaians, discussing issues related to urban and multicultural thematic facing the ethnic minority communities, particularly issues dealing with integration of second generations. Although second generations dominate the media sector in London, there is a growing number of first-generation Ghanaians in the medias professions, their main focus are on social and political issues concerning Ghanaians in the UK, but also they use this platform to host programs in local Ghanaian languages in

⁸⁴¹ Ziblim, A., 2013. Return migration of highly skills brain Gain and Brain circulation in the healthcare sector in Ghana: A case study of the IOM MIDA Ghana Health initiative. (Doctoral dissertation, Central European University) p. 9.

⁸⁴² Ghanaian searching for opportunities home and abroad.: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ghana-searching-opportunities-home-and-abroad>

⁸⁴³ Fieldwork interview in London with Mohammed Abdul Saaka

⁸⁴⁴ Ghanaian searching for opportunities home and abroad.: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ghana-searching-opportunities-home-and-abroad>

London to cater for their niche audience by linking Ghanaians in the UK to News and cultural events in Ghana.

Some 10% of the sample respondents indicated that they, worked within the banking sector which includes investment and high street banking. This professional segment also includes both first and second generations, but there is a slight over representation of second generation than first generation. Smaller percentages such as 5% diplomats and civil servants, among this group some were working for the Ghanaian diplomatic mission in the UK and others in the British civil services, 5% costumer services both in retail and corporate sectors, 4% nurses. These diverse professional backgrounds help in revealing some aspects of the process of Ghanaian diaspora integration in the UK through their professional orientations such as working as UK civil servants. These professional orientations of Ghanaians in London also enable them to forge and maintain a collective identity in the diaspora, via the symbolism of owning business that caters specifically for their own community.

With regards to the aforementioned professional orientations of Ghanaians in London, it is worth stating here that, on the one hand diasporic spaces can be a place for upward social mobility for those who left their homeland without qualifications and professional experience, but through migration they have studied or worked in specific professions to acquire some skills and as such climbed the social ladder. Akyeampong, describes the diaspora as ‘an important space to remake oneself, even to overcome the social liabilities of birth’ (Akyeampong 2000: 186). The diasporic space can also be place of downward mobility and have a de-skilling effect for highly qualified professionals from Ghana, who are unable to convert their qualifications from Ghana to work in the UK.

For example, a first-generation respondent who worked as a Lawyer in Ghana, could not practice in the legal profession in England states: *When I came to this country in 1972, I had in mind to sit for the British Bar, which would have enabled me to practice as a Lawyer in the UK. But unfortunately, I was unable to do that as I had to attend to other important personal issues that came up and as a result, I found myself doing jobs that had nothing to do with my qualification, I found myself in jobs that, I was overqualified for*⁸⁴⁵. This statement implies that migration is not always synonymous to upward mobility, on the contrary in the case of this respondent emigrating to the UK had a


⁸⁴⁵ Field work interview with respondent A, London December 2012

deskilling effect on his professional status and a downward mobility of his social classification and status in the UK. This is, therefore, what London being a leveller entails, meaning an equal level playing field for both skilled and unskilled migrants ⁸⁴⁶. Other studies on downward mobility and deskilling effects on Ghanaian migrant professionals in London and in Toronto observed that: *12 of our respondents in London were in managerial and professional occupations immediately before leaving Ghana, none were working in those categories at the time of interview*⁸⁴⁷. In a similar experience of downward mobility of Ghanaian migrants in Toronto reveals that many of them resign themselves to seeking ‘lowly occupations’ (Manuh 2000: 9)

In general terms what this data set concludes is that Ghanaians in London are inclined to work for themselves in self-employment jobs, regardless of where they reside, but more so with those who return to Ghana as it is demonstrated in the above dataset. This therefore implies that immigrants Ghanaians in London are engaged in various forms of career orientation as opposed to when they return to Ghana, where the percentage of returnees in self-employment is a lot higher.

This point will be developed in subsequent chapters on the characteristics of returnees and how their career experience abroad has shaped their career orientation back in Ghana and as such contributes to the development of Ghana both politically and economically.

Figure 0-30: Age of respondents in Accra and London



Source: Field work result findings Accra respondents July 2012

There were several differences between the age distribution of respondents in London

⁸⁴⁶ Vasta, E. and Kandilige, L., 2010. Art cit. p7

⁸⁴⁷ Vasta, E. and Kandilige, L., 2010. Art cit. p7

and in Accra. For London 64% recorded the highest level for respondents falling between the age of 30 years and 40 years. Accra on the other hand recorded 35% of respondents falling in the same age brackets of 30-40 years. The explanation for the similarities in terms of these age groups in both locations recording higher among respondent, stems from the fact that it was among this group who showed interest in participating in the study in both locations. It was observed during the fieldwork in London and Accra, that this age brackets of 30-40 years appeared to be the most dynamic for various reasons: a) they appeared to be more dynamic within their career orientation both in London and in Accra, b) more flexible in terms of their transnational movement between London and Accra, c) This age bracket took more risk to return to Ghana and as such they constituted the highest percentage of returnees in Ghana, notes Jenny a respondent during an interview in Accra, Ghana in 2017 ⁸⁴⁸. This age group being the dynamic group makes them more likely to be the ones interested in emigrating and in returning as well⁸⁴⁹. For the age range between 40-50 years and 50-60 years, Accra respondents recorded, 28% and 25% respectively. Whereas London recorded a low rate for age between 40-50 years (7%) and for 50-60 years, 10% was recorded, as show in Fig. 30. Above.

With regards to the characteristics of respondent's marital status in this study, which is important in ascertaining if there are any links between marital status in emigration and integration process of Ghanaian residents in London. Or does marital status such as being married or divorced influences the idea of returning home. Recent studies conducted on Ghanaian diaspora, has shown a strong correlation between marital status, emigration and return. The study indicates that marital status in emigration and return are strongly linked. Grant (2008) notes that the process of Ghanaian migrants' integration in their host country, is often tied to their marital status and their community network within the Ghanaian community abroad, as being married enables them to further forge stronger ties and networks within their church communities, hometown and professional associations⁸⁵⁰. Another study in similar direction, conducted by Schans, Mazzucato et.al illustrates that marital status plays a pivotal role in returnees to Ghana, their study shows

⁸⁴⁸ Fieldwork interview with Jenny in Accra, June 2017

⁸⁴⁹ Åkesson, L. and Baaz, M.E. eds., 2015. *Africa's return migrants: the new developers?* Zed Books Ltd.

⁸⁵⁰ Grant. R, 2009 *Globalising city: The urban and Economic transformation of Accra Ghana*, Syracuse University Press

that a significant percentage of returnee in Ghana, stated they were single and returned home after a sojourn for studies and “hustling” to come home and marry someone from their local area, or village, this therefore, demonstrates that the need to return home, to get married can be an encouraging factor in some instances to relocate permanently home⁸⁵¹. A returnee in Accra during a fieldwork interview in 2012 stated he returned home after studying and working for while in London to marry as he did not view his stay in London as a permanent one, therefore he did not want to commit to a relationship with someone living in London that would lead to marriage and in turn keep him away from Ghana⁸⁵². This observation therefore suggests that not marrying while in the diaspora is a strategic move by some migrants, as being married in the diaspora could hinder their motivation to return home as noted by the respondent above.

Table 5: Age cohort and marital status of respondents

	Married with children		Married with no children		Single		Single with children		Divorced with children	
	London (%)	Accra (%)	London (%)	Accra (%)	London (%)	Accra (%)	London (%)	Accra (%)	London (%)	Accra (%)
30-40 yrs	69.2	27.8	-	-	87.5	80.0	21.0	100.0	-	-
40-50 yrs	7.7	33.3	100.0	-	-	20.0	-	-	-	-
50-60 yrs	7.7	27.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	66.7	100.0
60-71 yrs	7.7	11.1	-	100.0	-	-	70.0	-	33.3	-
72 yrs (+)	7.7	-	-	-	12.5	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Field work result findings Accra respondents July 2012

The other important characteristic of Ghanaians in London was their household composition in London and in Accra. It is shown in table 5, that respondent between the age group of 30-40 constitute 69,2% in London who indicated to be married with children. Whereas 7.7 % for both the brackets of 40 to 50 years and 50-to 60 years, also stated they were married with Children in London. Whereas for returnees in Accra it is slightly

⁸⁵¹ Schans. D, Mazzucato.V, Schoumaker. B, Flahaux. M.L 2013 Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration, MAFE Working Paper 20

⁸⁵² Field work interview with Kwesi, Accra June 2012

different in terms of the figures, for the age brackets of 30-40, 27.8% were married with children, 33.3% for the 40-50 years, 27.8% for 50-60 years, 11. % for 60-71 years. For the segments of people being single with children, respondents in London showed a higher percentage 70% among the 60-71-year-old segments, said they were single with children and 21% among the 30-40years said they were single with children. On being divorced with children, 66.7% of respondents in London were divorced with children, 33.3% of the 60-71 years category were divorced with children.

This data shows a wide variation of responses from respondents in London. It is clear that the age bracket of 30-40 years is more inclined to be those married with children, and paradoxically are also inclined to be single with no children.

This paradox could be translated as that this age bracket constitutes both first- and second-generation Ghanaians with its hybridity of various forms of culture and identity influences, such as having strong influence of host country culture and at the same time holding on to their Ghanaian heritage. By societal norms in Ghana the age group of 30-40 years are supposed to be settled, in other words, married with children, as at that age most individuals are also supposed to be in secured and stable employment⁸⁵³.

Second generation 30-40 years being single without children in London might not be something too much out of the norm, as a result of second generations being viewed as “westernised”, with less ties with their extended families in Ghana and as such less pressure is being placed on them from family back home in Ghana⁸⁵⁴. Whereas a first generation 30-40 years old living in London not married without children could face family stigmatisation from relatives back home in Ghana as a result of still maintaining strong ties with extended family in Ghana⁸⁵⁵.

However, the data on divorce rates are higher for the 50-60 years brackets in London compared to Accra where respondent indicated none. Does this imply that migration fosters higher percentage of divorce among diasporans as these results shows that the sample of respondents in London are prone to being divorced and are also in single parent

⁸⁵³ Boyle, P., Halfacree, K. and Robinson, V., 1998. Exploring contemporary migration Longman. *Harlow, United Kingdom*.p.12

⁸⁵⁴ Fieldwork discussions in London with Mohammed Abdul-Saaka, 12 March 2014

⁸⁵⁵ Manuh, T., 1999. This place is not Ghana”: Gender and rights discourse among Ghanaian men and women in Toronto. *Ghana Studies*, 2(1999), p 95.

household more than in Accra? This high percentage of divorce and single parent household in the diaspora is explained by the strains and difficulties of living abroad, without family network and at times financial challenges could explain the high divorce rate among the age brackets of 50 to 60 years old in London as opposed to the same age bracket who remain married in Accra. A respondent in London stated that: *You know here in London, life is not all that easy, working full time with childcare sometimes it puts lots of pressure and strain on marriages, as back home in Ghana you have a support network to help. But here such support is not there, which puts a lot of pressure on marriages in our community, some of our people look out to divorce as a quick fix or solution to marital issues, whereas in Ghana you marry into a family and not to one person so when there are issues in the marriage both families come together to find solutions and resolve any marital issues. But here in London, there is no such family support, so marriages break-down easily. And women have more rights here and the laws protect them, which is a good thing and I support that, but some of our people do not even try to look for solution before divorce. So yes, divorce is a bit higher here than in Ghana*⁸⁵⁶.

This demographic consideration on household composition of Ghanaians in London, was undertaken to aid in understanding the various elements that contribute to migrants' integration in a host country and the challenges that they face in this process of integration. It is equally to understand if new environment where migrants find themselves, can have an impact on their cultural values, or that new environment contributes to reinforcing their strong bond to their culture and tradition, as a means of asserting their identity and a coping mechanism in migration. The case of the Ghanaian diaspora in London with reference to this data, demonstrates how the effect of migration can impact household composition and marital status, i.e., the impact of divorce being higher among diasporans than returnees and the delay in getting married while abroad than when back in Ghana. Inadvertently, migrant's new environment in general tends to have an impact in their integration process within their host country and the relationship they build with their home country within the framework of their social composition.

In relation to their emigration patterns such as year of migration, 40% of respondents indicated they left Ghana for London in the 2000s, 32% left Ghana in the 1990s, another

⁸⁵⁶ Fieldwork interview with Joshua in London in December 2012

20% in the 1980s and 8% in the 1970s. The percentage of those who left Ghana in the 2000s was significantly higher, it is an interesting observation, as the 2000s was a period of relative calm in terms of economic hardship and political agitation, as opposed to the period of economic hardships and political crisis of 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s in Ghana. As noted in part one of this thesis on the history of Ghanaian emigration waves and the push factors that drove thousands of Ghanaians to leave the country during the periods of 1970s 1980s and 1990s, is attributed to the political instability under various military regimes. These political instability in turn had a spill-over effect on the economy⁸⁵⁷. Other countries in the sub-region were economically prosperous in the 1980s such as: Zimbabwe, The Gambia, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, which played a pull factor in attracting both skilled and unskilled Ghanaian migrants, as transition countries before proceeding to Western countries such as the UK, the US, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy⁸⁵⁸. Quartey (2009) explains what accounts for this high percentage of emigration of Ghanaians in the 2000s was basically a period of educational emigration from Ghana to the UK, as he states that most Ghanaian universities had more exchange students' programs with universities abroad, which was not always the case in the 1990s. According to Quartey more scholarships were readily available for Ghanaian students, although quantifiable figures were not available in 2009 to measure the impact of students on scholarship emigrating to UK and the benefit for Ghana on transfer of knowledge and skills from the UK with regards to brain gain of these students upon their return⁸⁵⁹. Although there are no viable data readily available with regards to the number of scholarships that were available for Ghanaian students in the early 2000s as stated above, this assertion nevertheless serves as an indication on the varied profiles of emigration from Ghana to the UK. Also, Ghana started witnessing high economic growth between 2004 to 2009, which in turn contributed to the emergence of a new social category i.e., a class of very rich Ghanaians or an emerging "upper middle class"⁸⁶⁰. This in turn suggest that these upper middle-class or the class of very rich Ghanaian households are in a better financial position to send their children abroad to study, including the UK as a destination

⁸⁵⁷ Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S., Ababio, O.M. and Tiemoko, R., 2003. Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper. *University of Sussex: DRC on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty*. p.6

⁸⁵⁸ Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S., Ababio, O.M. and Tiemoko, R., 2003. Art.cit p.8

⁸⁵⁹ Quartey, P., 2009. *Migration in Ghana: a country profile 2009*. International Organization for Migration. p.10


⁸⁶⁰ Hamidu, J., 2015. Are Ghanaian diaspora middle class? Linking middle class to political participation and stability in Ghana. *Africa Development*, 40(1), pp.140.

country⁸⁶¹. It is therefore worth observing that not all return to Ghana upon finishing their studies in the UK, this further exacerbates the syndrome of brain drain of qualified Ghanaians abroad.

1.1.2 Social Mapping of Ghanaians in London

After the above overview of the demographic characteristics of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, the following sub-chapter seeks to analyse the composition and structures of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. As the Ghanaian community in London is organised around five cluster structures: Hometown Associations, Ghanaian Professional Associations, Alumni Associations, Ghanaian Faith base associations i.e., Ghanaian churches and Ghanaian political party branches in the UK as shown in the diagram below.

Figure 0-31: Ghanaian diaspora structures in London



Sheffer (2003) suggests two reasons that motivates diasporans in their decisions to form

⁸⁶¹Quartey, P. 2009. Migration in Ghana – A Country Profile 2009.

associations and organizations: first to promote their well-being and the continuity of their communities in their host countries; second, to increase their ability to extend support to beleaguered homelands and other diaspora communities of the same national origin⁸⁶². Diaspora associations have become a platform for migrant communities to network and maintain contact with their home country but to also foster and support members rights and opportunities in their host country by providing assistance and protection for members of the diaspora community.

The motivation behind the idea for migrants' communities abroad to form social structures aimed at catering for the needs of their communities can be viewed from Putnam's notion of social capital within the context of social networks formations. As such, Putnam defines social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995, p. 67). Putnam's idea of civic culture translated in the network ties they develop which are based on horizontal and vertical ties. The networks of horizontal ties, such as those formed in voluntary associations, support the emergence of norms of reciprocity which in turn fosters trust, exchange and collective engagement; and the success of past cooperation strengthens collective engagement and develops a taste for cooperation (i.e., sequential equilibrium in repeated prisoner dilemma games)⁸⁶³. For example, the active transnational political engagement among some members of the Ghanaian diaspora who participate in activities of Ghanaian political party branches in London, use their acquired resources and social capital in the diaspora to advance the political agenda of their party in Ghana. The main political party in Ghana in turn relies on their diaspora branches in London to use their expertise and experience in the diaspora to enable international visibility of their party's activities abroad. This therefore allows the mutual reciprocity that Putnam states, as such the Ghanaian diaspora collective transnational political engagement sets the stage for a win-win scenario for members of the party in the diaspora to advance their career interest within the context of collective action and for their party in Ghana to also gain international visibility in that process. The below examples with studies on civic engagement of ethnic

⁸⁶² Sheffer.G. 2003. op.cit, pp. 26

⁸⁶³ Putnam, R.D., 2007. E pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian political studies*, 30(2), p.174.

minorities in their host country influences political participation in both host and homelands, demonstrates the case of the Ghanaian diaspora in London.

Jacobs and Tillie (2004) conducted a study to determine the correlation between social capital and political participation towards homeland and integration of ethnic minorities in host countries. The studies focused on associational membership and political participation among ethnic minority groups in four Western European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The authors observed that: “*Within each country, differences between ethnic groups as to the degree of political integration and the impact of comparable independent variables can be observed. In Belgium ethnic social capital has different effects on the political involvement of Moroccans and Turks; furthermore, there seems to be an important gender dimension. For Denmark, Lise Togeby concludes that ‘both the scope of mobilisation and mobilisation mechanisms seem to vary from group to group’. In Berlin substantial differences in the political participation patterns of Italians, Turks and Russians are observed, but for all groups ethnic civil society contributes to political activities with regard to Germany. Despite the (local) differences with respect to patterns of political integration and the significance of ethnic civic community, important similarities between the four countries can be observed*⁸⁶⁴”. In other words, the more an individual is active in voluntary associations, the more they are likely to participate in politics. Ethnic membership seems to play a role in facilitating political participation⁸⁶⁵. In their research in Amsterdam (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001) and other Dutch cities (Berger *et al.* 2000), Fennema and Tillie have found an interesting correlation at the aggregate level between political participation and political trust of ethnic minorities, on the one hand, and the network of ethnic associations on the other. For instance, Turks in Amsterdam have a denser network of associations than Moroccans. Turks at the same time have more political trust and a larger participation in the political field than Moroccans. Similar results, linking associational networks and political participation, have been found for Surinamese and Antilleans. Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) claim there is a causal link underlying this correlation. Inspired by Putnam, they argue that voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into


⁸⁶⁴ Jacobs, D. and Tillie, J., 2004. Introduction: social capital and political integration of migrants. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 30(3), p.421

⁸⁶⁵ Fennema, M. and Tillie, J., 2001. Civic community, political participation and political trust of ethnic groups. In *Multikulturelle demokratien im Vergleich* (p. 198). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

political trust and higher political participation. In addition, they claim that a network of organisations further increases political trust through interlocking directorates.

A study on trade union membership in the host country and its impact on political participation of migrant communities demonstrate that in cross-ethnic membership in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and trade-union membership in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have a significant effect on political participation, but mostly trade union membership is frequent among second-generation migrants. Memberships in trade union as an avenue for political engagement was high among first and second generation Ghanaians in London, who stated that they were members of the Labour Party trade Union Congress, particularly for those working for the transport sector in the UK.

Figure 0-32: Explaining (ethnic) political participation: the path model



Source: Jacobs, D. and Tillie, J., 2004. Introduction: social capital and political integration of migrants. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*

Honey and Okafor, (1998) states that hometown associations have been considered the archetypal postcolonial development actors, because they are self-organized, entrepreneurial and popular. Honey and Okafor, (1998) further explains that hometown associations are postcolonial development actors as during the colonial period, the number of African migrants in the UK were considerably low to form home town associations, equally the profile of migrants were varied in terms of their ethnic

background as the bases for town association formation is in many cases tied to their ethnicity or ethnic background in Africa. They are also “organic” in that their in-depth knowledge about their host country in the diaspora and their homeland, implying that their interventions are more likely to be appropriate, sustainable and accountable than any externally driven projects (Honey and Okafor, 1998; Vertovec, 2004; Chikezie, 2005). In other words, their in-depth knowledge in both host and homeland makes them an asset for the role they play as “brokers” and developmental agents benefiting both host country and homeland, if used wisely and appropriately. To this effect, Trager (2001) argues that little development would take place in the homeland without the diaspora.

Ghanaian hometown associations in London to this effect serve as a platform for Ghanaians from various ethnic groups to meet, network and form a solidarity group to support each other in times of need or distress. These hometown associations in London carry out philanthropic activities towards homeland such as building a school in their rural area back home. Hometown associations and their activities in London provides host country information on the cultural heritage of specific migrant community in the country which in turn enables the host country social policies for migrant communities to be inclusive. This information on social policies for migrants in the host country fosters the understanding in aiding their integration process within various aspects of the society. This point on Ghanaian hometown associations’ activities in London and how that enables a diaspora identity formation and integration processes to emerge will be further analysed in the following sub-chapter.

1.1.3 Ghanaian Associations in London: various mode of political participation.

According to Walker (2008) participating in voluntary associations influences direct and indirect form of political participation. Walker further maintains that voluntary associations and civic engagement fosters and promotes political activism unintentionally; this is because of the connection they may provide into exclusive channels of political recruitment⁸⁶⁶. By this it means that participation in social

⁸⁶⁶ Walker, E.T., 2008, March. Contingent Pathways from Joiner to Activist: The Indirect Effect of Participation in Voluntary Associations on Civic Engagement 1. In *Sociological Forum* (Vol. 23).. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p.118

organisation and associations may make one a likely candidate for recruitment into an organised political association (Li et al., 1998). Equally the notion of social capital and voluntary associations participation is strongly linked, to the idea of social capital, being an economic trope, that stresses the inherent instrumental value of associational activity in creating other social goods (Smith and Kulynch, 2002). Along similar lines, Putnam conceptualizes social capital as “features of social life – voluntary networks norms and trust that enables participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (1995:664-665). In relation to voluntary associations social capital theories hold that participation in non-political voluntary associations promotes participation in formal political institutions through unintentional means (Putnam et. al., 1993). Non-political associations are, however, likely to increase participation only to the extent that such organisations provide some sort of political socialization (Verba and Nie, 1972:194).

In this section, I will examine various diaspora voluntary associations that make-up the Ghanaian community in London and their transnational rapport towards homeland Ghana, in philanthropic terms, but most importantly political and economic terms of their engagement. The focus of my analysis here centres on the various manners in which specific Ghanaian associations in London engage both in the UK and towards Ghana, and how that can be qualified as a direct or indirect form of political participation. And to explore their transnational practices, with much emphasis on “how” they act transnationally, with “whom” and for “what”. I will further differentiate between: a) different forms of transnational associations and activities – “how”; b) the organizations or associations they form contributes to transnational alliances with “with whom”; and c) specific area of transnational engagement in which Ghanaian diaspora associations are commonly oriented within the political arena “what for”.

In other words, what these association are and why were they created. Which association represents who and how do they use their social resources, cultural, political and religious capitals in these networks and associations to make a difference back home. What extent does these networks and associations contribute to maintaining links and close ties between Ghanaians abroad and those back-home in Ghana. Why do they need to maintain these ties with homeland? Is it for political, economic and developmental reason or it is for an ulterior motive? I will further discuss how Ghanaian migrants, under the auspices of these associations and networks are constructing a new life and identity abroad in line

with a model that is imported from home (Cf, Vernooji 2004; Nieswand 2003). The focus will be on Ghanaian networks and associations in London.

Morales and Jorba (2010) provides two postulates for defining migrants' associations. Firstly, they consider associations to be "formally organized named group and most of whose members – whether persons or organizations are not financially recompensed for their participation". This definition, therefore, allows us to distinguish associations from other social and political institutions such as family networks and groups of friends or organizations such as "third sectors" and "civil societies" (Morales and Jorba 2010:274) Secondly, they define migrants' associations as organizations when at least nearly half of its members or half of its board members i.e., leadership were of migrant origin either foreign born or having one of their parents foreign born. This definition is to include first and second generations. This second definition of migrants' association aptly corresponds to the criteria and profiles of Ghanaian diaspora associations in London.

These associations represent important links between the diaspora and their homeland. They also serve as vehicles for social-service provision in the places from which these associations originate. In addition, they give the Ghanaian diaspora access to information they would otherwise not be privy to, and allow them to form opinions, priorities and goals for their own individual and collective development activities⁸⁶⁷.

Ghanaians abroad often belong to a host of different social groups, clubs, networks and associations which may either have a more formal character with a constitution stipulating rules and regulations binding all members of such associations or operate as an informal group bringing together Ghanaians with common interests (Owusu 2000). Irrespective of the form in which they are organized, these networks typically involve Ghanaians who share a common interest by coming from the same traditional area, town or village, belong to the same tribal/ethnic group, alumni associations are members of the same religious denomination, belong to the same club (women's association, sporting club etc.) or are members of the same political party. There are also national associations that bring together people of Ghanaian descent their relatives and friends. Some members of these associations are also members of other associations such as Ghanaian political party branches in London and professional associations. These members are often the educated

⁸⁶⁷ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Diaspora and migration policy and institutional frameworks Ghana country report.p.9

professionals among the Ghanaian community. It therefore means that they bring some form of socio-political capital to their engagement in these associations.

It is a fact supported many studies that migrants do not simply “leave”, instead they maintained ties both with families and communities left behind⁸⁶⁸. The concept of transnationalism has been coined to refer to this intense traffic of communication, information and resources across places of origin and destination⁸⁶⁹. The research literature has also established that the immigrants most likely to take part in these organisation and activities are not recent arrivals, but those better established and with more solid economic position in the host country⁸⁷⁰.

Better established first-generation immigrants create organisations of the most varied kinds, from hometown associations to civic associations and branches of home country political parties⁸⁷¹. Portes (2013) demonstrate this view with a study on Colombian and Mexican migrants in the US in which the study confirms this idea that, older established and professionals among these communities are those who are members of hometown associations and professional associations too. Migrants who perform manual work and have become financially secured are also likely to take part in such associations, reversing in part, the negative consequences of their departure⁸⁷².

Transnational organisations engage in a variety of philanthropic activities in their home localities and regions. Their activities have been referred to as a form of “globalisation from above”⁸⁷³. Remittances to families, philanthropic contributions to towns, and public works planned and funded by transnational organisations are illustrative of the forms in which globalisation from below takes place⁸⁷⁴. The mass of their pooled contributions

⁸⁶⁸ Eckstein, S.E. and Najam, A. eds., 2013. *How immigrants impact their homelands*. Duke University Press. p.36

⁸⁶⁹ Landolt, P., 2001. Salvadoran economic transnationalism: Embedded strategies for household maintenance, immigrant incorporation, and entrepreneurial expansion. *Global Networks*, 1(3), pp.217-242.

⁸⁷⁰ Guarnizo, L.E., Portes, A. and Haller, W., 2003. Assimilation and transnationalism: determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants. *American journal of sociology*, 108(6), pp.1211-1248.

⁸⁷¹ Portes, A., 2009. Migration and development: reconciling opposite views. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(1), p.10.


⁸⁷² Portes, A., 2009. Art.Cit.p.15

⁸⁷³ Portes, A. and DeWind, J., 2004. A cross-Atlantic dialogue: the progress of research and theory in the study of international migration. *International Migration Review*, 38(3), pp.828-851.

⁸⁷⁴ Itzigsohn, J., Cabral, C.D., Medina, E.H. and Vazquez, O., 1999. Mapping Dominican transnationalism: narrow and broad transnational practices. *Ethnic and Racial studies*, 22(2), pp.316-339.

can have significant positive effects in their hometowns, very limited ones at the regional and, particularly, at the national levels⁸⁷⁵.

Figure 0-33: Ghanaian Diaspora Associations in London and mode of political participation



Ghanaian diaspora associations range from small networks of village associations that involve individuals coming from the same settlement or traditional area to national associations whose membership is open to all migrants with Ghanaian citizenship, of Ghanaian descent or who have some family roots in Ghana, as it is illustrated in the above diagram which stipulates specific associations and the role they play within the Ghanaian community in London. For example, in London, the most common hometown associations are the tribal and ethnic groupings and associations, this includes the Ashanti and Asanteman Union, Brong-Ahafo Union, Ga Union, Fanti Union, Kwahu - Akuapem

⁸⁷⁵ Landolt, P., Autler, L. and Baires, S., 1999. From hermano lejano to hermano mayor: The dialectics of Salvadoran transnationalism. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 22(2), pp.290-315.

Union, Northern Ghanaian Union and Ewe Union. These associations are located in virtually all of the major towns in England including: Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Melton Keys, Brighton and Nottingham⁸⁷⁶. There are also several social clubs such as professional associations these include: the Ghanaian professional Women Association, Ghanaian Nurses association, Ghanaian medical association, Ghanaian Lawyers associations, Ghanaian Architects association, the Old Timers Club, the Ghana Black Stars Supporters Club and Star 100 all these are professional associations⁸⁷⁷. Another such example of a Ghanaian association in London, is the Ghana Refugee Welfare Group in UK, founded in 1983 in London, which was operated by exiles, who fled the country during Rawlings regime in the 1980s and provided advice and guidance on immigration matters and benefit rights, accommodation, education for the youth, and makes referrals for legal matters⁸⁷⁸.

National associations such as the Ghana Union which exists in countries with high numbers of Ghanaian migrants. The Ghana Union in London was established in 1979, it is an umbrella organization for 50 affiliated Ghanaian groups and associations⁸⁷⁹.

Ghana Union UK is first and foremost an association of the Ghanaian community and voluntary groups and individuals (both Ghanaian and otherwise) who have the welfare of Ghanaians in the UK in general, at heart. Membership is also open to commercial organisations that want to support Ghanaians in the UK⁸⁸⁰.

Ghana Union UK is non-ethnic, non-political and religiously neutral group with its membership being accessible to all Ghanaian associations, professional associations, religious bodies and individual Ghanaians residing in the UK⁸⁸¹. Ghana Union's mandate is to provide information and advice for Ghanaians or people of Ghanaian descent, but it also provides aid to other African communities on their rights to benefits, employment, housing, immigration, education, health and care services.

Unlike the Tanzanian associations in the UK which is organized only on national association bases without ethnic organisation in it, the Ghanaian associations as it has been demonstrated above in the UK is organised based on both ethnicity and national

⁸⁷⁶Tonah S. 2005 art.cit p.18

⁸⁷⁷ Field work data in London 2010-2018

⁸⁷⁸ Field interview with Mohammed Abdul Saaka, founding member of NPP UK branch.

⁸⁷⁹ The birth of Ghana Union UK: <http://www.ghanaunion.org.uk/about-us/4594384566>

⁸⁸⁰ Ghana Union UK: <http://www.ghanaunion.org.uk/about-us/4594384566>

⁸⁸¹ Ghana Union UK: <http://www.ghanaunion.org.uk/about-us/4594384566>

affinity⁸⁸². Which implies that in the case of some African countries such as the Ghanaian case, both national, hometown and other forms of associations can co-exist in the diaspora as ethnically homogenous, but also nationally in terms of the activities they carry out in their quest to maintain the Ghanaian identity in the diaspora. On the website of Ghana Union UK, it states it aim as: *“Our Aim” “From its birth, Ghana Union's aims have been to relieve hardship and distress among Ghanaians and to advance the education of all in the social and cultural traditions of Ghana in order to preserve the 'Ghanaian Identity'. This is still true today and we ask for the support of the community to aid us to realise this”*⁸⁸³.

Apart from the ethnic association, welfare associations and national association mentioned above, is also faith-based associations. Some of the well-known faith-based groupings include the Ghana Catholic Mission-London, Action Chapel International London, Presbyterian Church London, Ghanaian Pentecostal church of London, Ghana Muslims associations and the numerous Ghanaian Churches that are springing up throughout Britain⁸⁸⁴. These cited faith groups maintain their distinctive independence and conduct activities that are intended for their members. Ghanaian faith groups in London are not a federated cluster of faith groups, this noted, they do carry out transnational activities with their “mother” churches in Ghana and in line with the teachings and philosophies of the main church in Ghana.

First, the aim of these faith groups in London is to foster unity and amity amongst their membership abroad, supporting each other in difficult times and strengthening the bonds amongst their membership. It is common for members of a group or an association to share occasions of joy such as births and marriages as well as stressful situations such as deaths, illnesses and accidents through visits and get-togethers⁸⁸⁵. These groups also assist their members and all other Ghanaians in their locality with immigration and accommodation issues as well as with the education of their wards. Implying that these associations provide a form of solidarity and protection for their members.

Secondly, they all aim at promoting good relations between Ghanaians abroad and the

⁸⁸² Mercer.C. Page. B and Evans. M 2008 Development and the African Diaspora: Pace and the politics of Home, Zed Books, London and New York pp. 26

⁸⁸³ Aims and objective of Ghana Union UK: <http://www.ghanaunion.org.uk/about-us/4594384566>

⁸⁸⁴ Tonah, S., 2007. Ghanaians abroad and their ties home: Cultural and religious dimensions of transnational migration. p.11

⁸⁸⁵ Mazzucato, V., 2008. The double engagement: Transnationalism and integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and the Netherlands. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 34(2), pp.199-216.

host population. Generally, relations between the Ghanaian community abroad and the host population can sometimes be strained as a result of the existing stereotypes and negative images that Ghanaians and Blacks in general face in some Western countries⁸⁸⁶. This is particularly the case in non-English speaking countries such as Eastern European countries, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, where people of ethnic minority are often treated with hostilities⁸⁸⁷. While promoting and defending the interests of their members, these associations also organize social and cultural activities that project a positive image of Ghanaians in the host country.

Thirdly, all these clubs and associations seek to strengthen their ties and links with Ghana. The most common form of maintaining links with Ghana at the associational level includes adopting deprived groups, churches and benevolent institutions at home which they regularly support through the transfer of funds, equipment and expertise. Most of the philanthropic activities of Ghanaian associations abroad are concentrated in the health and education sectors and are often sent to deprived communities, government institutions, churches and nongovernmental organizations in Ghana. These typically involve sending beds, medical equipment, medicines and training gadgets to health institutions as well as the construction or rehabilitation of classroom blocks, and the provision of learning materials and equipment to basic schools in Ghana.

Ghanaian expatriates have their own churches, welfare and ethnic associations and restaurants in the major cities of Europe and North America as well as in many African capitals, this is a platform to reinforce their ties with the home country. Social and business contacts are useful since many carry out business activities on their own account or being self-employed as well as the wage employment which provides their major income. Wherever the numbers warrant it, there are a range of social activities to remind the emigrant Ghanaians of home and raise funds for development projects. For example, London's Anglo-Ghanaian Society meets at least twice a year for social events and sometimes has speakers from the Ghanaian High Commission. Another example, the Ghana Union UK, organizes Independence Day celebrations and other activities, such as talks on investment and citizenship issues. An also entertainment events such as dance

⁸⁸⁶ Tonah, S., 2007. Art.cit. p.11

⁸⁸⁷ Tonah, S., 2007. Art.cit. p.17

and fashion shows were organized in London with Ghanaian bands based in the UK, and Accra attracted 4,000 Ghanaians in 2006⁸⁸⁸.

In addition, there are at least 18 hometown or sub-ethnic associations in London, some of which meet monthly for socializing and fund-raising. The over-representation of Southerners within the set-up of Ghanaian associations is evident in that there is only one Union of Northern Ghanaians and a Brong Ahafo regional association, whereas one coastal town of only 6,000 people has an association in London⁸⁸⁹. Major ethnic groups have chiefs and other officials in major cities. They have thrones, robes and paraphernalia as at home, though they are elected by the emigrant community for a fixed term rather than by 'king-makers' as it is the case in Ghana. When the Asantehene visits London, he is well cared for by the Asante chief in London. Major ethnic festivals and funerals are also celebrated abroad. A Ghanaian may fly home for his mother's funeral, but he will hold another when he gets back to London⁸⁹⁰. For those who cannot go home, videos are made and shown at the funeral celebration in London to their families. The ethnic association pays funeral expenses and collects a percentage of the 'contributions' made by participants. All these activities help to keep the ties of second-generation children of Ghanaian immigrants to 'home' and initiate host-country spouses into Ghanaian culture through the activities of the aforementioned hometown associations⁸⁹¹. Welfare services are also important as leaders of these hometown associations are active in immigrant problems and race relations issues concerning Ghanaians in London⁸⁹².

The following examples are merely indicative of the variety of groups and interests involved and available for Ghanaian residents in London. The Ghanaian High Commission occasionally holds events in London to raise funds for schools and clinics. In March 2003 for example the High Commission in London set up the 'Five Pounds No Balance' initiative, it was an incentive which obliged elite members of such association to raise funds for the purposes of purchasing basic equipment for the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Fire Service and government institution which needed extra help for

⁸⁸⁸ Tonah, S., 2007. Art.cit. p.17

⁸⁸⁹ Tonah, S. 2007. Art.cit p.17

⁸⁹⁰ Fieldwork interview with Regina Sintim, London, December 2012

⁸⁹¹ Mazzucato, V. and Kabki, M., 2009. Small is beautiful: The micro-politics of transnational relationships between Ghanaian hometown associations and communities back home. *Global networks*, 9(2), p10

⁸⁹² Lyon, F., 2006. Managing co-operation: Trust and power in Ghanaian associations. *Organization Studies*, 27(1), p31

funding some basic equipment⁸⁹³. In total, Ghanaian individuals and communities in the UK and Ireland donated more than £27,000, the main community donors being the Ashanti New Town Club of the UK and Ireland, the Ghana Union of Manchester, the Association of Ghanaians in Middlesbrough, the Kwahuman Association (UK), and the Ghana Union in Chichester⁸⁹⁴.

This list in microcosm hints at the diversity and character of Ghanaian diaspora organizations in the UK, based on the hometown, home district or ethnic group. Other examples of initiatives with social development objectives include the following: people originating in Kwamang in the Sekyere West District based in the UK have presented building materials towards the completion of a medical laboratory block for the Kwamang Health Centre in Ghana; the Wives of Ghanaian Diplomats Association in London (WOGDA) has raised more than £7,000 for the purchase of mammographic x-ray equipment for the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra Ghana's biggest teaching hospital, a private donation was made by the Akim Swedru diaspora for various items for the visually-impaired in Birim South District; the Ghanaian Nurses Association, London donated to the 'Stadium Tragedy Fund' following many deaths at a football match at the national stadium in 2001⁸⁹⁵.

Moral influence is exerted by the clergy of Ghanaian Pentecostal and charismatic churches who urge Ghanaians in the UK to extend their influence in the form of social remittances over their relatives back home, especially among the youth to help curb the spread of HIV AIDS virus back home⁸⁹⁶. This is how social remittances of diasporans come into play, by using their influence and exposure to transnationally influence family back home and not just through financial remittance. Another interesting initiative in the health sector is the MET Care Sankofa health insurance plan (SHIP). Developed by Ghana-based financial institutions Metropolitan Insurance Company Ghana Limited and Tristar Financial Services, the scheme is operated in the UK by Gold care UK Limited⁸⁹⁷. Subscribers in the UK can ensure a dependent resident in Ghana for a monthly

⁸⁹³ Peil. M. 1995, art.cit. pp. 350

⁸⁹⁴ Peil.M. 1995, art.cit. pp. 352

⁸⁹⁵ Peil.M. 1995, art.cit. p. 352

⁸⁹⁶ Mensah, K., Mackintosh, M. and Henry, L., 2005. The 'skills drain' of health professionals from the developing world: a framework for policy formulation p.15

⁸⁹⁷ Mazzucato, V. and Kabki, M., 2009. Small is beautiful: The micro-politics of transnational relationships between Ghanaian hometown associations and communities back home. *Global networks*, 9(2), pp.227-251.

premium of £15, while the underwriters agree to meet claims up to a maximum of 10,000 cedis (£606 at current rates) for outpatient services and 25,000 cedis (£1516) for admission to any private or public health institution in Ghana⁸⁹⁸.

Most of these initiatives mentioned above are focused in the south of Ghana, rather than the poorer northern part of the country. A small-scale exception was the ‘Ghana Day’ which took place in St. Mary’s RC Primary School in Clapham, London⁸⁹⁹. The purpose was to raise funds and awareness for Afrikids, a UK charity working with abandoned and vulnerable children in Northern Ghana⁹⁰⁰. Business promotion is high on the Ghanaian diaspora agenda as well, initiatives such as various ‘Ghana Expos’ since 2003 is an exhibition fair in London facilitating Ghanaians in the Diaspora to connect with businesses and services in Ghana⁹⁰¹. The programme took place in London to facilitate links between Ghanaians in the UK and businesses in Ghana (Van Hear et al. 2004). This four-day event was lauded for promoting partnerships in trade and investment, but no evaluation on long-term impacts is available⁹⁰². Further similar events have been held in the US as well. The Non-Resident Ghanaians Association, UK and Ireland aims to establish an interest-bearing Non-resident Ghanaian Fund for investment among Ghanaians abroad⁹⁰³. The Ghana High Commission in the UK, in partnership with broadly selected Ghanaian Professionals Associations and groups in the UK, officially launched the Ghanaian Professional Skills Database on 17 February 2012 at the High Commission in Belgrave Square in London⁹⁰⁴. It has been charged with creating a database of the large number of Ghanaian professionals residing in the UK⁹⁰⁵. The database aims at offering secured access to employers and recruiters from both government and private agencies to short-list prospective registered candidates for employment and projects in Ghana⁹⁰⁶.

The activities and initiatives of these hometown associations and clubs indicates the strong link that exist between the diaspora and homeland by undertaking projects in the

⁸⁹⁸See Ghanaian diaspora: www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/

⁸⁹⁹ Peil.M. 1995, art.cit. p. 352

⁹⁰⁰Peil. M. 1995, art.cit. p. 353

⁹⁰¹ See Ghana Expo website: www.ghanaxpo2003.com

⁹⁰² Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9

⁹⁰³ Peil.M. 1995, art.cit. p. 353

⁹⁰⁴ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9

⁹⁰⁵ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9

⁹⁰⁶ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9

diaspora to promote Ghana abroad and vice versa. The Ghanaian authorities tend to capitalize on such initiatives in the diaspora for developmental projects in Ghana, such move by the government proves the important role attributed to the diaspora by the government.

Most of the cited examples of Ghanaian diaspora hometown associations in London are located in areas with high concentration of Ghanaian migrants, areas such as: Seven Sisters, Edmonton, Tottenham, Broadwater Farm in North London, Dalton in East London and finally Peckham in South East London. National associations such as the Ghana Union and professional associations are located nationwide in the UK. The socio-professional status of Ghanaians in London is not linked to their areas of residence, a Ghanaian investment banker for example can be found living in one of the areas mentioned above, or a Ghanaian doctor could be found living in West London, their localisation in London is linked to the affordability of accommodation and housing in London and their socio-professional background. Also, regardless of their location they participate in one way or the other in some of these associations and clubs' activities in London.

The examined activities of the associations and clubs above, all appear to have philanthropic approach, and this approach also takes an indirect and unconventional form of political participation. Chief among them is the example of diasporans in London contributing £5 for the purchasing of equipment intended for the Ghana Police Service and the Fire Service. This act can therefore be equated to an indirect form of political engagement. Since the provision of such materials rests within the realm and responsibility of the government and not diasporans.

Another example to illustrate diasporan indirect political engagement via philanthropic approach, is the healthcare insurance scheme being run in London, by a Ghanaian diaspora company, again this act can qualify as an indirect mode of transnational civic and political engagement. To further analyse these forms of direct and indirect forms of political participation by Ghanaian diasporan groups.

The following chapter will briefly analyse the indirect political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora through the prisms of professional associations, to ascertain how they contribute to national development both politically and economically through such

activities.

1.1.4 Ghanaian Professionals and professional associations: centre for developmental engagement towards homeland

Many Ghanaian professionals and students who came to study and trained as healthcare professionals and lawyers among other specialised field remained after their studies. A study of twelve months of 'Letters to the Editor' in the weekly West Africa found that two-fifths of the letters from Africans came from emigrant Ghanaians living in 22 countries among such is the UK, who were students sent abroad to study⁹⁰⁷. This therefore confirms the idea that the UK has long been the centre for professionalisation of Ghanaians via the presence of elite Ghanaian students and therefore this trend dates as far back as the colonial era as demonstrated with weekly 'Letters to the editor's'.

Rado (1986) estimated that between half and two-thirds of Ghana's experienced, top-level professional manpower' went abroad from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s. Between 1975 and 1981, Ghana lost about 14,000 qualified teachers, including nearly 3,000 university graduates, and the exodus was expected to continue⁹⁰⁸. In most Francophone West-African countries such as La Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Burkina Faso benefited from the elite migration of Ghanaian professionals particularly Ghanaian English language teachers in schools and Ghanaian English language lectures in universities in Francophone West-African countries⁹⁰⁹. The Gambia equally benefited from highly educated Ghanaian judges and Lawyers who migrated to the country during the years of political and economic uncertainty of the 1970s and 1980s in Ghana⁹¹⁰. Many Nigerian secondary schools were largely staffed by Ghanaian teachers during that period⁹¹¹. Some 60 per cent of Ghanaian doctors trained in the early 1980s are now

⁹⁰⁷Peil.M. 1995, art.cit. p. 354

⁹⁰⁸E. Rado, 1986 'Notes toward a political economy of Ghana today,' African Affairs 85, 341, pp. 569.

⁹⁰⁹ Anarfi, J., Awusabo-Asare, K. & Nsowah-Nuamah, N. 2000. 'Push and Pull Factors of International Migration. Country Report: Ghana'. *Eurostat Working Papers* 2000/E (10). p.16

⁹¹⁰ Anarfi, J., Awusabo-Asare, K. & Nsowah-Nuamah, N. 2000.art.cit...p.17

⁹¹¹ E. Rado, 1986, art.cit. p.570

working abroad⁹¹². Well-qualified Ghanaians are also working with international institutions such as the: ECA, ADB, FAO, ILO, UN, UNCTAD, WHO, and other international organizations and NGOs⁹¹³.

Since the 1970 up until the early 2000s Ghana has lost most of its highly skilled migrants to Western countries, especially medical professionals as noted earlier on. The inception of Ghanaian professional associations emerged from the 1990s in most Western countries with a high presence of Ghanaian professionals in cities, such as London, Geneva, Brussels, New York, Washington and to a lesser extent Paris where headquarters of international institution are found. The UK in particular being a country that benefited from the emigration of Ghanaian professionals for examples, saw the inception of the Ghanaian medical and nurses association formed in 1990 in London, as one of the most active professional association with a mandate of contributing to the country's development transnationally⁹¹⁴. Ghanaian professional associations in the UK generally play an important role in developmental causes in Ghana. Ghanaian professional association namely Star 100 association in London, was established in 2004 with the aim of bringing together Ghanaians professionals from various sectors in the UK to network and organize philanthropic events in London for the benefit of Ghana⁹¹⁵. Their activities include welfare projects within the healthcare sector in terms of transfer of knowledge and know-how of expertise from the diaspora and therefore lend their expertise to Ghana through short visits in order to capacity build Ghanaian hospitals which are often in need of specialist healthcare professionals, such as cardiologist, neurologist, surgeons and public health specialist on preventative medicine within the medical corps⁹¹⁶. Other professional associations such as Ghana Lawyers associations and Ghanaian architects' associations in the UK are equally industry specific in terms of their transnational contribution to Ghana⁹¹⁷.

Black et al notes that since 2004, the percentage of returnees' professionals to Ghana is

⁹¹²Stop Exodus of Teachers', West Africa, No. 3396 (1982), pp. 2319-20, in Marguerite Peil's Ghanaians abroad

⁹¹³Costly migration', West Africa, No. 3969 (1993), p. 1863, citing a UNDP Report, in Marguerite Peil's work on Ghanaians Abroad

⁹¹⁴ Fieldwork interview with Tina, June 2011 London,

⁹¹⁵ Fieldwork interview in London 28th December 2012 with Richard Tandoh,

⁹¹⁶ Krause, K., 2008. Transnational therapy networks among Ghanaians in London. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(2), p.248

⁹¹⁷ Mensah, K., Mackintosh, M. and Henry, L., 2005. Art.cit p. 15

on the increase⁹¹⁸. These returnee professionals go back home to undertake short- or long-term capacity building assignment in some rural areas where specialist doctors are for example in need of and to equally train local healthcare professionals with their experiences acquired from abroad⁹¹⁹. By utilizing their expertise acquired abroad to aid in the development of Ghana can be qualified as transfer of knowledge through brain gain. This notion of transfer of knowledge from the returnee diaspora Ghanaians will be analysed later in a chapter dedicated to the role of returnee diaspora contribute in Ghana's national development. The Ghana medical association in London for example, sends medical equipment to hospitals in rural areas in Ghana yearly. For example, during my fieldwork interview in London in 2013, a member of the Ghanaian medical association in London stated that: *"the associations' commitment to helping the development of some sectors of the medical field is our own way of giving back to our own society, by conducting such activities"*⁹²⁰. Most of these professionals were trained at the expense of the Ghanaian State before some left for further training abroad and never returned. Contributing through these transnational channels with their professional experiences is an effort to give back to Ghana, the opportunities the country has offered them through their initial training in medicine⁹²¹.

One such initiative that expert Ghanaians in the diaspora via Ghanaian professional associations contribute to the national development of Ghana was through IOM's Migration for Development in Africa, (MIDA) project. MIDA Ghana was launched in 2008, the project aimed at targeting health sector professionals to entice them to contribute to the national development of their home country. The project's objective was also to aid in curbing the syndrome of brain drain within the health sector⁹²². The project offered opportunities for health professionals in Europe who are of African descent to temporarily return to countries such as Ghana to undertake assignments within healthcare institutions, including training schools. The IOM and the Ministry of Health (MOH) collaborated to invite healthcare professionals in the diaspora back home to work on a

⁹¹⁸ Black, R., King, R., Litchfield, J., Ammassari, S. and Tiemoko, R., 2003. Transnational migration, return and development in West Africa. Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research p.10.

⁹¹⁹ Black, R., King, R., Litchfield, J., Ammassari, S. and Tiemoko, R., 2003. Art.cit p.2.

⁹²⁰ Fieldwork interview London, April 2013

⁹²¹IOM Migration for development in Africa, MIDA project: www.iom.int

⁹²² Fieldwork, IOM diaspora engagement project and colloquium 20-25 August 2012 Accra, Daniel Sam's presentation on Ghana MIDA project.

temporary basis⁹²³. The Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Ghana Health Project facilitated the return of over 150 health professionals to work temporarily in Ghana⁹²⁴.

As a result of the positive return from such reverse brain drain projects aimed at Ghanaian professionals abroad such as the example IOM's MIDA project in Ghana, the Ghanaian government is undertaking vigorous efforts to maximize the contributions of expatriate Ghanaian professionals for national development programs. An example of such government initiative was in January 2001 when an 11-member task force was set up by the Ghana High Commission in London to help transfer requisite skills and resources to help in the healing of the ailing Ghanaian economy⁹²⁵. The immediate objective was to encourage expatriate Ghanaian professionals to take jobs in Ghana⁹²⁶. Equally, in 2018 the current government set-up a steering committee at the office of the president to initiate a program to attract and facilitate the return of highly qualified Ghanaians from the diaspora⁹²⁷. The Homecoming Steering Committee of the United Kingdom and Ireland is working with the Ghanaian government to facilitate the former's contribution to Ghana's development⁹²⁸. As a result, the Ghanaian government has taken "steps to put in place a viable, responsible legal and regulatory framework" to boost the committee's efforts⁹²⁹. Similarly, the Ghana Embassy in Washington, D.C., earmarked June 29, 2002, as the day to launch the Ghana Skills Bank, "an inventory that will stock in a computer-based system the status, professional qualifications and experiences of Ghanaians living particularly in the United States. It is geared towards creating a bigger space for Ghana's development agenda. It is sought to measure Ghana's human resource strength and weakness which the "skills bank" of the diaspora could be tapped wherever necessary for home use. The same initiative of "skills bank" has been initiated in various countries with large concentrations

⁹²³ Fieldwork data from my work with IOM Ghana in 2012

⁹²⁴ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9

⁹²⁵ Fieldwork observation and discussions with Regina Sintim PA to the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK and Ireland on Ghana government's effort of tapping into the expertise of Ghanaian professionals in London. 20th December 2012 in London

⁹²⁶ Fieldwork, IOM diaspora engagement project and colloquium 20-25 August 2012 Accra, Daniel Sam's presentation on Ghana MIDA project.

⁹²⁷ Schramm, K., 2009. Negotiating race: blackness and whiteness in the context of homecoming to Ghana. *African Diaspora*, 2(1), p15

⁹²⁸ Kleist, N., 2013. Flexible politics of belonging: diaspora mobilisation in Ghana. *African Studies*, 72(2), p.299

⁹²⁹ Peil, M. 1995. art.cit. pp.356

of Ghanaian immigrants including the UK”⁹³⁰.

Another such example of transnational transfer of skills of Ghanaian professionals in the diaspora towards homeland is role of the Ghanaian diaspora professionals in the UK working within the field of academia who tend to have collaborative connections with home based Ghanaian researchers. Example of three professionals among the discussant who were present at the Ghanaian diaspora colloquium in 2012 mentioned that they regularly collaborated in research and joint academic papers whereby, colleagues in Ghana contribute with their updated knowledge of the terrain such as in agriculture, education and health sectors⁹³¹. Diaspora scholars aid in bringing innovative ideas from their respective work experiences from abroad. For example, resident Ghanaian scholars put together the logistics and research assistance; non-resident scholars provide data on theoretical perspectives (extant literature) and funding and they look for journals to publish collaborative research findings⁹³².

A Ghanaian historian discussed the symbiotic connections during the colloquium on joint working papers between Ghanaian diaspora scholars and homebased scholars, stressing that information received from expatriate Ghanaian academic community enabled resident Ghanaian scholars to build meaningful academic relationships with the larger non- Ghanaian intellectual community⁹³³. From the historian's standpoint, the expatriate Ghanaian academic community serves as an intellectual and epistemological bridge that links resident Ghanaian scholars with non- Ghanaian scholars worldwide ⁹³⁴. There were other examples to illustrate Ghanaian diaspora long distance engagement, whereby expatriate Ghanaian professors have established study-abroad programs to link Ghanaian tertiary institutions with those overseas. Such programs send large numbers of foreign students to Ghana and create opportunities for Ghanaian students to study abroad ⁹³⁵. More importantly, study-abroad programs also facilitate cross-fertilization of pedagogies and cross-cultural insights that enrich host institutions, exchange students, and their

⁹³⁰Fieldwork, IOM diaspora engagement project and colloquium 20-25 August 2012 Accra, Daniel Sam’s presentation on Ghana MIDA project.

⁹³¹ Fieldwork, Accra 2012 IOM Ghana, Ghanaian diaspora Colloquium August 2012

⁹³² Peil. M. 1995. art.cit. pp.357

⁹³³ Field work: IOM diaspora engagement project colloquium 20-25 August 2012

⁹³⁴ Teferra, D., 2010. Deploying Africa’s intellectual diaspora: Potentials, challenges and strategies. *Higher Education and Globalization*, p.99

⁹³⁵ Tettey, W.J., 2016. Regenerating scholarly capacity through diaspora engagement: the case of a Ghana diaspora knowledge network. In *Diasporas, Development and Governance* (pp. 171-186). Springer, Cham.p.180

campuses and the home countries. These collaborative work between home-based professionals and diasporans or expatriates which is often identified as one of the symbiotic net gains from brain drain.

Walker demonstrates in his work on the effect of socialization in professional association and its impact on indirect form of political mobilization and that as professional associations have grown, so too is their political power⁹³⁶. Walker, however, hypothesises and concludes that: *Professional association membership will have a direct effect on participation, due to the intentional mobilization on the part of such organisations*⁹³⁷. For Hart (2004) professional and business-related associations have become known for their capacity to mobilise their memberships on issues of political concern. As organisations that have many elite memberships, professional associations must work hard to appear to represent a broad and diverse constituency and therefore depends heavily on their membership to contact policy makers directly (Berry, 1997: 134).

To highlight this example of the Ghanaian diaspora professionals utilizing their expertise as an indirect mode of political participation was highlighted during the Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summits in 2001 and 2017. Where in 2001 President Kufuor affirmed that the expatriate Ghanaian professionals made a difference in the lives of their families and friends via the remittances they send. He explained: *“On the national level, remittances from professionals and unskilled Ghanaian expatriates forms a crucial component of our revenue, and on the individual level, there are many Ghanaian homes today that rely to some extent for their upkeep on these remittances. For many, this makes the difference between a reasonable standard of living and the life of deprivation”*⁹³⁸. Referring to the bleak period of the 1980s, he declared that in particular, Ghanaian expatriates *“money... made the difference between the country going down completely and keeping afloat”*⁹³⁹. *Currently, you contribute a third of the capital inflow into the country. I salute your efforts and your hard work, and I extend a warm invitation to you to come home and let us rebuild our country with your professional expertise.*⁹⁴⁰.

President Kufuor’s statement also indicates that regular remittances to family and friends

⁹³⁶ Walker, E.T., 2008, art.cit. p. 122.

⁹³⁷ Walker, E.T., 2008, art.cit. p. 122.

⁹³⁸ Kufuor, J.A. 2001. Inaugural Speech, 2001 www.AllAfrica.com

⁹³⁹ Kufuor, J.A. 2001. Inaugural Speech, 2001 www.AllAfrica.com

⁹⁴⁰ President Kufuor inaugural Speech 2001: <https://allafrica.com/stories/200101070055.html>

serve as the nerve centre of daily survival and hence mitigate the harsh economic realities of life in today's Ghana. President Akuffo-Addo made a similar remark on the role skilled and unskilled Ghanaian expatriates contributes to the country's development during the 2017 Ghana diaspora Home Coming summit: *I recognise the role that some of you contribute to the national development of Ghana through your professional expertise to serve Ghana in philanthropic projects while in the diaspora. I am however, urging you to return home to aid us in accelerating Ghana's development with your specific professional experiences that the country is in deficit of*⁹⁴¹. President Akuffo-Addo's statement equally illustrates the importance that the government of Ghana places on the Ghanaian diaspora expertise and resources of Ghanaian professionals towards the country's development.

These cited examples demonstrate that the notion of long-distance nationalism is linked to how Ghanaian professionals in the diaspora are viewed as developmental agents by the government in Ghana through using their professional capital in various fields such as in academia to make a difference in collaborative work with their colleagues back in Ghana. Other studies on remittance rate from Ghanaians in the diaspora observed that remittance rate was higher among the professional category in the diaspora, however the frequencies of their remittance were lower than non-professional diasporas⁹⁴². In other words, non-professional diaspora remitted frequently towards homeland with lesser amount of money compare to professionals who remitted less frequently but of higher amount⁹⁴³.

In theory the activities and engagement of the professional Ghanaian diaspora association appears as apolitical, however indirectly such action does take a political stand, since the professional diasporic community are taking over the responsibility of the state by carrying out welfare and philanthropic activities with the aim of capacity-building of some state agencies in Ghana. As such, the government of Ghana recognizes the role that professional diasporans are contributing to developmental initiatives in Ghana, this recognition on the part of the state vis-à-vis the activities of professional associations in the diaspora confirms that such transnational philanthropic activities are not apolitical.

The activities of the professional association of Ghanaians in London towards homeland

⁹⁴¹ Fieldwork July 2017, Accra Ghana, President Akuffo Addo speech during the Ghana Diaspora Home Coming Summit 5-8 July 2017

⁹⁴² Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Asiedu, E., 2009, November. Remittances and poverty in Ghana. In *4th African Economic Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*.

⁹⁴³ Higazi, A., 2005. Ghana Country Study. Informal Remittance Systems in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries p.2.

can be viewed as a form of long-distance nationalism on the basis of their blood ties between diasporans and their compatriots back home. This blood link propels them to engage with homeland via philanthropic initiatives. As stated previously in the introduction of this thesis with reference to Glick-Schiller's notion of long-distance nationalism via the blood ties between diasporans and their homeland. Glick-Schiller uses the Haitian diaspora example in the US to illustrate nationalism via blood linkages to homeland as being sufficient in making diasporans undertake transnational projects towards homeland for the purposes of contributing to national development ⁹⁴⁴. In this sense, the Ghanaian diaspora professional association's engagement towards homeland is positive in the context of Glick-Schiller's narrative of blood ties between diasporans and homeland, as opposed to Anderson's assertion of diaspora transnational engagement towards homeland being viewed as negative and to a large extent distractive in that being far away from homeland protects and shields diasporas from political and economic uncertainty. Therefore, it is easy for diasporans to use this protection from a distance to organise political mayhem which could be disguised as philanthropic activities towards homeland⁹⁴⁵. This analysis the activities of the Ghanaian diaspora professional association in London being a bridge between diaspora and homeland by utilizing their professional experience and expertise to make a difference both on human resources level and political. These analysis paves way for the following sub-chapter on the role that Ghanaian Alumni associations in London play in terms of developmental activities vis-à-vis homeland and how such activities can be classified as a direct or an indirect form of transnational political participation.

1.1.5 Alumni organisation in the diaspora: platform for political mobilisation

“Classmate and schoolmate networks, as a basis for subsequent mutual reciprocities, have a long history in Ghana and can be traced partly to the esteem given to success in education, as well as the system of education itself. Students on average spend close to five of their formative years in boarding school, away from home and family, forging

⁹⁴⁴ Schiller, N.G., Ember, M., Ember, C.R. and Skoggard, I., 2005. Long-Distance Nationalism T. *Diaspora*, 1(1), p.5

⁹⁴⁵ Anderson, B., 2006. Imagined communities. *Different Dispatches: Journalism in American Modernist Prose*, 49.

strong bonds of friendships with class and schoolmates that often last a lifetime. Alumni ties in this environment are prevalent » Hanson (2005: 11)

Alumni network groups or associations has long been essential in social networking and social capital accumulation in Ghana, since the colonial era and especially in the aftermath of independence in forming of an elite group, based on shared values and social capital. A study conducted by Henson (2005) on the role of alumni networks in Ghana as the establishment of social mobility via alumni fraternity states:

More than any of the other social cleavages, alumni networks today are pivotal to individual social mobility. Old boy (girl) networks by their very nature tend to be very expansive, both in terms of density (strength of connection between contacts) and size (number of contacts within a network), with members drawing on both the horizontal (within-year group members) and vertical (between-year groups) linkages. As a result, everyone is a key component of a support structure that ultimately reflects the individual's social space of personal contacts established, nurtured, and sustained over several years⁹⁴⁶.

For many the camaraderie of boarding school is what ensures trust and loyalty. The experience of boarding school and subsequent reunions often yearly although some meet monthly forges the bonds that feed the networks that stand individual members in good stead. The resulting identities, shared experiences, beliefs, and values are what engender social capital and make alumni ties such a powerful social cleavage and an invaluable web of related socioeconomic support⁹⁴⁷.

To illustrate the essential nature of network ties that alumni associations provides for former school mates the following vignettes of three respondents from the aforementioned study mirrors and attest to the expansive nature and supportiveness of alumni ties in Ghana:

“After the Nigerians sacked us in 1983, I came home with skills but knew no one and had no money since I had been gone for 10 years.... One day I run into an old classmate and things changed. She was the wife of the then District Chief Executive. After listening to

⁹⁴⁶ Hanson, K.T., 2005. Landscapes of survival and escape: social networking and urban livelihoods in Ghana. *Environment and Planning A*, 37(7), p.12

⁹⁴⁷ Hanson, K.T., 2005. Art.cit. p.12

my situation, she introduced me to her husband who immediately got me a stall in town and led me to the manager of the bank for a loan to set up my [hairdressing] business. This lady also told all her friends about me... so overnight I had clients, apprentices and a thriving business. Knowing people is crucial.... Think of it, where would I be without this old girl [friend] of mine from our days as students⁹⁴⁸".

Mr Sampson-Atta, a 46-year-old auto mechanic and graduate of Takoradi Polytechnic, now running his own garage, also had this to say: "Everything I have done here in this garage I owe to my supportive schoolmates, particularly those I met in the Polytechnic. I went to a 'bush' secondary school so that does not help much... however going to Poly has been a blessing. There are 37 of us ex-Poly grads working in Koforidua. We meet formally every other month but informally on a daily basis. Four work with Electricity Corporation, three with Water and Sewerage, one is the Bank Manager at Barclays, one is a teacher and others are in the civil service. To cut a long story short, they have helped me with loans, contacts, customers, and even getting electricity to the workshop... you name it. We are all one, no tribalism such as being Asante, Fante, or Ewe and no politics among all old Poly grads! I can always count on these people and they can also rely on me. As they say 'The left hand washes the right, and the right the left'⁹⁴⁹."

Maame Afua, a 50-year-old retired educationist, now operating her own crèche and a convenience store was very crisp yet poignant about alumni ties: "Education is everything! If you don't have a classmate or schoolmate then you are 'nobody'. People will even laugh at you. Life in general and Ghana in particular is based on whom you know. Look at Rawlings' government, they are not all Ewes, they are all old Achimotans (Achimota Secondary School) ... former mates of Rawlings and his wife. It's the same everywhere... people tend to associate with people they know and can trust. It's that plain and simple. School ties are also varied men, women, people from different ethnic groups and different socioeconomic backgrounds. Because of this, it presents more opportunities than say a small social or ethnic group⁹⁵⁰."

The above examples demonstrate the important role alumni network groups plays in helping each other in Ghana. This form of old school mates' clubs of network is echoed

⁹⁴⁸ Hanson, K.T., 2005.art.cit p.10

⁹⁴⁹ Hanson, K.T., 2005.art.cit p.10

⁹⁵⁰ Hanson, K.T., 2005.art.cit p.10

among members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and their memberships within alumni networks. As it has been observed above with alumni groups in Ghana, almost all Ghanaian universities and secondary schools have alumni associations in Britain particularly in London. Ghanaian alumni association, such as: the prestigious Achimota school association in Britain, Wesley Girls Secondary School Association of Britain, Aburi Girls Secondary School Association, Prempeh College Associations in Britain, Accra Academy Secondary School Association, Accra Girls Secondary School Association, Tamale Secondary School association, University of Ghana Association, Kwame Nkrumah University of Sciences and Technology Association, University of Cape Coast Association, and the Ghana-Cuba students associations.

They play an important role in bringing together former mates from the same schools and organise at least yearly reunions to raise funds in aid of development of their former school and universities. Ghanaian alumni associations just as Ghanaian churches abroad, and professional associations serves more than being a migrant association. Often these associations form a fraternity in supporting the development of their former school or University, by organizing regular fund-raising events, which enables them to send equipment for specific department of their former university⁹⁵¹. In some cases, they build extra blocks for their former school dormitory, or provide equipment for laboratory and textbooks for secondary schools⁹⁵². They tend to perform these transnational developmental tasks in the hope of giving back to their alma mater institutions, through these philanthropic activities. In doing so, is an act of recognition for what the institution has contributed to their personal development and educational trajectories. An example of such is the Prempeh college alumnus (Ampofo) group in UK organizing fund raising dinner dance to build a chemistry block at the college in 2014:

“Alumni of Prempeh College have launched their Global Fundraising Initiative in London on Saturday May 24, at the Cavendish Banqueting Hall, Edgware Rd in North London, to raise awareness and funds to support the refurbishment of the school’s chemistry Laboratory. The Black-Tie event which was attended by a representative of the Ghana’s High Commission in the UK, among other dignitaries was highly patronized by

⁹⁵¹ Fieldwork interview in London January 2011 with Dr, John Koramoa, a paediatrician and a former student of Prempeh collage and a member of the Ghanaian Medical Association of Britain.

⁹⁵² Mazzucato, V. and Kabki, M., 2009. Small is beautiful: The micro-politics of transnational relationships between Ghanaian hometown associations and communities back home. *Global networks*, 9(2), p 7

alumni of Prempeh College and other schools such as Aburi Girls, St Louis and Opoku Ware. President of Amanfoo UK, Mr. Albert Owusu said their aim is to “raise funds throughout 2014, and all Amanfoo all over the world, are invited to make donations ⁹⁵³”.

Figure 0-34: Image 6 Alumnus Association : Prempeh Collage, Ampofo UK



Amanfoo UK raise funds to refurbish alma mater's chemistry lab, Source: Ghanaweb

These alma mater, association and networks serve as a first port of call for newly arrived Ghanaian in London, through these alumnus associations they are able to integrate by providing advice on migrant's rights, accommodation and other resources to help their fellow colleagues who have just arrived ⁹⁵⁴. During a fieldwork interview in London with Dr. Kromoa a Ghanaian medical doctor (paediatrician) in London noted on the importance of alumni fraternity helping him to settle in London when he arrived in 1975: *Upon my arrival in London in 1975, I had no family in the UK, but I had friends that I went to secondary school with in Ghana. Which is Prempeh Collage in Kumasi and friends that I studied with at the University of Ghana medical school who were already in London, this network of school mates and friends from the age of 12 was vital in*

⁹⁵³ Amanfoo UK raise funds to refurbish alma mater's chemistry lab::
<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/Amanfoo-UK-raise-funds-to-refurbish-alma-mater-s-chemistry-lab-314290>

⁹⁵⁴ Mazzucato, V. and Kabki, M., 2009. Art.cit. p 10

*accommodating me and helping me with getting acclimatise with my new environment. These old school mates became more than family to me because of the bond we shared in Ghana at boarding school and later at university. So yes, Alumni network is important both in helping each other here in London and those back in Ghana⁹⁵⁵. Another respondent Elliott, a Ghanaian student at the London School of Economics and Political Science observed in an interview in 2012: *I came to pursue a master's degree in law specifically in energy law specialising on petroleum-related litigation. My family are all in Ghana, I have a cousin who lives here, I don't know him well because we never lived together or grew up together, so we do not have much of a bond. But I have a lot of friends from the University of Ghana with whom I have strong bond with as we studied together in Ghana and share common ties who are in the UK and are studying either in London or in other cities in Britain. Here in London, my network of friends from UG (University of Ghana) really did well in helping me settle in, for example understanding how things are done here in the UK, as this was my first time of living outside of Ghana, although I have visited the UK many times on holidays, it is not the same as coming to live here. My network of friends from UG helped with finding an accommodation. Without the network of my friends here in London from Ghana, I am sure, I would have found life a lot difficult⁹⁵⁶.**

The noted examples demonstrate in some instances alumni fraternity can even be stronger than family bonds in the diaspora, as the statement in Elliott's case attests. In the case of Lord Paul Boateng who stated in an interview in 2010 on his membership in an Alumni organisation was an opportunity to meet old friends from his secondary school days in Ghana, but to also support valuable causes through philanthropy: *"I am a member of an alumni Association, The Accra Academy Boys Secondary School, we meet from time to time to philanthropically support our former school in Ghana. Aside from that, it is also an opportunity to meet and socialise with former school mates from Ghana"⁹⁵⁷.*

This mode of Ghanaian migrants' fraternity and solidarity through alumni associations resonate with activities carried out by Ghanaian churches abroad as an avenue of social solidarity and fraternity. The activities of these alumnus association in the UK just as the professional associations operate on the basis of transnational philanthropy, meaning

⁹⁵⁵ Fieldwork interview in London with Dr. Kromoa, January 2011

⁹⁵⁶ Field work interview in London with Eliotte December 2012

⁹⁵⁷ Fieldwork interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London 20th August 2010

giving back to homeland on the basis of charity activities ⁹⁵⁸. These philanthropic activities only carry a developmental agenda in theory, it indirectly denotes a political message, it implies that these activities can equally be categorized as providing some form of welfare to their former universities or schools. Which in terms of material and welfare provision, government institutions should be in charge of providing such assistance with facilities within educational institutions in Ghana. If the state is unable or struggling to provide adequate teaching materials and building blocks for universities and schools and that alumnus associations are being solicited to provide, then it indirectly equates to political engagement of some kind although such actions comes across as civic engagement ⁹⁵⁹. It is important to clarify here the distinction between civic engagement and political participation within the context the activities carried out by members of these associations. Civic engagement conventionally refers to activities by ordinary citizens that are intended to influence circumstances in society that is of relevance to others, outside the own family and circle of close friends (Adler, Goggin 2005, 241). The most comprehensive definition of political participation to date, encompassing actions or activities by ordinary citizens that in some way are directed toward influencing political outcomes in society⁹⁶⁰. In line with this, Verba and Nie used four dimensions of participation in their often-cited typology: voting; campaign activity (including membership in or work for political parties and organisations as well as donating money to such parties or groups); contacting public officials; and cooperative or communal activities (basically understood by Verba and associates as all forms of engagement that focused on issues in the local community) (Verba, Nie 1972, 56- 63).

As such, the activities of these alumni associations can therefore be translated as an unconventional form of transnational political engagement via the provision of welfare materials in educational institutions.

What might appear here as a civic engagement in these alumni associations' activities in Ghana, indeed has a political undertone as leaders and prominent members of these alumni associations are in most cases members of the Ghanaian political party branches

⁹⁵⁸ Owusu, T.Y., 2000. Art.cit p.12

⁹⁵⁹ Hanson, K.T., 2005. Landscapes of survival and escape: social networking and urban livelihoods in Ghana. *Environment and Planning A*, 37(7), p.12

⁹⁶⁰ Ekman, J. and Amnå, E., 2012. Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology. *Human affairs*, 22(3), pp.289.

in the UK. They therefore transfer such civil engagement into a political capital that they use to influence polity and public policies in Ghana via their political network within the mother party in Ghana.

In this sub-chapter, the activities of the alumni association in London demonstrates that these activities can be classified as a form of unconventional mode of transnational political engagement. In sum, alumni associations' activities can be viewed from two postulates: a) it serves as a fraternity group to help and support its member in the diaspora during periods of hardships and b) their transnational activities towards their former alma mata, as a form of acknowledgement in the role those institutions played in their professional trajectory.

To this effect, it is worth reiterating that members of these alumnus associations are also members of various Ghanaian associations in London such as: professional association, a church group and Ghanaian political party chapters in the UK, most often their membership intertwine with other associations and as such their loyalty to one specific association is also interwoven through spill-over effects from being a member one association to the other. To continue in this same disposition on Ghanaian diasporan association and identification of what can be classified as political engagement towards homeland, through such philanthropic activities. It is important to now turn to the activities of Ghanaian churches abroad and their transnational engagement towards Ghana.

1.1.6 Ghanaian faith organisations in the UK: Ghanaian churches as space for diaspora engagement

Christianity is the most dominant religion in Ghana with more than two-thirds of the population (68.8%) claiming membership of one of the Christian churches⁹⁶¹. With the populations of Moslems composing (15.9%) and adherents of traditional religion (8.5%). Catholics with a population of 1,446,223 persons (15.1%) constitute the single largest denomination in the country⁹⁶². The group of churches under the label of 'Protestants' are about 1,822, 661 persons (that is, 19.1% of the population). Churches grouped together under the umbrella of Pentecostal Charismatic churches, however, constitute the largest

⁹⁶¹ Tonah. S. 2007. art.cit. p. 14

⁹⁶² Tonah. S. 2007. art.cit. p. 39

group of churches in the country and in the diaspora⁹⁶³. The most significant development within the Ghanaian religious landscape since the 1980s is the sharp increase in the congregation of the Charismatic and Pentecostal churches. According to Gifford, the spread and growth of these Pentecostal and Charismatic churches coincided with the period of economic decline in Ghana during which most Ghanaians found it difficult to make ends meet⁹⁶⁴. These newly established churches brought some amount of hope and confidence to their congregation at a time of economic hardship (Gifford, 2004). The leadership of most of these Charismatic churches is led by strong and powerful leaders who are also the founders of these churches⁹⁶⁵. The management of these churches rests largely in the hands of these small group of charismatic pastors and founders. The membership of these Pentecostal churches is dominated by young middle-class professionals and businessmen most of whom look forward to a prosperous and successful life. This is reflected in the main strands of their church teachings that emphasise prosperity and success in life⁹⁶⁶. Their leaders are also noted for leading an opulent lifestyle and living in some of Accra's plush residential areas⁹⁶⁷. Materialism permeates all aspects of church teachings and being financially successful in life is considered a blessing of God and a goal to be attained by all members⁹⁶⁸. Their church services are participative and exhilarating involving long periods of dancing, singing, and bible study. Members of these churches have a strong bond, and this is evident in the extensive social support that they provide to each other⁹⁶⁹. Mazzucato (2008) observed that members in these churches within the transnational space are provided not only with spiritual support but also economic, social and psychological support. Charismatic and Pentecostal churches in Ghana are noted for their extensive and aggressive use of the media for advertising their churches, spreading their religious messages and proselytizing both in Ghana and abroad (Gifford 2004; Omenyo 2002; Sackey 2001).

These Ghanaian charismatic churches have been transplanted in the diaspora in their bid

⁹⁶³ Tonah, S. 2007. art.cit. p. 39

⁹⁶⁴ Gifford, P., 2004. Ghana's new Christianity: Pentecostalism in a globalizing African economy. Indiana University Press.p.20

⁹⁶⁵ Tonah, S. 2007. art.cit. p. 40

⁹⁶⁶ Mensah, J., Williams, C.J. and Aryee, E., 2013. Gender, power, and religious transnationalism among the African diaspora in Canada. *African Geographical Review*, 32(2), p.160

⁹⁶⁷ Gifford, P., 2004. Art.cit. p.20

⁹⁶⁸ Gifford, P., 2004. Art.cit. p.21

⁹⁶⁹ Mensah, J., Williams, C.J. and Aryee, E., 2013. Art.cit. p.161

to link diasporans to homeland through the church. The Pentecostal and Charismatic churches recognized the deep spiritual vacuum that exists among Ghanaian migrants abroad. Having no church structures in the destination of these migrants, the churches began to look for ways in which they could establish links with members of their congregations who had travelled abroad in search of greener pastures (Ter Haar 2005). Some of the Charismatic churches initially encouraged their members to join other churches in the communities in which they resided. It did not take long, however, for the Ghanaian Pentecostal and Charismatic churches to discover the benefits of establishing branches abroad⁹⁷⁰. The roots of these newly formed churches are to be found in the prayer groups that Ghanaian Christians in large cities abroad organized. These prayer groups were held in community centres, and in the homes of members on a regular basis, as their membership grew, they began to meet regularly⁹⁷¹. By the late 1990s, some of the Ghanaian Pentecostal and Charismatic groups had established small congregations in major European cities such as Amsterdam, Hamburg and most importantly in London⁹⁷². Some of these churches did not see themselves solely as ‘Ghanaian churches’ but wanted to expand their membership among the host country population. Tonah (2007) claims in his case study on Ghanaian churches in Germany and their transnational ties with Ghana, that Charismatic and Pentecostal churches in Ghana also realized the usefulness of being international by establishing branches abroad. As such, it became fashionable for Ghanaian Charismatic churches to rename themselves by adding the word ‘international’ to the official name of the church in Ghana⁹⁷³. Pastors from the ‘mother’ churches in Ghana were sent abroad to lead the newly established churches in an attempt to ensure continued links with the church in Ghana as well as ensuring theological purity. We have the Christian Action Faith Ministries International, the International Central Gospel Church, the Alive Chapel International, World Miracle Church International and many others⁹⁷⁴.

The inclusion of the word ‘international’ in the names of these churches was not only symbolic. It was equally to spread the message that these churches were expanding so

⁹⁷⁰ Ter Haar Gerri, (1998), *Halfway to Paradise: African Christians in Europe*, Cardiff, Cardiff Academic Press.

⁹⁷¹ Fieldwork interview in London with Dr. Kromoa January 2011

⁹⁷² Asamoah-Gyadu, J.K., 2010. 4. Mediating Spiritual Power: African Christianity, Transnationalism and The Media. In *Religion Crossing Boundaries*, Brill...p.91

⁹⁷³ Tonah. S. 2007. art.cit p. 51

⁹⁷⁴ Tonah. S. 2007. art. cit. p. 52

rapidly that they were now to be found all over major cities of the world, where Ghanaian migrants resided. Besides, the word ‘international’ also conveyed the message of being modern, and having extensive links abroad, particularly in rich industrialized countries⁹⁷⁵. The name change was also to strengthen the link with the ‘mother church’ in Ghana and indicate to their membership abroad that they were all part of one global Ghanaian family. Ghanaian Pentecostal and Charismatic churches were able to create a transnational network linking their members located across Africa, Europe and North America⁹⁷⁶. The role of the Ghanaian churches abroad is not only to provide a place of worship for migrants abroad but are engaged in social, cultural, economic and political activities that link them with Ghana. Arthur (2008:95) notes that Ghanaian churches in the United States for example serves as the first port of call for newly arrived migrants and do provide support to poor and distressed Ghanaians, it is a place of fraternity and solidarity. Arthur (2008) further observed that the place of worship for Ghanaian churches in the diaspora in large are not only places to assert one’s spiritual faith, but it also serves as the social and cultural nerve centres of the immigrant community. It is in the churches, that migrant Ghanaians share their experiences and frustrations abroad and meet people with a similar fate⁹⁷⁷. Experiences are shared about how to navigate one’s way through the excessive state and communal bureaucracy in the host country⁹⁷⁸. Ghanaian migrants may also be offered legal assistance in case of difficulties with the local authorities. In general terms, these Ghanaian churches in the diaspora also serves as the meeting place for the isolated, lonely and home-sick migrants to seek solace⁹⁷⁹.

Drawing from the experience of Ghanaian churches in the USA, the Netherlands and in Germany and the role the church plays within the Ghanaian community, corroborates with that of the role of Ghanaian churches in Britain. Choenni (2002: 24) maintains that Ghanaian religious institutions in the Netherlands have “*an effective social importance in the community*”, not only as a meeting point, but also for material and practical matters. Ter Haar (2005: 316) also concludes that “*the religious beliefs of many Ghanaian Christians equip them with the spiritual strength and social contacts necessary to survive,*

⁹⁷⁵ Tonah, S. 2007. art. cit. p. 52

⁹⁷⁶ Arthur.J. 2008. Op.cit. p.74

⁹⁷⁷Ter Haar G, 1998, art.cit. pp. 35

⁹⁷⁸ Van de Kamp, L. and Van Dijk, R., 2010. 6. Pentecostals Moving South-South: Brazilian And Ghanaian Transnationalism in Southern Africa. In *Religion Crossing Boundaries* (pp. 123-142). Brill.

⁹⁷⁹ Mensah, J., 2008. Religious transnationalism among Ghanaian immigrants in Toronto: a binary logistic regression analysis. *The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien*, 52(3), p.315.

and even to begin the long climb up the ladder of social mobility in a country that has gradually become more hostile to foreigners” (see also Van Dijk 2002).

These churches link their members within their congregations in Ghana as they also serve as a reliable link with family members, relatives, and friends back home. The churches abroad provide financial support to congregations in Ghana and elsewhere⁹⁸⁰. They also support developmental projects undertaken by churches and non-governmental organisations in Ghana. Besides their religious functions, the pastors provide social, psychological and moral support to Ghanaians living among an increasingly hostile population in host countries⁹⁸¹. In London, for example the Action Chapel International Church, serves as a first port of contact for newly arrived migrants from Ghana, they help them to settle in through the network of older members of the church in London⁹⁸².

The key messages of the Ghanaian churches abroad, is to provide a moral compass and support for Ghanaians living in London for examples. The emphasis is on bringing ‘hope’, ‘success’, ‘winners’ and ‘victory’ to the congregation and the goal is to bring wealth and prosperity to the congregation (cf. Gifford 2005: 45).

Nieswand (2003: 130) argues with respect to Ghanaians in Germany that: *“the empowerment and prosperity discourse of these churches promises to provide believers with the spiritual means to overcome the symbolic, material and legal obstacles to the affirmation of the constructed self-image”*. The role of Ghanaian churches in the construction of migrants’ identities has often been emphasised in such studies on Ghanaian churches abroad. Furthermore, the charismatic churches place more emphasis on a *“practical and rhetorical modernist discourse that deals with central experiences of migration, reflect them religiously and empowers the believers to further action”*⁹⁸³. By providing the platform on which migrants can consider themselves as being modern and successful they contribute to strengthening and stabilising the identities of migrants.


⁹⁸⁰ Mazzucato, V., 2008. The double engagement: Transnationalism and integration. Ghanaian migrants’ lives between Ghana and the Netherlands. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 34(2), p.7

⁹⁸¹ Mazzucato, V., 2008. ART.Cit. p.7

⁹⁸²Field work interview Dodji 27th December 2012

⁹⁸³Tonah. S. 2007. p. 37

Figure 0-35: Respondents Faith orientation : London



Source: Field work results Accra and London August to December 2012

As shown in fig. 35. on religious practices of members of the Ghanaian community in London and returnees in Accra. 50% of respondents interviewed in Accra indicated they were non-believers. Whereas 39% in London indicated they were Pentecost. Muslims formed 3.6% as in the case of Accra and 11% for London. Religion plays a greater part within Ghanaian society as noted above. This religious affinity among the sample of respondents interviewed for the fieldwork, is more pronounced among Ghanaians living in London than their compatriots who have returned to Ghana. This observation could be attributed to the fact that returnees in Accra tend to have a variety of networks and social obligations in Accra such as: attending funeral ceremonies, naming ceremonies, weddings and other traditional durbars.

Such activities occupy their leisure time which leaves little room to “feel lonely” with the need to join a religious group, as is the case in the diaspora, isolation often leads many to be part of a church congregation, as a coping mechanism ⁹⁸⁴. As was stated earlier in this chapter, overseas Ghanaian religious institutions play an important role in terms of assisting their members with psychological help in times of need and aiding them to succumb to isolation, loneliness and depression which at times comes with migration ⁹⁸⁵. Ghanaian churches often serve as a unique institution that supports migrants socially,

⁹⁸⁴ Arthur.J. 2008. Op.cit p.74

⁹⁸⁵ Ter Haar G. 1998, art.cit. p 39.

financially and psychologically. The churches also provide them with a sense of identity and self-worth within an increasingly hostile host society in Britain particularly in the aftermath of Brexit vote, where such hostilities are now becoming “normalised”.

Ter Haar points out that religion among diaspora communities is also a place of identity forging, as in general terms African churches serve to advance African values, cultures and promotes strong ties with homeland⁹⁸⁶. Ghanaian churches in London, doubles as avenues for political mobilization in the diaspora. Leaders of the Ghanaian churches run their churches in line with their mother churches political affiliations back home. These mother churches in Ghana often operate on political cleavages this suggests that church members in London are often encouraged to take-up membership of some Ghanaian political party chapters in London which enables them to participate in these party activities and contribute financially⁹⁸⁷.

This in-depth analysis of the function of Ghanaian churches in London as a place of worship, network and engagement both socially and politically can be explained through the interwoven nature of Ghanaian diaspora associations in London. As noted previously, members of these churches also belong to various diaspora associations at the same time, therefore, they bring more to their engagement as church goers, and to this effect bringing their political views to the church environment. These churches are platforms of mobilization of all social strata, they inform their congregational members on social issues affecting Ghana, they serve as bridge-builders between the diaspora and homeland, and they use their transnational links in the diaspora to support a specific party in Ghana⁹⁸⁸. In recent years, most Ghanaian mainstream churches, have tendencies to overtly, show their political affiliations as to which Party they support which was not the case about 15 years ago⁹⁸⁹. This therefore justifies the distinction between civic-engagement and political engagement. An example is Pastor Mensah Otabil, the founder of the International Central Gospel Church in Accra, who is openly known as a supporter of the ruling Party, New Patriotic Party (NPP), his political position was quite explicit

⁹⁸⁶ Ter Haar G., 1998, art. cit. p. 40.

⁹⁸⁷ Field work interview with Dodji Numekova in London, 26 December 2012

⁹⁸⁸ Van Dijk, R.A., 1997. From camp to encompassment: discourses of trans-subjectivity in the Ghanaian Pentecostal diaspora. *Journal of religion in Africa*, 27(Fasc. 2), p.139

⁹⁸⁹ Field work discussion with Kofi Blankson, June 2013, Accra, Ghana

during the 2012 election debacle between NPP and NDC and the 2016 elections⁹⁹⁰. Duncan William and his Action International Church have long been linked to the opposition party National Democratic Congress (NDC), these cited churches have branches in London and other major cities in England. The political ideologies of these parties have little in common with the theological orientations of these churches. The political affiliation of these churches to political parties is based on galvanising political support for a party, that the leaders of these churches find sympathetic to the needs of their church when the party is in government. These affiliations are tied to the interest of the church and not based on theological orientation.

It is worth highlighting that this mode of participation via Ghanaian churches is common among first-generation migrants than second generations in London. This mode of transnational political mobilization within Ghanaian churches in London is apparent among both the elite and non-skilled migrants, but the elite Ghanaian migrants appears to engage more within the church setting. Another observation on church goers and political mobilization is the spill-over effect from active church participation to political participation. Peterson (1992) maintains that *participation in decision making within a church could be expected to spill over and enhance the odds of an individual becoming more involved in political activities*⁹⁹¹. Guth et. al., (1988) equally notes that: a group's influence upon individuals is a function of social interaction among group members⁹⁹². They further contend that more focus should be centred on the "analysis of religion in terms of sets of structured social organisations"⁹⁹³. Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014) observed in their work on "*Religion and Politics in the United States*" in which they noted that increased social integration within a church produced the greater likelihood of voting among members of both mainstream Protestant and fundamentalist churches in America⁹⁹⁴. They further pointed out that participating in church networks yields reinforcement for accepting the church's political views⁹⁹⁵. This can be said also about

⁹⁹⁰ Pastors at Kufuor's mediation meeting are NPP 'politicians in cassock' - Sampson Ahi: <http://www.ghananews.adomonline.com/politics/2015/July-24th/pastors-at-kufuors-mediation-meeting-are-npp-politicians-in-cassock-sampson-ahi.php>

⁹⁹¹ Peterson, S.A., 1992. Church participation and political participation: The spill-over effect. *American Politics Quarterly*, 20(1), p.124

⁹⁹² Guth, J.L., Jelen, T.G., Kellstedt, L.A., Smidt, C.E. and Wald, K.D., 1988. The politics of religion in America: Issues for investigation. *American Politics Quarterly*, 16(3), p.371.

⁹⁹³ Guth, J.L., Jelen, T.G., Kellstedt, L.A., Smidt, C.E. and Wald, K.D., 1988. Art.cit. p.373

⁹⁹⁴ Wald, K.D. and Calhoun-Brown, A., 2014. *Religion and politics in the United States*. Rowman & Littlefield. p.16

⁹⁹⁵ Wald, K.D. and Calhoun-Brown, A., 2014. Op.cit. p18

the influence Ghanaian churches in London exert on their members and as such spill-over their political orientation within UK politics and equally transnational politics towards homeland. According to Peterson, the spill-over theory, involvement in decisions within a church would lead a person to feel more competent and, hence, more capable of being politically relevant. He further maintains that involvement of people in institutions, if they can extrapolate from the workplace and political literature, are likely to bind people more to the status quo. He therefore proposes the following hypothesis on the notion of spill-over theory: as participation in the church increases: 1) political interest and information level will increase, 2) political participation will increase, 3) political alienation will decrease, and 4) conservative political views will increase.

Other examples of spill-over effects and political engagement of church participation is the example of the African American Baptist churches. Calhoun-Brown (1996) asserts in her study on African-American Baptist churches as a space of political and resource mobilization to support a political party or a candidate⁹⁹⁶. In the case of a candidate, Calhoun-Brown notes the role African American churches in Chicago played in galvanizing support for Jesse Jackson's campaign in 1988⁹⁹⁷. Most of Ghanaian Pentecostal and charismatic churches both in Ghana and in the diaspora, draw inspiration from the African-American Baptist churches as their modal and therefore the church has a spill-over effect on their political views. These aforementioned examples illustrate how church participation can strategically be linked to political participation either via informal, indirect or unconventional mode of political participation.

The analysis in this chapter of Ghanaian churches in London, serving, as both religious, social, psychological and political purposes, aides to analyse the in-depth, activities of Ghanaian political party branches in London and the role it plays as the space for transnational political engagement towards Ghana.

1.1.7 Collective political mobilization: the role of Ghanaian political party branches in London

⁹⁹⁶ Calhoun-Brown, A., 1996. African American churches and political mobilization: The psychological impact of organizational resources. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4), p. 939

⁹⁹⁷ Calhoun-Brown, A., 1996. Art.cit. p.940

Ghanaian political party chapters in Britain often serve as a space of direct transnational political participation and engagement. There are various political parties in Ghana, the three major political parties in Ghana are: The New Patriotic Party, (NPP) the party currently in government, The National Democratic Congress, (NDC) the main opposition party and The Convention Peoples Party, (CPP) all have very active branches abroad, particularly in the UK and the USA. These political party chapters bring together besides the Ghanaian churches which do sometimes have a rather large nominal membership. These political party chapters typically have executives to manage and operate their party affairs. They organize regular meetings, once every month⁹⁹⁸. Attendance at these meetings is however less, partly due to the heavy work schedule of many members but also because Ghanaians abroad belong to various Ghanaian diaspora associations and as such hardly have a good overview of their meeting days. Meetings are held mostly in community centres in London some party meetings are often organised at the Broadwater Farm Community Centre in North London, an area with a high concentration of Ghanaian community. In this sub- chapter I will focus on the inception and organisational set-up of these political party branches in London, how it serves as a platform for transnational political mobilisation in the diaspora.

Ghanaian opposition parties were formed abroad when they were not allowed at home; they recruited support from Ghanaian emigrants, both during periods of military rule when it was safer to demand democracy from a distance and when a civilian government is unpopular or seen as less than completely legitimate ⁹⁹⁹. Much of the negotiation of mergers and programs in the build-up to civilian government in 1993 was carried out in London ¹⁰⁰⁰.

For some time, little was known of the effect emigrant kin may have on voters at home, recent studies show that social remittance of migrants abroad on family back home can at times change their political ideology and dispensation. This observation was demonstrated among Senegalese and Malian diasporan influence on their families voting behaviours back home during the 2012 election in Senegal and in Mali ¹⁰⁰¹. In the case of Ghana, such influences on social remittances and voting behaviour in Ghana has not yet

⁹⁹⁸ Fieldwork interview in London 20th June 2011 with Mohammed Abdul Saaka, one of the founding members of the NPP UK branch.

⁹⁹⁹ Setrana, M.B. and Kyei, J.R.K.O., 2015. Art.cit. p.93

¹⁰⁰⁰ Peil. M. 1995. art.cit. pp.370

¹⁰⁰¹ Smith, É., 2015. Sénégal, la diaspora fait-elle l'élection ? *Afrique contemporaine*, (4), p.53.


been established. It is therefore prudent to note here that the most intensive transnational political participation to date between Ghana and the diaspora has been the participation via the three major Ghanaian political party branches in London, namely the New Patriotic Party (NPP), National Democratic Party, (NDC), and the Convention People's Party (CPP)

The organisational structures of these political party branches in the diaspora are modelled in alignment with the main political party back in Ghana, as among the three political parties mentioned above, the most visible among them with longer experience in transnational diaspora politics has been the NPP Party, the party currently in power. The NPP Party has branches in major Western countries such as the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, but also in African countries with large presence of Ghanaian migrants in countries such as: Nigeria, Gambia, Liberia, Botswana and South Africa. But in recent years, the other two parties, NDC and CPP, have equally opened up branches both in Africa and Europe, and the USA therefore transnational diaspora politics is no longer an exclusive terrain for the NPP, as it was once the case. Ghanaian political parties in the diaspora often serve as a platform for the mother party in Ghana to raise funds for political campaigns back home. But equally it also serves as a platform to recruit experts in other areas of political communications and campaign from the diaspora that they do not have back home in Ghana. The activities of these parties and their relationships with the mother party in Ghana and the influence that the external branches of the party exert on the mother party will be examined and discussed in detail later in a chapter dedicated to political diasporas and their engagement in Ghanaian political parties in the diaspora. This brief review of the mandate and organisational structures of the Ghanaian political parties abroad is important in analysing their rehabilitation and structure of Ghanaian community in London.

Figure 0-36: Ghanaian Political party branches in London

NPP UK, website

CPP UK website



NDC UK website



In this sub chapter, I examined the ties that exist between Ghanaians in the diaspora and those at home through the activities undertaken by Ghanaian associations in London. How the activities of these associations serve as a platform for promoting and supporting individual Ghanaians and institutions both in Ghana and abroad. This support is viewed through the perspectives of Social, Political, Financial, Cultural and Religious exchanges between Ghanaians abroad and those at home as they form the bedrock of various developmental projects. Material resources that Ghanaians from abroad provide are reciprocated by social, moral and religious support of individuals, relatives and groups and associations in Ghana. The latter is indispensable for the growing of financial and material remittances to Ghana. The emergence of a new transnational social and religious institutions that are building networks in the increasingly globalised world. To this effect, this chapter has demonstrated that, there is an undertone of a political agenda which can be classified as indirectly and unconventionally in relation to transnational political

engagement, even though members of these associations do not view it as a political act. The following chapter seeks to further analyse the direct and indirect forms of transnational political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and the relationship between long distance political engagement of the diasporas as “brokers and bridge-builders in the diaspora and ties to their roles as developmental panaceas in Ghana.

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE GHANAIAN DIASPORA IN LONDON

The principle of political equality is reflected in the concept of ‘one person, one vote’. Equal voting rights are only a minimal requirement and political equality is also important in other modes of political participation that are not legally limited in use. On a formal level, political equality exists in most contemporary democracies as the basic democratic requirements such as free elections and the rule of law are implemented¹⁰⁰². In practice, however, the opportunities to participate are unevenly distributed across the population and inactivity is often not a free choice (Dahl, 1989; Verba et al., 1995; Young, 2000, pp. 11–4). Russell J. Dalton et al. (2003, p. 263) states that, ‘the law treats everyone equally when it comes to opportunity, but it is in the use of opportunities that real inequalities exist’. Exercising one’s right to participate in civic life requires resources such as money and political knowledge. Therefore, underprivileged groups in the population are confronted with constraints that others do not face, with, as a result, strong differences in the likelihood that one will participate in political life. Moreover, advantaged groups will use their privileged position to preserve the social status quo so that marginalised groups within the population are confronted with an uphill battle if they want to have their voices heard (Young, 2000, p.17). It is in this context of marginalisation of disenfranchised Ghanaian voters in the diaspora that, this chapter seeks to analyse here by reviewing the means used in participating in transnational political engagement.

As stated earlier in the introduction of this thesis, in which it was highlighted that the nature of this study being a longitudinal study since 2010. As such, an earlier hypothesis in 2010 observed that, there was a correlation between ethnic minority vote and links with the Labour Party since the 1980s. However, this hypothesis has evolved as with the Brexit vote in 2016 and with the 2019 UK general elections, it appears that the Black and minority vote in the UK has also changed. As people of the ethnic minority descent are no longer voting on the basis of political party loyalty and political ideology but rather on the basis of their own interest and their position

¹⁰⁰² Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E., 2010. Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. *Political Studies*, 58(1), pp.187-213.

as people of ethnic minority descent within the British society. In other words, this hypothesis of linking ethnic minority votes for the Labour Party no longer holds as the voting patterns of ethnic minorities during Brexit and particularly during the 2019 general elections demonstrate this massive change and a paradigm shift. The analysis in this chapter seeks to excavate and demonstrate that shift.

The hypothesis of this thesis posed in 2011 equally noted that, the Ghanaian diaspora political participation in London is characterised by first-generation and second-generation participation, which is therefore tied to the ethnic minority voting pattern in the UK. This 2011 hypothesis still stands, as the Brexit vote and the 2019 general elections among other UK elections since 2011 demonstrates that the Ghanaian diaspora electorates in London voting pattern is strongly tied to the voting patterns of the Black and minority ethnic group voting patterns in the UK. But also, that the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London differs from one generation to the other, i.e., first-generation and second-generation Ghanaians in London engage primarily in UK politics which is different from the first-generation political engagement towards homeland Ghana.

Who participates in both UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana and why? To what extent does their accumulated capitals: social, cultural, financial and human resources capitals are utilised for political purposes both in London and towards Accra? And in which way do they appear to use their political engagement as a panacea for political change in the UK and towards Ghana? Moreover, what does the stories of Ghanaian diaspora political engagement tells us about their role as both “brokers” and “bridge-builder”. To this effect a caveat is needed, as such this chapter analysis draws on the results of the qualitative fieldwork conducted in London from 2010-2016, alongside a participatory field research method of a sample of 52 Ghanaian diaspora in London. Clearly a sample of 52 respondents cannot claim to provide a generalized account of the mode of political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and their transnational engagement towards Accra. Yet, the stories collected hints at important gaps and omissions on diaspora engagement in politics in host country and towards homeland to be homogenous and collective, nonetheless the sample analysis reveals a shift from such standpoint. A focused group discussion method was employed among African Brexiters during the Brexit vote in June 2016 to ascertain the motives behind voting Brexit among

people of ethnic minority descent. As such this chapter is therefore divided into two sub-section. The first sub-section deals with the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in British politics in London. The second sub-section focuses on transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London towards Accra, Ghana and how that is organised.

To this end, this chapter seeks to analyse the mode of Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London and transnational political participation towards Accra from their positions as “brokers” and “bridge-builders” in both host and homeland. The central questions that will be examined in this chapter are as follows: what motivates the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana? how can their participation in UK politics shed lights on their integration process as a “novelty” particularly within the current context of Brexit and post-Brexit reconfiguration of a new “Global Britain” narrative?

Political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London takes form on two levels: conventional and unconventional, direct and indirect. Conventional and direct means being a member of a political party and voting during elections in the UK. Unconventional and indirect is via civil society organizations, hometown associations, Ghanaian churches in London and Ghanaian diaspora professional associations. Ghanaian diaspora political participation in London constitutes both first- and second-generation Ghanaians. Transnational political engagement towards Accra consists mainly of first-generation Ghanaians. According to Waterbury (2006) diaspora political participation in host country politics and political participation towards homeland by expatriates’ communities is characterized by the following variables: their educational attainment, professional status, social status, social network, social capital, ethnic belonging and their religious belonging or affiliation to a church¹⁰⁰³. These variables enable diasporans to engage in political discourses and activities in both host and homeland¹⁰⁰⁴. To this effect, the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London can be classified by the aforementioned variables: their educational attainments, professional status, affiliation to a religious group, membership in a hometown association, members of professional

¹⁰⁰³ Waterbury, M.A., 2010. Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, pp.136.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Waterbury, M.A., 2010.art.cit 137

associations, memberships of UK political parties and membership of Ghanaian political party branches in London.

Political integration is defined here as the process by which immigrants incorporate into the host society through political engagement, language acquisition, acquiring skills and influencing public policy (Okigbo, 2014; Castles and Miller, 2009). For the purpose of this study, political integration is conceptualised within the framework of political participation. This study conceptualizes political participation as the “active dimension of citizenship in which individuals take part in the management of collective affairs of a given political community” (Martiniello, 2006:84). However, within discussions of transnationalism, political participation extends beyond a particular nation. Immigrants are participating both conventionally and unconventionally across borders through engagement in demonstrations, boycotts, association, voting, and membership to political parties in both host and home countries.


2.1. Diaspora classification and mode of political participation in London: A space for dynamic participation of different social categories

Ghanaian diaspora political participation in London can be classified as both direct and indirect, conventional and unconventional, formal and informal. This mode of political participation can be grouped in two clusters as noted above: first-generation Ghanaians, these are Ghanaians born in Ghana and emigrated later on to the UK and second generations are Ghanaians born in the UK. Transnational political engagement towards Ghana is mainly practiced by first-generation Ghanaians in London who maintain strong links with homeland Ghana; whereas political engagement in UK politics is practiced by both first- and second-generation Ghanaians, but mainly second-generation Ghanaians constitutes the highest percentage of Ghanaian diaspora participating in frontline politics in the UK.

First-generation political participation in London, is motivated by the fact that, the first-generation diasporas cannot vote transnationally towards Accra, Ghana. This is because the current constitution does not allow transnational voting, therefore they vote in UK

politics as an alternative form of civic engagement in the diaspora. The second-generation political participation in UK politics on the other hand, is active and more visible in terms of political representation in UK Politics. Throughout the three years of Brexit political crisis, second-generation ethnic minority politicians in both the Conservative and the Labour Party were visible in political debate about the UK’s position in the EU and how that will affect the plight of people of ethnic minority in the UK. This differences on how first and second-generation diaspora political engagement in London plays out will be discussed later in this chapter.

Figure 0-37: Classification of political participation in London



Hooghe et al states that, the classic distinction between conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation, should revolve on the issue of institutionalisation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Traditional – or conventional – forms of participation are all closely related to the electoral process. Party membership, voting and contacting politicians are all part of the electoral process or they involve officials who have been appointed as a result of the electoral process¹⁰⁰⁵. This is not so for acts such as political consumerism, participating in demonstrations or signing petitions: while these

¹⁰⁰⁵ Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E., 2010. Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. *Political Studies*, 58(1), p.190

acts may be directed towards elected officials, this is not necessarily the case¹⁰⁰⁶. Participants in more traditional political activities, such as attending a political meeting or joining a political party, become ‘part of the political system’ such participation enables them to influence the political system directly¹⁰⁰⁷. while participants in non-institutionalised forms of political participation keep some distance from the political system by trying to have an indirect impact on political decision making or by circumventing the political system altogether¹⁰⁰⁸.

For Bauböck et al. political participation is the active dimension of citizenship. It refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of collective affairs of a political community¹⁰⁰⁹. Bauböck et al. further observes that within the study of political participation, it must not be restricted to conventional forms such as voting or running for elections, as is often the case in political science¹⁰¹⁰. It also covers political activities such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, etc. These less conventional and extra-parliamentary forms of political participation generally presuppose the formation of a collective actor characterised by a shared identity and some degree of organisation through a mobilisation process¹⁰¹¹.

In the context of non-conventional participation, political mobilisation refers to this process of building collective identity and agency¹⁰¹². By contrast, in conventional participation, mobilisation occurs within a previously structured set of political institutions. In general terms, participation can be individual or collective in both types of arenas. An individual may stage a hunger strike and ethnic mobilisation may turn the individual act of voting into a collective action¹⁰¹³. In other words, while the focus is usually on individual participation in conventional arenas and on collective mobilisation in non-conventional ones, these distinctions must be kept open for all possible combinations¹⁰¹⁴.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Miller, A.H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G. and Malanchuk, O., 1981. Group consciousness and political participation. *American journal of political science*, p.498

¹⁰⁰⁷ Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E., 2010. Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. *Political Studies*, 58(1), p.191

¹⁰⁰⁸ Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E., 2010. art.cit.p.192

¹⁰⁰⁹ Bauböck, R., Kraler, A., Martiniello, M. and Perchinig, B., 2006. Migrants’ citizenship: legal status, rights and political participation. *The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe*, p.65

¹⁰¹⁰ Bauböck, R., Kraler, A., Martiniello, M. and Perchinig, B., 2006. Art.cit p.65

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid.p.65

¹⁰¹² Ibid

¹⁰¹³ ibid


¹⁰¹⁴ Bauböck, R., Kraler, A., Martiniello, M. and Perchinig, B., 2006. Art.cit p.65

From the direct and conventional postulate, political participation of the Ghanaian community in London, takes shape in the traditional form, such as membership of a political party, voting, canvassing for a political party in London¹⁰¹⁵. Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana is strongly tied to their social categorization (i.e., educated and non-educated elites) and generational consideration (i.e., first and second generations Ghanaians in London). Within these two frameworks as their mode of participation is also characterized by their social status. This categorisation is listed as:

- a) Elite participation: i.e., educated, skilled and professional first and second-generations participation in London
- b) Non-elite participation: i.e., non-or less educated, unskilled and non-professional first- and second-generation participation, they do not engage in politics both in London and in Accra
- c) Indifference in participation: A mixture of both first/second generation, elite/non-elites.

¹⁰¹⁵ Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E., 2010. p.193

Figure 0-38: Ghanaian Diaspora process of political participation



Their mode of political participation takes place at:

- a) Hometown association participation = indirect and unconventional form of participation by first-generation.
- b) Faith group participation (Ghanaian churches) = indirect and unconventional form of participation by both first-and second generation.
- c) Professional association participation = indirect and unconventional form of participation for first-generation towards Accra
- d) Alumni association = indirect and unconventional form of participation, by first generations.
- e) Ghanaian political party chapters in London participation = direct and indirect, conventional and unconventional form of participation by first generation participation
- f) Participation in UK politics via memberships UK political parties such as the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Greens this participation is by both first and second generations

To this effect, Teorell notes that in the study of political participation, prominent examples include such well-known determinants as education, knowledge and skills¹⁰¹⁶.

‘Political knowledge,’ we are told, ‘is to democratic politics what money is to economics:

¹⁰¹⁶ Teorell, J., 2006. Art.cit. p.799

it is the currency of citizenship' (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996: 8). Verba et al. (1995: Chapter 11), in turn, elaborate on the concept of 'civic skills', by which they imply linguistic facility, communication and organizational proficiency.

It has been shown by many analysts, such as Nie et al (1996), who demonstrates the link between absolute years of formal education and the development of prodemocracy principles and attitudes, such as tolerance for unpopular groups. But they also try to illustrate, with some success, that because key dimensions of political engagement are an inherently scarce "positional good," engagement is tied to relative rather than absolute levels of educational attainment. Education serves as a sorting mechanism; whatever educational attainment may be median at a given time, individuals significantly above the median will tend to be members of social networks that can connect their views more effectively to political leaders and institutions. For example, as information technology permits more and more citizens to communicate with their representatives, the impact of each message will decrease.) These countervailing forces explain the apparent paradox that rising education levels over the past generation have not yielded commensurate indeed, any gain in political engagement (Nie et al 1996: Ch. 7, 8). This finding is of particular importance today. Since a generation ago, education has become a more significant sorting mechanism while others have weakened. Nie et al (1996: 194) maintains that, in addition to promoting support for democratic principles, education increases verbal cognitive proficiency and related intellectual skills, which improves an individual's ability to understand political events and act in an instrumentally rational manner (Nie et al 1996:194). Still, if the argument of Nie et al (1996) is correct, some of the traditional expectations for civic education can strongly influence and consolidate democratic principles. As such, the statement above supports the idea that political participation being dominated by certain elites within the Ghanaian community in London who understand these political discourses both in host country and towards homeland. This in turn positions these elites in frontline politics and paves way for them to take political leadership roles within the Ghanaian community. These elites also assume the roles of "brokers" within the Ghanaian community in London and transnationally towards Ghana. The dominance of elites African diasporans playing a leadership role in politics and in other sectors between

host and homeland is not exclusive to the case of the Ghanaian diaspora.

The following examples illustrates how elite diasporans are utilising their dual heritage and professional expertise to serve both homeland and host country. The case of Mo Ibrahim an Anglo-Sudanese entrepreneur who is using both his experiences as an African entrepreneur residing in England yet contributing transnationally for developmental projects on governance thematic in Africa, by setting-up philanthropic initiatives for African Youths through educational scholarships for African students. Lionel Zinsou, a Franco-Beninois, who became the prime minister of Benin Republic in 2015, has up until now worked as “*Monsieur Afrique*”, within the French political circle advising ministers on investment and development thematic mostly in Francophone Africa. Same can be said about the active role Lord Paul Boateng the Anglo- Ghanaian, Black British politician, who was the first Black British to serve as cabinet minister under Tony Blair’s government. Lord Boateng has long played the role of a “broker” and a bridge between the UK and Africa, as such this contributed to him being appointed at the later stages of his career as the British High Commissioner to South Africa from 2005 to 2009. The following section focuses on Ghanaian diaspora political participation in UK politics with much focus on educated second-generation Ghanaians engaging in frontline politics in the UK.

2.1.1 Political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London

Bauböck, et al. note that a second core concept in transnational activities of migrants, is political integration. Integration in a broad sense refers to a condition of societal cohesion as well as to a process of inclusion of outsiders or newcomers in host country politics¹⁰¹⁷. Integration in the latter sense is generally regarded as a two-way interaction between the institutions of a ‘receiving society’ and those who gain access that will also result in changing the institutional framework and the modes of societal cohesion. Integration thus brings together the two perspectives on opportunity structures under the umbrella of the more normatively accentuated concept of societal cohesion¹⁰¹⁸. The concept of

¹⁰¹⁷ Jacobs, D. and Tillie, J., 2004. Introduction: social capital and political integration of migrants. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 30(3), p.420

¹⁰¹⁸ Bauböck, R., 2006. *Migration and citizenship: legal status, rights and political participation*, Amsterdam Univ. Press. p.128.

integration is open for both transitive and intransitive use. On the one hand, political integration is an aspect of a broader process of structural integration.

In this sense it refers to access to political status, rights, opportunities and representation for immigrants and to an equalisation of these conditions between native and immigrant populations¹⁰¹⁹. On the other hand, political integration is also about migrants' activities and participation and their acceptance of the laws, institutional framework and political values that 'integrate' a political system.

Bauböck et al. further state that, political *integration* of immigrants can be broken down into four dimensions: a) political rights, b) identification, c) norms and values, and d) participation. The more rights they enjoy, the more they identify with the society where they live, the more they share its political values and norms, and the more they participate and are represented in the political system, the better integrated they are¹⁰²⁰. Research on migrants' political integration focuses on the post-migration stage in the receiving society. The notion of political integration of the Ghanaian diaspora in London can therefore be classified as being linked to post -migration stage in receiving country. As this idea is exemplified by two Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in the UK viewing themselves as being post-race Lord Paul Boateng the former Labour Party MP for Brent South and former cabinet minister on one hand, and on the other hand, Adam Afriyie, the first Black Conservative Party MP for Windsor both indicating that, their political representation in UK politics goes beyond their race, their political representation in politics is rather woven into the fabric of the British society. In this sense political integration of post-migration stage in the host country can also be said with the example of Anglo-Pakistani Labour MP for Birmingham Perry Barr, Khalid Mahmood, a hard-line supporter for Brexit based on anti-EU migrant's sentiment. These views on political integration of ethnic minorities will be discussed later in this chapter. Another aspect of migrant political engagement in receiving country is tied to the notion of Political transnationalism as stated by Bauböck et al.

Political transnationalism is thus the third core concept that informs our approach to the migration-citizenship nexus. Studies on migrant transnationalism challenge the separation between migration and integration stages. Research on political transnationalism has focused mostly on migrants' political identities and activities in

¹⁰¹⁹ Bauböck, R., 2006. *Op.cit.* p.128

¹⁰²⁰ Bauböck, R., 2006. *Op.cit.* p.128

relation to their countries of origin. However, the concept applies also to the status of external citizenship and to sending country policies vis-a`-vis emigrant communities and the destination state. Finally, transnational citizenship has been interpreted as a broader transformation of political membership in migration contexts. This is most visible in the proliferation of multiple nationality but pertains also to the separation of citizenship rights from formal citizenship status and the emergence of a residential citizenship for foreign nationals in democratic immigration countries (Bauböck et al 1994).

Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London can be characterized firstly as a direct and conventional form of engagement in UK politics and secondly as an indirect and unconventional form of transnational political engagement towards Ghana as stated previously. In this sub-section I will concentrate firstly on the direct and conventional form of political participation of Ghanaians in UK politics. Although this section is dedicated to the analysis of the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London, the analysis will be incomplete without first discussing the pattern of political party affiliation and the Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) group engagement in UK politics. As the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in the UK is strongly tied to the political affiliation of the BAME group within the context of communitarianism and multiculturalism in the UK. To this end, this chapter seeks to deal with the following questions: who participates in UK politics and why? How do they participate in UK politics? Does participating in UK politics by Ghanaians in London a sign of full integration and assimilation? Or is rather full integration and assimilation in the UK that motivates political participation of Ghanaians in London?

With regards to direct and conventional mode of political participation in UK politics, both first- and second-generation Ghanaians in London indicated that they were interested in political activities during the field work interviews. In terms of voting patterns, historically, people of ethnic minority descent in the UK tend to vote for the Labour as opposed to the Conservative party ¹⁰²¹. The attractiveness of the Labour Party to the working class and people of ethnic minority descent is due the Labour party policies that the working class find to be more sympathetic to their plight. Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London as shown in graph.4

¹⁰²¹Fielding, S. and Geddes, A., 1998. The British Labour Party and 'ethnic entryism': Participation, integration and the Party context. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 24(1), p.60

where respondents indicated to have voted for the Labour Party since emigrating to the UK with 85% who mentioned that they voted for the Labour Party and 15% for the Conservative Party. In terms of membership of a political party in the UK of Ghanaians residing in London, 59% of respondents stated that they had a membership card whereas 41% indicated that they were not holding any membership card of any political party¹⁰²². This data therefore implies that a considerable percentage of Ghanaians in London are highly politicised.


These figures referring to the membership of a political party and voting habits of Ghanaians in London, corroborates with previous studies conducted on ethnic minority votes in the wake of the 2015 general elections in the UK. The study revealed similar observation in terms of the numbers of voters of ethnic minority descent, based on an estimated 4 million Black and Minority Ethnic group, BAME. For the BAME voters, Labour won 1.6 million; Conservatives secured one million votes, whilst the smaller parties, Lib Dems and Greens achieved 160,000 and 150,000 votes respectively, with UKIP managing to attract 60,000¹⁰²³. These figures, however, confirms the political affiliation between the Black British Community and the Labour Party¹⁰²⁴. The below image depicts support from the Labour Party to the Black and Caribbean community during the Brixton race riots in the 1980s, this represents how entrenched the political affiliation between the Black British community and the Labour has historically been linked.

¹⁰²² Fieldwork data, London 2010-2012

¹⁰²³ New research shows ethnic minority votes increasingly up for grabs. Ethnic minority votes in 2015 general elections. <http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/ethnic-minority-votes-up-for-grabs/>

¹⁰²⁴ New research shows ethnic minority votes increasingly up for grabs. Ethnic minority votes in 2015 general elections. <http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/ethnic-minority-votes-up-for-grabs/>

Figure 0-39: Press-cutting : The Story of Lambeth in the 1980s, Radical Lambeth



Source: Radical Lambeth: The story of Lambeth in the 1980s: <https://radical-lambeth.org/2018/12/04/socialist-responses-to-brixton-riots-1981/>

In recent times however, there has been a paradigm shift in this direction on the voting patterns of people of ethnic minority descent and Ghanaians who are now voting for the Conservative Party. The 2016 referendum votes for the UK to exit the European Union, exemplifies this paradigm shift in voting patterns. As an important percentage of people of ethnic minority and Ghanaians in London voted for the Conservative Party either for the Remain or the Leave camp during Brexit. This point will be examined later in this chapter on Brexit votes among ethnic minority groups and Ghanaians in London.

In this similar vein of comparing ethnic minority voting preference in the UK and in other European countries. A study was conducted in France in 2012, which also revealed that migrant communities tended to vote for the Socialist Party than the UMP (Les Republicans, now) ¹⁰²⁵. A similar, study on the Colombian transnational political engagement in Madrid also revealed how Colombian migrants voting

¹⁰²⁵ Jean-Philippe Dedieu, Lisa Chauvet, Flore Gubert, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps and Étienne Smith, 2013, The “Battles” of Paris and New York: An Analysis of the Transnational Electoral Behaviour of Senegalese Immigrants in France and the United States, *Revue française de science politique* (Vol. 63), p. 865

patterns in Spanish elections leans more to the Left of the political spectrum¹⁰²⁶. In other words, Colombians migrants in Madrid tended to vote for the Spanish Socialist Party, a similar observation was made in relation to Turkish migrants in Germany and the Netherlands voting for the German and Dutch Socialist Parties¹⁰²⁷. In the US it has also been observed that most African-Americans, Latinos and migrants' communities tend to vote for the Democrats¹⁰²⁸.

According to Fielding and Geddes (1998), the reason for pro-Labour bias among people of ethnic minority descent could be explained by several factors: *their disproportionate concentration in the working class, Labour's past record of support for decolonisation; the desire of a number of Conservatives to embrace racism; and the fact some immigrants had acquired socialist beliefs prior to emigration*¹⁰²⁹.

Anwar (2001) cites, the other reason why people of ethnic minority descent vote for the Labour Party is that *the community perceives the Labour Party to be more sympathetic to ethnic minorities and "supports the working class"*¹⁰³⁰. Anwar further notes that, *this pattern of voting is also found in the United States, where the Democratic Party has always received most Black votes due to a similar perception*¹⁰³¹.

This, therefore, means that people of ethnic minority descent residing in most Western democracies, are inclined to vote or support political ideologies leaning to the left of political spectrum and that, the Black and minority ethnic group in the UK voting pattern leaning towards the Labour Party is not exclusive to the UK, but to other Western countries as the above examples attests.

¹⁰²⁶ Bermudez, A., 2010. The transnational political practices of Colombians in Spain and the United Kingdom: politics 'here' and 'there'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(1), p.90.

¹⁰²⁷ Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2003. The politics of migrants' transnational political practices. *International migration review*, 37(3), p.768

¹⁰²⁸ Michelson, M.R., 2003. Getting out the Latino vote: How door-to-door canvassing influences voter turnout in rural central California. *Political Behaviour*, 25(3), p.247.

¹⁰²⁹ Fielding, S. and Geddes, A., 1998. The British Labour Party and 'ethnic entryism': Participation, integration and the Party context. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 24(1), p.60

¹⁰³⁰ Anwar, M., 2001. The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(3), p.540

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.p.541

2.1.2 A brief historical account of ethnic minority voting patterns in the UK

Ethnic minorities of Commonwealth countries have an automatic right to vote in both local and general elections in the UK¹⁰³². Due to historical and colonial linkages between Britain and its former Commonwealth colonies in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as being part of the old British empire, these ties explain why former Commonwealth migrants are accorded the legal right to participate fully in British politics, beyond the rights to vote but become MPs even before post war mass migration¹⁰³³.

A brief historical account is needed in understanding ethnic minority political participation and representation in Britain and how that directly or indirectly facilitates and influences the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in Britain. The main UK political parties namely, the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, all have ethnic minority caucuses. These ethnic minority caucuses within these political parties were established to facilitate and encourage ethnic minorities to vote and as such diversify political representation in British politics to reflect the changing population demographics of the country. To this effect, the Labour Party Race and Action Group (LPRAG) was set up in 1975 as a pressure group to educate and advise the party on relevant issues pertaining to ethnic minority causes¹⁰³⁴. Then there was a long campaign to set up Black Sections in the Labour Party (Jeffers 1991). The main objective of the Black section of the Labour Party is to get and maintain ethnic minority support for the party¹⁰³⁵. The Black section of the Labour Party is not a unique phenomenon, as the Labour party has long had strong affiliations to various migrant communities in the UK first with the Irish community, the Jewish community lately the Black and Asian communities.

a) Labour Party and ethnic minority: An avenue for political integration

¹⁰³² Ibid.p.543

¹⁰³³ Anwar, M., 2001. The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(3), p.538.

¹⁰³⁴ Shukra, K., 1998. *The changing pattern of black politics in Britain*. Pluto Press.

¹⁰³⁵ Jeffers, S., 1991. Black Sections in the Labour Party. *Black and Ethnic Leadership*, p.63

The interaction between decentralised Labour Party organisation and residential concentration of Irish, Asian, Afro-Caribbean and Black African ethnic minorities, meant that Labour Party parliamentary candidate of ethnic minority descent were selected in areas and districts with high concentration of migrants ¹⁰³⁶. Irish as well as the Asians, Black Africans and Caribbeans, were largely poor, and judged by the need for industrial society, mainly unskilled ¹⁰³⁷. Both groups had to overcome severe socio-economic impediments as well as culturally and racially motivated hostilities, in order to participate in the British political system ¹⁰³⁸. According to Fielding and Geddes, the Irish were also not universally welcomed: *some of the indigenous population in Britain thought them racially inferior, others despised their Catholicism* ¹⁰³⁹. They nonetheless faced less hostilities than the Black Commonwealth immigrants, who due to a combination of difference of colour, religion, language and culture, provoked calls for their repatriation from national politicians of repute ¹⁰⁴⁰.

It was in this context that, the Black Sections of Labour Party came into force. The Black Section sought to unite diverse ethnic minority communities within the Labour Party and politically “Black” in accord with what Gilroy (1987) would refer to as a two-dimensional model of Black identity. They had two main objectives: to increase black representation at all levels of the party and achieve better “descriptive” representation (Pitkin,1967); and to put forward a “black agenda”, and hence, more “substantive” representation of “black interest” (Black Sections 1988; Jeffers 1991; Shukra 1990). In contrast to the Irish members of the Labour Party, the Black Sections sought to overcome religious and national affiliations and develop a form of political action centred on anti-colonialism and anti-racism (William and Chrisman 1993). It is through the Black section that, emerged Labour ethnic minority leaders such as: Lord Paul Boateng (second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian descent) MP for Brent South in North-West London who is a barrister and a Civil Rights Lawyer and the first Black cabinet minister in British politics in Tony Blair’s government; Diane Abbott, a Cambridge University graduate; (second-generation Anglo-Jamaican descent), first Black female in British History to become Member of Parliament and currently MP for Hackney in East London; Keith Vaz,

¹⁰³⁶ Jeffers, S., 1991. Op.cit. p.65

¹⁰³⁷ Fielding, S. and Geddes, A., 1998. Art.cit. p.70

¹⁰³⁸ ibidem

¹⁰³⁹ ibidem

¹⁰⁴⁰ ibidem

Labour MP for Leister East of Anglo-Indian descent a lawyer and equally a Cambridge university graduate. Bernie Grant, Labour Member of Parliament for Tottenham in North London, is of Anglo-Guyanese descent, a member of the Labour Party Union and a graduate from Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh¹⁰⁴¹. All four ethnic minorities were elected to parliament in 1987 under the Labour Party ticket. Others who also emerged from the Labour Party Black caucuses are: Baroness Valerie Amos (Anglo-Guyanese descent) was secretary of State for International Development under Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair. Baroness Amos was later appointed British High Commissioner (British Ambassador) to Australia in 2009. In September 2015 She was appointed the ninth director of SOAS University of London, making her the first woman of African descent to be director of an institution of higher education in Great Britain¹⁰⁴². Baroness Patricia Scotland (Caribbean descent Dominica and Antigua) former Attorney General of England and Wales under Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Baroness Scotland is currently the Secretary General of the Commonwealth of Nations Organisation she was appointed to this position in 2016, She is the first female secretary of the Commonwealth Organisation of Black British descent with Caribbean origin¹⁰⁴³.

b) The Conservative Party and ethnic minority entryism

The support for the Conservative party by people of ethnic minority is often linked to the notion of “Moving-up and moving out”¹⁰⁴⁴. In other words, moving-up on social mobility and out of migrant concentrated areas meaning leaving the Labour party for the Conservative Party as a result of upward social mobility. This metaphor also suggests that the more successful one becomes as a migrant, the easier the affiliation with the Conservative Party. It is noted in an example of the Jewish community, where some Jews moved from supports for the Liberals to backing Labour during the inter-war years¹⁰⁴⁵.

¹⁰⁴¹ Yuval-Davis, N., 2007. Intersectionality, citizenship and contemporary politics of belonging. *Critical review of international social and political philosophy*, 10(4), p.566

¹⁰⁴² Valerie Amos profile SOAS University of London: <https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/fellows/baroness-amos/>

¹⁰⁴³ The Commonwealth Organisation profile of Baroness Patricia Scotland: <https://thecommonwealth.org/secretary-general-rt-hon-patricia-scotland-qc>

¹⁰⁴⁴ Fielding, S. and Geddes, A., 1998. Art.cit. p.68

¹⁰⁴⁵ Alderman, G., 1993. The Jewish dimension in British politics since 1945. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 20(1), p.10.

As Jewish people experienced social and spatial mobility, support for the Conservative party increased (Alderman, 1993).

The Conservative Party took the initiative in 1976 to set up an Ethnic Minority Unit in the Conservative Central Office's Department of Community Affairs. Its objective was to make party members aware of the growing importance of ethnic electors, to influence party policy, to improve the image of the party among ethnic minorities, and as a result to seek their support¹⁰⁴⁶. The Unit helped to form an Anglo-Asian Conservative Society through which they recruited Asians directly into the party¹⁰⁴⁷. It had about 30 local branches. This development was followed by the formation of the Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society with the same objective¹⁰⁴⁸. However, more recently, these societies have been replaced by a national organisation, *the One Nation Forum*, with similar objectives¹⁰⁴⁹. But some Anglo-Asian and Anglo-West Indian Societies continue their activities at local level. The members of these societies and the *One Nation Forum* get involved in election campaigns as Conservative Party workers, and some are coming forward as party candidates in local, parliamentary and European elections¹⁰⁵⁰. It is often mentioned by Conservative Party leaders that the Asian values are closer to the philosophy of the Party. For example, in a February 1997 speech Michael Howard, the then Home Secretary, voiced his appreciation of the role Asian British have played in the economy of the country via business owned by Asian and Asian Brits, he therefore reiterated that Asian values were closer to the philosophy of his party¹⁰⁵¹. Asians were therefore natural Conservative Party supporters, he said. The Conservative Party leader of the time William Hague speaking as chief guest at a dinner for Asian millionaires at the Café Royale in central London, *expressed the hope that one day an Asian would be the Conservative Party leader and added 'though you'll forgive me for saying not quite yet. As far as I am concerned, I see Asians as no less British than the Scots, the English, the Welsh and the Northern Irish'* (*Daily Telegraph*, 22 April 1999). He also announced

¹⁰⁴⁶ Fisher, S.D., Heath, A.F., Sanders, D. and Sobolewska, M., 2015. Candidate ethnicity and vote choice in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(4), p.883.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibidem

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibidem

¹⁰⁴⁹ Seawright, D., 2009. *The British Conservative Party and one nation politics*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.p. 15

¹⁰⁵⁰ Seawright, D., 2009. *Art.Cit.* p. 15

¹⁰⁵¹ Anwar, M., 1998. *Ethnic Minorities and the British Electoral System: A Research Report*. Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick. p.10.

the initiative to set-up a 'Cultural Unit' at the Conservative Central Office to attract more Asian Brits. Mr Hague said that he wanted more British Blacks and British Asians playing a full part in *'the mainstream of our national life. Not just in business, the professions, sports, the arts or in the media but also in politics'* Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1999. Margret Thatcher in 1988 welcomed the new Indian High Commissioner to Britain with the following statement:

"We so much welcome the resourceful Indian community here in Britain. You have brought the virtues of family, of hard work and of resolve to make a better life ... you are displaying splendid qualities of enterprise and initiative, which benefit not just you and your families but the Indian community and indeed the nation as a whole ¹⁰⁵²."

All these statements and special arrangements show that the Conservative Party is trying to attract ethnic minority support, particularly from Asian Brits. The effort by the Conservative Party to attract Asians to the Party, has seen in recent years Asian-British politician being appointed to key and prominent positions in Conservative government.

Examples of prominent ethnic minority Conservative politicians is namely: Sajid Javid the recent past Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Minister of Finance) who is of Anglo-Pakistani descent and was born in Rochdale in Lancashire, he was appointed to this position in July 2019 by Boris Johnson, he is the first Asian Brit to occupy such a high-profile government position in the UK. Prior to this, he was appointed in April 2018 by Theresa May as the Home Secretary, (Minister of Interior) the first Asian at the time to occupy such as a high position of state in the UK ¹⁰⁵³. Before taking up these prominent positions he served, as the Business secretary and Cultural secretary under David Cameron's government. Javid was a prominent supporter of Britain remaining in the EU during the Referendum vote in 2016. Although he has in the past been noted for being Eurosceptic: *as a student in 1990 he was thrown out of the Conservative Party conference for handing out leaflets opposing Britain joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the forerunner of the single currency*¹⁰⁵⁴. On 13 February 2020 Javid

¹⁰⁵² Shah.N 2020. How did British Indians become so prominent in the Conservative party? The Guardian 27th February 2020

¹⁰⁵³ Mason. R Stewart. H and Walker. P "Sajid Javid resigns as chancellor in Boris Johnson reshuffle" The Guardian 13 February 2020: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/13/sajid-javid-resigns-as-chancellor-amid-boris-johnson-reshuffle>

¹⁰⁵⁴ Murphy J. 2012 Treasury minister Sajid Javid: Don't slam the City, it represents some of the best of capitalism, The Evening Standard: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/treasury-minister-sajid-javid-don-t-slam-the-city-it->

resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer and another Asian Brit replaced him Rishi Sunak. Sunak was promoted to Chancellor of the Exchequer on 13 February 2020 as part of a cabinet reshuffle ¹⁰⁵⁵.

Priti Patel the current British Home Secretary (British Minister of Interior), who is Anglo-Indian and Indo-Ugandan descent. She was born in the Borough of Islington in North London to parents who are Indo-Ugandans, who migrated to the UK in the 1970s, as a result of Amin's regime in Uganda. Prior to being appointed as Home Secretary, Patel was the International Development Secretary between 2016-2017. She is ideologically positioned on the party's right wing and identifies herself as a Thatcherite ¹⁰⁵⁶. A longstanding Eurosceptic, Patel was a leading figure in the vote Leave campaign during the build-up to the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union as the image below demonstrates ¹⁰⁵⁷.

Figure 0-40: Image 8: Priti Patel current Home Secretary campaigning for Brexit in 2016



Source: Priti Patel was one of the leading figures in the Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU © Matt Cardy/Getty Images: <https://www.ft.com/content/52fbc7c8-b50d-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b>

Neha Shah explains in an article published in the Guardian on 27 February 2020 highlighting the reason for an increasing number of Asian-British serving in Boris Johnson's government, the title of her article as: *How did British Indians become so*

[represents-some-of-the-best-of-capitalism-8134667.html](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/27/british-indians-boris-johnson)

¹⁰⁵⁵ Cabinet reshuffle: Sajid Javid resigns as chancellor, 14 February 2020: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-51491662>

¹⁰⁵⁶ Warrell.H and Staton.B. 2019. How radical will Priti Patel be at the UK Home Office? The Financial Times 04 August 2019

¹⁰⁵⁷ ibidem

prominent in the Conservative party?

Shah contends in her article that: *“The second wave of Indian migrants to Britain were the so-called “twice migrants” who arrived from East Africa in the 1960s and 70s, having been expelled or encouraged to leave by the newly independent regimes in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The families of our chancellor - Rishi Sunak, home secretary -Priti Patel and attorney general Suella Braverman are all part of the second-generation East African Indian descent group. So how and why have their descendants become so prominent on the Tory-Conservative frontbenches? The answer begins in 1895, with the creation of the British East Africa Protectorate. British officials envisioned the protectorate, which occupied Indians in east Africa enjoyed success in business, finance and the professions throughout the colonial period, and gained significant control over the economy. By the time Kenya won its independence in 1963, Indians – who accounted for less than 3% of the population – owned more than two thirds of the country’s private non-agricultural assets. These advantages virtually guaranteed the economic success of east African Indians in Britain, especially in the retail businesses of Margaret Thatcher’s “enterprise economy”, for which they soon became known. Rishi Sunak’s pharmacist mother and Priti Patel’s newsagent-owning parents were typical of their generation.*

The Conservative leadership of the time identified this demographic as potential voters. From the 1980s onwards, the Tories began to court an imagined “Indian community”, limited to east African Indians who had settled around London. Successful British Indians were held up as evidence of what could be achieved under a free-market Conservative government. After 30 years of Thatcherite ideology, British Indians were the most pro-Conservative ethnic minority, after the Jewish community. After decades of gradual advance, this number soared to 40% in 2017. In the 2019 election, as the Conservatives chased a realignment towards white northern voters based on racist scaremongering, support in constituencies with high Indian populations increased substantially again. At every point, this has included members of both groups of Indian migrants. Now British Indians make up 15% of the Tory cabinet under Boris Johnson’s government. The Tories have now managed to extend their appeal beyond the “two time” migrants by finding common cause in a project of Islamophobia. Supported by the Indian government and its

*far-right ruling party, the BJP, the Conservatives have exploited a sharp rise in Hindu nationalism within the British Indian community to play Hindu, Sikh, Jain and Muslim communities off against one another*¹⁰⁵⁸.

b) The Liberal Democratic Party and the ethnic minority caucuses

The Liberal Party used to have a Community Relations Panel in the 1970s, which included ethnic minority members. It met regularly to discuss relevant issues and formulated not only policies to attract ethnic minority members, but also campaigning strategies at elections. It appears that the Liberal Democrats are following a similar arrangement. One of the Party's recent ethnic minority prominent MP is Layla Michelle Moran Spokesperson for Education, MP for Oxford West and Abingdon, a British-Palestinian Maths and Chemistry teacher. Her father is a White British EU diplomate and her mother a Palestinian Christian.

These cited examples illustrate the diversity of ethnic minority representation in politics both on the left, right and centre of political ideologies in Britain. Equally it also demonstrates the cleavages of Black and Asian British political visibility and representation within all the major political parties in Britain.

2.1.3 Ethnic minority voting patterns in the UK: A general overview

A study conducted in 1998 by Anwar on "*views about ethnic minorities participation in politics in Britain*", where respondents were asked whether ethnic minorities should be encouraged to participate in political process in Britain. As shown in the below table an overwhelming majority of both white and ethnic minority respondents mentioned that minorities ought to participate in politics¹⁰⁵⁹.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Shah.N. 2020.Art. Cit. p.2

¹⁰⁵⁹ Anwar, M., 1998. *Ethnic Minorities and the British Electoral System: A Research Report*. Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick.

Table 6: Should ethnic minorities be encouraged to participate in political process? (%)

Ethnic group	Yes	No
White	97	3
Black	96	4
Asian	98	2
Other	96	4

Source: Anwar (1998a: 28).

In the same study a question was asked on “Reasons for encouraging ethnic minorities to participate in political process” and the finding shows that most respondents in all ethnic groups (White British, Black British and Asian British) felt that, it was good for integration and for providing equal opportunity for ethnic minorities¹⁰⁶⁰. The below table shows that slightly more Asians 22% than Blacks 16% felt that they should be encouraged to engage in British politics, because they are British citizens ¹⁰⁶¹.

Table 7: Reasons for encouraging ethnic minorities to participate in political process (%)

Ethnic group	Good for integration	Equal opportunity	British citizen	Need more representatives	To have say	Get involved
White	48	20	7	12	8	6
Black	30	25	16	16	2	12
Asian	19	35	22	7	1	15
Other	51	20	-	16	8	5

Source: Anwar (1998a: 29).

Source: Anwar, M., 2001. The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*,

¹⁰⁶⁰ *ibidem*

¹⁰⁶¹ Anwar, M., 2001. Art.cit. p.539

Ethnic minority or migrants' rights to vote is not an automatic right in most Western countries, for example in France the right to vote for ethnic minorities has long been a contentious issue of political and societal debate as Vincent Tiberj notes:

Le soutien au droit de vote des étrangers est de plus en plus marqué et se diffuse progressivement au-delà des groupes sociopolitiques les moins touchés par le racisme et la xénophobie. Reste à comprendre comment et pourquoi une telle évolution a pu apparaître. L'explication classique face à de tels mouvements d'opinion mobilise généralement la théorie de la "révolution silencieuse" proposée par Ronald Inglehart. À la base de ces évolutions en faveur du libéralisme culturel, on trouve trois mécanismes majeurs: la généralisation de l'État providence qui assure à chacun une subsistance et donc permet à un agenda et à des valeurs post-matérialistes de s'exprimer; le renouvellement générationnel des électorats; enfin, l'élévation général du niveau de diplôme. On sait depuis longtemps que plus les individus sont diplômés, moins ils sont touchés par les préjugés. Sans conteste, ce basculement de l'électorat français vers le soutien au droit de vote des étrangers s'explique en partie par l'élévation du niveau de diplôme des Français et le renouvellement générationnel¹⁰⁶².

The above statements both in Britain and in France attests to the idea of migrants' integration in host countries is driven in part via political participation of people of ethnic minority descent by host nation according these groups the right to vote which has not always been an automatic right to vote.


Although, the Conservative party has gained more grounds in terms of cultivating an increasing support from ethnic minority community in recent years, particularly among Asian British voters as it has been observed above. A recent study shows that support from Asians constitutes 50% for Labour party, and 38% for Conservative Party, whereas support from the Black community composes of 67% for Labour and 21% for Conservative¹⁰⁶³. Political support for faith groups during the 2015 general elections in the UK, shows that the Labour party derived a great support from the Christian and Muslim community in England than the Conservative Party. This affiliation of faith-based groups within the ethnic minority community could be a

¹⁰⁶² Tiberj, V., 2011. Le droit de vote des étrangers. Un exemple de la progression du libéralisme culturel en France. *Hommes & migrations. Revue française de référence sur les dynamiques migratoires*, (1294), pp.112-119.

¹⁰⁶³ New research shows ethnic minority votes increasingly up for grabs. Ethnic minority votes in 2015 general elections. <http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/ethnic-minority-votes-up-for-grabs/>

spill-over effect from their support for the Labour party that exist already without the religious dimension. It comprises of the following: Christian, 56% Labour, 31% Conservative; Muslim, 64% Labour, 25% Conservative, Hindu: 41% Labour, 49% Conservative; Sikhs (small sample): 41% Labour, 49% Conservative¹⁰⁶⁴.

Figure 0-41: Ethnic minority votes 2015 UK General Elections



Survation for British Future, May 2015

Ethnic minority votes 2015 general elections, source:

<http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/ethnic-minority-votes-up-for-grabs/>

Among ethnic minority groups in the UK, Asian British have a large business community and interest, therefore the Conservative party's liberal approach on the economy tends to attract more Asian voters within the minority groups to a large extent due to their business interest among other reasons¹⁰⁶⁵. For example, in a February 1997 speech Michael Howard, the then Home Secretary, voiced his appreciation of the role Asians are contributing to the prosperity of Britain and reiterated that Asian values were closer to the philosophy of his party¹⁰⁶⁶.

In terms of the Ghanaian community in London majority votes goes to the Labour Party as stated above, this is in line with other minority groups voting Labour as


¹⁰⁶⁴ New research shows ethnic minority votes increasingly up for grabs. Ethnic minority votes in 2015 general elections. <http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/ethnic-minority-votes-up-for-grabs/>

¹⁰⁶⁵ Anwar, M., 2001. The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(3), p.540

¹⁰⁶⁶ Anwar, M., 2001. p.542

noted above. This therefore indicates that, the Ghanaian community in London political affiliation and voting pattern is highly interwoven within the context of the Black British community voting patterns. As it has been addressed above, the traditional Labour vote among the Black British community in recent years has changed slightly as such, an increasing number of Ghanaians in London are also voting for the Conservative Party. But the Labour Party remains the party that most Ghanaians vote for in London and are associated with. Members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London who were interviewed in 2012 and 2016, about their voting choices since their arrival in the UK, 64% mentioned that they have been voting since they emigrated to the UK. Whereas 36% stated they did not¹⁰⁶⁷. About those who voted during the 2010 general elections 70% mentioned they did vote whereas 30% said they did not vote¹⁰⁶⁸. When respondents were questioned about voting during parliamentary and council elections, 71% stated they did and 29% indicated they did not vote¹⁰⁶⁹.

Figure 0-42: Respondents vote in the UK



Source: Fieldwork results, 2012-2013 London

This therefore shows that Ghanaians in London, tend to be more politically inclined. The majority of the 71% who indicated that they had voted during the UK general election in 2010 and equally during the Brexit referendum in 2016, constitutes the educated and professional segment of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and this

¹⁰⁶⁷ Fieldwork London data 2010,2012 and 2016

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid


¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid

segment includes both first and second generations.

The educational attainment among the segment of Ghanaians in London who showed interest in UK politics was higher than those with less educational attainment. The other 29% who indicated that they did not vote during the Brexit referendum election were a mixture of both educated and non-educated Ghanaians, among those with less educational attainment some cited the following reasons for their lack of interest in politics: *their effort was concentrated on working hard to save and prepare for their return home*. Another variable in relation to voting attitudes of Ghanaians in London, was the parallel between length of stay and political interest for voters in London and those participating transnationally towards Accra. Some of the respondents within this category had been in London less longer and are mainly short-term migrants. On the other hand, a great majority of those who stated they had been voting since they emigrated to the UK were long term migrants, who had been in the UK for over ten years, and tended to consider London, as their main place of abode and home. Among these long-term stayers also consisted of second-generation diasporas, who responded to be interested in UK politics and much less interested in what is happening in Ghana politically.

There was a correlation however, between first- and second-generation Ghanaians who voted, they were mostly the educated elites, of each generation, or those with higher education qualifications who said they voted. Among the first-generation migrants who indicated they did not vote in the UK, some also stated to be interested in politics in Ghana. Political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is therefore measured around two axes: educated elite participation and non-educated elite participation. In terms of voter perception in London, 41% of respondents indicated they are ‘very much interested’ and 15% said they are not interested in political campaigns. (See below fig.43)

Figure 0-43: Interest in political campaigns




Source: Fieldwork data London 2012

As it can be observed in the below pie chart (Fig.44) 86% of the sample respondents indicated to be interested in politics in London, while 14% mentioned they were not interested in Politics in London. Those interested in both UK and Ghanaian politics are normally long-term stayers who are first-generation migrants and those with higher educational attainment. In other words, Ghanaian migrants who have been in the UK since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. It has been observed by scholars of transnational politics and diaspora studies that, settled long term stayers of first-generation migrants tend to still maintain long-distance relationship towards their home countries as opposed to second generations, which therefore explains why first generations engage in transnational politics towards their homeland ¹⁰⁷⁰. A similar observation was made among Senegalese diaspora in France and their transnational voting patterns towards Senegal, whereby the study revealed the correlation between duration of stay in France and educational attainment played an important role in their decision to participate in politics in France or towards homeland Senegal ¹⁰⁷¹.

¹⁰⁷⁰Sheffer G. *Diaspora Politics at home and abroad* 2003, Cambridge university Press

¹⁰⁷¹ Jean-Philippe Dedieu, Lisa Chauvet, Flore Gubert, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps and Étienne Smith, 2013, The “Battles” of Paris and New York: An Analysis of the Transnational Electoral Behaviour of Senegalese Immigrants in France and the United States, *Revue française de science politique* (Vol. 63), p. 865.

Figure 0-44: Respondents who were interested in Ghanaian politics while in London




Source: Field work result findings London respondents December 2012

A study conducted by Heath et.al in 2010 on why people of ethnic minority vote Labour found that: “*Ethnic background in the UK is now a much more powerful predictor of how people will vote than is social class (or region, or age, or indeed any other social division)*¹⁰⁷².” The data below indicates a breakdown of votes during the 2010 general elections, in which the study Heath et al conducted observed that: “*the remarkable Labour loyalty of ethnic minorities could have major long-term implications for the party system as Britain’s minority communities are growing rapidly and are set to become a larger and larger proportion of the electorate in the future*¹⁰⁷³.” The study shows that 68% of people of ethnic minority voters, voted Labour and 16% voted Conservative.

¹⁰⁷² Heath, A.F., Fisher, S.D., Sanders, D. and Sobolewska, M., 2011. Ethnic heterogeneity in the social bases of voting at the 2010 British general election. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21(2), p.255

¹⁰⁷³ Heath, A.F., Fisher, S.D., Sanders, D. and Sobolewska, M., 2011. Art.cit. p.270

Figure 0-45: Why ethnic minorities vote Labour



The authors noted that, the reason why people of ethnic minority vote Labour could be attributed to the fact that new migrants who will “typically be joining an established ethnic community, which will have developed over time many shared norms and sentiments¹⁰⁷⁴.” This developed norms and sentiments could also be political affiliation. “Migrants do not have to wait to find out for themselves what life would be like under different governments; they will quickly pick up ideas about the British political situation from their new community. Community norms and sentiments, then, may well perpetuate the belief, based on collective experience, that Labour looks after ethnic minorities while the Conservatives do not¹⁰⁷⁵.”

Heath et al further claims that group-based explanations have become less popular as the preference for individualistic choice-based theories grows, but states: “while communities based on social class may have declined or weakened, there are undoubtedly strong communities based on ethnicity in Britain today¹⁰⁷⁶.” This statement explains the interwoven nature of the Ghanaian diaspora voting pattern tied to the voting patterns of the Black British community in London.

Another study on the correlation between the Labour Party and ethnic minority vote


¹⁰⁷⁴ Heath, A.F., Fisher, S.D., Sanders, D. and Sobolewska, M., 2011. Ethnic heterogeneity in the social bases of voting at the 2010 British general election. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21(2), p.258

¹⁰⁷⁵ Heath, A.F., Fisher, S.D., Sanders, D. and Sobolewska, M., 2011. Art.cit. p.271

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid.p572

shows an increase between 2010 and 2017. The below data shows that the Black and Minority Ethnic group (BAME) in 2010 where 60% voted Labour compared to 16% voting Conservative, in 2015 BAME voters voted 65% for Labour and 23% for the Conservative Party and in 2017 BAME voted recorded 73% votes for the Labour Party and 19% for the Conservative Party. With reference to the evolution of BAME votes during the 2019 UK general elections, there are currently no data to attest to that. Therefore, with the data set on BAME between 2010-2017 once more confirms the aforementioned statement on the links between BAME group, the Ghanaian community in London and their voting patterns towards the Labour Party.

Figure 0-46: BAME Votes 2010-2017



Source: Ipsos/MORI

It is worth noting here that this correlation between Labour Party and voting patterns of ethnic minority groups is fast changing. As in recent years an increasing number of people of ethnic minority descent are joining the “unfriendly party - the Conservative party” to quote Theresa May on the Conservative Party’s effort to reinvent itself to become more attractive to people of ethnic minority descent ¹⁰⁷⁷.

According to James Kanagasooriam, a policy analyst for a Conservative Party Think Tank, Onward, states that: *There is no disguising it: The Conservative Party has a*

¹⁰⁷⁷ James Kanagasooriam: The Conservatives have no secure future as a governing party unless they win many more ethnic minority votes, Published July 17th 2018: <https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2018/07/james-kanagasooriam-the-conservatives-have-no-secure-future-as-a-governing-party-unless-they-win-more-ethnic-minority-votes.html>

problem with Black and Ethnic Minority (BAME) voters¹⁰⁷⁸. At last year's General Election, (2017) 73 per cent of BAME voters opted for the Labour Party, compared to a paltry 19 per cent for the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party regressed from its high watermark in 2015, and huge numbers of black and ethnic minority voters who voted Liberal Democrat in 2010 found their home in Corbyn's Labour Party just seven years later¹⁰⁷⁹.

During the 1980s, the Labour Party regularly polled 90 per cent of black voters, and Conservatives only succeeded in winning a fraction of the British Indian-origin vote as late as 1987, notes Kanagasooriam¹⁰⁸⁰. The continuing challenge today is that the biggest statistical driver of not voting Conservative is being non-white¹⁰⁸¹. This is despite many BAME voters aligning themselves to values of hard work, faith, patriotism, a scepticism of excessive welfare, and an uncompromising attitude of aspiration and household prudence, as all these cited "values" are associated with the Conservative party¹⁰⁸². The BAME vote should be fertile ground for Conservative messages and policy, but it isn't. Conservatives must ask themselves why: it is not just philosophically damaging for the party of One Nation politics but also electorally essential¹⁰⁸³.

According to a study by the Conservative Party Think Tank on why the Conservative Party struggles to gain support from the BAME group. The graph below demonstrates that just 36 per cent of BAME considerers more supporters for the Conservatives, compared to 70 per cent for White considerers supporters¹⁰⁸⁴. This suggests there is a considerable scope for improvement in terms of attracting more BAMEs to the Conservative Party.

¹⁰⁷⁸ James Kanagasooriam, Published July 17th 2018, art.cit

¹⁰⁷⁹ James Kanagasooriam: The Conservatives have no secure future as a governing party unless they win many more ethnic minority votes, Published July 17th 2018:

<https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2018/07/james-kanagasooriam-the-conservatives-have-no-secure-future-as-a-governing-party-unless-they-win-more-ethnic-minority-votes.html>

¹⁰⁸⁰ James Kanagasooriam, Published July 17th 2018, art.cit. p.2


¹⁰⁸¹ James Kanagasooriam: 2018.art.cit. p.3

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.p.4

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid. p.4

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid.p4

Figure 0-47: BAME votes for the Conservative Party 2017



The Conservative Party’s incentive to improve share of the BAME vote is also overwhelming: without it, the Party has lost dozens of seats. Between 2010 and 2015, David Cameron managed to increase BAME vote share amongst BAME voters by seven percentage points just to stand still electorally¹⁰⁸⁵. Onward’s modelling of changing ethnic composition at constituency level reveals that if as predicted 20 per cent of the population is BAME by 2031, the Conservatives would have to either add two points of vote share amongst white voters from Labour or increase vote share by 12 points amongst BAME voters from Labour¹⁰⁸⁶.

It is worth noting here that this correlation between Labour Party and voting patterns of ethnic minority groups is fast changing. As in recent years an increasing number of people of ethnic minority descent are joining the “unfriendly party - the Conservative party” to quote Theresa May on the Conservative Party’s effort to reinvent itself to become more attractive to people of ethnic minority descent¹⁰⁸⁷. According to James Kanagasooriam, a policy analyst for a Conservative Party Think Tank, Onward, states that: *There is no disguising it: The Conservative Party has a*

¹⁰⁸⁵Ibid.p.3

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid.p.3

¹⁰⁸⁷ James Kanagasooriam: The Conservatives have no secure future as a governing party unless they win many more ethnic minority votes, Published July 17th 2018:

<https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2018/07/james-kanagasooriam-the-conservatives-have-no-secure-future-as-a-governing-party-unless-they-win-more-ethnic-minority-votes.html>

problem with Black and Ethnic Minority (BAME) voters¹⁰⁸⁸. At last year's General Election, (2017) 73 per cent of BAME voters opted for the Labour Party, compared to a paltry 19 per cent for the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party regressed from its high watermark in 2015, and huge numbers of black and ethnic minority voters who voted Liberal Democrat in 2010 found their home in Corbyn's Labour Party just seven years later¹⁰⁸⁹.

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¹⁰⁹⁰ James Kanagasooriam, Published July 17th 2018, art.cit. p.2

¹⁰⁹¹ James Kanagasooriam: 2018.art.cit. p.3


¹⁰⁹² Ibid.p.4

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid. p.4

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid.p4

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Figure 0-48: Swing votes to Conservative from Labour amongst Whites/BAME 2010



Source:<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/06/12/are-conservatives-really-breaking-through-extend>

Although, the Labour Party, as stated and demonstrated earlier, has had long and established support from the BAME group, the Labour Party in recent times have seen a collapse in their crucial ethnic minority vote since 2010 with three quarters of Indian voters abandoning the party ¹⁰⁹⁷. According to polls Labour are mistaken in their belief

¹⁰⁹⁵Ibid.p.3

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ibid.p.3

¹⁰⁹⁷ Article in the Daily Telegraph by Georgia Graham Published on 24 Dec 2014, Labour's crucial ethnic minority vote set to collapse Exclusive: Detailed polling shows that Indian, Caribbean and African voters are abandoning the party, article by: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11294984/Labours-crucial-ethnic-minority-vote-set-to-collapse.html>

they are "sitting pretty" with the ethnic minority vote, as such Indian, Pakistani, Caribbean and African voters are turning away from the party in huge numbers ¹⁰⁹⁸.

The number of Indian voters identifying with the Labour party has fallen from 77 per cent in 1997 to just 18 per cent in 2014 - a fall of over three quarters, according to the figures from the British Election Study¹⁰⁹⁹. Pakistani support has fallen from 77 to 57 per cent, a fall of 27 per cent¹¹⁰⁰. Meanwhile Caribbean support has dropped 14 per cent from 78 to 67 per cent¹¹⁰¹. Support from the African community has dropped by 20 per cent, from 79 to 63 per cent, the research shows¹¹⁰². According to a recent research one in three people in Britain will be from an ethnic minority within a generation with non-white people will be making up between 20 and 30 per cent of the population by 2050¹¹⁰³. The current share is around 14 per cent.

Dr Maria Sobolewska, an expert from Manchester University and part of the team conducting the Ethnic Minority British Election Study, noted at a Labour Party conference that in 2014: *"What is happening is that the Labour party is sitting pretty, or at least they think they are sitting pretty, they think they have the minorities in the bag. The ethnic minorities are seen to be the core of Labour party vote, they have been for years, for decades but I will make these people here representing Labour a little bit uncomfortable about this assumption that minorities will vote for them as a matter of course"*¹¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ibid

¹⁰⁹⁹ ibid

¹¹⁰⁰ ibid


¹¹⁰¹ Article in the Daily Telegraph by Georgia Graham Published on 24 Dec 2014, Labour's crucial ethnic minority vote set to collapse Exclusive: Detailed polling shows that Indian, Caribbean and African voters are abandoning the party, article by: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11294984/Labours-crucial-ethnic-minority-vote-set-to-collapse.html>

¹¹⁰² ibid

¹¹⁰³ ibidem

¹¹⁰⁴ ibidem

Figure 0-49: Where did the Ethnic minority vote go?



Data from the BES shows how the ethnic minority vote has abandoned the party in recent years

She added: *"Labour is not really sitting pretty on ethnic minorities anymore and in fact it wasn't in 2010 either... we can already see that a lot of the ethnic minority groups, in fact all of the ethnic minority groups supported Labour a lot less even in 2010, but this did not yet make Labour worried. Looking at the 2014 figures I am hoping that all of you from the Labour party are shifting uncomfortably in your seats. This is a disaster. The percentage of people who identify with the Labour party is falling fast. The Conservatives, who only attracted 16 per cent of black and ethnic minority (BME) voters at the last election have, in recent years, set their sights on winning more over to counteract the losses they have made to UKIP¹¹⁰⁵. The December 2019 polls attest to this idea of the Labour Party loosing and have lost the ethnic minority vote. With the Conservative Party's historic win of the general elections, saw this ideological shift from Labour to Conservative, and the election results demonstrates that this is the heaviest election lost from Labour to the Conservatives. Safe Labour constituencies with ethnic minority votes have been lost to the Conservative Party. This is partly because, Brexit has had a homogenous effect on the pattern of ethnic minority voting patterning aligning itself to the voting pattern of the white British electorate¹¹⁰⁶.*

¹¹⁰⁵ ibid

¹¹⁰⁶ McDonnell, A and Curtis, C.2019. How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections. YouGov Data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

The below narrative of a Black Briton who is a third generation Windrush migrant attest to the notion of why some Black Britons are now voting for the Conservative. Diana Young noted that she no longer votes for the Labour Party but the Tory Conservative and her reason for voting for the Conservative Party during the 2019 general election, although her family from three generation of Black Caribbeans have long been traditional Labour voters.

Figure 0-50: Box.3: Narrative of Diana Young, A Black Briton Conservative voter during the 2019 UK General Elections

“What being a Black Tory voter means to me and why I won’t be shamed for it: My parents and grandparents voted Labour for all sorts of reasons. But those reasons don’t necessarily apply to me”¹¹⁰⁷.

As a third-generation Windrush migrant and black Briton who voted for the Conservative Party, I do feel as though I’ve waded into the unknown. Reviewing a political party manifesto and making a choice – especially this one – doesn’t seem like something that’s meant for me. Black people in Britain have traditionally voted for the Labour Party. Most of the Black and Asian people that migrated from the Commonwealth arrived straight into industrial jobs that were heavily unionised, and they therefore voted for the only party that favoured unions.

Working-class values and attitudes to economic resources, cultural interests and education were part of the culture of the Windrush and migrant generations to which my parents and grandparents belonged. They were relatively poor and suffered discrimination in Britain, and I suspect that’s what led them to vote Labour. But in this month’s general election, I had to make a decision: whether to vote according to my parents’ traditional Labour values or my own socioeconomic position. Initially, I was torn. As soon as I turned 18, I knew I would definitely vote for the Labour Party in line

¹¹⁰⁷ Young, 2019, What being a Black Tory voter means to me and why I won’t be shamed for it, The independent 21 December 2019: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/black-british-vote-windrush-generation-boris-johnson-corbyn-conservatives-a9255081.html>

with my family. It simply became a habit to subscribe to the same politics – and while living under their roof, that was important.

But this year, with Jeremy Corbyn as leader, I could no longer vote for the Labour Party. While I respect Labour’s impulse to support the poorest and most marginalised members of British society, their policies have become unpopular. The party’s manifesto seemed somewhat radical: nationalising key industries, including the provision of free broadband, tax rises for the country’s top 5 per cent of earners, a four-day working week,


Labour need to realise that they don’t own the “black vote”. But a vote for the Conservative Party has been met with resentment and disapproval among leftist Black people, many of whom are aggrieved at the party’s historic links with racism and far-right politics.

I was raised in a working-class household. I have worked hard and paid taxes my entire life so that I can invest in my children and their future. What’s the point of working hard just so Corbyn can snatch the fruits of my labour? As a black Briton voting for the Conservatives, I felt like I was choosing the lesser of two evils. And in spite of alleged racism, Islamophobia and now links to far-right fascist parties, I stick by my democratic choice to vote Conservative based on their plans for education, employment, business and the economy.

There’s also Brexit to contend with. I voted to remain within the European Union, but I think it’s vital to respect what was a democratic vote rather than suggest holding a second referendum or reversing Brexit. With this election, the Conservatives have increased their complement of BAME MPs from 19 to 22. I don’t feel overly represented in parliament, but I’m giving Boris Johnson five years to prove that he can bring about the change promised in his manifesto and eliminate the racist political discourse that has dogged his party¹¹⁰⁸.

¹¹⁰⁸ Young. 2019, What being a Black Tory voter means to me and why I won’t be shamed for it, The Independent 21 December 2019: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/black-british-vote-windrush-generation-boris-johnson-corbyn-conservatives-a9255081.html>


Figure 0-51: Ethnic Minority vote by region 2010



Source: Operation Black Vote: <https://www.obv.org.uk/news-blogs/black-british-voters-are-move>

Regional statistics in England on voting pattern of various ethnic groups shows that Labour, particularly in the North and Midlands has high percentage of votes, as illustrated in the above graph. With 60% support in both the Midlands and the North. However, in the South Labour seem to be less popular, but in London Labour seem to have more support.

Figure 0-52: Vote by ethnic background



Source: Operation Black Vote: <https://www.obv.org.uk/news-blogs/black-british-voters-are-move>

The graph above on vote by ethnic minority background, demonstrates that in general, most of the Asian community came out for the Tories and similarly the African, Caribbean and dual ethnicity voters supported Labour but with a significant and growing minority defecting to the Tories:

Asian: 50% Labour, 38% Conservative

Black: 67% Labour, 21% Conservative

Mixed race: 49% Labour, 26% Conservative


In terms of ethnic minority voting based on faith group orientation, the graph below demonstrates that the Christian and Muslim community votes more Labour, whereas the Sikhs and Hindus vote Conservative. As stated earlier in this chapter, what could attest to the Asian British votes for the Conservative party particularly votes from the British Hindus and Sikhs seems to be that those faith groups within the Asian British community are quite conservative and they are those who tend to own small and medium size business, as such they are seduced by the Conservative Party economic policies. According to Rakib Ehsan's article in *The Independent* on why British Asians are now voting for the Conservative Party states that: *Under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, the party is severely disadvantaged among many British Indian voters. Pressure points include the economy, welfare, housing, issues surrounding caste and even foreign policy*¹¹⁰⁹. Another explanation as to why British Hindus and Sikhs are now voting more for the Conservative Party is due to Jeremy Corbyn's stand on the caste system among the Indian community: *Corbyn's opposition on the caste system also puts him at odds with those British Hindus and Sikhs who object to politicians intervening on culturally sensitive issues. They have found the Conservatives to be more sympathetic to their concerns*¹¹¹⁰.

¹¹⁰⁹ Ehsan R. 2017. The Conservatives have stolen the British Indian vote from Labour – here's how, The Independent, 17 May 2017: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/general-election-2017-jeremy-corbyn-labour-party-british-indian-voters-modi-a7742251.html>

¹¹¹⁰ Ehsan R. 2017. Art.cit

Figure 0-53: Ethnic Minority vote by faith group

Ethnic minority vote by faith group




Respondents: Christian (512), Muslim (373), Hindu (223), Sikh (63), *nb small sample; Not religious (363).

Source: Operation Black Vote: <https://www.obv.org.uk/news-blogs/black-british-voters-are-move>

2.1.4 The influence of faith groups on Ghanaians diaspora and Ghanaian diaspora political orientations in the UK

Figure 0-54: Q=if yes to respondents who voted in UK, which party they voted for in the last elections, 52 Ghanaians were interviewed in London



Source: Field work result findings London respondents December 2012

Ghanaian churches in London, as stated previously, remain the place of political mobilisation and engagement in both UK politics and transnational politics towards Accra. Previous studies on the ties between church mobilization and political

engagement, suggests that evangelical Protestant churches serve as a space to mobilize their members for political campaigns, while others argue that they encourage withdrawal from political life through religious indoctrination. Campbell 2004 hypothesises that the tight social networks formed through this intensive church activity can at times facilitate rapid and intense political mobilisation in encouraging church members to vote in the same direction.

Campbell further argues that the political potency of evangelical Protestants is found in their potential for mobilisation, not in their actual mobilisation. Indeed, evangelical Protestant denominations ask for so much of their members' time and energy that they pull their members out of participation in the wider community¹¹¹¹. Frequent participation in church activities, however, thickens social networks that can be used sporadically for rapid and intensive political mobilisation and as such it leads to having a spill-over effect from church participation to political participation. The impression of evangelical churches as hotbeds of activism, therefore, stems from periodic bursts of mobilisation, rather than a sustained effort, notes Campbell¹¹¹².

Campbell also contends with the premise that churches can be understood as institutions that shape their members' behaviour¹¹¹³. Specifically, different types of churches provide their members with varying behavioural incentives for participation in religious activity, which in turn have systematic implications for participation in political activity¹¹¹⁴. This approach is similar in spirit to the work of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (VSB) in *Voice and Equality* (1995), as they also look to the organisational characteristics of churches in order to understand their impact on political participation. VSB focus on the opportunities for the development of civic skills, arguing that a church which is organized hierarchically (e.g. the Catholic church) will provide fewer opportunities for its members to develop such skills than a more congregational based organization (e.g., Protestant churches). By "civic skills," VSB means the capacity to engage in the prosaic activities by which people express voice in the political process-such as running meetings or giving speeches. In VSB's civic voluntarism model, these skills are resources that facilitate political participation, as they can be employed in the pursuit of political ends.

¹¹¹¹ Campbell. D 2004. *Acts of Faith: Churches and Political Engagement Political Behaviour*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 160

¹¹¹² Campbell. D 2004. *Art.Cit.* p162

¹¹¹³ *Ibidem*

¹¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*

It underscores the utility in viewing churches as institutions, demonstrating that even a basic understanding of their different institutional characteristics can illuminate our understanding of how America's churches affect political participation. However, VSB's focus on how hierarchy relates to the development of civic skills only captures a single dimension of churches' impact on political involvement. Other factors matter too. For example, Jones-Correa and Leal counter VSB's emphasis on the link between hierarchy and civic skills, stressing instead that churches are civic associations and thus "important conduits of political information and recruitment" (2001, p. 754), regardless of their organizational structure.

To continue in similar direction, members of the very conservative wing of Ghanaian churches in the UK in recent years advocates for their members to vote for the Conservative party as an alternative to the Labour party. Once more this is a sign of a paradigm shift from traditional Labour Ghanaian voters to the Conservative Party via the influence of church participation having a spill-over effect on political participation. The cleavage between Conservative, Labour Parties and faith group support within Ghanaian diaspora in London is also echoed among Ghanaian professionals in London and British politicians of Ghanaians descent. The members of these elites group play a role as to which party the community members ought to vote during election period in the UK.

From a political participation viewpoint, the 2010 UK general elections saw two Conservative Party Members of Parliament who are of Ghanaian descent to enter the House of Commons for the first time: Kwesi Kwarteng, and Samuel Gyimah. Adam Afriyie on the other hand, became Conservative Party Member of Parliament in 2005, becoming the first Black British Conservative Party Member of Parliament. These three Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative MP's maintained their seats in parliament during the 2015 and 2017 general elections. This, therefore, indicates the support for the Conservative party is gaining currency among ethnic minority groups, and not only amongst British Asians as analysed previously. The Conservative party has long been viewed as an elitist party and with liberal economic policies, as such the working class and people of ethnic minority, particularly among the Black British community could not identify with the party's ideology.

It is therefore important to state here that the cited examples of the three Anglo-Ghanaian Tory MPs could be classified as elite professionals within the Ghanaian community in London either through their educational and professional achievement and therefore could explain their affinity with the Conservative Party.

Below are the biographies and political trajectory of these three Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative Party MPs. By zooming on their biographies aids to understand the political participation of some elite members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London. As such, this mode of political participation can be classified as a top-bottom approach and how such top-bottom approach has an influence on the Ghanaian community's political participation in UK politics:

Figure 0-55: Box.4: Adam Afriyie, an Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative Party Member of Parliament for Windsor.

Adam Afriyie is British Tory Conservative Party Politician of Anglo-Ghanaian descent and a member of Parliament (MP) for Windsor. He was first elected to his seat in 2005 and then re-elected at the 2010, 2015 2017 and 2019 general elections. He has been a member of the Conservative Party since 1987 ¹¹¹⁵.

Adam Afriyie was born in 1965 in a middle-class neighbourhood of Wimbledon in South-West London to an English mother and a Ghanaian Father¹¹¹⁶. As a result of his parents' divorce, he was later raised in a social housing estate in poor and rough working-class neighbourhood of Peckham South East of London. He was educated at Imperial Collage London, where he graduated with a B.Sc. in Agricultural Economics and went on to become a successful entrepreneur in the information and technology sector ¹¹¹⁷. He is the first Black British Tory-Conservative MP, his view about being the first Black Tory MP: *"I consider myself post-racial, I don't see myself as a black man. I refuse to be defined by my colour or pigeon-holed in that way"* ¹¹¹⁸. From a poor neighbourhood in South East London to becoming a member of Parliament for Windsor a predominately white upper-

¹¹¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Afriyie

¹¹¹⁶ Ibidem

¹¹¹⁷ Adam Afriyie: From Peckham Council Flat to Shadow Tory Minister: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council-house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html>

¹¹¹⁸ Adam Afriyie: From Peckham Council Flat to Shadow Tory Minister: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council-house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html>

middle class neighbourhood, is an indication of the changing face of the Tory Conservative Party membership's profile.

On Brexit Adam Afriyie indicated on Twitter that: *"I voted to leave the EU this week...and It looks like the majority of Conservative MPs agree. Only 131 voted to delay, the rest voted against delay (97) or abstained in defiance of a 3-line whip (80). Let's stop the uncertainty, leave now & move on as a nation¹¹¹⁹".* On voting for No-Deal Brexit Adam Afriyie stated: *Last night I voted to keep no-deal on the table. 75% of MPs voted that way last year, but many MPs have now done the exact opposite & want to stop the UK leaving the EU. The duplicity is astounding at times. I'll continue the fight to respect the referendum¹¹²⁰.* On the notion of playing the role of a "broker" between the UK government and Ghana, in 2017 saw Adam Afriyie representing the UK as the trade envoy to represent the Queen and the UK government on trade related issues in Ghana during President Nana Akuffo-Addo's inauguration. *On behalf of Her Majesty's government, the UK Prime Minister's Trade Envoy to Ghana Adam Afriyie will attend the Inauguration of the Republic of Ghana's President- elect Nana Akufo- Addo on January 7th 2017. His visit will strengthen and promote the existing trade relations between the two countries – putting partnership at the centre of bilateral relations. Alongside meeting key members of the incoming administration, he will see members of the newly founded UK-Ghana Chamber of Commerce (UKGCC), leading businesses in Ghana, and infrastructure experts to discuss how the UK can support Ghana to achieve its infrastructure development goals. Ghana is the UK's fourth largest export market in Sub-Saharan Africa¹¹²¹.*

¹¹¹⁹ Adam Afriyie on voting to Leave the EU: <https://twitter.com/AdamAfriyie>

¹¹²⁰ Adam Afriyie on No- Deal Brexit: <https://twitter.com/adamafriyie/status/1106005048448962560?lang=en>

¹¹²¹ British High Commission Ghana 05 January 2017: UK Prime Minister's Trade Envoy Adam Afriyie, MP visits Ghana: Adam Afriyie, UK Trade Envoy will be attending the inauguration of Ghana's President elect as well as promote existing trade relations: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-prime-ministers-trade-envoy-adam-afriyie-mp-visits-ghana>

Figure 0-56:Box: .5 Samuel Gyimah, An Anglo-Ghanaian, former Conservative Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovations in 2018

Born in the UK in 1976 in Beaconsfield to Ghanaian parents, his father was a medical doctor and his mother a nurse in the UK¹¹²². When he was six years old his parents split up and his mother returned to Ghana with Gyimah, his younger brother and sister while his father remained in the UK¹¹²³. In Ghana he attended one of Accra's prestigious schools, Achimota School, he returned to the UK to sit his GCSE and "A" LEVEL and proceeded to Oxford University where he read Politics Philosophy and Economics and was once elected as President of Oxford Union¹¹²⁴. Upon graduating from Oxford, he worked as an investment Banker with Goldman Sachs. He later left the City and investment Banking to venture into politics with the Conservative Party. He was elected in May 2010 as Conservative Party member of Parliament for East Surry, in South East London, an area in London with a huge population of people of ethnic minority descent including Ghanaian diaspora community¹¹²⁵. He served in Prime Minister Theresa May's government, as Minister of State for Prisons between June 2016 to January 2018, and later appointed as Minister of State for Universities, Sciences, Research and Innovations between January to November 2018.

On Brexit he supported the UK's bid to remain in the European Union, as a result he resigned in November 2018 over Theresa May's Brexit deal, which he deemed will make the UK weaker economically and politically¹¹²⁶. Sam Gyimah defected to the Liberal Democratic Party as a result of voting against a No-Deal Brexit. He notes: *"I think I'll probably spend the next few days saying, 'Sam Gyimah, Liberal Democrat MP', and get used to that first. There is a huge emotional side to it. I've been involved in the Conservative party for two decades. I've fought for the party. I have an unusual background – I'm not your typical Tory recruit. I've spent a long-time*

¹¹²²Sam Gyimah Bio https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Gyimah

¹¹²³ Cassidy.S. 2014, Sam Gyimah interview: Life-changing events often occur in early days of learning, The Independent, 9 September 2014.p.1

¹¹²⁴ Cassidy.S. 2014, Art.cit. p.1

¹¹²⁵ Ibid. p.2

¹¹²⁶ Ibid.p.2

evangelising about why people and in particular people of ethnic minority descent should look at the Conservative party seriously. It is sad that I find myself at a crossroads. I am an outcast in the Conservative party. But that's Brexit. It has divided families. The country is divided. This is a huge fault line. The withdrawal of the whip meant I just had to face a stark reality – being in the Conservative party now means you're signing up to no deal or hard Brexit, or you'll be cast into the wilderness”¹¹²⁷. Upon joining the Liberal Democrats in September 2019, he was appointed Shadow Secretary for Business, Energy and Industrial Energy the following month. At the December 2019 general elections, he stood for the Liberal Democrats in Kensington and finished third with 21% of the vote¹¹²⁸.

Figure 0-57:Box. 6 Kwesi Alfred Addo Kwarteng, Minister of State for Business, Energy and Clean Growth

Kwasi Alfred Addo Kwarteng, currently Minister of State for Business, Energy and Clean Growth, appointed on 24 July 2019, by Boris Johnson, previously he was Under Secretary of State for the Department of Exiting the European Union appointed in November 2018¹¹²⁹. Kwesi Kwarteng is an Anglo-Ghanaian, British Conservative Party Politician.

He was born in 1975 in North London. His parents migrated from Ghana to the UK as students, his father studied at the London School of Political Sciences and Economics and became an economist with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London¹¹³⁰. His mother studied Law and became a barrister in London. Kwesi Kwarteng attended the prestigious Eton College on a scholarship (the King's Scholar)¹¹³¹. He went on to read British History at Cambridge University then a master's degree on a Kennedy Scholarship at Harvard University. He completed a PhD at Cambridge University in 2000. He was elected in 2010 as a Conservative Party member of Parliament for Spelthorne in Surrey¹¹³². On Brexit in 2016, Kwesi Kwarteng supported the UK's bid

¹¹²⁷Sam Gyimah: 'I am an outcast in the Tory party':

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/14/sam-gyimah-joins-lib-dems>

¹¹²⁸ UK results: Conservatives win majority: <https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/constituencies/E14000768>

¹¹²⁹ Kwesi Kwarteng profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kwasi_Kwarteng

¹¹³⁰ Kwesi Kwarteng profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kwasi_Kwarteng

¹¹³¹ Kwesi Kwarteng profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kwasi_Kwarteng

¹¹³² Kwesi Kwarteng Bio: <https://web.archive.org/web/20100510223513/http://www.kwart2010.com/about/>

to Leave the European Union¹¹³³. This support to Leave the EU could explain the reason why he was designated as an undersecretary for UK leaving the EU. Kwarteng has enjoyed support from Boris Johnson, while he was the Mayor of London and even supported Kwarteng's bid to become an MP for Spelthorne in 2010.

In Kwasi Kwarteng's bid to win his seat as MP for Spelthorne, he had the support of some influential Tory members of the day: the former Chancellor of the Exchequer in David Cameron's government George Osborne stated: "*Kwasi is a great asset to the party. He has a lively mind, lots of energy and would make a fine MP!*"

Boris Johnson the then Mayor of London noted: "*Kwasi Kwarteng is one of the most intellectually able people I know and would make an outstanding MP. Select Kwasi now*"¹¹³⁴.

This support and proximity with Boris Johnson could be attributed to why Kwarteng has been made the Business Secretary upon Johnson assuming office as Prime Minister.

His views on ethnicity and political representation within the Conservative Party, Kwarteng notes: "*In Westminster, the atmosphere is different. There is a consistent expectation in the media that MPs from ethnic minorities will engage with 'black' issues, like knife crime in London. But they never talk about the incredible appetite for entrepreneurship found among parts of the African community in Britain. It's as if being from a particular background gives a politician a God-given right to speak on behalf of every single person from that background. This is the heart of identity politics, which has dominated the left for a couple of decades. Of course, linking ethnic background to a political party is a fairly crazy thing to do. There are certain patterns but it's not as if mere skin colour or ethnicity should proscribe the political choices an individual make. It seems to me the very definition of racism to believe all members of an ethnic group will think the same thing, politically*". "I make a point of attending diaspora events – when the organisers give me enough notice. It's mostly because I remember that when I applied to be on the Conservative Candidates' list in 2003, there were no ethnic-minority Conservative MPs. There were none. There were no 'role models', or mentors, or anything of that kind. It was only with the election of Shailesh Vara in North West Cambridgeshire and Adam Afriyie in Windsor, both in 2005, that the modern era

¹¹³³ Kwasi Kwarteng Bio: <https://web.archive.org/web/20100510223513/http://www.kwart2010.com/about/>

¹¹³⁴ Kwasi Kwarteng Bio: <https://web.archive.org/web/20100510223513/http://www.kwart2010.com/about/>

of MPs from ethnic minorities in the Conservative party really began”. As immigrants settle in Britain, I expect more members of parliament will be drawn from the diverse ethnic and cultural heritages found in the UK. This is an exciting development, but we must not expect them all to be mouthpieces for their ethnic communities. The first job, and by far the most important, for an MP is to represent his or her constituents, from whatever race, creed or social background they come. It’s that simple “¹¹³⁵.

Samuel Gyimah an Oxford educated and a former city banker, Kwesi Kwarteng, a Cambridge University PhD and Harvard educated historian, Adam Afriyie an Imperial College graduate and wealthy businessman, are all second-generation Ghanaians with no political affiliations to Ghana. In other words, their political engagement is purely based in England and from a top-bottom approach, the constituencies they represent tend to be a mixture of constituencies with white British areas, which are predominately white middle-class neighbourhood and some migrants centred communities including Ghanaians. Among the cited examples of the three Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative MPs, Adam Afriyie uses his role in UK politics to promote Ghana in business terms in the UK and uses his position to represent the UK in Ghana as was noted with the example of him representing the UK as an envoy during the 2017 Ghanaian presidential inauguration. This therefore positions him as a “broker” serving both the UK and Ghana. For the other two Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative MPs, Sam Gyimah and Kwesi Kwarteng, play less of the role of “brokers” between the UK and Ghana with their position. In the case of Sam Gyimah while he was an MP for East Surrey in South East London, members of the Ghanaian community residing in the constituency were urged to vote for Gyimah regardless of the Ghanaian community being traditionally Labour voters¹¹³⁶. The Ghanaian community leaders in those areas urged its member to vote Conservative in the spirit of solidarity because of his Ghanaian origin. This political move is a mark of solidarity rather than voting on the basis of the community members

¹¹³⁵ Kwesi Kwarteng interview with Ture African online: His views on British politics and representations of people of African descent in UK politics: “British politician Kwasi Kwarteng on why he doesn’t need to represent ‘black’ issues”

<https://trueafrica.co/article/british-politician-kwasi-kwarteng-on-why-identity-politics-are-undemocratic/>

¹¹³⁶ Fieldwork interview 2014 with leader of the Ghana Union Association in London

individual political convictions¹¹³⁷. Ghanaian churches in those areas of London, where Gyimah stood as member of parliament served as a space to mobilised members of the Ghanaian communities during both local and general UK election.

Social mobility has played a paramount role in the political trajectories of the three Anglo- Ghanaian Tory MPs, for example Adam Afriyie noted that: *" I grew up in poverty in social housing in Peckham surrounded by some of the most violent estates in London. My mother is white English, my father Ghanaian, but I never knew my father until I was much older and my mother, Gwen, brought us up alone. She was my rock, the gel at the centre of my life. At home life was difficult as from time to time, we run out of food. So, I know what it is to go hungry, I had to pull myself up by my bootstraps. Growing up in Peckham, I had to ask myself: Am I a victim here? Or am I going to sit down and work hard? And I made it into an ex-grammar school, and then into university and business¹¹³⁸."* On what gave him the impetus to change his circumstances Afriyie noted: *"I think it was partly desperation; the need to escape my circumstances. And a lot of it was driven by a sense that I had to become financially secure, so I could take care of my family and my future wife. Aside from education, I think that business, entrepreneurship, is really the main engine of social mobility. It has to be at the heart of the Conservative Party narrative¹¹³⁹.*

On Afriyie's reasons for joining the Conservative Party, he notes that: *"I was an outsider, and to this day, it defines me. When I joined the Tories in 1989, it was a deeply unfashionable move for a man of colour to make¹¹⁴⁰.*

Afriyie's view about the Tory Party being perceived as the "unfriendly Party" towards people of ethnic minority descent he observed that: *" I'm hopeful that the complexion of the party will change. Currently we have 12 Black and Asian candidates standing in winnable seats. If my role has been to encourage that trend, then I'm proud to have played a part. But it's the merit of candidates that count, not the colour of their skin. If there'd*

¹¹³⁷Fieldwork interview with M. Saaka 26 December 2012

¹¹³⁸ Ibidem

¹¹³⁹ "I'm a great believer in social mobility" – Left Foot Forward talks to Tory MP Adam Afriyie: <https://leftfootforward.org/2014/04/im-a-great-believer-in-social-mobility-left-foot-forward-talks-to-tory-mp-adam-afriyie/>

¹¹⁴⁰ Adam Afriyie: From Peckham Council Flat to Shadow Tory Minister: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council-house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html>

been all-Black shortlists, I'd never have stood¹¹⁴¹." And Afriyie's view about the Labour Party and its ideology: "I learned from my mother that self-help is the route out of poverty. Labour has this terribly patronising attitude. They see you as helpless and in need of a handout, and their policies breed dependency. It's a terrible trap¹¹⁴²."

For Kwesi Kwarteng who views identity politics with regards to ethnic minorities representing constituencies with high percentage of people of migrant descent to be bad for democracy: *"This is the heart of identity politics, which has dominated the left for a couple of decades. Of course, linking ethnic background to a political party is a fairly crazy thing to do. There are certain patterns but it's not as if mere skin colour or ethnicity should proscribe the political choices an individual make. It seems to me the very definition of racism to believe all members of an ethnic group will think the same thing, politically. As immigrants settle in Britain, I expect more members of parliament will be drawn from the diverse ethnic and cultural heritages found in the UK. This is an exciting development, but we must not expect them all to be mouthpieces for their ethnic communities"*¹¹⁴³.

The life trajectories of these Anglo-Ghanaian Tory politicians, indicates that they were not born with a silver spoon. In other words, not coming from a traditional middle class or upper middle-class background which most Tory members are often associated with being middle and upper middle classes. These three Anglo-Ghanaians became successful as self-made men through hard work and through attending some of Britain's best educational institutions such as Oxford University, Cambridge University and Imperial Collage London. By attending such prestigious institutions also enabled them to cultivate and build a social capital based on networking with people who can aid them in advancing their political trajectory. Their personal achievement is what made them attractive to the Tory Party and not necessarily their social background¹¹⁴⁴. As without their personal

¹¹⁴¹ Adam Afriyie: From Peckham Council Flat to Shadow Tory Minister: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council-house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html>

¹¹⁴² Adam Afriyie: From Peckham Council Flat to Shadow Tory Minister: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council-house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html>

¹¹⁴³ Kwesi Kwarteng interview with Ture Africa online: His views on British politics and representations of people of African descent in UK politics: "British politician Kwasi Kwarteng on why he doesn't need to represent 'black' issues"

¹¹⁴⁴ Goodman.P 2014 What does the Conservative Party offer ethnic minorities? Article in the Spectator 5 May 2014: <https://beta.spectator.co.uk/article/what-does-the-conservative-party-offer-ethnic-minorities->

success, they would not have stood the chance of becoming members of the Conservative Party, their personal success made colour bar was no longer an eliminating factor to become a party member¹¹⁴⁵. This could therefore reinforce the idea that the Conservative party remains elitist, although ethnicity is less of an issue today providing that one is successful socially. Another factor is that the Political and demographic landscape in Britain has evolved since 1948 with arrival of Empire Windrush, and mass labour migrants to the UK from its former colonies in the Caribbean¹¹⁴⁶. But, also the race riots in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s as demonstrated in part one of this thesis, has paved way for political representation of people of ethnic minority descent in parliament as part of the recommendation made by Lord Scarman in his report, in the aftermath of the Brixton race riot of 1986 to curb racial and institutional discrimination of people of ethnic minority descent in the UK ¹¹⁴⁷.

The Labour party, on the other hand, has long had a history with ethnic minority support as early as the 1960s, as it has been mentioned several times in the above chapters. The Labour Party being the Party often associated with the working-class, people of ethnic minority were drawn to the Party's egalitarian political ideology. The Labour Party was the first Party in the UK to present aspiring Black and Asian MPs in mostly their inner London constituencies with a larger migrant community in 1987¹¹⁴⁸. The box below presents the life and political trajectory of Lord Paul Boateng a second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian politician. How his life and political career trajectory has enabled him to play the role of a "Broker" both in the UK and in Ghana:

Field work interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London, 20th August 2010

Figure 0-58:Box.7: Lord Paul Boateng

Lord Paul Yaw Boateng: *I was born in Hackney, East London in 1951, I am of mixed parentage. My father is Ghanaian Kweku Boateng and my mother Scottish Eleanor Peggy Boateng. My mother and my father met when they were both students. My father studied Law at King's Collage University of London. He was called to the English Bar*

¹¹⁴⁵Ibidem

¹¹⁴⁶ Olusoga, D., 2016. *Black and British: A forgotten history*. Pan Macmillan.p.21

¹¹⁴⁷ Roberts, K. and Benyon, U.U.I.J., 1984. Scarman and After: Essay's Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, The Riots and Their Aftermath.p.19

¹¹⁴⁸ Anwar, M., 2001. The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(3), p.541

at Grey's Inn and later called to Ghanaian Bar in 1955 and became a Lawyer and politician when he returned to the Gold Coast. My mother is a teacher and a civil liberty activist, a unionist and a member of the Communist Party in London. I come from a political family. My mother and my father were both members of the colonial freedom movement. In 1953, my father returned to the Gold Coast to prepare for my mother and myself to join him. I attended the Ghana International School in Accra and the Accra Academy Boys Secondary School in Accra. My father was the first Ghanaian to qualify as a Lawyer in the UK. He worked in private practise as a Lawyer and a politician in the Gold Coast. He was the legal representative and lawyer for the CPP Party. My father played an important part in Ghanaian politics so, all my life I have been aware of politics, politics was important to us as a family. My father became a member of Parliament for Old Tafo in the Akyem Abuakwa area and I use to visit his constituency with him. My father became a cabinet minister, minister of information for Kwame Nkrumah's government.

All the world leaders were coming to Ghana, President Nixon came, as well as inspirational Black diaspora thinkers such as George Padmore and W.E.B Dubois. My father and my mother were friends with the Padmore's they all visited our home on a regular basis, they were all part of my story. It was that sort of environment that I was brought-up in. So, you realise that others from the diaspora were all part of your story, when growing up. We lived in a country where you were part of history in the making right before your eyes. But the 1966 coup d'état happened and everything changed. It was a traumatising experience for us as a family, my father was thrown into prison by the military government without a trial for many years. We moved back to the UK when I was 15 years with my mother and my sister Rosemary to live in what Americans call a "housing project" here we call it the "council housing estate" to put it differently a social housing estate¹¹⁴⁹.

Career as a solicitor and later as a barrister

I read Law at the University of Bristol. I trained as a solicitor to begin with, because I wanted to work in my community, so I decided to qualify as a solicitor, rather than a barrister, because only solicitors have the right to operate in communities as a legal representative, I later trained as a Barrister. At that time, I wanted to become a solicitor

¹¹⁴⁹ Fieldwork interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London 20th August 2010

to work in the Law Centre in Paddington in West London. This decision to work at the Law Centre as a Solicitor, brought legal aid to the community that were struggling with: poor housing, police discrimination, denial to access to opportunities, denial to employment and access to benefit. People I represented in Court were the working class, ethnic minorities, Blacks, Asians, disadvantaged young people in society, disabled people and women. I started to publicise their concerns in the media whether it was discriminations from the police or the migrancy Act. I was a Lawyer and political Lawyer, I represented member of the community in London, Brent, Liverpool, Bradford, Leeds etc... I also represented the Miners Union. I was a strong activist in London and protested against the Apartheid regime in South Africa¹¹⁵⁰.

Forming of the Black Section of the Labour Party

We formed the Black Section of the Labour Party in 1983 myself, Diane Abbott and Sharon Atkins to demand representation of Black people at all levels of the Labour Party. This was in the aftermath of the riots in Brixton. The Black Section of the Labour Party demanded that Black people in the Labour Party should have the same rights as anyone in the party. The Black Section was an autonomous organisation within the Party. we demanded that things needed to change for example, they should put forward candidates of ethnic minority descent to represent the party in constituencies with high ethnic minority populations. In areas such as: Hackney, Leicester, Tottenham and Brent. Once we entered parliament on May 7th 1987, there were other struggles. You entered Parliament as a Black Member of Parliament, but you were more than that. I never accepted the label Black Member of Parliament. I am a member of parliament who is Black. I choose not to be defined by the colour of my skin. I am a person who is very proud of my African heritage and I have always been. I grew-up in Ghana and in the UK and I have strong sense of identity, which is rooted in both worlds, I am therefore comfortable in my skin in both worlds. If you want to succeed as an ethnic minority MP and a leader you have to represent everyone and the whole of the country and not just people of ethnic minority descent¹¹⁵¹.

Becoming a Minister in Government

¹¹⁵⁰ Fieldwork interview with Lord Boateng in London 20 August 2010

¹¹⁵¹ Fieldwork Interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London 20th August 2010

I started from the bottom, when we were elected to government in 1997, I became a junior minister. Again, you work your way up. I was parliamentary under-secretary, which is the bottom of the rank. I then became a Minister for State at the Home Office (Ministry of Interior). And in 2002 I became a cabinet minister chief secretary to the Treasury, becoming the first Black Cabinet Minister in the History of British Politics. Throughout my position and ministerial career, I never forgot where I came from, my background and my roots. I never forgot and have not forgotten of the impact of racism on the people of ethnic minority descent in the UK¹¹⁵².

African roots in Government

When I was chief secretary of state, I worked on African Economic issues on the African Commission report with colleagues in the Department of International Development on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program and initiative. On the African Commission I worked with a number of African Finance Ministers on many economic policies including the Diaspora Bond. Whiles as minister matters concerning Africa was not far removed even when I was carrying out my ministerial duties.

Upon winning his seat as an MP in 1987, during his victory speech he stated: “*We can never be free in Brent until South Africa is free too, he then declares “Brent South today, tomorrow Soweto”¹¹⁵³. He successfully retained his seat as Brent South MP from 1987 to 2005. Upon assuming his new position as Cabinet Minister Lord Boateng reiterated to media what he mentioned during my interview with him: “my colour is part of me, but I do not want to be defined by my colour ¹¹⁵⁴”.* After thirty years of active politics under the Labour Party and his activities in civil rights matters in Britain and other parts of the World notably in Africa, especially during Apartheid South Africa. In 2005 Lord Boateng was made British High Commissioner to South Africa (British Ambassador to South Africa 2005-2009), making him the first Black British Ambassador, and particularly being appointed as British Ambassador to South Africa was an acknowledgment to his

¹¹⁵² Fieldwork Interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London 20th August 2010

¹¹⁵³ Today Brent South, tomorrow Soweto: Africa lures Boateng:

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/today-brent-south-tomorrow-soweto-africa-lures-boateng-8004396.html>

¹¹⁵⁴ Today Brent South, tomorrow Soweto: Africa lures Boateng:

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/today-brent-south-tomorrow-soweto-africa-lures-boateng-8004396.html>

contribution and work towards Africa whiles in British politics¹¹⁵⁵. In an interview on his appointment as British High Commissioner to South Africa he noted that: *"I think anyone who knows me knows that South Africa, Africa and the cause for development and justice in that continent has been a lifetime passion. I grew up in Africa, mentioned South Africa in my election address in 1987, and I am delighted to have this post. For so many people in Britain regardless of race, country, city or town, they see Britain's role in Africa being of central importance"*¹¹⁵⁶.

He now serves on many House of Lords advisory Committee Boards on matter pertaining to developmental challenges in Africa. He equally advocates for developmental initiatives on behalf of Ghana in the UK. And when in Ghana he brings the UK to Ghana, he plays an important role as a “bridge builder” and a “broker” utilizing his experiences and knowledge of both worlds to serve both countries.

Lord Boateng further noted in a concluding remark during the interview that looking at the tapestry of his life he followed his father’s foots steps, as he became a lawyer, a politician and cabinet minister just as his father did. This therefore means that his background had a major influence on his political aspirations and political career.

An interesting correlation between Lord Boateng the first Black British cabinet minister under Labour Party government and Adam Afriyie first Black British Tory Conservative MP, both mix-race of Ghanaian descent and both equally stating at different stages that they do not wish to be reduced by the colour of their skin in reference to their achievements in politics and their political positions. When Lord Paul Boateng was appointed 2002 as cabinet minister to the Treasury in Blair’s government, he noted that he wanted to be judged on his performance rather than his colour. *"First and foremost, I am a cabinet minister, my colour is part of me but I do not choose to be defined by my colour. I work for a world in which people are not judged by their colour but by the content of their character. I want to be judged by my work in this*

¹¹⁵⁵ Field work interview in London with Lord Paul Boateng 10 June 2010

¹¹⁵⁶ Today Brent South, tomorrow Soweto: Africa lures Boateng:

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/today-brent-south-tomorrow-soweto-africa-lures-boateng-8004396.html>

position¹¹⁵⁷." In 2005 when Adam Afriyie won his seat as Member of Parliament for Windsor, the first Black British Tory Conservative Party MP, he also stated: "*I consider myself post-racial, I don't see myself as a black man. I refuse to be defined by my colour or pigeon-holed in that way*¹¹⁵⁸." These statements could be translated as that although both men are British politicians of ethnic minority descent, they view their representation in politics to be a wider representation within their constituencies and in national affairs. The above statements by these Anglo-Ghanaian politicians can also be interpreted as being second-generation Ghanaians and participating in British politics their identities can no longer be pigeon-holed to a specific community rather their identities are now woven into the fabric of British society and notably within its political arena. Paradoxically, both Boateng and Afriyie claim to be post-race, but in reality, their identity in one way or the other is still tied to their political achievement, as it has been mentioned previously, they both represented the UK in Ghana either as UK business envoys or UK international development envoys as a result of their dual heritage and connection to Ghana and Africa.

Lord Boateng, a member of the Labour Party could be classified as an educated elite. Lord Boateng is a seasoned politician who prides himself in advocating for the political inclusion of minority groups in society and development within urban communities in London¹¹⁵⁹. In contrast to the Conservative MPs of Ghanaian descent, Lord Boateng has and maintains strong links with Ghana and is an active member of the Ghanaian community in London. But politically, Lord Boateng just as the other Anglo-Ghanaian politicians only participates in UK politics and not Ghanaian politics. In an interview Lord Boateng stated his reason for only engaging in UK politics: *I made a conscious decision not to get involved and entangled in Ghanaian politics for two reasons: 1) Because of my father and what he went through in Ghanaian politics, he was thrown into jail for many years without any trial and this affected us as a family. 2) I live in the UK and political issues in the UK concerns me more directly than Ghanaian politics. I also think that one Boateng is enough for*

¹¹⁵⁷ History made as Boateng becomes first black cabinet minister:

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/may/30/uk.Whitehall1>

¹¹⁵⁸ "I'm a great believer in social mobility" – Left Foot Forward talks to Tory MP Adam Afriyie:

<https://leftfootforward.org/2014/04/im-a-great-believer-in-social-mobility-left-foot-forward-talks-to-tory-mp-adam-afriyie/>

¹¹⁵⁹ The First Black Parliamentarians in our Times: <http://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/history-of-politics/the-first-black-parliamentarians-in-our-times/>

Ghanaian politics... I also made a decision not take-up positions in the UK that involved Ghanaian politics. Rather as I became active participant in British politics, my job was to support Ghana's development. Therefore, this made me apolitical in terms of Ghanaian politics, which meant that each time I visited Ghana, I made a courtesy call to the president, the vice-president and leaders of the opposition party. I also pay curtsey call to traditional rulers and chiefs, such as the Asantehene, the Okyehene, the Ga Mantse, the Ewe chief and chiefs from the Northern region of Ghana¹¹⁶⁰.

Lord Boateng is a practicing Christian and lay Methodist church preacher, as a result he is well appreciated among Ghanaians in general but more so Ghanaian Christians in the UK, this affiliation therefore means that the Labour Party is well positioned in getting support from Ghanaian faith groups and churches in London¹¹⁶¹.

The December 2019 general elections in the UK saw two second-generation British-Ghanaian females being elected to parliament: Bell Ribeiro-Addy and Abena Opong-Asare both becoming first female Anglo-Ghanaian MPs under the ticket of the Labour Party¹¹⁶². Bell Ribeiro-Addy is the new MP for Streatham in South West London an area with high concentration of people of ethnic minority descent, also it is a safe Labour seat since 1992¹¹⁶³. A UK population census data indicates that 22.3% of residents in Streatham consider themselves as Black¹¹⁶⁴. Abena Opong-Asare is the new Labour MP for Erith and Thamesmead in South East London. A 2011 census revealed that 35.58% of residents in the Thamesmead Moorings ward described themselves as Black African, the highest percentage in both London and the UK, Thamesmead East had the second highest at 34.88%¹¹⁶⁵. This therefore confirms the idea that constituencies with high ethnic minority population tends to vote Labour and the Labour Party presents candidates for such areas who are of ethnic minority descent to reflect the population demographics of the area. Both Ribeiro-Addy and Opong-Asare are university graduates both hold Masters Degrees, they both served in different capacities as advisors to Labour MPs, prior

¹¹⁶⁰ Fieldwork interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London 20th August 2010

¹¹⁶¹ Field work interview with Lord Paul Boateng in London June 2010

¹¹⁶² Four Ghanaians win seats in UK Parliament:

<https://www.peacefonline.com/pages/local/news/201912/397517.php>

¹¹⁶³ Anseau. J. 2009. What does the 2001 Census tell us about the new parliamentary constituencies?

<https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fpt.2009.6.pdf>

¹¹⁶⁴ Ibidem

¹¹⁶⁵ Wikipedia, Abena Opong- Asare profile:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140809104319/http://data.london.gov.uk/datastorefiles/visualisations/atlas/2011-rate-diversity-ward/atlas.html>

to being elected as MPs themselves. Ribeiro-Addy and Oppong-Asare both supported the Remain campaign during the UK referendum in 2016 and were opposed to Brexit. These Anglo-Ghanaian MPs often use their positions to raise the profile of Ghana in UK Parliament. An example was a maiden speech made in Parliament by Bell Ribeiro-Addy on issues pertaining to colonialism and her Ghanaian roots: *I am proud to be the daughter of Ghanaian migrants, and they are even prouder than myself and my honourable Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead (Abena Oppong-Asare) are jointly the first women of Ghanaian heritage to sit in this House. The support we have received from the Ghanaian community in the UK and globally has been immeasurable. Ghanaian Brits boast many notable names including Stormzy; June Sarpong; the editor of Vogue, Edward Enninful; and too many others to count. But as I am often reminded, the most important British-Ghanaian to ever walk this earth is of course my Mum.*

I cite my heritage not just because it is important to me, but because it underpins my experience in this country, my country, and my fear as racism and other hate crimes are on the rise. Today, we are debating Global Britain. There is the saying that “If you don’t know where you’ve come from, you don’t know where you’re going.” It strikes me that as a country we cannot begin to fulfil the idea of Global Britain until we first address the historic injustices of the British Empire, injustices including slavery and colonialism; first, because it is the right thing to do, but also because we may soon find ourselves out in the cold if we do not. Countries in Africa, such as Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, are among the fastest-growing economies in the world; countries that Britain deliberately underdeveloped, stole resources from and brutally enslaved their people. Madam Deputy Speaker, were you aware that in the mid to late 1700s, over 50 Members of this House represented slave plantations? Members of Parliament just like me enslaved people that looked just like me.

I am someone who believes firmly that the only way to tackle an issue is at its very root, and the racism that I and many other people in this country face on a daily basis has its root in those very injustices. Not only will this country, my country, not apologise—by apologise I mean properly apologise; not “expressing deep regret”—it has not once offered a form of reparations. People see reparations as handing over large sums of money, but why could we not start today with simple things like fairer trade, simple things like returning items that do not belong to us, and simple things like cancelling debts that

*we have paid over and over again?*¹¹⁶⁶.

Ribeiro-Addy gave an interview on a Ghanaian radio while she was on a visit to Ghana in January 2020 indicating that the need to raise issues relating to Africa in the UK Parliament: *“The Streatham constituency representative of Ghanaian descent highlighted the need to amplify the pride associated with being Ghanaian as part of the roles diasporans must be seen playing as they go back to their countries after the initiative. I think the role that a returnee can play is raising the profile of Ghana and Ghanaians which is some of the great things that have been done with the Year of Return* ¹¹⁶⁷”.

As stated above the 2019 general elections in the UK saw four second-generation Anglo-Ghanaians voted into UK parliament. Namely Adam Afriyie and Kwesi Kwarteng representing the Conservative Party; Bell Ribeiro-Addy and Abena Opong-Asare representing the Labour Party. Research evidences, demonstrates the following factors that enable ethnic minorities political participation in Britain: policies of political parties; the organisation and mobilisation of ethnic minority at local and national level; the candidates contacts and familiarity with ethnic minority and the presences of ethnic minority candidates within the political party establishment are important factors in attracting electoral support from ethnic minorities groups¹¹⁶⁸.

In terms of political party preference of voting among Ghanaians in London, a second-generation diasporan, stated her reason for voting Labour: *“When the Labour Party was in power, they invested more in youth projects, within the Black and ethnic minority communities, which later opened doors for the like of us”*¹¹⁶⁹. The profile of Ghanaians in London who indicated to have voted for the Conservative party were all among the elites and professional class within the community. An explanation of this was given by one respondent who gave the reason for voting Conservative was basically related to his faith and moral values: *“the Conservatives have policies that protect family values and they also seem to have the interest of small business at*

¹¹⁶⁶ Bell Ribeiro maiden speech in Parliament 31 January 2020, House of Commons Hansard: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-01-30/debates/33EA2EAC-BA44-490B-93D0-11799618B342/details#contribution-631D9B2E-1048-48C8-B5CA-01F24350A030>

¹¹⁶⁷ Raise Ghana's Profile Abroad Through Year Of Return - UK MP To Diasporans: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/976779/raise-ghanas-profile-abroad-through-year-of-retur.html>

¹¹⁶⁸ Ibid.p.541

¹¹⁶⁹ Interview with Sandra London December 2012

heart, as their economic policies are more tolerable for some of us running our own business¹¹⁷⁰”.

During the 2010 UK general election, Ghanaian churches in London played an important role as space for mobilizing community members. This is because the churches encompass all the social strata of Ghanaian society: professionals, non-professionals, educated and non-educated, first and second-generation all congregate at the same places of worship; therefore, this facilitates the organisation of such group to support a common cause or a person of Ghanaian descent as an MP candidate.

2.1.5 Social category and voting habits

In terms of social categorisation and voting patterns among respondents interviewed in London, there was, a clear correlation between social category and voting habits. From the field work observations in London between 2010-2016, it was noted that the more a respondent had higher educational attainment the more they were politically interested and participated regularly. According to the study Hillygus conducted on the link between educational attainment and political engagement which is set on three hypothesis to explain the impact of education on political participation: *(1) the civic education hypothesis; (2) the social network hypothesis; and (3) the political meritocracy hypothesis.* Hillygus further states that: *The most prominent explanation for the link between education and political participation can be called the civic education theory. The civic education hypothesis is rooted in the belief that education provides both the skills necessary to become politically engaged and the knowledge to understand and accept democratic principles.* Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) equally argues that: *the well-educated participate at higher rates because their schooling provided them with the skills people need to understand the abstract subject of politics, to follow the political campaign, and to research and evaluate the issues and candidates. In addition, because of their schooling, the well-educated are better able to handle the*

¹¹⁷⁰ Interview December 2012 in London, Respondent C

bureaucratic requirements of registration and voting” (p. 136).

In this same postulate on educational attainment and political participation, Bourdieu’s theory on social reproduction is important here to understand how elite reproduction in politics occurs, particularly in the context of Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in UK politics.

In Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction, cultural capital refers to transmissible parental cultural codes and practices capable of securing a return to their holders. Cultural capital embodies the sum of investments in aesthetic codes, practices and dispositions transmitted to children through the process of family socialisation, or in Bourdieu’s term, habitus. Habitus is an important form of cultural inheritance, which reflects class position or the actors’ location in a variety of fields and is geared to the perpetuation of structures of dominance (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, p 204-205). Because family habitus varies by class, only middle-class or elite cultural resources can become cultural capital valued in society. Knowledge and possession of “highbrow” culture as is argued by Bourdieu to be unequally distributed according to social class and education, to be institutionalised as legitimate, and to confer distinction and privilege to those who possess and deploy it. Along with economic, social and human capitals, such cultural capital actively reproduces social inequalities¹¹⁷¹.

Bourdieu’s Habitus could best explain the emergence of these Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in the UK. As the cited examples of these elite Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party confirms and illustrates the notion of educational attainment on political engagement and participation in the UK. But also, the transmission of cultural capital through their parents who are Ghanaian migrants educated in Britain. This therefore enables their parents to transmit some aesthetic cultural code of political education to their children. We saw with example of Lord Boateng’s parents influence particularly in the case of his father’s political career in Ghana, which inspired him to follow a similar career path in the UK by following his father’s footsteps into Law and politics. Here we can see the direct link of social code transmission of habitus from one generation to the other in this example.

¹¹⁷¹ Tzanakis, M., 2011. Bourdieu’s social reproduction thesis and the role of cultural capital in educational attainment: A critical review of key empirical studies. *Educate*~, 11(1), pp.76-90.

Equally, the transmission of habitus to second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in Britain stems from their socialisation in British society via attending some of the very top British universities and mingling with politically minded people like them through political party membership and as such acquiring these social and political codes.

A second-generation Ghanaian stated during an interview in London in 2011 on his reason for engaging in active politics:

“Because of social injustices and inequalities most ethnic minority groups face in this country and being a member of that community, I was compelled through my law career to do something about it and thought, I was in the position to use my voice to defend the voiceless”¹¹⁷².

For some second-generation Ghanaians participating in politics is a civic duty such is the example of:

Henry Bonsu a Journalist at the BBC and a second-generation diasporan of Ghanaian descent indicated his reasons for engaging in UK election during a field work interview in 2010: *I am a 42 years second-generation Ghanaian born in Manchester and studied English literature and French at St Ann’s College at Oxford University and currently a journalist with BBC radio and the founder of Colourful Radio in London, an ethnic minority radio station, that caters for the Black and Minority Community in the UK, covering a variety of issues affecting our communities. I have also voted in UK politics since I was 18 years of age and I am 42 years now.*

I am more oriented politically towards the centre left of the political spectrum, as most people of ethnic minority background, because of my line of work I cannot openly disclose the political party that I support and vote for.

I am engaged in politics through my radio programs on Colourful Radio and the BBC where I’ve learnt a lot about the political landscape in the UK through interviewing UK politician such as Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown; Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and his vice- Prime Minister from Lib Dem Nick Clegg; Michael Portillo, Ken Clark and many more, therefore, you cannot be intimidated by them, as you know who they are and what they stand

¹¹⁷² Interview with Load Boateng July 2010

for. I have also attended various political party events in the UK, such as the Conservative Party, Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats.

I have also attended Ghanaian political parties in the UK events such as the NPP UK branch events and the NDC UK branch events. I have written and published on political issues concerning Ghana in British press. I am more interested in UK politics more than Ghanaian politics. This is purely because, I have never lived in Ghana and therefore I do not know enough about Ghanaian politics. I have in the past interviewed Ghanaian delegations to UK such as Ministers and Former Presidents, such as: President Rawlings and President Kufuor here in London. I do a lot of research on Ghanaian political issues through Ghanaian medias such as: Myjoyonline, Peace FM and Ghanaweb. These are great avenues for information but they are not enough in terms of having a wider picture for engaging in Ghanaian politics from the UK for me. Because I was born and raised in the UK, I understand the UK political system better than the Ghanaian political system.

I do not really have a political affinity with Ghana, since I never lived there, my parents on the other hand do, especially my father he follows every political news in Ghana, because that speaks to his soul and it is very much connected to him. But me no, although I have general interest in geopolitical issues on Africa and around the world, I sometimes monitor political issues in Ghana for my radio program and debates especially issues on governance in Africa... In terms of my national belonging, I would say, my heritage is Ghanaian for which I am very proud of, but I am also a product of the community in which I grew up and the country I was brought up in, which is a mixture of Manchester and London, so urban cities have shaped my sense of identity, I consider myself as a mixture of both worlds.¹¹⁷³ (Henry Bonsu, interviewed in London 2010)

Engaging in politics in the UK is not an automatic civic duty as the lack of interest and knowledge about political discourses among some Ghanaian seems a stumbling block.

An interview with Sandra Asamoah a second-generation Ghanaian attest to this notion of lack of interest in politics: *I am not that interested in politics, but when I*

¹¹⁷³ Henry Bonsu Interview London 25th July 2011 London:

*do participate in, I tend to go with my husband's decision and the decision that my church takes. My husband is very much interested in politics and he understands politics more than me, so at home we follow his decision*¹¹⁷⁴. (Sandra Asamoah Interviewed in London in 2010)

Political participation can be linked to activism in politics as a student or activism in political parties and with local authority. **Nabila Ahmed** a second-generation Ghanaian: *I have always been very keen on political discourse, both at university, I volunteered for the Green Party on few occasions and working for the local authority,*

*made me realise the importance of policies on local governance. So yes, I do vote, and I tend to vote Labour and sometimes the Green Party. I am not abreast with Ghanaian politics, it's my mum, my Dad and her sisters who are often keen on Ghanaian politics. I don't know much about what is going on in Ghana in terms of politics. I was born in London and spent my whole life here in London, I have only been to Ghana once, so I have little information and experience to engage in politics in Ghana*¹¹⁷⁵. (Nabila Ahmed interviewed in London in 2010)

Educational attainment and career orientation in the case of some members of the diaspora plays a role in their political participation, **Savahna Nightingale** a second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian journalist for the BBC and Bloomberg and a Public Relations specialist, observes that:

My mother is from Ghana and my father is British, therefore I am Black African mix-race of both Ghanaian and British descent. This therefore means that my political interest is in both countries. I follow Ghanaian politics through my mother's political interest on issue happening in Ghana, I have never voted in Ghana. I am a journalist; I started by working with the Economist. From there I moved into television producing and making documentaries for the BBC, Channel 4 and ITV. I have reported and presented BBC Focus on Africa programs, which covers political issues in Africa, this has given me an insight into political affairs in most African countries especially my experience of working in Zimbabwe during the political crisis in 2001 and 2002. After working for many years with

¹¹⁷⁴ Fieldwork interview with Sandra Asamoah 15 July 2011, London

¹¹⁷⁵ Fieldwork interview with Fareeda Nabila Ahemed 12 June 2011 in London

mainstream media, I wanted to use my experience to help make a difference in our community, so I moved to OBE TV (Original Black Entertainment TV), particularly the Ghanaian community which I feel strongly related to. I use my work in the media to inspire young Black males and females to aspire for more in life through education and hard work.

Here in the UK, I do vote and I am an active political observer. My political views lean to the left of the political spectrum, meaning I find the Labour Party ideas of social equality more interesting. I believe that Ghanaians in the diaspora contribute to national development through remittances therefore, they should be given the right to vote transnationally. (Savahna Nightingale interviewed in London in 2010)

Voting in UK election is based on strong policy orientations of political parties as highlighted by:

Elsie Owusu OBE Ghana-born British Architect: *I am a Ghanaian Architect working in the UK. We came to the UK with my parents in 1962. My father was a diplomate and was appointed to the Ghana High Commission in 1962. My mother is a trained mid-wife. I studied architecture in the UK and started practising in 1989. In terms of identity issues among Black people in the UK, I will say that more people of ethnic minority feel as though they are now well settled as a community, people feel at ease to say they are British-Ghanaian or Ghanaian-British or just British. There is a choice of identity today, people can choose whatever identity they choose to be, it depends on where you are and what you are doing. I do follow politics in Ghana, but I am a British citizen I live here and therefore I am more interested in UK politics, as it has direct effect to my daily life. I do vote in UK politics; I will not go as far to say I am an active participant in UK politics. Although, I am interested in politics in both countries. My views on the Ghanaian diaspora right to vote is based on the logic that Ghana's population is relatively small, but the country has a large diaspora community of Ghanaians both on the African continent and in Western countries. This diaspora community are well educated and well-formed politically, therefore giving them the right to vote in the diaspora can overwhelm votes back in Ghana. Also, when you visit Ghana today, it is clear that there are two economies, the diaspora economy and the local economy. The diaspora economy is lucrative, these are people who return with enough financial capital to start business, work in service industry and live-in gated communities and have a higher purchasing*

*power to spend in shopping malls in Accra.
(Elsie Owusu interviewed in London in 2010)*

Voting in UK elections is linked to permanent residency in the UK and therefore participating in all aspect of the society, such is the reason in the case of **Regina Sintim, Personal Assistant of the High Commissioner of Ghana to the UK and Ireland**, a first-generation Ghanaian: *I have been living in the UK for the past 25 years, my children were both born here in London. I do vote in UK election, because, I know the importance of voting in a democracy, and how it can make a difference or not. So, yes, I vote in British elections, because my place of abode is the UK for the past 25 years. I live and participate fully in the society and community that I reside in. Since, I work at the Ghana High Commission here in the UK, I am in contact with Ghana every day. (Regina Sintim, Interviewed in London in 2012)*

Political interest for some diasporians can be both in Ghana and in the UK, but voting takes place solely in the UK, notes **Richard Tandoh**, IT consultant and head of Star 100 Ghanaian diaspora professional association in London, a second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian: *I was born in Ghana, my father is Ghanaian and my mother is English, we moved back to the UK when I was young. Generally speaking, I have keen interest in political discourses in the UK and Ghana. I vote in the UK, but not in Ghana. I have interest in Ghana government policies on issues concerning the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK, especially, on issues relating to permanent and temporary return of Ghanaians both first and second generations. As the philanthropic work that Star 100 does requires such regular interest in Ghanaian politics and policies. (Richard Tandoh interviewed in London in 2012)*

An interview with Mrs Tina Mensah, a first-generation Ghanaian Teacher and the wife of the former Minister of Finance in Ghana during the Second Republic 1970-1972. She and her Husband J.H Mensah fled Ghana as a result of the 1972 military coup d'état which overthrew the government of the Second Republic.

I do vote in the UK, actually I have always voted since I came to this country. My husband was an economist and politician in Ghana, but left Ghana during the 1972 coup. So, I have always been interested in politics. Here, I vote Labour, but in Ghana I vote NPP. I participate in politics because as a citizen, it is important to use this

*right to hold those in power accountable for their actions*¹¹⁷⁶. (Tina Mensah interviewed in London in 2010)

These statements emphasised by second-generation Ghanaians such as: Lord Paul Boateng, Henry Bonsu, Savannah Nightingale and Nabila Ahmed indicates:

a) how educational attainment influences their political engagement as to which party to vote: i.e. preferring to vote Labour because of its policies, as shown in Galston's (2001) work on higher education attainment and link to political participation, where he states: *all education is civic education in the sense that individuals' level of general educational attainment significantly affects their level of political knowledge as well as the quantity and character of their political participation. In addition, non-educational institutions and processes—families, ethnic groups, voluntary associations, and concrete political events, among others—are crucial influences on civic formation*¹¹⁷⁷.

Living in the UK does not always guarantee fully participating in UK politics via voting: **Sophie Rodrigues**, First-generation Ghanaian, owner of a Ghanaian Restaurant in North London: *I am a Ghanaian, but my name does not sound Ghanaian because my family have roots in Brazil. My family are part of the Brazilian slaves who returned to most countries in West Africa, like Benin, Togo, Nigeria and Ghana, so my ancestry is a bit mixed. Since moving to the UK, I have never voted in British elections, although I follow the campaign on the radio. But I have a lot of interest in Ghanaian politics, I follow Ghanaian politics here in London, through the hometown association that I belong to, some of our members are also members of a Ghanaian political party Branch. I vote in Ghanaian politics when I am in Ghana.* (Sophie Rodrigues interviewed in London in 2012)

For some diasporans not voting can be attributed to the lack of time due to work commitment, such is the example of **Harriet**, first-generation Ghanaian, who works as a cleaner in offices in the City of London:

No, I have never voted in British elections. I don't have much time to follow elections

¹¹⁷⁶ Field work interview with Mrs Tina Mensah, in London, 10th June 2010

¹¹⁷⁷ Galston W. A. 2001, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement and Civic Education, Annual Reviews, Political Sciences, p.219

debates here in London and in Ghana, because, I have two jobs so when, I finish work, I am really tired. Also, I work on some weekends and I go to church on Sundays, a Ghanaian Church, so it leaves me with no time for political debates etc... (Harriet interviewed in London in 2012)

Voting in UK politics is strongly linked policy orientations within the Health sector such is the narrative of **Afia Ntrimoa**, First generation Ghanaian Nurse at the Royal Free Hospital in London:

Yes, I do vote in British local council and general elections. I think it is important for someone who works for the NHS to be interested in British politics because government policies within the health sector have direct effects on some of us working within the health sector. I read news articles on Ghana online, because I have family back home so Ghanaian politics interest me a lot. I am an active member of my hometown association and member of a Ghanaian Church here in London, so sometimes we discuss Ghanaian politics. I have never voted in Ghana, because, I have lived in the UK for such a long time that I am not a registered voter in Ghana, and during Ghanaian election period, I am often in London not in Ghana. I also do not see it necessary to travel to Ghana just to go and register and vote during elections... (Afia Ntrimoa interviewed in London in 2014)

Linda, first-generation Ghanaian, works as an administration assistant at Charing Cross Hospital in West London:

Yes, I vote during UK elections, not all UK elections. But I try to vote when I can. I follow indirectly Ghanaian elections through my family links especially when I call home, they tell me what is going on in politics back home. I do not belong to a hometown association as such. But I do attend church services, and sometimes friends in church who have great interest in Ghanaian politics also discusses issues of political interest back home after church. (Linda interviewed in London in 2014)

Jacob Anamzoya, first-generation Ghanaian: *I work as a financial analyst with an investment Bank in the City of London. I do vote when, I am in London, as I often travel with my work. I have never voted in Ghana, but I do follow Ghanaian politics. I am not a member of a hometown association, but I am a practising Catholic Christian. (Jacob Anamzoya interviewed in London in 2014)*

Hamidu-Yakubu, retired first-generation Ghanaian:

Yes, I vote during UK elections when I am in London and in Ghanaian elections when I

am back home in Ghana. I think it is important for one to express their political views via the ballot box as a citizen. Voting is the only way citizens voices can be heard. (Hamidu Yakubu interviewed in 2012)

Isaac, First Ghanaian hair stylist:

No, I don't vote, I have never voted since moving to the UK nearly 30 years now. I read the newspapers every morning on my way to work. I have never voted in Ghana either, but I do listen to Ghanaian radio stations here in London. I am an active member of a Ghanaian church here in North London, at times our pastor does mention about welfare and political issues in Ghana in his Sunday Sermon. (Isaac interviewed in London in 2014)

Georgina, First-generation Ghanaian who works as a sales assistant in a shop in North London:

No, I do not vote in the UK and I have never voted in Ghana. I am not interested in political issues. I am not a member of a hometown association. But I do attend a Ghanaian church on Sunday, and I hear from a distance people discussing Ghanaian politics etc... (Georgina interviewed in London in 2014)

Yaw, first-generation Ghanaian who works for London Bus Company as a Bus driver:

Yes, I am interested in politics. I used to vote in Ghana, but since moving here it is not always easy to find time for political discussions. I try to vote in local council, Mayoral and UK general elections, because voting makes you feel that you are e part of the society and therefore political issues is also part of the society. I am a member of the Labour Party Trade Union for Transport Workers, so we discuss politics a lot... (Yaw, interviewed in London in 2014)

Abena Boateng: first-generation Ghanaian, Human Resources Assistant for a Company in West London

Yes, I do vote in UK generation elections since moving here. My husband and I have been interested in politics back in Ghana as students. So, voting in the UK is not a surprise for us. We are also members of the NPP party branch here in London, we belong to a hometown association and we are members of a Ghanaian church here in London. (Abena Boateng interviewed in London in 2014)

Kweku Amoah, Ghanaian diplomat at the Ghana High Commission to the UK and Ireland:

As a diplomat, I am not allowed to state which political party or political ideology I lean towards. But, I as a citizen, I am interested in political discourses and I do vote in Ghanaian elections. Being on a duty of tour as a diplomat, I vote transnationally through the High Commission here in London, as a Ghanaian civil servant working for the country abroad, we have the right to cast our votes at our duty station. I do not vote in UK politics, because I am representing Ghana in the UK. I am not member of a Ghanaian association. I do attend church services as an Anglican Christian... (Kweku Amoah interviewed in March London in 2014)

Helen Attia, Retired, first-generation Ghanaian:

My husband studied medicine at the University of Glasgow in Scotland, after finishing his studies in medicine, he worked briefly in Scotland. We moved to London when he started work as an Obstetrician-Gynaecologist at the Royal Free Hospital here in North London. We were both interested in politics in Ghana. I voted once in Ghana, but my husband was already a medical student in Scotland, so I do not think he voted in Ghana. Also, Ghana was under various military rule in the 1970s, therefore not that many elections were held to vote at. In the UK, yes, we both vote in the UK general elections, we tend to vote Labour and sometimes, the Greens. We used to be members of our hometown associations, but the association was dissolved because of leadership rivalries... I am a catholic, so I do attend church service on Sunday, my husband is a practicing Muslim. So, we are an inter-faith couple... (Helen Attia interviewed in London in December 2012)

Kwesi Aboagye, first-generation Ghanaian, who works as cleaner for the London Underground:

Yes, I do vote sometimes not in all UK politics though. I used to vote in Ghana before coming to the UK. I am a member of the NDC party in Ghana, here in London, I sometimes attend party meetings, but not always, because of work constraints. (Kwesi Aboagye interviewed in London in March 2014)

Joseph, first-generation Ghanaian who works as a care assistant in a retirement home

Yes, I sometimes vote in UK elections. I have never voted in Ghanaian elections. But I am a strong supporter of the NDC party. I am a member of a hometown association here in London, and I attend our hometown association meetings regularly. I believe in God, but I don't go to church... (Joseph interviewed in London in June 2010)

The correlation between education and political engagement is equally articulated among first-generation Ghanaian migrants in the UK. A statement from Mr. Mohammed Abdul-Saaka, a Lawyer and former deputy Minister of Interior during the second republic in Ghana 1970-1972, who fled Ghana in 1972 to seek political asylum in the UK, as a result of the military coup d'état which overthrew the Busia government stated:

I have been living in London since the 1972 and I have been voting for the Labour Party since the 1980s, because I lived through the Thatcher years as an African migrant, things were so bad for us, we had jobs, but we couldn't live decently because of the tough economic measures that were put in place by Thatcher's government. Some of us who had the intention of going back to school to upgrade our qualification could not do so at the time, because those were the years when university grants were being removed and fee paying came into force for people who wanted to study at university. In fact, my main reason for joining and voting for the Labour Party were because of Thatcher's severe economic policies, austerity measures and unreasonable stand on immigration, prompted me to be politically inclined. As a trained Lawyer in my native Ghana, politician and a former Government Minister in Ghana, I knew the importance of political engagement as a citizen. Therefore, I also knew that the only right I had as a citizen in order to make a difference was to use my constitutional right, which was to vote during every election to bring that change. During the 1980s, the Conservatives were mainly in power which enabled me to observe and pay close attention to what was happening politically. It was also the period when migrant communities in the UK faced serious discrimination, which I had first-hand experience of. Having lived through various Labour and Conservative government in this country, I can see and feel the difference each time one party or the other comes to power. As a result, I can attest that Labour Party seems to have policies more sympathetic to the working class, the disadvantaged and migrant community... Being the head of Black and Ethnic Minority Group in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, I can affirm that Majority of our members were inclined to vote Labour than Conservative. Although our Borough, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea is a Conservative

*stronghold*¹¹⁷⁸.

And b) Among others, first-generation respondents such as Tina Mensah and Mr Mohammed Abdul Saaka, noted that their political engagement in the UK was informed by their educational attainment but not only that their socialisation in political circles in Ghana formed their strong political ideas and as such spilled-over into engagement in UK politics.

There was a correlation between respondents who indicated that they voted since emigrating to the UK and regularly voted whiles in Ghana before emigrating, as it has been observed above in the statements of first generations. As a result of their political engagement back home prior to migration some of the respondents gained their political consciousness in Ghana which in turn propelled them to be politically active or interested in UK politics, hence the high percentage of elite first-generation being interested in UK politics and voting during general elections in the UK. A similar observation was made on Colombian transnational political practices in London, in which the study demonstrated that first-generation Colombians who engaged in both UK politics and transnational politics towards Colombia, were often members of the Colombian diaspora in London who were already active in politics in Colombia before emigrating to the UK. Therefore, voting in UK politics was normal, as they had already acquired these civic codes with regards to voting back home in Colombia and transferred their practices in the diaspora¹¹⁷⁹.

An example of uninterrupted voting in homeland to host country politics pointed out in an interview with a respondent in London Dodji, who stated that:

“I have always been a militant of the NPP Party in Ghana as a student in university. Therefore, it was normal for me to participate and vote in UK politics. Although in Ghana the party that I support is the NPP, a centre-right party on the political pendulum. In the UK however, I support the Labour Party and not the Tory Conservative Party, which in theory is the UK Party that is politically aligned to the NPP in Ghana. This is partly because, I am uncomfortable in accepting social

¹¹⁷⁸ Fieldwork interview with Mr. Saaka London December 2012

¹¹⁷⁹ Bermudez, A., 2010. The transnational political practices of Colombians in Spain and the United Kingdom: politics ‘here’ and ‘there’. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(1), p.89.

inequalities and discrimination in society, which in my view is what the Conservative Party at times sends that kind of message, or that is what they make us believe. The NPP Party I support in Ghana (the Party currently in government), is a party that has the most educated and smart people in Ghanaian politics and whenever they are in government, they seem to have the right policies to advance society. Although it is a party that stands on the centre-right of the political spectrum in Ghana, the party's policies are nevertheless more of social democratic than anything else. Being in the UK does not stop me from still having a keen interest in Ghanaian politics, as I am equally a member of the NPP UK branch¹¹⁸⁰”.

Another respondent Kojo states: *“Before coming to the UK, I often voted during elections in Ghana, because at University I was a representative of the opposition Party NDC youth wing, which derives its political ideology as Nkrumahist with socialism as its political ideology. Since moving to this country, I have maintained my political interest both in the UK and in Ghana. I am a proud Labour voter, as the Labour Party's political ideology is in alignment with my own political convictions, also the Labour Party's political ideology is in alignment to the Party I support in Ghana, the NDC. I often keep abreast with political events in Ghana, but my participation has reduced significantly due to work and family commitments in the UK¹¹⁸¹”.*

Although both Dodji and Kojo, are keen participants in the UK and Ghanaian politics, they seem to vote for the same political party in the UK, however, in Ghana they seem to belong to different political traditions. This therefore translates that one's political traditions changes as a result of emigration, in other words political convictions are not static they are changeable and adaptable depending on where one is located. What binds these two respondents, is their keen interest in politics in general but most importantly Ghanaian politics, regardless of where they find themselves.

This attachment in participating more in Ghanaian politics in the UK by Dodji and Kojo could be attributed to their recent arrival in London (less than ten years since they left Ghana) compared to long term stayers such as Mrs Tina Mensah and Mr.

¹¹⁸⁰ Interview with Dodji fieldwork, London December 2012

¹¹⁸¹ Interview with Kojo fieldwork December 2012

Mohammed Abdul Saaka, for whom home is now the UK than Ghana, therefore the logic of participating in UK politics is more consolidated. It has long been demonstrated within migration theories on the correlation between long- and short-term stayers and political engagement. Sheffer (2006) points out that on the one hand, long term migrant's political engagement towards homeland is often less, as the more they assimilate in their host country, their tendency to engage in civic activities in their host country is more pronounced. On the other, he notes that for newly arrived migrants or short-term stayers, engaging in transnational politics or homeland politics is high among these groups, as they are still very much attached to their homeland and that once they are fully assimilated in their host society, they most often cease to engage in long distance transnational activities vis-à-vis homeland ¹¹⁸².

This observation confirms the notion that immigrants who are “short-term stayers” are still inclined to have strong attachment to homeland, as compare to “sedentary” immigrants or long-term stayers ¹¹⁸³. Equally some short-term stayers among the respondents interviewed in London indicated that they were not interested in politics both in the UK and in Ghana, as some of the respondents interviewed in London has demonstrated. The example of a respondent Fatawu illustrates this point: “*I have never voted in Ghana, and since coming to England I have not voted. I have been living in this country for over 15 years, I am not particularly interested in politics as I do not understand what it is all about. My aim of being in this country is to work hard and look after my family here in London and in Ghana, so politics is really the last thing on my mind either here in the UK or in Ghana*”¹¹⁸⁴.

Popkin & Dimock (1999:142), concludes in their study that: “*The dominant feature of non-voting in America is lack of knowledge about governance and government; not distrust of government, lack of interest in politics, lack of media exposure to politics, or feelings of inefficacy*”. This suggest that political knowledge affects participation, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Delli Carpini & Keeter

¹¹⁸² Sheffer. G. 2003, *Diaspora Politics*, Cambridge University Press

¹¹⁸³ Sheffer. G. 2003, art. cit. p.30

¹¹⁸⁴ Field work interview with Fatawu, London July 2010

(1996: 259–60) found that the more knowledgeable voters are, the more they are likely to vote on the basis of national economic conditions than personal economic circumstances. Additionally, higher educational status and long periods of stay in the host country supports the variable raised in other studies on political transnationalism towards homeland and political integration in host country (Martiniello, 2005; Mugge, 2010; Portes, Escobar & Radford, 2007).

This observation resonates with some segment of the Ghanaian diasporas interviewed in London and their political engagement, as noted with the examples of the profiles and career trajectories of second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in the UK. Their engagement in UK politics is informed by their political knowledge and not necessarily their economic circumstances. This political knowledge is translated in their process of political integration in the UK. Same could be said about the political engagement of first-generation Ghanaians in London, based on their educational attainment in Ghana prior to emigrating to the UK, has enabled them to acquire political knowledge and as such contributes to voting in UK politics.

A study conducted in Amsterdam on the profile and background of ethnic minority political participation revealed that elites' members who are integrated in host society tend to be those who participate in politics:

*We assume that the possibilities for ethnic communities to present their preferences in the political arena depend at least partly on the integration of their ethnic leaders in the local power structure*¹¹⁸⁵.

In figures 36,37 and 38 we present a typology of political integration of ethnic groups based on the level of political participation of the members of the ethnic group and the degree of integration of the ethnic leaders in the local power structure¹¹⁸⁶. If both are high than we can call the ethnic group politically integrated¹¹⁸⁷. If the member of the ethnic group shows a high degree of political participation but the ethnic elite is not integrated in the local power structure, we may call the ethnic group mobilized¹¹⁸⁸. If the elite of the ethnic group is well integrated but the rank and file does not participate, we call the group

¹¹⁸⁵ Fennema, M. and Tillie, J., 1999. Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, 25(4), p.726

¹¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸⁸ Ibid

pacified. Finally, if the members of an ethnic group do not participate and the leaders of that group are not integrated into the power structure, we call that group isolated¹¹⁸⁹. Turks in Amsterdam are best characterized as an integrated ethnic minority, while the Surinamese are more like a pacified ethnic minority (see Fennema et al., 2000). The Moroccans are somewhat in between, while the Antilleans are best characterized as an isolated ethnic minority (see Fennema et al., 2000).

Table 8: Political Participation and elite integration of ethnic minorities

		Degree of integration of the ethnic elite	
		High	low
Political participation Of all members of the Ethnic community	High	<i>Integrated</i>	<i>mobilized</i>
	Low	<i>pacified</i>	<i>isolated</i>

Source: Fennema, M. and Tillie, J., 1999. Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*,

To this end, the political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is strongly linked to the following variables: a) elites' engagement versus non-elite engagement; b) educational attainment of first- and second-generation Ghanaians versus non-educated first-and second-generation Ghanaian; c) level of integration in the UK and ties to political participation. As such voting in UK politics is tied to communitarian influences either via the Black and Minority Ethnic (BAM) voting patterns or voting patterns being influenced by Ghanaian associations in London, particularly the influence of Ghanaian churches in London. But equally, Ghanaian diaspora voting patterns is also influenced by the general trend in the paradigm shift on voting patterns among Conservative electorate and Labour electorates by Commonwealth migrants' community. The 2016 London Mayoral elections and the Brexit referendum served as an important space in observing this paradigm shift in political engagement of people of ethnic minority descent in reference to settled Commonwealth migrant communities. The next section seeks to analyse the political

¹¹⁸⁹ Ibid

participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London during the London Mayoral elections and the Brexit votes in 2016.

2.1.6 London Mayoral elections 2016 and Brexit referendum: ethnic minority votes and the case study of Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian voters.

The London Mayoral election in May 2016 and the UK Referendum on exiting the European Union in June 2016 served as an avenue for studying and observing the paradox and the paradigm shift of ethnic minority and the Ghanaian diaspora votes in the UK. The London Mayoral elections in 2016 saw Labour Party candidate Sadiq Khan winning by 56.08% against 43.2% for the Conservative Party candidate Zac Goldsmith¹¹⁹⁰. Sadiq Khan was born in Tooting in South London to Pakistani parents of working-class background in South London¹¹⁹¹. Sadiq Khan's father worked for London Transport as a bus driver and his mother was a homemaker. He is lawyer by profession, became a member of Parliament for Tooting in South London in 2005¹¹⁹². Statistics from the Labour Party on the Mayoral election shows that ethnic minority communities in London voted massively for Sadiq Khan¹¹⁹³. Ethnic Minority votes for Labour candidate Sadiq Khan, could be explained by two reasons: one, on policies and two, voting on solidarity bases. Firstly, voting based on his policies for Londoners, for example introducing affordable housing schemes to tackle London housing crisis, community initiative programs for people living in disadvantaged areas of London, a freeze on transport cost in London by introducing cheaper Bus ride on London Buses¹¹⁹⁴. Secondly voting by solidarity is reflected on London's urban multicultural setting, as a great percentage of Londoners are of ethnic minority descent, migrant communities including EU migrants and working-class white British could identify with Sadiq Khan's working-class background. But more importantly the Labour party has long enjoyed support from the

¹¹⁹⁰ Zac Goldsmith Biography: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zac_Goldsmith

¹¹⁹¹ Sadiq Khan Biography: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadiq_Khan

¹¹⁹² Ibid. p.2

¹¹⁹³ Brown Steph, 2016, Labour Party Campaign Report 2013-2016

¹¹⁹⁴ Wright. O. 2016, UK Elections: Sadiq Khan's manifesto – what the new London Mayor has promised for his city The Independent 7 May 2016: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-elections-sadiq-khan-manifesto-new-london-mayor-city-a7017836.html>

ethnic minority group in most of inner-city Boroughs in London. Khan’s policies for London and his social background appealed to London multicultural and diverse communities including EU nationals who are settled in London, also had the right to vote during the Mayoral elections.

On the other hand, the Conservative Party Mayoral candidate Zac Goldsmith born in London is the son of billionaire businessman Sir James Goldsmith and an Anglo-Irish aristocrat mother Lady Annabel Van-Tempest Stewart. Zac Goldsmith went to Eton Collage and later became a journalist and editor in chief of the Ecologist magazine, which is owned by his uncle Edward Goldsmith. Both Zac Goldsmith’s paternal and maternal family are generations of Conservative Party members. In 2010, Zac Goldsmith became a member of Parliament for Richmond Park. Zac Goldsmith’s Mayoral campaign policies were criticised for being, elitist, disconnected with the concerns and lives of majority of Londoners, he was criticised by the Labour Party, some members of the Conservative and the civil society for using racist and divisive rhetoric during his campaigns¹¹⁹⁵. Zac Goldsmith’s background reflects the traditional Tory Conservative party members being viewed as elites in society and their political ideologies reflects their social class.

Table 9: 2016 London Mayoral Elections

Candidates			
Conservative Party	Votes	Labour Party	Votes
Zac Goldsmith	43.2%	Sadiq Khan	56.08%

Source: London Mayoral election results <https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/london/results>

The London mayoral elections in May 2016 saw traditional Labour Voters voting in line with their political ideologies by voting massively for the Labour Party. However, a month later in June in 2016 with the EU referendum vote saw a break away and a paradigm shift in the direction of people of ethnic minority descent and the working class in London voting more towards the right and extreme right populist ideology with

¹¹⁹⁵ Rowena. M. 2016, Top Conservatives condemn Zac Goldsmith's 'disgusting' mayoral campaign, The Guardian, 07 May 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/07/top-conservatives-condemn-zac-goldsmiths-disgusting-mayoral-campaign>

emphasis on anti-immigrant sentiments. As noted in Part I of this thesis on the history of migration and integration process of people of ethnic minority background in the UK. Whereby it was highlighted on the extreme hostilities and racial discrimination, which people of ethnic minority faced particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. These hostilities led to the various race riots in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and as late as the early 2000s, which served as a mode of combating socioeconomic and political disparities, marginalisation and discrimination in Britain towards people of ethnic minority descent. But now however, these same ethnic minorities are expressing hostilities and discriminations towards newly arrived migrants mainly from EU states. Why this paradigm shift?

A UK election data in 2017 maintained that class is no longer to determining factor for voting in the UK but rather age and educational attainment are, “Class” used to be central to understanding British politics¹¹⁹⁶. This observation therefore correlates with earlier assertion on the links between educational attainment and political participation of Ghanaian diaspora in London. To all intents and purposes, the Conservative Party were the party of the middle class and Labour that of the workers as it has been stated previously. For example, at the 1992 general election the Conservatives lead Labour amongst middle class voters by around 30 points, whilst Labour was leading amongst working class voters by around 10 percentage points¹¹⁹⁷. This therefore implies that Conservative Party enjoys more support from the middle classes, whereas the Labour Party consolidates its votes from the working class. The 2017 data sets on voting intentions during the elections shows, that 46% of voters intended to vote for the Conservative Party and 43% indicated their intentions to vote for the Labour Party¹¹⁹⁸. This therefore confirms the notion that class orientation is indeed no longer a determining factor for voting in UK election. This also shows how people of ethnic minority and Ghanaian voters in London are being influenced not by such indicators of class orientation. The Brexit vote in London among Ghanaian and Nigerian voters indicated

¹¹⁹⁶ YouGov data shows how class, age, gender, education and income will shape the electorate:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>

¹¹⁹⁷ YouGov data shows how class, age, gender, education and income will shape the electorate:


<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>

¹¹⁹⁸ YouGov data shows how class, age, gender, education and income will shape the electorate:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>

class orientation was indeed not the only determining factor on who voted Brexit or not.

Figure 0-59: Class is no longer a reliable indicator for how a person will vote in 2017



Source: YouGov data shows how class, age, gender, education and income will shape the electorate: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>


The 2019 UK general election data on voting by social class demonstrated that there is little change in voting patterns and social class since 2017. The below graph shows that the Conservatives still have a slight increase on middle class voters than Labour. *This is a further realignment of voters by class that we first saw in 2017. The Conservatives performed equally well amongst ABC1 voters and C2DE voters (44%) two years ago, marginally better than Labour in both cases. Now they have improved their showing amongst C2DEs while achieving the same as 2017 amongst ABC1s* ¹¹⁹⁹.

The below data on 2019 UK general election with regards to voting by age demonstrates that the younger a voter the more likely they are to vote Labour, as the Labour Party gained more votes amongst the age brackets of 18-39 years old. However, the data also shows that the older a voter is, the more likely they are to vote Conservative, the data further shows that Conservatives performed better amongst the age brackets of 40-70+

¹¹⁹⁹ McDonnell. A and Curtis. C. 2019, How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

years old. These data findings on voting by age during the 2019 general elections are similar to the findings of the 2017 general elections which shows Labour performed better among the 18-39 age category and the Conservatives did well with voters of the age brackets of 40 and above¹²⁰⁰.

Figure 0-60: Vote by age




Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

For every 10 years older a voter is, their chance of voting Tory Conservative increases by around nine points, and the chance of them voting Labour decreases by eight points. The tipping point - the age at which a voter is more likely to have voted Conservative than Labour - is now 39, down from 47 at the last election. Labour is down among all age groups, although slightly less so among those nearing or in retirement, losing just 5% of their vote share among the over 60s, compared to around 9% among the under 60s. However, given how badly they did among the over 60s in the last election, they didn't have much more to lose¹²⁰¹.

¹²⁰⁰ McDonnell, A and Curtis, C. 2019: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

¹²⁰¹ Ibidem

Figure 0-61: Age is a key indicator of how people voted in 2019 elections




Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:
<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

The data below on voting by gender during the 2019 UK general election equally demonstrates a similarity with voting by age, where younger women were more likely they are to vote Labour. Whereas voting Conservatives was higher among older men. In other words, the data points towards a small gender gap, with the Conservatives on 46% among men and 44% among women, and Labour on 31% among men and 35% among women. *But when you break this down it is most evident among the very youngest. If we just look at those aged from 18 to 24 the Conservatives are on 28% among men and just 15% among women. On the Labour side, the party are on 46% among young men and 65% among young women, a gap of 19%*¹²⁰². Among gender demographics on voting by ethnic minorities could be added to these categories and invariably Ghanaian diasporas as well since the Ghanaian diaspora voting patterns in the UK is embedded within the ethnic minority voting pattern, and as such both being woven into the fabric of British society.

¹²⁰² Ibidem


Figure 0-62: Vote by age and gender



Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

74: Figure 20: How 2017 voters voted at the 2019 general election



Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:
<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

The 2019 general election saw Labour lose by 32.1% and the Conservatives win 43.6%. The above graph on “How 2017 voters voted at the 2019 general elections” illustrates that Labour lost similar numbers of voters to the Conservatives (11%) in 2017 as they did to the Liberal Democrats (9%) also in 2017. One in five (19%) 2017 UKIP voters backed the Brexit Party, while two thirds (67%) moving to the Tories¹²⁰³. The Liberal Democrats overall vote share from 8% to 12% in 2019 election, they only retained 59% of their 2017 voters¹²⁰⁴. One in five of this group moved to Labour and 14% voted Conservative¹²⁰⁵. This loss of voters was balanced by winning over new

¹²⁰³ How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

¹²⁰⁴ Ibidem

¹²⁰⁵ Ibidem

voters from across other parties¹²⁰⁶. The Greens also struggled with retaining their 2017 voters (keeping just 30%) with a third (34%) moving to Labour¹²⁰⁷.

These data on UK elections demonstrates that voting patterns and political party belonging is not linear as the socio-economic and socio-political demographics changes with time, it has a spill-over effect in UK election turn out and election results. The general elections in 2010,2016,2017 and 2019 attest to this assertion on the continues change in that direction of voting patterns and political engagement of ethnic minority group and the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK. Analysing UK election data from 2010 and especially since the UK referendum in 2016, is important in aiding our understanding on how people of ethnic minority and Ghanaian diaspora voted for Brexit.

a) BAME Brexiteers: a general overview of ethnic minority voting pattern during the EU referendum

Many polls indicators conducted before the European referendum in 2016 and some conducted afterwards stated that in principle ethnic minority voters were more likely to vote Remain, meaning for the UK to remain in the EU. Neema Begum a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Bristol stated that: *“There were much higher levels of support for Remain voters amongst Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Black Caribbean and Black African groups – on average a quarter being more pro-Leave than Remain¹²⁰⁸.”*

On similar observation Rakib Ehsan a research specialist on UK ethnic minority socio-political attitudes and behaviours, also noted that *“there is data to suggest that the strength of Euroscepticism within the British South Asian population was perhaps stronger than previously anticipated¹²⁰⁹”*. According to ward-level data published recently from the West London boroughs of Ealing and Hounslow provides strong support for the idea that Asian voters were more inclined towards voting Leave than the

¹²⁰⁶ Ibidem

¹²⁰⁷ Ibidem

¹²⁰⁸ [Neema Begum](https://ukandeu.ac.uk/minority-ethnic-attitudes-and-the-2016-eu-referendum/), Minority ethnic attitudes and the 2016 EU referendum, 6 February 2018:

¹²⁰⁹ Rakib Ehsan, The British Asian vote for Brexit contains a few surprises: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/20/the-british-asian-vote-for-brexit-contains-a-few-surprises/>

polls suggested¹²¹⁰. In these two multi-ethnic boroughs, non-white ethnicity was associated with voting Leave, defying the wider national trend¹²¹¹. In both boroughs, the more prosperous, mainly white wards voted strongly in favour of Remain ¹²¹². Ehan further states that: *The Asian areas, on the other hand, were much more evenly split between Remain and Leave (it's also worth mentioning that the poorer, largely white areas containing council estates voted to Leave)*¹²¹³. While the borough of Ealing voted overall Remain by 60.4%, the wards (Ealing Broadway and Ealing Green) in Southall – primarily a South Asian residential district – voted only very narrowly Remain (50.5% and 50.9% respectively)¹²¹⁴. Ealing's relatively prosperous, predominantly white wards such as Southfield, Northfield, Walpole and Ealing Broadway all delivered Remain votes exceeding 70% ¹²¹⁵.

A study conducted by the Labour Party Ealing Borough branch reveals that REMAIN Labour voters constituted mainly from the professional categories, as oppose to the traditional working-class category of the Labour Party¹²¹⁶. These professional categories among Labour voters for the REMAIN camp were: White British, Black and Asian British. Data from the Labour Party Borough of Ealing in West London, indicates that REMAIN voters during the referendum elections tended to have stable jobs, and had professional status ¹²¹⁷. This observation further attests to the notion that regardless of racial categorisations, urban London voters with similar social interest tended to vote in similar patterns. According to YouGov data, Brexit realignment was already a huge factor in the last general election in 2017, with 55% of Remainers voting Labour and 65% of Leavers voting Conservative¹²¹⁸. The graph below shows that this time around the Conservatives managed to boost their vote share amongst Leave voters to three quarters (74%) while the Labour Party reduced their share of Remain voters to just under half (49%)¹²¹⁹. This fall came mainly at the hands of the Liberal Democrats,

¹²¹⁰ Local voting figures shed new light on EU referendum: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38762034>

¹²¹¹ Ibidem

¹²¹² Ibidem

¹²¹³ Ibidem

¹²¹⁴ Local voting figures shed new light on EU referendum: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38762034>

¹²¹⁵ Ibidem

¹²¹⁶ Brown, Steph, Labour Party Campaign Report, London Borough of Ealing 2013-2016 p.6

¹²¹⁷ Fieldwork data 2016 referendum vote analysis by the Labour Party Ealing borough and wards in Acton


¹²¹⁸ How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

¹²¹⁹ Ibidem

who increased their vote share amongst Remain voters to 21%, compared to 12% in 2017¹²²⁰.

Figure 0-63: How Remain and Leave voted at the 2019 UK General Election



Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>


The above graph demonstrates that both the Conservatives and Labour lost voters on the other side of the Brexit debate. The Conservatives held on to 19% of Remain voters (down from 25% in 2017) while Labour's vote share amongst Leavers was 14% (down from 24% in 2017)¹²²¹.

¹²²⁰ Ibidem

¹²²¹ Ibidem

The below data with regards to the 2019 general election vote on how people voted at the EU referendum, and in 2017 illustrates that, on the one hand, Conservatives managed to keep hold of almost all (92%) of their 2017 voters who were on the Leave side in 2016 ¹²²². On the other hand, Labour were able to hold onto 8 in 10 (79%) of their 2016 Remain voters, although 12% deserted the party in favour of the Liberal Democrats ¹²²³.

Figure 0-64: 2019 vote by how people voted at the EU referendum and in 2017



The Conservatives managed to hold on to two thirds (65%) of their voters who backed remain in 2016 to stick with them this time round ¹²²⁴. 22% voted Lib Dem, while 8% moved to the Labour party. 52% of those who voted leave in 2016 and Labour in 2017, stuck with the Labour party in 2019 ¹²²⁵. A third (33%) moved directly to the Conservatives, while 6% voted for the Brexit party ¹²²⁶. The above analysis of the 2019 UK general election demonstrates how the Brexit referendum vote impacted on voting patterns of the whole British society and its impact on socio-economic and political

¹²²² Ibidem
¹²²³ Ibidem
¹²²⁴ ibidem
¹²²⁵ Ibidem
¹²²⁶ Ibidem

demographic changes.

b) Brexit divide and rule narrative: Commonwealth migrants versus EU migrants

In the run-up to the referendum, images were published featuring supporters of both camps, addressing the potential benefits for the Commonwealth of Britain staying in or leaving the EU. In one example (Ponniah, 2016), the BBC interviewed a handful of Commonwealth voters representing Malaysia, Canada and Australia¹²²⁷. Of the two women from Malaysia, one was planning to vote Remain, citing lack of information about a Brexit approach as crucial, and noting a failure by both campaigns to explain how Commonwealth nations may be affected by the result. The other was planning to vote Leave because, according to the BBC, ‘Her vote will be pinned on hopes that immigration policy will change in a way that benefits Commonwealth citizens if the UK no longer has to abide by free movement within the EU’ (Ponniah, 2016)¹²²⁸. Shortly after the referendum, the BBC reporter Farai Sevenzo (2016) investigated why some Black African migrants voted Leave. According to Sevenzo, some of the 1.8% of the UK population who identify as Black African may have voted Leave because ‘the expansion of the EU had drastically reduced the job chances of Africans from the Commonwealth and beyond’. These combined issues of jobs and immigration weighed heavily on referendum voters of all backgrounds¹²²⁹.

Namusoke (2016), highlighted that: *despite Commonwealth national’s resident in the UK being largely ignored during the referendum, Britain’s ethnic minority population, most of whom have Commonwealth heritage were canvassed by Leave campaigners. In February the official Vote Leave campaign published a letter signed by 80 ‘patriotic Britons of Commonwealth background’ involved in business and culture (BBC News, 2016b). In supporting the Leave campaign, the signatories addressed immigration: ‘... our immigration policy forces us, in effect, to turn away qualified workers from the Commonwealth so as to free up unlimited space for migrants from the EU ... The*

¹²²⁷ Namusoke, E., 2016. A divided family: Race, the commonwealth and Brexit. *The Round Table*, 105(5), pp.466

¹²²⁸ Ibidem

¹²²⁹ Ibidem

*descendants of the men who volunteered to fight for Britain in two world wars must stand aside in favour of people with no connection to the United Kingdom*¹²³⁰. The argument that leaving the EU would allow for more or easier Commonwealth immigration was echoed by Priti Patel, then Minister of State for Employment and arguably the most prominent non-white Leave campaigner¹²³¹. Figures published in May 2016 revealed the 2015 net migration in the UK hit 333,000, the second highest figure on record and well above the 100,000 target the Conservatives were working towards (BBC News, 2016c). Patel argued that EU freedom of movement meant little control over EU citizens moving to the UK, with the result being tighter government restrictions on non-EU migration to try to lower these figures. Consequently: ‘This means that we cannot bring in the talents and the skills we need to support our economy. By voting to leave we can take back control of our immigration policies, save our curry houses and join the rest of the world’ (Cecil, 2016).


The LEAVE campaign was very successful in tapping into the emotions of established Commonwealth migrants communities such as Africans, Asians and Afro-Caribbeans against EU migrants by pointing out that EU migrants are the cause of the UK’s economic decline and the reason why they cannot get: school spaces for their children, having to wait far too long to get a Hospital bed or to even get an appointment with a consultant doctor. Leave campaign spoke in a language which was to send a message that they had the interest of the working-class including Commonwealth migrants at heart and that Commonwealth migrants were an integral part of the fabric of the British society as a result of their links to the British empire via colonialization and that EU migrants were outsiders. The current Home Secretary Priti Patel has been a strong advocate in supporting a point system migration to the UK in favour of Commonwealth countries. The LEAVE communication strategy was effective as they communicated via radio station which was popular among working classes and Commonwealth migrants who felt that they had been left behind by the establishment. Tabloid Newspapers such as the Daily Mail and The Sun had front page scaremongering headline vilifying EU migrants for the UK’s economic woes. These tabloids are often read by both working classes White, Asian and Black

¹²³⁰ Ibidem

¹²³¹ Ibidem

British people. What was the motive behind people of ethnic minority descent voting Brexit, on the backdrop of anti-immigrant sentiment?

Figure 0-65: Diagram: Brexit and Ethnic Minority



i) Motivation for voting Leave by Commonwealth migrants

Ehsan poses the following questions why Asian British voted Brexit: Why did some South Asians vote for a campaign that was, at times, seen as bigoted and xenophobic? Why did several middle-class South Asians (most notably those living in West London Boroughs of Ealing and Hounslow) not vote in a way which their socio-economic status would predict?

Ehsan argued that one of the reasons Asian British voted for Brexit might be that many voters within the British South Asian diaspora do not feel European¹²³². When the Remain, campaign sought to appeal to a sense of European identity and warned that people were about to lose that identity, it did not make for a particularly convincing

¹²³² Rakib Ehsan, The British Asian vote for Brexit contains a few surprises: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/20/the-british-asian-vote-for-brexit-contains-a-few-surprises/>

argument¹²³³. First-generation migrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were encouraged to integrate under a social policy based on the adoption of “British values”¹²³⁴. Being absorbed into a “European collective” was never really part of that integration process¹²³⁵. The pro-Commonwealth rhetoric coming from the Leave camp, on the other hand, would have pulled on the heartstrings of many South Asian voters¹²³⁶.

The Commonwealth argument became particularly interesting when the Leave campaign mentioned immigration. Leave campaigners such as Michael Gove often claimed that the EU was essentially forcing Britain to implement a “racist” immigration system¹²³⁷. While predominantly white EU migrants were allowed to freely enter the UK, those from the Indian subcontinent were subject to visa and work restrictions¹²³⁸. Voting Brexit was seen as an opportunity to “level out” this in-built unfairness, which some pockets of ethnic minorities bought into this divisive rhetoric¹²³⁹.

Ehsan further observed that the other reason that could explain why Asian British voted for Brexit could simply be the case that many well-integrated, South Asian voters who strongly identify with the UK felt they were left out. The “target” was perceived to be Eastern Europeans originating from non-Commonwealth countries who were taking advantage of freedom of movement¹²⁴⁰. What the post Brexit ward data reveals is that: The Brexit voter is not just your dispossessed, lower-educated white British Northerner¹²⁴¹. They might also be your well-to-do, educated voter of Indian origin living in one of West London’s leafier suburbs¹²⁴².

An article in the Guardian by Nazia Parveen in June 2016 with the title: Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU? Noted with the example of: *Azar Mahmood*,

¹²³³ Rakib Ehsan, The British Asian vote for Brexit contains a few surprises:

<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/20/the-british-asian-vote-for-brexit-contains-a-few-surprises/>

¹²³⁴ Ibidem

¹²³⁵ Ibidem

¹²³⁶ The Commonwealth is not an alternative to the EU for Britain: <https://theconversation.com/the-commonwealth-is-not-an-alternative-to-the-eu-for-britain-57009>

¹²³⁷ EU referendum: EU is 'job destroying machine', says Gove: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36447923>

¹²³⁸ EU referendum: EU is 'job destroying machine', says Gove: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36447923>

¹²³⁹ Ibidem

¹²⁴⁰ Ibidem

¹²⁴¹ Ibidem

¹²⁴² Rakib Ehsan, The British Asian vote for Brexit contains a few surprises:

<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/20/the-british-asian-vote-for-brexit-contains-a-few-surprises/>

*the owner of an Asian restaurant in Birmingham referring to himself as an Anglo-Pakistani, is aware of the irony – coming from an immigrant family, he now wants to pull up the drawbridge on others*¹²⁴³. He says, however, that all his views are valid. “We have worked so hard to earn the right to live here and we contribute to the communities ¹²⁴⁴. What we don’t want is more people coming in who won’t bring anything positive and will just take. Mahmood admits he does not know many exact facts and figures about the EU, but nonetheless he is unfaltering in his position”¹²⁴⁵. Those originally from Commonwealth countries feel white European migrants do not face the same difficulties with the immigration system as they do. The report said: “Long-settled migrants often feel they have had a difficult time in Britain or at least following their initial arrival; they then may see or think that newer migrants have had better or easier experiences ¹²⁴⁶.”

One of the loudest ethnic minority LEAVE campaigners for Brexit is Amjad Bashir a Ukip defector to the Conservative Party and a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Yorkshire and Humber¹²⁴⁷. Born in the UK and of Pakistani descent. Bashir’s father came to Britain in 1956 from Jhelum in Punjab, Pakistan. He worked in a textile mill until 1963 and then started his own fabric business ¹²⁴⁸. Bashir states that: “Our ministers went over to the Commonwealth countries after two devastating world wars as they needed workers in the cotton mills of Lancashire to the factories in Birmingham. It was managed migration,” he notes¹²⁴⁹. Bashir says he and his followers want a fair immigration system that does not discriminate against “auntie from Pakistan”¹²⁵⁰. He does not want an influx of low-skilled workers from the EU into a jobs market already overflowing with low-skilled Asian workers¹²⁵¹. “Look, I’m not saying close the doors, but we need to manage this migration,” he says¹²⁵². “The figures of migration that are being talked about now are completely different to those when my father came over. In life there is a trade-off. A nation should be able to decide which skills

¹²⁴³ Parveen. N. 2016. Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU? The Guardian, 1 June 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/01/british-asians-views-eu-referendum-figures-brexit>

¹²⁴⁴ ibidem

¹²⁴⁵ ibidem

¹²⁴⁶ Ibidem

¹²⁴⁷ Ibidem

¹²⁴⁸ Neema Begum, Minority ethnic attitudes and the 2016 EU referendum, 6 February 2018: <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/minority-ethnic-attitudes-and-the-2016-eu-referendum/>

¹²⁴⁹ ibidem

¹²⁵⁰ ibidem

¹²⁵¹ ibidem

¹²⁵² ibidem

*are required. My fathers' generation was actively sought. We need to question why some of these immigrants are coming over and what they will bring to our economy*¹²⁵³. ”

In a similar observation on voting Brexit from an Asian-British Saqib Bhatti says: *“The EU forces Britain to discriminate against people who want to migrate here from non-EU countries. This isn't fair and doesn't make sense*¹²⁵⁴. ”

The Labour MP for Birmingham Khalid Mahmood an Anglo-Pakistani had strong views in favour of the UK leaving the EU. According to an article in the Guardian newspaper in which he tells horror stories of eastern European immigrants murdering Pakistani families and Asian women having their gold bangles torn from their arms by Romanian gangs¹²⁵⁵. Mahmood says he represents those people on the ground who will feel the direct impact of increased European migration¹²⁵⁶. *“He is fearful of the influx of poor immigrants into “ghettoised” communities that he says are already struggling with a lack of housing and resources. He says: “We don't want an open house. We don't do criminal checks on them. We can't stop certain types of people coming in*¹²⁵⁷. ”

Amina Lone, a second-generation Anglo-Pakistani notes that the views of a small contingent are not representative of the British Asian community. Lone, a Labour councillor and remain campaigner, says: *“It is very easy for some people to forget where they have come from and to stoke up a rhetoric of fear and hatred. It is a very narrow view and it is being perpetuated by a small minority with very loud voices. It is a selfish way of thinking and they are using the campaign and this position to forward their own interests*¹²⁵⁸. ” Lone notes that most people in the city's BAME communities are positive about the EU and understand the economic benefits of remaining in the EU. *“The EU is not a panacea and we understand there is a need to reform in some areas but on the*

¹²⁵³ *ibidem*

¹²⁵⁴ *ibidem*

¹²⁵⁵ Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU?:

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/01/british-asians-views-eu-referendum-figures-brexit>

¹²⁵⁶ Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU?:

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/01/british-asians-views-eu-referendum-figures-brexit>


¹²⁵⁷ *ibid*

¹²⁵⁸ *Ibid*

whole, the EU is a positive thing, and we don't want to leave future generations with a legacy of some kind of island utopia that does not exist ¹²⁵⁹.”

What these statement reveals about BAME Brexiteers is that: voting Brexit is about protecting and safeguarding their interest as an old established migrant community, but also voting Brexit is about full integration into the fabric of the British society as part of the Commonwealth family. The post Brexit ward data also indicated that in West London Boroughs of Ealing and Hounslow which has high concentration of ethnic minority communities, such as Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis a small pocket of Caribbeans and Africans, with some being middle class voted Brexit¹²⁶⁰. This therefore confirms earlier assertions that social class is no-longer the determining factor in voting in UK elections. On the other hand, education could be the determining factor in voting in UK politics, as the below data demonstrates how educational attainment influences voting for a particular political party. The more educate a person is the more likely they are to vote Labour or Liberal Democrat as demonstrated in fig.66. below.

Figure 0-66: Voting intention of British adults by education qualification level



According to the above YouGov data on voting patterns in UK elections in 2017,

¹²⁵⁹ Why do some ethnic minority voters want to leave the EU?:

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/01/british-asians-views-eu-referendum-figures-brexiteers>

¹²⁶⁰ Fieldwork data from the Labour Party Ealing ward analysis on Brexit voting patterns in the Borough of Ealing June 2016

education has become one of the key electoral demographic dividing lines. It played an important role during the EU referendum campaign in 2016. The study indicates that leading to the 2017 general elections opinion polls showed that the Conservatives have the lead amongst all educational groupings, however their vote share decreases among this group¹²⁶¹. On the other hand, the Lib Dem and Labour gained more support from the educated segments of the electorate¹²⁶². This is therefore suggesting that the more a person has formal education, the less they are likely to vote for the Conservative Party. As the above data attest, amongst those with no formal education or qualifications, the Conservative lead by 35%. But when it comes to those with a degree, the Tory lead falls to 8%. Education also shapes other parties' vote shares. UKIP also struggles amongst highly educated voters, polling four times higher amongst those with no formal qualifications compared to those with a degree¹²⁶³.

Education is still a key dividing line for voters in 2019 general election as it was in 2017. The highest level of education someone has achieved remains an important dividing line in how people vote. Labour perform better than the Conservatives amongst those with Higher education qualification amongst those who have a degree or higher, by 43% for Labour to 29% for the Conservatives¹²⁶⁴. The Conservatives won amongst the much larger group of voters who do not hold a degree, 58% to 25% amongst those whose highest level of education is GCSE or lower. Compared to 2017, the Conservatives have improved amongst those without a degree, but performed worse amongst those with a degree or higher. Labour lost voters amongst all three education level groups¹²⁶⁵.

¹²⁶¹ Voting intentions of British Adults and educational attainment: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>

¹²⁶² Voting intentions of British Adults and educational attainment: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>


¹²⁶³ The demographic dividing Britain: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain>

¹²⁶⁴ Source:, How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

¹²⁶⁵ Ibidem


79: Figure 24: Vote by education level



Source: How Britain voted in the 2019 general elections, YouGov data:

<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/17/how-britain-voted-2019-general-election>

80: Figure 25: How support for Brexit differed by race and ethnicity



Source: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-result-7-graphs-that-explain-how-brexit-won-eu-explained-a7101676.html>

The above data shows another demographic component for voting Brexit within the framework of race and ethnicity is the question of religion. It appears that Brexit support among the Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME), there is a higher support among the

Christians, Jewish and the Sikhs, whereas Hindus and Muslims support for Brexit is less important. The data above shows that on ethnicity, Brexit support is slightly high among the mix-race and Asians than the Chinese and the Black group. It is therefore important to question what accounts for this support or less support for Brexit among people of ethnic minority descent. British Asian Sikhs are considered to have a very conservative approach to religion and therefore find the Tory party policies more attractive, as oppose to the Hindus and Muslims who find the Tory Party policies less liberal in terms of religious tolerance to their faith¹²⁶⁶.

ii) African Brexiters: The case of Ghanaian and Nigerian voters

Toni Hastrup, a lecturer in International Security at the University of Kent, states that it is a received wisdom that Black Asian Minority Ethnic group, BAME voters were more likely to vote for REMAIN during the referendum campaign¹²⁶⁷. She noted that about 30 percent of the 4 million eligible Black voters were not yet on the electoral register¹²⁶⁸. This notwithstanding, the LEAVE campaign still attempted to persuade the BAME constituent to vote for them, while the REMAIN campaign seems to be taking the BAME vote for granted, she asked¹²⁶⁹. But are things as they seem?

Table 10: BAME voters are more likely to vote Remain

	Leave	Remain	Don't know	Will not vote	N
All	40.54	42.79	14.47	2.21	22,337
White	41.79	41.85	14.3	2.06	20,591
Indian	27.74	51.7	16.85	3.7	322
Pakistani	26.14	56.11	11.49	6.27	160
Bangladeshi	17.33	41.97	37.08	3.61	97
Black Caribbean	20.54	56.35	19.57	3.54	202
Black African	15.61	63.09	17.97	3.32	193
Chinese	17.96	64.51	10.28	7.25	122

Note: Figures in the table are based on British Election Survey Data, without filtering for

¹²⁶⁶ Anwar, M., 1990. The Participation of Asians in the British political system. *Clarke et al*, p. 280.

¹²⁶⁷ Toni Hastrup How do Britain's ethnic minorities view the EU referendum? <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/how-do-britains-ethnic-minorities-view-the-eu-referendum/>

¹²⁶⁸ Toni Hastrup 2016, art.cit. p.5

¹²⁶⁹ Ibidem

turnout. Source: Toni Haastrup How do Britain's ethnic minorities view the EU referendum?
<https://ukandeu.ac.uk/how-do-britains-ethnic-minorities-view-the-eu-referendum/>

As the table above shows, there is indeed evidence that BAME voters overwhelmingly back REMAIN for the referendum vote. However, some BAME voters are also considering Brexit. For instance, as Dreda Say Mitchell has argued, there is rising concern in some Black communities over the growing influence of far-right political groups on the EU's integration process¹²⁷⁰. There is also a general concern that the EU is undemocratic – a concern also shared with non-BAME voters¹²⁷¹. Beyond this, there are those that are concerned about what they see as the continued marginalisation of those already on the margins of British society¹²⁷². Such concerns are frequently articulated in terms of their implications for the working class; however, the category of the working class is often not inclusive of BAME voters.

Haastrup pointed out that on immigration, for example, some BAME voters see the free movement of Eastern Europeans into the UK as being linked to their own marginalisation¹²⁷³. In addition to the impact of right-wing political groups on the EU itself, free movement also means those who hold less progressive views are free to move to the UK¹²⁷⁴. Other BAME voters see the principle of free movement itself as being discriminatory. While it allows white Europeans unrestricted access to the UK, it has been accompanied by stricter limits on migration from the non-white Commonwealth to the UK¹²⁷⁵. Thus, for those who buy into the promise of a fairer immigration system in the event of a Brexit, a vote to leave has some appeal from the BAME community¹²⁷⁶. Interestingly, however, many of the arguments put forward by those BAME voters that are keen to Remain rely on the same themes as the Leavers. To some extent, the EU provides an alternative to the culture of racism and intolerance that has been magnified by the referendum campaign. This is also apparent in the perceptions that remain voters

¹²⁷⁰ Ibidem

¹²⁷¹ Ibidem

¹²⁷² Ibidem

¹²⁷³ Ibidem

¹²⁷⁴ Ibidem

¹²⁷⁵ Ibidem

¹²⁷⁶ Ibidem

have of those backing a leave vote. Concerning immigration, REMAINERS with links to the Commonwealth are sceptical about the promise of more favourable immigration terms since the dominant refrain of the politicians campaigning for Brexit has been to put a curb on immigration to the UK¹²⁷⁷. As a recent data shows, non-EU migration currently outnumbers migration from within the EU, it is therefore, difficult to see how Brexit would benefit those coming from Africa, the Caribbean and parts of the Pacific¹²⁷⁸. On the economy, most members of the BAME community, including British Asian business owners, backed the REMAIN campaign on the basis that membership of the EU is good for small and medium sized businesses¹²⁷⁹. The fact that specific data on the views of ethnic minorities has not been gathered during the campaign also illustrates the extent to which these issues have been ignored. While numerous polls have measured how opinions vary across factors such as gender, geographical location, party preference, or stances on other subjects, variations by ethnicity have not been measured in the same way.

Indeed, only the British Election Survey has considered the implications of views among BAME voters for the referendum. It is this situation that prompted the Operation Black Vote (OBV) campaign, whose campaign poster, designed by the acclaimed advertising firm Saatchi and Saatchi, has generated controversy and been characterised as divisive¹²⁸⁰. But the low electoral registration figures for BAME voters illustrate the divided nature of the electorate. This is also apparent, as shown in the table below, when the likelihood to vote during the election by different groups. If a significant proportion of the population feel alienated from democratic proceedings, this calls into question the quality of democracy.

¹²⁷⁷ Ibidem

¹²⁷⁸ Ibidem

¹²⁷⁹

A reminder of how Britain voted in the EU referendum – and why: <https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/03/a-reminder-of-how-britain-voted-in-the-eu-referendum-and-why/>

¹²⁸⁰ Ibidem

Table 11: BAME voters are less likely to vote in 2016

Reported % saying 'very likely that I will vote' (on a 5 pt scale: very unlikely, fairly unlikely, neither likely nor unlikely, fairly likely, very likely')

	% certain to vote	N
All	79.07	22,337
White	80.42	20,591
Indian	56.53	322
Pakistani	57.69	160
Bangladeshi	53.41	97
Black Caribbean	57.40	202
Black African	61.20	193
Chinese	61.79	122

Source: Toni Hastrup, How do Britain's ethnic minorities view the EU referendum? <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/how-do-britains-ethnic-minorities-view-the-eu-referendum/>

As it has been discussed above on the voting patterns of BAME during the EU referendum, majority of people of ethnic minority voted REMAIN, however a considerable minority equally voted LEAVE. Earlier on we saw the reason that Asian British LEAVE voters gave as to why they voted on populist anti-immigrant sentiment that was highlighted by the LEAVE campaigners.

In this same vein, it is equally important to analyse the motives behind Black British Africans who voted LEAVE during the EU referendum. A focus group discussion was conducted among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians in July 2016 to find out the reasons behind voting Brexit. Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians diaspora in London were chosen because these two African diaspora communities constitute the largest and oldest settled African diaspora groups in London, with some member of the community who are well integrated in all aspects of the fabric of urban British society. Their demographic and socio-professional profile was equally paramount in seeking balance of representation during the study.

The results that emerged from the focused group discussion indicated a mixed outcome:

a) voting Brexit to preserve their interest and their position as one of the oldest settled Black African Commonwealth community in London with the privileges that come with such strategic positioning; b) voting Brexit is about full integration and assimilation as their identities are now very much fused and woven into the fabric of the British society. Some respondents went further to indicate that they voted Brexit because they felt that their exclusive place as an old established migrant community in Britain is being threaten by the massive arrival of new migrants, especially since the arrival of Eastern European migrants between 2002-2003. They therefore believe that EU migrants have now taken over the position they once occupied in various sectors within the job market ¹²⁸¹. This sentiment expressed by the Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians diaspora as we saw earlier echoes a similar sentiment Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Pakistanis had expressed vis-à-vis EU migrants' arrival in the UK and their position as old Commonwealth migrants. This, therefore, shows a convergence of solidarity among Commonwealth migrants towards EU migrants, which was part of the Brexiters strategy to divide and rule, but also to create an atmosphere of “us against them” notion. The aim of Brexiters was to capture all aspects of British Society demographics such as: the youth, senior citizens, rich, poor and people of ethnic minority descent. And in so doing to normalise the ideology of Brexit.

Figure 0-67: Mural Representation of Empire Windrush



Image 1.: Street art of Empire Windrush on Campbell Street St Pauls by artist BS51 delivered by Cleo Lake for Jahlake Concepts and St Pauls Afrikan Caribbean Carnival with support from MShed. Source: <http://stpaulscarnival.co.uk/about-us/history/>

¹²⁸¹ Fieldwork data on Brexit vote in June 2016

Table 12: Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian Brexit voters in North London

Socio-Professional categorisation and Brexit votes: REMAIN and LEAVE	
<u>Professional categories:</u> Doctors, Nurses, Lawyers, Journalist, Architects, Business owners, investment banker etc	<u>Non-Socio-Professional categories:</u> Bus drivers, cleaners, manual workers on constructions sites, Tube conductors etc...
<u>REMAIN VOTERS:</u> 15 out of 20 respondents voted for the UK to REMAIN in the EU. 5 respondents voted for the UK to LEAVE the EU	<u>LEAVE VOTERS:</u> 18 out of 20 Respondents voted to for the UK to LEAVE the EU, whereas 3 respondents voted for the UK to REMAIN in the EU

The majority who indicated that they voted Remain during the referendum among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians were the professionals among these diaspora groups. This therefore indicates that educational attainment and professional status are determining factors as to who voted Brexit among Ghanaians and Nigerians, this observation also corroborates with earlier observation on voting patterns in UK general elections in 2017 and 2019 with links to educational attainment. Most importantly what this observation illustrates is that for example Ghanaians are not more pro-Brexit compared to Nigerians.

Among Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian professionals i.e. Lawyers, Doctors, Nurses, Architects and journalists, some indicated during the group discussion that they voted for the UK to Remain in the EU because they believed, that Brexit had more to do with internal UK party politics and internal political crisis¹²⁸². Therefore, it had no bearing

¹²⁸² Field work group discussion among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians during UK's Brexit Referendum in London July 2016

on the UK's position in Europe and that EU migrants were used as political scapegoat to advance the ruling Party's scepticism about Europe¹²⁸³. To these Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian professionals, EU migrants were not to be blamed for Britain's economic woes and recent political crisis which has had an impact on the country's economic decline. To this effect, the consensus among this professional category, unanimously revealed to be against the UK leaving the EU. This notwithstanding, some respondents within this professional group voiced out their concerns and dismay about recent competition from professionals among EU migrants competing for the same jobs. These respondents noted that professionals among EU migrants have contributed in making the highly skilled job market competitive, as they are being offered better position than them (Anglo-Ghanaian professionals and Anglo-Nigerian professionals), advancing the argument that they are Commonwealth citizens and native English speakers and therefore should be considered first for such highly skilled jobs before EU migrants¹²⁸⁴.

To them, EU professionals often have added advantages for recruiters in terms of speaking other European languages, which makes it more competitive especially jobs that requires international travel and contacts within sectors such as: Media, Finance and Banking jobs in the City of London, Legal and Judiciary field, academia and health sector jobs¹²⁸⁵. An example, to illustrate this paradigm shift in terms of recruiting labour force outside the UK, is within the National Health Service, (NHS.). Historically, the NHS has long relied on foreign healthcare professionals mainly from former Commonwealth countries to fill-in the deficit of NHS healthcare staffs' shortages. The below data on NHS professionals' nationalities reveals that between 2013 and 2018 there was a considerable increase of NHS staff from EU countries¹²⁸⁶. Figure 43 shows that out of every 1,000 NHS staff, 55 are EU nationals compare to 52 Asians and 22 Africans. In London, 110 out of 1,000 NHS staff are EU nationals, either 11%¹²⁸⁷.

¹²⁸³ Fieldwork Group discussions with Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians July 2016, London


¹²⁸⁴ Fieldwork focused group discussions among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians Brexiters July-August 2016 in North London

¹²⁸⁵ Fieldwork focused group discussions among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians Brexiters July-August 2016 in North London

¹²⁸⁶ How many staff are from the EU and Commonwealth? Published 28th May 2014, By Full Facts: <https://fullfact.org/health/immigration-and-nhs-how-many-staff-are-eu-and-commonwealth/>


¹²⁸⁷ How many staff are from the EU and Commonwealth? Published 28th May 2014, By Full Facts: <https://fullfact.org/health/immigration-and-nhs-how-many-staff-are-eu-and-commonwealth/>

Figure 0-68: Most common Nationalities of NHS Staff



Source: House of Commons Library, NHS staff from overseas: statistics, published 07 February 2018: <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7783>

Figure 0-69: Nationality of NHS Staff



Source: Immigration and the NHS: how many staff are from the EU and Commonwealth? Published 28th May 2014, By Full Facts: <https://fullfact.org/health/immigration-and-nhs-how-many-staff-are-eu-and-commonwealth/>

Figure 0-70: Most common Nationalities of NHS Staff

MOST COMMON NATIONALITIES OF NHS STAFF

	British	976,288		Nigerian	5,405
	Indian	18,348		Zimbabwean	3,899
	Philippine	15,391		Romanian	3,775
	Irish	13,016		Pakistani	3,375
	Polish	8,477		Greek	2,952
	Spanish	6,781		German	2,400
	Portuguese	6,725		Ghanaian	2,345
	Italian	6,044		Malaysian	2,201

Source: House of Commons Library, NHS staff from overseas: statistics, published 07 February 2018: <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7783>

These 2018 data set, indicates a slight decline of EU NHS staff in 2013 were 3.6% whereas Commonwealth staff increased by 4%. This implies and confirms that there has been a shift in terms of Britain's dependence on EU health professionals in various capacity. Whereas, in the past the first port of call for health professionals to fill in the deficit of the NHS employment sector came mainly from Commonwealth countries such as: India, Pakistan, Jamaica, Ghana and Nigeria, this trend has gradually changed. And as such, some Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian respondents among the professional category felt that they were at times being side-lined in favour of EU health professionals. This sentiment was echoed by Anglo-Ghanaian doctor during the fieldwork observation who noted:

I left Ghana in the late 1980s to specialise in neurology, because as medical students in Ghana, we were offered ample of opportunities to emigrate to the UK, some of my colleagues at the University of Ghana medical school who left the country in the 1980s and the 1990s for the UK, came mainly as medical professionals to work, because Britain needed helping hand from us. We felt we were needed, and we easily blended into the British Society because of the colonial ties with Britain. Some of my colleagues working here at the hospital are from: India, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, who equally emigrated here either as medical students or were already qualified doctors, who were recruited to come and work in Britain. This trend has changed dramatically, as from the early 2000s, very few doctors are being recruited from Commonwealth countries. I have observed that some of my colleague specialist in cardiology and neurology are EU doctors from Germany, Spain, Italy and some Eastern European countries. Although, these EU colleagues are very good doctors, we have had incidence of misdiagnosis or bad diagnosis due to the language barrier, as some of the EU doctors struggle to communicate in English with our patients who are of diverse ethnic backgrounds, socio-economic backgrounds here in South-East London. Recently, an EU doctor was suspended for severe misdiagnosis of a patient due to language barrier. As a result of such medical errors, the hospital has to employ interpreters in various European Languages to help some EU doctors in their diagnosis, as some EU doctors understand medical English jargons, but to communicate in simple English to patients often proves to be a challenge...With these personal observations, I believe that Britain should reconsider Commonwealth medical

professionals more as opposed to EU medical professionals, as in a long run it cost more to employ an EU doctor than a Commonwealth doctor, due to the language barrier of EU doctors¹²⁸⁸ ... An Anglo-Nigerian journalist during the focused group discussion indicated that he voted LEAVE. He noted: *I voted Leave, because of a first-hand experience I had when I was looking for a new job with one of the main media outlets here in London, I was shortlisted with another journalist for the position, the other journalist was an EU national, he got the job although he was not an expert on issues pertaining to Africa, but because he spoke other international languages, he got the job*¹²⁸⁹.

An Anglo-Nigerian respondent, owner of a cleaning company stressed that he voted LEAVE, because Eastern European migrants have made bidding for cleaning contracts become less profitable and lucrative in recent times. He noted that cleaning companies owned by Eastern European migrants are willing to accept the lowest bidding price etc... He further noted that: *these days when you employ someone to go and work as a cleaner at a company, you are asked as the owner of a cleaning company to send a CV of the cleaner showing their qualification. Such requirement never existed in the past. People are supposed to go and do cleaning and not show what qualifications they have... but since Polish and EU migrants started owning cleaning companies and employing Polish cleaners the whole sector is now suffering and everything has changed dramatically ... I am even considering venturing into a new business, because of this unfair competition from EU migrants, as this competition is killing my business. It is for this reason that I voted Brexit because they have come and spoiled our business*¹²⁹⁰.

According to a study by BBC Africa on post Brexit reaction on reasons why some Africans voted Brexit: *“Even the NHS and care sector, which had relied so much on African professionals, began to forget them in favour of the new EU arrivals”*¹²⁹¹.

Among the Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora who voted Leave or those who were pro Brexit, majority of them were not the professional and educated category, as most of them worked in semi-skilled, low-skilled and manual jobs. They worked in low-skilled jobs

¹²⁸⁸ Fieldwork observation on Brexit votes June-July 2016 in London discussion with an Anglo-Ghanaian doctor

¹²⁸⁹ Fieldwork observation on Brexit votes June-July 2016 in London discussion with an Anglo-Nigerian journalist

¹²⁹⁰ Fieldwork observation on Brexit votes June-July 2016 in London discussion with an Anglo-Nigerian business owner

¹²⁹¹ BBC Africa, Africans voting Brexit: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

such as: cleaners (in offices and London underground), construction site workers, electricians, plumbers, builders, labourers working on farms etc. As noted in earlier chapters on motives for voting Brexit, it appeared that voting Brexit was common and high amongst low-skilled, less educated working-class white British and ethnic minorities. Which could be interpreted as that this social category voted Brexit regardless of their ethnicity but rather based on their common interest and personal circumstances. The below statement from a BBC survey on African Brexiteers illustrates this assertion aptly: *"The African migrant who voted to leave the EU was as fearful of the new arrivals, of his or her chances in a crowded job and housing market, as was his indigenous British neighbour"*¹²⁹²

With the sample of 20 respondents, 18 out of 20 non-professional Anglo-Ghanaian and Anglo-Nigerian voters indicated that they voted LEAVE because they felt that their jobs were being threatened by EU migrants. They cited the following reasons: *European migrants have taken their jobs, they have made claiming for social welfare benefit difficult, they have taken-up hospital beds, no school spaces for their children*¹²⁹³. Some politicians highlighted during debates leading up to the referendum that their constituents in London were bemoaning the lack of places for their children in local schools because of the burgeoning numbers coming from Eastern Europe. Residents in these inner-city London Boroughs made complaints to their MPs in this regard, such is the case of Streatham a South London Borough with a large African-Caribbean community¹²⁹⁴.

Previously low-skilled and manual professions such as: working for the London Underground as tube conductors, administrators and cleaners, working as carers in retirement homes or giving care and assistance to vulnerable senior citizens in their homes, London bus drivers, office cleaning jobs, street cleaners, plumbing decorators and construction workers have now been taken over by Polish and other EU migrants according some respondents during the field work focused group discussions. These semi-skilled and low-skilled jobs were once reserved for or dominated by Ghanaian and Nigerian low skilled migrants among other Commonwealth migrants. Some of the respondents went further to indicate that because of Polish workers, wages have

¹²⁹² BBC Africa, Africans voting Brexit: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

¹²⁹³ Fieldwork, focus group discussion on why Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians voted Leave, July-August 2016, in North London

¹²⁹⁴ African migrants in London voting LEAVE: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

decreased, as Polish and Eastern European migrants are willing to accept being paid below the legal minimum wage of £7 per hour¹²⁹⁵.

An Anglo-Ghanaian who works as a cleaner in an office in one of the Investment Banks in the City of London noted: *“ I have no bad feeling against Polish migrants, I can understand why they are here, to search for a better life and help their families back home just like some of us are here for the same reason. I sometimes go and buy my Beer from a Polish corner-shop, because I like the taste of their Beer, it reminds of the taste of Beer in Ghana, so if I didn't like them, I will not go and buy stuff from their shop.... My only concern is the way they have made the job market difficult compare to before, but apart from that they are pretty cool people ¹²⁹⁶”*.

Anglo-Nigerian who works as a bus driver for London Bus Company states: *Well, it is true that these days we are seeing fewer and fewer Sierra Leonian Bus drivers, Ghanaian bus drivers or even Zimbabwean bus drivers. This is because of the high presence of Eastern Europeans; they are prepared to work extremely long hours 7 days a week. Some of them are even willing to work every Sunday and even on Christmas day (only that Christmas day is a holiday here in England). Because, the Nigerian, the Ghanaian, and the Zimbabwean drivers will like to take Sunday off to go to Church or to rest. But also, it is because we know our rights and speak-up against any form of workplace abuse and exploitation. But for the Polish drivers, they accept everything and anything, even abuse and exploitation, so the managers prefer to employ more of the Polish drivers than us because they can make them work under any conditions without any complains¹²⁹⁷.*

A survey conducted by BBC Africa among Black British and Africans living in London on post Brexit reactions, illustrates the reasons why some Africans in London voted during the referendum:

- **“Julius from Uganda:** *I have been living in London for 13 years, I didn't vote, but I wanted them (British) to vote OUT for many reasons: firstly, for the economy of Africa, my country Uganda exports coffee to Britain, and it helps our economy, leaving the EU will be good for the African economy less competition from other European countries. Secondly, my country Uganda,*

¹²⁹⁵ Fieldwork, focus group discussion on why Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians voted Leave, July-August 2016, in North London

¹²⁹⁶ Fieldwork, focus group discussion July-August 2016, in North London

¹²⁹⁷ Fieldwork, focus group discussion July-August 2016, in North London

has more ties with the UK than with the EU so this tie will be much stronger”¹²⁹⁸.

- ***Esther from Nigeria:*** *voted REMAIN, because I am afraid of the unknown, because now that we have voted we do not know what will happen. This is something new so it’s a bit scary. It is really the fear of uncertainty¹²⁹⁹.*
- ***Jean-Didier from DR Congo:*** *I have been here for 24 years, I voted LEAVE because of job competition, that’s what I don’t like¹³⁰⁰.*
- ***Gifty from Ghana:*** *I don’t think it makes any difference to me whether we are IN or OUT, because I am still doing what I am doing. But I think OUT is okay”¹³⁰¹.*

These BBC survey showcases some of the underlining reasons behind African Brexit voters which also corroborates with the focused group discussions conducted among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians in North London. This survey also underscores the diverging views of respondents as to the reason why they believe LEAVING or REMAINING in the EU to be good or bad for the UK. This is based on the perceived idea of threat from EU migrant based the juxtaposition to their personal interest, as this was highlighted by the Anglo-Ghanaian neurologist and the Anglo-Nigerian owner of a cleaning company, with regards to the job market. There is also the argument about the historic ties with England and Commonwealth African countries as it was indicated by Julius from Uganda who stated that Leaving the EU will enhance trade and economic ties between Britain and Uganda... Another dimension to this argument on voting Brexit among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians posits with the idea of voting in alignment to the general pattern of voting within the framework of communitarian voting set-up in UK politics. Such communitarian voting pattern has been facilitated by the representation of people of ethnic minority within both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party in constituencies which has high concentration of migrants and people of ethnic minority descent, as we saw with the Examples of Labour and Conservative Anglo-Pakistanis MPs

¹²⁹⁸ BBC World Service: Africans in London react to Brexit, 24 June 2016: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03zbx4m>

¹²⁹⁹ Ibidem

¹³⁰⁰ Ibidem

¹³⁰¹ Ibidem

advocating for their constituents to vote for Brexit or equally Adam Afriyie and Kwesi Kwarteng the Anglo-Ghanaian Tory MPs supporting Brexit.

These observer participatory research and focused group discussions, among Anglo-Ghanaians and Anglo-Nigerians further cements the idea that political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is very much interwoven and embedded within the general voting pattern of people of ethnic minority in the UK. But equally as the ethnic minority political participation evolves at the same pace as British politics evolves, so too does the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement progress in the UK. Political participation in Britain is therefore not static, Ghanaian diaspora and ethnic minority political participation has changed from a political engagement that was once based on social cohesion and integration in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s to a political engagement that is now based on exclusion of the “other” in 2016, as it has been shown with the examples of Anglo-Ghanaians, Anglo-Nigerians and people of ethnic minority descent voting Brexit. This changing nature of Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London is equally a reflection and the evolution of the British politics in general. In this regard, an important question needs to be posed. Is the Ghanaian diaspora political participation in UK politics a marker of total integration and assimilation? Or is it a sign that the British model of multiculturalism and communitarianism is a success in terms of making people of ethnic minority feel so integrated and evolving at the same pace as the British society? The answer to this question is both multiple and complex. It is both a question of the degree as to what integration, assimilation, multiculturalism and communitarianism can be defined, for whom, why and how.

In a nutshell, what appears to be a simplistic vote to LEAVE the EU by first-and-second generation Africans and Ghanaians in London underscores various reasons, be it personal or national. These reasons for voting Brexit by people of ethnic minority descent in London did not prevent and preserve them from post Brexit discrimination by far-right white British groups.

iii) Post-Brexit: Legitimisation and normalisation of racism and discrimination in the UK

Whatever else Brexit means or does not mean; it certainly means racism. Born of fortuitous circumstances, lacking programme or policy, the government has had to find

its 'mandate' in the twin Brexit themes: that immigration is unravelling of the nation, and anything foreign, except investment, is abhorrent to its ethos – thus giving a fillip to popular racism and elevating institutional racism to fully-fledged state racism.

Of course, there were signs of state racism from the time of the first Immigration Act in 1962, but these were counterbalanced by anti-discrimination legislation and community programmes – and for a while the way was opened to a truly multicultural society, the foremost in Europe, and its exemplar. The difference today is that racism and xenophobia have become tied into the state itself, making nativism the state ideology and 'take back control' its political culture.

In the post-referendum period, racial violence and harassment, as this report graphically shows, became widespread and brazen. But in going along with the dominant narrative, the government reduced racial violence, a socially based issue, to individualised 'hate crime'. And in so siphoning off racism and racial violence to the terrain of law and order, the government conceals its complicity in creating state racism. The struggle then is on two levels, both at once: against state racism and against 'hate crime'. A. Sivanandan¹³⁰²

Burnett notes that the explosion of racist violence that followed the announcement of the EU referendum result on 24 June 2016 has been well documented.¹³⁰³ Though the political direction of travel in the UK on issues of immigration, race, religion and refugee policy has largely been disconnected from that violence, the sheer level of racist abuse and attacks could not be ignored¹³⁰⁴. Home Secretary Amber Rudd, launching a hate crime strategy a few days after the referendum, declared that hate crimes were '*utterly unacceptable*' and must be '*stamped out*'. Former Prime Minister David Cameron described the situation as '*despicable*'¹³⁰⁵, Theresa May, said that *hate 'has no place in the UK'*¹³⁰⁶. For Metropolitan Police Chief Bernard Hogan-Howe, the 2,300 (plus) racist incidents reported to the police in the thirty-eight days after the referendum, were a

¹³⁰² Quotation by A. Sivanandan on Post- Brexit violence in an article written by Burnett, J., 2017. Racial violence and the Brexit state. *Race & class*, 58(4), pp.85.

¹³⁰³ Burnett, J., 2017. Art.cit. p.86.

¹³⁰⁴ Burnett, J., 2017. Art.cit. p.87.

¹³⁰⁵ Sebastian Whale, 'David Cameron condemns "despicable" racist abuse after referendum result', *Politics Home*, 27 June 2016, <https://www.politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-policy-agenda/brexit/news/76638/david-came/>

¹³⁰⁶ 'Hate crime awareness week 2016: Theresa May's message', *Prime Minister's Office*, 8 October 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hate-crime-awareness-week-2016-theresa-maysmessage/>

*'horrible spike'*¹³⁰⁷.

Between 16 June and 30 June, more than 3,000 hate crimes were reported to the police across the UK: a 42% increase on the same period in 2015. whilst the majority of the 134 incidents examined were incidents of racist abuse, they also included physical assaults, arson attacks, death threats and stabbings¹³⁰⁸. Several people were hospitalised¹³⁰⁹. Most of these incidents were in England, and whilst the most frequent 'targets' were European migrants (particularly eastern European migrants) and Muslims, these were not the only people targeted¹³¹⁰. There were incidents against Black people, Jewish people were targeted too. People were singled out for attack on the basis of speaking a foreign language, or presumptions about their 'right' to be here¹³¹¹.

According to Burnett: "*The referendum result was taken by some as affirmation that the country was not only now 'theirs', but that it was theirs 'again'*"¹³¹². In this way, there was a sense of history being corrected and of historical wrongs (immigration, primarily) being righted¹³¹³. The racist violence that was legitimised was underpinned by a racism tied to 'entitlement'¹³¹⁴. An example was a racist abuse of one person mistakenly assumed to be a Polish national, who was told '*we only tolerate you lot because of the income you bring in*', indicated a form of racism within which people were only accepted in the UK on the basis that they brought skills/capital¹³¹⁵. Here was a clear message: outsiders are acceptable only when profitable¹³¹⁶.

The below graph shows the proportion of hate crimes reported to the NPCC in the week before, and the eight weeks after the referendum (when 'returns' were no longer obligatory) compared to the corresponding weeks in 2015¹³¹⁷. The below figure also depicts, how the British media and press reported on post-Brexit violence, highlighting how visible it was after the referendum.

¹³⁰⁷ Matthew Weaver, "'Horrible spike' in hate crime linked to Brexit vote, Met police say", *Guardian*, 28 September 2016.

¹³⁰⁸ Mark Piggott, 'Hate crimes soar by 400% in first week after referendum result following Brexit result', *International Business Times*, 30 June 2016.

¹³⁰⁹ Burnett, J., 2017. Art.cit. p.90

¹³¹⁰ Burnett, J., 2017. Art.cit. p.90

¹³¹¹ Burnett, J., 2017. Art.cit. p.91

¹³¹² Ibid.91

¹³¹³ Ibid.91


¹³¹⁴ Ibid.92

¹³¹⁵ Ibid.92

¹³¹⁶ Ibid.93

¹³¹⁷ Ibid.96

Figure 0-71: Post Brexit racial violence: Police reported hate crime and media reported racial violence



Source: Burnett, J., 2017. Racial violence and the Brexit state. *Race & class*,

Figure 0-72: Box.8 Tabloid Media coverage and press report during Brexit campaign propaganda and post-Brexit violence and hate crime

February 2013: The Daily Express claims that Britain has been 'hit by a Romanian crimewave' in an article headed 'How Romanians terrorise our streets'.

July 2013: The Daily Express announces that 'foreign scroungers' are to be 'barred from free NHS treatment'.

September 2013: The Sun demands that teachers and nurses are banned from wearing the veil, and that they are banned in banks, airports and some other areas.

October 2013: The Sun says there are 600,000 'benefit tourists' in the UK.

October 2013: The Sun admits that there is no evidence to support its claim above.

November 2013: The Daily Express editor leads a delegation to Downing Street to deliver a petition, signed by 150,000 readers 'opposed to a flood of Bulgarians and Romanians working in Britain'.

December 2013: On International Migrants Day the Sun's front page superimposes a big red line over a picture of Europe, telling the Prime Minister to 'stop the flood ... OR ELSE'.

June 2015: An article in the Daily Mail claims that the 'tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest threat to Europe since the war'.

November 2015: The Daily Mail runs a cartoon on 'Europe's open borders' which, in its depiction of Muslims, migrants and rats entering Europe, is likened to Nazi-era propaganda.

November 2015: The Sun distorts its own polling data to produce a front-page

headline saying '1 in 5 Brit Muslims' sympathy for Jihadis'.

November 2015: The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) finds a Daily Star Sunday headline 'UK mosques fundraising for terror' to be 'significantly misleading'.

December 2015: The Times claims on its front page that 'Muslims are silent on terror' on the basis of low referrals by Muslim communities to the government's Prevent programme.

March 2016: The Daily Star claims that Gypsies have 'invaded' a southern coastal town, saying it is 'under siege'.

August 2016: The Daily Mail discusses a 'migration ultimatum' which includes kicking out 'dodgy asylum seekers'.

October 2016: Channel 4 presenter Fatima Manji says that it is now 'open season' on Muslims after IPSO clears a former editor of the Sun, who in July wrote an article condemning her employers for allowing her to wear a niqab whilst reporting on terrorist murders in Nice.

a Sydney Smith, 'Daily Mail cartoon on refugees recalls Nazi-era propaganda, critics say', *imediaethics* (22 November 2015), <http://www.imediaethics.org/daily-mail-cartoon-on-refugees-recalls-naziera-propaganda-critics-say/>

Source: Burnett, J., 2017. Racial violence and the Brexit state. *Race & class*,

According to a 2018 UN report on post-Brexit vote racial discrimination and intolerance. The UN special rapporteur Prof Tendayi Achiume, a Zambian professor of Law at the University of California was appointed as the UN's special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerances in September 2017¹³¹⁸. Achiume spent 11 days in the UK investigating the impact of Brexit on racial equality. She spoke at the end of her mission in the UK, she identified a range of institutional prejudice towards migrants in the UK but most importantly towards ethnic minorities in Britain. Her reports pointed to a Brexit-related growth in "explicit racial, ethnic and religious intolerance, including extreme views that have gained ground in mainstream political parties of the left and the right". She also noted that: "The environment leading up to the referendum, the environment during the referendum, and the environment after the referendum has made racial and ethnic minorities more vulnerable to racial discrimination and intolerance. The discourses on racial equality before, during and after the 2016 referendum, as well as the policies and practices upon which the Brexit debate has conferred legitimacy, raise serious issues at the core of my

¹³¹⁸ UK has seen 'Brexit-related' growth in racism, says UN representative

UN special rapporteur on racism says 'extreme views' have gained ground in Britain since vote:

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/11/uk-has-seen-brexit-related-growth-in-racism-says-un-representative>

mandate. Many with whom I consulted highlighted the growth in volume and acceptability of xenophobic discourses on migration, and on foreign nationals including refugees in social and print media ¹³¹⁹.” The report of Prof. Achiume, its findings and conclusions were presented to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in June 2019¹³²⁰. “The Africans awoke to a post-Brexit Britain that was as full of prejudice to the non-EU citizen as to the EU citizen¹³²¹”. Post-Brexit racial discrimination revealed that both EU and old established Commonwealth migrants’ communities were subjected to physical, verbal and cyber abuses. Racial discrimination such as: “*go back to your country, why are you still here, we voted for you to LEAVE our country etc, gained common ground in Britain.* According to a report by the Race Relation centre on post-Brexit racial discrimination, they recorded a high rate of racial discrimination the aftermath of Brexit ¹³²².

Africans and ethnic minorities who voted LEAVE indeed woke-up to a post-Brexit Britain to realise that they were not considered as “fully integrated and assimilated” as they thought. As the far-right extremist group’s discrimination towards migrants’ communities made no difference between old established Commonwealth communities and EU migrants. This is exemplified by a BBC report which observed that: “*Bitter graffiti appeared urging all foreigners to leave. People were targeted on the streets because they were Black, Brown, wore a turban or had an accent. One tweet, mentioned in parliament, read: "Go home. #We voted Leave. Time to make Britain great again by getting rid of you Blacks, Asians and immigrants." Prejudice, it seems, has been released through the pressure valve of the referendum and the pro-Brexit voters did not count on that. And now there are more questions than answers as people wonder what will replace the EU as a trading and development partner*¹³²³.

¹³¹⁹ UK has seen 'Brexit-related' growth in racism, says UN representative
UN special rapporteur on racism says ‘extreme views’ have gained ground in Britain since vote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/11/uk-has-seen-brexit-related-growth-in-racism-says-un-representative>

¹³²⁰ UK has seen 'Brexit-related' growth in racism, says UN representative
UN special rapporteur on racism says ‘extreme views’ have gained ground in Britain since vote:
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¹³²¹ Bitter Graffiti: Africans migrants voting Brexit: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

¹³²² UK racial inequality a 'threat to democracy', warns UN: <https://www.ft.com/content/a5ed1582-9f13-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb>

¹³²³ Bitter Graffiti: Africans migrants voting Brexit: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

The BBC report further states that: *The Commonwealth lost its economic clout with the end of colonies. And China is decades ahead of the old colonial rulers in terms of influence on the African continent. The African Brexiteers may find that life after Brexit may be little different to life before the referendum, except for the nagging uncertainty It was also feared that with Albania, Turkey, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro waiting to join the EU, the African worker could tumble to the bottom of the working pile. And this argument was put across persistently. Yet the Africans awoke to a post-Brexit Britain that was as full of prejudice to the non-EU citizen as to the EU citizen*¹³²⁴.

This idea of being well integrated and represented within British politics by people of ethnic minority descent as exemplified by second-generation Anglo-Ghanaian politicians such as, Lord Boateng and Adam Afriyie indicating to be “*post-race, and that the colour of their skin does not define them*”. This assertion further attests to the notion of full integration and assimilation of Black British and Asian British within the fabric of UK politics and society. Electing London’s first ethnic minority Mayor Sadiq Khan in May 2016, exemplify this integration and assimilation through the lenses of multiculturalism, yet post-Brexit discrimination proves that there is a paradox on this notion of full integration and assimilation of people of ethnic minority descent in the UK.

Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London can therefore be summarised as: elite participation among first- and second-generation Ghanaians in London who have a political knowledge and therefore understand the need of civic action versus first and second generation non-elite participation. This political knowledge of elite Ghanaians in London is articulated via networking within political parties in the UK, Ghanaian associations in the UK such as Ghanaian churches etc.

But also, a top-bottom approach of political engagement which has been facilitated by political representation of people of ethnic minorities within both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. With the examples of Lord Boateng, Adam Afriyie, Kwesi Kwarteng, Sam Gyimah, Abena Opong-Asare and Bell Ribeiro-Addy as Anglo-Ghanaian politicians. They attest to this top-bottom approach, which is mainly composed of educated second-generation Ghanaians. First-generation political engagement in UK politics is a bottom-top approach, first-generation Ghanaians political participation can also be qualified as a partial integration and

¹³²⁴ Bitter Grafitti: Africans migrants voting Brexit: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36643891>

assimilation in the UK. First-generation political participation in London is partial because they participate in transnational politics towards Ghana. Whereas second-generation Ghanaians only participate in UK politics and therefore, their political engagement can be qualified as full integration and assimilation into the British Society. The political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is informed by the embedded degree of their social capital and social network accumulation in their host country.

As it has been noted earlier on, Ghanaian diaspora political engagement does not stand alone, their voting pattern and political engagement in the UK is highly influenced by the voting pattern of the ethnic minority group in the UK. Ethnic minority political elites in the UK have a strong influence on their constituents, for example London Labour MPs in constituencies with high concentration of ethnic minorities and migrant communities influenced the local population to vote for Labour Mayoral candidate Sadiq Khan in May 2016¹³²⁵. But also, as we saw with the example of Anglo-Pakistani Labour MP in Birmingham encouraging his constituents to vote for Brexit. Another example of such influence from top-bottom approach on political influence is the support for Brexit by the two Anglo-Ghanaian Tory MPs: Adam Afriyie and Kwesi Kwarteng.

Post-Brexit political scene in the UK is positioning Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative MPs such as Adam Afriyie to play the role of a “broker” between the UK and Ghana, with regards to a new UK-Africa partnership in line with the current UK government’s position on developing a stronger partnership with the Commonwealth. We saw the role Afriyie played when he represented the UK in Ghana in 2017 as the UK government trade and Business envoy during president Akufo-Addo presidential inauguration.

c) Post-Brexit and the “Global Britain” narrative: A Renaissance of UK-Africa relations?

James Carver UKIP Member of European Parliament MEP for the Midlands argues that the Commonwealth was ‘forsaken’ when the UK joined the EU (Carver 2016), while Boris Johnson argued that UK-Commonwealth relations were ‘betrayed’ through UK’s

¹³²⁵ Fieldwork discussions with Rupa Huq, Labour MP for Acton Central June 2016

accession to EU membership (cited in Dominiczak 2013). Membership of the EU has been constructed as a ‘betrayal’ of the Commonwealth, with Brexit being presented as a moment to re-engage with the world beyond Europe and reinvigorate the global role of the UK¹³²⁶. The Brexit discourse of Commonwealth betrayal through British accession to the EU is therefore opened to contestation¹³²⁷. Price (2018) observed that the longest standing and most comprehensive of all EU development Cooperation agreement, the EU-ACP relationship has formed the cornerstone of the EU’s Development Cooperation relationships since the early 1970s and acted as a blueprint for the wide range of agreements that link the EU, and thereby the UK, to states and regions across the world¹³²⁸.

To this effect, there is a new player on the world stage, or rather let's rephrase that an old player is trying to redefine itself – the United Kingdom¹³²⁹. On January 31, Britain officially leaves the European Union and the UK has no qualms showing that it's focusing on its future outside the bloc¹³³⁰.

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson skipped this year's World Economic Forum in Davos to focus on Brexit¹³³¹. During that week, he hosted many African heads of state at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in London. Deals worth nearly \$8 billion (€7.3 billion) were announced¹³³². The message was, Britain is ready to do business with Africa¹³³³. Mark-Anthony Johnson, the CEO of JIC Holdings an investor, who was also involved in organizing the summit states: *“Britain has to find new partners that they can work with in the long run to build their economy. Africa of course, with its huge potential, will make the ideal partner. The UK wants to be the continent's investment partner of choice, but it has quite a bit of catching up to do. UK companies will continue irrespective [of the*

¹³²⁶ Price, S., 2018. Brexit and the UK-Africa Caribbean and Pacific Aid Relationship. *Global Policy*, 9(3), p.420

¹³²⁷ Price, S., 2018. Art.cit. p.421

¹³²⁸ Ibidem

¹³²⁹ Why Brexit is s turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

¹³³⁰ Why Brexit is s turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

¹³³¹ Why Brexit is s turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

¹³³² Why Brexit is s turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

¹³³³ Why Brexit is s turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

economy] because they are looking to expand and they are looking for new markets, irrespective of what happens to the economy " ¹³³⁴.

EU-Africa affairs consultant Uzuamaka Madu is of the opposite view on UK's new partnership with Commonwealth Africa: *"The UK is trying to revive the Commonwealth now post-Brexit and with the idea of a Global Britain. There's still not yet enough meat to really call "Global Britain" something that's a strategy [...] focused on delivering something focused"*¹³³⁵.

Global Britain's true novelty is a narrative of discursive means by which the policies are packaged for domestic and international consumption in a story about where Britain is "going" as an international actor in post Brexit era ¹³³⁶. In this respect, the narrative analysis of Global Britain speeches and policy documents shows that it puts a strong Conservative Eurosceptic twist on an otherwise familiar linguistic repertoire, meaning constructing Britain as both different and crucially, better than the EU¹³³⁷. To this end, this approach of "Global Britain" was evident when the Prime Minister Boris Johnson delivered his administration's first major statement on Africa during the UK-Africa Investment Summit in London on 20th January 2020, ¹³³⁸. He spoke mainly about existing private sector initiatives, pushing the idea that the UK is an 'obvious partner of choice' for Africa, highlighting financial services in London, tech innovation, security co-operation and the UK's higher education sector¹³³⁹.

The Summit's pre-publicity described the UK's desire to take advantage of leaving the EU to secure trade and investment opportunities in Africa, making London a centre for 'development financing' for a rapidly growing continent¹³⁴⁰. Nigerian President Buhari, who met the Prime Minister, has been arguing ahead of the Summit: *'in recent years, our relationship – particularly economically – has become increasingly defined by Britain's*

¹³³⁴ Why Brexit is a turning point for Europe-Africa relations: <https://www.dw.com/en/why-brexit-is-a-turning-point-for-europe-africa-relations/a-52177939>

¹³³⁵ Ibidem

¹³³⁶ Daddow.O. 2019. The real meaning of 'Global Britain': A Great Escape from the EU <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/04/04/the-real-meaning-of-global-britain-a-great-escape-from-the-eu/>

¹³³⁷ Ibidem

¹³³⁸ Fraser. A. 2020, The UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020: an analysis, published on SOAS University of London Blog 20th January 2020 :<https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/uk-africa-investment-summit-2020/>

¹³³⁹ Fraser. A. 2020, The UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020: an analysis, published on SOAS University of London Blog 20th January 2020 :<https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/uk-africa-investment-summit-2020/>

¹³⁴⁰ Fraser. A. 2020, The UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020: an analysis, published on SOAS University of London Blog 20th January 2020 :<https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/uk-africa-investment-summit-2020/>

*membership of the European Union. A new free trade agreement would reconfigure this, presenting new opportunities for both... visa restrictions and customs barriers must be reduced to fulfil the potential these connections could bring to the nations where they today reside. As an African leader, I have an obligation to speak of the fact that while many in the African Diaspora enjoy considerable benefits from life in the West, they do not always feel at the heart of the community. A renewed sense that there are ties that bind us through the Commonwealth, and a concerted effort to grow those links through trade, could act as a spur to encourage togetherness and the certainty of belonging*¹³⁴¹.’ President Buhari’s statement on post- Brexit opening-up and strengthening trade opportunities between Commonwealth Africa and the UK indicates how the idea of Brexit has been orchestrated and marketed to some African leaders by the current UK administration as a positive move that stands to benefit both the UK and Commonwealth African countries. And on the part of some Commonwealth African countries post-Brexit provides more option of trade and investment partnership to choose from: The UK, The EU, The USA, Russia and China. Which makes the competition fierce among foreign investors to get into the African markets, therefore benefiting African countries in terms of re-positioning their interest depending on which country is offering a better bidding for trade and investment deals.

Other observers view this narrative of “Global Britain” in post-Brexit era as being illusive without much substance to it. In other words, it is opening-up an avenue for Britain to take advantage of resources in Africa and the UK repositioning itself an “imperial” power: *“The prime minister’s vision of a “Global Britain” after Brexit will only succeed if he abandons imperial nostalgia in favour of practical investment in the continent’s fast-growing economies”* noted Stephan Paduaono¹³⁴²

Stephen Paduano makes this point of “revival of the empire via Commonwealth ties in post Brexit era” in his article published on the foreign policy website entitled: *“Boris Johnson’s New Scramble for Africa”*. He observed that the UK-Africa summit was *“a maiden voyage of Global Britain”*. For Paduano, a Global Britain, loosely defined, *remains possible*,

¹³⁴¹ Fraser. A. 2020, The UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020: an analysis, published on SOAS University of London Blog 20th January 2020 :<https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/uk-africa-investment-summit-2020/>

¹³⁴² Paduano.S. 2020, Boris Johnson’s New Scramble for Africa, article from the Foreign Policy website: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/29/boris-johnsons-new-scramble-for-africa/>

but a humbling will have to come first. Although a recommitment to its relationship with African countries is important, the U.K. cannot reasonably expect to out-invest the United States and France or outbid China. Global Britain will have to reckon with its outsized ambition—in Europe, in Africa, and around the world. The U.K. government can't assert, as it did at the summit, that some 54 distinct African countries should select Britain—and Britain alone—to be their partner of choice. Casting its relations with African states as a matter of geopolitical competition and reproducing fading memories of imperial glory in the process, will not deliver results¹³⁴³.

In the Prime Minister's speech below, he stated: "Let us seize the opportunities that are before us here today," Africa with its rapidly growing populations and economies, rising middle class, and recent ratification of a continent-wide free trade agreement—was as good a place as any to start ¹³⁴⁴. Within two years, Britain aims to become the largest G-7 investor in Africa—a feat that will require a 75 percent increase in capital invested to top the United States and a more than 90 percent increase to top France¹³⁴⁵.

To be sure, this goal is largely, if not entirely, implausible¹³⁴⁶. A new initiative of the British High Commission in Ghana, the Agricultural Transformation Programme, which was announced at the summit, hopes to advance this productivity project and benefit from its rewards. Boasting a decently diversified, high-tech, multibillion-dollar industry of its own, Britain should be well placed to promote Ghana's agricultural agenda¹³⁴⁷.

Brexit is on the one hand a paradox as it has been maintained by most supporters of this idea who advanced anti-immigration sentiment towards both EU and Commonwealth migrants, as this was demonstrated above in the part of this thesis on post-Brexit discrimination. On the other hand, Commonwealth migrants who voted Brexit cited examples of reinforcing trade and investment partnership between Britain and the Commonwealth, as we saw with the examples of Anglo-Ghanaian Conservative party MPs and Anglo-Pakistani Labour MP for Birmingham who support this idea. The support for fair immigration from Commonwealth states to the UK was also on the agenda, which

¹³⁴³ Paduano.S. 2020, Boris Johnson's New Scramble for Africa, article from the Foreign Policy website: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/29/boris-johnsons-new-scramble-for-africa/>

¹³⁴⁴ Ibid

¹³⁴⁵ Ibid

¹³⁴⁶ Ibid

¹³⁴⁷ Ibid

was echoed by Anglo-Ugandan British Home Secretary Priti Patel. Some of these concerns were also echoed by the Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, as we saw above during the UK-Africa Summit. These ideas are all part of what the Prime Minister indicated in his address at UK-Africa Summit in his bid to build a new ‘Global Britain’ narrative.

The below speech of the Prime Minister at the UK-Africa Summit spells-out, this paradox of on the one hand the UK’s independence from the EU. On other hand, encouraging Labour migration of highly skilled individuals and students from the Commonwealth to study and work in the UK. This means that ‘Global Britain’ appears to be beneficial to Britain with regards to its partnership with Africa. This partnership in theory is not a partnership of a level playing field for both the UK and Commonwealth African states. Attracting skilled migrants and students from Commonwealth Africa amounts to a brain drain syndrome of highly skilled Africans in the long run, which the continent is currently in deficit of its highly skilled and educated elites who are currently in the diaspora.

Figure 0-73:Box.9: Transcript of Prime Minister Boris Johnson address at the UK-Africa Summit in London, 20th January 2020

Good morning. Heads of state, heads of government. Business leaders. Friends. Good morning to you all and a very warm welcome to London, to the UK, and to a new start in our business partnership between my country and your countries and indeed the whole continent of Africa. I am reliably informed that this is the very first time that the UK and quite so many African nations have come together for an event of this kind. And when we celebrate all sorts of exciting new beginnings, the start of a new year, a new decade, a new government here in Britain, it is an event whose time has come. And indeed, an event that is long overdue.

An event that I regard as the climax of considerable personal exertion because during my two years as foreign secretary I visited more African nations than any other senior British politician in living memory Ghana, the Gambia, Libya, Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria, Cote D’Ivoire, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia. And wherever I was I am proud to say I found a lot of interest and lot of affection for the UK and even a lot of

love. But I also realised that we in the UK have a vital job in continuing to convince people across the continent that we're not just a great friend and ally, a reliable ally, but also the people you should be doing business with.

We have no divine right to that business. This is a competitive world. You have many suitors. Some of you may be off shortly to sample the delights of Davos. But look today at what we have to offer, look around the world today and you will swiftly see that the UK is not only the obvious partner of choice. We also are very much the partner of today, of tomorrow and decades to come. Because the truth is, in 2020 the UK is the ultimate one-stop shop for the ambitious, growing international economy. If you want investment in a new project or enterprise just hop on the tube and one stop from here, you'll be in the heart of Canary Wharf, where, along with its older sibling in the City of London, trillions of pounds of capital are being raised for every venture you can think of from French construction to African telecoms to American cancer curing drugs.

In every currency you have heard of and some that have only been recently invented, and it may give you some idea of the scale of the financial services in London when I say that Canary Wharf alone is a bigger banking centre than the whole of Frankfurt. We have the tech. We have ed tech, med tech, fin tech, bio tech, green tech, nano tech. Tech of all kinds. And we have by far the biggest tech sector anywhere in this hemisphere, two or three times bigger than our rivals, and that works in synergy of course with our amazing higher education sector.

We have more of the world's top universities than any other country outside the US. Every year, thanks to our Chevening and Commonwealth Scholarships, their doors are opened to the best and brightest students from every part of Africa. And I am proud to say today that one in seven of the world's Kings, Queens, Presidents, Prime Ministers were educated in this country including the Japanese emperor. We have a total global monopoly on the higher education of emperors. Thank you – it's true.

And if you want to come here to study in those universities, if you want to play a part in the hi-tech revolution, if you want to work with the titans of our financial world, then

you'll be pleased to hear, my friends, that one thing is changing. Our immigration system. I know it's an issue that people have raised with me in the past, but change is coming. And our system is becoming fairer and more equal as between all our global friends and partners. Treating people, the same regardless, wherever they come from and by putting people before passports, we will be able to attract the best talent from around the world, wherever they may be.

Because I appreciate, as I say, that there is no shortage of governments out there touting for your business. I must mention the competition, I better I mean why not, China, Russia, Germany. I'm told there will be a conference in France fairly soon. But in the words of an old Akan proverb that I picked up while I was in Ghana, "All fingers are not the same." There is wisdom in these Akan proverbs. All fingers are not the same and all countries are not the same, and the UK boasts a breadth and depth of expertise that simply cannot be matched by any other nation.

And that's why we are already one of the biggest partners for countries across Africa. Look at the billions of pounds worth of deals that are being finalised just here today and that we are announcing. The monorail trains that will shortly be conveying citizens through the streets of Cairo, that great and growing city, will be made here. The monorail trains will be made here in the UK in Derby. In Nigeria's Oyo state every streetlight is being installed with low carbon high efficiency low emission diodes from Dorset. Families across Angola will shortly be tucking into delicious wholesome chicken from Northern Ireland. It is thanks to the miracle of free trade that today our birds go plucked, frozen, oven ready.

Africa is a continent of amazing, independent and diverse nations. But they – you - have some things in common clearly. Some of you are members of the Commonwealth - 19 members of the Commonwealth – look forward to the summit in Kigali. But one thing that unites African countries is ambition, and optimism and, by comparison with much of the rest of the world, quite staggering levels of growth. More than half the world's fastest, 15 fastest growing economies are in Africa. Two-thirds of African economies are expanding faster than the global average. Africa is the future, and the UK has a huge and active role to play in that future. And I hope you agree. Because we

are, and we will be, a partner, your partner through thick and thin.

So, let's seize the opportunities that are before us here today. Let's build the partnerships for the future. And, together, let us begin to write the next chapter for my country, for your country, and above all for all the peoples of our countries. Thank you all for very much for coming and welcome to London¹³⁴⁸.

Published 20 January 2020

This sub-chapter has been focused on the analysis of the Ghanaian diaspora and elite Anglo-Ghanaians political engagement in UK politics, the analysis of UK general elections in 2017 and 2019, the 2016 London Mayoral elections and the UK Referendum elections in 2016, the post-Brexit reaction on discrimination, and the new post-Brexit UK-Africa partnership. These election analyses and its aftermath is important in understanding the paradigm shift in UK politics and how that has a spill-over effect on ethnic minority and Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in the UK. The focus of my analysis is in demonstrating the link between educational attainment and political participation among first- and second-generation Ghanaians in London via the examples highlighted earlier on. The emphasis here was more on second-generation Anglo-Ghanaians in frontline British politics. I argued here that the Ghanaian diaspora political participation in the UK is both influenced by the ethnic minority political engagement, voting pattern and the influence exerted by elite ethnic minority MPs on members of their constituents. But most importantly, the changing nature of politics in the UK also has a bearing on how ethnic minorities and Ghanaians vote in the UK today. Especially with the examples of Brexit and post Brexit UK-Africa relations. The analysis here on the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London, sought to shed light on engaging in British politics as a means of full integration and assimilation of people of ethnic minority in the UK and for that matter the case of the Ghanaian diaspora to the extent of voting for

¹³⁴⁸ PM Africa Investment Summit speech: 20 January 2020

Prime Minister Boris Johnson opened the UK-Africa Investment Summit.:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-africa-investment-summit-speech-20-january-2020>

Brexit. I also demonstrated, the various modes of political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London via membership in UK political parties, Ghanaian associations especially the role of Ghanaian churches in London. The following sub-chapter will continue in the direction of the analysis of the Ghanaian diaspora political in engagement in London, however with much emphasis on transnational political engagement of mainly first-generation Ghanaians in London towards Accra, Ghana.

2.1.7 Ghanaian transnational political engagement in London: A politics of here and there.?

This sub-section aims to further analyse the means and modes that Ghanaians in London engage in homeland politics from London via transnational political participation.

To this effect, the benefit of this study being a longitudinal research study has made it possible to observe the answers and unanswered questions to my hypothesis which was posed in 2011 on Ghanaian diaspora policies on transnational political voting rights being highly politicised, implying that depending on the party that is in government advocates for diaspora transnational vote or not. The change of government in 2017 has demonstrated this hypothesis of politicising diaspora transnational vote was correct. Since the NPP assumed power in 2017 they have been working towards the implementation of the ROPA amendment bill in time for the December 2020 general elections, since the amendment was voted in parliament by the NPP government in 2006. Therefore, implementing the ROPA Bill for the NPP is about politically institutionalising the Ghanaian diaspora voting policies as an NPP flagship policy. During the NDC reign between 2009-2016, Ghanaian diaspora voting rights was not the regime's priority and the regime advanced arguments that implementation of the rights of diaspora vote was too costly coupled with logistics problems in organising an offshore election. To this end, some aspects of the hypothesis posed in 2011, does no longer hold, particularly with regards to the NDC party's position on according external voting rights for the diaspora. In 2019 the NDC party made a U-turn in support of external voting rights for expatriate Ghanaians.

As such this sub-chapter seeks to focus on the Ghanaian diaspora transnational political participation in London between 2011 and 2016 with two proposed hypothesis. The first hypothesis states that: Ghanaians in the diaspora are currently not allowed to participate

conventionally and directly in Ghanaian political practices via transnational voting. In the absence of not being able to engage in direct and conventional form of political participation from abroad. What are the indirect and unconventional means that first-generation Ghanaians in London employ to participate in homeland transnational politics? How does this mode of political engagement manifest itself? why are first-generation Ghanaians in the diaspora disenfranchised of their voting rights? Does engaging in transnational political activities in the diaspora a marker of failed integration as a Ghanaian migrant in the UK? Or engaging in UK politics and transnational politics towards to homeland is an indication of seizing political opportunity and facilitating political integration in both host and homeland? Who participates and how?

The second hypothesis about transnational political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London indicates that: members of the Ghanaian diaspora who are actively involved in transnational political activities in the diaspora, use that transnational space to professionalise their political militancy. Active transnational political engagement of members of the diaspora serves as a platform for professional visibility and a steppingstone for political diaspora returnees and as such paving way for their return home to engage in homeland politics.

The 2016 general election has demonstrated the accuracy of this second hypothesis, as most members of the Ghanaian diaspora who were actively involved in transnational politics have indeed done so to advance their political and professional careers as some of the high-profile members of the NPP party branches in the diaspora have returned to occupy key positions in the current administration.

This second hypothesis therefore indicates that transnational political participation among some members of the diaspora is a strategic positioning of their own personal and professional interest and therefore not a completely homogenous act of collective transnational political participation. To this effect, which socio-professional background among these transnational actors who engage in diaspora politics? What strategies do they employ to seek political visibility in the diaspora and how? These are some of the questions that this sub-section will attempt to provide some answers to. This sub-section will also draw on the empirical analysis from the field work conducted in London among the 52 members of the Ghanaian diaspora who were interviewed in London between 2010-2016. As it has already been noted previously in this part, the sample of 52

respondents might not be conclusive and representative of all Ghanaians in London. However, this sample gives a depth indication as to how transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is organised.

Political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London towards Accra can be categorised as a transnational political activity. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) and Vertovec (2004). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) propose the following definition of transnational politics: *transnational political activities as immigrants' engagement in homeland political activism in the host country with regard to issues concerning country of origin and they may include long-distance voting and expatriate voting, electoral campaigns and running for political office in the home country.* For Vertovec (2004) diaspora political participation can be described as a transnational electoral participation which includes membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin country from afar.

Transnational political practices are defined in various forms of direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organizations) ¹³⁴⁹. Transnational element includes the way that political participation in one country, such as voting patterns or lobbying, is informed by political events in another – also referred to as ‘broad transnational practices’ (see Itzigsohn et al. 1999)¹³⁵⁰. ***Homeland politics*** denote migrants’ and refugees’ political activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That is, it means opposition to or support for the current homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals¹³⁵¹.

Waterbury (2010) reveals that homeland countries shift towards increased diaspora engagement as in most cases this move is driven in large part by the interest and perceptions of homeland state political elites. These are regrouped in three main sets of interest and resources represented by the diaspora: the extractions of material resources for economic gains; the creation or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy and the utilization of those abroad as culture-linguistic resources to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity. The

¹³⁴⁹ Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2003. Art.cit. p,262

¹³⁵⁰ Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2003. Art.cit. p,262

¹³⁵¹ Ibid p. 262

Ghanaian diaspora transnational engagement fall within the narrative of interest and resources they provide to homeland such as utilising their professional experiences to serve Ghanaian political party branches in the diaspora. As such, Ghanaian diasporans are also being used by homeland politicians for political legitimacy in defining the borders of national identity from afar, as emphasised by Waterbury. Diaspora engagement also plays an important role in political legitimization, both domestically and geopolitically. Reaching out to those abroad and establishing cross-border ties can be a way for governments and political parties to redefine the bases of their legitimacy at times of economic or political crisis, or when the sovereignty of the state is being weakened by external forces¹³⁵². With the example of Mexico's changing policies towards its expatriate residents, Sherman argues that the state, extended its hand to those abroad during moments in which political legitimacy was being questioned and the state was trying to consolidate a particular institutional order (1999:847). Maintaining the loyalty of emigrants to their home country and thereby, securing access to those communities and their resources can be a vital part of the process of nation building and maintaining elite dominance at home¹³⁵³.

One of the triggers for utilising the diaspora to bolster state legitimacy is political liberalisation through institutional or regime change, which subject control over the state-diaspora relationship to more intense political contestation¹³⁵⁴. The resources become prizes to be captured within the context of domestic political competition. The opening of a political competitions after decades of dictatorial or authoritarian rule triggers the search for new sources of political support and legitimacy by new political actors on the scene. They can position themselves as “nationalizing elites” or as “saviours” of the nation who can now right the wrongs of the past¹³⁵⁵. Emerging elites can also utilise diaspora populations as potential constituents, who can affect domestic political outcomes through trans-border media connections or eventually through gaining the right to vote or have special representation in government¹³⁵⁶.

¹³⁵² Waterbury, M.A., 2010. Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, p. 140

¹³⁵³ Ibidem

¹³⁵⁴ ibidem

¹³⁵⁵ Ibidem


¹³⁵⁶ Ibidem

At the time of political transformation, the diaspora may come to be considered by a new regime as the key population for domestic transformation (Shain 2000: 665)

Koinova (2010) views diasporas as being the liberal creed, which suggests that socialized with liberal values in Western societies, diasporas might be expected to be interested in promoting such values towards their homeland. This often occurs within the international and transnational space. Diasporas teach their extended families and friends about democratic practices, such as how to vote for local governments and to develop gender equality norms, this process is known as transfer of social remittances (Levitt 2001). Koinova further states that diasporas have interacted with the political cultures of their host country for extended periods of time and internalized some of the liberal political values which leads to facilitating the process of transfer of social remittances in a democratic setting. But this can equally be viewed as destructive in an authoritarian setting, in such cases diasporas are viewed as destabilising factors by home country government. As such, political pluralism allowed many migrants who did not have a political voice in their homeland to form political groups and associations in their host lands (Adamson 2002). To this effect, the Ghanaian political party chapters in the diaspora such as in London emerged as being the sole voice of the opposition during the era of military regime. The structural organisation and legitimisation of Ghanaian political party chapters in Britain emerged in 1992, which was the period of political pluralism in Ghana after decades of military rule. Implying that political pluralism in Ghana paved the way for structural transnational political activities of Ghanaian expatriates in the diaspora to emerge.

Some active members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London used this international and transnational space to advocate for political pluralism and electoral change in Ghana. To this end, Ghanaian expatriates' transnational political engagement from London towards Accra, takes root primarily among first-generation Ghanaian immigrants. This first-generation transnational political engagement towards homeland can be classified in two clusters: Pioneer Generation participation 1980-2000 and New Generation participation 2000-2016 both generations were not born in Britain but have been living in Britain for a long time.

Figure 0-74: Diagram: Classification of Ghanaian Diaspora transnational Political Engagement towards homeland



The Pioneer Generation participant category constitute of the founding members of these party branches abroad in London, which dates from the early 1970s to 2000s. *“They were mainly politicians who fled Ghana during the various coup d’états under military regimes. Among those who fled were scholars and professionals. They formed the NPP branch in London, to start with which later was spread to other metropolis in Europe and America, so the main idea of opposition political party branches originated here in London and I was one of the founding members in 1980. Most of us who started the NPP branch in London knew each other in Ghana, either because we were in government together, or we belonged to the same professional associations back home, or because we went to the same secondary school and university together back in Ghana”*¹³⁵⁷, noted by Mohammed Abdul-Saaka, former deputy minister of Interior and later a deputy minister for Defence in Ghana, who fled the country in 1972 to seek political asylum in Britain as a result of the military coup d’état that ousted the government of Ghana’s Second Republic 1969-1972. Mohammed Abdul Saaka, is a member of the pioneer generation in London and part

¹³⁵⁷ Field work interview with M. Saaka, December 2012, London

of the group that initiated the NPP UK branch in 1980. A study on transnational political participation of Ghanaians in the Netherlands also found that the NPP party was the first Ghanaian political party branch to be established in the Netherlands in 1998. A founding member of the NPP Holland branch states: *In 1998, some of us came together to form the NPP Holland branch. In our first meeting which was held in the house of one of our members, we were about ten people but the numbers increased steadily to over one hundred within a year* ¹³⁵⁸.

The current opposition party National Democratic Congress (NDC) established its diaspora chapter in London in 2001, as it was the first time that the NDC found itself in opposition after nineteen years in power under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings. Both NPP and NDC diaspora branches were formed when both parties were in opposition ¹³⁵⁹. The New generation participants are made-up of current young members of both diaspora political parties in London, who are mostly first-generation migrants. The New generation members of the NPP UK, NDC UK, and CPP UK emigrated to the UK in the 1990s and 2000s. These NPP and NDC youth members in London were already active members of the Party in Ghana, as a result of their affiliation to these political parties in Ghana, when a particular party is in government some youth members of the party are awarded government scholarships to finish their studies or for specialised training course in London, others after their studies find lucrative careers and settle in London ¹³⁶⁰. As such, both pioneer and new generation Ghanaian migrants constitute a bulk of first-generation migrants who participate in transnational politics towards Ghana.

A study on Turkish diaspora transnational political engagement in Germany and in the Netherlands equally notes that it is among first-generation Turks who are keen and engage in political discourse towards Turkey (Kissau and Hunger 2010:254). Equally, the first-generation Turkish who engage in transnational politics in Germany and the Netherlands were often educated Turkish elites, who were already members of a political party in Turkey before emigrating to Germany or to the

¹³⁵⁸ Setrana, M.B. and Kyei, J.R.K.O., 2015. Transnational Paradigm within Immigrant Political Integration Discourse. *Afrique contemporaine*, (4), p.8

¹³⁵⁹ Setrana, M.B. and Kyei, J.R.K.O., 2015.art.cit. p. 10

¹³⁶⁰ Field work interview with Nana Yaw March, 2013, London

Netherlands either as political refugees or as students. A study on transnational political practices of Colombians in London observed a similar tendency, first-generation Colombians with higher educational attainment were more inclined in engaging in transnational politics towards Colombia¹³⁶¹. The study further states that prior to emigrating to Britain these Colombian migrants were highly politicised and regularly practised politics in Colombia. It therefore means that their transnational political engagement in the diaspora is a continuation of what they had already started from homeland and not a transnational political engagement that has occurred as a result of emigration.

Transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London can be viewed as a collective action of a group of individuals advocating for a common cause. This collective action appears to have an undertone of political opportunity of some members within the Ghanaian political party branches in London. In this regard, Collective action is defined as an action taken by a group of people to achieve a common objective¹³⁶².

Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004: 200) notes that “what most definitions have in common is that collective action requires the *involvement of a group of people*, it requires a *shared interest* within the group, and it involves some kind of *common action* that works in pursuit of that shared interest “¹³⁶³.”

Olson’s concludes that the challenges to collective action is that: “The larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common interest.” (p. 36)¹³⁶⁴. Collective action theory assumes that individuals make isolated, independent decisions whether to contribute to collective action and predicts that individuals will usually try to “free-ride,” that is, to reap the benefits of a collective good provided by the contributions of other group members while paying none of the price¹³⁶⁵. As such collective action also further the idea of interdependencies among individuals and group members, individuals can

¹³⁶¹ Bermudez, A., 2010. The transnational political practices of Colombians in Spain and the United Kingdom: politics ‘here’ and ‘there’. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(1), pp.75-91.

¹³⁶² Olson, M., 2009. *The logic of collective action* (Vol. 124). Harvard University Press. p.10

¹³⁶³ Ostrom, E., 2007. Collective action theory. In *comparative politics*. p.2 *The Oxford handbook of*

¹³⁶⁴ Olson, M., 2009. Art.cit. p.36

¹³⁶⁵ Ostrom, E., 2007. p.36

therefore, find it "rational" to participate in collective action (see Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Hardin 1982)

Ghanaian diaspora transnational political engagement is centralised among a few strong leaders: *they are structured- more specifically, the extent to which they are centralised or concentrated among a few individuals rather than being spread more evenly across the whole group*¹³⁶⁶.

Ghanaians' diaspora political engagement towards homeland is both homogenous and heterogenous in their mode of participation within the context of collective action: *The direct effects of group heterogeneity on collective action can be briefly summarised as when groups are homogeneous, everyone is interchangeable, and the collective action outcome is a simple function of how many people participate. In contrast, in a heterogeneous group, it matters who is organised as well as how many since one person may be willing and able to contribute much more than another*¹³⁶⁷.

Transnational political engagement of Ghanaians in London is based both on sharing strong and weak network ties. Granovetter's (1973) argues that strong ties tend to form cliques, while weak ties tend to bridge cliques and bring everyone into the same network, therefore that weak ties are a better basis for collective action¹³⁶⁸. It translates that Ghanaian diaspora transnational political participation is based on forming of alliances based on strong and weak ties within a group.

Political opportunity theory argues that the actions of the activists are dependent on the existence or lack of specific political opportunity¹³⁶⁹. In other words, if existing political system is vulnerable to a challenge, it creates an opportunity for others like movement of members to issues such as a challenge and try to use opportune time to push through a social change¹³⁷⁰. According to Cragun et al. this vulnerability could be the result of a) increasing political pluralism, b) a decline in repression, c) a division within elites d) increased political enfranchisement. In the case of the Ghanaian diaspora transnational political participation, it is a result of increased political pluralism and increased political enfranchisement. Members of Ghanaian political party branches in London use this space of increased political pluralism to advance their political agenda based on advocating for

¹³⁶⁶ Collective Action Theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action_theory

¹³⁶⁷ Collective Action Theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action_theory

¹³⁶⁸ Granovetter, M.S., 1977. The strength of weak ties. In *Social networks* (pp. 347-367). Academic Press.

¹³⁶⁹ Eisinger P. 1973. The conditions of protest behaviour in American cities. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 81: 11 – 28

¹³⁷⁰ McAdam D, Tarrow S, Tilly C. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge University Press.

their right to transnational political franchise to vote in Ghanaian political processes. Within the framework of collective action, transnational political participation of the Ghanaians diaspora in London could be translated as a form of political opportunity. As this enable activist within the political party to be rational entrepreneurs, this environment allows some members to emerge as powerful leaders who use this as a platform to launch a transnational political career. They therefore use this transnational space for political lobbying and electoral campaigns ¹³⁷¹. In sum, the transnational political practices of Ghanaians in London, can be viewed as a combination of political opportunity, collective action, conventional and unconventional means of transnational political participation.

To understand the political actions of members of Ghanaian political party branches in London, it is vital to use the rational choice theory which has been advanced by Schumpeter, Olson, Mosca and Pareto as to how an individual's political interest in most cases is tied to their personal interest, and their political action is well calculated within this framework. According to Olson's postulate on rational choice theory, political rationality is used by individuals as self-interest derived on the backdrop of group politics. Olson argued that there is no incentive to take on the costs associated with joining, membership and participation, unless the marginal contribution of that individual appreciably advances the organizational cause (1965: 85-87).

Lafleur observed that migrants political engagement is often linked to their profile, background and calculated interest before emigrating: *« les Boliviens qui votent à New-York ont tendance à voter plus à droite que ceux d'Argentine car ceux qui partent aux Etats-Unis sont plus souvent issus des classes aisées boliviennes qui étaient déjà politiquement actif avant leur immigration. Les autres travaillent d'avantage dans l'agriculture ou l'industrie de textile avec un profil d'électeurs de gauche. Les contacts avec le pays d'origine ont également leur importance, car de nombreux migrants discutent avec la famille restée dans le pays d'origine avant de voter ¹³⁷²»*. In the case of the Ghanaian diaspora in London's mode of transnational political engagement

¹³⁷¹ Meyer, D.S. and Minkoff, D.C., 2004. Conceptualizing political opportunity. *Social forces*, 82(4), p.1463

¹³⁷² Lafleur, J.M. 2012, *Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas*. London: Routledge, Book Review, by Tova Wang, in *International Migration Review*, Volume 48, Number 2, June 2014

towards Ghana, is articulated among Ghanaians who were already politically savvy and had a good political capital prior to emigrating to the UK, and they are the educated middle class. This is among both the Pioneer and New generation segments. Their transnational political engagement towards Ghana while in London, is to some extent a calculated effort in positioning themselves in the diaspora for their own political interest.

Coleman (1988), notes that individual behaviours are influenced by characteristics of the social system, players do not stand alone but are motivated by their personal interest and decide rationally for their actions, they are neither “over-socialized”¹³⁷³.” From this idea, Coleman wants to establish a link between social interactions and individual choices and seeks to go beyond a concept of society as a simple summation of individual behaviours¹³⁷⁴. To achieve this, he uses social capital like a means of transition between micro and macro¹³⁷⁵. The idea is that on the basis of exchanges motivated by self-interest, long lasting relationships are established, and these are not only social structures, but are also resources for individuals (i.e. these resources constitute social capital)¹³⁷⁶. Active members of Ghanaian political party branches in London engagement can be translated as activities based social interaction and individual choices motivated by their personal interest, and in doing so transferring their political engagement in London as a micro action (political action in London) to a macro action towards Ghana and in Ghanaian politics.

To this effect, the mode of political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora towards homeland takes form in direct and conventional, indirect and unconventional mode of political mobilisation. Direct and conventional participation is articulated via engagement in Ghanaian Political Party branches in London and returning to Ghana to vote during election periods. Indirect and unconventional manner is through Ghanaian associations in London and via the internet.

According to Kriesi, who notes that traditionally political participation on the one hand, takes form in direct and conventional mode of political mobilization which is via participation in a structured political party system and voting is the quintessential

¹³⁷³ Coleman, J.S., 1993. The rational reconstruction of society: 1992 presidential address. *American sociological review*, pp.1-15.

¹³⁷⁴ *ibidem*

¹³⁷⁵ *ibidem*

¹³⁷⁶ *ibidem*

embodiment of the electoral process¹³⁷⁷. On the other hand, he observes that unconventional and indirect mode of political participation and mobilization is via pressure groups and associations¹³⁷⁸. Unconventional and indirect mode of engagement is through protest, such as mobilizing individuals to demonstrate physically against government policies. Other modes of unconventional and indirect mobilization are via the internet.

The usage of the Internet as a form of indirect and unconventional form of long-distance political participation, was visible among Ghanaians in the diaspora during the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections in Ghana. Online mobilization of Ghanaians in the diaspora gained currency and took place on Ghanaian websites and on Ghanaian social media platforms. Ghanaian websites such as: Ghanaweb.com, myjoyonline.com, peacefm.com all served as an active avenue for long distance political engagement particularly by members of Ghanaian political party branches in London.

Social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and WhatsApp, became an important avenue for sharing information on the Ghanaian election campaigns. All the main political parties in Ghana had a special Facebook page, where active and vigorous campaign was undertaken by their party supporters in the diaspora. The UK branches of the main Ghanaian political parties were particularly active in their online political engagement in order to advance their respective parties' policies. The internet equally served as a platform to rapidly share election results by Ghanaian media outlets and political party branches in the diaspora to further disseminate the election results on their social media platforms. The internet was also used either as an avenue to endorse the election results or to dispute the validity of the election results¹³⁷⁹. To effect, Ghanaian political party branches in the diaspora utilized their party online space and platforms to advocate for the support from the international community about Ghanaian election irregularities¹³⁸⁰. These actions by diaspora can be described as an informal form of political participation. As Krisie views these as unconventional form of political

¹³⁷⁷ Kriesi, H., 2008. Political mobilisation, political participation and the power of the vote. *West European Politics*, 31(1-2), p.148

¹³⁷⁸ Kriesi, H., 2008. Art.cit. p.157

¹³⁷⁹ Fieldwork data, interview with prof. Gyimah Boadi July 2018 in Accra

¹³⁸⁰ Fieldwork data, interview with prof. Gyimah Boadi July 2018 in Accra

participation is gaining more currency in recent times and to a large extent is becoming the normal form of political participation.

Sheffer (2006) notes that internet political mobilization, has revolutionized and changed substantially the nature of political interaction between diasporans and their homeland government and government of their host country. Through the internet, diasporans are able to obtain direct information from homeland, which was not the case in the past. As in the past homeland governments could control the kind of information that they wanted to send out to their diaspora community. This translates that the internet has empowered diasporans with obtaining information on homeland issues via different channels and sources, not only from homeland government sources, but also from civil society organisations. This change through the internet provides diasporans a balanced view of what is happening at home and not a one-sided version¹³⁸¹.

Access to the right information and news (not fake news) via the internet could be beneficial to both home and host countries. On the one hand, host countries can benefit from the cultural and political diversity that diaspora community bring as they are in constant link to their homeland. On the other hand, homeland governments could benefit from the direct impact diasporans bring to the table through their skills on community mobilization, political resources, via online sharing of information and ideas¹³⁸². Sheffer further observed that globalization has expedited the development of noticeable development among Western democracies and the developed world. This propagation of liberal, social and economic ideas has been greatly increased by the new means of communications, which has great social, economic and political ramifications for some societies¹³⁸³. It has in turn given power to minority groups, whom without such mode of communication would not have been able to voice out their concerns¹³⁸⁴. In a similar vein, it has been argued here that the internet promotes globalized diffusion of information and localized appropriation of information (Slevin 200).

¹³⁸¹ Sheffer, G. 2003. *op.cit.* pp.182

¹³⁸² *Ibidem*

¹³⁸³ *Ibidem*

¹³⁸⁴ *Ibidem*

For Isabell Sommier, the internet facilitated collective political mobilisation and collective action among individuals who hold similar views, this has been possible through globalisation of mass media communication. Sommier delineates that:

L'internet présent de multiple avantage pour les minorités actives, sachant que la densité des communications interne constitue une condition de succès essentielle pour toute action collective. Le premier avantage tient évidemment à la rapidité de l'information et de la propagande au moindre coût qui permet de pallier le manque de moyen financier et humains, mais aussi de faciliter les contacts et la proximité (virtuelle) avec les adhérents et les autres organisations. Le Net favorise le désenclavement des luttes, leur globalisation, mais aussi la division du travail de militant. Son utilisation facilite également l'accès au médias, qui par la simple consultation du site, trouve aisément souvent sous une forme attractive, les informations nécessaire et les répercutent plus volontaire (du moins jus 'à présent) que lorsqu'elles sont fournies sur un support papier.¹³⁸⁵ La cyberpropagande traduit peut-être le déplacement de la contestation du niveau national au niveau transnational, en cherchant à soucité par-delà les frontières, à mobiliser ce que certain appellent l'opinion publique internationale¹³⁸⁶.

On the notion of the media and the internet revolutionizing political engagement, Theviot and Mabi argued that: *Radio, télévision, presse puis Internet favorisent en effet la naissance d'une « mosaïque » d'espaces thématiques et de mini-publics qui peinent d'autant plus à se rencontrer que, selon Sunstein (2002), l'Internet favorise davantage la polarisation des audiences que leur délibération¹³⁸⁷.*

Kruikemeier et al. on the other hand proposes, two forms of internet use: Active and passive internet usage. *Active Internet usage is defined as creating or contributing to online content (e.g., writing online comments or engaging in an online conversation on social network sites) and Passive Internet usage is defined as consuming online content (e.g., reading online comments or viewing online videos; Muntinga et al., 2011)¹³⁸⁸.*

2.1.8 Internet and social media: An avenue for Ghanaian diaspora political mobilisation and engagement towards homeland

Diasporic communities have always relied on networks, which expanded from the

¹³⁸⁵ Sommier, I. (2003). *Le renouveau des mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation* (Vol. 550). Flammarion. p.198

¹³⁸⁶ Sommier, I. (2003). *Op.cit* p.198

¹³⁸⁷ Thievot, A. and Mabi.C 2014, art.cit. pp. 13

¹³⁸⁸ Kruikemeier, S; Van Noort, G; Vliegthart, R and de Vreese, C, 2014, art.cit. pp. 906

immediate to local to the transnational and global (Georgiou 2002:3). The internet is now a central place for such networks, therefore observing online platforms can provide insight into diasporic community characteristics¹³⁸⁹. For all these important activities, the internet is a significant instrument, if not the central instrument used by diaspora groups in their networking and ties with homeland in recent times¹³⁹⁰. As such, the internet platforms, plays an important role in this process by reawakening of identities imagined homelands and its political process¹³⁹¹. Georgiou points out that: *The internet has allowed most of these communities to discover and rediscover this shared imagination and commonality, it has taken even further the potentials for developing diasporic cultures of mediated, transnational and partly free from state control communications (2002:3)*. Diaspora and transnational communities in general form bridges between host and home countries. Therefore, in analysing these bridges, the internet can be used as a device, as these connections mainly consist of communicative relationship. Online platforms are used by various diaspora communities, notably the Ghanaian diaspora community in London, for personal discussion, community organising activities and publication of home country news including political activities. The internet is therefore used as an avenue to gain political and community visibility (Georgiou 2002:2).

Figure 0-75:Box.10 : Internet Political use and communication

To sum up, previous studies on the internet as space for engagement seems to support the notion that more active forms of political Internet use affect citizens' political involvement more strongly than more passive forms. Following the interactivity literature, active forms of Political Internet Use (PIU) is defined as having features that enable two-way communication (either interactive or mobilization features) and passive forms of Political Internet Use (PIU) is

¹³⁸⁹Georgiou, M., 2006. *Diaspora, identity and the media: Diasporic transnationalism and mediated spatialities*. Hampton Press.

¹³⁹⁰ Ibidem

¹³⁹¹ Ibidem

defined as having features that enable one-way communication (often reading political information or political news). Active forms of PIU are activities such as filling out Vote Advice Applications, writing comments, participating in political activities on social network sites and online political discussion, signing online petitions, forwarding political e-mails, videos or links, or chatting about politics¹³⁹².

Kruikemeier et al further states that *active forms of political internet use tend to have a bigger impact on political outcome variable than passive forms of political internet use*. For instance, Hardy and Scheufele (2006) found that *the effect of searching for information about politics online on political behaviour was stronger for people who used computer-mediated interactions (chatting) than for people who use the Internet in a more passive way*. De Zúñiga (2009) found that *more active use of blogs (i.e., commenting and publishing) predicts political participation better than passive use of blogs (i.e., reading blogs)*. Furthermore, Kushin and Yamamoto (2010) found that *online expression on social media was related to political involvement, while general attention to social media was not*. Finally, Dimitrova et al. (2011) found that *the use of political party websites and social media have a stronger effect on political participation than the use of online news sites*. They argue that *political websites (which incorporate interactive and mobilization functions) and social media (which often connect and involve citizens) are more likely to encourage citizens to become politically active than online news websites (which often involve reading information online)*¹³⁹³. These stated definitions and observations on the link between active and passive internet political use and the direct correlation between active internet use and political participation, can be associated to the example of the Ghanaian case study on their active online participation.

In the case of the Ghanaian transnational political practices in London, the internet has enabled a two-way information sharing mechanism that helps them to interact directly with their political parties via their online party platforms. These online

¹³⁹² Kruikemeier. S; Van Noort. G; Vliegthart. R and de Vreese. C, 2014, art.cit. pp. 913

¹³⁹³ Kruikemeier. S; Van Noort. G; Vliegthart. R and de Vreese. C, 2014, art.cit. pp. 911

platforms facilitate direct diffusion of information aimed specifically at their party members in the diaspora. These modes of online political engagement have permitted and facilitated Ghanaians in London to be both active and passive participants. Active online participants here refer to political party members in the diaspora for all the main political parties in Ghana: NPP, NDC and CPP. They serve as an avenue for party members to advance their political rhetoric. Passive participants engage in online political discussion but with less political activism.

An example to illustrate active online political engagement by diasporas via online platforms was, during the presidential elections in 2012 and 2016. The internet was the only means for diasporans to follow political events in Ghana. The internet gave voice to the voiceless members of the Ghanaian diaspora to participate in politics transnationally. The 2012 general elections proved how the internet was vital in empowering transnational political engagement to challenge the election result between the current ruling Party NPP (which was the party in opposition) and the current opposition NDC (which was in power between 2008-2016). The internet provided a platform for diasporas to follow and engage in the election petition of 2012 at the Supreme Court, radio stations in the diaspora, television channels in the diaspora all served as a maiden for diasporans to monitor political events in Ghana. NPP sympathizers abroad staged international protest to draw the attention of the international community to what they claimed as an election fraud of the 2012 elections, as illustrated **below in (see fig.82 p.471)** images of Ghanaians protesting in front of the Ghana High Commission in London, in Washington during US-Africa Summit and at the UN headquarters in New York regarding electoral malpractices in Ghana. These transnational protest images of Ghanaians in London, New York and Washington were posted on their party websites. This trend has since gained more currency and evolved with time as most of the Ghanaian websites such as Ghana web, modern-Ghana, and Myjoyonline have all become a platform for diaspora participation especially during the 2016 elections, where Ghanaians in the diaspora used that venue to voice out their political opinion, which was not the case in previous elections in 2004 and 2008. The 2004 and 2008, election was a period when accessibility to online pages and social media platforms were not common, although

it existed.

In 2008, social media platforms such as Facebook, began to emerge as an important avenue for political contestation by Ghanaian diasporas in London. All the major Ghanaian political party chapters in the UK have Facebook accounts and media sites dedicated to online political engagement. This trend reached its apex during the highly contested 2012 elections, whereby websites, internet radio stations connecting people in Ghana and the diaspora were created, more social media accounts were created, websites such as: *Ghana decides*, *Let My Vote Count*, *Ghanaians for political Accountability*, *I love Ghana* and *Concerned Ghanaian Abroad*, were initiated by diaspora groups (see image 5-10) ¹³⁹⁴. All eight presidential candidates had their own personal social media accounts where they post their campaign rallies, political programs and engaging Ghanaians across the globe on their political activities¹³⁹⁵.

The 2016 presidential elections in Ghana saw the consolidation and institutionalisation of online political engagement as an alternative and acceptable mode of political engagement both for Ghanaians in the diaspora and those back home in Ghana. Kissau and Hunger (2010:255) notes, that members of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and in the Netherlands also engage actively in transnational politics via the internet. Smith (2015) equally notes that the Senegalese diaspora in the US, are active in transnational politics via the internet particularly during the 2012 general election in Senegal: *Le succès du site Seneweb, basé aux États-Unis, a également mis la diaspora au centre de la scène médiatique en ligne et contribué, avec d'autres sites, à structurer un espace public transnational en ligne, au sein duquel la diaspora est massivement surreprésentée. Ces sites Internet ont puissamment contribué à la médiatisation des doléances des émigrés. Leurs revendications sont à la fois économiques, réglementaires et institutionnelles, si l'on se fie par exemple au tract en ligne diffusé par le « Groupe Initiative Atlanta » appelant à faire battre Abdoulaye Wade en mars 2012: « Suppression de la surtaxe sur les appels entrants. Relèvement de l'âge*

¹³⁹⁴ Facebook accounts of Ghanaian political parties and online pages for the Ghanaian elections.

¹³⁹⁵ Facebook Accounts of Ghanaian political parties

*des véhicules importés à 8 ans. Réduction des denrées de première[s] nécessités. Diaspora comme 15e région ».*¹³⁹⁶

Allamand et al in collectif DAEM contends that social media as a political tool were used to observe social movement protest on: *la loi de travail in 2015*. Collectif DAEM notes that:

*Les réseaux comme outils politique, des questionnaires proposés aux lycéens et étudiants dans le contexte du mouvement social contre la loi Travail, concernant les pratiques politique sur les réseaux vis-à-vis des pratiques traditionnelles. Certaines signalaient effectivement que l'important était la mobilisation dans la rue, mais la plupart des lycéens et étudiants, perçoivent les réseaux comme un réel lieu d'action et d'organisation politique. Car l'accent est mis principalement sur la communication des idées, la capacité d'information rapide, la portée des partages sur les réseaux. L'engagement politique se manifeste alors par une pratique utilitaire des réseaux sociaux, voir par le choix de réseaux utilisés pour l'action de l'organisation politique. « Moi engagé » et redéfinition de « moi ». Les réseaux agissent comme un renforcement de l'activité et de l'identité militante des usagers qui participent à la contestation sociale et politique. La présentation de soi sur les réseaux sociaux peut inclure une dimension stratégique qui relève de la gestion de son image qui n'est pas si éloignée des choix de construction d'une « persona politique »*¹³⁹⁷.

This mode of political communication or mobilisation enables: « *les gouvernés avoir accès et un pouvoir direct aux gouvernants* »¹³⁹⁸. In other words, online political engagement empowers individuals, which in turn allows these individuals to hold political elites accountable of their actions in a more direct fashion, as internet political engagement demystifies the relationship between those in government and those being governed.

Mabi and Thiebot further highlights the role internet plays in political participation by proposing various avenues of reflexion: *la thèse de mobilisation et la thèse de la normalisation*:

¹³⁹⁶ Smith, É., 2015. Sénégal, la diaspora fait-elle l'élection ? *Afrique contemporaine*, (4), p.67.

¹³⁹⁷ Collectif DAEM.2017, Arts et Media: Lieux du Politique ? Harmattan, p.111

¹³⁹⁸ Thiebot. A. and Mabi.C 2014, Présentation du dossier S'engager sur Internet Mobilisations et pratiques politiques, Presses Université de Grenoble, Politiques de Communication 2014/2 - N° 3 pp. 5

La thèse de la mobilisation:

Elle établit qu'Internet permet d'attirer de nouveaux publics. Les tenants de cette thèse estiment que certaines caractéristiques d'Internet (comme son architecture ouverte et sa communication distribuée) sont susceptibles de favoriser les interactions entre gouvernants et gouvernés, au sens où les gouvernés peuvent prendre la parole en ligne et formuler des critiques ou des suggestions. Le caractère virtuel des propos tenus sur le Web apporterait une plus grande liberté dans les prises de positions des internautes. Par exemple, sur la Toile, l'absence physique rendrait moins visible certains marqueurs sociaux (l'internaute n'est d'ailleurs pas obligé d'en faire état) et permet, selon W. Dutton, d'exprimer ses idées sans remettre en cause le « pacte de stabilité sociale » (Dutton, 1996) présent dans des relations amicales ou de voisinage. L'information politique serait aussi plus facilement accessible et plus diversifiée sur Internet ce qui permettrait, selon les partisans de cette thèse, d'amener des internautes à s'intéresser à la politique, voire de les pousser à participer à des discussions politiques en ligne (Mossberger, Tolbert et MacNeal, 2008)¹³⁹⁹.

La thèse de la normalisation:

La thèse de la normalisation, développée dans l'ouvrage de M. Margolis et D. Resnick, défend l'idée que sont actifs en ligne, ceux qui l'étaient déjà hors ligne (Norris, 2003). Les tenants de cette thèse affirment que seuls les individus déjà intéressés par la politique vont être en capacité de se diriger vers ce type de contenu et ainsi démultiplier leurs sources d'information (Delli Carpini, Keeter, 2003). En France, l'enquête de 2009, réalisée par le CEVIPOF confirme ces résultats au sens où les citoyens déjà politisés semblent mieux à même de se saisir du Web en tant que ressource d'information et espace d'expression de leur engagement. Pour les adhérents de partis politiques, on retrouve cette idée de normalisation au travers des enquêtes soulignant que les activistes en ligne sont en fait ceux qui sont déjà les plus actifs sur le terrain (Pedersen, Saglie, 2005)¹⁴⁰⁰.

The profiles of online political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London

¹³⁹⁹ Thievot. A. and Mabi.C 2014, art.cit. pp. 16

¹⁴⁰⁰ Ibid

during the 2008, 2012 and 2016 election, were predominantly members of Ghanaian political party branches in London: NPP, NDC and CPP. They transferred their physical participation from the streets of London, to an online platform, following the global trend in long-distance political engagement via the internet. Their participation was not a random act, it was a calculated act of participation. The language they used online was aimed at sending a strong message on developmental issues and concerns in Ghana, this strategy enables a rapid online visibility. This observation was also confirmed in Anaïse Thievot's Ph. D thesis: *Mobiliser et Militer sur Internet*, where she also observed that: *les participants qui investissent les dispositifs numériques sont ceux qui disposent d'un capital militant hors ligne important (Norris, 2003). L'exposition à l'information sur Internet serait même la source d'une polarisation des opinions (Sunstein, 2001) qui renforcerait la « balkanisation » de l'espace public*¹⁴⁰¹.

A study on Turkish transnational political engagement in Germany and the Netherlands also notes that those who actively engage in online protest on issues regarding Turkish political process are often the same individuals who protest on the streets of Berlin and Amsterdam about political issues in Turkey (Kissau and Hunger 2010:255).

Online political participation among members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is not a random act by those who use the internet as a premise to voice out their political stand, in most cases, it is often the same individuals who engage politically at the grass root level who adapt their engagement to an online political communication. Below **images in fig.77 p.455**, shows Facebook account of various Ghanaian political party advocacy groups and their political leaders accounts, which illustrates the visual and virtual idea of online political participation.

These images show that Ghanaian political space is increasingly adapting to and evolving through the lenses of global trends. In the last few years, social media such as Facebook, twitter, WhatsApp and Instagram have become part and parcel of the Ghanaian political scene. Government ministers, opposition party leaders, political party sympathisers and civil society often turn to social media as an avenue to discuss, debate and denounce political malpractices within government and Ghanaian society. Some examples of social

¹⁴⁰¹ Thievot. A. and Mabi.C 2014, art.cit. pp. 18

media political mobilisation and contestation was in 2014 and early 2015, when pressure groups took to the streets of Accra in protestation against “DUMSOR” meaning (power outage) see images in fig,76. below. This was in response to the extreme crisis of power outage that the country was facing for an extensive period of three years (2013-2016) which resulted or contributed to severe economic challenges for local business and the population at large. The effect of DUMSOR also rendered slow economic growth, this had a direct effect on purchasing power and living standards for most Ghanaians, as it was stressed by the organisers of the demonstrations in Accra¹⁴⁰². The physical protestation on the streets of Accra was transplanted virtually on to social media platforms particularly on Facebook, members of the Ghanaian diaspora were very much active in their contribution towards discussions on such social issues often providing and proposing alternative measures to combat the power crisis, i.e., the need to introduce and democratise the use of solar power system in Ghana according to one Facebook diasporan contributor ¹⁴⁰³.


Figure 0-76: Images: Dumsor Must Stop Protest on Social Media Platforms




Source: <https://www.660citynews.com/2015/05/17/ghana-movie-stars-join-blue-collar-workers-in-protest-march-against-power-cuts/>

¹⁴⁰² Dumsor Must Stop Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dumsor-Must-Stop/476392179204021?fref=ts>

¹⁴⁰³ Dumsor must stop discussion on Facebook page, a diasporan contribution to the discussion on the provision of solar systems to solve the problem: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dumsor-Must-Stop/476392179204021?fref=ts>



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/Dumsor-MUST-STOP-1609682525955061/>




Source: <https://ghanaonthegeo.com/2015/10/07/dumsor-struggles-light-off-and-petrol-shortages-in-west-africas-newest-oil-capital/>; <https://www.facebook.com/Ghana-Dumsor-must-stop-933942226642360/>,

The availability of information to diasporans via the internet, made it possible for Ghanaians in London to follow daily political events such as the 2012 election results disputes at the Supreme Court. Members of the Ghanaian diaspora took to the streets of London to protest on the need to allow the Supreme Court to operate as an independent body without the interference of the government during the Supreme Court proceedings of the 2012 election fraud claim by the then opposition NPP:

“Under normal circumstances, it doesn’t take three months for interlocutors to be served... We know even within this week the number of delay tactics the respondents have been trying to apply... So we know there are going to be delays that is why we are trying

to strengthen the hands of the Supreme Court,¹⁴⁰⁴” one of the protesters in London told Citi News¹⁴⁰⁵. “We want the whole world to know what is going on in Ghana,” another said¹⁴⁰⁶.

Figure 0-77: Ghanaian Political Parties on social media platforms (Facebook)



NPP Party Facebook page, source: <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialNDCGhana>

NDC Party Facebook page: Source: <https://www.facebook.com/newpatrioticparty.org>




CPP Party Facebook page, Source: <https://www.facebook.com/ConventionPeoplesParty>

¹⁴⁰⁴ Dumsor must stop discussion on Facebook page, a diasporan contribution to the discussion on the provision of solar systems to solve the problem: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dumsor-Must-Stop/476392179204021?fref=ts>


¹⁴⁰⁵ Dumsor must stop discussion on Facebook page, a diasporan contribution to the discussion on the provision of solar systems to solve the problem: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dumsor-Must-Stop/476392179204021?fref=ts>

¹⁴⁰⁶ Ghanaians hit London streets in protest against Mahama's administration: <http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201304/104358.php>


Figure 0-78: Ghanaian Political Party leaders on Social Media



a) President of Ghana's Facebook account President Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo, current candidate of the NPP party for the presidential and parliamentary scheduled for December 2020





b) President John Dramani Mahama (former president) and the current presidential candidate of the main opposition Party, the NDC Party for the presidential and parliamentary scheduled for December 2020, Facebook account



c) Prof. Edmund N. Delle CPP party leader and presidential candidate for the December 2020 polls Facebook account

Figure 0-79: Ghanaian Political Parties Vigilante Groups on Facebook



NPP Facebook Vigilante group “foot soldiers” Associations page, NDC militant group on Facebook



Youth forum of members of the Youth wing of all the main political parties in Ghana: NPP; NDC; CPP Facebook page

Figure 0-80: Ghanaian Political Party leaders on Twitter

President Akufo-Addo Twitter account



Source: <https://twitter.com/nakufoaddo>

Former President Mahama's twitter account



Source: <https://twitter.com/JDMahama>

Some government officials also took to the same social media platforms to counterattack the civil society groups and the opposition parties stand on such social matters. Social media to a large extent might have empowered diasporan transnational ties with homeland, when utilised properly. Both local civil society groups, government institutions and opposition party all know the importance and the power of social media and how that can garner international attention, as a result it has become the modus operandi of all political entities within the Ghanaian context¹⁴⁰⁷. Discussing the notion of the internet and society, Slevin draws on Giddens and Thompson's concepts and theories to build a sociological analysis of how the internet fits within, changes or reinforces contemporary cultural and social trends. Giddens and Thompson notes that internet culture, as part of contemporary

¹⁴⁰⁷ Fieldwork discussions with Kofi Blankson Ocansey in Accra, 28th June 2018

society, is conceived of as an extension of modernity rather than part of a postmodern condition¹⁴⁰⁸. Slevin sees the internet as contributing to ‘a shift into a period in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radical, and more universal than ever before’¹⁴⁰⁹. These consequences include intensifying globalisation, (with associated time-space distinction) the emergence of post-traditional forms of organisations, and the expansion and intensification of social reflexivity¹⁴¹⁰. It is in this context of intensified globalisation that has enabled Ghanaians in the diaspora to continue to engage in this transnational political engagement via the internet. When respondents were asked about the frequency of their internet use about 60% of the respondents indicated they connected to the internet to be informed about what is happening back home in Ghana on Ghanaian websites such as: Ghanaweb; Myjoyonline, peaceFM etc. This mode of internet use can be classified as a passive form of online political participation. About 40% of the respondents mentioned that they frequently connect to the internet for political discussion by posting messages of political content on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. But also, some indicated that they had set-up blogs to discuss politics. This mode of online participation can be viewed as an active online participation.

It should also be noted here that internet political participation for most diasporas and their homelands can equally serve as a basis of home government political surveillance of their decedents abroad¹⁴¹¹. This has been observed in some African countries with poor democratic record, whereby diasporan are often viewed as troublemakers and to that effect internet becomes the fora for political antagonism for both government and diaspora activist, this is demonstrated by the case of Eritrea and its diaspora¹⁴¹².

As it has been observed above on Ghanaians who engage in transnational political practices consider themselves as first-generation diaspora who aspire to return to Ghana and continue with their political practices or political careers they were already engaged before migration.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Slevin, J., 2002. The Internet and Society: central themes and issues. *N. Brügger and H. Bødker (eds.)*, p.7

¹⁴⁰⁹ Slevin, J 2000, *The Internet and Society* Cambridge: Polity Press, p.10

¹⁴¹⁰ Lincoln Dahlberg 2001, *Situating the Net* Slevin’s Antidote to Techno-Determinism

¹⁴¹¹ Bernal, V., 2006. Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: the Eritrean diaspora online. *Global networks*, 6(2), p.170.

¹⁴¹² Kruger. B. 2005 Government Surveillance and Political Participation on the Internet *Social Science Computer Review*, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 439-452

During the field work observation in London among first-generation Ghanaians who engage in active transnational politics, some indicated that they were politically inclined back in Ghana before emigrating. Some respondents indicated that the political atmosphere in Ghana became hostile, therefore since relocating to Britain they decided to distance himself from homeland politics while living in the UK. Adam a respondent in London noted: *I was very active in politics back home in Ghana before moving to the UK in the 1980s. I decided to distance myself from Ghanaian politics here in London, because my experience as a politician in Ghana was a very traumatising experience with several military coup d'états. Life was really hard and uncertain for myself and my family. So since moving to London, I decided I wanted a peaceful life for myself, my wife and to help provide good education for my children here in London*¹⁴¹³.

Penninx et.al. noted a similar observation of political refugees who settled in the US during the Cold War from Communist, Central and Eastern Europe wanted to disconnect themselves as fully as possible from homeland politics and were more ready to assimilate in their host country¹⁴¹⁴. These examples, therefore, demonstrate that engaging in politics before migration does not necessarily indicate that such engagement continues in migration, although in most cases that is what occurs, as we saw earlier with the examples of Colombians in London, Turks in Germany and the Netherlands.

A.1. Political participation via hometown associations

As previously indicated in chapter one of Part two of the thesis with reference to the organizational structures of Ghanaian diasporas associations abroad, such as hometown association activities where it was noted to be platforms for developmental projects by Ghanaians residing abroad, to support their villages and local communities. To this effect, these diaspora association activities could be classified as an indirect and unconventional mode of transnational political engagement. It is however in this context, that the analysis of the activities undertaken

¹⁴¹³ Fieldwork interview with Adam, London 24 March 2014

¹⁴¹⁴ Penninx, R., Berger, M. and Kraal, K., 2006. The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe. A State of the Art, AUP, IMISCOE Joint Studies series, Amsterdam. p.90

by Ghanaian diaspora associations in London will be examined from this postulate of the indirect political message that the associations activities are conducted.

According to a leader of the Ga (a Ghanaian ethnic group mainly from the Greater Accra region) hometown association in London, who stated that: *the activities that our association carries out in our local area in Accra has nothing to do with politics, it is our way of giving back to our local community and showing solidarity with our people back in our community. Our community has played a role in raising us, so it's our duty now to raise the next generation. You know, in Africa, a child is not only born to their parent, a child is born to a community in Ghana. So, most of us within the association here in London at some point in our up-bringing in Ghana were brought-up by the community, so we owe our success to our community in Accra and therefore, it is only normal that we do our best to also give back. It is a moral duty by us Ga people in London to help elevate our people in our community*¹⁴¹⁵. This statement suggests that family and community provide an ideal model of polity indicating that family and community further provide an ideal political system, this modal can be found in many African countries and around the world.

Another leader of a hometown association states: *The main mission and manifesto of our association is to help deprived children from Northern Ghana, migrating to the South such as Accra, Kumasi and other major Southern cities in Ghana in search of work. We want to try and reduce child labour and abuse of people from our area in the North. You know, Northern Ghana, is not as developed as the South, so often times poor families send their children to the south to work and look after their siblings back in the North, to these families migrating to the South such as Accra is viewed an "el dorado". What they fail to understand is that these children are often abused physically and mentally. Most of those who go to Accra are underage girls, who are sexually abused, which causes high rate of teenage pregnancies and more poverty. Previous governments in recent past, have tried to curb this North/South development disparities, but the initiatives they put in place are not enough to help the development of the North. So, some of us Northern Ghanaians in London have taken it upon ourselves to contribute in setting-up local NGO, which serves to*

¹⁴¹⁵ Fieldwork interview March 17th 2014 London, Ga hometown association chief in London

*educate families in the North about the dangers of sending their offspring down South to work*¹⁴¹⁶.

*Our NGO organises workshops to vocationally train girls in basket weaving, Shear Butter cream production, by initiating such activities, these girls will have vocations that they can practice in the North and therefore will not need to risk their lives emigrating down South to Kumasi and Accra to seek for work. We often educate our people in the North about the importance of family planning and having less children, as it is not the quantity but the quality that matters in terms of child rearing. Having too many children that you cannot feed and properly look after pushes families to either marry their daughter's off too young in order to relieve some family burden and responsibilities or to send them down South to work. Although we try our best to help them, some of our local people back in Northern Ghana still believe, even though they do not have the financial resource to look after their children, that the more children they have, at least one out of the lot will succeed and then look after the rest of the family. So, it is very difficult to change such mentality. Some of us are very lucky to have the exposure of living and working in London, so we want our people back in Northern Ghana to also benefit from our exposure, and that is why we set up this NGO in London to also help our people. We cannot always wait for Government in Accra to put in place developmental projects in areas like Tamale, Bawku or Bolgatanga. We Northern Ghanaians often know the problems our people are facing there than central government in Accra, because from my home here in London, I speak to my family in Tamale every weekend, I am informed of what is going on back home. Our NGO has no political affiliation it is purely on the basis of humanitarian work to help young children in Northern Ghana*¹⁴¹⁷. These statements made by leaders of these hometown association in London indicates that their transnational philanthropic activities towards their local community are apolitical, but indirectly these activities does have a political meaning, as setting-up an NGO, to help curb labour emigration of young children from Northern Ghana to the South, is normally the responsibility of the state's social services department to put in measures to curb such trend of internal migration of young children.

¹⁴¹⁶ Fieldwork interview March 18th 2014 London, leader of Northern Ghanaian Association

¹⁴¹⁷ Fieldwork interview with March 20th 2014 London, leader of a Northern Ghanaian Association in London

Therefore, diaspora association initiating such activities shows the unconventional aspect of their transnational engagement which has an underlining political aspect to local development through such transnational activities.

Equally, there is a spill-over effects from members of the Ghanaian political party branches in London who are also members of these hometown associations, therefore they utilise the activities of these hometown associations in a discrete manner to send political messages. As a study on Colombian diaspora transnational political engagement in Madrid and in London demonstrates, how Colombian hometown association activities in Madrid are not only used for philanthropic activities, but they are also a platform for transnational political mobilization. Bermudez notes that: *The Colombian Association in Madrid, Aculco, promotes Colombian culture abroad and counter the negative image of Colombia in Spain. The association also does some philanthropic gestures towards homeland by sending some first aid medical needs for poorer communities in Colombia. However, as migration to Spain started to accelerate, the association began to focus more on the local needs of Colombian migrants. Their main activities involved offering labour, legal, social and cultural assistance to Colombian migrants. But this did not mean that the focus on homeland politics had disappeared completely, the association's original political and cultural aims were still there, even if more subdued*¹⁴¹⁸. The activities of the Colombian diaspora association in Madrid echoes with the Ghanaian hometown association activities in London as a means of philanthropic aid to homeland, but also mobilises for the purposes of homeland politics. For some high-profile members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, being a member and engaging in hometown association activities is an act of connecting to their Ghanaian roots and not forgetting their Ghanaian heritage, such is the case of Lord Paul Boateng who noted in an interview in 2010 that: *"I am also a member of the Akyeam Tafo village Association, again as and when time permits, I participate in their events. This helps me to stay grounded at all times and in being connected to my Ghanaian roots, as my father comes from the Akyeam traditional area, when I was in Ghana as a young boy, I use to follow my father to his village particularly when he was*

¹⁴¹⁸ Bermudez, A., 2010.art.cit.p87

on a campaign trips to his local area as an MP. So, I have fond memories of those period, and therefore, I want to maintain that on a personal level¹⁴¹⁹”.

Figure 0-81: Images: Ghana National Day Celebration 6th March 2014, London: Leaders of Ghanaian Diaspora hometown Associations in London



Fieldwork images Ghana National Day celebrations, 6th March 2014 in London

A.2 Professional association: Indirect mode of political participation in London

The activities of Ghanaian professional associations such as Star 100, which was founded in London by Ghanaian professionals. The association’s aim is to bring Ghanaian professionals together to network and work towards developmental projects in Ghana. Star 100 is composed of both first-and-second-generation Ghanaian professionals residing in the UK. The average age of its members is between the age brackets of 35-55 years. According to the head of Star 100 Richard

¹⁴¹⁹ Fieldwork interview with Lord Paul Boateng, London 20th August 2010

Tandoh, their association raised funds to build a school in Accra for Autistic children, the first school in Ghana to cater for children with Autism. *“Ghanaian society in general seem to have very little consideration for people with physical and mental disability, as a result not much has been put in place by government agencies to cater for such minorities in society. This observation prompted our association to build this school and to draw the attention of local authorities on the importance of taking such social issues serious”*¹⁴²⁰.

Tandoh further indicated that their association is apolitical, the association’s mission is to undertake charity initiatives in Ghana. He stated that: *as part of the mandate of our association, we seek not only to carry out projects in Ghana, but also to help educate second-generation Ghanaians in London on our culture heritage and rites. Some second generations are completely disconnected with Ghanaian culture, as their parents in the UK did not teach them their local language, Ghanaian traditional rite such as naming ceremonies, traditional marriage rites etc... Star 100 often organises such programs in London to reconnect with our roots in a meaningful way and still maintain our “Britishness” as second-generation Ghanaians*¹⁴²¹. In other words, creating a space to bring together young Ghanaian professionals to ponder on issues pertaining to their lives in the UK as second generations by so doing they maintain both their British and Ghanaian heritage, it shows how multifunctional the activities of the professional association takes form.

The activities undertaken by the Star 100 professional association appear apolitical as noted by Tandoh. In fact, such activities convey a political message to the local authority’s reluctance in initiating social welfare projects to cater for the disable community. To this effect, these activities have an indirect and unconventional form of political engagement, as a result the Ghanaian government has since started to initiate awareness projects on autism as a disability to educate the public about the stigma that Ghanaian society attribute to such disability. To this end, the Ministries of Health and Education have conducted pilot studies into how best the government can start a national dialogue and campaign awareness on de-stigmatizing Ghanaian societal perceptions on welfare issues on disabilities and building specialised

¹⁴²⁰ Field work interview, with Richard Tandoh 27 December 2012, London

¹⁴²¹ Fieldwork interview with Richard Tandoh 27 December 2012, London

institutions to cater for such minorities in society. In sum, the transnational activities, of Star 100 has to a large extent contributed to the awakening of local government consciousness and awareness as to the importance of initiating public health policies of such nature. And in so doing the professional associations transnational activity could be classified as an unconventional form of political participation, as it has contributed policy to change on healthcare issues in Ghana. This action is a game changer within the realm of healthcare and public health policies in Ghana.

A.3 Ghanaian political party branches in London: explicit form of political engagement

As already highlighted, on the profile of transnational political engagement towards Ghana and the nexus between Pioneer Generations and New Generations participation in London. Ghanaian political party branches in the UK are avenues for direct and indirect, conventional and unconventional form of political participation, as activist within the political party branches in London hold party membership cards in Ghana. They often travel to Ghana during election period to vote. By holding political party membership card and travelling to Ghana to vote constitutes an important part of political participation. Ghanaian political party branches in London are also platforms for both direct and conventional forms of political participation. These conventional and direct form of political participation is translated via protest that members of these Ghanaian political party chapters in London, carry out particularly during a Ghanaian president's visit to the UK. By petitioning the UK government to denounce Ghana government policies on economic and wealth-fare matters

The active participation of members of the Ghanaian political party branches in the diaspora are often a platform for enhancing their political activism and using their membership of the party as a platform to gain political visibility and network in order to pave the way for their smooth return into homeland politics.

Unlike activities of Ghanaian hometown associations, Ghanaian professional associations and Ghanaian churches which in theory are avenues for unconventional

and indirect spaces for political mobilisation. Members of Ghanaian political party chapters in London have a direct stand on their political ideologies, and activities since their actions are geared towards the formation of a collective political identity and collective political interest, but in so doing also position their own political interest within the framework of collective political action within the transnational space. Their activities are politically motivated and with an overt political agenda and rhetoric (as we saw with the protest groups in London and Washington during the Ghanaian presidential visit).

It is important to note that those who protest during Ghanaian president's visit to the UK, US and other parts of the world are usually active members of the Ghanaian political party branches in the UK and US, as not all Ghanaian diaspora or Ghanaian associations, demonstrate during such visit. It is often the elite and educated segments of the diaspora who are engaged in such transnational political activities. These demonstrators have a political agenda and message to send, both to their main party in Accra and equally on an individual level. This individual level is important as, it is where individual interest becomes intertwined with collective action. In other words, some members of the Ghanaian political party branch in London use their transnational political engagement in the diaspora to seek political visibility vis-a-vis the main party in Ghana and as such this paves the way for a political career upon return to Ghana. In a similar direction Smith (2015) observed in his work on Senegalese diaspora political participation in US, where he stated that active members of the diaspora use their political engagement in the US to gain political visibility back home in Senegal: *les militants ou candidats issus de la diaspora en quête d'une carrière militante ou d'une notoriété électorale accélérées. Mais aussi les autres candidats qui trouvent là un moyen de courtiser l'électorat expatrié en célébrant son rôle supposé de grand électeur. Enfin, les médias, friands de cet électorat presque « exotique », qui fait voyager son public et installe le Sénégal au coeur du monde*¹⁴²².

This mode of transnational political engagement via Ghanaian political party branches in London is, therefore, a calculated and a measured form of engagement by these demonstrators. Protesting and petitioning are considered as unconventional

¹⁴²² Smith. 2015. Art.cit. p.61

and indirect form of political participation¹⁴²³. Kriesi (2008) noted that such unconventional and indirect form of political mobilisation and engagement is as powerful as voting, if not even more powerful form of political engagement as it gives political visibility for the causes that these activists are trying to draw attention to in a more strategic manner¹⁴²⁴. Kriesi further explains that the changing role of the media and the declining control over the voters by the political parties provide political opportunities for the mobilisation of a potential wide range of collective political actors, in particular actors within social movement organisations, who do not have regular access to the parliamentary or administrative decision-making arenas¹⁴²⁵. In this context, the political action of Ghanaian political party members in London is linked to the fact that they do not have the right to vote from the UK and do not have parliamentary constituency. This therefore means that they are compelled to such form of political engagement via protest is a powerful means to send political messages back home in Ghana.

Studies of protest events by social movement scholars also show that the impact of mobilisation by the so-called 'new social movements', the number of protest events has considerably increased since the late 1960s in countries such as Switzerland (Kriesi et al. 1981), Germany (Rucht 1998, 2003), the Netherlands (Koopmans 1996) and in France (Sommier 2003). In other words, unconventional mode of political participation has now gained currency to such a point that it has become a legitimate and credible mode of political participation which is now acceptable in modern democracies. The Ghanaian diaspora transnational political engagement via protest can be viewed within this framework as a legitimate and credible mode of engagement.

A. 4 How do they participate

The organizational set-up of the political party branches in London is often based on the same organizational structure of the mother party in Ghana, as each party member in London for example is assigned to a role that is mirrored to the party structure in Ghana. They have a general secretary who is voted in a democratic style by the party members, a deputy, a treasurer, an accountant etc., Other specific roles

¹⁴²³ Kriesi, H., 2008. Art.cit. p.156

¹⁴²⁴ Ibid.157

¹⁴²⁵ Ibid.157

are allocated to members in line with their professions and expertise in London, example a public relation officer of the party in London will be someone who works within the media sector, who can use their expertise to effectively advance their parties political agenda both in the diaspora and back home. Another example of the party rank and files in London, will be a member who is a Lawyer or works within the Legal sector, will be assigned as the party's legal representative in the UK and so it goes for all the appointees of the ruling establishment of the party in the diaspora. This strategic positioning of the party members in line with their professional expertise is to harness and channel their experiences to benefit the party's political agenda in the diaspora. As these professional members of the political party branches in London are also members of the Ghanaian professional association, this therefore implies that once again their transnational engagement has a spill-over effect between their engagement in professional association and participation in Ghanaian political party branches in London. Their mode of participation takes shape in meeting the first Sunday of every month (mostly evenings). Each month has a topic of discussions, which in most cases is in line with political events in Ghana¹⁴²⁶. The meeting is normally a platform to strategize on how best to help their party to deliver on key policies and developmental projects, by comparing notes with what is happening elsewhere in the world. Financial contributions on a monthly basis are often made during these meetings to help political campaign back home in Ghana¹⁴²⁷. Depending on which party is in opposition the NPP or the NDC, their diaspora political chapter members meets to discuss ways in which they can assist their parties on key policy matters to aid the return of their party to power¹⁴²⁸. Equally when their party is in power, their diaspora chapter serve as an avenue to advance the visibility of the party policy achievements in Ghana, by giving an international exposure.¹⁴²⁹ Therefore, Ghanaian political party branches in London are of great importance for the main party back in Ghana when they are either in power or in opposition¹⁴³⁰. Political party candidates also travel to the diaspora to campaign for elections in Ghana. An example to illustrate

¹⁴²⁶ Fieldwork interview with Dodji Numekova 20th December 2012

¹⁴²⁷ Fieldwork interview with Nana Yaw Sarpong, 20th June 2010 in London

¹⁴²⁸ Fieldwork interview with Nana Yaw Sarpong, 20th June 2010 in London

¹⁴²⁹ Interview with Mohammed Abdul-Saaka 10 July 2013 in London

¹⁴³⁰ Interview with Dr. Kromoa 10 August 2013 in London

this were a series of events hosted in London between 2014-2016 by NPP UK branch with the presence of the then presidential candidate Nana Akufo-Addo and his vice-presidential candidate Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia among other leading members of the party in Ghana.

B.1 Ghanaian political party campaign in the diaspora: Protest and demonstration

As noted above most Ghanaian political parties seek diaspora support and endorsement from the diaspora this is particularly the case of the NPP party. For example, in November 2014 the vice-presidential candidate Dr. Bawumia attended a fundraising event in London organised by the NPP UK branch: *Dr Mahamudu Bawumia, Vice-Presidential Candidate for the New Patriotic Party for the 2016 elections, enjoyed a loudly enthusiastic reception at this year's dinner/dance of NPP UK. Dr Bawumia, together with an impressive delegation from the NPP mother party in Ghana, was guest of honour at the event on Friday 14 November in north London. The dinner/dance, an annual fundraiser, was organised this year by the Women's and Nasara wings of NPP UK in partnership with its Fundraising Committee. Despite the cold and damp of early winter, it attracted an audience of more than 400 people, including large numbers of party members from NPP UK Chapters in Milton Keynes, Manchester, Leeds, Hull, the Midlands, Reading, Northampton, and beyond.*

Chairman Ansah stated that NPP UK has a clear two-year plan for "mobilising all its resources – human, financial, intellectual and strategic – towards the single purpose of winning in 2016". He identified the main target groups for the next election; and once again he pledged NPP UK's support for NPP Ghana towards capturing these groups and ensuring that the vote of every Ghanaian is guaranteed, protected, counted and accurately declared in 2016. He appealed to NPP UK and other overseas branches to support the party's mobilisation efforts and said he was eager to work closely with them to achieve their targets. Dr Bawumia had a clear message for NPP members, friends and sympathisers: Ghana is being woefully mismanaged by the incompetent National Democratic Congress regime of John Dramani Mahama, Ghanaians are suffering, and the party owes the people of Ghana a great duty to leave no stone unturned in its quest to

oust the NDC in the 2016 elections. ¹⁴³¹.

Another such event was a campaign launched in London named: “The Akufo-Addo for 2016” (see annex 4 for full invitation of the launch of the campaign in London): *The campaign group officially launched Nana Akufo Addo’s campaign on 15/06/2014 at Chestnut Community Centre- London. It was at this launch that one of the guest speakers, Hon. Shirley Ayorkor Botchway, MP for Anyaa –Sowutuom announced that over 100 NPP parliamentarians support Nana Akufo Addo’s bid to lead the NPP to victory 2016. ‘Akufo Addo for 2016’ is a voluntary campaign group formed in UK, to first impress on Nana Addo to lead the NPP party for victory 2016. When Nana Akufo Addo officially announced his intention to contest the flagbearership of NPP on 20/03/2014, the group started mobilising logistics and resources to first, support the re-election of Nana Akufo Addo as the flagbearer and support the NPP with similar resources and logistics to prosecute the 2016 election. The group is of diverse makeup, drawn from a broad base of Ghanaians in UK, registered and non-registered members of NPP, businessmen and women, sympathisers and floating voters.*

In the presence of the presidential candidate Nana Akufo-Addo, the group officially introduced themselves to him 22/06/2014. Nana Akufo Addo also used that opportunity to encourage the organisers to broaden the base of the campaign by allowing more volunteers to join and encouraged them to accept and work cooperatively with all persons who support his bid to secure the party's mandate for the third term regardless of their previous allegiances. He emphasised "the need to embrace all to show total support for my bid". He used the occasion to express his heartfelt appreciation to Ghanaians in the UK for their overwhelming endorsement of his bid to lead the party to victory, 2016. He also thanked them for their belief in NPP as the only alternative to restoring Ghana’s economy and building a fairer society for all Ghanaians.

At the same function, Hon Ursula Owusu – MP for Ablekuma West re-echoed the position of many Ghanaians in UK supporting ‘Nana Addo for 2016’ Campaign. She said, “Nana Addo did not lose 2012 election and the whole party as well as any objective Ghanaian who watched the Supreme Court petition attest to this simple fact”. It is therefore

¹⁴³¹ Bawumia wows NPP UK get-together, published on Ghanaweb.com 18 November 2014:
<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bawumia-wows-NPP-UK-get-together-335469>

*incumbent on us as a party to bury our personal ambitions and interest and focus on wrestling power from the NDC- 2016 with a candidate who will guarantee us that victory*¹⁴³². *'Akufo Addo for 2016' campaign group has outlined series of activities to galvanise support and logistics across Europe, Asia and America to support Nana Akufo Addo's bid for re-election and after this, galvanise more support and logistics for NPP to prosecute 2016 election*¹⁴³³.

A group affiliated to the NPP Party called: *"A Coalition to Elect Nana Addo, and Bawumia, UK"* also mobilised to support presidential candidate Nana Akuffo-Addo and vice-presidential candidate Dr. Bawumia for the 2016 general elections in Ghana: *A Coalition to Elect Nana Addo, and Bawumia, is abbreviated as CENAB and CENAB UK is an affiliate of a worldwide CENAB Advocacy group, which is a broad coalition of patriots, friends, sympathisers, political admirers and people who believe that Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, and Dr. Mahamadu Bawumia's leadership will be the best to project Ghana into prosperity through development, embedded in freedom. We are a voluntary gathering, with arms across the world. We have a common aim and purpose of campaigning for Nana Addo, and Dr. Bawumia. The group believes that it is always in times of need that voluntary organisations, voluntary groups, and voluntarism, plays an important role in the achievement and success of all human societies, and more so, political parties. To this end, CENAB UK, USA, Canada, Germany and Ghana, have worked harder than it can be imagined and will continue till we see Nana Akufo-Addo and Dr. Bawumia sworn in as President and Vice in the Republic of Ghana. From contributing material resources, to educating voters, and by providing the relevant human efforts, which is extremely necessary in all our activities to ensure the change this year*¹⁴³⁴.

¹⁴³² 'Akufo Addo for 2016' Campaign hits London, published 24 June 2014 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-for-2016-Campaign-hits-London-314039>

¹⁴³³ 'Akufo Addo for 2016' Campaign hits London, published 24 June 2014 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-for-2016-Campaign-hits-London-314039>

¹⁴³⁴ Mogabi. N 2016, CENAB - Nana Akufo-Addo Strong Backbone Support In UK, published on Modern Ghana.com on 14.09.2016: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/719425/cenab-nana-akufo-addo-strong-backbone-support-in-uk.html>

98: Image. 16: New Patriotic Party chapter in the UK (NPP UK) Ghanaians protest against fraudulent votes in London April 2013 on the backdrop of the 2012 presidential elections in Ghana

Figure 0-82: Images : New Patriotic Party chapter in the UK (NPP UK) Ghanaians protest against fraudulent votes in London April 2013 on the backdrop of the 2012 presidential elections in Ghana



Ghanaians protest against fraudulent votes in London: "Around 400 Ghanaians demonstrate outside Ghana's High Commission in London. In protest of the alleged fraudulent votes that were added to advantage Mr John Dramani

Mahama". 12 April 2013 by See Li¹⁴³⁵, <http://www.demotix.com/news/1951824/ghaians-protest-against-fraudulent-votes-london#media-1951774>

Another example is an organised protest held on October 24th 2014 by members of the Ghanaian political party branches in London, it was during president Mahama's official visit to the UK between 20-25 October 2014. A group known as "*Concerned Ghanaians in the UK*" staged a demonstration in London on 24 October 2014, citing the following reasons: "*worsening economic conditions in Ghana*" "*diasporans are not naïve and ill-informed about the real economic situation in Ghana*"¹⁴³⁶.

President Mahama indicated at a press conference in London during his visit that Ghanaians back home do not paint an accurate picture about the true state of the economy to their relatives abroad, this is to get their relatives abroad to remit more often ¹⁴³⁷. President Mahama stated: "*Things are working in Ghana... if Ghanaian residents back home were to tell their relatives abroad that things were alright, they would not be encouraged to send them the token £100 and £200 they have been sending,*"¹⁴³⁸. President Mahama assured the diasporans that: "*I am proud to tell you things are going on well in Ghana. We had some challenges, especially with the cedi, but that was caused by speculators,*" adding, "*the bubble will burst and when it bursts, you will lose money*"¹⁴³⁹.

According to the group *Concerned Ghanaians in the UK*, they felt insulted by the president's comments that their families back home are painting a bad image of the country so that they can send them more money. They were also not convinced about the president's arguments about the country's economy doing well.

The Public Affairs Director of the Group, Nana Ansah Obofour: "*we know what is going on in Ghana, because we visit home often and listen to local Ghanaian radio stations via the internet in the UK. We therefore demand from the president an*

¹⁴³⁵ Ghanaians protest against fraudulent election: <http://www.demotix.com/news/1951824/ghaians-protest-against-fraudulent-votes-london#media-1951774>

¹⁴³⁶ Demo hits Mahama in London October 24th 2014: <http://www.dailyguideghana.com/demo-hits-mahama-in-london/>

¹⁴³⁷ Field work London 2016, president Mahama addresses the Ghanaian diaspora on the state of the country's development 18 May 2016

¹⁴³⁸ Ibidem

¹⁴³⁹ Fieldwork observation during President Mahama's interaction with the Ghanaian community in London in May 2016 on his government's achievement

apology for his attempts to “mislead” us in his speech. We live in the UK, but we are well connected to Ghana and we know what is going on in Ghana... the economy, the IMF bailout and the 16.5 percent inflation... So, for the President to come to the UK and tell us that we don’t crosscheck facts and don’t know anything in Ghana is unfortunate. So, we think the president has insulted our intelligence and he must apologise, that is why we are protesting. The talking is too much; and stop calling Ghanaians liars¹⁴⁴⁰. ”

The statement by both the president and the group protesting in the UK indicates that different perception of the same issues is being viewed from different angles. The former president might have a point in indicating that families back home in Ghana will capitalise on local events to extort monies from their relatives in the diaspora, as they view their relatives living abroad to be in better financial situation. This assertion by the president cannot, however, be used to explain Ghana’s economic woes specifically under his watch and tenure as president between 2012-2016. These interactions between the former president Mahama and members of the Ghanaian diaspora in London illustrates how access to news and information has enabled both Ghanaian political party branches in the diaspora to challenge each other on local issues. President Mahama’s interactions with the diaspora to court their support for investment in Ghana also suggest and confirm the idea that Ghanaian government under NDC rule tends to attribute economic role to the diaspora as opposed to a political role.

During President Mahama’s official visit to the US to attend, the US-Africa Summit 4-6 August 2014 a demonstration was equally staged by the same group in the UK, but this time round the US chapter of the group in America “*Concerned Ghanaians in the US*” this group is affiliated to the NPP Party chapter in the US. The group stated that their objective for organising a protest was to denounce and bring to the international community’s attention on the economic crisis facing the country. In their demonstration manifesto the group explicitly noted their transnational solidarity with Ghanaians back home in their hardship: “*we are supporting our brothers and sisters back home*”¹⁴⁴¹. The

¹⁴⁴⁰ Ibidem

¹⁴⁴¹ Ghanaians Resident in the USA Demonstrate Against President Mahama, published on 9 October 2015 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghanaians-Resident-in-the-USA-Demonstrate-Against-President-Mahama-386593>

group further states: *It is imperative to point out that we deeply continue to share in the untoward hardship that has bedevilled our brothers and sisters back home as a result of the incompetence and corrupt practices of Mahama and his cronies. And in the spirit of togetherness, we will continue to stand with them – unabated – through thick and thin to demand accountability, better socioeconomic conditions and improved standard of living from Mahama and his NDC government. This will be in the spirit of venting our spleen against his corrupt and incompetent government*¹⁴⁴² (see Box.11 below).

Figure 0-83:Box.11 Concerned Ghanaian in the US demonstration manifesto: 06 August 2014

On August 6th, 2014, Concerned Ghanaians in the USA will be staging a mammoth DEMONSTRATION against President John Mahama, as he attends the US-Africa Leaders' Summit in Washington D.C., the political capital of the world. This will be in the spirit of venting our spleen against his corrupt and incompetent government.

The collapsed National Health Insurance Scheme, (NHIS), the unprecedented depreciation of Ghana's currency, erratic power supply, high fuel prices, unpaid salaries to workers and the general high cost of living in the face of the profligate lifestyle of President Mahama and his appointees; the GYEEDA, SADA, SUBA, WOYOMEGATE, and the World Cup fiasco among others, are some of the unacceptable factors that have triggered this DEMONSTRATION.

It is imperative to point out that we deeply continue to share in the untoward hardship that has bedevilled our brothers and sisters back home as a result of the incompetence and corrupt practices of Mahama and his cronies. And in the spirit of togetherness, we will continue to stand with them – unabated – through thick and thin to demand accountability, better socio-economic conditions and improved standard of living from Mahama and his NDC government.

As development partners of our nation resident in the USA, we call on all well-meaning Ghanaians in the States to show up at the demonstration grounds at the State Department in Washington, DC. In unison we want to strongly signal to President John Mahama that we will continue to expose his corruption and incompetence to the international community any time and any given day that he sets foot in the USA, until he and his cronies stop operating their “create, loot and share” Ponzi schemes that channel huge sums of taxpayers monies meant for development projects into their private accounts.

By this demonstration, we the demonstrators will be looking forward to awakening the

¹⁴⁴² Ghanaians Resident in the USA Demonstrate Against President Mahama, published on 9 October 2015 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghanaians-Resident-in-the-USA-Demonstrate-Against-President-Mahama-386593>

consciousness and nationalistic sensibilities of the suffering Ghanaian to demand accountability of President John Dramani Mahama and his NDC government. Enough is enough!

Let's show some love for Mother Ghana.

D.C. here we come!

Come one, come all!!

God bless our homeland, Ghana!!!

Date of DEMO: Wednesday, August 6, 2014. Venue/Meeting Point: US Department of State, Washington D.C. (22nd & C Street NW, Southside, Washington D.C.) Time: 11:00am – 3:00pm

Source: <http://newsghana.com.gh/heavy-demo-hit-mahama-us-africa-leaders-summit/>

Figure 0-84: Concerned Ghanaians in the US demonstrating during President Mahama's official visit to the US to attend the US/African leaders summit in Washington DC 4-6 August 2014

**CONCERNED
GHANAIAANS**
IN THE US INVITE YOU TO

**JOIN THE DEMO
AGAINST JOHN MAHAMA'S
CORRUPT AND BAD GOVERNANCE,
AS MAHAMA VISITS THE USA**

DATE OF DEMONSTRATION:
**August 6,
2014**

GROUP MEETING TIME
**11:00am
➔ 3:00pm**

MEETING POINT/PLACE
**US DEPARTMENT
OF STATE**
Washington DC
[22nd & C Street
North West [NW]
Southside Washington DC]

FOR FURTHER INQUIRIES CALL
2026180431

List of items you can bring along;
Bullhorn, Cardboard Placards, drums etc

Source: <http://newsghana.com.gh/heavy-demo-hit-mahama-us-africa-leaders-summit/>

Transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is not exclusive to the NPP party branch in London, as it has been highlighted in previous chapters, the NPP Party has been in opposition for a longer period, and therefore has extensive experience in transnational political activism. In April 2018, a group of Ghanaians staged a demonstration during president Akufo-Addo's visit to London. The group was mainly composed of the NDC Party UK branch members, who were voicing out their dissent towards the NPP government signing a Ghana-US defence cooperation¹⁴⁴³. The Ghana-US Defence agreement is to allow US troops to have among other things, an exemption on paying taxes on equipment that are brought to Ghana as well, the US army will be able

¹⁴⁴³ NDC UK demonstrate against President Akuffo-Addo visit to the UK on Ghana-US military agreement 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-shocks-NDC-protestors-in-London-645511#C-protestors-in-London-645511#>

to use Ghana's radio spectrum for free¹⁴⁴⁴. Other privileges of national security privacy have also been granted to the US army and potential contractors, to operate on Ghanaian soil¹⁴⁴⁵. The opposition party National Democratic Party NDC and its branch in the UK have criticized the NPP government's decision on this defence agreement, maintaining that Ghana's sovereignty has been mortgaged¹⁴⁴⁶.

Figure 0-85: Images: 21st April 2018, National Democratic Party chapter in the UK (NDC UK): Protesting against the opening of a US Army Base in Ghana, during President Akuffo-Addo's visit to the UK



Source: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Angry-Ghanaians-in-UK-confront-Akufo-Addo-over-US-military-deal-645187>

A group of NDC Party members in the US also organised a protest while president Akuffo-Addo was addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2019. The USA branch of the governing New Patriotic Party has accused the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) of hiring Togolese nationals in the USA to demonstrate against President Akuffo-Addo at the just ended UN General Assembly in New York¹⁴⁴⁷. According to the NPP Party branch, the NDC took the action after they noticed that they

¹⁴⁴⁴NDC UK demonstrate against President Akuffo-Addo visit to the UK on Ghana-US military agreement 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-shocks-ND>

¹⁴⁴⁵ NDC UK demonstrate against President Akuffo-Addo visit to the UK on Ghana-US military agreement 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-shocks-NDC-protestors-in-London-645511#C-protestors-in-London-645511#>

¹⁴⁴⁶ Ghana-US denounce agreement 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-shocks-NDC-protestors-in-London-645511#>

¹⁴⁴⁷ NDC hired Togolese to protest against Akuffo-Addo at UN – NPP USA, Thursday, 3 October 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-hired-Togolese-to-protest-against-Akufo-Addo-at-UN-NPP-USA-785932>

could not marshal a convincing number of supporters to protest against the President Akuffo Addo:

On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 the President of Ghana was set to deliver his speech on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in New York City. As expected, every year, citizens of various countries living in the areas around New York and nearby states come to the UN Park to either show their support or their displeasure to their country's Presidents and heads of state during when they deliver their respective speeches on the floor of of UNGA.

Pro-government protesters throng to the grounds of the UN park to express their support and approval of the government of President of Ghana H.E. Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo his policies and achievements with chants, cheers and expression of contentment to the Ghanaian leader throughout the morning and late afternoon. To their dismay, around 4:30pm a handful of NDC supporters in their quest to embarrass the President of the Republic to the world, holding placards with anti-government inscriptions came to demonstrate. Realizing how woefully embarrassing their numbers were, vis a vis the pro-government supporter, financially induced some Togolese nationals who had also come to the grounds to protest that day, seen clad in their Togolese branded T-shirts holding signs with French inscription, abandoned their protest to join the NDC protest. NDC shamelessly used these Togolese foreign nationals to demonstrate against the President of Ghana, their own country's President on a foreign soil. This unpatriotic shameful act has never been seen before in the history of Ghana. (As seen in the picture). NDC with their embarrassing act, succeeded in perfecting their internationalization of incompetence and unpatriotic behaviour towards Mother Ghana in the full view of the world. The NDC needs to wake up to the realization that nation-building and governance are serious undertakings for serious people, and that every aspect of what goes into it must be approached with honesty and with utmost seriousness and competence. They have proven time and again that Ghanaians cannot leave the destiny of Ghana into their incompetent hands. Even when they have to just copy, they still, gladly, copy wrongly¹⁴⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁴⁸ NDC hired Togolese to protest against Akuffo-Addo at UN – NPP USA., 3 October 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-hired-Togolese-to-protest-against-Akuffo-Addo-at-UN-NPP-USA-785932>

Figure 0-86: Images NDC US branch organised Togolese nationals to protest against President Akufo-Addo at the UN General Assembly in New York 25th September 2019



Sources: NDC hired Togolese to protest against Akufo-Addo at UN – NPP USA, Thursday, 3 October 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-hired-Togolese-to-protest-against-Akufo-Addo-at-UN-NPP-USA-785932>

Another protest was organised by the NDC UK branch on 28th February 2020 in London while president Akufo-Addo was on a visit to deliver a speech at Chatham House: *Some Ghanaians in London, on Thursday, 27 February 2020, staged a demonstration against the Akufo-Addo-led government at the St James Square when the President was making his way to Chatham House, home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, for a speaking engagement. The protestors chanted and hoisted placards with messages such as: “Scholarships for the needy taken by ministers”, “Why lock hospitals while patients are dying in Ghana”, “Oversized government: 125 ministers”, and many others. The protesters said they are unhappy with the governance of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which, according to them, has brought untold hardship on Ghanaians* ¹⁴⁴⁹.

¹⁴⁴⁹ London: Ghanaians protest against Akufo-Addo, 28 February 2020 classic FM online:

Figure 0-87: Images NDC Party supporters in London protest against President Akuffo-Addo 28th February 2020



Source: London: Ghanaians protest against Akufo-Addo 28 February 2020:

<https://www.classfmonline.com/news/politics/London-Ghanaians-protest-against-Akufo-Addo-11278>



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<https://www.classfmonline.com/news/politics/London-Ghanaians-protest-against-Akufo-Addo-11278>

In 2007, during the celebrations of Ghana's 50th independence anniversary, President Kufuor (presidential tenure 2000-2008) was invited by the UK government led by Queen Elizabeth II to celebrate the event in London. This prompted a demonstration by the diaspora association linked to the NDC Party (which was then in opposition in 2007), BONABOTO. Bonaboto association petitioned the UK government citing issues of corruption, economic mismanagement, neglect and lack of development in the Northern Ghana. See Annex 5 for copy of the petitioned letter.

The transnational space has become a platform for professionalisation of diaspora political activism and political campaign strategies for both the NDC and the NPP. As it has been observed above the NPP diaspora branches have been organising transnational protest since 1993 while the party was in opposition. As such the NPP appears to have acquired solid experience in professionalising their transnational political activism as opposed to the NDC. The above example of NDC USA branch hiring Togolese nationals to protest against president Akuffo Addo during the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2019 demonstrates such differences. It is equally important to note here that both the NPP and the NDC party branches in the diaspora stages protest against each other depending on which party is in power.

B.2. Involvement in UK branch of a Ghanaian political Party: A platform for political career in Ghana

Some members of the NPP Party and NDC Party chapters in London stated that their reason for participating in Ghanaian politics from the diaspora is about contributing in a meaningful way to make constructive democratic changes to Ghana's political governance¹⁴⁵⁰. During the field work observation in London in 2012 some respondents revealed that their reason for engagement in Ghanaian political party activities in London was to help their party win election in Ghana and hopefully position them for a political career back home in Ghana¹⁴⁵¹. This observation echoes Coleman's notion of individual interest within the context of collective action, in which he asserts that the accumulation of social capital is linked to an individual's

¹⁴⁵⁰ Fieldwork interview with Dodzi Numekova in London 21 December 2012

¹⁴⁵¹ Fieldwork observation and interview in London, 27 December 2012 in London, respondent did not wish to be named, as being member of the political party in London, his views are personal and does not represent the general views of the party.

personal interest. Coleman further maintains that individual interest can perfectly co-exist within the framework of collective action: *“individuals, each acting in his own self-interest, can nevertheless make collective decisions, function as an ongoing society, and survive together without a “war of all against all”*¹⁴⁵².” This implies that an individual’s engagement in any kind of association or in a political party is based on advancing their political interest and using collective action as steppingstone¹⁴⁵³. As it was noted earlier on during the then presidential candidate Nana Akufo-Addo’s campaign in London 2014, when he advised the party members to put aside their personal interest for the general interest of the Party: *he advised the group to be civil in all their campaigns and ensure healthy competition*¹⁴⁵⁴.

At the same gathering in London, Ursula Owusu – NPP, Party MP for Ablekuma West re-echoed the position of Nana Akufo-Addo in the UK on party member coming together to work for the Party’s interest: *“It is therefore incumbent on us as a party to bury our personal ambitions and interest and focus on wresting power from the NDC- 2016 with a candidate who will guarantee us that victory”*¹⁴⁵⁵.

According to a founding member of the NPP Party branch in London and part of the Pioneer Generation group, on his view on why he engages in Ghanaian politics in London: *our motive for starting this political group in London was to bring to the attention of the world what was happening in Ghana: the poor human rights records of the military regimes that came and went, the lack of rule of law and due process, and the economic hardships our families back home were experiencing. But most importantly, we were determined to let the world know the misled information and lies that the government was sending to the international community about Ghana’s democratic process especially during the 1990s return to constitutional rule. Opposition leaders were not free of their movement, yet the country was supposed to be democratic”. Our group was more interested in fighting against injustices for those left back home and lobbying for overseas votes for Ghanaians abroad. Although most of those in our group knew very well that we might never return to*

¹⁴⁵² Coleman, J.S., 1966. Individual interests and collective action. *Papers on non-market decision making*, 1(1), p.51

¹⁴⁵³ Coleman, J.S., 1966. Art.cit. p.51

¹⁴⁵⁴ 'Akufo Addo for 2016' Campaign hits London, published 24 June 2014 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-for-2016-Campaign-hits-London-314039>

¹⁴⁵⁵ 'Akufo Addo for 2016' Campaign hits London, published 24 June 2014 on Ghanaweb.com: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-for-2016-Campaign-hits-London-314039>

Ghana to participate in politics, we still felt compelled by our principles to do something for those who could not speak for themselves because of the authoritarian regime that was in place in the 1970s and 1980s. The 2000 election saw our party return to power.

*It was also a time when some of our members here in London returned to continue the political battle. Our participation was genuine, even during the dark days of military rule we never gave-up the fight in the diaspora, our political conviction was stronger than money. This said, off course there were those who joined the party branch in London for prestige and positioned themselves for future political opportunities in government back home, but these groups within the party branch were a very small fraction, but they cause some damages, I must admit. This small opportunist group only came to party meeting when it's nearly time for elections in Ghana, so that they can be seen as being active members yet during the whole time when we held meetings they were nowhere to be found, so I call them "the opportunist members". These opportunist members mix-up their political loyalties and religious loyalties, together. To sum-up, they bring their church members to our party meeting around election period, when we refuse them entry into our meeting, they come the next Sunday to threaten us with machetes, can you imagine here in London people behaving like that?"*¹⁴⁵⁶. This statement, therefore, indicates that diasporans can often be viewed as promoters of democratic principles via their transnational engagement and championing democratic principles.

As was noted by Mr. Abdul Saaka during an interview in London who is a Pioneer generation participant within Ghanaian political party in London, claimed that the New Generation members of the NPP Party branch in London, often been associate their participation in diaspora politics with an agenda of positioning themselves strategically for political visibility vis-à-vis homeland politics¹⁴⁵⁷. *Within this New Generation members of our party here in London is a mixture of small pioneer members and majority "opportunist members", who are most often interested in advancing their political career back home. Their actions are all calculated"*¹⁴⁵⁸. An example of such was the former Bawku Central MP, who was an active member of

¹⁴⁵⁶ Field work interview Mr. Saaka, London 27 December 2012

¹⁴⁵⁷ Field work interview Mr. Saaka, London 27 December 2012

¹⁴⁵⁸ Field work interview Mr. Saaka, London 27 December 2012

the NPP party in London in the early 2000s, his active engagement within the party branch in London enabled him to gain visibility among the rank and file of the party in Ghana¹⁴⁵⁹. This in turn paved the way for him to stand as an MP on the ticket of the NPP party. Mr Dramani, who became an MP for Bawku central, was later convicted of being in possession of multiple citizenship and was found guilty by the fast-track Court for violating one of Ghana's constitutional rules¹⁴⁶⁰. The Ghanaian constitution prohibits anyone vying for public office and civil servants from holding any other citizenship other than Ghanaian. At the time of Mr. Dramani's election, he was found holding both British, Burkinabé and Ghanaian passports, which automatically disqualifies him as far as the Ghanaian constitution is concerned¹⁴⁶¹. The Ghanaian Constitution currently prohibits dual citizens to hold political office in Ghana. The dual citizenship debate is one of the political mantles of the NPP Party members in London advocating in their transnational political activities for the Ghanaian state to abrogate this constitutional Law to allow diasporans with dual citizenship to fully participate in Ghanaian democratic governance.

In a similar vein on Ghanaian political party transnational engagement in London, an aspiring MP from the diaspora equally member of NPP UK, Kwame, whose active participation as a party member in London paved the way for him to gain political visibility back home in Ghana. This in turn aided his party the NPP, putting him forward as a parliamentary candidate for a local constituency during the 2016 general elections¹⁴⁶². Although, he lost his bid of becoming an MP, this gave him visibility within the circle of the Party back home in Ghana¹⁴⁶³. This visibility has contributed to him being appointed by the government for a position within the Ghanaian financial institutions. The current Mayor of Tamale, Musah Iddrisu, was once a highly active member of the NPP party branch in London. His active participation in the diaspora equally gave him a platform of political visibility and legitimacy as a party member in the diaspora and in Ghana. This visibility and legitimacy played a paramount role leading him to become the Mayor of Tamale

¹⁴⁵⁹ Field work interview with Adamu in Accra, March 15th 2012

¹⁴⁶⁰ Bawku Central MP, Adamu Dramani sentenced to two years imprisonment
<http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201207/91167.php>

¹⁴⁶¹ Bawku Central MP, Adamu Dramani sentenced to two years imprisonment
<http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201207/91167.php>

¹⁴⁶² Fieldwork interview with Kwame in London 4th March 2014

¹⁴⁶³ Fieldwork interview in London with Kwame, 4th March 2014

with a diaspora background¹⁴⁶⁴. Other members of the NPP party branch in London gave the following statement on their transnational political participation:

Kojo (a New generation party member) observes: *We are working very hard here in London, to raise funds and awareness for our mother party in Ghana. Obviously if our Party wins, I stand a chance of getting a political appointment of some sort in government. It is a way for me to put to use my experience on policy analysis in education*¹⁴⁶⁵.

Yaw (a New generation party member) notes: *Ghana needs professionals like us to return and help with development back home. Our engagement here politically is for Mother Ghana. The lack of professionals in the current government (NDC Government) calls for the need to do something to alleviate the country from this long phase of political and economic misery*¹⁴⁶⁶.

It is worth noting the personal profiles of the examples cited above are a mixture of longer-term and mid-term Ghanaian resident's migrants in London. Those who are longer term residents, meaning they have been in the UK for over 20-30 years, use their participation to rekindle their network back home, which in turn facilitate their return. For mid-term residents (they have been in the UK between 15 to 20 years or less), have more practical information of what is happening back home in Ghana, as in most cases they are the same who tend to travel back home. By visiting Ghana frequently permits them to utilise their dual position in both worlds to further establish either their political visibility with the main party in Ghana or capitalizing on their political network to advance their own personal and business interest in Ghana (getting the right contract for development project for example).

Active members of all the political party branches in London: NPP, NDC and CPP, made good use of their transnational engagement in the diaspora to pave the way for their political careers once in Ghana. These cited examples of NPP Party members such as Adamu Dramani, Kwame, and Musah Iddrisu. The former General Secretary of the Conventions People's Party CPP, Nii Armah Akomfrah, who was also an active member of CPP Party London chapter prior to returning to engage in active

¹⁴⁶⁴ Interview with Musah Iddrisu in London 20th July 2010

¹⁴⁶⁵ Field work interview Kojo, London, 20 December, 2012

¹⁴⁶⁶ Field work interview Yaw, London, 15 December 2012

politics in Ghana. The former Chairman of NDC Party UK branch Alex Segbefia, since returning to Ghana in 2009, held various government position including being appointed as the Minister of Health during the Mahama's regime. The NDC UK sent this message to congratulate him for his new position in government: *we commend His Excellency President John Dramani Mahama for recognising the potentials of our former chairman, Alex Segbefia and that his dedication, hard work and enormous passion for public service has paid off*¹⁴⁶⁷. In a similar development the NDC Party UK branch, again extended their gratitude to the former President Mahama for appointing the new deputy Ghana ambassador to China, Horace Ankrah, who was the immediate past chairman of the NDC Party UK branch. A communiqué from the party branch in London states: *"The NDC UK & Ireland Chapter are also grateful to His Excellency President Mahama for the appointment of our immediate past chairman, Mr Horace Ankrah as Deputy Ghana Ambassador to the Republic of China*¹⁴⁶⁸."

Their participation in transnational political activities position them as "brokers" or as "bridge builders" between both worlds, which in turn allows them to gain political visibility back home for those interested in returning to engage in frontline politics. The above images of members of Ghanaian political party branches in London protesting attests to the idea that active transnational political engagement equates to political visibility. Gaining visibility as diaspora political activist with their party chapters in the UK aids in lobbying for government position back home. For example, the current government has about 35 government appointees and presidential staffers who were members of the NPP party branches in the UK, the US and the Netherlands¹⁴⁶⁹. These are very active members of the party branches in the diaspora, they are highly qualified professionals and as such puts them in better position to lobby for a position in government. For those who are not interested in returning to frontline politics in Ghana when their party is in government, they put their experience to use in other government agencies and

¹⁴⁶⁷ The executive and membership of UK& Ireland Chapter of the National Democratic Congress have expressed joy over the appointment of their former chairman, Mr. Alex Segbefia as the substantive Minister of Health after having served as Deputy Minister of Defence.: <http://newsghana.com.gh/ndc-uk-ireland-happy-over-segbefias-appointment/>

¹⁴⁶⁸ <http://newsghana.com.gh/ndc-uk-ireland-happy-over-segbefias-appointment/>

¹⁴⁶⁹ Field work observation July 2017 in Accra, this was during President Akufo-Addo's speech during the Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit in Accra, 5-8 July 2017

institutions both in Ghana and Ghanaian diplomatic missions abroad.

All the above examples used their membership within Ghanaian political party branches in the UK to network and cultivate support within the party structures both in London and Accra, hence aiding to build their political careers once in Ghana. These cited examples testify the strong link that has always existed between diasporan elites and political engagement back in Ghana, as was noted in Part one of this thesis with the examples of historic Ghanaian political leaders and former presidents: Nkrumah, Busia, Kufuor, Mills, the current president Akufo-Addo and his vice-president Bawumia. These observations, therefore, demonstrates that the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement towards Ghana can be viewed in theory as a collective political action, but in practice these transnational engagements constitute of individuals positioning themselves for political careers based partly on personal interest. The Ghanaian example is not an isolated case, as this was equally observed in Senegal, Côte D'Ivoire and Mali, where their political elites, were at one-point party militant in their diasporan chapters in Paris, prior to returning to engage in politics back home in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal¹⁴⁷⁰.

In this sub-chapter, I have demonstrated that the transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora is practiced among educated first-generation, who constitute both pioneer and new generation both born in Ghana. Their transnational political participation is not a novelty as they were politically active in Ghana prior to emigrating to the UK. Their mode of transnational political engagement is via Ghanaian hometown associations, Ghanaian churches and Ghanaian diaspora professional associations in London, such mode of political participation is classified as unconventional and indirect mode of political participation. The direct and conventional mode of political participation is via membership of Ghanaian political party branches in London, which is articulated through active online political engagement, through protest in the streets of London each time a Ghanaian president is on an official visit. It was also argued here that the transnational space in the diaspora is being used as a platform for professionalising their political activism among individuals participation in Ghanaian political party branches in London.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Whitaker. E. 2011. art.cit.

As in doing so within the framework of collective action, they are equally positioning themselves strategically for political visibility back home. To this end, it therefore implies that transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London is both homogenous and heterogenous in terms of its practices.

The following chapter seeks to analyse the Ghanaian diaspora policies under various Ghanaian governments and transnational voting rights through the implementation of the Representation of People's Amendment Rights, ROPAA.

2.2. Transnational voting rights and Diaspora policies: A Constitutional review and implementation of ROPA Amendment Bill under NDC and NPP governments

Transnational voting rights for diasporans has long been a contentious issue for migrant sending countries. Lafleur (2012) notes that external voting rights of diaspora, in home-country elections is a central element to diasporan rights. Therefore, transnational voting rights might come with some ramifications for both sending states and receiving states, on migrant community cohesion. This could perturb integration process in host country and migrants' sense of belonging. Lafleur (2012) further observes that there are various conditions that origin countries place on citizens' rights to vote from abroad. He gives the following examples: *some countries require a citizen to be absent for a minimum period to participate in elections, while others exclude citizens deemed to have been absent for too long. Some only allow emigrant voting from certain countries, where there is a critical mass of emigrants*¹⁴⁷¹.

Lafleur indicates the factors that states consider before deciding to allow external voting rights, it is often a question of politics. In other words, what will the political impact for diaspora vote be on the various political parties' electoral fortunes? This question could equally be posed regarding the voting rights of the Ghanaian diaspora. Lafleur uses Mexico as an example in this regard, where its government appears to be trying to cherry-pick the type of voters able to participate through registration requirements and voting procedures that favour elites. Other reasons were that governments, in such countries also grapple with more practical issues of how to administer voting from abroad, the costs

¹⁴⁷¹ Lafleur, J.M. 2012, *Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas*. London: Routledge, Book Review, by Tova Wang, in *International Migration Review*, Volume 48, Number 2, June 2014

involved, and the need to prevent electoral fraud ¹⁴⁷². In the Ghanaian case, as noted already, the NDC Party currently in opposition and while the party was in government have always raised this point of electoral management and oversea electoral fraud as part of it concerns on extending voting rights to Ghanaians outside. This therefore shows the complex politics involved in homeland debates on according voting rights to its diaspora.

In this sub-section we will review diaspora policies and transnational voting rights under various Ghanaian governments. To what extent does past and present government view the diaspora vote as an important component of Ghana's democratic trajectory and the consolidation of democratic principles? How does that affect the implementation of diaspora policies both politically and economically? What are the challenges involved in implementing long distance voting rights for disenfranchised Ghanaians in the diaspora? In order to analyse policies on Ghanaian diaspora vote under past and present Ghanaian governments, it is important to start with a brief legislative background review of transnational voting Acts and the Ghanaian citizenship Act under NPP and NDC governments.

2.2.1 The debate and legislation on the Ghanaian Dual Citizenship Act and transnational voting Acts

*"I can understand why a Ghanaian in the diaspora will feel being disengaged in Ghanaian political process. But at the same time arguably, if you are not living in the country, you do not feel the consequences of your vote. Ghanaian living in Ghana live with the consequences of their votes. I welcome that Ghana now allows dual citizenship, which is a progress"*¹⁴⁷³.

The Ghanaian Dual Citizenship Act of 2000 was enacted in parliament in 2000 but

¹⁴⁷² Waterbury, M.A., 2010. Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, p.138.

¹⁴⁷³ Fieldwork Interview with Lord Paul Boateng London 20th August 2010

took effect in 2002. This set the process by which Ghanaians abroad could acquire a second nationality. The law also stipulates, that holders of dual citizenship cannot hold government positions, political positions and positions as civil servants. In other words, positions such as: Supreme Court Judges, Ambassadors, Cabinet Secretary, and Military Cadres, Member of Parliament (as was seen in the case of Adamu Dramani who was the first to violate this constitutional rule of holding multiple citizenship including both Ghanaian and British citizenships at the time he became an MP for Bawku Central). As such, the dual citizenship act allows Ghanaians in the diaspora to hold multiple citizenships, but refrains them from engaging in national politics etc... In addition to this, based on a clause in the 1992 constitution, dual national are not qualified to stand as members of parliament, diasporan groups have long been lobbying for this to change (Djaba, 2008).

After the recognition of dual citizenship in Ghana, a struggle for voting rights for Ghanaians in the diaspora emerged. In 2005, the NPP government under President Kufuor introduced the Representation of People's Amendment Law (ROPAL), which was to accord political franchise to Ghanaians living abroad. The enactment of the Bill sparked protests by the then opposition party the National Democratic Congress (NDC), who argued that overseas voting could not be monitored sufficiently and could be used to rig elections¹⁴⁷⁴. They also expressed concern over implementation cost (Oduro, 2009). The Bill's passage became possible in 2006, only when NDC lawmakers walked out of parliament and a vote was held in their absence¹⁴⁷⁵. According to Ghana's Electoral Commission logistics challenges prevented the implementation of ROPAL for the 2008 election and a victory of NDC in that contest meant that little was done to facilitate overseas voting anytime soon, since the NDC boycotted the adoption of the amendment in parliament and are not in favour of diaspora vote, as they deem diaspora vote will be in favour of the NPP Party abroad¹⁴⁷⁶.

Comparing Ghana, in this respect to other African countries, Ghana thus has a

¹⁴⁷⁴ Oduro, F., 2009. The quest for inclusion and citizenship in Ghana: challenges and prospects. *Citizenship Studies*, 13(6), p.629.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Whitaker, E 2011, The politics of home: dual citizenship and the African Diaspora, *International Migration Review*, Volume 45, Number 4

¹⁴⁷⁶ Oduro, F., 2009. The quest for inclusion and citizenship in Ghana: challenges and prospects. *Citizenship Studies*, 13(6), p.629.

restrictive approach to dual citizenship than Senegal. Emigrants have the right to naturalise abroad without losing their home countries nationality, Senegalese diaspora are not barred from holding public office because they are dual citizens¹⁴⁷⁷. For Ghanaian diasporans advocating for dual citizenship and transnational voting rights advances the argument that migrant civic rights help in building strong political and economic cohesions between migrants' communities abroad and their home countries. Djaba states that:

The Republic of Ghana has realized the economic benefits of dual citizenship and continues to encourage its citizens since December 1, 2002, to obtain dual citizenship. However, some of our fellow brothers and sisters are openly hostile to the idea of Ghanaians Living Abroad (GLAs) competing for political office. GLAs are yet to exercise their voting rights abroad as conferred by ROPAL Act of 2006¹⁴⁷⁸.

Djaba further notes: *It is in Ghana's best interest to have an individual who has dual citizenship as a Member of Parliament, especially at this time. Never before in the history of Ghana, has the need for international assistance become so urgent and essential. The need for change is apparent; the need to seek and identify individuals whose expertise and experiences transcend the day-to-day norms of the Ghanaian society is a responsibility, which all Ghanaians cannot afford to ignore. It is one thing to talk about fifty-one years of independence, and it is another to know that Ghana's years of national sovereignty have yet to match the scope of their national development. Currently, developments of road networks, water system, health care facilities, education system, telecommunication facilities, etc. would benefit from an open system where the minds and resources of GLAs are freely tapped. The endorsing or advocating the development of multiple national attachments should be viewed in terms of national development and economic strategy. Dual citizenship would help Ghanaian businessmen/women to transact and move freely, especially in and out of the United States, United Kingdom, other parts of the European Union, etc.¹⁴⁷⁹*

¹⁴⁷⁷ Whitaker. E 2011, Art.cit. p.38

¹⁴⁷⁸ Djaba. G. 2009 The Benefits of Dual Citizenship to the socio-economic and political development of Ghana:<http://pamgh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Benefits-of-Dual-Citizenship-to-the-socio-economic-and-political-development-of-Ghana.pdf>

¹⁴⁷⁹ Djaba. G. 2009 The Benefits of Dual Citizenship to the socio-economic and political development of Ghana: <http://pamgh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Benefits-of-Dual-Citizenship-to-the-socio-economic-and-political-development-of-Ghana.pdf>

On the benefit of dual citizenship and democratisation Djaba equally notes: *The ideals of Free Enterprise and Democracy are complementary. The development and sustenance of a strong middle class are essential to attaining stability and growth in Ghana. Dual citizenship has the ability to bring this about. The future seems to provide a great promise; Dual citizenship will help democratize the politics of Ghana. There are thousands of children born to Ghanaian nationals presently residing in the Diaspora. These children with their dual nationalities and exposures could help Ghana to navigate her destiny through the twenty-first century. Democracy indeed, is built on informed citizen participation, especially those who have lived and practiced it in developed countries. The ideal of democracy is meaningful participation of an engaged and informed citizenry. Dual Citizenship is undoubtedly, one of the ways to foster Ghana's future economic development*¹⁴⁸⁰.

In a discussion in August 2010 with the Former chief justice of Ghana Georgina Wood, who stated that “*since the constitution has approved of the diaspora vote, it is a question of time and organisation that needs to be put in place for its operationalisation to set-in. Since it will be the first time of organising external voting for Ghanaians abroad, therefore time is needed for such organisation to take place*”¹⁴⁸¹..

On the part of those against the Ghanaian dual citizenship and transnational voting rights being accorded to the diaspora states reasons such as national allegiances and security concerns. Whitaker (2011) highlights that security concerns may have motivated Citizenships Acts and identification of the Ghanaian government position for which dual nationals are not eligible, particularly those pertaining to the army, security apparatus and ambassadorial posts. Whitaker observes that these are sensitive positions for which national loyalty is important, and it is not unusual for governments to clarify citizenship question under these circumstances. Whitaker’s assertion is confirmed by the argument advanced by the NDC government in 2009, pointing to logistics and security challenges as some of the concerns in the delay of

¹⁴⁸⁰ Djaba. G. 2009. art.cit.

¹⁴⁸¹ Fieldwork data, discussion with Chief Justice Georgina Wood, 20th August 2010, London

implementing ROPA amendment ¹⁴⁸². All things being equal, there was no visible evidence to attest to such assertion being advanced by the NDC government about national security implication of dual citizenship holders and the possibility of being enemies of state to infiltrate the government apparatus ¹⁴⁸³. The NDC government position on according diasporans their rights to vote in Ghanaian politics transnationally is borne out of political position of the NDC party, which is less favourable of diaspora vote, as noted previous the NDC party views diaspora vote to be linked to the NPP party and therefore any effort to implement transnational voting rights of the diaspora will go against the NDC government and their political interest ¹⁴⁸⁴. Many Ghanaians in the diaspora in 2009 viewed this postulate on the restriction of their voting rights and the possibility to occupy positions in government as driven more by politics than national security concerns ¹⁴⁸⁵.

As was indicated in the introduction of this thesis and equally at the beginning of part two, the push for dual citizenship arose in the context of political liberalisation starting in the early 1990s. In 1992, in line with changes elsewhere in Africa, Rawlings's government oversaw the development of a new constitution that provided a framework for multiparty competition ¹⁴⁸⁶. To the disappointment of Ghanaians Living Abroad, who wanted to participate in the new system, the constitution did not recognise dual citizenship at that time ¹⁴⁸⁷.

With explicit and implicit advantages of incumbency, Rawlings won multiparty elections in both 1992 and 1996. In 2000, when Rawlings party was forced by term limit to step down, NDC was defeated and NPP's Kufuor took over power. Since then, Ghana has had electoral alternation shifting from one party to the other. For the Ghanaian diaspora, the demand for dual citizenship and the right to vote came from below, notes Whitaker (2011). In other words, from the diaspora particularly those in the UK and Canada (Rahemtullah, 2007). Whereas in contrast to Senegal demand for diaspora political engagement came from the top i.e. the Senegalese

¹⁴⁸² Ghana: Ropa-Dope: Why We Should Say No to NDC's Dangerous Propaganda, 14 February 2006, Opinion by Daniel Dugan, on All Africa online.: <https://allafrica.com/stories/200602150349.html>

¹⁴⁸³ ROPAB cannot be implemented in 2008, 14 February 2016, Ghanaweb.com:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ROPAB-cannot-be-implemented-in-2008-99332>

¹⁴⁸⁴ Oduro.F.. 2009.Art. Cit. p.629

¹⁴⁸⁵ Arthur.J. 2008.opt.cit p.110

¹⁴⁸⁶ Whitaker.E. 2011. art.cit. p765

¹⁴⁸⁷ Whitaker.E. 2011. art.cit. p765

political elites mostly in France, who also constitute the majority of those who return with qualifications, which puts them in a position to occupy key government posts¹⁴⁸⁸. As a result, an increasing number of Senegalese political elites are dual citizens, including Senegal's first president Léopold Sédar Senghor¹⁴⁸⁹.

In recent years, debate about political rights of the Ghanaian diaspora has taken partisan dimension, as was stated above in the chapter on transnational political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London via Ghanaian political party branches in London. After the 2000 election, which resulted in the transfer of power from NDC to NPP, Kufuor embraced the recently passed dual citizenship measure. He reached out to Ghanaians Living Abroad (GLA) in his inaugural speech, recognising the efforts of the diaspora to end the NDC's dominance: "*I must acknowledge the contributions made by our compatriots who live outside the country... Many of you do more than send money home, many of you have kept up a keen interest in the affairs at home and some of you have been part of the struggle of the past twenty years*" (Kufuor, 2001b). The NPP government subsequently took proactive stance towards the diaspora (Mohan, 2006), implementing the dual citizenship provision and introducing the Bill to allow Ghanaians abroad to vote. This record contributes to the fear among NDC politicians, that the overseas voting would be used to strengthen the NPP's hold on power, fuelling the resistance to amend ROPA Law in 2006 (Oduro, 2009). It is evident that both major Ghanaian political parties are looking to expatriates Ghanaians for votes and, perhaps more importantly, campaign contributions¹⁴⁹⁰.

According to those who opposed it, the system to be adopted could not be monitored because of the lack of logistics and the human resource capital to monitor the process world-wide¹⁴⁹¹.

The opposition party NDC MP Mr Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, who also doubles as a ranking member on foreign affairs committee in Parliament, stated the Party's position on the implementation of the Representation of People Amendment Act, 2006, (Act 699). noted: *The National Democratic Congress (NDC) is not in support of the Electoral*

¹⁴⁸⁸ Whitaker.E. 2011. Art.cit. p765

¹⁴⁸⁹ Ibidem

¹⁴⁹⁰ Oduro.F.. 2009.Art. Cit. p.629

¹⁴⁹¹ Oduro.F.. 2009.Art. Cit. p.629

*Commission's (EC) plan to pilot the implementation of the Representation of People Amendment Act (ROPAA) in the 2020 elections*¹⁴⁹². Mr. Ablakwa raised concerns about the cost and logistics involved in organising overseas voting: *regarding funding of elections in the Diaspora about 60 per cent of the country's election cost was financed by the donor agencies and international partners. Additionally, I am therefore against the suggestion, that Ghanaian Ambassadors in missions abroad would serve as Returning Officers for the EC, because those ambassadors are political appointees with some already showing their political partiality and, thus, could not trust the genuineness of the election outcome. The party also disagrees with the proposal that Ghana's embassies abroad should lead the registration of eligible Ghanaians in the Diaspora to vote, which was against Article 45 of the 1992 Constitution*¹⁴⁹³.

Another reason opposition NDC objected to the ROPA amendment and the establishment of a Ministry and Minister for diaspora Affairs (as is the case in Senegal and Mali) observed that a Minister for Diasporas Affairs for individuals who do not live in the country and are not affected by policies taken on their behalf, does not make much sense for the establishment of such a ministry due to their absence¹⁴⁹⁴.

In line with a similar development, Lafleur states: *avez été élu en Australie et que les sessions parlementaires se déroulent à Rome, il est difficile de demeurer en contact avec le terrain, de rendre régulièrement des comptes à son électeurat. Les migrants considèrent souvent qu'une fois élus, ils ne savent pas ce que leurs candidats font à Rome. C'est la difficulté inhérente à un tel système, mais il donne une représentation directe aux migrants*¹⁴⁹⁵ ». With Ghanaian diaspora mobilised around these issues and partisan division emerging, it will be interesting to see how these debates are solved amongst the competing political parties in Ghana. Since Ghanaian diaspora policies has always taken a partisan approach from Nkrumah's CPP government to the current NPP government under president Akufo-Addo. Below is a brief review of Ghanaian

¹⁴⁹² Akweitech-Allotey.G. 2019. Ghana not ready for ROPAA in 2020 election – Ablakwa, Citi News Room website, 14 March 2019: <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/03/ghana-not-ready-for-ropaa-in-2020-election-ablakwa/>

¹⁴⁹³ Akweitech-Allotey.G. 2019. Ghana not ready for ROPAA in 2020 election – Ablakwa, Citi News Room website, 14 March 2019: <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/03/ghana-not-ready-for-ropaa-in-2020-election-ablakwa/>

¹⁴⁹⁴ Fieldwork interview London, NDC UK member name withheld

¹⁴⁹⁵ Lafleur. J.M. 2012, *Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas*. London: Routledge, Book Review, by Tova Wang, in *International Migration Review*, Volume 48, Number 2, June 2014

diaspora policies under previous government, this is aid in understanding how diaspora policies began with partisan positions as early as post independent Ghana under Nkrumah.

A.1. Ghanaian diaspora policy under Nkrumah and Rawlings era

Since independence, Ghana has two diasporas, the Black Atlantic diaspora which is composed of African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans and the Ghanaian diaspora and therefore Ghana has two diaspora policies, one for the Atlantic diaspora and the other for the Ghanaian diaspora. As such, the politicisation of Ghanaian diaspora policies, takes its roots from policies adopted by past governments dating as far back to post-independence era. This is translated in the policies and measures Nkrumah and Rawlings took towards the Black Atlantic diaspora. In the case of Nkrumah, Ghanaian migrants abroad were not many in numbers and had not stayed long enough to form a strong diaspora, such as Ghanaian diaspora associations and professional diaspora group. More importantly, it was post-independence era therefore, Nkrumah turned to the African-American and Caribbean diaspora to form his “unofficial diaspora” policy between 1958-1966. His “unofficial” diaspora policy took shape in inviting qualified African American and Caribbean diasporans from the United States, United Kingdom and Commonwealth Caribbean to return to Ghana to help with its development¹⁴⁹⁶. These invitations were equally in the spirit of Nkrumah’s pan Africanism ideology and Nkrumah’s support of the civil rights movements in the US. Some of the Black Atlantic diasporas that Nkrumah invited were people with whom he had studied with or frequented during his stay as a student in the US and UK. As highlighted in earlier chapters in part one of the thesis on Nkrumah’s time abroad, this shaped his political consciousness and his ties with the Black Atlantic diaspora and as such paved the way in influencing his diaspora policies.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Kleist. N 2013. Art. Cit. pp.289

Figure 0-88: Images Ghanaian Diaspora Policies under Nkrumah and Rawlings



Nkrumah diaspora policy targeted at the African American community 1960



Rawlings Panafest festival for Africans in the diaspora 1992

Rawlings's diasporan policy between 1982-2000 on the other hand, was formed strategically. First under his Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) a military junta government from 1982-1992 and later Rawlings established the National Democratic Congress Party (NDC) which was in power between 1992-2000. By the early 1990s, Ghana had lost much of its population to outward migration, meaning by then there were enough Ghanaians outside of the country who had stayed long enough to form a diasporic community and various forms of Ghanaian diaspora associations including political party¹⁴⁹⁷. That diaspora community also constituted a political component and an opposition voice outside of Ghana. Their presence was apparent mainly in cities such as: London, Washington, Berlin and Amsterdam where members of the opposition party often staged protests against Rawlings government's authoritarian rule and the government's poor human rights record¹⁴⁹⁸. As a result, in order to avoid according transnational voting rights to Ghanaians abroad, Rawlings, diaspora policy was deliberately and strategically made towards the transatlantic Black diaspora and as such focused his diaspora policies mainly on heritage tourism for African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans.

This saw Rawlings government's support for Dr. Efua Sutherland's initiative of the Pan African Historical Theatre Festival (Panafest) in 1992, as shown in the above image. PANAFEST 1992 was officially opened by Rawlings, in his welcome address he

¹⁴⁹⁷ Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S.O., Ababio, O-M. & R. Tiemoko (2003) 'Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper' Working Paper C4 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty: 2-38

¹⁴⁹⁸ Fieldwork interview with Mohammed Abudul-Saaka, in London in March 2014

indicated that the festival marked the beginning of a movement with "great source of cultural enrichment for all Africans at home and abroad"¹⁴⁹⁹."

Between 1992 to 1994, Rawlings personally graced the festival, professors of African studies from the diaspora were invited to give speeches that resonated with the spirit of Pan Africanism¹⁵⁰⁰. The euphoria generated from PANAFEST was important, and that the Rawlings administration aggressively promoted the festival and made it an annual indispensable event for Diasporan Africans wishing to connect with Africa as their homeland¹⁵⁰¹. Prof. Esi Sutherland (the daughter of Dr. Efu Sutherland) indicated during a discussion in Accra in 2018 that through cultural activities bringing together artist from the Black diaspora to connect with local artist, PANAFEST also had similar role to lead the African diaspora, particularly the descendants of slave ancestors back to their real roots¹⁵⁰². The Panafest organisation has since established itself as non-partisan organisation, suggesting that the organisation has a working partnership with the Ghanaian state, as such both NDC and NPP governments' supports initiatives of the organisation on issues pertaining to the Atlantic diaspora, its history and linkages with Ghana¹⁵⁰³.

Rawlings diaspora engagement should be seen in the context of neoliberalism both globally and in Ghana, (Hasty 2002, Pierre 2013). Both Nkrumah and Rawlings linked Pan Africanism with national development to their diaspora policies. While Nkrumah's policy vision was explicitly political, Rawlings's diaspora policy via Pan-Africanism focuses on heritage tourism and has been characterised as a distinctively neoliberal and depoliticized version (Pierre 2013: 65).

Since 2001 various ministries and government agencies have been tasked with initiatives on diaspora affairs. Ministries such as: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Tourism. Government agencies such as the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Immigration services all have dedicated desk on diaspora and return migration issues¹⁵⁰⁴. The Ministry of Finance has dealings with migration through the Bank of Ghana. The Bank of Ghana oversees remittances as

¹⁴⁹⁹ History of Panafest, on Panafest website: <https://www.panafestghana.org/page/?id=2387>

¹⁵⁰⁰ Ibidem

¹⁵⁰¹ Ibidem

¹⁵⁰² Discussion with Prof. Esi Sutherland on the history of PANAFEST, 5th November 2018

¹⁵⁰³ Ibidem

¹⁵⁰⁴ Field work data 2011-2018, Accra, Ghana

an integral component of price stabilisation, collects financial data from other banks on total remittances, and monitors, analyses and makes data available on cash remittances from Ghanaian migrants abroad¹⁵⁰⁵. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning launched the Golden Jubilee bond in 2007, in commemoration of Ghana's 50-year anniversary¹⁵⁰⁶. Ghanaians in the diaspora were particularly targeted to invest in the country through bond purchases¹⁵⁰⁷. The Ministry of Tourism's (previously termed Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations) core policy function includes developing tourism infrastructure and human resources, marketing Ghana as a preferred tourism destination, using tourism as a tool for creating wealth to help reduce poverty, and making policies and programmes that acknowledge and address the essential role played by the Ghanaian diaspora in Ghana's development¹⁵⁰⁸.

A.2. Ghanaian diaspora policies under Kufuor, Mills and Mahama

The approach to the Black Atlantic diaspora policies continued, during the Kufuor regime 2000-2008, thus limited, as more emphasis was placed on developing a distinctive policy for Ghanaian diaspora itself. Since the first Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit in 2001, which was established under Kufuor's regime more policies have been initiated with regards to the Ghanaian diaspora. This was to recognise and place the Ghanaian diaspora policies at the heart of the country's economic and political affairs. President Kufuor's diaspora policies for Ghanaians abroad, stemmed from the fact, during the years that the NPP party was in opposition much of the support both financially and politically came from their members in the diaspora as highlighted previously on the Ghanaian diaspora political participation via Ghanaian political party branches in the diaspora. The political support that the NPP Party received from its diaspora chapter, meant that when the Party assumed power in 2000 after nearly twenty years in opposition the NPP party deemed it normal to introduce a policy that includes the diaspora. This took shape in NPP's effort of ensuring that ROPA amendment was enacted in parliament in 2006 while

¹⁵⁰⁵ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. *Diaspora and migration policy and institutional frameworks Ghana country report*.p.9

¹⁵⁰⁶ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. Art.cit. p.9p.9

¹⁵⁰⁷ Ibidem

¹⁵⁰⁸ ibidem

the NPP party was still in power¹⁵⁰⁹. The Representative of the People Amendment Bill (ROPAB) was introduced in Parliament to amend the representation of the People's Law of 1992 PDNC Law 284¹⁵¹⁰. The ROPAA, Act 2006, ACT 699 was therefore passed in 2006 to extend the right of vote for Ghanaians abroad to participate in public elections and referenda¹⁵¹¹. This bond with Ghanaians in the diaspora and the NPP Party was not surprising when, Kufuor's government made strides in incorporating the diaspora within national politics.

On Kufuor's policies towards the Atlantic diaspora, saw the initiation of the *Joseph Project*, which was set-out to make Ghana a spiritual home for the Black Atlantic diasporans to return and connect with the motherland, this is in alignment with Nkrumah and Rawlings Black Atlantic diaspora policies¹⁵¹².

In order to legitimise and institutionalise the Joseph Project in 2004 a four-day conference, organised by the Ghana Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations, under the theme, *"The Transatlantic Slave Trade- Landmarks, Legacies and Expectations"*¹⁵¹³, marks part of the proclamation of 2004, as the international year to mark the struggle against slavery and its abolition by the United Nations General Assembly. The Vice President of the time, the late Aliu Mahama stated at the conference that: *"The true story of the slave trade can no longer be suppressed or swept under the carpet. While we still search for the truth, we should at the same time, attempt to find the medicine to heal the deep wounds and scars that have been inflicted by the slave trade. Ghana supported UNESCO's quest for a "healing process that would mollify the bitterness among Africans and people of African descent". The only way to heal the wounds of this unparalleled tragedy is to ensure that we avoid its recurrence in any form. Therefore, calling for the reintegration and relocation of Africans in the Diaspora to the motherland, saying Ghana would lead the way through the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the ECOWAS. This is to adopt a common approach in inviting our*

¹⁵⁰⁹ Representative of People's Amendment Bill, Ghana Parliament Documents on the Parliament's website : <https://www.parliament.gh/docs?type=Bills&OT&filter=Representative%20of%20people%20Amendment%20Bill#>

¹⁵¹⁰ Representative of People's Amendment Bill, Ghana Parliament Documents on the Parliament's website : <https://www.parliament.gh/docs?type=Bills&OT&filter=Representative%20of%20people%20Amendment%20Bill#>

¹⁵¹¹ Ibidem

¹⁵¹² Kleist. N 2013. Art. Cit. pp.290

¹⁵¹³ Trans-Atlantic Conference Ghana 30 August 2004: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Trans-Atlantic-Slave-Trade-Conference-opens-65085>

*brothers and sisters in the diaspora to relocate to their roots*¹⁵¹⁴.

In sum, Kufuor's diaspora policies were both economically, politically and symbolically motivated, by including the Ghanaian diaspora at the heart of political affairs in Ghana through the enactment of the ROPA amendment, economically to facilitate policies for Ghanaians residing abroad to return and invest in Ghana. Symbolically and economically, with the inception of the *Joseph Project* as a form of heritage tourism to attract the Black Atlantic diaspora to visit Ghana.

As part of the government's initiative to amend parts of the 1992 constitution, a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was instituted in 2010 under the NDC government led by President Mills to take into account views from Ghanaians for the amendment of parts of the constitution¹⁵¹⁵. According to Dr. Raymond Atuguba the executive secretary of the Constitutional Review Commission indicated that as part of its mandate, the CRC reached out to the Ghanaian Diaspora for its input for the review of the Constitution¹⁵¹⁶. Dr. Atuguba further noted that the Commission took into account avenues to enable Ghanaians in the diaspora to engage in transnational practices in Ghana's democratic governance. And as such this is through enabling Ghanaians in the diaspora to participate in Ghanaian politics transnationally.

In 2012, the United Nations agency for Migration, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Mission in Ghana and the Ghanaian authorities organised a colloquium on migration thematic in Ghana under the NDC government of Mills and Mahama. To this effect, the Mill-Mahama NDC led government between 2009-2016; have continued their diaspora engagement policies through the NDC legacy, which has been more touted towards engaging the Ghanaian diaspora from an economic angle and not political. The NDC government cites the cost of monitoring overseas vote as being one of the primary reasons in the delay to the implementation of the ROPA Amendment¹⁵¹⁷. Therefore, the diaspora colloquium organised in 2012 an initiative and a drive by IOM Ghana and the Government of Ghana. It brought

¹⁵¹⁴ Trans-Atlantic Conference Ghana 30 August 2004:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Trans-Atlantic-Slave-Trade-Conference-opens-65085>

¹⁵¹⁵ Interview with Dr. Raymond Atuguba, Executive Secretary of the Constitutional Review Commission, 12 June 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Raymond Atuguba, Executive Secretary of the Constitutional Review Commission, 12 June 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵¹⁷ Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs holds Public Forum, Ghana Parliament website published 13 June 2016:

<https://www.parliament.gh/news?CO=1>

together Ghanaians from the diaspora to meet and discuss with authorities in Ghana, on how to encourage diasporans to engage effectively in national development and discuss policies on returning to Ghana. The NDC government in a way seized this opportunity at the colloquium to advance their Ghanaian diaspora policy based on economic and human resource engagement and not political as opposed to the NPP Party. This however translates the different approaches to diaspora policies of the NDC government and the NPP government, where one party sees the diaspora as a political asset and the other views the diaspora as a political threat. To this end, the IOM Mission in Ghana assisted the Government of Ghana in 2012 to establish the first Diaspora Affairs Unit attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁵¹⁸. It served as a one stop-shop institutional body for Ghanaians in the diaspora seeking information on matters relating to returning home. With the establishment of the Diaspora Support Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ghana, a diaspora affairs desk was set up at Ghanaian diplomatic missions abroad to facilitate and harness diaspora potentials for homeland development¹⁵¹⁹. This observation, therefore, reinforces the idea that Ghanaian diaspora policies are highly political, as it took the IOM mission in Ghana to collaborate with the Ghanaian government to establish in 2012 the first institutional body to represent the Ghanaian diaspora in Ghana¹⁵²⁰. In line with the Atlantic diaspora policies, the then outgoing president Mahama, in December 2016 granted Ghanaian citizenship to thirty-four members of the African American community residing in Ghana¹⁵²¹. In his speech to the African-American community, President Mahama states: *The approval of citizenship to the African-American community in Ghana was a demonstration of the Pan-African spirit, following in the footsteps of Ghana's first President Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and W.E.B Dubois, that Pan-Africanism remains an integral part of Ghana's foreign Policy*¹⁵²². This statement demonstrates once again that diaspora

¹⁵¹⁸ Field work data, IOM Ghana diaspora colloquium, August 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵¹⁹ Field work data, IOM Ghana diaspora colloquium, August 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵²⁰ Ibidem

¹⁵²¹ President Mahama grants 34 African-Caribbean diasporans Ghanaian citizenship, 29 December 2016: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/34-african-caribbean-diasporans-granted-ghanaian-citizenship.htm>

¹⁵²² President Mahama grants 34 African-Caribbean diasporans Ghanaian citizenship, 29 December 2016: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/34-african-caribbean-diasporans-granted-ghanaian-citizenship.htm>

policies under the NDC government had strong ties to Pan-African ideology that Nkrumah and Rawlings advanced as their main policy orientation vis-à-vis the Ghanaian diaspora and the African diaspora in general.

Figure 0-89: Ghanaian Diaspora policies under Kufuor and Mills governments



Kufuor's Homecoming summit for Ghanaians in the diaspora 2001

Mills diaspora engagement project 2012

A.3 Ghanaian diaspora policies under President Akufo-Addo 2017-2019

Diaspora policies of the current government takes form in implementation phases of NPP policies on Ghanaian and the Black Atlantic diasporas. The NPP party and government policies on Ghanaian diaspora as stated previously in this chapter, saw President Kufuor's regime's enactment of the Representation of People's Amendment Act ROPA in 2006, which is yet to be implemented. The current NPP government led by President Akuffo-Addo made his presidential campaign promises in 2016 in London that: *"if elected as president, I pledge to involve Ghanaians living abroad in the development of the country both politically and economically. Under my tenure as president, I will ensure that the Representation of People's Amendment Act ROPA is implemented to allow disenfranchised Ghanaians in the diaspora to vote¹⁵²³".* This above promise made to the Ghanaian community in London in 2016 as part of his campaign pledge to Ghanaians in the diaspora, saw the establishment in 2017 of a new Diaspora Affairs Bureau at the Office of the President. It is the first diaspora bureau established by a ruling government and being hosted at the Office of the President with the sole mandate to deal with diaspora

¹⁵²³ 'Akufo Addo for 2016' Campaign hits London Diasporan News of Tuesday, 24 June 2014: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-for-2016-Campaign-hits-London-314039>

related issues. The establishment of the Diaspora Affair Bureau at the Office of the president is a direct indication of the president's commitment to the Ghanaian Diaspora. This commitment to the Ghanaian diaspora by the president was echoed at the second Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit, held between 5-8 July 2017 in Accra, (the first Ghana diaspora Homecoming Summit was organised by the NPP government under President Kufuor tenure in office in 2001). The theme of the 2017 Homecoming summit states: *Development, Opportunity and Value: Welcome home*¹⁵²⁴. The summit's mission statement indicates: *Our mission is to enhance sustainable mechanisms supporting and promoting full Diaspora participation in Ghana's development*¹⁵²⁵. The agenda of the summit covered various themes including business opportunities for investment in Ghana, discussion and debate arose on the political inclusion of Ghanaians living abroad. At the Homecoming Summit the president addressed participants by indicating that: *"I was once a member of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK and France therefore, I do understand your pleas. I however, urge you to return and help us with your expertise and experience in my government's efforts to build a better Ghana*¹⁵²⁶". The president further noted that Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit has afforded Government: *"the opportunity to listen, at first-hand, the concerns, suggestions and opinions of overseas Ghanaians on the development of our country. We know from the examples of several countries what fruitful collaboration between their overseas nationals and their governments has enabled national development and prosperity, therefore my government intends to emulate similar collaborations for our overseas citizens*¹⁵²⁷".

The creation of a new Diaspora Bureau at the Office of the president and organising a second Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit both in 2017 at the very start of the president's first term in office are signs that indicates the important role that the government accords to diaspora affairs in his government. It is also an indication that the

¹⁵²⁴ Field work data, from the Ghana diaspora Home Coming Summit 5-8 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵²⁵ Field work data, from the Ghana diaspora Home Coming Summit 5-8 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵²⁶ President's Speech at the Ghana Diaspora Home Coming Summit, Fieldwork observation data, 5-8 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵²⁷ President's Speech at the Ghana Diaspora Home Coming Summit, Fieldwork observation data, 5-8 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

NPP government is in the process of institutionalising Ghanaian diaspora policies from a political point view. To organise a second diaspora Homecoming Summit 2017 as a follow-up to what was organised in 2001 and equally with the New Diaspora Affairs Bureau at the Office of the president. These new diaspora initiatives are clear signals of the NPP party's efforts in making Ghanaian diaspora policies as an important component of the government's policies and the party's policies. On the political involvement of the Ghanaian Diaspora, in 2018 the Electoral Commission of Ghana, inaugurated a Consultative Committee on the implementation of the ROPPA Amendment Act¹⁵²⁸. The consultative committee is made-up of nine-member representatives: The Electoral Commission, the Peace Council of Ghana, Civil Society Organisations, Academia and representatives of all the major political parties in Ghana¹⁵²⁹. According to the chairperson of the Electoral Commission Mrs Jean Mensa: *“The Committee shall commence sitting in January 2019 and shall present its final report to the commission by May 31, 2019. We will undertake desk research on countries that are implementing overseas voting rights and how it was implemented. The committee will pay working visits to countries already practicing external voting namely, Mali, South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom. This working group mandate is to seek the opinions of key stakeholders on the best approach to the implementation of ROPAA*¹⁵³⁰. The Electoral Commissioner pointed out that: *the implementation of ROPAA requires that the Commission puts together regulations, in the form of a Constitutional Instrument (CI), to regulate the registration of voters and the conduct of elections in foreign countries*¹⁵³¹.

Mrs Mensa indicated that at the end of the work of the ROPAA Consultative and Implementation Committee, a technical group would be constituted to draft regulations for external voting and would eventually be passed into by Parliament by the close of December 2019¹⁵³². The efforts of the current government in involving the Ghanaian

¹⁵²⁸ EC inaugurates ROPAA Consultative Committee, published on Ghana Web 21 December 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/EC-inaugurates-ROPAA-Consultative-Committee-710459>

¹⁵²⁹ Ibid

¹⁵³⁰ EC inaugurates ROPAA Consultative Committee, published on Ghana Web 21 December 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/EC-inaugurates-ROPAA-Consultative-Committee-710459>

¹⁵³¹ EC inaugurates ROPAA Consultative Committee, published on Ghana Web 21 December 2018: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/EC-inaugurates-ROPAA-Consultative-Committee-710459>

¹⁵³² Ibidem

diaspora in nation building and Ghanaian political governance confirms the notion that the NPP party has always been pro diaspora political policies. These efforts further consolidate the NPP Party's positions in the annals of Ghana's history to be the first Party to put in measures for enacting an amendment in favour of Ghanaian diaspora external voting and as such ensuring the implementation process of the amendment. In an unexcepted turn of events, recently some leading members of the opposition party NDC are voicing out their support for the implementation of the ROPA amendment Act, which the opposition Party NDC was previously hostile to its implementation process¹⁵³³. Leading NDC party members such as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hannah Tettey, the former Minister of Health Alex Segbfia and the former Minister of Defence Benjamin Kunbuor all support the idea of the ROPA being implemented, although they have reservation on logistics aspects of the implementation process. That notwithstanding, they all agree on the principal of according diaspora vote to be beneficial for Ghana's democratic process, and therefore it should not be based on partisan politics¹⁵³⁴. This change of view on the part of the opposition party NDC on diaspora voting rights, is motivated by the fact that the NDC party now has a strong diaspora branches abroad, (this was illustrated in earlier chapter where we saw NDC UK branch members protesting against President Kufuor in 2007, President Akuffo-Addo during his state visit to UK in 2018,2019 and 2020) therefore supporting an NPP government policy on diaspora vote, is equally beneficial to the NDC party as members of their diaspora chapters will be able to vote if the amendment is successfully implemented.

This therefore implies that Ghanaian diaspora voting rights is progressively becoming institutionalised as a constitutional instrument and therefore no longer affiliated to bi-partisan politics which has long engulfed Ghanaian political debate since 2006. With this in mind, other leading figures of the NDC party are questioning the logistics and structures that will be put in place for this to be fair and feasible. Mr Ablakwa an NDC MP and member of Foreign Affairs Parliamentary committee highlighted that there was an issue of mistrust among party members on the implementation of ROPAA: *"In my*

¹⁵³³ Participants at consultative meeting oppose ROPAA implementation:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Participants-at-consultative-meeting-oppose-ROPAA-implementation-725846>

¹⁵³⁴ ROPAA Committee inaugurated to implement road map: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-ropaa-committee-inaugurated-to-implement-road-map.html>

*honest view, I think Ghana is not ready for ROPAA implementation in 2020 election, but I support the principle, and I'm in solidarity with Ghanaians in the Diaspora and everywhere ...I want a peaceful election determined by Ghanaians in Ghana and the limited ones who have been voting from the Diaspora – student on scholarship, those working in the United Nations institutions and workers in Ghana's Embassies. Stakeholders must dispassionately discuss the matter without looking through the lenses of the NDC and the NPP. The country should not ignore the real challenges in the ROPAA implementation and consolidation of all the laws on elections, especially those that bothered on the Diaspora Voting. There is a need for the nation to set its priorities right and adopt a scientific approach towards the operationalisation of ROPAA. This could be enhanced by looking at the cost evaluation and how much would be required to fully implement the law*¹⁵³⁵.

For some NDC members, ROPAA implementation should be extended to all countries abroad and not only countries in the diaspora with strong NPP supporters and sympathisers. This view was echoed by the NDC Deputy General Secretary, Mr Peter Boamah Otokunor: *if the government and the Electoral Commission perceived that as an opportunity to let only living places where the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) supporters dominated to vote, to swing elections in NPP's favour; then they were grossly wrong. According to the Party, so far as it was concerned, every Ghanaian living everywhere on earth must be afforded the opportunity to vote in the national elections*¹⁵³⁶.

The current government diaspora's policies include the Black Atlantic diaspora, as an extension of the Joseph Project launched in 2007 under the NPP government of President Kufuor's administration on making Ghana the spiritual home for the Black Atlantic diasporas to return. In September 2018 in Washington DC, on a working visit to the US, President Akufo-Addo formally launched "*The Year of Return, Ghana 2019*", for Africans in the diaspora, giving fresh impetus to the quest to unite Africans in the diaspora

¹⁵³⁵ Akweitech-Allotey.G 2019, Ghana not ready for ROPAA in 2020 election – Ablakwa, published 14 March 2019, on Citi Room News website: <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/03/ghana-not-ready-for-ropaa-in-2020-election-ablakwa/>

¹⁵³⁶ "Implementation of ROPAA should be on "Everywhere or nowhere" principle" – NDC, published on Business Ghana website on 8 January 2019: <https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/politics/179355/Implementation-of-ROPAA-should-be-on-Everywhere-or-nowhere-principle-NDC>

to their brothers and sisters in Ghana¹⁵³⁷. The Year of Return 2019 can be viewed as the revival and a continuation of the 2007 Joseph Project, being redesigned to attract the Black Atlantic diaspora. The government launched the project “Year of Return 2019” to commemorate 400 years (1619-2019) of the commencement of the Atlantic slave trade which started in 1500s but documentation and record keeping began in 1619¹⁵³⁸. It is important to stress here that record keeping and documentation of the Atlantic slave trade started well before 1619, however what is supposed to have happened in 1619 was the arrival of African slaves in British colonies of the West Indies and North America¹⁵³⁹. The Atlantic slave trade to the Spanish Colonies of North America began before 1619 and it is now well documented¹⁵⁴⁰. It is also worth noting that slave trade was already in practice in Northern Ghana during the 16th to the 19th century, for example the Salaga Slave market was one of the biggest slave markets in Africa before the European slave merchants commercialised it and that some Africans participated in capturing and selling slaves to European slave merchants. These policies on the Atlantic diaspora to some extent, obfuscate the fact that Africans played a part in delivering slaves to the European slave merchants. Although these policies in essence are sending a strong message to Atlantic diaspora to return to their ancestral home it is worth noting the historical role African chiefs played during the period of slave commerce in Africa. To this effect, the president’s statement to the African American community in the US notes: *Ghana’s Pan-African leadership and legacy status was earned not by coincidence but by a conscious effort to validate the struggles, strengths and links between African descendants on a Pan-African scale*¹⁵⁴¹.

In May 2019, it was announced by the director of Diaspora Affairs Office at the Presidency, Mr. Akwasi Awuah-Ababio that 200 African Americans and Caribbeans will be granted Ghanaian citizenship¹⁵⁴². According to Mr. Ababio, the decision to grant

¹⁵³⁷ Year of Return: Over 200 African Americans go get Ghanaian citizenship as part of celebrations: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-200-african-americans-to-get-ghanaian-citizenship.html>

¹⁵³⁸ Agyare-Yeboah.K, 2019 We need to talk about Ghana’s Year of Return and its politics of exclusion, published on Africa Argument: <https://africanarguments.org/2019/12/19/ghana-year-of-return-politics-of-exclusion/>

¹⁵³⁹ The slave voyages: <https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/database#statistics>

¹⁵⁴⁰ The slave Voyages: <https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/database#statistics>


¹⁵⁴¹ Tetteh.B. 2018. 2019: Year of return for African Diaspora - Ghana rolls out the red carpet to encourage resettlement in the motherland, published on Africa Renewal: <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora>

¹⁵⁴² Year of Return: Over 200 African Americans go get Ghanaian citizenship as part of celebrations:

citizenship to the African-American and the Caribbean community in Ghana, formed part of the Year of Return 2019 celebrations in Ghana¹⁵⁴³. Mr. Ababio further noted that *the celebration is dear to the president because it had the potential to put Ghana on the international map*¹⁵⁴⁴. As reiterated previously that in December 2016 president Mahama also granted 35 African-American Ghanaian citizenship before leaving office as president. This implies that Black Atlantic diaspora policies are enshrined within the Ghanaian political arena through the Pan-African narrative, which was equally observed under Nkrumah, Rawlings, Kufuor and Mahama governments.

All these efforts on diaspora policies are made in the effort to establish Ghana as the historic home of returnees. In a nutshell, the current government diaspora policies for both Ghanaians and the Atlantic diaspora can be viewed from the prisms of implementation policies of the NPP Party's landmark diaspora policies from 2001-2008, with the example of the enactment of ROPA in 2006 under an NPP regime, while 2019 marked the start of its implementation of the policy by an NPP government. The initiation of the Joseph Project by an NPP government in 2007 making Ghana the spiritual home of return for the Black Atlantic diaspora in the form of pilgrimage via heritage tourism to the country. The Year of Return 2019 can therefore, be viewed as a follower-up to the Joseph Project in marketing Ghana to the Black Atlantic diaspora as the home of their ancestors, therefore a place to reconnect and reconcile the Black Atlantic diaspora to their roots.

Figure 0-90: Image: Ghanaian diaspora policy under President Akuffo-Addo



Source: <http://www.ghanadiasporahs.org/>

<https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-200-african-americans-to-get-ghanaian-citizenship.html>

¹⁵⁴³ Ibidem

¹⁵⁴⁴ Year of Return: Over 200 African Americans go get Ghanaian citizenship as part of celebrations:

<https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-200-african-americans-to-get-ghanaian-citizenship.html>



Source: <https://www.movemeback.com/events/ghana-homecoming-summit-2017/>

Conclusion of chapter 2

This chapter has demonstrated the political making of the Ghanaian diaspora social composition and ties to political participation in UK politics, transnational political participation in Ghana. The debate on politics of transnational voting rights of the Ghanaian diaspora and other forms of diaspora policies. The analysis in this chapter also revealed how Ghanaian diaspora political participation in the UK and transnational engagement towards Accra is influenced by various variables such as: duration of stay of Ghanaian migrants in the UK, generational engagement of first-and-second-generations, social categorisation, educational attainment, accumulation of various forms capitals. In addition, the role that Ghanaian associations in London opens an avenue for indirect and unconventional form of political participation in the absence of not being able to exercise their transnational voting rights. It was also highlighted in this chapter the mode of direct and conventional forms of political participation in UK, being through membership of a political party in UK politics and membership of Ghanaian political party branches in the UK. I further analysed the characteristics and social profile of Black British politicians of Ghanaian descent who engage in British politics and how the Ghanaian diaspora political participation in the UK is within the framework of the Black and Minority Ethnic Group voting pattern. As such, this influence of voting among Ghanaians in UK politics based on communitarian influence was evident and was confirmed by the paradigm shift in the voting pattern of Ghanaian diaspora during the Brexit referendum vote. The motives behind those who engage in politics towards Ghana within Ghanaian associations and Ghanaian political party branches in London, was also analysed. These analyses illustrated that Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in the UK

and transnational political engagement towards Ghana is based on collective action and individual interest within a political group or within an association.

Examining the debate pertaining to transnational voting rights and various policies on Ghanaian diaspora under different governments showed, firstly that diaspora policies are not partisan with regards to the Black Atlantic Diaspora policies, and secondly some diaspora policies are very much partisan based particularly on the debate regarding the implementation of the ROPA amendment Act in reference to the Ghanaian diaspora. The following chapter seeks to analyse the political participation of returnees in Accra, this is to examine if there are any linkages or correlation between transnational political engagement in the diaspora and its influence on political participation upon return from the diaspora or not?

CHAPTER 3: HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF RETURN MIGRATION TO GHANA: Returning home to make a difference?

3.1. Conceptual Framework of return migration

Historically, return migration of Africans during colonial and post-colonial era (particularly at the period of independence) was often associated with being viewed as: *cultured* which is to mean that one is refined, exposed and civilized in Anglophone Africa; *évolué* in Francophone Africa to mean that one has evolved in absorbing French social and moral values, and in Lusophone Africa *Assimilado* to mean one has assimilated as a result of their stay abroad¹⁵⁴⁵. In other words, return migration has always been linked to returning home with some form of capital be it,

¹⁵⁴⁵ Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015 Africa's Return Migrants: The New Developers? Zed Books London, p.10

educational capital, social capital and economic capital. Return migrants in recent times are now assuming the role of “*brokers*”; “*bridge-builders*”; and “*go-betweeners*”; and using these acquired capitals to serve both worlds¹⁵⁴⁶.

Akesson et al. state that *Return, Returnees and stayers* are terms that dominate the conceptualization and analytical framework of the notion of return migration in Africa. In their opinion, the terms ‘return’ and ‘returnees’ tends to reinforce sedentary and essentialized understanding of migration, identity and belonging¹⁵⁴⁷. This reflects a mismatch between policy makers objectives and the realities of ongoing transnational movements of people¹⁵⁴⁸. According to Skeldon (2012) transnational returns and circular migrations are often the preferred strategy of many migrants. Transnational returns extend over a long period of time and involves much movements of back and forth between the country of origin and the host country, a requirement for this mode of return is often holding the citizenship of the host country to facilitate such movements (Eastmond 2006; Hansen 2007).

For Akesson et al., returnees are people with an inherent identification with and duty to assist an assumed ‘homeland’ and a partial return to a place where they once lived. They further note that: while many displays a strong identification with this place and call it homeland, they also often articulate strong feeling of estrangement towards homeland describing themselves as ‘outsiders’, as ‘different’ and ‘not really fitting in’¹⁵⁴⁹. Moreover, they also often identify themselves as and sometimes even mainly as – Europeans¹⁵⁵⁰. ‘Stayers’ on the other hand are identified as having a history of movement between places, ‘stayer’ moved, either internally between rural and urban areas or across borders without having to assume an identity as migrants (Akesson and Eriksson Baaz 2015:10).

Concepts such as “brain gain”, “brain bank”, “brain trust” and “brain circulation”¹⁵⁵¹ have gain currency recently, signalling a growing interest in finding ways to use diasporans

¹⁵⁴⁶ Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015 op.cit. p.10

¹⁵⁴⁷ Ibidem

¹⁵⁴⁸ Ibidem

¹⁵⁴⁹ Ibidem

¹⁵⁵⁰ Ibidem

¹⁵⁵¹ Kapur, D., 2001. Diasporas and technology transfer. *Journal of Human development*, 2(2), p.265.

skills, knowledge and experiences to fill in human resource gaps in their homelands¹⁵⁵². Backed by forward thinking policies, these concepts are aiding to attract professionals and skilled emigrants and their descendants to endeavours in their homelands where their professional skills are harnessed in sectors such as education, health and political governance¹⁵⁵³. In these sectors they assume positions such as teachers, mentors, research directors, medical practitioners and politicians who return frequently to perform services related to their expertise¹⁵⁵⁴.

To this effect, recent policy discourses have come to attach great expectations to African returnees, portraying them as ‘agents of development’ both economically and politically (Akesson and Eriksson Baaz 2015:1). Return migration specifically to sub-Saharan Africa occupies a central position in current debate on migration and development. A statement by the European Commission in 2011 observes that:

Migrants’ skills and knowledge transfers also constitute assets for development. These could translate into remittances, technology transfers, links to professional networks, investment and arguably a better integration of origin countries into the global market (2011:7).

This statement sums up key assumptions in current policies on the benefits of migration, return and development. An important supposition is that migration to Northern countries is an enriching experience leading to the accumulation of capitals that are valuable for the developing countries in the South (Akesson and Eriksson Baaz 2015:3). The underlining idea is that the capital obtained is used for investment and business activities, which in turn promotes jobs and economic growth. In line with this thought, Black and Castaldo (2009) argue that returnees’ development of small-scale business is often construed as being part of the solution to reducing poverty in Africa¹⁵⁵⁵. In view of this, European donors, are funding new programs to help returnee entrepreneurs’ set-up business in their country of origin (Sinatti and Horst 2015:145). In addition to the creation of business activities returnees are

¹⁵⁵² Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015 Africa’s Return Migrants: The New Developers? Zed Books London, p.10

¹⁵⁵³ Kapur, D., 2001. Diasporas and technology transfer. *Journal of Human development*, 2(2), p.265.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Agunias, D.R. and Newland, K., 2012. *Developing a road map for engaging diasporas in development: A handbook for policymakers and practitioners in home and host countries*. International Organization for Migration. p.159

¹⁵⁵⁵ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.48

viewed as political game changers, such as to take -up political office, work for different types of international organizations and they engage post-conflict nation building and political reconstruction efforts in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia (Hammond et al.2011; Kleist and Vammen 2012).

Past hypothesis of this thesis in 2010 advanced the notion that return migration to Ghana is highly sought after economically, and therefore government policies directly or indirectly have been initiated in this direction – to attract returnees for the economic development of the country. Just as Ghanaian diaspora policies, returnee diaspora policies in Ghana is highly political depending on which party is in power, returnee diaspora policies are high on the current government policies. The change of government in 2017 attest to this idea that return migration policies are highly political. The current NPP government views returnee diasporas as developmental panaceas both in the economic and political sense therefore, the government is in the process of implementing policies on return migration to Ghana, to attract various forms of return, professional and skilled returnees, but also economic and political returnees.

The present hypothesis of this section seeks to point out that return migration in Ghana is viewed as a positive element to the country's development both politically and economically. Return migration to Ghana is shaped by the various capitals' that migrants accumulated from the diaspora to homeland. These accumulated capitals have long been sought after by various Ghanaian government for the economic development of the country. Through Ghana's political history, diaspora returnees have long played an important role in Ghana's democratic governance, with the examples of returnee political figures such as: Nkrumah, Busia, Kufuor, Mills and Akuffo-Addo, this is to name a few among many political returnees. Non-political returnees have played important roles in the development of the country in various economic sectors in Ghana such as: agro-business, tourism, health sectors and private education sectors. Little attention thus far, has been directed to the experiences of return migrants and the structural factors shaping returnees' possibility of assuming these roles of 'new developers.

The methodology in this chapter is based on empirical research findings, drawn from an extensive qualitative ethnographic fieldwork interviews and as an observer

participant in focused groups discussions conducted in Ghana in two phases. The first phase was in 2011, 2012 and 2013 to identify who these returnees are and their role in Ghana's developmental process both politically and economically. With the aim to further investigate the constraints and opportunities attached to the discourses on the benefit of return migration and integration in Ghana. To this effect, there was a need to review the above initial fieldwork conducted in 2011, 2012 and 2013, it was in order to have a holistic view on policy changes pertaining to Ghanaian diaspora returnees. The second phase of the updated fieldwork took place in 2017 and 2018 to ascertain the evolution of Ghanaian returnee diaspora narratives on the role they occupy as 'developmental panaceas' both in the economic and political sense, and the policies that the new government upon assuming power in 2017 had in store for returnees. Attending the Second Ghana Diaspora Home Coming Summit in 2017, was an important opportunity and an avenue to gather firsthand empirical data as an observer participant. My return to Ghana in 2018 was equally vital in following-up on the empirical data gathered in 2017 in view of the measures that the government was in the process of putting in place to implement these returnee diaspora policies that were mentioned at the Diaspora Home Coming Summit in 2017. To this end, what kind of capitals, social, economic, cultural and political, have Ghanaian migrants acquired abroad? How useful are those acquired capitals helped in settling back "home"? To what extent does diaspora returnees' narratives shed light on their ability to occupy the role of "developmental panacea" or simply "new agents of development"? What is the current knowledge, about the readjustment, settlement patterns of Ghanaian returnees? Once they arrive in Ghana, do returnees consider their repatriations as temporary, permanent or circulating between host and home country as transnational migrants? Are there any policy implications for return migration and for an immigrant sending country such as Ghana? And finally, who returns and why? What roles do returnee assume within the Ghanaian political space? These are some of the questions among others that I seek to address in this chapter. The primary purpose of this section is to identify the pull and push factors affecting returnees and to provide a contextual exposé of the determinants of return migration to Ghana. Ghanaian diaspora returnees can be grouped in two major clusters, first-generation returnees and second-generation

returnees. First generation returnees are those born in Ghana before emigrating and second-generation returnees are those born in the diaspora either with both parents being of Ghanaian descent or one parent is of Ghanaian descent. I focused my field work observations on these clusters of returnees in Accra, this is because Accra is Ghana's capital city. Accra is a highly dynamic and urbanized city in West Africa therefore, Accra captures much of Ghana's urban infrastructure and development, which in turn makes it attractive for business ventures, as such, Accra absorbs and attracts most of Ghana's return migrants to settle in the capital city. I categorise these return migrants in Accra as the following: Political returnees; Business Returnees and Economic Returnees and Professional Returnees. These categories will be defined and discussed in this chapter. It is however worth noting that Ghanaian government policies in recent years tend to favour elite and professional returnees, hence the observation of these categories of returnees in Accra may come across as being tilted mainly on elite returnees, but also elite returnees tended to be those who were interested in responding to the fieldwork questionnaires in Accra. I also regroup returnee in in three groups: circular returnees, temporal returnees and permanent returnees. It is, therefore, necessary to begin with a brief historical background on return migration to Ghana.

3.1.1: Historical background on return migration to Ghana

Historically, Ghana has always had to two diaspora returnees, the first is the Black Atlantic diaspora returnees who relocated to post-independent Ghana in the 1960s through the encouragement of Kwame Nkrumah. The second returnee diaspora is the Ghanaian diaspora¹⁵⁵⁶. Both Black Atlantic diaspora returnees and Ghanaian diaspora returnees in most cases constitute the elite segments of the diaspora¹⁵⁵⁷. In an interview in June 2017 in Accra with Prof. Horace Campbell, a Jamaican-born visiting professor from the University of Syracuse in the US who was based, at the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, stated: *Returning to Ghana as the ancestral home for the Black Atlantic diaspora constituted mainly of the elites.*

¹⁵⁵⁶ Fieldwork data: A statement made by Charles Kwenin Director of IOM Sub-Saharan desk, at a conference organised by IOM Ghana on the: Institutionalisation of the Ghanaian Diaspora, held in Accra, 22 May 2012

¹⁵⁵⁷ Ibidem

Most of the African Americans and Caribbeans that are currently living in Ghana or those who have been living in Ghana since independence are often professionals. This, therefore, means that they are bringing some form expertise to the motherland. For the Caribbean returnees here in Ghana, they did not relocate to Ghana from say, Jamaica, Trinidad or Barbados, they are Caribbeans who lived in England and the US, it is from their base in the US and England that they made the move to Ghana. It is therefore important to stress that returning to the motherland for the Black Atlantic diaspora is not accessible to all Black Atlantic diaspora. Returning to the motherland is only accessible to those who can afford it financially, and those in the position to afford this relocation are the professional and business categories¹⁵⁵⁸. Returnee Ghanaian diaspora, just as the Black Atlantic diaspora, is also predominantly made-up of the elites and professionals, who can afford this move back home.

Literature on return migration to Ghana, particularly the works of Asompong et.al 2013; Awumbila and Teye; Ammasari 2001; Kleist 2015; Black and Castaldo 2009 all pointed to the ties that exist between elites migrant and their successful relocation to Ghana: return migration to Ghana is often associated to highly skilled and educated returnees, who relocate home after studying abroad and had acquired some work experience in the diaspora¹⁵⁵⁹. To this effect, returnee Ghanaians from the diaspora emerged as early as post- independence era dominated mainly by the educated elites, who left the shores of Ghana to study abroad. Upon returning home formed a group of political returnees to challenge the colonial rule. This is exemplified by post-independence political figures such as Ghana's first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Ako Adjei, Dr. J.B Danquah, Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, Dr. Hilla Liman and John Kufuor. The current president Nana Akufo-Addo, his vice president Dr. Mahamadu Bawumia and several Ministers and appointees of the current government are all returnees¹⁵⁶⁰.

Returnees are extremely hard to track because governments do not record systematic data

¹⁵⁵⁸ Fieldwork interview 17 June 2017 with prof. Horace Campbell, Chair of the Kwame Nkrumah, at the Institute of African Studies, at the University of Ghana.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.50

¹⁵⁶⁰ Fieldwork observation, during the Diaspora Homecoming summit in 2017, at which the president gave a speech in which he referred to the fact that he himself and his vice are both returnees including 35 ministers in his current government serving in key positions. As such, he encourages diasporans to return.

about them¹⁵⁶¹. This could partly be explained by the fact that returnees in Ghana are not a homogenous group, but rather a heterogeneous and dispersed group once in Accra¹⁵⁶². The lack of official data on return migration to Ghana, was explained by the deputy director of Ghana Immigration Service Mr. Prosper Asima in an interview in Accra in 2012, he noted that most returnee Ghanaians are often dual citizens holders and therefore travel back to Ghana with their Ghanaian passports, which means that they return as Ghana nationals, and not Ghanaian nationals with dual citizenship¹⁵⁶³. Therefore, such returnees are difficult to capture within the Ghana Immigration service statistics on return migration data in Ghana¹⁵⁶⁴. While there are no official data on return migration, recently there is a nascent emergence of returnee associations in Accra. These returnee associations operate in an informal manner, their activities are focused on professional networking among returnees, which gives us an idea of their socio-economic profile and to some extent their numbers in terms of data and figures.

Other studies on migration and returns in Ghana have shown that outbound migration from Ghana to Western countries tends to favour English speaking countries as a destination route by Ghanaians namely to the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia. Return migration is also dominated by similar trends of countries that returnee diaspora indicated to have lived prior to relocating home. Among the sample of respondents, I interviewed in Accra both during the first phase and the second phase of my fieldwork, the UK and the USA came top as countries of residency before resettling in Accra. A study on a similar theme on the trends of return migration to Ghana found that between 1975-1989, there was an increase in return migration to Ghana, (see below graph). One of the reasons to explain this increase in numbers of returning Ghanaian migrants, was the 1983-84 mass deportation or forced return of around one million Ghanaians from Nigeria¹⁵⁶⁵. The increase of return migration to Ghana between the periods of 2000-2007 is attributed to

¹⁵⁶¹ Grant, R., 2007, January. Geographies of investment: how do the wealthy build new houses in Accra, Ghana? In *Urban Forum* (Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 31-59). Springer Netherlands.

¹⁵⁶² Fieldwork data 2012, Accra, Ghana


¹⁵⁶³ Fieldwork interview with the deputy director of the Ghana Immigration Service Dr. Prosper Asima, 22 May 2012, Accra Ghana

¹⁵⁶⁴ Fieldwork interview with the deputy director of the Ghana Immigration Service Dr. Prosper Asima, 22 May 2012, Accra Ghana

¹⁵⁶⁵ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.49

the first change of government since the inception of the fourth republic in 1992, with the NPP winning the 2000 general elections, paved the way for many diaspora Ghanaians to return, who either left the country as political refugees, or others returning as the euphoria of a “new” Ghana was emerging. This change in government brought with it new hopes and new opportunities for them ¹⁵⁶⁶.

Table 13: Percentage of migrants returning within 10 years of their first departure from Ghana 1975-2009



Source: Schans, D., Mazzucato, V., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M.L., 2018. Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration. In *Migration between Africa and Europe*, Springer.p.14

Schans et.al concluded in their study that: *The percentages of people returning to Ghana from the UK for long or short visits increased especially in the 2000-2009 period whereas this increase was not found in The Netherlands where the percentage of migrants visiting remained the same (Table 4). Migrants in the UK show higher percentages of both long and short returns (visits) compared to migrants in The Netherlands. Yet it is worthy to note that in both cases well over half of Ghanaians living in these two countries had*

¹⁵⁶⁶ Field work discussion with Prof. Peter Quartey, 23 May 2012, Accra Ghana

returned to Ghana, again attesting to great circulation rates¹⁵⁶⁷.

Black and Castaldo (2009) also noted in their comparative study on Ghanaian and Ivoirian returnee, in which they observed in their samples of respondents for Ghana that 40% of their sample respondents indicated that they had returned from the UK and 21% from the US¹⁵⁶⁸. Both data sets on return migration to Ghana, confirms the notion that the UK, remains the country of return migration of Ghanaians, a similar observation was made among the sample of respondents I interviewed in Accra between 2011-2018.

Table 14: Proportion of people living in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who have done at least one(long) return migration or a visit (short return) within 5 years of their first arrival (Kaplan Meier Estimates), by period of arrival and country of residence

Current place of residence	Long or short visits			
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2009	1975-2009
United Kingdom	27.7	28.0	56.3	39.1
N	29	33	74	136
Netherlands	23.1	32.8	32.5	30.5
N	53	76	142	271
United Kingdom, Netherland,	27.1	28.9	52.6	37.7
N	82	109	216	407
Sample includes migrants who left at age 18 or over after 1975, currently living in United Kingdom, Netherlands. Percentages are weighted.				

Source: Schans, D., Mazzucato, V., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M.L., 2018. Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration. In *Migration between Africa and Europe*, Springer.p.14

In this respect, returnees in Ghana can be categorise in three groups: a) those who return permanently; b) those who return temporarily and c) circular returnees who are in between host and homeland countries. It is important to distinguish between these forms of returnees as each plays a unique role upon their return home¹⁵⁶⁹.

Permanent returnees are those who have already made these back-and-forth trips and are

¹⁵⁶⁷ Schans, D., Mazzucato, V., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M.L., 2018. Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration. In *Migration between Africa and Europe*. Springer.p.14

¹⁵⁶⁸ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.50

¹⁵⁶⁹ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development: applying concepts to West Africa.p.22

finally settled home with no intentions of going back to their host country¹⁵⁷⁰. Temporary returnees on the other hand, constitute those, who come and go depending on the projects they are establishing back home, projects such as building a home or initiating a business plan back home¹⁵⁷¹. The duration of these temporary returns is between six months to a year or more, then return to their host country work and save more capital to invest in their project before finally relocating¹⁵⁷². Circular returnees constitute of those who commute between the UK and Ghana, depending on consultancy projects or being employed by the government to undertake capacity building projects in sectors, such as education, healthcare and governance. In most cases upon the termination of their consultancy they often return to their positions in the diaspora¹⁵⁷³. An example are Ghanaian professionals working as international civil servants with the UN agencies, the World Bank, African Development Bank and other regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union. The government often taps into the expertise of these diasporas for short term assignments.

In the below chapter I will examine what entails this notion of preparing to return “home”. The sociological understanding of return migration is important in the formulation of government strategies to confront the short- and long-term problems associated with the management of Ghana’s human resources and the implications of return migration for the nation. What role, if any, do migrants’ sociocultural and family networks play in facilitating the process of returning or hindering their decision to return home.

3.1.2 Motives for returning home

The influences of return migration on socio-economic change in the emigration country varies depending on the motives for return and the problems that returnees encounter¹⁵⁷⁴. Return motives includes a variety of economic social and family oriented as well political

¹⁵⁷⁰ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001.art.cit.p.22

¹⁵⁷¹ ibidem

¹⁵⁷² Fieldwork interview, Kwesi Accra July 2012

¹⁵⁷³ Ammassari, Savina. "From nation-building to entrepreneurship: the impact of élite return migrants in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana." *Population, Space and Place* 10, no. 2 (2004): p.134

¹⁵⁷⁴ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development: applying concepts to West Africa, a paper written for the International Organisation for Migration Research Series, IOM Geneva.p.22

reasons (King, 2000)¹⁵⁷⁵. Existing empirical evidence shows that social and family related reasons are of particular importance for returnee. Such strong family ties, the wish to re-join family and friends, homesickness, problems of adjustment in the host country, racial harassment, and the aim for improved social status back home are significant reasons for return¹⁵⁷⁶. Other factors are related to migrates stage in their life trajectory, as age brings changing needs and preferences¹⁵⁷⁷. Migrants may wish to raise their children back in their home country¹⁵⁷⁸. They may return to get married, to care for their elderly parents¹⁵⁷⁹. Going back home is an avenue for returnees who have acquired substantial human capital in the form of higher educational qualifications and savings to gain rapid up-ward social mobility and status, in other words becoming part of an elite class¹⁵⁸⁰. In the case of those who return to work with government agencies, they are provided with; subsidized government homes, in some of Accra's affluent areas, government cars and a chauffeur, a house help and a night watchman (a security guard). In addition to their trappings, they often get the opportunity to travel abroad, as senior personnel to represent Ghana at international conferences. A lifestyle, that with a similar occupation in the diaspora, they will not be able to sustain. In this instance, returning home is synonymous to rapid social mobility. From the lenses of transnationalism, return migrants represent an in between group. Potentially their networks are either exclusively rooted in the initiatives of immigrants themselves (i.e. from below), or dependent on institutional actors and external agents (i.e. from above)¹⁵⁸¹. The theoretical literature (Levitt and Glick Shiller 2004; Jackson et al. 2004) posit that traditional social networking and transnational networking are neither incompatible nor binary opposites; rather, they are combined. In theory returnees are expected to combine transnational networking, pre-existing family networks and new networks with neighbours and other associates to facilitate their reintegration back home. Returnees interviewed in Accra between (2011 -2013 and 2017-2018) gave various reasons on their decision for coming back home, one of such reason that motivated

¹⁵⁷⁵ King, R. and Christou, A., 2011. Of counter-diaspora and reverse transnationalism: return mobilities to and from the ancestral homeland. *Mobilities*, 6(4), pp.451-466.

¹⁵⁷⁶ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Art. Cit. p.22

¹⁵⁷⁷ Ammassari, S. and Black, R., 2001. Art. Cit. p.22

¹⁵⁷⁸ Ibidem

¹⁵⁷⁹ Ibidem

¹⁵⁸⁰ Arthur, J.A., 2016. Art.cit.p,167

¹⁵⁸¹ Ibid.p94

their return, which was often cited by respondents, was weighing the economic, social and cultural standard of living in Europe vis-à-vis Ghana. Some of the reasons that prompted respondents to return from the UK among other reasons was the 2008 financial crisis in London and the general economic downturn of the UK economy as this saw some Brit-Ghanaians losing their jobs¹⁵⁸². Competitiveness of the job market also brought back old sentiments of racial discrimination towards migrants' communities in the UK, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

In this respect, relocating back home for some diaspora returnees, was facilitated by some other variables such as: being able to save enough financial capital to help with settling back home, followed by attaining professional experience and educational capital to help with their careers in Ghana. These factors were prerequisite to prepare for one's voluntary repatriation. Another factor that was remarked among respondents in Accra, was the frequencies of visits to Ghana in preparing the ground for an eventual return, short term visits meaning becoming a circular migrant and long-term visits equating to permanent return. Grant (2009) also found that return migration to Ghana is often tied by the frequency of travelling to Ghana while still residing abroad which in turn helps Ghanaian migrants' decision to return permanently or not¹⁵⁸³. These visits were made for a period of time were to inform them of the realities of what was happening at home in order to measure what they could or could not adapt to before settling back home.

Home ownership in Accra was equally important in aiding the transition from living abroad to resettling back in Ghana¹⁵⁸⁴. Another study conducted on return Ghanaian health professionals in 2013 found similar reasons such as completing a building project they started while they were still abroad:

*"I have been able to complete my building and opened a clinic. I see no reason why I should continue to stay abroad."*¹⁵⁸⁵ Other studies observed that frequent short- or long-term visits to Ghana was key in their preparation to return home:

The below table (Table 3) shows the percentage of Ghanaian migrants currently living in

¹⁵⁸² Fieldwork interview with Jenny, 12 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁵⁸³ Grant, R., 2009. *Globalizing city: The urban and economic transformation of Accra, Ghana*. Syracuse University Press.p.51

¹⁵⁸⁴ Grant, R 2009. Op.Cit. p.51

¹⁵⁸⁵ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of" returning" emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.118

the UK or The Netherlands who had returned to Ghana for a short or long stay since their first arrival in Europe (not necessarily their current country of residence). *Short visits may act as a substitute to definitive return – and become part of a transnational way of living. Migrants in the UK show higher percentages of both long and short returns (visits) compared to migrants in The Netherlands. Yet it is worthy to note that in both cases well over half of Ghanaians living in these two countries had returned to Ghana, again attesting to great circulation rates*¹⁵⁸⁶.

Table 15: Propotion of people living in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who have done at least one long return migration or a short visit since their arrival in Europe, country of residence

Current place of residence	Long return	Visit (short return)	Short or long	N
United Kingdom	10.4	64.4	66.8	136
Netherlands	5.5	57.2	58.9	271
<i>United Kingdom, Netherlands</i>	9.7	63.3	65.6	407
Sample includes migrants who left Ghana at age 18 or over after 1975, currently living in United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Percentages are weighted.				

Source: Schans, D., Mazzucato, V., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M.L., 2018. Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration. In *Migration between Africa and Europe*, Springer.p.14

The other explaining factor for relocating back home that returnees mentioned was their social status, meaning return migration is often tied to upward social mobility therefore, home ownership is translated as a social marker in terms of preparing to resettle home. This was the case of a female Ghanaian health professional and a medical doctor both returnees noted that through migration and the experience gained from their work abroad it has propelled them into a middle-class status. According to the female health professional: *“My basic salary was very small. I come from a poor background and I had to do something. I had to travel if I was to make any*

¹⁵⁸⁶ Schans, D., Mazzucato, V., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M.L., 2018. Changing patterns of Ghanaian migration. In *Migration between Africa and Europe*. Springer.p.14

headway in life¹⁵⁸⁷.” A doctor stated: *In the 1980s, things were tough, and my family was struggling. I had to work, but I saw that this was only possible if I travelled. I had contacts in the USA who told me that I could earn some money and at the same time continue my education*¹⁵⁸⁸. This point will be discussed in the chapter on Ghana’s emerging middle class formed partly by return migration. Return migration in Ghana is often linked to the nexus between circular migration and permanent return status.

Figure 0-91:Diagram: Return process and preparation




Table 16:Savings brought back from abroad and related expenditure and investment by country (%).

	Côte d’Ivoire	Ghana
Did you accumulate any savings abroad?		
Yes	56.7	89
No	43.3	11
Total	100.0	100.0
(n)	(150)	(154)
How much savings did you bring back upon your last return?		
No savings	10.5	8.8
<10,000 USD	70.9	54
10,000–50,000 USD	11.6	24.8
>50,000 USD	4.7	10.9

¹⁵⁸⁷ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of" returning" emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.130.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013, p.130

No response	2.3	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(n)	(86)	(137)
Which of the following best describes your major expenditures/ investments upon your last return? (more than one reply possible)		
Housing-related expenditure	51.7	69.9
Durable consumer goods	59.8	49.3
Electronic appliances	57.5	31.9
Providing support to other family members	35.6	38.4
Investment in business	24.1	44.9
Investment in stock market	10.3	17.4
Other	26.4	26.1

Source: Author's survey.

Although return migration to Ghana, as indicated above has historically and is currently dominated by professionals and skilled migrants, it is equally worth to state here that return migration also constitute unskilled migrants who might not be as visible as the professionals and skilled returnees. Nevertheless, these non-professional and unskilled returnees, are those who form an important percentage of returnees in Ghana generally¹⁵⁸⁹.

It is generally known problematic in international migration discourse that while many of those who undertake the journey do intend to return home in the future, the decision as to when to return home and the circumstances under which the return will be initiated are amorphous due to the several intended or unintended considerations that may mar any proposed return plan¹⁵⁹⁰.

The feeling of nostalgia often associated with constant sense of loss of contacts with family members often occupy and shape the thoughts of immigrants on their decision to return home¹⁵⁹¹. In this respect, migrants' decision to return home could be masked by feeling of homeland abandonment and the nostalgic feeling that emanate from persistent feeling of having been absent from home for far too long¹⁵⁹². A returned Ghanaian nurse stated she felt homesick and had missed her family back in Ghana: *"I am so happy to see my family and be reunited with them. It has been such a*

¹⁵⁸⁹ Fieldwork data from IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return data in 2012

¹⁵⁹⁰ Arthur. 2008. Op.cit. p26

¹⁵⁹¹ Ibidem

¹⁵⁹² Ibidem

*long time*¹⁵⁹³. ”

Arthur (2008:140) proposes two approaches that determines reasons for Ghanaian in the diaspora to return home. He points out that firstly, there is a structured approach to the level of integration of Ghanaians in their host country: i.e. the job they held, marital status, level of acclimatization and incorporation of host countries' values. Secondly, a more micro approach and individualistic reasons for returning home¹⁵⁹⁴. These approaches highlights, the level to which a potential returnee has assimilated or not in the host country and family network, motivation, psychological state and perceived benefits of staying abroad or returning home. The decision to return home is usually made, once the returnee is able to configure the impact a return migration would have on those associated to the returnee¹⁵⁹⁵. In this regard, the motivation to return is multidimensional and is often nuanced by a complex set of social and economic variables that are specific and internal to Ghana, as well as those that are non-specific to Ghana, which is based on pull and push factors for returning home.

A Pull factors:

A-1 First-generation returnees: A general feeling for “Home” and home sickness

Whether the migratory experience is international or regional, for short or long term, the bulk of Ghanaian émigré tend to repatriate to Ghana after they have achieved their economic, political and cultural goals. According to Arthur, (2008) in the United States, for example, most Ghanaian immigrants 79% consider themselves as sojourners and will repatriate sooner or later to Ghana. Whereas 15% indicated that they would probably repatriate but are not definite about the timeline to return. On the other hand, the remaining 6% were definite that they will stay permanently in the United States¹⁵⁹⁶.

For some migrants, prolonged absence from home has made the heart grow fonder and the prospects of going to Ghana becoming a myth, because the thought of going

¹⁵⁹³ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Art.cit. p.122

¹⁵⁹⁴ *ibidem*

¹⁵⁹⁵ Arthur. 2008. Op.cit. p26

¹⁵⁹⁶ Arthur. J. 2008. Op.cit. p.140

home becomes a coping mechanism in migration, an adaptive tool to find solace in the believe and knowledge that perhaps, the return home is not going to occur ¹⁵⁹⁷. This longing for “home” whatever it might mean, clearly works as a coping mechanism allowing people to overcome failures or the end of dreams¹⁵⁹⁸. The constant talk about going home for some is seen as a diversionary tactic to ease apprehensions associated with being a voluntary diasporan that is characterized by entrenched racial and ethnic subordination and powerlessness¹⁵⁹⁹. The rationalizations associated with homebound one day, are temporary fix for unmet aspirations, lack of full citizenship, and delayed integration into the society of the host country. From the qualitative field work results and analysis on diaspora returnee Ghanaians conducted between 2011-2018, returnees’ reasons for repatriating back to Ghana is clustered in three groups: a) returned home after achieving their educational and professional goals; b) returning to Ghana due to homesickness; c) returning home as a result of assimilation and integration challenges.

Some respondents in Accra were quite explicit as to their decision to return and resettle back home, one respondent noted that he returned home due homesickness:

Alex states: *I left a well-paid job as an investment banker in London to return home. This is because, I was just feeling home sick and was fed-up of living a life of a migrant abroad. Although I had a good job, I did not have the quality of life and social recognition that I now have here in Ghana*¹⁶⁰⁰.

For some coming back home was a duty, but also was motivated by the feeling of having something to give back and contribute to the Ghanaian society. Such is the example of Prof. Glover:

Prof. Abladie Glover: *I came back home after my studies in the US in the 1970s, because, I thought, I had more to give to my country than in the US. Here in Ghana, I can make an impact in society with my qualifications from abroad, whereas in the US, I would have been a Black lecturer among others, over here in Ghana I am special, because I am valued and the work I am doing makes a difference and has*

¹⁵⁹⁷ Arthur. J. 2008. Op.cit. p.140

¹⁵⁹⁸ Arthur. J. 2008. Op.cit. p.140

¹⁵⁹⁹ Arthur. 2008. Op.cit. p26

¹⁶⁰⁰ Interview with Kofi, 28th June 2012

*an impact in the lives of people in my community*¹⁶⁰¹.

Both statements resonate with research on the motives for returnees' going back home, with examples of Jamaica and India. Where returnees stated that sentimental feelings of home sickness and a lost feeling of belonging in the host country contributed in part to their decision to repatriate home¹⁶⁰².

On returning home to use professional experiences acquired from the diaspora to make a difference in society, a Ghanaian doctor stated a similar opinion in a study on returned health professionals to Accra in 2013 noted: *We acquire some new experiences and skills which we bring back to enrich the service in Ghana. On the hospital wards, you see that the returnee is clearly different, punctual, courteous, and very professional in his or her approach. We are passionate about medico-legal issues and how in this part of the world we do take things for granted*¹⁶⁰³. A doctor stated: *Now that I am here and working, I have solved a human resource factor by one health professional, and I hope many will return to help with the human-resource problem*¹⁶⁰⁴.

For other returnees in Ghana such as Kwesi, it is was evident from the onset that his stay in the UK was temporary, if that temporary sojourn lasted for twenty-five years before returning home permanently, his return was just a matter of time. This therefore meant that his migration trajectory was strongly linked to his return trajectory as well, his return trajectory is also tied to the accumulation of various forms of capitals: educational capitals, financial and social.

Kwesi Owusu: *For me, my stay in the UK had never been a permanent one. I went to Addisadel College in Cape Coast here in Ghana, and after that went to the UK for further studies. I stayed in the UK for 25 years, everything I did in the UK geared me toward my return to Africa. I studied development studies at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and a PhD on Black British Culture at Cambridge University. While in London, I took up careers that involved Africa and its diaspora because, I knew I will one day leave the UK, so living in the UK and*

¹⁶⁰¹ Fieldwork interview with Prof. Abladie Glover in Accra 30th June 2012

¹⁶⁰² Bauböck, R, and Faist, T 2010 *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods* Amsterdam University Press, p. 171

¹⁶⁰³ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of "returning" emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.123

¹⁶⁰⁴ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of "returning" emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.123

working towards Africa was a steppingstone to preparing my return to Ghana. While in the UK, I had always had a foot in Ghana, I had projects within the media and film industry in Ghana, and so I came home at least twice a year. Eventually, I decided to make the big move in 2004, and since then, I have not regretted relocating. My business is doing well, and I have a relaxed lifestyle than back in the London. Although I made a good living in London as a professional in academia and working on Black British popular culture in the media, life was pretty much stressful. For me relocating to Ghana was a natural course, because I never felt that my stay in the UK was permanent¹⁶⁰⁵.

Another respondent gave the following reasons for relocating home:

Kofi: *I came back to Ghana after nearly 28 years of living in various countries, mainly in the US where, I studied at Yale University and worked at the Wall Street in New York as an investment banker and had some stint in Europe. I relocated to Ghana for personal reasons. I also became tired of life abroad and wanted to come back to my family. My return to Ghana was more on a personal level than a career, but coming to Ghana, I saw there was a niche market for my business which I decided to capitalize on¹⁶⁰⁶.*

Dr. Joel Son: *I left Ghana for the UK to pursue my PhD studies. Prior to that I was already working in Ghana, as a civil servant with the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, so after my PhD, I did not see the need to stay abroad, because, I already had a job to return to in Ghana, and my family were home. So, for me there was never a question of staying abroad, returning home was mandatory¹⁶⁰⁷.*

In the case of Kofi, Kwesi and Joel, returning home was motivated either for family or professional reasons. They never viewed their stay as a permanent one, regardless of the duration of stay abroad.

As observed in other studies on return migration to Africa, in which the authors concluded that returned migrants are essentially privileged people, which results from a “double selections of better-off people who are likely to migrate to Europe and are the same category who are likely to return”¹⁶⁰⁸. This observation was based

¹⁶⁰⁵ Fieldwork interview with Kwesi Owusu Accra, July 10th, 2012

¹⁶⁰⁶ Fieldwork interview with Kofi Accra, July 10th 2012

¹⁶⁰⁷ Fieldwork interview with Dr. Joel Son, August 15th 2012

¹⁶⁰⁸ Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015. Op. Cit, p.31

on a study on return migrants in Democratic Republic of Congo, where returnees were in most cases those who were better-off socially before emigrating and were the same who returned after acquiring certain capitals abroad¹⁶⁰⁹. This observation could equally be applied to some of the profiles of returnees I interviewed in Accra, as with the cited examples above of Kofi and Kwesi who came from a middle-class background (both parents were professionals in Ghana) they were sent to study abroad by their parents, upon the completion of their secondary education in Ghana. What facilitated their reintegration in Ghana apart from having a strong family ties back home, was the network of friends they had in Ghana through attending secondary school in Ghana and as such being part of an alumni group in Ghana. Being part of an alumni group in Ghana before emigration, fosters a professional network and solidarity, which in turn helps returnees in their resettlement process back home. This same alumni network providing solidarity helps Ghanaian migrants in the diaspora, as we saw earlier on in the section on Ghanaian Alumni association in London.

These first-generation returnees also have solid family network and social capital which in turn facilitates their return to Ghana. Joel on the other hand, had a professional network in Ghana (worked as a civil servant) before leaving to pursue a Ph.D. in the UK. In sum, return migration for first generation Ghanaians is influenced by the condition (social and professional background) they had in Ghana before emigrating abroad, which contributes to their return. Second-generation returnees on the other hand, have to build a social and professional network once they settle in Ghana, which in some cases can hinder their integration process in Ghana.

A-2 Pull factor for Second- generation returnees: A quest for homeland identity and roots

According to King and Christou, second-generation returnees are children of first-generation immigrants returning to their parents' country of origin¹⁶¹⁰. Complication can

¹⁶⁰⁹ Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015. Op. Cit, p.31

¹⁶¹⁰ Christou, A., 2006. Deciphering diaspora–translating transnationalism: Family dynamics, identity constructions and the legacy of ‘home’ in second-generation Greek-American return migration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29(6), pp.1040-1056.

arise for second-generation returnees to their parents' country of origin as the destination is also the origin, going back to their roots (Wessendorf 2007). As such, they are relocating from one home to another except that the return to the parental home has a different cadence - the home is the homeland¹⁶¹¹. There are various forms of return to ancestral home, such as Jews going back to Israel, the German *Ausseidler* and the Pontic Greeks¹⁶¹². These ancestral returns also include return migration of colonial people, such as the Dutch Indonesians who repatriated from the Dutch Indonesia in 1949, the *pieds noirs* who settled in France from Algeria in the early 1960s, the Portuguese *retornados* who came back from Portugal's African colonies in the mid-1970s and British colonial settlers who came back from India after the country's independence, also British returnees from East Africa and South Africa¹⁶¹³. These examples therefore indicate that the notion of second-generation and subsequent generations returning to an ancestral home which they have never lived is not a novelty but rather an old phenomenon just as migration itself is too.

The trend for second-generation Anglo-Ghanaians returning to their ancestral homeland or the country of their parents' is not isolated to the Ghanaian case.

In the UK, newspaper articles have recently picked-up on this phenomenon of returning "home" by second-generation Black British Carribeans, Black British Africans and Asian British describing it as *going back to my roots* or *home from home*¹⁶¹⁴ an example is a collection of personal accounts from second-generation British Pakistanis now living in Islamabad, Karachi and Mirpur - the remote rural district where most Pakistani migrants to Britain originate¹⁶¹⁵.

The country is attracting a new generation of socially mobile British Pakistani women. Pnina Werbner, a social anthropologist, explains, "*There are an enormous number of young British Pakistani girls now who, unlike their parents, went to university, and a whole new world of opportunities are opening up to them. They have to decide what to*

¹⁶¹¹ King, R. and Christou, A., 2014. Second-generation "return" to Greece: New dynamics of transnationalism and integration. *International Migration*, 52(6), p.170

¹⁶¹² Ibidem

¹⁶¹³ Ibidem

¹⁶¹⁴ Wajid, S (2006), Going back to my roots: A growing number of Pakistani women brought up in the UK are leaving to live in their mother country - despite its oppressive image. *The Guardian* G2, 23 October 2006 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/23/pakistan.familyandrelationships>

¹⁶¹⁵ Wajid, S (2006), Art.cit.p1

do and make a lot of choices. [Their experience can be] a cultural no-man's land and one way out for them is to return home¹⁶¹⁶."

In the case of second-generation diaspora and their reason for returning to Ghana is often a blend between psychological quest for an identity to connect to a root as homeland and new career prospects opening up for them in Ghana¹⁶¹⁷. They happily blend this psychological aspiration for a Ghanaian identity with the search for new economic opportunities. The field work observation with a of group second-generation Ghanaian returnee in Accra interviewed between 2012–2018, demonstrated that most of these second-generation returnees relocated to Ghana alone, while their parents were still living in the diaspora, mostly in the UK. Second generations relocating back to their parents' homeland alone, was also observed in a study on Anglo-Caribbean second-generations returning alone to Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana. Some of the reasons second-generation Ghanaian returnee cited for motivating their relocation was their feeling of not belonging and the feeling that their parents' homeland had more career prospects and space where they could be free to express that. The following interviews with second-generation returnees to Accra gives an overview of their reasons to return.

Makeba interviewed in Accra in 2012: I am British-Ghanaian, I was born in Nigeria in the 1970s, as my parents were Ghanaian teachers living and working in Nigeria. In the late 1970s they left Nigeria for England, London to be precise, so all my life, I have always lived outside of Ghana, and my parents are still living in London. But for some reason I have always been attached to Ghana, so I first moved back in 2001, stayed in Ghana for two years, went back to London and there I finished my studies worked for a public relation company, and then decided to relocate for good in 2011 and since then home has been Ghana. My first attempt to relocate failed because, I did not come with a real blueprint as to what I had wanted to do, so settling in Ghana was very difficult in 2001. After going back to London, I realized that home was really here in Ghana, because, I felt very much at home, and Ghana presents more opportunities for my business than if I had stayed in London. So, my

¹⁶¹⁶ Wajid, S (2006), Art.cit.p1

¹⁶¹⁷ Fieldwork interview with a group of second-generation returnees from the London in Accra in 2012, 2017 and 2018

return to Ghana was more for my career than anything else.

Abena interviewed in Accra in 2011: *I was born and bred in London, but London never felt like home. I feel very much at home here in Accra than in London. My parents are still living in London, but I decided to make the move here, because, culturally, I feel very connected here. I also came with a business interest, I have set –up my clothing line; African fabric clothing line, in which I only sell African clothes, but with European style. I returned to Ghana, because I wanted to discover my roots, my culture and find my real identity, as in England, I felt very much proud of being identified as Black British, but I never felt connected to who I am. Coming back to Ghana I found that connection and my roots.*

Vina interviewed in Accra in 2012: *I was born and raised in London too, but I have always considered myself very much as Ghanaian, more than my Black British identity. Feeling as a Ghanaian in the UK was ok, but I had never lived in Ghana. I used to visit on holidays, but it's a different ball game altogether coming to live in Ghana. I studied African diaspora and politics at SOAS University of London, in the hope that I will one day relocate to Africa and Ghana. I relocated to Ghana to set-up a business and to help diasporans who wanted to relocate to Ghana. Using my personal experience as a returnee and my career background in development work, since I came back to Ghana, I thought I did utilize that to encourage and demystify the fear of returning to Ghana. So, for me returning to Ghana, was borne out of two factors; firstly, to connect with my heritage and secondly to see how best I can use my professional experience in the UK here in Ghana to make a difference¹⁶¹⁸.*

Mety, Accra July 7, 2017:

I was born in England and returned in 2010 to work for L'Oréal West Africa office in Accra, as the marketing and product development manager for West Africa. I returned home frequently on holidays with my parents, my parents returned home upon their retirement in England, so in a way the opportunity to come and work for L'Oréal in Ghana was also motivated by the fact that my parents were now back in Ghana.

¹⁶¹⁸ Field work interview with Vina, September 2012 Accra

Jeny, interviewed in 2017 and 2018 in Accra:

I came back to Ghana in 2008 after the financial crisis in London. I was born and raised in London, so I've never lived and worked in Ghana. But, as I worked with British Airways, I had the opportunity to travel the world, including visiting Ghana frequently, therefore I came to Ghana quite often. I became used to the local environment and then decided to relocate. I returned alone as both my parents died in London, my sister and brother are still living in London. I am the only one from my family in England who has permanently relocated to Ghana. Since my return to Ghana, I have mainly worked in the private sector as a business and corporate development manager and then later ventured into my own business. I was head-hunted recently to become the CEO of a government agency, which I gladly accepted because I knew that my experience and expertise could be utilised for the development of Ghana.

The above reasons advanced by second-generation Brits-Ghanaians as the motives to relocate to Ghana, echoes with similar reasons that motivated the return of second-generation Caribbean-Brits and Pakistanis Brits.

Roystone, a second-generation British-Jamaican born returnee interviewed in Jamaica, states:

I was born in England, but always felt unwelcomed in my own country, so I can't call England home as a place of warmth and comfort... prejudice and discrimination were always there...in London you grow up constantly looking over your shoulder... I was getting stopped by the police... now here in Jamaica I am comfortable in my own skin. I'm a very hard worker... and if you come to Jamaica with that attitude... there's more options to build up your own business. I'm in a better position now to invest in a future for my family. Also living here, I feel the environment is secure to raise my children ¹⁶¹⁹.

Monica, a second-generation British born returnee to Guyana noted in an interview:

You make your life for your kids. I can see how much the move has been good for the kids. They love it here and have settled really well... they walk to school on their own, they are always out playing on the lane... I would never allow them to do that in London... I have peace of mind because I'm not constantly worrying about their safety¹⁶²⁰.

¹⁶¹⁹ Reynolds, T., 2008. Ties that bind: Families, social capital and Caribbean second-generation return migration. *University of Sussex, Sussex Migration Working Paper, 46, p.18.*

¹⁶²⁰ Reynolds, T., 2008. Ties that bind: Families, social capital and Caribbean second-generation return migration. *University of Sussex, Sussex Migration Working Paper, 46, p.18.*

The selectivity of this return, mainly available to the better educated, combined with lifestyle choices and developmental focus tend to make this case broadly positive experience albeit framed within post-colonial hierarchies of race and Britishness¹⁶²¹. In a similar observation to second-generation Brits-Ghanaian returnees, some Anglo-Pakistanis second-generation relocate for a better lifestyle in terms upward social mobility, such is the example of Natasha and Sadia:

Natasha Anwar, a 35-year-old British-Pakistani doctor who moved to Pakistan five years ago, says one of the key attractions for her was the freedom from racial tension. Born to Pakistani parents in Chingford, north-east London, Anwar says she "never felt part of British society, whereas now I feel like I'm home. I don't feel edgy and anxious anymore. I work as a research scientist at a research centre in a hospital in Lahore. Moving here also provides excellent career prospects"¹⁶²² ”

Sadia Rasheed, 27, a British-born Pakistani from Hounslow, in West London, relocated in 1998 when she married her Pakistani husband, an architect. At first, she found her elite new social world so disturbingly libertarian she almost fled back to Britain¹⁶²³. In the rarefied circles she moves in she has "become more broad-minded than I was in London,". "For instance, the way young women dress [at parties] here is more revealing and I just had to get over it. There are only advantages here for the upper classes, there's nothing you can't do with the right contacts. But it's very tough for everyone else. It is difficult to survive as a single woman in this society, but some do it - the strong ones"¹⁶²⁴.

Professions such as journalism in Ghana has in recent times been an area dominated by second-generation returnees. Their English and American accents are often highly sought after by the Ghanaian media, and they tend to be presenters of television and entertainment programs. As stated by a second-generation respondent during an interview in Accra in 2012:

Ama Abebrese:

I studied media and journalism at University in London, and I worked for OBE Tv a

¹⁶²¹ King, R. and Christou, A., 2008. Cultural geographies of counter-diasporic migration: The second generation returns 'home'. *University of Sussex, Brighton, Sussex Migration Working Paper*, 45.

¹⁶²² Wajid. S (2006), Art.cit. p.3

¹⁶²³ Wajid. S (2006), Art.cit. p.3

¹⁶²⁴ Wajid. S (2006), Art.cit. p.3

*Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora tv channel in London and for the BBC radio in London. I continued my work in journalism here in Ghana, since my return. And yes, my English accent seems to be attractive to some media houses here in Ghana, it helps when you want to demark yourself from other colleagues within the job market in media here in Accra*¹⁶²⁵.

Potter and Philipps (2006) note in their article: '*Black skins–white masks*': *Postcolonial reflections on 'race', gender and second-generation return migration to the Caribbean*, how second-generation Brits-Barbadians use their British accent as a social marker which serves their best interest in Barbadian society:

The power of the Black English accent:

*There were strong indications that the young UK-born returnees used their English accents as a powerful brokering tool to challenge the extant racial barriers in Barbados. One informant freely acknowledged that the Bajan-Brits' accent appeared to provide a unique social and economic privilege within a traditional English hegemonic society: There are two ways of going through it in Barbados. If you are white or if you've got an accent, you know, and you will use it to the best of your ability whichever you've got*¹⁶²⁶.

The narratives of Makeba, Abena, Mety Vina, Ama and Jenny as second-generation British Ghanaian returnees, with their parents and siblings still living back in London, can be viewed as being part of the new African “repats”. But equally what these second-generation Brit-Ghanaian all have in common is that they are all university educated graduates, just as the British-Caribbean and British-Pakistani second-generation returnees. Their reason for returning stems both from coming “home” to launch a career and discovering and connecting or reconnecting to their roots and heritage. To this effect first-generation return, is tied sentimentally to returning home to the “known”, whereas second-generation returns are coming back to the “unknown”, hence the important attachment with the notion of discovering or re-discovering their roots, and aiding them to negotiate the framing

¹⁶²⁵ Fieldwork interview with Ama Abeberese in Accra, June 2012

¹⁶²⁶ Phillipps, J. and Potter, R.B., 2006. 'Black skins–white masks': Postcolonial reflections on 'race', gender and second generation return migration to the Caribbean. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 27(3), p.317

of a process of deconstruction, construction and reconstruction of a new identity to fit into the Ghanaian societal setting.

3.1.3 The nexus between return migration and Brain Gain: African professionals as “repats” and the new “expats”?

The notion of “returnee” and “repat” has in recent years gained currency among both first- and second-generation Africans living in European metropolises such as London, Paris, Lisbon, Amsterdam and Berlin. This new phenomenon can be viewed as returning to the “promised land” in some respect.

In recent times various International companies (apple, google), multinationals such as (Shell, Total, Exxon) International Organisations (UN, World Bank) and Non-Governmental Organisation (Oxfam, USAID) and regional organisations (African Development Bank, African Union, ECOWAS, SADAC) are increasingly in favour of recruiting qualified African diaspora professionals to work in various capacities. The emphasis on this new tendency to recruit African “repats” or « Afropéennes » is motivated by the fact that African diaspora professionals’ positions as “brokers” are accustomed to the mindset of international work practice and are also rooted in the African cultural mindsets¹⁶²⁷. In other words, their role as “bridge-builders” in both worlds facilitates their chances of occupying such international professional roles within the African job market¹⁶²⁸. The examples below of an article in a French news magazine “*L’observateur*” illustrates this new wave of “repats” in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. The notion of African “repat” in the below article might sound excessive in linking African returnees as a form of the Jewish Alayah to Israel. These African returnees are relocating back to African not with a connection to religious repatriation as is the case of the Jewish Alaya. This said, the article nevertheless, gives us an insight into how this notion of return has become normalised and widespread all over Africa, and mainly benefiting the educated professionals and elites amongst the African diaspora as demonstrated by the profiles of these returnees below.

¹⁶²⁷ Akesson.L and Eriksson-Baaz.M 2015 Africa’s Return Migrants: The New Developers? Zed Books London, p.10

¹⁶²⁸ Ibidem

Figure 0-92: Box.13 African repats: The return of " Afropéennes "

Directrice de la filiale Bayard Presse en Côte D'Ivoire, Laure Gnagbé Blédou, né en France d'un père Ivoirien et d'une mère française est devenue une « Afropéenne » un terme qui qualifie cette génération d'Afro-descendant nés dans la diaspora et assume pleinement leur culture métissée. Elle et son mari Ivoirien ayant étudié en France sont des « repats » ou des « returnees », on appelle ces « migrants à l'envers » qui comme la manière des juifs qui « font leur alayah » et « retournent » en Israël, entreprennent un voyage identitaire vers le continent Africain après être nés ou avoir vécu de leur vie en Europe, en Amérique ou ailleurs¹⁶²⁹.

Comme Laure, ils quittent parfois de jobs en or pour venir toucher du doigt leur « pas de cœur ». De cet exode inversé, la romancière nigériane Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie a tiré le sel de son best-seller « Americanah », ou l'héroïne, Ifemelu, après avoir quitté Lagos pour aller faire ces études à Philadelphie décide quinze ans plus tard, de revenir sur ses pas., c'est aussi le chemin emprunté par Kayo, jeune médecin parti d'Angleterre pour le Ghana, héros du roman « Notre quelque part » de Nii Aikwei Parkes. Et les parcours réels de Rita Marley, veuve de Bob Marley retournée au Ghana ou de Gaël Faye, auteur de « Petit Pays » lui aussi retourné au Rwanda.

Another example of such African repats from Francophone Africa is Thierry Tchapgna of Cameroonian descent and the founder of paraethink.com, an online parapharmacy dedicated to Black skincare. He notes: “ *Il compte bien profiter de la “ Africa Rising”, son taux de croissance cinq à neuf fois supérieur à celui de l'Europe, l'explosion du numérique et l'émergence d'une vraie classe moyenne. Pour cette entrepreneur 36 ans né au Cameroun mais émigré à Lille à 18ans pour faire ces études de pharmacie: « l'heure des 'repats' est arrivée. La croissance européenne est en berne, l'Asie commence à stagner et c'est l'Afrique qui va commencer à prendre tous les marchés*”¹⁶³⁰. Thierry veut être pragmatique, il planifie de s'installer en Côte D'Ivoire, plus prometteuse que le Cameroun avec ses 8% de croissance, et ensuite développera Yaoundé au Cameroun »¹⁶³¹.

¹⁶²⁹ Le « repat » ce nouvel expat, L'obs./No 2752- 03/08/2017: <https://www.epresse.fr/magazine/1-obs/2017-08-03/sommaire>

¹⁶³⁰ Le « repat » ce nouvel expat, L'obs./No 2752- 03/08/2017: <https://www.epresse.fr/magazine/1-obs/2017-08-03/sommaire>

¹⁶³¹ Ibidem

A-3: 1 Socio-Environmental improvements
A-3-2: Improved political stability and democracy in Ghana

As noted in previous chapters, by the mid-1990s Ghana was gradually returning to constitutional rule. The process of political stability and gradual confidence in the economy was starting to gain currency by this time. By the early 2000s saw a period of democratic alternation from one party to another, this therefore brought about economic growth and security¹⁶³². This growth and security have enabled some Ghanaian professionals from the diaspora returning home “en masse”¹⁶³³. This trend of mass returnees started the process of reverse brain drain to brain gain and to brain circulation as exemplified by the above profiles and life trajectories of Ghanaian returnees. Ammassari (2003) also found in her study Ghanaian and Ivorian returnees, that there was an increasing change in the profiles over the years: *earlier returnee migrant contribution tended to concern the realm of nation building, more recent contributions are to be found in a more explicit economic context in the form of entrepreneurship*¹⁶³⁴. As stated earlier on, the political stability that Ghana has enjoyed since the early 1990s, has contributed to a perceived “economic boom” during the early 2000s, this rapid economic growth is partly attributed to the discovery of oil in Ghana¹⁶³⁵. As such various multinational organizations have established offices in Accra. Ghana’s capital Accra has since become a regional hub for international organizations to plant their West African regional offices specifically for Anglophone countries¹⁶³⁶. This trend has also spurred the profile of return migration to Ghana, as a result of the career opportunities offered by such international companies and organizations¹⁶³⁷. In some instances, these multinationals prefer to recruit local personnel who have had professional experience of working in Western countries. This, therefore, validates the return of

¹⁶³² Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.49

¹⁶³³ ibidem

¹⁶³⁴ Ammassari.S 2003, From Nation-Building to Entrepreneurship: The impact of elite Return Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Population, Space and Place, vol.10 p.134

¹⁶³⁵ Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Prempeh, H.K., 2012. Oil, politics, and Ghana's democracy. *Journal of democracy*, 23(3), pp.95

¹⁶³⁶ Friederici, N. 2015. Incubators vs. Hubs at the Example of Accra:<https://geonet.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/incubators-vs-hubs-at-the-example-of-accra/>

¹⁶³⁷ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of “returning” emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.119

some « Afropéennes ». In this regard, return migration is seen as a modus operandi of economic and industrial incorporation into the global economy.

A-3-2 Comparative economic opportunities

The Ghanaian economy witnessed a significant growth over the past few years, the economy grew by 4.8%, in 2010. The highest growth over the past eight years was in 2011 with 14.0%; economic growth recorded in 2012 was 9.3 %; in 2013 7.3% and 2014 4.2%¹⁶³⁸. There was an economic decline in 2016 by 3.7%, it increased to 8.5% in 2017¹⁶³⁹. In 2018 the economy grew by 6.3%, while Ghana's economy continued to expand in 2019, with real GDP growth estimated at 7.1% making it one of the fastest growing economy in the sub-region in 2019¹⁶⁴⁰. This growth could explain why some diaspora Ghanaians find it safe to relocate to Ghana from an economic standpoint, although the economic growth is not stable, there are still opportunities for returnees to exploit and tap into¹⁶⁴¹. Some respondents indicated that their returned to Ghana was directly or indirectly influenced by institutional racism and discrimination, this is in relation to career progression and opportunities according to Kwesi, who had lived in England for 25 years before returning to Ghana to set up his own multimedia company¹⁶⁴². Another respondent indicated in 2017: *I left London for Accra 2009 in the wake of the economic crisis in England, this was to start all over again here in Ghana, as in Ghana the economy was doing better, plus it is a developing country and therefore opportunities are everywhere*¹⁶⁴³.

With regards to the 2012 sample of respondents who returned home, 80% of the respondents indicated that they returned to Accra, Ghana's capital city, 20% stated that they returned to other cities such as Kumasi, the second biggest city in Ghana and the third city, Cape Coast. Whereas the sample of respondents interviewed in 2017 and 2018, all indicated that they returned and resettled in Accra. As these three

¹⁶³⁸ Focus Economy, Ghana country profile: <http://www.focus-economics.com/country-indicator/ghana/gdp>

¹⁶³⁹ Dontoh.E and Janse Van Vuuren. A 2018 Ghana Economic Growth Rate More Than Doubles in 2017 to 8.5%, Published on Bloomberg online, 11 April 2018: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-11/ghana-economic-growth-rate-more-than-doubles-in-2017-to-8-5>

¹⁶⁴⁰ Ghana Economic Outlook Macroeconomic performance and outlook, African Development Bank Data: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economic-outlook>

¹⁶⁴¹ African returning to take their places, Guardian newspaper, 29th January 2013

¹⁶⁴² <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/29/africa-diaspora-elite-poverty>

¹⁶⁴² Field work interview June 2012 Kwesi, Accra

¹⁶⁴³ Fieldwork interview with Jenny, Accra June 18, 2017

cities provide more opportunities for business venture for returnees as such all returnees interviewed for both the 2011-2013 and 2017- 2018 samples relocated mainly in the 2000s. For example, 21% in 2005, 14% in 2001, 10% in 2009 and 30 % in 2011¹⁶⁴⁴. These observations echo with Quartey's assertion on return migration to Ghana which gained currency in the 2000 (Quartey: 2009:10).

B: Government policies on return migration

To vigorously attract Ghanaians mostly skilled and professionals to return, the government in collaboration with key ministries such as The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Finance. Government agencies and institutions such as the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) and Bank of Ghana and international organisations namely the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The IOM and the Ministry of Health (MOH) collaborated to invite health professionals in the diaspora back home to work on a temporary basis. The program, known as the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Ghana Health Project, as noted both in the general introduction of this thesis and in Part one, facilitated the return of over 150 health professionals to work temporarily in Ghana¹⁶⁴⁵. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), an autonomous public service body, which reports directly to the Office of the President, has the core mandate for the collection, analysis and production of official statistical data for Ghana¹⁶⁴⁶. Data collected includes migration and return data with the goal of establishing linkages with overall development. The Diaspora Support Unit (DSU), established in 2012 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides a sustainable link between the Ghanaian diaspora and various government agencies to achieve development and investment goals for returnees. Such facilitation is expected to result in an increase of investment of resources (know-how, financial resources, skills) of the Ghanaian diaspora in social and economic initiatives in Ghana.

Prof Mariama Awumbila, director of the Centre for Migration Studies at the

¹⁶⁴⁴ Fieldwork data, 2012-2018 in Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁴⁵ Fieldwork data from IOM Ghana Mission, 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁴⁶ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. *Diaspora and migration policy and institutional frameworks Ghana country report*.p.10

University of Ghana Legon, stated in an interview in 2012 that the Ghanaian state does not have a comprehensive diaspora or return migration policies¹⁶⁴⁷. However, since the early, 1990s Ghanaian government started pursuing various forms of return migration initiatives with the hope of turning them into policies, both formal and informal with the goal to attract skilled Ghanaian nationals abroad¹⁶⁴⁸. Both the NDC and NPP government have initiated migration and return offices based at various government ministries and agencies such as the Migration Unit at the Ministry of Interior established in 2006, the Diaspora Investment Bureau in 2007 at the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the Diaspora Support Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated in 2012 by the International Organisation for Migration and the Government of Ghana¹⁶⁴⁹. According to the Principal Investment Officer at the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), Dr. Richard Adjei, in an interview in 2012 in Accra, various initiatives were taken by GIPC, such as the Non-resident Ghanaian Secretariat with a mandate to liaise with Ghanaians abroad on their investment needs, in order to facilitate their return home.

One of the initiatives put in place by the GIPC was the initiation of the Diaspora Investment Bond. The Diaspora Investment Bond was created in order to facilitate transnational investment for the Ghanaians diaspora, as this initiative is to entice diaspora to investment in key sectors which will in turn help their return and reintegration process in Ghana¹⁶⁵⁰. The director of the Migration Unit at the Ministry of Interior Mr David Agorsor, noted that as part of the mandate of the Migration Unit, is to ensure that information on the acquisition of the dual citizenship card is being forwarded to Ghanaians in the diaspora and that the Ministry is working with Ghana embassies abroad for this to be done properly. According Mr. Agorsor, the other role of his outfit is to supervise the attribution of the Right of Abode for the Atlantic diaspora returning to live in Ghana¹⁶⁵¹.

The 2001, Homecoming Summit organized by President Kufuor's administration to

¹⁶⁴⁷ Fieldwork interview with Prof. Mariama Awumbila, 10 May 2012, Accra Ghana

¹⁶⁴⁸ Awumbila, M. and Teye, J.K., 2014. *Diaspora and migration policy and institutional frameworks Ghana country report*.p.10

¹⁶⁴⁹ Fieldwork data collected while working for the IOM Ghana Mission on Ghana Diaspora Engagement project in 2012

¹⁶⁵⁰ Field work interview with Dr, Richard Adjei principal investment Officer, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 12 April 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁵¹ Fieldwork interview with Mr. David Agorsor, the Director of Migration Unit at the Ministry of Interior Ghana, 10 April 2012

attract and tap into the potentials of skilled Ghanaians in the diaspora to aid in the development of the country¹⁶⁵². The objectives of the summit as stated by Manuah and Asante (2005: 298): *to develop a process of renewal of confidence of Ghanaians living abroad and those at home, to enhance dialogue and explore opportunities for productive relations between Ghanaians Living Abroad and their country and to identify the means to tap into the acquired capacities of Ghanaians living abroad for the creation of the nation's wealth*¹⁶⁵³. The Kufuor led government's diaspora Homecoming summit, could also be seen as a political act, as noted in previous chapters on the cleavage between diaspora politics and policies under various Ghanaian governments. To this effect, President Kufuor made a plea to the Ghanaian diaspora to return and help build the country with their expertise, during his inaugural speech in 2001 he noted that: *"come back home where you belong to join in building a new Ghana* ¹⁶⁵⁴". The 2001 Ghana diaspora Home Coming Summit theme: *Harnessing the Global Ghanaian potential for the accelerated national development*¹⁶⁵⁵. The initiation of the Joseph project in 2005 by the Kufuor administration to make Ghana the spiritual home of pilgrimage for the Black Atlantic diaspora, these are all return initiatives for both the Ghanaian and the Atlantic diaspora.

In line with such development on return migration initiatives and policies at the 2017 Diaspora Homecoming Summit, President Akuffo Addo, remarked that: *Ghana needs its expatriate brains abroad to return and help with the country's development. He further noted that there are opportunities in various sectors that diasporans can make a difference with their expertise*¹⁶⁵⁶. The 2019 Year of Return initiative by the NPP government to attract the return to the Black Atlantic Diaspora, all these initiatives indicates the importance that the government accords to the cause of return migrants.

These Diaspora Homecoming Summit in 2001 and in 2017 are political gestures, by the NPP regime in recognition of the support they gained from the diaspora during

¹⁶⁵² Arthur, J.A., 2016.Op. Cit. p.35

¹⁶⁵³ Awumbila, M. Manuh.T, Quarty.P, Tagoe C. and Bosiakoh T 2008, art.cit. pp. 17

¹⁶⁵⁴ The Presidential Address: *Inaugural speech by President John Agyekum Kufuor, Fourth President of the Republic of Ghana at Independence Square Accra January 7th 2001*:
<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/prez-inug-adr.php>

¹⁶⁵⁵ Ghana Investment and Promotion Centre archive documentation

¹⁶⁵⁶ Field work notes, Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit 5-8 July 2017, Accra Conference Centre, Accra

their time in opposition. The other factors contributing to this trend of returnees from the diaspora, is the efforts that the government of Ghana both NPP and NDC, have gradually put in place to attract the return of its “sons and daughters” in the diaspora to aid in its national and economic development¹⁶⁵⁷. To this effect, the current government has launched initiatives such as tax incentives in key sectors to facilitate returnees to invest within the agricultural, mining, construction and transportation sectors by subsidizing certain investment cost related to investing in these areas¹⁶⁵⁸. Although, these policy ideas appear to be a progressive direction in theory, its implementation and sustainability seem to be the stumbling block. As Kleist (2015) observed these policies are a kind of political positioning exercise when state shows interest, but does not necessarily follow-up with implementation¹⁶⁵⁹

C. Push factors

C. 1: Returning to make a difference: skilled and unskilled returnee investment and business

Asompong et al noted in their study on the return of Ghanaian medical professionals, observed that most returnees came back home with the idea to make a difference with their newly acquired experiences and knowledge¹⁶⁶⁰. Generally, more psychological resistance and physical obstacles are encountered by returnees in the public sector¹⁶⁶¹. Yet, in spite of these difficulties, some of the older elite migrants who went to work in the civil service were able to achieve some important changes after their return in Ghana¹⁶⁶². Having accessed key positions of responsibility and authority in various government departments and other public institutions or mixed organisations, they were in a strategic position to use the knowledge and skills they had acquired overseas to influence policymaking and the implementation of new policy measures¹⁶⁶³. An example of a 56-year-old Ghanaian, who explains that returning to Ghana from the US with the

¹⁶⁵⁷ Fieldwork Observation at the Ghana diaspora Home coming summit 5-9 July 2017, in Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁵⁸ Field work Observation at the Ghana diaspora Home Coming Summit,5-9 July 2017 in Accra Ghana, Speech by Mr. Yofi Grant Director of the Ghana Investment and Promotion Centre,

¹⁶⁵⁹ Kleist, N., 2015. Pushing development: a case study of highly skilled male return migration to Ghana. In *Africa's Return Migrants* (pp. 64-86). Zed Books.p.70

¹⁶⁶⁰ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Back to my roots: a study of "returning" emigrated health professionals in the greater Accra region of Ghana. *Africa today*, 59(4), p.123.

¹⁶⁶¹ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp145

¹⁶⁶² Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp145

¹⁶⁶³ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp145

professional experiences he acquired helped in launching and managing a new energy regulatory body which licenses all service providers in the energy sector:

'This is a new set-up that I've tried to put in place by using my expertise from the US... it is completely different from most institutions, but it is not easy because it's a new thing, there's no capacity, you have to build capacity, you have to change the orientation of people, you have to make sure that things are working properly, you want to develop some code of conduct in terms of standards of performance, and sometimes it is not accepted because that is not the culture of some people'¹⁶⁶⁴.

A sector where returnees use their skills as a game changer is within the health sector, a medical doctor who returned and opened a medical centre in Accra notes: *Now that I am here and working, I have solved a human resource factor by one health professional, and I hope many will return to help with the human-resource problem*¹⁶⁶⁵.

Another important arena for knowledge transfers has always been the tertiary and higher education sector, since many older-generation returnees decided to go back and teach students what they had learned abroad¹⁶⁶⁶. An Ivorian returnee, notes for example stated that it was clear that this was the type of contribution he needed to make:

'Rightly or wrongly, I thought I had acquired certain knowledge and that it was my duty to pass it on to others. Thus, a private enterprise offered me twice as much as the university, but I opted for the university, because I felt I was more useful there, I had something to transmit'¹⁶⁶⁷.

A returnee university professor at the faculty of Law at the University of Ghana also made a similar observation:

I came back to Ghana after my studies with a Ph.D. at McGill University and worked in Canada before relocating home. I knew with my acquired knowledge and experience, would make a difference in society through teaching at the University here in Ghana. I knew I would be much useful here in Ghana than in Canada'¹⁶⁶⁸.

Another lecturer at the University of Ghana notes:

My return home was not negotiable, after my PhD and teaching at Harvard University. I knew I had to come back home, because that was the initial plan, to finish studying, gain work experience and return home to teach and conduct research within Constitutional Law. Which is needed within the framework of ameliorating Ghana's constitution for the consolidation of our country's democracy. Which invariably contributes in making a difference in Ghana politically. Which was exactly what I

¹⁶⁶⁴ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.145

¹⁶⁶⁵ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. p.123.

¹⁶⁶⁶ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.147

¹⁶⁶⁷ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.147

¹⁶⁶⁸ Interview with Dr. Atua, university of Ghana Legon, September 2012, Accra

*did*¹⁶⁶⁹.

The private sector offers more opportunities for return migrants to instigate socio-cultural changes because generally there is less resistance¹⁶⁷⁰. To avoid some of the potential obstacles, several of the younger returnees decided to launch their own private firms or to work as independent consultants, because they faced less resistance of bureaucratic red tape in the private sector compare to the public sector¹⁶⁷¹. About 85% of respondents interviewed in Accra stated that they returned to establish business ventures, to manage pre-existing business enterprises or to explore the feasibility of starting a business and take advantage of Ghana's seemingly "booming" economy of the early and mid-2000s¹⁶⁷². The types of business ventures of returnees are as varied as their main reasons for returning. In other words, some had business ventures such as business and marketing consultancies, finance and insurance consultancies, creative media, tourism and hospitality industries, foreign consumer goods, auto sales, private medical practices, pharmacies, architecture and construction consultancies. Some are now the head of civil society organisations, think tanks, University lecturers and professors. In a similar vein, Arthur (2008) stated that occupation practiced by Ghanaian returnees from the US were mainly found in activities such as business ventures in similar industries to those indicated earlier in this chapter¹⁶⁷³. These aforementioned sectors are dominated by highly skilled returnees, as they use their educational, economic and social capitals acquired during their stay abroad as a social marker and transfer of knowledge in various business ventures¹⁶⁷⁴.

Added value from returned migrants, was also observed in a study on Ghanaian returned migrants.

'I think that I have learned so much because the 15 years I spent abroad were not all that rosy at all. Before I got into jobs in public relations, I had to do [many unskilled and menial jobs] ... It's all for the experience, it's just with my

¹⁶⁶⁹ Interview with Dr. Raymond Atuguba, university of Ghana, Legon, September 2012, Accra

¹⁶⁷⁰ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: the role of capital transfers. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 100(1), p.49

¹⁶⁷¹ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Art. Cit. p.49

¹⁶⁷² Fieldwork data 2012-2018, Accra Ghana

¹⁶⁷³ Arthur, J. 2008. Op.cit p.141

¹⁶⁷⁴ Bourdieu, P. 1982 "Les rites d'institution." *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* p. 58-63.

*interaction with people that I was able to learn so much. I learned more when I was out of school, than in school. Yes, if I had gone there without schooling, I would still have come back totally educated in terms of real-life experiences, and I think that's the energy that I brought back, that Ghanaians find so different in everything that I do. So, I can confidently say that who I am and what I now have, takes roots in the 15 years that I was in the States, which is an added value to what I can contribute to this country's advancement in my own little way*¹⁶⁷⁵.

These statements provide a positive correlation between skills and exposure returnee come back with and their process of re-integration. The above examples illustrate that returnees use whatever capitals acquired abroad to help their reintegration process in order to make a difference. This assertion is not the case of all returnees, as some struggled in identifying their niche employment potentials, as noted by one returnee, Nii Obodai: *“because there are so many untapped opportunities, which is confusing to concentrate on one specific aspect, as you can see business opportunities everywhere. As a result, I am all over the place trying my hands on every business opportunity that comes my way, which I guess leads me to not doing much in the end, and this can be quite frustrating*¹⁶⁷⁶”.

C: 2 Narratives of Involuntary returnees or “forced returnees”: a turning point in Ghana?

Deportation constitutes another form of involuntary return¹⁶⁷⁷. Deportation and detention have become increasingly used and normalized as practices in many migration destination and transit countries, not least in Europe and the US¹⁶⁷⁸. Social isolation and marginalization are frequently the difficulties involuntary returnees face once they are back home. It is particularly the case of return migrants who have lived for many years abroad, especially, those who have maintained little contact with their families and friends in their countries of origin, often find themselves with limited social network upon return¹⁶⁷⁹. With high expectations regarding the economic outcomes of migration, the

¹⁶⁷⁵ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp.149

¹⁶⁷⁶ Fieldwork interview with Nii Obodai, Accra, September 2012

¹⁶⁷⁷ Kleist, N. and Bob-Milliar, G., 2013. Life after deportation and migration crisis: the challenges of involuntary return. *DIIS Policy Brief*.p.3

¹⁶⁷⁸ Kleist, N. and Bob-Milliar, G., 2013. Art.cit.p.3

¹⁶⁷⁹ Kleist, N. and Bob-Milliar, G., 2013.Art. Cit. p.3

shame of returning emptyhanded can be almost unbearable. As stated in the general introduction of this thesis on returnee respondents sampling and profile during my fieldwork in Accra, it was fairly easy to find voluntary returnees, such as those who return by their own will and not by deportation. Involuntary returnees were a lot difficult to find and less visible in terms of recruiting them for the purposes of my fieldwork.

This is because of the social stigma and marginalisation that locals associate with deported and involuntary returnees as having “failed” in their migration trajectory. As in Ghana and other countries in the African sub-region, return migration is synonymous to upward social mobility. As such the sample of involuntary returnee, I interviewed were through the IOM Ghana Mission’s, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programs (AVRR) contacts, I was then working for the IOM Ghana Mission in 2012, which facilitated such contacts with a number of deported Ghanaians from the UK and other European countries.

Among those who were compelled to return to Ghana because, they had overstayed their legal entry to their host country and hence got deported by the UK authorities. Upon their return, under such circumstance some of these returnees were able to utilize their experience gained from the UK to establish themselves in some lucrative small business ventures. Kwame a forced returnee from the UK epitomize the example of returning to Ghana as being a turning point in his life. He noted: *I was working at a food processing factory in Kent in the UK when, one day immigration officers came for inspection and I was one of those who was taken away because I did not have my papers. I was kept in a detention centre at Oxford for 8 months, and I was later deported to Ghana. The UK government and IOM assisted me with £4.000 to help me reintegrate back into the Ghanaian society. So, I used that money to open a furniture shop here in Tema. Eventually my business grew from strength to strength, I now travel to China and Dubai to buy furniture for my shops, as I now have two shops. I think the best thing that happened to me was for me to be deported from London, as my life in London was just about surviving and scared if I got caught by the police, I would be deported, because I did not have papers. I was not happy at all; life was very hard for me. But since I have been back in Ghana, I even managed to find a wife, in London, I was unable to find a Ghanaian woman who*

*would accept me with my problems. So, the best thing the UK authority did for me was deporting me, as I am now better off here in Accra than in London, and I advise young people wanting to travel abroad to think twice because, there are opportunities here in Ghana and we do not need to go abroad to hustle*¹⁶⁸⁰...

For Kwame, his experience abroad as much as it was a difficult and at times a painful ordeal while abroad, his forced return to Ghana has turn-out to change his life for the better. His experience in London might have also influenced his choice of business and enabled him to identify a niche market to capitalize on, and as such Kwame might have learnt more through his experience abroad even though at the initial stage his migration trajectory in Britain was an unpleasant experience.

Another example of a returnee who came back to Ghana without financial resources, due to being deported from London, but also has been successful in her career since her return to Ghana. Cecilia states: *I was deported from the UK, 2 years ago. I had overstayed and my visiting visa had expired. I was able to study to upgrade my qualification. I took a teacher's training course to teach in a nursery. So, when I was deported to Ghana, I was given some financial assistance from the IOM office in Ghana through the UK government, with that money and some savings I had, I was able to open a small nursery school, which I am running myself. Although I am far from earning a huge salary, I am ok; I can feed myself and my family which is good enough*¹⁶⁸¹.

The above interviews are not representative of all the cases of forced involuntary returnees or deported migrants, as these forced returnees benefited from a scheme known as the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programs (AVRR) by the IOM and the UK government. The AVRR scheme provided financial assistance and other forms of assistance to aid in their reintegration process in Ghana. The scheme's mandate is to help forced return migrants to rebuild a life back home, and to limit the probability to re-emigrate.

To this end, the above statements indicates that although these two individuals were both deported, from the UK. They are both doing considerably well since they were

¹⁶⁸⁰ Field work interview with Kwame in Tema close to Accra, June 2012,

¹⁶⁸¹ Field work interview with Cecilia in Accra June 2012,

forced to return to Ghana, and as such the stigma related to forced returned migrants as failures is not visible. It also indicates that, if used properly, experience that migrants have gained abroad can be useful within the job market upon their return, regardless of the nature of their return. This is to illustrate that the confidence and exposure gained abroad can be an added value upon return regardless of the return being voluntary, involuntary or deported.

3.1.4. Characteristics of returnees in Accra

In terms of the demographic consideration of returnees in Accra, they tended to fall within the age brackets of 40-50 years, who made up 33% of the sample of respondents in 2012, followed by the 30-40 years bracket who also made up 27%. The 30-40 years old brackets all stated to be married with children, therefore the whole family relocating to Ghana. The 2017 and 2018 group discussion sample also indicated to be within similar age brackets as those interviewed in 2012. In other words, the age brackets for 30-50 years were those who had returned and settled in Accra in 2017 and 2018.

For employments of returnees in Accra, most indicated working as self-employed, respondents cited reasons for opting for self-employment as: finding it difficult to fit into working for government institutions, as there was too much bureaucracy, too much red-tape, work ethic is different from working abroad and generally wanting to put to use their experiences acquired from abroad to good use in their own capacity. Other studies carried out on returnee Ghanaians and their occupational activities also observed that: In total, just over half (55 per cent) of respondents were self-employed, compared to 30 percent in employment and 15 per cent not employed. The 2017 and 2018 sample of respondents were working as self-employed and mainly in start-ups they had created.

D-3-1: Enjoying better life:

The other contributing factor that propelled some Ghanaians to return home was to retire after years of working abroad and saving enough financial capital¹⁶⁸². These

¹⁶⁸² Grant, R., 2007, January. Geographies of investment: how do the wealthy build new houses in Accra, Ghana? In *Urban Forum* (Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 31-59). Springer Netherlands.p.45

types of returnees were less economically active¹⁶⁸³. For them, returning home was to spend the rest of their lives back home peacefully.

In terms of their lifestyle, they are also able to send their children to some of the prestigious schools in Accra and some returnees leave behind their families in the diaspora for the education of their children. At home, returnees live a life that is far from the life of the average Ghanaian¹⁶⁸⁴. They have access to modern equipment and facilities, such as satellite televisions and internet, and can afford to send their children abroad on summer holidays¹⁶⁸⁵. Most returnees have been successful in duplicating material comfort close to what they had in the diaspora or at times even more than what they had in the diaspora¹⁶⁸⁶. Hence, they have the best of both worlds: living in their own country and enjoying a lifestyle that is out of reach for more than 90 percent of the population of the country. Immigrating to the Western shore by many Ghanaians is seen as a quest for greener pastures, as such returning home with the right credentials and financial capital makes it even more economically rewarding than attempting to re-emigrate.

The household income of a returnee is relatively higher than that of an average Ghanaian who has not emigrated. The average household income of a returnee in Accra ranged between \$2.000 to \$ 8.000. A returnee doctor in a successful high-end clinic in Accra stated that he could earn up to \$8.000 a month, which enables him to afford a certain lifestyle which he could not have afforded even if he did earn the same income in America, where he lived before returning to Ghana¹⁶⁸⁷. In his case, he is now part of a class of rich Ghanaians, because of his professional status¹⁶⁸⁸.

The economic condition, as a reason to return home by far outweighs other conditions as stated by some returnees during a focus group interview in Accra. For some who return with their children, they return to a privileged private education system in Ghana which later enables them to gain access to some of the top UK universities.

Another example of a high-earning returnee is hotelier Joe, who has been running

¹⁶⁸³ Ibidem

¹⁶⁸⁴ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Art. Cit. p.50

¹⁶⁸⁵ Grant.R.2009. Op.Cit. p.28

¹⁶⁸⁶ Ibidem

¹⁶⁸⁷ Fieldwork data interview with a returnee doctor in Accra, June 2012, Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁸⁸ Fieldwork analysis June 2012

two Bed & Breakfasts in Accra for over 20 years. He indicated that in a good month he could earn more than \$5,000. As a result, this enabled him to send his children to some of the best international schools in Accra such as Lincoln College, an American International School. He returned to Ghana from Canada with his family, his children were born in Canada since they had Canadian passports, they could travel to Canada every holiday¹⁶⁸⁹. Their frequent visit to Canada was a way of maintaining their transnational ties and networks with their country of birth, Canada. The Children were eventually sent to Canada to attend university. The example of such returnee who still have one foot at home and the other in the diaspora, is a common trend among those who relocate to Ghana with their children, the children end up benefiting from both worlds, a good education in Ghana enables them travel abroad for further education ¹⁶⁹⁰.

To a large extent, the returnees have become part of the “Ghanaian bourgeoisie” living in relative affluence and enjoying a level of financial security due to access to foreign capitals and currencies. Another example of such returnee benefiting from both worlds is the example of an African-American lady married to a Ghanaian man, whom she met while they were both students in New York in the US. Her husband worked for Coca-Cola as a financial analyst in the US but was later expatriated to Coca Cola Africa office in South Africa, the Ivory Coast and then finally to Ghana¹⁶⁹¹. According to Jessica their children were raised both in the US and in other African countries including Ghana. She noted that as international expats, the kids benefited from attending American international schools in South Africa, Ivory Coast and in Ghana, as such they were able to gain admission to some of the top US universities¹⁶⁹². These examples are to illustrate that with the right kind of career i.e. working for multinationals such as Coca-Cola, Total or Shell, returnees and their children benefit from a lifestyle that propels them to a class of very privileged people. According to Jessica (the African-American lady), her children being born in the US to an African-American and a Ghanaian father, being raised in Africa has enabled her children to be grounded and rooted in terms of their identity construction

¹⁶⁸⁹ Fieldwork interview with Joe, June 2012 in Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁹⁰ Åkesson, L. and Baaz, M.E. eds., 2015. *Africa's return migrants: the new developers?* Zed Books Ltd...p.50

¹⁶⁹¹ Fieldwork interview with Jessica, June 2018 in Accra, Ghana

¹⁶⁹² Fieldwork interview with Jessica June 2018 in Accra, Ghana

and as such helped them in gaining real life perspective¹⁶⁹³. These examples above imply that returnee in privileged position hardly cut the umbilical cord with the diaspora, their return to Ghana is still rooted and maintained within the framework of transnationalism and therefore being permanent “bridge-builders” and “brokers”.

D-3-2: Financial and economic capital of skilled returnees:

The economic capital that returnees come home with enables them to live in some of Accra’s desirable areas. In most cases, they tend to live in areas such as gated communities with amenities similar to what they are used to in the diaspora. Most returnees tend to earn more than the average Ghanaian. Some of them spend over \$50 a day, whereas majority of the population live with a daily income of under \$1.25 a day¹⁶⁹⁴. The following chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to this notion of return migration as a panacea of social mobility. With this relatively high income and living standard of returnees, they continue to shape the culture and geography of Ghana in creating a sort of a “Ghanaian dream¹⁶⁹⁵”. To consolidate their social mobility and standard of living, most returnees from the diaspora in general, tend to live in Accra’s booming gated communities housing complex, inspired by the American and European standard¹⁶⁹⁶. These housing complexes are often found in leafy areas of Accra such as Cantonment, East Legon, and Airport residential Area etc. Most homes in these areas are specifically built to cater for a certain social class, such as the emerging middle class, and returnees from the diaspora, because they provide a certain comfort and lifestyle similar to the Western way of living, which some diasporans, after a long stay abroad are accustomed to¹⁶⁹⁷. Homes with regular running water, electricity, security and a place for networking with people of similar social class and needs¹⁶⁹⁸. For some of the returnee diasporans who are able to afford buildings or buying a house in a gated community or exclusive areas in Accra, they tend to view such investment as a sign of their permanent return to Ghana or as a

¹⁶⁹³ Fieldwork observation Accra 25 July 2018

¹⁶⁹⁴ Fieldwork data Accra, 2018

¹⁶⁹⁵ Grant. R. 2009. *Globalizing City: The urban and Economic Transformation of Accra, Ghana*, Syracuse University Press p. 80

¹⁶⁹⁶ Grant. R. 2009. *Op.Cit.* p.75

¹⁶⁹⁷ Arthur. J. 2008. *Op.cit.* p.143

¹⁶⁹⁸ Grant. R. 2009. *Globalizing City: The urban and Economic Transformation of Accra, Ghana*, Syracuse University Press p. 107

dream come true¹⁶⁹⁹. Although their return home, might reduce their income significantly on one hand, on the other hand, it has been compensated by a social mobility in terms of social standing and economic advancement.

Existing research shows that most returnees relocate to the most globally connected, urban centre (Cohen 2005). According to Grant (2009) evidence from Ghana shows that not only do returnee relocate to Accra, their investment is also concentrated in Accra¹⁷⁰⁰. Assompong et.al also points out in their study on returning Ghanaian health professionals opting mainly to settle in Accra: *Having worked in high-income countries, most professionals prefer working in similar conditions on their return. Hence, Accra. Hence, Accra becomes their first choice of place for work*¹⁷⁰¹.


Returnees in Accra tend to live in some of the most affluent areas of Accra. In these affluent areas, resides both professional and non-professional returnees, as the requirement needed to live in such areas is based on one's financial capability to build or to buy a house in a gated community and not one's professional status. Most returnees interviewed in Accra between 2012-2018 lived in areas such as Airport Residential Area, East Legon, Adjinganor, West Legon, Dzorowulu, Spintex Road, McCarthy Hill, Madina and Airport Hills, Reggie Manual Estates where most gated communities are located. As a result of their financial savings from abroad which has made it possible to climb the social ladder in Ghana, through acquiring a home in such exclusive areas of Accra.

Figure 0-93: Map of Accra: Areas with gated Communities and return migrants areas

¹⁶⁹⁹ Fieldwork interview with Jan in July 2018 in Accra, Ghana

¹⁷⁰⁰ Grant, R., 2009. Art.cit. p.93

¹⁷⁰¹ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.145



Source: fieldwork results 2012, map by V. Alfaut LAM 2015

3.1 5. Returnees as Developmental Panacea: Classification of returnees and Broad categorizations 2012-2018

Researchers in the area of migration have indicated that the successful return and reintegration of return migrants in their countries of origin have helped improve the human, financial, and social capital of these countries, thereby contributing to development (Naicker et al. 2009).

The socio-professional profile of returnees in Accra since the first fieldwork in 2011 has not changed and as such returnees can be classified as skilled or unskilled. Skilled returnees are those who come back with professions or vocational professions. These include: Lawyers, event management consultants, University lecturers, Doctors, Nurses, Architects, policy analyst, politicians etc. Vocational skills such as catering, hotel management, builders and mechanics. The unskilled returnees are those who came back with none of the aforementioned professions, but they return with economic capital to establish a business of any sort, most often they follow the general trend i.e. what is in “vogue” at the time¹⁷⁰².


As shown in the diagram below returnees within the professional and skilled category occupy both professional and economic returnee boxes, Whereas unskilled

¹⁷⁰² Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Art. Cit. p.49

and non-professionals only occupy the economic box, which is not surprising, but rather indicates that the human resources capitals of returnees, who come back with experiences opens ample of opportunities and other forms of business ventures for them.

Political and non-political returnees' is also dominated by skilled and unskilled professionals (see image 5 below)

Figure 0-94:Diagram:Claffication of Ghanaian returnee diaspora



Returnee classifications: Source field work results Accra 2012-2018

Table 17: Foreign human capital gains and their importance in current work, by country (%)

Importance of foreign human capital gains	Côte D'Ivoire		Ghana	
	Knowledge and skills	Work experience	Knowledge and skills	Work experience
Very important	73.3	56.2	82.4	77.1
Important	20.7	21.5	14.4	17.6
Fairly important	4.7	5	2.6	4.6
Not important	1.3	17.4	0.7	0.8

Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(n)	(150)	(121)	(153)	(131)

Source: From Nation-Building to Entrepreneurship: The Impact of Elite Return Migrants in Côte D'Ivoire and Ghana (2004) by Savina Ammassari

In Ammassari's comparative study on Ghanaian and Ivorian elite returnee she observed (see Table 17) that a high percentage of respondents in Côte D'Ivoire 73% and 82% in Ghana stated that 'Knowledge and Skills' they acquired abroad 'were very important' or 'important in the working experiences'¹⁷⁰³. A similar observation was also made among the sample of elite returnees in Accra interviewed between 2011-2018, where 75% of the sample respondents indicated that their acquired experience abroad helped them in their own work in Accra. A returnee medical doctor in Accra noted:

Dr. Asante: *Yes, the acquired experience of working as a physician in America obviously played an important part with the types of patients who come to my practice: They consider my practices being modern with all the latest medical equipment, which are not always available in public hospitals or clinics. So, yes, coming back home with experience, helps in gaining confidence and respect from my patients*¹⁷⁰⁴

Ammassari further notes that foreign 'work experience' was gained by 81% of the Ivorians and 85% of Ghanaians and was seen as an 'important' or 'very important' professional asset by 78% of the former and 95% of the latter¹⁷⁰⁵. These statements demonstrate that most migrants are not only willing, but even eager to apply what they have learned abroad in their home country, as was observed in a similar example of returnees in India and Mexico. In a similar development, Sinatti observed in a 2015 study on return Senegalese migrants and their reintegration process in their home country in which she noted that acquired Western work ethics that returnees came back with, was highly sought after in terms of being recruited for employment in Dakar particularly within the international development sector and among multinational groups¹⁷⁰⁶.

As seen in table 18, where returnees indicated that they applied new procedures, methods

¹⁷⁰³ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.144

¹⁷⁰⁴ Field work interview Dr. Abena Asante, Accra, June 2012

¹⁷⁰⁵ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.144

¹⁷⁰⁶ Sinatti G 2015 in Africa's Return Migrants. p.89

and ideas they acquired abroad in their current jobs in Ghana. This, therefore, shows the homogeneous link between Ghana and Côte D'Ivoire, where 89% of Ivorians and 95% of Ghanaians replied affirmatively to this question in table 17 on the impact of their experiences from the diaspora helping with their current jobs¹⁷⁰⁷.

These observations on the impact of returnees and the added value they bring to their workplace, via the qualification and experiences acquired abroad, shows through the evidence presented above that this is not only a Ghanaian case, but it is also observed in other locations. Based on objective and subjective indicators, suggesting that elite migration leads to human capital accumulation which in turn motivates return migrants to attempt to introduce changes in their workplace. This implies that social change through social remittances they brought back from abroad is the game changer between returnees and stayers within the job market in Ghana. In terms of the working hypothesis of this thesis, this means that elite return migration – with only some minor, though systematic differences among the two samples in London and Accra – clearly produces sociocultural, political as well as economic change potential at home. It is also important to note that this also, suggest that it depends mostly on the migrants' duration of absence and the length of their working experience abroad that makes the difference.

A.1 Political returnees:

Political returnees here are made-up of those who return to engage directly in Ghanaian politics and often these returnees are the categories of Ghanaians who were active members of Ghanaian political party branches in London. These political returnees are all of first-generation Ghanaian, in other words those born in Ghana before emigrating. An example is the director of Diaspora Affairs at the office of the president, Akwesi Awuah-Ababio was a former active member of NPP Party chapter in London¹⁷⁰⁸. There are currently 35 members of diaspora serving in various ministries, these are often active members of the diaspora the party's branches abroad. The current president Nana Akufo-Addo an Oxford university graduate who also worked for a law firm in Paris for 5 years, is also a political returnee. Same applies to the current vice president an economist and an academic who is also an Oxford educated forms part of the political diaspora

¹⁷⁰⁷ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.144

¹⁷⁰⁸ Fieldwork interview with Mr. Akwesi Awuah-Ababio, Accra 6 November 2018

returnee¹⁷⁰⁹. Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko, head of the Danquah-Busia Think Tank, affiliated to the NPP, was also an active member of the NPP branch in London before returning to head Danquah Institute and a former spokesperson for the NPP party. Gabby worked as a lawyer with a law firm in London before his return to Ghana.

In many instances, political returnees plan their return migration to Ghana to coincide with Ghanaian electoral period. For example, during the 2016 election active members of Ghanaian political party branches in London returned to campaign with the Party in Ghana and vote during the elections. This leads us to assume that their return consciously or not might have a link to politics. Returnees with strong social, economic and network capital constitutes the make-up of political returnees in Ghana. On political diaspora returning home to campaign for their party during election period Hamond (2015) observed a similar case with Somaliland political returnees: *During political campaign sessions many people have returned to Somaliland to work for their preferred candidate and parties. With links to fundraisers in the diaspora, they are able to help and setup campaign office and prepare publicity materials, but they also influence the formation of political platforms and campaign strategies*¹⁷¹⁰.

As it has been noted in previous chapters on Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in London where diasporans engaged either in UK politics or transnational politics towards Ghana. It was also noted that both current and past Ghanaian governments have derived some of their political elites from the diaspora, often coined as “transnational diaspora politicians¹⁷¹¹”. These returnees’ politicians are well known among Ghanaians abroad and in Ghana through their active transnational political activities.

The opposition party NDC has also courted its political diaspora returnees, who served in various positions in government during both the Mills administration and the Mahama administration an example is the former Minister of Health Alex Sebgefia, who was a former chairman of NDC UK branch. He practised law in the UK in various capacities such as a Crown Prosecutor, and then eventually becoming the Acting District Crown

¹⁷⁰⁹ Fieldwork observation, Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit 2017

¹⁷¹⁰ Hammond, L., 2015. Diaspora returnees to Somaliland: heroes of development or job-stealing scoundrels. *Africa's return migrants: the new developers*, p.50

¹⁷¹¹ Hamidu, J., 2015. Are Ghanaian Diaspora middle class? Linking middle class to political participation and stability in Ghana. *Africa Development*, 40(1), p140

Prosecutor at the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)¹⁷¹². The former mayor of Accra under the NDC government 2009-2016 serves a good example to illustrate the return of educated Ghanaian elite from the diaspora to have occupied political office, after living in the US for over 30 years. Same observation applies to the former CPP Party chairman Nii Armah Akomfrah, who worked as a surveyor in the UK, he was also an active member of the CPP Party branch in London before returning home to engage in politics. These cited examples above constitute part of the professional and skilled category of the Ghanaian diaspora returnees in politics. This therefore demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between educated elites and political returnees in politics in Ghana.

Example of President Kufuor in his 2001 inaugural speech in which he encouraged political returnees to come back home and help with the country's development:

*Those of our compatriots who have made homes beyond our shores, I make a special plea for your help; we need your newly acquired skills and contacts, we need your perspective, and we need your capital. Those who left and have stayed out, only because of the military revolution or political differences, I say come back, come back home where you belong and let us join in building a new Ghana. I pledge that it will not be a case of one set of Ghanaians coming back from exile to be replaced by another set of Ghanaians going into exile. Multiparty democracy is here to stay in our country. There is room for differences of opinion, our political opponents have their honoured roles to play, and I urge all of us to extend the same tolerance to each other that we want for ourselves*¹⁷¹³.

Hammond (2015) observes in her study on Somaliland diaspora returnees who engage in politics by stating the following: *diaspora returnees engaged in local NGOs say that they believe they are contributing the development of Somaliland. They also believe that by engaging with and strengthening civil society they can play an important in role in challenging the political establishment*¹⁷¹⁴. *Many returnees speak out in public forums or through their connection with diaspora communities, provide an independent monitoring function that helps further the causes of*

¹⁷¹² Alex Segbefia UK citizen: <http://graphic.com.gh/news/politics/27021-i-never-applied-for-british-citizenship-segbefia.html#sthash.mfkWZmlc.dpuf>

¹⁷¹³ The Presidential Address: *Inaugural speech by President John Agyekum Kufuor, Fourth President of the Republic of Ghana at Independence Square Accra January 7th 2001*: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/prez-inug-adr.php>

¹⁷¹⁴ Hammond, L., 2015.art.cit.p.55

*democratisation and human rights*¹⁷¹⁵. On diaspora returnees as political game changers, Hamond further stated that: *Women diaspora returnees heads of civil society organisations also stressed that they are able to challenge traditional gender roles by becoming leaders in civil society. They lobby the political establishment and international development community to promote the rights and opportunities for Women in Somaliland society*¹⁷¹⁶.

In Ammasari (2003) comparative studies on Ghanaian and Ivorian returnees, she observed that some older returnee in Cote d'Ivoire, decided to go back to work at the university because, they could pursue political activities and campaign for a plural political system (N'Da, 1987). The education sector for example has long remained the greatest source of opposition and protest against the government in Cote d'Ivoire, and a suitable ground for returnees to foster some of the democratic ideas they brought back from overseas¹⁷¹⁷.

Ammasari further observed in her study that a 51-year-old Ivorian professor recalled how he and other colleagues who had been involved in politically oriented student movements in France, had returned with the idea of creating a political opposition party back home. They had decided to deploy their initial efforts in the university context because they felt they needed to raise the awareness of the younger generations¹⁷¹⁸. The other reason was that they decided to use the teaching staff's trade union as a platform for their unofficial political action, since a multi-party system was sanctioned only later in 1990. Another middle-aged Ivorian university professor also returned from France to form one of the first opposition parties with other returnees:

*'We have contributed much to the experience of multiple political parties because we were the only ones who had seen how a democratic society works, how parties different from the one in power operated, and we have reflected on how we could have gone about that here*¹⁷¹⁹.'

Political change was also fostered by some of the Ghanaian elite returnees, for example this 57-year-old lecturer who, after his return from the UK, campaigned against

¹⁷¹⁵ ibidem

¹⁷¹⁶ ibidem

¹⁷¹⁷ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.146

¹⁷¹⁸ Ibidem

¹⁷¹⁹ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp147

authoritarian rule in Ghana by publishing articles in newspapers and writing books:

'My experiences also made me very human rights conscious, you know, because certain things cannot just be done in Britain, and you just wonder why a person should be brutalized and then get away with it. Why a government should think it is not accountable to its people, why a person should dare suppose that the rule of law does not stretch to him because he happens to be in power. I spoke about some of these things even when the military regime was there, I wrote in newspapers, I spoke on radio when I had the opportunity to be interviewed. They didn't like it, but I did what I could as some kind of public advocacy'¹⁷²⁰.

A.2. Academic returnees

Academic returnees represent those who relocate to work in academia mostly in Ghanaian universities, particularly at Ghana's premier University, the University of Ghana, Legon. Other returnee academics and scholars work for local Think Tanks and Civil Society bodies such as Centre for Democratic Development, CDD Ghana and IMANI Ghana, some academic returnees become government ministers and political appointees. These academic returnees are mostly Ph.D. holders and mainly composed of first-generation Ghanaians, who left Ghana to study and return upon completion of their studies. Examples of academic returnees who were interviewed in Accra in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2017 and 2018 are: Prof. John Nabila, former head of the Department of Geography and the president of the National House of Chiefs studied for his post-graduate and Ph.D. in the US; Prof. Abladi Glover, He is an artist and a professor of Fine Arts and former head of the department of Arts at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Sciences and Technology, he studied in the US at Kent State University for his first degree and he earned his Masters and PhD at the Ohio State University also in the US.

Prof. Mariama Awumbila, former head of the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana, Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Newcastle in the UK. Others such as Prof. Appiagyeyi-Atua, Prof. Raymond Atuguba both professors at the faculty of Law at the University of Ghana, returned after earning Ph.D. from McGill University in Canada and Harvard University in the US. Another, example of an academic returnee who established Ghana's first local Think Tank, is Prof. Gyimah-Boadi,

¹⁷²⁰ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp147

Executive Director, of Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and the Executive Director of Afrobarometer. Who studied in the US for his M.A and Ph.D. at the University of California, before returning to Ghana to teach at the department of political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon, he noted this during an interview in Accra in 2013 and a follow-up informal conversation in Accra in 2018 about his professional and academic trajectory.

A.3. Non-political returnees

This category of non-political returnees constitutes both skilled and unskilled returnees. Skilled returnees who are not interested in frontline politics, often they stated reasons as ‘being tired of the current state of affairs’ because not much is being done to make real social changes¹⁷²¹. This assertion was made during a protest in Accra by a group named “Concerned Ghana middle class” in 2015 who petitioned the Government over economic hardship¹⁷²². Studies on skilled non-political returnees in Jamaica, illustrates similar observation on the mistrust among such returnees vis-à-vis the political class, mainly being viewed as only serving their own interest¹⁷²³. Whereas the remaining unskilled Ghanaian returnees stated they were not interested in politics because they did not want to get meddled with authorities and that it was far away from their main concerns and day to day life¹⁷²⁴.

A.4. Business and economic returnees

These are composed of those who return from the diaspora to set-up business and start-ups. These are mainly professionals who had well paid jobs and careers which enabled them to save enough capital before returning to invest in Ghana. This category comprises of both first- and second-generation Ghanaians. Example Kwesi is a first-generation Ghanaian with a Ph. D who studied at Cambridge University and worked in London for a number of years, before returning to Ghana set-up a multi-media company in Accra in

¹⁷²¹ Interview with Sara Asafo, Accra 2013

¹⁷²² Ghana’s angry middle-class petitions Mahama over economic hardships:

<http://www.starrfmonline.com/1.1770729>

¹⁷²³ Horst, H.A., 2007. ‘You can’t be two places at once’: rethinking transnationalism through Jamaican return migration. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 14(1-2), pp.63-83.

¹⁷²⁴ Fieldwork interview with Kwame in Accra, June 2012

2004. Another example is Jane, a second-generation Ghanaian who worked with British Airways as a public relations officer, return to Ghana in 2008 to set up a Public Relations company in Accra.

A.5. Professional returnees

This category constitutes all forms of highly skilled professionals: Lawyers, Doctors, Nurses and Architects etc... First-generation returnees form about 80 percent of these professional returnees and remaining 20 per cent are of second-generation¹⁷²⁵. Joe Osie an architect who studied, lived and worked in Los Angeles returned in 2001 and currently bringing a different dimension to building houses in Ghana, also epitomizes the profile of highly skilled returnees in Ghana.

3.1.6 Re-integration and Re-adjustment challenges in Accra: the struggle between models of achievement and “rejection ”

Some migration scholars have examined the relationship between integration, assimilation and return (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1973; Esser, 1980). They claimed that return occurred because migrants were unable to integrate or assimilate into their host country society. Rogers (1984:233) has argued that “*Returns may indeed indicate failure to become integrated and assimilated into the host country, but they may not do so. For some migrants they may have ‘new’ decisions, arrived at the basis of changed personal and societal circumstance*”¹⁷²⁶. There are also various studies on the difficulties that returnees face upon relocating back to their home countries (Bovenkerk, 1974; Gmelch, 1980; King, 2000; and Lepore, 1986). Gmelch, (1980) has distinguished two perspectives from which this question can be approached. On the one hand, the economic and social situation of returnees can be examined, such as looking for an employment and housing, participation in association, and so on. On the other hand, migrants’ own perceptions can be measured based on the degree of “satisfaction” or “dissatisfaction” with regards to their expectation nurtured vis-à-vis the home country upon return.

Readjustment problems have been considered as an indicator of social change brought

¹⁷²⁵ Fieldwork data Accra 202-2018

¹⁷²⁶ Rogers, R., 1984. Return Migration in Comparative Perspective in Kubat, D., The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe. *Center for Migration Studies, Rorna-New York.*

about by return migrants. Cerase (1974) has for example postulated that the greater the conflict of re-adaptation due to the changed value structure of returnee migrants, the greater the probability that they provoke social change¹⁷²⁷. Conversely, the more traditional their value orientation upon return, the less likely they are to bring change about innovation and social change. King (2000) has indicated that these hypotheses find confirmation in much existing empirical evidence. But he also emphasised the ambivalence that accompany migrants return¹⁷²⁸. This implies that on the one hand, migrants are relieved to be back home in a familiar context. On the other hand, they are often quite disappointed after return and easily irritated with how things are done at home. Also, the relationship between returnees and stayers is generally ambiguous (Gmelch 1980)¹⁷²⁹.

Return migration is often associated with a period of transition from the diaspora into settling home, which is not always a smooth transition¹⁷³⁰. Multiple literatures on return migration in various countries both in developed countries and in developing countries, demonstrates the challenges returnees face in their re-integration process in their homeland¹⁷³¹. These integration challenges are both from the lack of clearly defined return policies of homeland governments, but also personal challenges from colleagues and family who are no longer on the same wavelength as returnees or that returnees themselves are not in sync with local realities¹⁷³². The returnee is confronted with being disconnected with homeland realities and the changes that migration has had on returnees' sense of identity and sense of belonging is often manifested in their integration process back home.

Returnee respondents in Accra complained about the competition that existed between “returnees and stayers”. Stayers believe returnees come back and take their jobs,

¹⁷²⁷ Cerase, F.P., 1974. Expectations and reality: a case study of return migration from the United States to Southern Italy. *International migration review*, 8(2), pp.245-262.

¹⁷²⁸ King, R. and Christou, A., 2011. Of counter-diaspora and reverse transnationalism: return mobilities to and from the ancestral homeland. *Mobilities*, 6(4), pp.451-466.

¹⁷²⁹ Gmelch, G., 1980. Return migration. *Annual review of anthropology*, 9(1), pp.135-159.

¹⁷³⁰ Ammassari.S and Black.R, 2001 Harnessing the Potential of Migration and Return to Promote Development: Applying Concepts to West Africa, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva.p.17

¹⁷³¹ Ammassari.S and Black.R, 2001.p. 19

¹⁷³² Ibidem

without having to go through the ranks¹⁷³³. A recent example of an Anglo-Ghanaian trained architect Sir David Adjaye, whose company was awarded 12 contracts by the government to build new state edifices. The award of the contracts did not go through the state procurement procedure, which indicates multiple bidding is required before any state contract could be awarded to any company¹⁷³⁴. To this effect, a petition was forwarded to the president by the Ghana Institute of Architects denouncing such unfair practices:

A petition has been forwarded to the President by the Ghana Institute of Architects raising concerns about procurement breaches and unfair practices in the award of some lucrative contracts to the firm owned by renowned Ghanaian-born British architect, Sir David Adjaye. In an interview with the press in Parliament, Adwoa Safo Minister for Procurement said the concerns raised by the local architects were legitimate. Sir David Adjaye's architectural firm has already courted controversy because of its work on the National Cathedral and the new Parliamentary complex¹⁷³⁵. The Ghanaian Architects Association petition to the president further states: But the crux of the local architecture firm's complaints had to do with the procurement process which it described as "bizarre." It maintained in the petition that David Adjaye & Associates was selected "contrary to all notions of fairness to carry out projects when it is clear that anyone firm would be overburdened by projects of such magnitude¹⁷³⁶."

On the same case another petition by a Ghanaian Architectural firm, Design and Associates Development Consortium, petitioned President Akufo-Addo, over possible bias in the award of 12 state projects to David Adjaye & Associates: *Design and Associates argue that these two projects, in addition to others like the Marine Drive Master Planning, Trade Fair Centre redesign and the GNPC Accra Head Office, were*

¹⁷³³ Waterbury, M.A., 2010. Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics. *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, pp.131-148.

¹⁷³⁴ Sir David Adjaye; a messiah or a hindrance to architectural practice in Ghana?: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/features/ghana-news-sir-david-adjaye-a-messiah-or-a-hindrance-to-architectural-practice-in-ghana.html>

¹⁷³⁵ Sir David Adjaye; a messiah or a hindrance to architectural practice in Ghana?: <https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/features/ghana-news-sir-david-adjaye-a-messiah-or-a-hindrance-to-architectural-practice-in-ghana.html>

¹⁷³⁶ Gov't to probe contracts awarded Adjaye and Associates, news article in Ghanamma on July 7 2019: <https://www.ghanamma.com/2019/07/18/govt-to-probe-contracts-awarded-adjaye-and-associates/>

not awarded fairly. The firm is raising concerns over Mr. Adjaye's legitimacy to practice in Ghana because he is not a resident per the Architects Decree (NRCD 357). Design and Associates also said Mr. Adjaye's firm is recruiting architects from beyond Ghana and ignoring local talent¹⁷³⁷.

Sir David Adjaye responds to these allegations from the local architects that his company was favoured in being awarded lucrative Government of Ghana contracts. The petition against him claims that he does not have a licence to practice in Ghana and yet he was awarded such important contracts because he is a diasporan and has links to the right people in government.

Sir Adjaye states: *“Why do you think somebody of my calibre would come into Ghana and not have a licence to practice? Am I suddenly not professional anymore after I have worked at the highest level everywhere why would I not bring that excellence to Ghana? I don't think my country knows me yet and I understand that they don't know what I've done yet and I hope that they will soon see what I'm capable of doing¹⁷³⁸”*

This example of Sir David Adjaye demonstrates the challenges that skilled and professional returnees encounter back home in Ghana, although the cited example is a high-profile Ghanaian diaspora professional. Other Skilled and professional Ghanaian diasporas returnee interviewed in Accra between 2011-2018 voiced similar concerns of the challenges they faced in Accra in terms of re-adjustment and reintegration both professionally and personally.

Although some respondents stated in the interviews that they returned to put to good use their acquired knowledge and experience for the development of “Mother Ghana”¹⁷³⁹. These entrenched challenges often hinder their re-integration process back home. For example, from the viewpoint of political returnees, they have long been criticised by locals for being disconnected with local realities, as they have

¹⁷³⁷ Sir David Adjaye; a messiah or a hindrance to architectural practice in Ghana?:

<https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/features/ghana-news-sir-david-adjaye-a-messiah-or-a-hindrance-to-architectural-practice-in-ghana.html>

¹⁷³⁸ Ghanaians don't know me well enough – Sir David Adjaye:


<https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2019/September-26th/i-dont-think-ghanaians-know-me-yet-sir-david-adjaye.php>

¹⁷³⁹ Fieldwork observation in Accra July 2018

been abroad for lengthy period of time ¹⁷⁴⁰. For political returnees, this absence serves as an obstacle to their political career and political ambitions. It is therefore not unusual to observe the strategic political engagement of diasporans in London, as highlighted previously. These strategic political engagements, towards Ghana from London helps them to gain that political visibility, credibility and legitimacy through long-distance transnational political engagement. Which in turn paves way for their transition into politics without being viewed as disconnected politicians by their critics¹⁷⁴¹.

This competition between returnees and stayers in the job market is not only limited to the political sphere and architects, but in all sectors, as most returnees complained about the fact that they could not utilise their acquired skills and knowledge properly once home. This is due to the constant issue of having been away for a long period and their legitimacy to practice their profession is often questioned by locals. This was one of the reasons advanced by some returnees seeking to work as self-employed, as opposed to working for government institutions, where their skills could help to make a difference or aid in making policy difference.

Figure 0-95: Returnee diaspora integration process: Competition between returnee and stayers



¹⁷⁴⁰ Fieldwork discussions with David Appiah, Governance Expert at the UNDP Office in Accra, 28 May 2013, Accra Ghana

¹⁷⁴¹ Fieldwork discussion with Prof. Peter Quartey in Accra at a work on Drafting Ghana Migration Policy phase II, organised by the International Organisation for Migration in Accra 24 May 2012

However, by no means all efforts to produce change are crowned by success of return diasporas, as the challenges returnee face with their reintegration process attests to this notion. Therefore, with regards to the original hypothesis stating that elite return migrants foster development and political change upon return, or that they are ‘agents of change’. The questions arises how they attempt to introduce those changes and how the changes are or were received by homeland authorities. In other words, the question of how frequently the application of these procedures, methods and ideas caused difficulties or tensions, for instance with colleagues’ back is of important relevance.

Table 18: Application of foreign human capital gains, by country (%)

Application of foreign human capital gains	Côte D’Ivoire	Ghana
Have you tried to introduce and apply any new procedures/ methods/ ideas in your workplace?		
Yes	89.3	95.4
No	10.7	4.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(n)	(149)	(153)
Do you consider the way you work particularly different compared with that of colleagues who have not lived abroad?		
No, not really	15.3	7.8
Yes, very much	50.7	55.2
Yes, to some extent	34	37
Total	100.0	100.0
(n)	(150)	(154)

Source: From Nation-Building to Entrepreneurship: The Impact of Élite Return Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (2004) by Savina Ammassari

These reintegration challenges and difficulties in transferring accumulated capitals from the diaspora for homeland development is not exclusive to the Ghanaian example.

The above table 18, illustrates that this type of problem was encountered ‘often’ or ‘very often’ by 43% of the Ivorians and by 25% of the Ghanaians, and ‘occasionally’ by 25% of the first and 40% of the second. This observation resonates with the sample interviewed in Accra between 2012 and 2018, where some returnees complained about

the frustrations, they encountered at their workplace and in the advancement of their business since their relocation.

In Ammassari's comparative study, she further observed that Ivorian returnees tended to return with job related experience whilst abroad, they spent more time in education than their Ghanaian counterparts. She also noted that Ivorian returnees were more inclined in returning to civil service and into bureaucratic structures, as a result they tended to encounter more resistance to their efforts for change and re-integration back home¹⁷⁴². Whereas returnee Ghanaians came back with qualification but also with practical experience, which enabled them to establish their own private enterprises and practices, she observed that returnee Ghanaians are less inclined in returning to work in civil services and government structures¹⁷⁴³. This means that Ghanaian returnees faced more challenges in getting the right institutional assistances to get their business off the ground, this could be attributed to bureaucratic red-tape procedures, or the attitudes that locals perceive of returnees in terms business opportunities.

A returnee Ghanaian medical Doctor shared a similar sentiment on the challenges he faced in his reintegration back in Ghana: He was interviewed in 2012 and noted:

I came back from Canada, in the early 2000s and went to work at the Korle Bu teaching hospital in Accra, the biggest university teaching hospital in the country. I am a trained cardiologist, with over 15 years' experience working in Toronto Canada before returning home. After practicing for a few years, I was promoted to head my unit at the hospital. I became, the subject of serious contention with my colleagues at the hospital. Who thought, my promotion was not merited because, I had not served enough as a consultant, and that my promotion was purely on the fact that I had returned from abroad. Whereas they, local doctors and consultants, had to go through the ranks, which took years before such promotion. But what they failed to understand was that I downgraded my status when I came home, because I wanted to help my country. This whole situation became too much for me to bear so I eventually left the hospital and now I operate my own private practice with other colleagues' doctors who are returnees too. It is a shame, because I initially wanted to serve the general

¹⁷⁴² Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.145

¹⁷⁴³ Ibidem

public by choosing to return home and work for a state-run hospital. But this treatment has made it impossible because operating a private Clinique only serves those who can financially afford it which is a shame, I must admit¹⁷⁴⁴.

Joe, first-generation returnee interviewed in 2012 and 2017 in Accra also mentioned in the below statement as the challenges he faced in adjusting back home:

I returned to Ghana in 2000 from Los Angeles where I worked as an architect. I have had many challenges within my field of work as an architect here in Ghana. Too much red-tape and government regulation on buildings on the one hand, and on the other hand lack of explicit regulation on safety procedures in building sites makes it complicated to get work done properly. There is also the lack of using our own local products such as Bamboo trees to build home in here in Ghana. Work ethic is not the same etc... Yes, at times I came across as someone who is not in sync with the way things are done here in Ghana and its almost 17 years since I came back home.

Ammassari also noted the case of a 51-year-old Ivorian returnee from France and the challenges of adapting and adjusting in Ivory Coast:

'You are admired because you are seen as someone who has ideas, someone who can help, contribute to change and improve the situation. Perhaps sometimes people even expect too much from you, both resources and ideas¹⁷⁴⁵.'

These above statements on the one hand illustrates, a mixture of positive and negative view that returnees encounter in their country of origin. On the other hand, returned migrants are seen as a threat to the existing order and values, for example the statement below of a 37-year-old Ivorian migrant who returned from the US notes:

'When you get here people point at you with their finger, meaning there he is, the newcomer who has new ideas, who wants to change everything. Perhaps it's a bit caricatured, but essentially, it's like that especially in the workplace¹⁷⁴⁶.'

Challenges faced by returned health professionals in Ghana was noted by Asampong et al: A nurse respondent said: *"By the time one is done going through an interview and getting an appointment letter, your colleagues who went to the private sector*

¹⁷⁴⁴ Interview with Dr. Charles, Dzorwulu, Accra, July 2012

¹⁷⁴⁵ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.145

¹⁷⁴⁶ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit pp145

would have moved ahead and already settled in¹⁷⁴⁷.” Other challenges occurred at the facility level, and they include interpersonal challenges, as mentioned by some respondents. One said: “When you return, of course your colleagues would also have moved on to higher positions, but they still feel intimidated by you and would want to frustrate you. Some administrations would even have you start from where you left off—which to me is a discouragement to return¹⁷⁴⁸”. Another said: “Sometimes at work, you may get an understanding manager; you may also come across the other one, who will let you feel that when things were difficult when you left. Now that you have come, they make things difficult for you and make you feel alone¹⁷⁴⁹”.

Also, these return migrants’ accounts confirmed the existence of an ambiguous and sometimes contrasting relationship between return migrants and non-migrants, a problem that has already been addressed in the return migration literature (Ghosh, 2000; King, 2000). The complexity of this relationship was highlighted in the Ivorian returnee study, by a 41-year-old Ivorian who returned from Germany states that:

‘There often is repulsion vis-à-vis those who stayed. I would even say that many of them have a certain inferiority complex, just as many of those who went abroad have a superiority complex. They say to themselves – I know better – whereas we may know a little more, but not necessarily better; and those who stayed here say – he has lived in Europe, he did this, he did that. There is a great, great problem of reintegration¹⁷⁵⁰.’

The same difficulties were also encountered by returnee Ghanaians in Accra in 2013 and in Ammassari’s work in 2003 on the account of a 43-year-old Ghanaian returnee who explained how he and others who returned from abroad were seen by those who never emigrated, resisted any changes they wanted to promote:

‘What we normally say in this country is that he’s a person that is “too known” [i.e. a “know all”] – you think you know everything; you think you are cleverer than anybody else. But there’s a habit in this country of people saying that this is

¹⁷⁴⁷ Asampong, E., Harrison, J.A., Yarney, L., Opoku-Mensah, K., Karim, A.S. and Fobil, J.N., 2013. Art.Cit.p.125

¹⁷⁴⁸ Ibidem

¹⁷⁴⁹ Ibidem

¹⁷⁵⁰ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.145

how we used to do things, this is how we've been doing things for the past ten years and it's good, when it's obvious to the most basic mentality that this is no good, it's not getting us anywhere ¹⁷⁵¹.

It is therefore observed that this results in a situation where a high proportion of returnees – 49% of Ivorians and 29% of Ghanaians – had to admit that ‘often’ or ‘very often’ they felt frustrated at being unable to apply some of their expertise and skills back home. Many more Ivorians than Ghanaians felt frustrated, probably because a greater share of the former were employed in the public sector and in large institutions ¹⁷⁵². Those who were working in the public sector were not only more likely to feel frustrated, but also more generally less satisfied with their current work conditions (e.g. income, career opportunities, responsibility, management, relationships with colleagues, organisational culture). Moreover, some other problems, such as the lack of adequate infrastructure, equipment and facilities, or oppressive bureaucracy, tend to be amplified in the public sector, was also cited in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2017 and 2018 sample of respondents in Accra.

But more significant, in theoretical terms, is the evidence that the development impacts of return migration depend upon the attitudes of the receivers almost as much as upon the efforts of the proponents. The way return migrants are perceived back home by those who have never emigrated is contradictory, as it emerged from the accounts of the returnees’ narratives collected during in-depth interviews in Accra in 2012, 2017 and 2018. Return migrants perceive themselves to be valued as they are viewed to be those who bring back with them innovative ideas from abroad, in popular perceptions in Ghana which often associated with what comes from abroad is considered as better, this in turn cast them into the role of “brokers” and “developmental panaceas” ¹⁷⁵³. Another expression that is widely used in Ghana to denote return migrants is ‘have been to’, a term which also reflects their ‘know-it-all’ attitude and often perceived as arrogant and condescending attitude towards those who have never moved or travelled abroad¹⁷⁵⁴.

From the interviews conducted in Accra in 2012, 2017 and 2018 it emerged, that an

¹⁷⁵¹ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.147

¹⁷⁵² Ibidem

¹⁷⁵³ Fieldwork discussions with Kofi in Accra November 2018

¹⁷⁵⁴ Fieldwork interview with Kofi Blankson in Accra November 2018

increasing number of returnees are starting to realize that they do not know it all, they cannot change the system overnight; they first have to regain a thorough understanding of how the local system works. Other studies on return migration and challenges returnee face posits that on the one hand, having been abroad for a prolonged time periods, returned migrants have lost contact of realistic insight into their home context; non-migrants are frequently considered more knowledgeable in this respect^{1755 1756}. On the other hand, non-migrants are warming to the idea that returnees have something special to offer, in particular a wider and more detached perspective and a broader frame of reference to examine and act upon certain development issues¹⁷⁵⁷. In brief, those who have been away are usually in a better position to compare and contrast, hence such capability can at times foster competition within the job market and at times attract unpleasant remarks and hostilities towards returnees from the local population¹⁷⁵⁸.

The return migrants' capacity to apply foreign capital gains in their workplace is not only hampered by the ambivalent relationships they have with non-migrants and the latter's resistance to change and reluctance to participate in new initiatives. It is also influenced by the difficulty that return migrants have in re-adapting to the local work culture and conventional ways of doing things, the poor local physical working conditions, the lack of basic facilities and up to date equipment, and the slow bureaucracy including red tape and corruption, are some of the concerns returnees in Accra raised as part of what hinders their reintegration in Ghana¹⁷⁵⁹.

3.1.7 Second-generation integration challenges

Jeny, second-generation returnee interviewed in 2017 and 2018 in Accra: *I encountered a lot of challenges whilst working for the government agency purely because of my work ethic was quite different to the norm and people working under my supervision found it challenging to work at a certain standard. Especially some male colleagues*

¹⁷⁵⁵ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.147

¹⁷⁵⁶ Thomas-Hope, E., 1999. Return migration to Jamaica and its development potential. *International migration*, 37(1), pp.183-207.

¹⁷⁵⁷ Ammassari.S 2003, art.cit p.147

¹⁷⁵⁸ ibidem

¹⁷⁵⁹ ibidem

working under my supervision some could not accept taking orders and directions from a woman, as result a male civil servant resigned from his position after 18 years of working for that government agency, because I was heading that agency. There are many challenges working as a returnee here in Ghana, as you are often admired by some and others view you as a threat to their own position...

Mety, second-generation returnee interviewed in Accra in 2018: *As a second-generation returnee, I was working for L'Oréal an international company which meant that my colleagues were both Ghanaians and other nationalities too, therefore the working environment was more international. I did not encounter much hostility at work. But I did encounter some challenges with our suppliers here in Ghana, this is based on misunderstanding in communication strategies...*

Vina, second-generation returnee interviewed in 2012:

The challenges, I encountered was not at my workplace, but rather in my lifestyle choices. I used to attend Yoga class in London, so I thought I could continue doing Yoga and Pilates in Accra, although, I found a place to do Yoga in Accra, it was not something the locals understood. I was often mis-understood for some of my lifestyle choices here in Ghana, which at times does not resonate with my extended family here in Ghana. So, in that sense I was not in sync with the local ways of doing things.

- **Abena, second-generation returnee interviewed in 2012:**

The challenges I encountered fitting into the Ghanaian society was both on professional fronts and in my personal life. Having a business that necessitated working directly with local suppliers. It was hard to get my local suppliers to respect a certain professional standard meaning supplying products on the said day and time was always a struggle...It is to say that punctuality is a big issue and a challenge for me when working with local suppliers for my business as they have a laissez-faire attitude towards meeting strict business deadline...

- **Makeba, second-generation returnee interviewed in 2012:**

My integration challenges were more to do with my lifestyle choices, since my whole family are back in London. I am alone in Accra, and it is difficult to fit into the extended Ghanaian family setting of my parents' relatives, whom I don't really know well, since I

've never lived with them. So, we were not on the same wavelength on a lot of things. I'm single and not married, and in Ghana the extended family do not understand that it is like you always have to justify yourself and your lifestyle choices, the extended family think they know what is best for you. To exist as an individual here is difficult, you cannot be anonymous like in London, here the community and the family always seem get involve in your life, which is hard to accommodate for an independent minded woman that I am ...

The challenges that second-generation returnee Ghanaians encountered as being viewed as socially misfits is not exclusive to the Ghanaian case study. A study on Pakistani-British returnees showed that they are often called names such as *BBCDs - British Born Confused Desis, by some local Pakistanis*¹⁷⁶⁰. Potter and Phillips (2006a) note in their article titled: *"Mad Dogs and Transnational Migrants? Bajan-Brit Second-Generation Migrants and Accusations of Madness"*, which refers to how local Barbadians view and label first and second generations returnees as misfits. They are misfits because they appear as being disconnected with the local way of life in the Caribbean. *Local Barbadians view Bajan-Brits returnees as trope of 'madness' as a means of 'othering' thereby positioning them outside mainstream island society*¹⁷⁶¹. The mad label derives from two origin: first, the Bajan Brits observed behaviour, i.e. rushing around in the heat, talking quickly, obsession with punctuality, etc. and second, stories of high rate of mental illness among Caribbean migrants in Britain (Potter and Phillips 2006a).

Potter and Phillips further state: *Second-generation British-Barbadians ("Bajan-Brits") returning to the land of their parents are frequently accused by indigenous Barbadian nationals of being mad. Narratives of the migrants reflect four major sets of factors: (1) madness as perceived behavioural and cultural differences; (2) explanations that relate to the historical- clinical circumstances surrounding the incidence of mental ill health among first-generation West Indian migrants to the United Kingdom; (3) madness as a pathology of alienation that is attendant on living in Barbados; and (4) madness as "othering," "outing," and "fixity." British second-generation "returning nationals" to the Caribbean, living as they do in the plural world of the land of their parents' birth,*

¹⁷⁶⁰ The Guardian 2006, Going back to my roots: A growing number of Pakistani women brought up in the UK are leaving to live in their mother country - despite its oppressive image. Sara Wajid reports: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/23/pakistan_familyandrelationships

¹⁷⁶¹ Potter, R.B. and Phillips, J., 2006. "Mad dogs and transnational migrants?" *Bajan-Brit second-generation migrants and accusations of madness. Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 96(3), p.587

*after having been raised in the colonial “Mother Country,” exhibit hybridity and in-betweenness. Accusations of madness serve to fix the position of these young migrants outside the mainstream of indigenous Barbadian society*¹⁷⁶².

Miranda Husain, a 35-year-old second-generation British Pakistani with a Pakistani father and a British mother. As a journalist from Essex, England, after travelling the world and losing both her parents in her 20s, she decided to move to her father's country of origin in 2003 to be near her remaining family¹⁷⁶³. She notes on the challenges of integration in Pakistani society: *There are many things that she loves about Pakistan - seeing people praying casually on the roadside, for instance - but after three years of pushing social boundaries as a single woman, I am not sure if Lahore can be a permanent home. I miss the breathing space of a multicultural society. To be accepted here you have to surrender your own identity. It's not just about adapting, it's about losing [your British] culture and I don't agree with that at all*¹⁷⁶⁴.

In comparative terms the challenges that Caribbean and Pakistani, second-generation returnees faced by locals ‘labelling and ‘othering’ them as outsiders is not the same for second-generation Ghanaians returnees as they are few in numbers and therefore, they are less visible in order to be labelled in such fashions. They are nevertheless recognisable through their English accent and the fact that most of them do not or barely speak the local language. They nonetheless tend to blend in easily, in order to take advantage of what is in offer for them within the job market.

The main focus in this chapter aimed at stressing on return migration to Ghana, that it should not be seen as the end result to a migratory life trajectory, but as a further development of the transnationally connected to stable democracy that Ghana has become. To this effect Åkesson, L., 2011 posits that return migration should not be viewed as the “natural ending”, rather it should be viewed within the context of transnational returns and circular migration, as she observed in her study on Cape Verdean returnees. Åkesson, states *“We do not understand return as being the natural ending, but rather as partial return to a place where the migrant once lived. Returned in the African*

¹⁷⁶² Potter, R.B. and Phillips, J., 2006. Art.cit. p.587

¹⁷⁶³ The Guardian 2006, Going back to my roots: A growing number of Pakistani women brought up in the UK are leaving to live in their mother country - despite its oppressive image. Sara Wajid reports: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/23/pakistan.familyandrelationships>

¹⁷⁶⁴ Ibid. p.4

cases we have studied should be viewed as transnational returnee and circular migrants.”

¹⁷⁶⁵This example of the Cape Verdean case study to a large extent echoes with the Ghanaian example of returnee diaspora in Ghana who continue to navigate between homeland and host, they therefore continue to maintain the transnational links. This therefore translates to the notion that return is not the natural ending for Ghanaian diaspora returnees. In other words, the most successful among Ghanaian returnees were those who were travelling back and forth and continuing to develop and maintain their social networks in the diaspora ¹⁷⁶⁶.

B - Structures of Ghanaian returnees: A general overview

B-1: Returnee diaspora associations in Accra

In recent times there has been a nascent Ghanaian diaspora returnee associations and organisations which has emerged and still emerging¹⁷⁶⁷.

The mandate of these returnee associations serves as an avenue for returnees to seek advice from the experiences of those who have been back home for a long time, but also a platform to compare notes about various issues pertaining to their re-integration process¹⁷⁶⁸. An example of such returnee association is the Adventures in the Diaspora Association¹⁷⁶⁹. The association was created by a returnee who worked as an architect in Los Angeles in the US, it was created as an avenue for returnees to network among themselves¹⁷⁷⁰. As such the membership constitutes mainly of the professional segments of returnee diasporas, who can be considered as being part of an elitist club. They meet once every Wednesday of the month, at the Golden Tulip Hotel, a four-star hotel in Accra, where they organise events such as arts exhibition, poetry and writing, film critic, urban music and bringing artist from abroad to entertain them¹⁷⁷¹. Other activities include organising sports events such as playing tennis, golf, Yoga, Salsa and Kizomba dance classes organising short

¹⁷⁶⁵ Åkesson, L., 2011. Making migrants responsible for development: Cape Verdean returnees and northern migration policies. *Africa Spectrum*, 46(1), pp.61-83.

¹⁷⁶⁶ Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 2009. Art.cit. p.55

¹⁷⁶⁷ Fieldwork interview with Jenny founder of Back to My Roots Ghanaian Diaspora Returnee Association, 5 July 2018, Accra Ghana

¹⁷⁶⁸ Fieldwork interview with Jenny founder of Back to My Roots Ghanaian Diaspora Returnee Association, 5 July 2018, Accra Ghana

¹⁷⁶⁹ Fieldwork observations Accra 2012

¹⁷⁷⁰ Interview with Joe Addo, founder of Adventures in the Diaspora, 23 April 2012, Accra Ghana

¹⁷⁷¹ Fieldwork interview with Joe Addo, 10th June 2012

weekend breaks to the countryside¹⁷⁷². They are maintaining a certain standard of life that they might not have had while living in the diaspora, or perhaps have discovered a privileged lifestyle because of their professional status which enables them to have higher earning and as such higher purchasing power to maintain a privileged lifestyle¹⁷⁷³.

Another Returnee association, named Back to My Roots, the founder is a returnee professional who works within the field of Public Relations, it is an online platform for returnee professionals to network and also create business opportunities or ideas for newly return diaspora to ponder on¹⁷⁷⁴. It should be noted that non-elite returnee diasporans tend not to adhere to such associations, as one non-professional returnee indicated in an interview in Accra: *I will feel disconnected attending such get together with other returnees because, I do not think I have much in common with them*¹⁷⁷⁵. They are less visible and blend into the general Ghanaian society with little notice, though some are visible due to the remnant features from their lifestyle abroad. This difference between elite returnees and non-elite returnees also influences their political perceptions and engagement.

In sum, a lifestyle led by a few comfortable returnee elites emulating the lifestyle of middle and upper middle classes in West countries. The aforementioned activities associated with returnees sends a message of social mobility of returned migrants in Ghana. Members of these returnee associations are politically aware and vote, but they are not necessarily members of a political party. Some members of these returnee associations are strong critiques of present and past governments' policies on the economy, social and political policies.

In other countries such as Mali, returnee association are not based on elite networking club alone, as exemplified with the Ghanaian case study, but rather a solidarity group such is the case of a deported Malian migrants' associations from abroad. They use their voice to advocate for the rights of Malian migrants outside of the country. According to Gary-Tounkara: *Le plus souvent originaires de zones urbaines, qualifiés et conscients de leurs droits, les membres des associations de*

¹⁷⁷² Field world observation 2012, 2017 and 2018

¹⁷⁷³ Fieldwork observations and discussions with founder of the Association Adventure in the Diaspora

¹⁷⁷⁴ Fieldwork observation 2017 and 2018 Accra discussions with the founder of the Back to my Roots Associations

¹⁷⁷⁵ Field work interview with Kwame, 24 April 2012, Tema, Ghana

migrants de retour portent un discours alternatif sur les réalités migratoires. Ces associations tentent de peser dans le débat public sur les politiques publiques afin de défendre les droits des migrants tant au Mali qu'à l'extérieur. La diversification des régions d'origine des migrants de retour provoque des positionnements différents de ces associations selon la localisation (ville/campagne), les objectifs immédiats (développement villageois/défense des droits des rapatriés), le genre et la nationalité (Maliens/ autres Africains). La plus visible dans les mobilisations est l'AME (l'Association des Maliens expulsés), fondée le 6 octobre 1996 par Ousmane Diarra, un diamantaire lui-même expulsé d'Angola. Le terme « expulsés » dans la dénomination de l'association n'est pas anodin: il dénote un statut revendiqué par Ousmane Diarra pour qui les migrants n'ayant pas réussi leur « aventure » n'ont pas pour autant à avoir honte de leur mésaventure. Les expulsés se réunissaient habituellement au sein du Haut conseil des Maliens de l'extérieur (HCME), la structure fédérative des associations et amicales de Maliens vivant à l'étranger créée par le gouvernement¹⁷⁷⁶. This example of Malian returnees' association demonstrates to some extent that the profile of returnees differs from one country to the other. This further implies that returnees in Mali, constitutes two specific difference compared to Ghanaian returnee. Firstly, a great majority of Malian returnees do not form part of the professional category as is the case with Ghanaian returnees; secondly, there is a strong cohesion among Malian returnees as a result of the mass deportation of Malians from France some years back. This has therefore, resulted in Malian returnees composing a strong union to advocate for the rights and plights of Malians still abroad, whereas the Ghanaian returnees are fragmented returnees and do not constitute a common strong voice to advocate for the rights of those still in the diaspora as opposed to the Malian case study. Ghana has also witnessed mass forced return from Libya in 2011 as a result of the political upheaval in Libya after Gaddafi's regime was overthrown. Mass deportation of Ghanaian migrants was witnessed from the US in 2017 with Donald Trump's hard-line policies on irregular migrants¹⁷⁷⁷. It was also announced in June 2019, that 7000 illegal

¹⁷⁷⁶ Gary-Toukara, D 2013, La gestion des migrations de retour, un paramètre négligé de la grille d'analyse de la crise malienne, Politique africaine n° 130

¹⁷⁷⁷ 75 Ghanaians deported from the US, 14 June 2017:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/75-Ghanaians-deported-from-USA-548297>

Ghanaian migrants were to be deported from the US¹⁷⁷⁸. But this group of forced returnees did not form an association in Ghana, as is demonstrated here with the example of Mali. This difference, therefore, shows how forced return migration is viewed from one country to the other, in Mali forced returned is destigmatised or less stigmatised whereas in Ghana forced returned comes with shame and social stigma¹⁷⁷⁹.

To this effect, returnee Ghanaians as a political group are heterogenous in terms of their mode of structural organisation for the purposes of political engagement, compared to the homogenous and well-structured Ghanaian political diaspora abroad. This heterogenous nature of political returnees in Ghana, can be explain by the existing political structures that is already in place by the main political parties in Ghana, and therefore political returnees come back home to fit into an existing well-structured political institution which enables their integration as a political group¹⁷⁸⁰. This therefore means, that they do not have to form a homogenous political returnee groups in Ghana, as opposed to the homogenous political diaspora in London¹⁷⁸¹.

3.2.1. Political participation of returnees in Accra: transfer of political capital?

An increasing body of work has been carried out recently on the economic contribution of returnee Ghanaians to national development, but little is known about their political participation once they are back home. This section therefore aims at shedding light on the political contribution of returnees in Ghanaian politics. In other words, who participates, for which political party and how is that political participation is articulated. Are returnees participating in politics for the development of the country? Or are they participating in politics to advance their own personal interest, career aspirations and progression? To this effect, rational

¹⁷⁷⁸ 7000 Ghanaians face deportation from the US, 23 June 2019: <https://www.ghanamma.com/2019/06/23/7000-ghanaians-face-deportation-as-us-immigration-begins-mass-raid-on-illegal-immigrants/>

¹⁷⁷⁹ Data from IOM Ghana Mission's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programme in a discussion with Doris Ohene-Kamkam, AVRR focal person at IOM

¹⁷⁸⁰ Fieldwork observation, In a discussion with Prof. Gyimah Boadi on political elites from the diaspora and political party structures in Ghana, in Accra 28 July 2018

¹⁷⁸¹ Fieldwork discussion with Prof. Kwadwo Appiagye-Atua, 10 July 2017, Accra

choice will be appropriate in aiding to understand the political participations and behaviours of returnees.

Rational Choice theory, as noted previously, involves strategies employed by diasporans in London regarding their political engagement towards homeland Ghana. Rational Choice theory assumes that complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of the individual actions in which they are composed. In other words, it is a methodological individualism:

'The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals' (Elster 1989: 13). In rational choice theories, individuals are seen as motivated by their wants or goals that express their 'preference'. They act within specific, given constraints and on the information, they have about the condition under which they are acting. Rational choice theories hold, that individuals must anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate that which will be best for them. Rational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction (Heath 1976: 3; Carling 1992: 27; Colman 1973).

The idea of 'rational action' has generally been taken to imply a conscious social actor engaging in deliberate calculative strategies. Homans argued that human behaviour, like all animal behaviour, is not free but determined¹⁷⁸². It is shaped by the rewards and punishments that are encountered. People do those things that lead to rewards and they avoid whatever they are punished for ¹⁷⁸³. Reinforcement through rewards and punishments, technically termed 'conditioning', is the determining factor in human behaviour¹⁷⁸⁴. This behaviour can, therefore, be studied in purely external and objective terms; there is no need to invoke any internal mental states. People learn from their past experiences, and that is all we need to know in order to explain their behaviour¹⁷⁸⁵.

With reference to the political engagement of returnee Ghanaians, in some cases, if not in most cases, their political engagement has been motivated by a rational choice of doing

¹⁷⁸² Scott, J 2000 in *From Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present*, edited by G. Browning, A. Halcli, and F. Webster. (Sage Publications, 2000).

¹⁷⁸³ Colman, A.M., 2003. Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction. *Behavioral and brain sciences*, 26(2), p.140.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Colman, A.M., 2003.art.cit.p.140

¹⁷⁸⁵ Scott, J 2000. art.cit. p.10

things that leads to rewards with their strategic transnational political engagement while abroad. As over the years, such strategic behaviour of positioning their political career within the transnational space has yielded results. As such this transnational political engagement from the UK towards Ghana based on a rational choice, positions them and gives them political visibility, which in turn enables them to actively engage in homeland politics once they are back in Ghana.

These political returnees often transfer their political knowledge, via occupying positions that are in line with their expertise acquired in the diaspora. An example of a political returnee Richard, who worked for several years for British Railways and was an active member of the NPP party branch in London, was appointed as the CEO of Ghana Railways Development Authority in 2017. This is in line with his expertise in the transport sector in the UK ¹⁷⁸⁶. His expertise is being utilised to serve his political fraternity as a returnee. His appointment is also a reward and a symbolic gesture by the president to acknowledge Richard's transnational political contribution to the Party in London. Returnees coming back home with acquired knowledge and experience in political terms, position themselves in ways that benefit their political aspirations.

Returnees with higher educational credentials decisions to return as temporary, circular and permanent returnees perceive, their service to be more valued at home than in the diaspora, hence the reason why most tend to relocate after their educational sojourn abroad ¹⁷⁸⁷. Possession of foreign credentials is highly valued in Ghana, returning home with higher educational qualifications is also a social maker. Educated returnees come home to live in societies highly stratified along class lines and those with higher educational attainment dominate the political landscape and as such become key figures in economic and political decision making. To this end, this therefore, explains why an increasing number of returnees can be considered as political returnees, their exposure of having lived elsewhere other than Ghana, in some instances plays a pivotal role in their willingness to part take in politics.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Fieldwork observation 18 June 2017 in Accra, Ghana meeting with Richard

¹⁷⁸⁷ Arthur, J.A., 2016. Art.cit.p,167

3.2.2. Political participation of diaspora returnees

Political participation of returnees in Ghana is often dominated by political returnees as stated previously, these categories are highly immersed in social and political discourse of Ghana. Political returnees constitute part of the political elites their political participation can be viewed from the top-bottom structure, as often they are part of the ruling elites in government or part of the high-ranking personalities of the opposition party structure. These position that political returnees occupy within their party structures gives them the opportunity of being in a better position to compare social and economic issues of their former host countries and Ghana. In other words, their diaspora experience via their transnational political experience equips them better in participating in Ghanaian politics as highlighted by a political returnee in an interview¹⁷⁸⁸.

For others, the mere fact that they have lived abroad gives them the automatic rights and privileges to become full members and participants in the political affairs of the country. *Some returnees who came back to settle in Ghana, were still very much disconnected with local realities due to their long stay abroad and often kept comparing the incomparable politically here in Ghana and where they came from*¹⁷⁸⁹. This cited observation and critique advanced by an aspiring parliamentary candidate, who is a circular migrant and still maintains his residency in the UK and also in Ghana, further stipulated that: *being an investment banker in London, gives me a better understanding of how to find ways to contribute to mending Ghana's recent economic woes*¹⁷⁹⁰. In other words, to him, he is best suited to become a law maker in Ghana, even though he still lacks the adequate local know-how, as he has been living in the diaspora for nearly 30 years. He further states, *I'm not yet ready to risk everything to go back home for good or permanently so having one foot in both worlds gives me the opportunity to prepare well both professionally and personally*¹⁷⁹¹. A political returnee who is the current deputy minister of trade stated at the 2017 Ghana Diaspora Homecoming summit, indicated that: *returnees in general including political returnees are whiners, as they whine about everything*

¹⁷⁸⁸ Field work observation 2017 and 2018 Accra, Ghana

¹⁷⁸⁹ Fieldwork interview with Kwame, 20 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁷⁹⁰ Fieldwork interview with Kwame 10 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁷⁹¹ Field work interview with Kofi, 20 August 2018, Accra, Ghana

politically and they tend to compare Ghana to the political institution and situations their host countries, as it is difficult to compare a political institution in the UK to that of Ghana. These returnees need to be realistic in their expectations of how things are done here. As by quickly learning to change and adapt will facilitate their integration as a whole but also politically ¹⁷⁹²...

These returnees believe that they can make meaningful contributions towards developmental projects in Ghana; however, they are at times disconnected from local realities due to their long stay abroad.


Questions posed to returnees during 2011 and 2012 fieldwork in Accra on their political interest and what distinguishes one political party to the other: 39% of respondents stated programs proposed by the political parties. About 22% stated “*other reasons*” without specifications of what those reasons are. Some also stated they “*do not know*” what distinguished one political party from the other. Some of the reasons given by respondents to this effect included a statement about one political party being more elitist, this was referring to the NPP party. By being an elitist party meant that they advanced policies in favour of the elites when in power¹⁷⁹³. Others stated the leadership role, and some noted political parties’ approach to voters was their reason for being politically inclined. (See Fig.96.below). This observation contrasts with other studies conducted on Ghanaian population and their perceptions of the role of political parties, Adu-Gyamfi (2014) notes that a great majority of Ghanaians knew little in terms of policy difference from one political party to other. He further noted that the only thing that distinguishes a party from the other was their political party logo: Elephant for NPP and Umbrella for NDC¹⁷⁹⁴. This assertion implies that returnees are better armed compared to stayers in understanding the various policies of Ghanaian political parties and what distinguishes one party to the other.

¹⁷⁹² Fieldwork observations Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit 2017

¹⁷⁹³ Field work interview with Nansata Yakubu, 10 August 2011

¹⁷⁹⁴ Adu-Gyamfi, E. 2014. Examining Electorates’ Perception on the State Funding Political Parties Activities in Ghana: <http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/viewFile/12406/12789>

Figure 0-96: Differences in political parties




Source: fieldwork data 2012, Accra, Ghana

When asked about their political interest in Ghana, more than half (52%) of respondents indicated that they were ‘very much interested in political campaigns, 26% stated not to be interested in politics, another 15%, mentioned they had little interest and only 7% noted that they were not interested in political campaigns See Fig.97.below. This data shows that more than half of Accra respondents, were politically inclined, this data can therefore be translated as returnee diasporans playing a paramount role within the Ghanaian political scene. An Afrobarometer study conducted in 2008 to gauge the interest of Ghanaians in politics revealed that 50% of Ghanaians indicated to be interested in politics¹⁷⁹⁵.

¹⁷⁹⁵ Political accountability in Ghana: Evidence from Afrobarometer Round 5 survey: <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/bp136-political-accountability-ghana-evidence-afrobarometer-round-5-survey>

Figure 0-97: Interest in political campaigns in Accra



Source: Source: fieldwork data Accra 2012

Again, when asked about means they used to follow elections campaign, 15% said several means. This includes radio, television, meetings, discussions, newspapers, and tracts. 15% of those interviewed indicated that radio, television, newspapers, and internet were the means used to monitor election campaigns. Additional 11% only used radio and television as means of monitoring election campaigns. As shown in (table 5b).


3.2.3 Motivation for participation in Ghanaian Politics

Reasons why people engage in politics may differ depending on several factors. Respondents interviewed in Accra, stated they liked engaging in politics because they “*liked giving their opinion*” (39%). A quarter (25%) of respondents said they “*liked to change the situation of things*” and that is why they engaged in politics. 3% said “*they engaged in politics because they meet people of influence in the process*”. That is to state that political engagement for some returnees in Ghana has various meanings depending on individuals’ personal interests.

On membership of a political party a significant majority of respondents (75%) maintained that they belonged to a political party in Ghana, whereas 25% were not members of one. Some of the respondents who answered ‘yes’ to being a member of a political party also cited the following reasons: *being a member of a political party was a platform to express and voice out their political ideas, being members of a political party was to give them access to holding those close to power accountable*

for their political promises made during electoral campaigns. Some also stated: *Being a member of a political party was also a platform to gain access to some privileges such as contracts, this is to also compensate for my contribution both financially and time spent in running errands for the party*¹⁷⁹⁶.

Figure 0-98: Political Party membership



Other respondents gave the following reasons for engaging in politics in Ghana:

For some returnees engaging in politics is a continuation of their engagement from the diaspora and a duty to incite others still in the diaspora to engage in homeland politics, as the following statement by a political returnee attests to this idea:

Akwesi Ababio Awuah, November 2018: *I am a political returnee and occupy a position in government on diaspora affairs this gives me the responsibility to galvanise those still in the diaspora to engage in Ghanaian politics from the diaspora and utilise their experience for the development of Ghana*¹⁷⁹⁷.

Gloria, interviewed in 2012: *I am very much interested in politics, even more since I returned from the US and being the assembly woman for the NPP constituency in Adetan municipality in Accra. This requires me to be at the forefront of Politics in Ghana.*

Sekou Nkrumah, interviewed 2012: *I became politically inclined since my return from Romania and due to my family's legacy in Ghanaian politics, as being the son of Kwame Nkrumah Ghana's first president, politics has always been of great interest to myself and my other siblings.*

¹⁷⁹⁶Fieldwork results analysis, Accra 2012

¹⁷⁹⁷ Fieldwork interview with Ababio Awuah 9 November 2018, Accra, Ghana

Elizabeth Ohene, interviewed 2011: *I am very much interested in politics, as I returned from London, where I worked as the African correspondent at the BBC Africa radio in London to occupy a political position as the information minister and communication advisor to president Kufuor between 2001 to 2009.*

One respondent noted that although he votes in Ghanaian elections since returning, he is not always convinced of policies that the government adopts:

Joe Ossie, interviewed in 2012 and 2017: *Yes, I do vote in Ghanaian elections, although I am at times sceptical about the some of the policies that past and present government advanced and implemented¹⁷⁹⁸...*

Kofi, interviewed 2012 and 2018: *I am very political, I have always been very much interested in politics both as a student in Ghana and at Yale University in the US. I have always protested against social injustices and inequalities. I have voted in every election since I came back home, because it is important to send a message to our ruling elites and governments about our rights and to let them know what is right to do as politicians. My vote also acts as a means of change from one government to the other, as my vote can make a change in all circumstances. I also vote to denounce, bad governance and mismanagement of our resource by our political elites and the whole political establishment. I voted for the NPP Party. I am active on social media as a political activist, to me engaging in politics in Ghana as a returnee is my way of also giving back to society through challenging the political elites with my experience and knowledge of Ghanaian politics.*

Some of the reasons cited by respondents was that they did not trust politicians in Ghana and therefore, will rather abstain from participation (abstaining is also a political act of protest):

Bruce, interviewed July 2017: *I am interested in political debates but, I am not interested in voting during election, since I returned from London, I have not voted in any Ghanaian elections because the development that I see in this country has not really benefited me*

¹⁷⁹⁸ Fieldwork interview with Joe Ossei, 15 July 2018, Accra, Ghana

directly and I view local and returnee politicians to be the same, as they only think about themselves and not the interest of all ¹⁷⁹⁹.

Jeanne, interviewed in July 2018: *No, I have not voted since coming to live in Ghana. I have great interest in Ghanaian politics, but I have not voted*¹⁸⁰⁰

Kwame Sefa, interviewed in 2012: *I do not vote because I don't understand politics and their political language. I am a simple man, with little education, politics is for those educated people "up there".*

Some respondents indicated that they have always voted in Ghanaian elections. However, the positions they occupy prohibit them from revealing their political affiliations, such is the example of the former president of the National House of Chiefs in Ghana:

Prof. John Naa Nabilla interviewed in 2012: *As an academician and a scholar at the Department of Geography at the University of Ghana Legon, I have always had a great interest in Ghanaian politics and local government issues, since returning home in the late 1970s after my studies in the US. I am also the chief of Wulungu traditional area in Northern Ghana. After my retirement from my academic career, I now occupy the position as the president of the National House of Chiefs, which advises and mediates between the government and traditional chieftaincy issues, but also on local governance thematics such as playing a role in ensuring that peace prevails before, during and after general elections in Ghana. Therefore, this position requires me to be apolitical and discrete about my political convictions, but in private I have my own political convictions.*

Prof. Mariama Awumbila interviewed in 2012: *As senior lecturer and the head of the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana, my work directly or indirectly requires me to be a political observant on various issues pertaining to government policies on: internal and international migration and within the international migration framework, there is the diaspora and return migration aspects linked to political participation. I have voted in all Ghanaian election since*

¹⁷⁹⁹ Fieldwork interview with Bruce 10 July 2017, Accra, Ghana

¹⁸⁰⁰ Fieldwork interview with Jeanne, 20 June 2017, Accra, Ghana

1992 Therefore, I have been interested in Ghanaian politics since my return from my studies at the University of Newcastle in the UK.

Nansata Yakubu, interviewed 2011: *Yes, I have always had an interest in politics at university in Ghana before travelling abroad. Since I came back from England, I have been working at the heart of government in parliament, which in retrospect makes me more political than I had thought ... I have always voted since my return to Ghana, politics has always been part of my ethos.*

Makeba interviewed 2012: *I did vote during the last general elections, but to be quite honest, I am not a political person, even when I lived in the UK, I wasn't that keen on politics. But I know, that as a citizen, voting is my constitutional right. I do not wish to disclose the political party I voted for.*

Joe Sonne, interview 2012 and 2017: *Yes, I do vote and I have always voted, but being a civil servant, I am not allowed to openly say which party I voted for. But I have always had a very keen interest in politics.*

Prof. Abladi Glover interview 2011, 2012 and a follow-up informal discussion in 2017: *Yes, I do vote. As a community leader, voting is mandatory, as I have seen in my community in Labadi, what the importance of voting means. This is because most people in the community are not educated and therefore, they do not know, how important their vote is. As such, my role as a community leader and an elder of my community, it is my duty to equally serve as an adviser and a motivator to our community members about the importance of voting during elections and indicate to my local community how important it is to use their political franchise appropriately. Since the democratic transition in Ghana in 1992, I have always voted as an individual but also as an elder of my community. My vote is also a community thing and not just personal. I did prefer not to mention which party I voted for.*

Sara Asafo-Adjaye interviewed 2012 and a follow-up interview in 2018: *I have always been very interested in Politics, I am a member of civil a society organisation here in Ghana, since returning from the UK. The mandate of our organisation is to bring to the public fora all issues relating to political governance, corruption and*

women's rights in society and in politics in general, via petition and demonstrating passively. So yes, I am very active in Ghanaian politics from the civil society perspective and I have voted in all the elections here in Ghana since my return. For example, before and during the 2016 election campaign period our organisation mounted various protests to denounce issues to do with corruption and political clientelism by the NDC party, which needed to be discussed openly.

Odile Tevie interviewed in 2012: *I do follow political discussion here in Ghana just as I did while in the UK. I do also vote during elections here in Ghana, but I refrain from being actively involved in frontline Ghanaian politics, purely because my work consumes most of my time.*

Other returnees had the following reasons on voting or not voting in Ghana:

Tsatsu Dawson interview in 2012: *I have always been very much interested in politics and human rights issues, as before returning home, I was based in Geneva, working with the UN on issues dealing with human rights and political refugees. So yes, I do follow issues on political campaigns here in Ghana, but I have never voted as I've always been away during election time. I hope to vote in this year's elections since, I am now based here in Ghana.*

Vina interview 2012: *I have a great interest in politics both whilst in the UK and since relocating to Ghana. In my view voting was a platform to hold those in high office accountable for their political promises. I have voted since being in Ghana. My vote counts as it can make or break my MP's political career, because in my area we keep experiencing power outage, poor water supply yet I pay for utility bills every month, which to me, does not make sense. So, my vote counts in that I can use that to hold my MP responsible for all the promises he made during the campaign period. In the UK, I voted as a person of ethnic minority background, I know what voting for the right candidate during general elections counts.*

Abena, interviewed 2012: *Politics has never been my thing either in the UK or here in Ghana, although, I have a keen interest in political affairs. I have not voted since*

being back in Ghana, because it is too far from my reality and my day-to-day life.

Kwesi interviewed 2012 and 2018: *No, I do not vote. I have never voted since I relocated back home. I did not vote whilst in the UK. I just do not trust politicians, regardless of it being in the UK or in Ghana. I do not vote in Ghanaian politics because, I just do not trust them, they make promises during election and they do not uphold to those promises once they are voted into government. I have been back nearly 20 years now and each time you hear similar promises but there is no real change behind.*

Habib Kadiri interviewed in 2012: *Since my return from Atlanta in the US, I have always voted in Ghanaian politics, because I am interested in political affairs generally. My wife's family are in frontline politics here in Ghana, my father in -law was Ghana's vice-president under President Kufuor's regime, so inevitably my interest in politics is even stronger.*

Salma Mahama interviewed in 2012: *I am interested in politics and I do vote during elections in Ghana and I at times campaign as well for the NPP party, as my family are affiliated to the party, and my father being the former vice-president under President Kufuor's administration it is normal for me to campaign for the NPP party since my return from Atlanta, Georgia in the US.*

Mona Issahaku interviewed in 2011, 2012 and 2017: *Since returning from London in 2001, I have voted in Ghanaian elections. I am a strong NDC supporter, so is my whole family, my husband was the former governor of the Bank of Ghana under President Mahama regime. During the 2016 general elections, I campaigned for the NDC party*

Ama Konadu-Abeberese interviewed in 2012: *Yes, I am interested in Ghanaian politics partly because of my line of duty as a journalist here in Ghana. I have voted since my return from London. I prefer to keep it discrete as to the party I vote for.*

Nana Hema Awindor interviewed in 2011: *Yes, I have keen interest in Ghanaian politics since my return from the UK many years ago, I operate an NGO, which serves to empower women in rural areas, as I am also a queen mother in my local area, it is important to use this platform to educate local women on their political rights etc...*

{in Ghana and particularly among the Akan group and tradition, the queen mother rules alongside the chief or the king in their area. Queen mothers are considered as spiritual heads of their community. One of the queen mother's major roles, and some would argue that it is definitively her major role, is to advise the chief on all matters" (Stoeltje 1997, p. 52).}

Cecilia Anderson interviewed in June 2017: *Yes, since my return from US, I have worked with various local and international NGO's here in Ghana. These NGO's serves to empower woman and vulnerable children in deprived areas. So yes, these activities have a political side, as we have to directly work with government agencies on these issues of poverty among women and its impact on children in Ghana. So indirectly, I have strong views on policies that government implement on such issues of political governance on welfare issues here in Ghana.*

Nana Tseasewaa III interviewed in June 2017: *I have always voted in Ghanaian election since I came back from Germany and the US. As a queen mother in my local area, I have a responsibility to lead by example, so voting in Ghanaian election is also a form leadership for myself and to also encourage people in my local area to vote and use their vote wisely.*

Vida interviewed in 2012, 2013, and 2017: *Yes, I have voted since my return from the UK, but as I mentioned to you when you interviewed me some years back, my vote here in Ghana is based on economic policies that impact my business, so that view has not changed...*

Kweku Dankwah interviewed in 2012 and 2013: *Since my return from France, I do vote in Ghanaian elections. As the work that I am involved in has links with government agencies within the Tourism sector, so voting for the right government is key for my work and business.*


Metz, July 2017: *I have never voted in Ghanaian elections since moving back home. I am interested in political discourses, but I am not really interested as an activist politically.*

What some of these statements indicates, is that political participation among returnees in Accra is informed by three points: i) Abstaining from politics because it is too far from their main preoccupations and they do not trust politicians, but happy to protest against government policies; ii) wanting to contribute in politics by utilizing their experience acquired from abroad to help in making policy change, iii) they are apolitical, because of lack of educational level to understand politics and political discourses. All these statements also refer to the social category that one belongs to, the following statement illustrate this poignantly: *“wanting to contribute to the political discourse as they do not trust politician but happy to protest against their policies”*. This statement was made by one of the skilled and professional returnees, a remark similar to what other respondents said: *“I am apolitical because I do not understand politics”*. This statement was indicated by an unskilled returnee. These aforementioned statements illustrate that political engagement upon returning home is strongly tied to various variables including the extension of one’s socio-economic and socio-political background.

3.2.4 Voting Behaviours


The below graph illustrates that a little over half (54%) of respondents stated that they voted during the last general elections, whereas 46% said they did not. When asked about whether they voted during the parliamentary elections, a significant majority 75% said they voted during the parliamentary elections and only a quarter 25% said otherwise, as depicted in fig.99 below.

Figure 0-99: Respondents who voted in Ghana



Source: Fieldwork data Accra 2012

Figure 0-100:Q = Which party do you intend to vote for in this year's elections (2012)




Source: Fieldwork data Accra 2012

It can be seen in the graph above (fig. 100), "When asked which party they intend to vote for in this year's (2012)". 54% of respondents indicated that they intend to vote for the NPP, 30% for NDC, 4% for CPP, 9% for PPP and 3% for other parties. This however implies that a great percentage of returnee diasporans from London tended to be NPP sympathizers among the sample of respondents. Those who indicated that they voted for the NPP Party during the 2012 elections were predominantly NPP political returnees (see chapter 1 of part 2).

These observations further confirm the notion that most members of returnee diasporas are inclined to vote for the NPP party. These observations might not be conclusive and not up to date, as it was conducted during the 2012 presidential election campaign in Accra and during the 2013 post- election result dispute at the Supreme Court. For the 2016 presidential elections no field work was conducted to ascertain which party returnees intended to vote for, however a post-election fieldwork was conducted in 2017 and 2018 to gauge out which political party some returnees voted for. As such, there was a similar observation in line with the 2012 sample of respondents returnee diaspora voting patterns, as a great majority of those who indicated that they voted during the 2016 elections stated that they voted for the NPP party, the party that eventually won the presidential election and pushing the then ruling Party NDC into opposition. This preference of returnee voting NPP could be explained as the NPP Party, since independence has always derived a great support and membership from the Ghanaian professional elites in the diaspora as pointed out in detail in earlier chapters in Part one of this thesis on the history of Ghanaian emigration to the UK. This trend continues upon their return to Ghana. In Ghana, the criteria used in voting for candidates varies depending on several indicators. 64% of respondents interviewed in 2012 said they look out for competent candidates, 7% look out for competent candidates but from a different party. Only few respondents (4%) approved of candidates from the diaspora (See Fig. 101.). More interesting correlation of the findings in Fig.100 and Fig.101 is that respondents preferred to vote for competent candidates and not necessarily a candidate with diaspora links, be it in London or from elsewhere. Which means that what respondents wanted was competent candidates regardless of them being returnees or not. Respondents indicated that their conception of competence is someone who is accomplished and well versed in all matters concerning governance, policy and politics. It is therefore based on these attributes that they vote for a candidate in Ghana.

Figure 0-101: Criteria used to vote a candidate in Ghana in 2012




Source: Fieldwork data 2012, Accra, Ghana

3.2.5 Views on Ghanaian political Life

Again, when respondents were asked about their political life in Ghana compared to their host country, 75% said “it was very interesting”. 22% said they were “not interested at all” and less than 5%, (3%) said they “did not know”. What can be noted here is that respondents who were already politically inclined before returning to Ghana featured among the 75% who mentioned that they were very interested in politics in their host country.

Figure 0-102: Political life in Ghana compared to host country




Source: Fieldwork, Accra responses 2012

In fig. 103 below, respondents were asked if they knew anyone from the diaspora currently in office as a member of parliament, 43% said ‘some’, 21% said “fewer”

and 36% said *'none'*. There are no official data on how many returnee diasporas as members of parliament, this is explained by the fact that the Ghanaian constitution prohibits anybody with any other nationality but Ghanaian to serve in public service (which includes the parliament) see chapter one on diaspora policies under various governments. Returnee diaspora wishing to occupy political positions and political office, they are required to renounce their host country citizenship before they could serve in Ghana. As stated earlier on in this chapter, on the example of the Member of Parliament for the Bawku Central constituency in Upper East Region of Ghana, who was prosecuted and found guilty in a court ruling in 2012 for not renouncing his British citizenship before running for political office. This however indicates that there has been a concerted effort by previous government to disenfranchise members of the diaspora with dual citizenship to engage in politics in Ghana. It is nonetheless worth stating that the current ruling NPP government is in the process of amending the constitution to allow returnee with dual citizens to engage in politics and be able to hold positions in government without having to renounce their host country citizenship¹⁸⁰¹. As stated previously on the 35 diaspora returnees currently serving in government all had to renounce their host country's citizenships, before being able to take-up their post in government.

Figure 0-103: Do you know any Parliamentarians from the diaspora currently in office?



Source: Fieldwork, Accra responses 2012


Questions posed to returnees about the transnational voting rights for Ghanaians in

¹⁸⁰¹ Fieldwork observation, Ghana homecoming summit 2016, president Akuffo Addo speech

the diaspora, it appeared that there was a common view among respondents with regards to extending transnational voting rights to Ghanaians in the diaspora (See Fig. 10b). Out of the 52 who were interviewed: 20 mentioned that: *“it was bad that they could not exercise their political franchise”*; 10 stated that it was *“their constitutional right to vote”*; another 5 noted that *“they should be allowed to vote because they had families in Ghana”*; another 2 said *“they should be allowed to vote because they contribute to the economic fabric and development of Ghana”* 2 respondents said *“they should be allowed because they are still Ghanaians regardless of the artificial boundaries separating them from homeland Ghana”*; 5 respondent also noted: *“because they do not pay taxes in Ghana, they should not be given the right to vote”*; 3 respondent stated that: *“the right to vote should only be applicable to residents in Ghana”*; 5 respondents indicated: *“they should not be given the right to vote because they have no physical knowledge of what is happening in Ghana”*.

These multiple reasons that respondents gave, proves that majority of returnee support the idea of being given the right to vote transnationally for those still in the diaspora, it should be noted that these responses were given by returnee diasporans in Accra and not among stayers. which therefore implies that there is a consensus among returnees on advocating for their rights to vote transnationally. It worth stating also, that this view to extend transnational voting to the diaspora is not totally unanimous among all returnees, as some diaspora returnees are of the view that voting rights should only be applicable to Ghanaians who live in Ghana as policies made in Ghana only affects those living in the country and not those living abroad.


Figure 0-104:Opinion that Ghanaians living in the diaspora cannot vote outside Ghana*Accra response



Source: fieldwork results February-September 2012

When respondents were interrogated on: “political parties with diaspora policies” 54.9% of respondents cited NPP as the political party having policies for the diaspora. This was followed by Other 23%; NDC 9%; CPP 4.5% and PPP 9% were rated as having the least policies in their manifesto for the diaspora. This is shown in graph.105 below. As noted in earlier chapters on diaspora political engagement via the internet, returnees’ political engagement was also visible online during the 2016 presidential elections. These engagements were mainly on social media platforms such as Facebook; Twitter; Instagram and WhatsApp.

Figure 0-105:Q:among the political parties contesting in this year's elections which one has the most policies for the diaspora



Source: Fieldwork, Accra responses 2012

Returnees have also harnessed the power of the media to promote socio-cultural change, and to a lesser extent political change, in their home country contexts. A 43-year-old Ghanaian who started one of the biggest private radio stations in Accra illustrated the type of contribution he is making:

'I'm very critical of things, from the grammar used in newspapers, to the type of newspaper stories, to government policies, anything that I think is worth criticizing on my radio stations... I like to get people actually thinking, in a critical manner. I'm critical of the acceptance in this country of certain bad standards of workmanship, a total lack of customer care, and things like that... By pushing the boundary on critical thinking, I assume in some way I am helping to bring some positive contributions, because once you start criticizing things in a way that says: this can be done better, it has been done better, it means there are people, perhaps one or two, who would listen and understand that in a customer dominated society, the customer is king and since Ghana or should I say Accra is gradually becoming a service-based economy, so we need to raise the standard¹⁸⁰².'

On returnee diaspora engaging in frontline politics, Mahemet (2014) notes that since the inception of a Ministry in 1983 dedicated to Senegalese living abroad, during the presidency of Abdou Diouf, for political reasons the Ministry has changed names several times. It has always been operated by appointees from the diaspora, who at one point were members of the Senegalese diasporan trade Union and members of the political party chapter in France¹⁸⁰³. It is worth to state that Senegal in the African sub-region, is viewed as a pioneer since the 1970s by initiating diaspora policies and transnational diaspora political engagement.

According to Mahamet:

La titulaire est Fambaye Fall Diop, troisième femme ministre dans l'histoire politique du Sénégal. Mais, ce qui semble le plus révélateur est le fait qu'elle soit issue des rangs de la Confédération nationale des travailleurs sénégalais (CNTS). Première confédération syndicale du pays, très proche du gouvernement et du parti gouvernemental, elle co-gère

¹⁸⁰² Fieldwork observation 2012 August

¹⁸⁰³ Mahamet T. 2014, « Mots et maux de la migration. De l'anathème aux éloges », *Cahiers d'études africaines*, p. 28

avec eux le pays à travers un « syndicalisme de participation responsable ». Le ministère disparaît un mois plus tard du gouvernement du 1er mai 1983 et revient le 9 octobre 1984 avec la même titulaire. Le 2 janvier 1986, il devient un ministère délégué auprès du président de la République. Fatou Ndong Dieng lui succède le 5 avril 1988. Elle est aussi issue des rangs de la CNTS. En mars 1990, elle est remplacée par Mata Sy Diallo qui devient ministre déléguée auprès du Premier ministre. À partir du 2 juin 1993, le ministère disparaît et c'est le ministre des Affaires étrangères qui sera aussi chargé des Sénégalais de l'extérieur jusqu'en août 2003 date à laquelle revient un ministère autonome parfois associé à un autre département (avec le tourisme notamment le 25 juin 2007). Il faut souligner que les deux premières ministres chargées de l'émigration sont deux grandes militantes issues de la CNTS. Ces nominations reflètent la perception de l'émigration par l'État et les choix dans sa gestion. Elle est traitée principalement comme une force laborieuse, ce qui est du reste le cas à l'époque. L'objectif est d'encadrer la main-d'œuvre émigrée et/ou de faire face à une opposition active à « l'étranger »¹⁸⁰⁴.

Mahmet highlights in his study that there is a ministry for Senegalese living abroad, which is often attached either to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Tourism. It often does not have a portfolio or a mandate and a real project or program, it serves more symbolically than carrying out programs for Senegalese abroad.

According to Charles Kwenin, senior regional advisor for sub-Saharan Africa at IOM, discussed during the drafting of Ghana Migration Policy Phase II at a workshop in Accra in 2012. Mr. Kwenin stated that establishing diaspora ministries and diaspora support bureau in origin countries does not necessarily serve policy change for members of the diaspora inclusion in homeland politics, nevertheless its symbolic presence indicates the important role origin countries accords to their diasporas in relation to nation building¹⁸⁰⁵. Ghanaian political returnees are being viewed as elites, this perception is not an isolated case, as within the West-African sub-region, studies on Malian, Senegalese and Ivorian demonstrates that a considerable percentage of their political elites were educated and

¹⁸⁰⁴ Mahamet T. art.cit. 2014. p. 31

¹⁸⁰⁵ Charles Kwenin, senior regional advisor at the International Organisation for Migration, IOM Geneva, presentation at the workshop on Phase II draft of the Ghana migration policy. Charles Kwenin presentation was on the "Institutionalisation of the Ghanaian diaspora.", 23 May 2012 in Accra

professionally trained in the diaspora¹⁸⁰⁶. It is therefore important to observe here that their educational attainment and their network in the diaspora paved way for political returnees to access power in their home countries. Moreover, as we saw in previous chapters on transnational political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, the transnational space is used for professionalising their political practices and helped pave way for their political careers once they return home.

CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 3

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that returnee Ghanaian diaspora form part of both the economic and political fabric of the Ghanaian society. By the virtue of returning from the diaspora with various forms of capitals such as, educational, economic, political, cultural and social capitals. As such returning with such capitals has catapulted them into the group of Ghanaian elites and law makers. The examples of past and present political leaders in Ghana such as: Nkrumah, Busia, Liman and in recent times Kufuor, the late Professor Atta Mills, Mahama and the current president Akuffo-Addo and his vice president Bawumia are all returnee diaspora, as stated previously all these cited examples attest to this notion that to a large extent, Ghanaian elites are derived from the diaspora. It has also been shown in this chapter that these political elites also constitute scholars and academicians, who return with their educational capitals to form part of the Ghanaian civil society. The review of policies pertaining to both diaspora and returnee diaspora was examined in this chapter in order to understand how transnational voting rights of the diaspora are formulated and how such policies are articulated to encourage Ghanaians from the diaspora to return. Also, the notion of first- and second-generation returnees was discussed and the challenges they encountered in their readjustment efforts back home in Ghana. What this chapter aimed to demonstrate was that political engagement of returnees in Accra depended of the following variable: a) the level of political engagement in host country before returning, either being a member of the ruling Party NPP or a member of the opposition Party NDC in the diaspora,; b) diaspora activities shaping their political position upon return; c) active political engagement in the diaspora serves as a

¹⁸⁰⁶ Charles Kwenin, head of Africa desk at the International Organisation for Migration, IOM Geneva, presentation at the workshop on Phase II draft of the Ghana migration policy. Charles Kwenin presentation was on the “Institutionalisation of the Ghanaian diaspora., 23 May 2012 in Accra

platform for acquiring political capital upon return and transferring political skills from the diaspora to homeland politics.

This chapter of the thesis further attempted to illustrate that returnee Ghanaian are a major force in Ghanaian political arena, and that they have always been the dominating category, this is not to indicate that to become a political elite in Ghana, one needs to have had a stint in the diaspora. In fact, a great majority of Ghanaian political elites are not necessarily returnees, nevertheless returnee, still constitute a significant percent among Ghanaian politicians historically and in recent times. The following chapter, therefore, seeks to address these themes relating to accumulated capitals from the diaspora and how that position returnees as part of the Ghanaian middle class and as such their influence within the landscape of Ghanaian politics.

CHAPTER 4: GHANAIAN DIASPORA AND THE LABELLING OF MIDDLE CLASS: POLITICAL MOBILISATION TO POLITICAL STABILITY

Earlier chapters of this thesis focused on the making of the Ghanaian diaspora and their identity formation, diaspora political engagement in London and transnational political engagement towards Ghana and finally returnee political engagement in Ghana. This chapter is therefore a follow-up of the previous chapters on returnees' resources being translated into the formation of a distinctive forms of capitals accumulated in the diasporas to return home with. In other words, can returnees be viewed as part of the emerging middle class in Ghana? Who are these diaspora returnees? Are they a class of their own or do they form part of the larger Ghanaian middle class? How do they organize themselves as a political entity? This sub-chapter therefore seeks establish the link between return migration, middle class formation and political elites as vanguards of Ghana's democratic consolidation.

4.1.1: Transfer of different forms of capitals and developmental implications: Turning migrants into political diaspora and economic resources

Ghana, just as many African countries has had its share of political instabilities in the aftermath of independence, in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Since the return to constitutional rule in 1992, Ghana has been noted as one of the most stable countries within the sub-region and as such a beacon of democracy for other African countries to emulate¹⁸⁰⁷.

Researchers and specialists on Ghana such as Richard Rathborn, Jeff Haynes, Basil Davidson and Paul Nugent all note that the current political stability in Ghana can be attributed to the country's educated elites, the well-established educational system that existed before and after independence¹⁸⁰⁸. Educational institutions such as Achimota School and University of Ghana, Legon, all served as a bastion for educating Ghana's professional elites and as such its middle class, based on educational meritocracy. These educated elites were the product of both Ghanaian and British educational systems. Most of the first-generation political leaders as noted previously, went on to further their education in the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Leading figures during the fight for independence all emerged from the educated Ghanaian elites who returned from the diaspora. Prominent figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, Kofi Abrefa Busia, J.B Danquah and William Ofori Atta, just to name a few¹⁸⁰⁹. The trend of returnee Ghanaian elites emerged in the formative years of Ghana's independence; it is still a continuing trend to date as it has been shown in the previous chapter.

4.1.2. History and conceptual framework of Ghana's Middle Classes: experience of expatriation and new economic growth?

The history of Ghana's middle classes dates from the early twentieth century, where there existed a nascent middle class, characterized by similarities of occupation, lifestyle and

¹⁸⁰⁷ Hamidu, J., 2015. Are Ghanaian Diaspora middle class? Linking middle class to political participation and stability in Ghana. *Africa Development*, 40(1), p.139

¹⁸⁰⁸ Nugent P (1995) Big Men, Small Boys and politics in Ghana, New York Print

¹⁸⁰⁹ Clignet and Foster: Potential elites in Ghana and Ivory Coast : a Preliminary Comparison, November 1964, p.349-362, American Journal of Sociology

status, endowed with a certain capacity for collective action. Their emergence was the product of three intersecting but at times competing processes: (i) the incorporation of Ghana into the world economy from the late 19th century; (ii) the expansion of the educational system, starting with the introduction of mission schools in the 19th century; (iii) the expansion of state employment, especially in the immediate post-independence era, (iv) the return of Ghanaian professionals from the diaspora¹⁸¹⁰. These pioneer middle class, educated elites and professionals were essentially confined to the political and administrative class. Which implies that those working closely with the state. Aside from the educated elites or educated middle class, there has been an established and middle class formed by local businessmen and women, traders and large-scale farmers within the cocoa industry¹⁸¹¹. These intersections of past events, particularly the latter has contributed to the emergence of a new form of middle and “global middle class” in Ghana. For the World Bank, the emergence of a global middle class is a result of globalization. The definition of middle classes (or middle class) tends to be arbitrary as it implies different choices to this notion, in other words a smaller and larger or less homogeneous form. Ravallion (2009) states that “*we hardly ever ask the question of what exactly "middle class" is and, finally, there is little sign of agreement on what the term 'middle class' means*”. Therefore, defining “middle class” as a statistical result, a modern bourgeoisie, new elite, or a small bourgeoisie, which induces pre-established conclusions¹⁸¹². Defining Middle classes in Ghana demands a focus on a wider spectrum, as this regroups different socioeconomic realities and different individual trajectories needs to be considered. Kofi Bentil of IMANI Ghana, a local think tank, defines the Ghanaian middle class as: “*Our definition of the Ghanaian middle class does not have to do with disposable income or comfort: Our definition of the Ghanaian middle class has to do with the ability to mask poverty. In other words, many of the people who are considered middle class here in Accra, sometimes in the month have a problem feeding themselves to the standard of a middle class... but the thing is, they can get through the month without looking dirty or poor. Some of them have cars, and there are days when they cannot fuel their cars... So, someone who is middle class here in Ghana would be*

¹⁸¹⁰Luckham R, Gyimah-Boadi et. al, (2005) Middle Class and their role in National Development, CDD/ODI Policy Brief No. 3, November 2005

¹⁸¹¹Luckham R, Gyimah-Boadi, E. Ahazie W et Boateng N, (2005) Middle Class and their role in National Development, CDD/ODI Policy Brief No. 3, November 2005

¹⁸¹²Darbon D, Toulabor C (2013), art.cit. p.18,

*considered lower class in a developed country*¹⁸¹³. Bentil's definition highlights the notion and criteria for defining a middle class in a developed world is quite different to a middle class in a developing world.

4.1.3 Does diaspora Returnees stands as a middle class?

An increasing number of Ghanaians residing in the UK who tend to be the largest group to relocate home with 53% compared to 28% from the US, 16% from other Western countries and only 3% from France, as such these returnees form a distinctive group of elites and a new middle class mainly from England¹⁸¹⁴. This observation was also confirmed by the UN agency for Migration, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) report on Ghana, in which the report stated that the largest percentage of return migration to Ghana from Western countries were those who lived in England¹⁸¹⁵. These returns have been largely motivated by the continued economic growth and political stability in Ghana. Among those returning are those setting-up businesses and working within multi-national companies in Ghana, but some are returning home to engage in politics as noted in previous chapters.

The benefits that these returnees bring back are considerable, as they bring back not just skills and capital, but also transformed attitudes to established social hierarchies of status, age and gender, to work and to enterprise (Robinson, 2004). According to the African Development Bank *“economic growths in the coming years will fuel the growth of its own middle class – young professionals with families and desires for the latest technology and mod-cons. This emerging social class with a high purchasing power will, however, drive a niche in the market by the creation of a whole range of businesses to provide the services and products needed to support it – and so the cycle continues”*¹⁸¹⁶. Ghana is now benefiting from the return of its diaspora, as we saw in the previous chapters on return migration to Ghana. Politically some exiled Ghanaians from the diaspora could not return due to the military rule and during the early stages of the return to constitutional rule in 1992, most exiled Ghanaians who left during the Rawlings era still feared for their lives

¹⁸¹³Fieldwork interview with Kofi Bentil, 20th May 2013, Accra

¹⁸¹⁴ Quartey, P., 2006. The impact of migrant remittances on household welfare in Ghana.p.10

¹⁸¹⁵Quartey. P 2009, Migration in Ghana: country profile, IOM press, Geneva,

¹⁸¹⁶Africa's rising star: <http://dasibatamale.wordpress.com/tag/ghanas-middle-class/>.

by returning¹⁸¹⁷. Economically, the job market was not conducive for a lot of them to return as the country was experiencing economic reforms such as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which meant job cuts within the public sector, and devaluation of the cedis made it difficult for some members of the diaspora to return home¹⁸¹⁸. Those who were however brave to return home at that time, often run into entrenched social attitudes and bureaucratic blockages and other factors that were not conducive for business. Returnees who stayed in Ghana and succeeded provide ample anecdotal evidence of their frustrations, including the so-called PHD (pull him/her down) syndrome, which ensures that habits and disciplines acquired abroad are not easily practiced, let alone transferred to others (Boateng 2002; Robinson 2004).

The example of a returnee Ghanaian expatriate, a banker by profession and his wife a businesswoman, returning to Ghana after 20 years of living in England, points out eloquently that: he considers himself to be part of this new emerging “Global middle classes” as a result of having lived abroad and returned with qualifications: *“I do feel to be part of a bubble. When I think how much it costs to pay our driver or our nanny, I know that we can go to lunch or dinner and spend the same in one night as they earn together for the month. That does make me feel uncomfortable”*¹⁸¹⁹. It should be clarified that with a professional status as a banker in the UK classifies him as a middle class, in Ghana however, with his professional status as a returnee with qualification and experience, this automatically parachutes him and his family into an upper middle class, or a global middle-class category in Ghana. The professional trajectories of professional returnees mentioned previously could be classified as a “global middle class”, elite and upper middle class from a Ghanaian perspective, but in their host countries they will not necessarily be considered as middle class. Being considered as middle class in Ghana is derived from numerous classifications. Using Bourdieu’s social classification (Economic, Social and Cultural capital) criterium in this regard, indicates that one can be considered middle class via educational attainment, economic means, traditional standard and social hierarchy. However, not all returned diaspora fit into these different categories of middle classes in Ghana, as migration can be a deskilling factor on one hand, and on the other

¹⁸¹⁷Nugent P (1995). art.cit. pp. 35

¹⁸¹⁸ Information on Data skills Bank for Ghanaian in the Diaspora: <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/ghana1.htm>

¹⁸¹⁹Ghana’s expatriates returned home to seize opportunities from economic boom: www.guardian.co.uk <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/19/ghana-expatriates-return-home-economy>, the guardian 19 December 2012.

hand, return migration can propel to upward social mobility and as such becoming part of the middle class upon an individual's return to Ghana. The current Mayor of Tamale, the capital of Ghana's Northern Region, Musah Iddrissu exemplifies this notion of upward social mobility upon his return from the diaspora, as in London he occupied positions as a security expert with the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK, that could not qualify him as being middle class in the UK¹⁸²⁰.

¹⁸²⁰ Fieldwork data, discussions with Musa Iddrissu, London 2011

4.1.4 Social Composition and Characteristics of Ghanaian Middle Class 2012-2018

In contrast to studies on the middle class in Maghreb such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, belonging to these social categories are mainly associated to the entrepreneur and business classes¹⁸²¹. In Ghana, however, being middle Class is not only exclusive to the business and entrepreneur classes. The characteristics of being a middle class in Ghana constitute having an: economic, educational, political, cultural and traditional capitals, as highlighted above. These capitals can be translated into professional status, economic status, cultural and traditional status. Among respondents who were interviewed in Accra, 84.6% answered that they considered themselves to be middle class. Within the 84.6% who considered themselves middle class, consisted of individuals with different forms of capitals: level of education, economic status, cultural status and traditional status. Within these social categories included individuals working within the informal sector, who thus do not have a higher education qualification, yet identify themselves as middle class because of their financial and economic status. 13.5% of the sample respondents answered they did not consider themselves to be middle class, although their profession, and social status qualifies them to be in that social category; 1.9% gave no answer.

These results, however, illustrate the ease at which Ghanaians feel in labelling themselves as middle class was evident, even when their social, financial, economic, educational, traditional and cultural status at times does not necessarily corresponds to the lifestyle of the 84.6% of the sample of respondents who considered themselves as middle class. For some, being classified as middle class also comes with pride, prestige and not necessarily what their purchasing power allows them to spend on the education of their children and material goods of an aspiring middle-class household.

¹⁸²¹EASTERLY, W. (2001), "The Middle-Class Consensus and Economic Development", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 6 (4),

4.1.5 Identification and the labelling of the Ghanaian middle class

La catégorisation des classes moyenne en Afrique devient ainsi un enjeu central pour la compréhension des transformations intenses qui traversent le continent africain. Cela suppose:

- *d'une part de s'interroger sur les conditions de l'invention de la catégorie en Afrique pour en saisir les enjeux et la pertinence et se persuader que l'émergence de cette « catégorie émergente » est autant due au constat objectif de nouveaux faits empiriques qu'à des procédures organisationnelles différenciées de construction de la réalité sociale. Ces débats témoignent à la fois de la violence des conflits qui se déroulent pour les constructions de la réalité sociale africaine à travers des nouvelles catégories supposant des procédures d'inclusion et d'exclusion. Travailler sur la labélisation des « classes moyennes en Afrique », c'est donc aussi s'interroger en creux sur les processus d'occultation quelle produit des nouvelles pauvretés, les pauvres ruraux et urbains disparaissant simplement du radar médiatique et la pauvreté étant remplacée par l'émergence de la sortie de précarité;*
- *Derrière ces processus de construction de la réalité, il s'agit alors de rechercher les dynamiques sociales en cours, d'utiliser la prénotion comme une occasion d'interroger différemment le social et la politique en Afrique en s'intéressant aux formes du sociales, aux trajectoires qui déploient telle qu'elles se révèlent dès lors qu'on interroge sérieusement le label « classes moyennes en Afrique » ainsi proposé¹⁸²²...*

Darbon notes in “*L'invention des classes moyennes africaines: enjeux politiques d'une catégorie incertaine*” as cited in the statement above that the process of labelling and social categorisation of African middle classes takes roots in African local realities in other words empirical observation as opposed to an already established benchmark for such identification and labelling process.

¹⁸²² Darbon, D. and Toulabor, C.M., 2014. *L'invention des classes moyennes africaines: enjeux politiques d'une catégorie incertaine*. Éditions Karthala.p.19

As such the Ghanaian middle classes can be identified in these three typologies: (i) educated middle classes: doctors, lawyers, university lecturers, architects (ii) economic middle classes: businessmen not necessarily educated but their financial status is sufficient for them to be classified middle classes; (iii) traditional rulers can also be classified as middle and upper middle class, as within the traditional setting these individuals belong to a social notables and some might be educated as we saw with the example of the president of the National House of Chief, Prof. John Naa Nabila, a returnee scholar and former head of the Geography department of the University of Ghana, or the Asantehene the chief of the Ashanti Kingdom Otumfuo Osie Tutu II, a returnee who studied and worked in London and in Canada, majority of local chiefs are not educated, all the chiefs educated and non-educated are landowners therefore they can be considered as upper middle classes. This automatically positions them within a local and traditional context to be part of an elite group; (iv) Returnee diasporas including political returnee, who relocate home to engage primarily in politics; (v) Dynasties of political leaders, Social and cultural middle classes: these are children of first generation educated professionals and elites of post-independent era with their established family names such as the Nkrumahs, the Danquahs, the Busias, the Limans, the Akufo-Addos, the Bawumias and the Egalas among other prominent political families in Ghana. These are established names within the Ghanaian society, whose children do not need to be highly educated or professionals to be considered middle classes, they might not have the financial influence to be considered an economic middle class, but their name and family connection alone put them in this category of social middle classes, (Bourdieu's cultural capital). As being the son or daughter of Nkrumah for example automatically classifies you as being middle class or being part of the elite group. Sekou Nkrumah, son of Ghana's premier president noted in an interview in Accra in 2011: *I consider myself both as an educated middle class and a social middle class. Educated middle class because of my higher educational attainment both in Bulgaria and in Ghana. A social middle class because, my father was Ghana's first president, therefore socially here in Ghana, our family name resonates with many people, therefore not much introduction is needed in social gatherings*¹⁸²³. These

¹⁸²³ Field work interview with Sekou Nkrumah 5th August 2011, Accra, Ghana

social middle class are considered middle class without having to pass “the criteria test” of merit and hard work¹⁸²⁴.

4.1.6 Social representation and lifestyle criterion of the Ghanaian middle class

The urban landscape of Accra has gradually been changing, as a result of the emergence of gated communities and up market residential areas¹⁸²⁵. Accra’s gated communities has evolved since its emergence in 2002, whereby homes are built to cater for niche markets, designed predominantly for returnee diaspora¹⁸²⁶. Fieldwork observations in 2017 and 2018 revealed that gated communities in Accra, are now in areas where some of the best schools in Accra are located. International schools such as the Ghana international School located in Cantonment an area close to Accra’s business centre and also dominated by the presence of diplomatic missions in Ghana¹⁸²⁷. Another example of amenities in areas close to the locations of gated communities in Accra with Shopping Malls and International Schools such as The American International School, British International School and Lycée Français Jacques-Prévert d'Accra are all located in East Legon, a high end residential area in Accra where the middle class and returnee diaspora lives. Close to these gated communities are the localisation of Leisure centres such as pubs, bars, sports bar and gyms, fitness clubs that proposes Salsa class and Yoga class¹⁸²⁸. The emergence of these gated communities in up market residential areas are designed for the demands of a burgeoning middle and global middle classes in Accra with smaller family units of two to three children, for those with disposable income to spend on leisure activities. The “criteria” to live in such areas are not just exclusive to the educated and economic middle classes but also cultural and traditional middle classes. As a result of living in the same area, they belong to the same social networks of: diaspora returnees, political middle class, individuals who attended the same prominent schools in Ghana, such as: Achimota school, Ghana International School, Accra Academy Secondary School, Mfantsipim Boys

¹⁸²⁴Field work interview with Kofi Bentil, May 20th 2013 Accra Ghana,

¹⁸²⁵ Grant, R., 2009. *Globalizing city: The urban and economic transformation of Accra, Ghana*. Syracuse University Press.p.97

¹⁸²⁶ Grant, R., 2009. Art.cit. 98

¹⁸²⁷ Quayson, A., 2014. *Oxford Street, Accra: city life and the itineraries of transnationalism*. Duke University Press.p.99

¹⁸²⁸ Fieldwork observations Accra 2017 and 2018

Secondary School, Prempeh College, Adisadel collage, Wesley Girls High School, Mfantseman Girls Secondary School, Aburi Girls Secondary School, St Monica's Girls Secondary School and Holy Child School then proceeded to the University of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, University of Cape Coast and those who studied in Universities abroad. In turn these Ghanaian middle class can now afford to send their children to some of the best schools in the country such as Ghana International School, Achimota school, Lincoln Community School, and thereafter to universities in Ghana and abroad. This social network that they acquire as a result of living in the same areas creates a professional competition and higher aspiration to acquire more than what their parents had. According to Coffi: *"I send my children to private schools for them to gain better education and to give them a better chance in life. Attending schools with other children whose parents are doctors, lawyers, architects and businessmen will in future help my children to have a network of friends who will inspire them to aim higher and emulate their parents success, but to also to know the right people in Ghana, because in this country sometimes who know is important and it matters to be in the right circle"* ¹⁸²⁹. Therefore, being considered middle class is also ideological and self-representation in social classifications terms. It is important highlighting that not all the children of those living in these gated communities and residential areas end up having higher aspirations or succeeding in life as did their parents, some have actually ended up becoming delinquent and have not been able to live up to their parent's higher expectations of them which in some case can be pressurising for the subsequent generation ¹⁸³⁰. Meaning being middle class in this case is not automatically transferable or a reproduction from one generation to other, being middle class can stop at the first-generation level in Ghana.

¹⁸²⁹Field work interview with Gaylord Coffi, July 2012 Accra,

¹⁸³⁰See Carola Lentz: Trajectories of elites in Northern Ghana

Figure 0-106:Image: Gated Community in Accra



Source: Field work Middle Class in Africa, Ghana case studies June 2012: Gated Community in Cantonment, Accra

On the rise of gated communities in Accra as an enclave for Accra's middle class and returnee diaspora, Godwin Arku, assistant professor of Geography at the University of Western Ontario, noted that: *"the rise of Ghana's gated communities since the early 2000s and is linked much to the growth of the emergence of a well-paid professional class. Most of them are educated university graduates and some of them have been to school abroad, their overall lifestyle is different, and they have access to technology, cars, and houses¹⁸³¹."* Frank Gadzekpo, a resident of a "gated community" in Accra states: *"My family and I moved to Cantonment two years ago. We chose to buy a house in a gated community, mainly because of security; it was also to have neighbours who were of like-minded. What I mean by that is having neighbours who would take care of their house and gardens as a community. In a non-gated community, people do whatever they wish¹⁸³²."*

¹⁸³¹<http://af.reuters.com/article/ghanaNews/idAFL5E7MI20R20111129?pageNumber=3&virtualBrandChannel=0>

¹⁸³²Fieldwork, Middle classes in Africa Project, the Ghanaian case study June 2012,

This therefore denotes that living in a gated community is not only for the comfort and security, but also an area to establish and reinforce social networks, social capital and cultural capital. The vice president of Databank Group asserts: *“In the past, most people would opt to just rent a place, but this changing trend shows that there is a growing middle-income class in Ghana that wants to own a property. It has some cultural reflection as well. We used to be more communal, live with extended family, but the middle class is becoming more nuclear”*¹⁸³³. Living in a gated community is also a lifestyle option and a breakaway from the traditional setting of communal living, as is indicated in this statement.

Brock Friesne of Starbow (local airline company) emphasized on the purchasing power and lifestyle of the middle classes by observing the passenger profile of his airline: *“Our typical customer has a decent house, sends his kid to a decent school and drives a car or can afford a taxi to the airport, while this may not be the same type of middle class as Canada or Switzerland, there are a lot of those kind of people now in Ghana”*¹⁸³⁴. Although this observation is not representative for all the 84.6% who indicated that they consider themselves to be middle classes, there is nonetheless a pattern and a profiling of these passengers who can afford to fly on these local airlines among the sample of respondents interviewed in Accra between 2011-2018. This observation, however, indicates that to be considered middle class in Ghana, one’s educational, traditional and cultural status are not the only prerequisite, but financial status plays a major part in belonging to this social category. A person’s capacity to afford a certain lifestyle and comfort gives them the right to be part of this social class. Kofi Bentil of Imani Ghana, (a local think-tank) argues that the African Development Banks figures on African middle classes in general are fragmented, particularly figures for the case of the Ghanaian middle classes, which highly underestimates the importance of the informal sector: *“When you fly domestically now, you see all sorts of passengers you would never expect to. There are people who trade cattle or sell imported products from China. They fly because they have money, and it’s safer and more comfortable than the road”*¹⁸³⁵.

¹⁸³³Jin Lee, The Rise and Rise of Ghanaian Middle Class <http://www.thenewblackmagazine.com/view.aspx?index=3035>, Monday, December 10, 2012.

¹⁸³⁴Fieldwork, Middle class in Africa project, the Ghanaian case study June 2012,

¹⁸³⁵Ghana’s modest Middle takes the skies, <http://www.ft.com> 28 December 2012

As Bentil states, the lack of concrete and tangible data to quantify all these segments of the society as part of the emerging « Middle Classes » in Ghana, poses difficulties and challenges in having a larger view of who is or can be considered as middle class. He however noticed the recent surge of this social category (the middle class) in Ghana in the past 12 years, has been the ability of individuals with higher earnings to live a life that might match the high cost of living in Accra¹⁸³⁶. The rapid growth of the Ghanaian economy between 2000-2012 and between 2017-2019 was partly credited to the economic liberalization during the Kufuor's administration and the discovery of oil in 2006, with commercial exploitation in 2010. This was one of the catalysts of the rapid surge of Accra's class of "nouveau riche" and middle-class category in Ghana.

When interviewed on respondent's household income in 2012: 10% of those interviewed, indicated that they earned about \$5,000 per month, whereas 13% earned between \$3,000 - \$5,000 per month, 14% had a household income of \$2,000 – \$3,000 per month, while 23% answered they earned \$1,000- \$2,000 per month, and 40% indicated they had a household income of \$1000 - \$1,500 per month. What this fieldwork findings demonstrate, on the one hand, is that the average middle-class household income in Accra is situated within the brackets of the 40 %, which translates that those who earn \$1,000 - \$ 1,500 per month. On the other hand, the "global middle class" monthly household income sits within the brackets of \$ 3,000-\$ 5,000 quite high to classify anyone as being middle class in Ghana, so this category can be considered more of an upper, a global middle class or a class of rich people in a Ghanaian context.

In a similar fieldwork conducted in 2018 on the purchasing power of those who indicated to be middle class, and their household income. Among the sample of respondents 20% indicated they earned between \$ 5,000- \$ 8,000 monthly. A further 28% stated they earned between \$ 4,000-\$6,000 monthly, whereas 32% noted that their monthly income was \$ 2000-\$4,000; finally, 30% mentioned that their monthly income was between \$1,000- \$ 2, 000. These figures in 2018 on the household income of Accra's middle class demonstrates that there has been a clear income rise among those stating to be middle class. The profile of those who stated to be middle class in 2018 were much more explicit

¹⁸³⁶Field work interview with Kofi Bentil, Accra may 20th 2013

in exhibiting their social status, in their professions, where they lived, the cars they drove as opposed to 2012, where those who indicated to be middle class, some had multiple jobs both in the formal and informal sectors at the same time. Their purchasing power in 2012 was not always visible, whereas in 2018 it was visible. The visibility of the burgeoning middle class in Accra in 2018 is translated in their purchasing power and also an increasing presence of leisure centres to cater for this social category such as more fitness clubs dotted around areas with predominately gated community enclaves proposing fitness regimes such as Salsa and Yoga classes. This kind of fitness activities were less visible in 2012. Equally finding Fast Food Restaurants such as KFC, Pizza Hut and Burger King within proximity to gated communities and residential areas in Accra, where returnee diasporas, middle class and diplomatic missions are located. These Fast Food restaurants were not found in Accra in 2012. The emergence of Fast Food restaurants in Accra is a sign of upward social mobility for those who can afford it. It is not accessible to all Ghanaians.

In 2018, the middle classes socio professional profile was a lot more stable and established, they either had a thriving business or start-up that they had been operating for several years and felt that their financial situation was secured and consolidated. These middle and global middle classes in 2018 were predominately diaspora returnees i.e. Black Atlantic diaspora returnees and Ghanaian diaspora returnee who worked for international agencies and multinational cooperation based in Accra. Others among these categories in 2018 included political elites and Ghanaian diaspora political returnees.

CHAPTER 5: Middle-Class as vanguard of political stability? 2008 election first test to Ghana's democratic consolidation

Ghana's political stability is the result of highly educated elites, middle and upper middle classes who appear to understand or have understood the need to maintain the status quo, through elites' bargain¹⁸³⁷. DiJohn and Putzel (2009) define elites' bargain as the *'distribution of rights and entitlements' across groups and classes in society, on which*

¹⁸³⁷ Hamidu, J., 2015. Are Ghanaian diaspora middle class? Linking middle class to political participation and stability in Ghana. *Africa Development*, 40(1), p.130.

any state is based. From this standpoint, the strategies employed by the Ghanaian political elite to maintain power is no different from any other country.

The first major threat to Ghana's political stability since the return to multi-party elections in 1992, occurred during the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. The 2008 election has been viewed as the one of the most contested if not the most elections in Ghanaian electoral history, with the election results being very close. The ruling party at the time was the New Patriotic Party, NPP, a centre-right party which lost the elections by 1% to the then opposition party the National Democratic Congress NDC a centre left party¹⁸³⁸. This contested election results marked the beginning of the NPP's quest for questioning the electoral commission's position as an independent body with regards to electoral irregularities. As of 1992, political parties in Ghana seem to have evolved with ideological proximity of the main two political parties: the New Patriotic Party (the NPP, the Party currently in government) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC, the main opposition party) both seem to have similar political programs as such makes it difficult to distinguish one party from the other during this era of Ghana's democratic consolidation. The similarity does not end here, the two main parties tend to derive their ruling elites from the same social background and recruit their "*Big wings*" from the same social class: diaspora returnees, professionals in various sectors, the traditional and educated middle and upper middle class.

This political stability can however be explained by:

- The strong presence of Civil society organizations, institutions such as The Law Society, the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and the associations of Ghanaian business, Trade Unions, political parties, the press (particularly the radio) has played and continuous to play an important role in advocating for peace during the last four presidential elections. Some private radio stations belonging to returnee Ghanaian diaspora serve as a platform for political engagement of their respective parties. Professionals within the above organizations and institutions are part of the: educated elite, economic middle class and diasporas returnees.
- Ghana's Electoral Commission has since established itself as an independent institutional body (depending on which party is in opposition,

¹⁸³⁸ Hamidu, J., 2015. art.cit. p135.

does not view the Electoral Commission to be independent, as the current opposition party the NDC, finds the Electoral Commission position not being impartial in its procedures). Amidst the entire allegation on its lack of impartiality from the opposition party the NPP whilst in opposition 2008-2016 to the current Party in opposition the NDC's dismay about the current Electoral Commission's handling of the institution. These critiques notwithstanding, from the main two political parties, about the Electoral Commission, it still plays a pivotal role in mediating political disputes. In 2008, the then opposition party NPP accused the ruling party of the time the NDC Party of electoral fraud and demanded a re-run. The Electoral Commission however requested the opposition party to provide evidence within two weeks before any court proceeding could be organised. The 2008 election were validated, since the NPP Party was unable to provide evidence of electoral fraud within the two weeks' time frame. The 2012 presidential election proved a major challenge to Ghana's democracy and a test to the independence of the judicial services in Ghana.

5.1. The death of President Mills and the 2012 elections as second test to Ghana's political stability?

The second test to Ghana's political stability occurred in July 2012 with the untimely death of the sitting president, John Evans Atta Mills. His death came as a massive shock to Ghanaians, as this was the first time in Ghana's political history where a sitting president dies in office before the end of his first presidential mandate and also within five months to the presidential elections of December 2012. Political observers in Ghana, such as Prof. Gyimah Boadi, were of the view that if this unprecedented event had occurred in another African country, it could have led to political unrest¹⁸³⁹. Ghana as a country had never experienced such an event, so it had to improvise to ensure that no political party capitalises on this event to destabilize the country by staging a coup d'état with the military or any form of political mayhem. To the surprise of many, the sudden

¹⁸³⁹ Field work interview with Prof. Gyimah Boadi, 21 June 2013 in Accra, Ghana

death of the president rather brought the country together, as all the parties contesting the 2012 presidential elections, business community, professional associations, religious institutions, traditional rulers and chiefs all came together to advocate for peace. The president died on July 24th 2012 at 2pm, the vice president John Dramani Mahama was sworn in at 8pm, all the proceedings went smoothly as stipulated in the constitution without anyone contesting the Constitutional instrument and its rights. As remarkably this sad event was, it was viewed as cementing and consolidating the maturity of Ghana's democracy and the will of its elites to respect the constitution¹⁸⁴⁰.

5.1.2 Presidential election in 2012: biggest challenge to Ghana's political stability

The 2012 elections in Ghana according to Alex Vines the director of Chatham House: *"These elections are important not just to Ghana, but for the growing number of states and actors seeking to benefit from the increasing confidence in Africa"*. This statement, however, illustrates the importance of ensuring that political stability in Ghana prevails, not just for Ghana, but to continue being a reference for other African countries to look-up to, and to attest that a form of African democracy even with its own challenges can be achieved¹⁸⁴¹. This understanding of the importance to safeguard this democratic status as a marketing image for the political elites in respect of Ghana's constitution and institutional bodies such as the Electoral Commission provides credibility and legitimacy to these political elites as having the country's best interest at heart, vis-à-vis the international community.

The December 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections proved as the third test to Ghana's political stability, with the death of the presiding president and with five months to presidential and parliamentary elections changed the whole landscape of the political campaign for both the ruling party of the time NDC and the then opposition party NPP. For the opposition party the NPP, the death of the president was a sad event, nonetheless it was also an opportunity to attract the undecided voters to their camp, during their campaign. One of NPP's campaign strategy in early 2012, was to highlight the ruling

¹⁸⁴⁰ Fieldwork interview with Kojo Asante, 4th August 2012, in Accra, Ghana

¹⁸⁴¹ Field work discussion with Prof. Gyimah Boadi, 20th May 2013, in Accra, Ghana

party NDC's, inaptness of managing the economy since they came to power in 2009. This untimely death of president Mills provided a tense and to some extent a hostile environment for the 2012 election campaign and one of the most competitive, if not "the most competitive" election campaigns since the inception of Ghana's fourth Republic in 1992. The stakes were high for candidates of the two main parties the NDC and the NPP, as both were eager to win the elections. The 2012 elections in theory were supposed to be the last chance for the main opposition party's candidate, Nana Akuffo Addo of the NPP, who at that time was 68 years old, to challenge for the presidency due to his age. He had stood in 2008 for his party and lost to President Mills. President John Mahama, on the other hand, contesting the 2012 elections on the ticket of the NDC was 54 years at the time and ascended to the presidency as a result of the sudden death of the late president Mills. In president Mahama's case, this was his chance to be elected as president on his own mandate and not a "caretaker" president as some quarters of the Ghanaian media did coined him¹⁸⁴².

Ghana's economic growth in the past few years seemed to have propelled this recent political competitiveness. With the discovery of oil, Ghana's political and electoral landscape has become increasingly competitive. The competition between both parties to win an election and have a monopoly on decisions pertaining to the oil industry and other sectors of the economy at large. As noted by Prof. Gyimah Boadi, the director of CDD Ghana, a local think tank: "*They know what comes with power; if you capture the presidency, you control all the machinery of the state and unlike the past, we now have oil. The state coffers will be brimming*"¹⁸⁴³. These economic and personal interests of the political elites, political returnees and middle classes however indicate the competitive nature of the presidential elections in 2008 and in 2012. In 2012, Damina Frontier Markets, an independent market research company predicted an outright win of 53% for the opposition in the first run during the 2012 elections. If this had happened, it would have been the biggest election upset in Ghanaian politics since 1992, that a ruling party does not win an election to serve a second term mandate. On the 10th of December 2012, the Electoral Commission announced that the ruling party NDC had won the elections by

¹⁸⁴²Ghana elections <http://www.africa-confidential.com/news>.

¹⁸⁴³The telegraph, Article 7 December 2012, Ghana's democracy put to the test high stakes elections, consulted 1e 7 December 2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news>,

50.7%, the main opposition scored 47.7% and the remaining 1.56% went to the other smaller parties¹⁸⁴⁴.

The main opposition party at the time, the NPP decided to legally contest the election results, citing electoral fraud as they did in 2008 election and this time, they decided to proceed this challenge via the Supreme Court as a means to challenge the electoral results. Unlike the verdict of the 2008 election, albeit the opposition party NPP being disenchanted with the election results then, the party conceded defeat, straight away. In 2012, however, the Party's grass root supporters and some members within the leadership of the Party took to the streets of Accra to protest against the election results. To avoid political unrest and mayhem, the leadership of the opposition NPP viewed it necessary to quickly petition the Supreme Court as the only legitimate legal channel to contest any electoral dispute. To this effect, by petitioning the courts aided to appease the tension reigning within the opposition party and its supporters. This act of petitioning the Supreme Court was both important and symbolic, in that it was the first time an election results was going to be contested and ruled at the Supreme Court, by such action it also sets the precedence for subsequent dispute to be contested at the High Court. By using the Supreme Court channel to challenge the election results was also an opportunity to test the independence of the judiciary system in Ghana¹⁸⁴⁵. On August 29th 2013, the Supreme Court hearing ruled in favour of President John Mahama as being the legitimate winner of the December 2012 polls, after eight months of court hearing debacle between both sides. The court ruling came as a unifying factor for both parties and country¹⁸⁴⁶. The economic, educated, cultural, traditional and global middle classes or diaspora returnee middle class, as noted earlier, all played their role as the vanguard of the political stability in Ghana once more by advocating for peace during, before and after the announcement of the Supreme Court verdict.

¹⁸⁴⁴Ghana elections: www.ghanaweb.com,

¹⁸⁴⁵Africa Confidential, Ghana, after a unifying funeral, a divisive election, 24 August 2012, Vol. 53. No 17, www.africaconfidential.com

¹⁸⁴⁶Africa Confidential, Ghana, court lowers the curtain, 6 September 2013, Vol. 54. No 18, www.africaconfidential.com.

5.1.3 The 2016 presidential elections

The 2016 presidential election could be viewed as the fourth challenge to Ghana's democracy as the election campaign proved to be tense election period. The sitting president was vying for a second term as president, but a third mandate for his party the NDC, which would have been a new trend in Ghana's political history if he had won the election, as no political party since 1992 has ever won a third mandate. On the part of the opposition NPP, this was a crucial election for both the presidential candidate Nana Akuffo-Addo and his Party NPP to regain power, as the candidate and the party lost the 2008 and 2012 elections to the NDC. There has been a trend since the return to democratic rule in 1992, whereby the NDC or the NPP serves two terms of four years and the other party takes over the same terms via universal suffrage. This logic might appear as undemocratic, but the Ghanaian electorate has been voting in such pattern since 1992. As such, the NPP party viewed the 2016 election as an important turning point to regain power after 8 years in opposition and this time unlike previously, the three times presidential candidate Nana Akuffo-Addo was over 70 years old, this could perhaps be his last attempt to lead the party for the next elections in December 2020. The 2016 election was therefore important for both parties and their presidential candidates, as the stakes were high for both candidates. Once more both parties tapped into the network of their political elites both home and abroad, they also tapped into the resources of their diaspora branches in the UK and in other countries around the world, but also their political diaspora returnees in Ghana for the election campaign. The 2016 election was the first elections in Ghana where, there was no second re-run to determine the winner, as previous electoral results were so close that a second re-run was needed to determine the winner. News from various electoral commentators and observers at the various polling station, projected the NPP party as having won the elections. The Electoral Commission, however, delayed in its pronouncement of the electoral results, which prompted, civil society organisations, professional bodies, faith groups and the traditional ruling class seeking for the electoral results to be made public. The Asantehene, the King of the Asantes who is a diaspora returnee, who studied and worked in London and Canada before returning to Ghana and was later installed as the paramount chief of the Asantes. Traditional rulers are important in Ghana's democratic governance, they have been vital in advocating for maintaining peace in the country since Ghana's second republic in 1969-

1971. The National House of Chiefs was established in the year 1969 under the 1969 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and was formally inaugurated by the Presidential Commission in Kumasi¹⁸⁴⁷. It was subsequently maintained under the 1979 and 1992 Constitutions of the Republic¹⁸⁴⁸. The Headquarters of the House is located at Manhyia in Kumasi in the Ashanti Region of Ghana¹⁸⁴⁹. As such the national house of chiefs has played a pivotal role since 1992, as an important body which mediates for peace before, during and after each general election.

The king of the Asantes the Asantehene Otumfuo Osei Tutu II is an important figure within the National House of Chiefs. As such the Asantehene revealed that he had to intervene to convince ex-President Mahama to concede defeat in the 2016 Presidential election. Speaking at the UN High-Level Forum in September 2019 on the Culture of Peace at the Headquarters in New York, Otumfuo Osei Tutu said Manhyia palace was heavily involved in ensuring a violence-free election after the polls in 2016¹⁸⁵⁰. *“I’m proud that in a quiet and informal way we in Ghana are showing the benefits of the traditional and contemporary cohesion in governance. Apart from the constitutional arrangement for a National House of Chiefs, the respect for traditional authority has created a layer of moral authority that can be mobilized in times of crisis. On occasions where the political temperature has been on the verge of boiling over it has been possible to bring the combatants into a quiet conclave to cool down passions and restore calm. The Asantehene added: “At the conclusion of the last Presidential and Parliamentary elections the country stood on the edge of disaster. The UN Representatives and the Diplomatic community were aghast alarmed that Ghana was about to slip down the slope of electoral violence. Fortunately, the moral authority of the Palace was at hand. We were able to intervene to persuade the losing candidate to accept his fate and fly both candidates for a quiet encounter to pave way for a smooth handover¹⁸⁵¹.”*

¹⁸⁴⁷ History of National House of Chiefs: <https://www.nhoc.gov.gh/>

¹⁸⁴⁸ History of National House of Chiefs: <https://www.nhoc.gov.gh/>

¹⁸⁴⁹ History of National House of Chiefs: <https://www.nhoc.gov.gh/>

¹⁸⁵⁰ 2016 Elections: I persuaded Mahama to concede defeat – Asantehene:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/2016-Elections-I-persuaded-Mahama-to-concede-defeat-Asantehene-781017>

¹⁸⁵¹ 2016 Elections: I persuaded Mahama to concede defeat – Asantehene:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/2016-Elections-I-persuaded-Mahama-to-concede-defeat-Asantehene-781017>

The NPP Party and their presidential candidate Nana Akuffo Addo won the elections in December 2016 on his third attempt as a presidential candidate for his Party. This is to indicate that election campaigns and the democratic process in Ghana is highly tied to the participation of the traditional ruling elites, political middle class and returnee political elites. Their engagement is paramount in terms of preserving Ghana's democracy as it is exemplified by the role that the King of the Asantes played during the 2016 presidential election in brokering peace between the NDC and the NPP Party.

In 2008, an Afrobarometer survey indicated that 80% of Ghanaians indicated that they were happy with the political system, whereas 55% considered that they lived in total democracy¹⁸⁵². This observation might be relevant in 2008, but in 2012 and 2016, many political observers noted, that Ghanaians were becoming disenchanted with their political elites, as they view them not to be upholding to the promises made during the campaign period¹⁸⁵³.

Nonetheless the 2008 Afrobarometer data, could be translated by the presence of the civil society who have since auto-designated themselves as "*the watchdog or vanguard*" of *Ghana's political stability* as stated in an interview with Kojo Asante a researcher at the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development¹⁸⁵⁴. Since, the middle classes, political elites and to a larger extent traditional ruler are mainly composed of political returnees and are those who operate these civil societies. It is therefore in their interest to ensure that peace reigned in Ghana at all cost. Most of these individuals manning Civil Society Organisations studied and lived in abroad therefore being part of the returnee elites.

5.1.4 Threat to destabilise Ghana: 2019 foiled coup plot

As noted above, the political scene in Ghana has since 2008 become increasingly competitive among the elites. As such, the gap between the elites and masses has gotten wider both in the economic and political sense. The struggle for political power among

¹⁸⁵²Afrobarometer Ghana survey: <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

¹⁸⁵³ Fieldwork interview in Accra with Kofi Blankson, 12 July 2018

¹⁸⁵⁴Field work interview with Kojo Punpuni Asante August 2012

the elites both at the local and national level has become important for the elites, to this end, the political climate is becoming more and more hostile and the competition is fierce among political parties and politicians vying for political office. To this effect, there is not much to distinguish in terms of political ideology and policies among the competing political parties in Ghana, rather Ghanaian politics has become monetised¹⁸⁵⁵. This is to mean that the elites have professionalised the political landscape through monetisation of politics, in other words winning a seat in parliament depends on how much money a candidate can spend or is able to spend on his /her election campaign. The former speaker of parliament delineated in a statement:

The Speaker of Parliament Edward Doe Adjaho has bemoaned what he describes as the excessive monetization of the country's politics. Addressing a Parliamentary press corps Wednesday, the Speaker said the reality of Ghana's politics is that if politicians fail to pay, they fail to win. Doe Adjaho said in the first eight to twelve years of Parliamentary business, emphasis was more on a person's ability to deliver but the situation has changed dramatically. Presently there is more emphasis on how much money one can give to be retained or to win elections. According to him, the mantra now for voters is that "if you don't pay, we won't vote for you. «He said an MP can be all efficient and vocal on the floor of parliament but if he goes to the constituency and does not pay money, the constituents will say you will be a "one-time MP."

Doe Adjaho said the monetization of the politics is the reason for the increasing challenges and corruption facing the country. "We have monetized our politics. All of us. If we don't pay, they won't vote for you. That is the fact,". Mr Adjaho worried about the future of the country if qualified leaders are not permitted to continue their good work, adding that "My worry is that as a democrat, as somebody that devoted my youthful years to this process.... where are we going as a country?"¹⁸⁵⁶

This competitive and hostile political landscape among the competing elites could in part explain a foiled coup plot by some elites trying to instrumentalised the youth. On Monday September 23rd 2019, the Government of Ghana confirmed in a press release that a

¹⁸⁵⁵ Fieldwork discussion with Prof. Gyimah Boadi, July 2018 Accra, Ghana on Ghanaian politics

¹⁸⁵⁶ Monetization of Ghana's politics is the cause of corruption- Adjaho:

<https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/monetization-of-ghanas-politics-is-the-cause-of-corruption-adjaho/>

discovery of Bombs and guns factory were found in Accra and its environs¹⁸⁵⁷. Government intelligence and security services arrested the mastermind behind the coup plot Dr. Mac-Palm and some Police and Army cadres, senior army officer and non-commissioned army officers, a Senior Police officer alongside some civilians involved in organising the coup plot. Minister of Information, Kojo Opong Nkrumah issued a statement to that effect saying that: *“On Friday, 20th September 2019, a joint security operation of personnel drawn from Defence Intelligence, CID and Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), conducted a successful operation which led to the arrest of three persons and the retrieval of several arms, explosive devices and ammunition from locations in Accra and Bawaleshie near Dodowa”*. The joint operation was to neutralize an elaborate plot targeted at the Presidency, and with the ultimate aim of destabilizing the country. The arrest and seizure come after fifteen (15) months of surveillance and gathering of evidence on the activities of the prime suspects and others. The persons arrested are Dr. Frederick Yao Mac-Palm and his two accomplices – Mr. Ezor Kafui (a local weapon manufacturer) and Mr. Bright Allen Debrah Ofosu¹⁸⁵⁸.

The minister of information further added that: *“Surveillance on the activities of the persons involved commenced in June 2018, when Dr. Mac-Palm and Bright Allan Debrah Ofosu (“BB” or “ADC”), started organizing a series of meetings at the Next-Door Beach Resort, in Teshie, and other locations in Accra, in furtherance of their objectives. Between June and August 2018, BB, acting for and on behalf of Dr. MacPalm, contacted a number of serving military personnel, and talked them into hatching and executing a plot to obtain weapons, take over key installations, and secure funding for the purpose of taking over the reins of government. These meetings were closely monitored¹⁸⁵⁹.”*

The suspected Senior Army officer Colonel Samuel Kojo Gameli, four civilians, four other military personnel and a senior police officer, are said to be part of a group called *Take Action Ghana (TAG)* that was allegedly planning to overthrow the government¹⁸⁶⁰.

¹⁸⁵⁷ Gov't confirms discovery of Bombs and guns factory; arrest of Dr Mac-Palm others, 24 September 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Gov-t-confirms-discovery-of-Bombs-and-guns-factory-arrest-of-Dr-Mac-Palm-others-783206>

¹⁸⁵⁸ Gov't confirms discovery of Bombs and guns factory; arrest of Dr Mac-Palm others, 24 September 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Gov-t-confirms-discovery-of-Bombs-and-guns-factory-arrest-of-Dr-Mac-Palm-others-783206>

¹⁸⁵⁹ Gov't confirms discovery of Bombs and guns factory; arrest of Dr Mac-Palm others, 24 September 2019: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Gov-t-confirms-discovery-of-Bombs-and-guns-factory-arrest-of-Dr-Mac-Palm-others-783206>

¹⁸⁶⁰ Senior Military Officer, One Other Charged Over Alleged Coup Plot:

According to the prosecution, the group planned to undertake series of demonstrations, put together a plan to target key institutions including the Jubilee House (the presidential palace and the seat of government), 37 Military Hospital, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, the National Police Training School and Burma Camp in their attempts to execute the planned coup¹⁸⁶¹.

a. Background of coup mastermind

The mastermind behind the foiled coup plot is a returnee who studied medicine in the US according to Dr Mac-Palm' Facebook Account¹⁸⁶². He studied at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, from August 1998 to June 2000. He then studied Medicine at Brody School of Medicine at East Carolina University, USA¹⁸⁶³. In August 2018, Dr. Mac-Palm and two others, Kennedy Amoah and Dr. Albert Sam (based in the USA) formed a group called “*Take Action Ghana*” (TAG), under the guise of mobilising the youth for nation-building, education, health, and providing shelter to the needy¹⁸⁶⁴. Available evidence showed the intent was to build a support base of youth and radicalise them against the political authority in Ghana, it said¹⁸⁶⁵.

The two top army and police officers associated with the coup plot, Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Dr. Benjamin Agordzo, who holds a Ph.D. from Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Italy¹⁸⁶⁶ and who has been on various international peace keeping missions with the African Union and UN in Sudan, Somalia and Haiti¹⁸⁶⁷.

<https://www.modernghana.com/news/957631/senior-military-officer-one-other-charged-over.html>

¹⁸⁶¹ Coup plot, Avatime Chiefs and Families demand soldier’s soldiers bail:

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Coup-plot-Avatime-Chiefs-families-demand-soldier-s-bail-865894>

¹⁸⁶² Modern Ghana website: Suspected 'Coup Plotter' Dr. Mac-Palm Not Renewed License For 2019 — Medical Council 25 September 2019: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/957029/suspected-coup-plotter-dr-mac-palm-not-renewed.html>

¹⁸⁶³ Modern Ghana website: Suspected 'Coup Plotter' Dr. Mac-Palm Not Renewed License For 2019 — Medical Council 25 September 2019: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/957029/suspected-coup-plotter-dr-mac-palm-not-renewed.html>

¹⁸⁶⁴ Suspected 'Coup Plotter' Dr. Mac-Palm Not Renewed License For 2019 — Medical Council: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/957029/suspected-coup-plotter-dr-mac-palm-not-renewed.html>

¹⁸⁶⁵ Suspected 'Coup Plotter' Dr. Mac-Palm Not Renewed License For 2019 — Medical Council: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/957029/suspected-coup-plotter-dr-mac-palm-not-renewed.html>

¹⁸⁶⁶ Series of Seminars: International Relations and Law: Contemporary Aspects Present and upcoming international challenges: country analysis (Draft proposal n. 3, 28.3.2008) : http://www.stals.sssup.it/files/sssup_Ciclo_seminari_torre.pdf

¹⁸⁶⁷ I’ve learnt my lessons – Freed Agordzo speaks from home Ghanaweb, 24 January 2020: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/I-ve-learnt-my-lessons-Freed-Agordzo-speaks-from->

Colonel Samuel Kojo Gameli, holds a master's in law enforcement and has also been on peacekeeping missions in various conflict prone countries including Liberia with the Ghana Army¹⁸⁶⁸.

The two senior officers in the Army and the Police standing trial for their involvement in the coup plot, can also be considered as educated elites who have both studied, been trained and worked abroad. Also, the coup plotter Dr. Mac-Palm, gaining logistics support of some diaspora members in the US, as noted above demonstrates this paradox of diaspora and returnee diaspora elites being viewed as stabilising and destabilising factors in Ghanaian politics. This is to further indicate that the elites are not only vanguards of political stability, but they can also be a destabilising factor in Ghana's democratic governance through instrumentalising the youth and the masses to their causes, as exemplified above with the coup plotters organisation TAG, with the mission to galvanise the support of the youth and the poor for their mission to take over power.

Sub-chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued and demonstrated that Ghana's political stability so far, has been maintained by the willingness of the elites, i.e. middle, upper and global middle class, traditional rulers and elites who are majority returnee diaspora within the Ghanaian society and as such they play by the rules of the "democratic game" and are also political game changers. With active mode of participating in politics, regularly organizing elections every four years, alternating power from one party to the other, by respecting the rule of law, and instruments of the constitution. There is also the willingness on the part of these elites within Civil Society Organisations to hold politicians accountable for any political malpractices, to also charge politicians to surmount any unforeseen political

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¹⁸⁶⁸ Overweight people likely to suffer coronary heart diseases – Dr Sereboe
<https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/02/09/overweight-people-likely-to-suffer-coronary-heart-diseases-dr-sereboe/>

crisis that might arise. With these analyses in mind, the only time this stability could be threatened would be:

Firstly, if the past accords among the elites, that has been essential in maintaining the political stability, starts to become less horizontal and more vertical as each political party recruits its support base from the same social categories that are likely to help them win or lose elections.

Secondly, political stability depends on the capacity of the elites to foster political and economic development that trickles down to most poor which will enhance their daily lives and promote upward social mobility of the population, particularly the lower middle classes, the floating classes, the working classes and the poor.

Thirdly, if the lives of the working classes, the lower classes, the floating middle classes and the poor does not improve and if unemployment rates among the youth and young professionals continue to rise and are not addressed adequately, this might lead to them no longer being classified as the emerging middle classes. Then, this could lead to an alliance of the lower, working classes, middle classes and the poor to violently contest for political power. The danger for instrumentalization of these groups by populist leaders who are attracted by the current oil find could create major political instability.

Fourthly, the example of the foiled coup plot in September 2019, coupled with the monetisation of Ghanaian politics in recent times demonstrates the widening gap between the ruling elites and the masses. As such, populist leaders could use this void to galvanise support from the youth and the masses and pose a threat to weaken Ghana's democracy or break down Ghana's democratic consolidation process altogether.

Other major challenges that the country could face in the coming years are the capacity for the middle classes and elites to ensure that there is equal redistribution of the rents from the natural resources by directly involving young professionals, businessmen and women within the informal market, as demonstrated in this sub-chapter on the ties between Ghana's middle and returnee diasporas in Ghanaian politics. The following chapter aims at reviewing how these accumulated capitals in the diaspora has aided in creating new political identities which serves both host country and homeland.

5.5. Social Capital accumulations in the UK and in Ghana: Fusion and intermingling between political engagement in

London and Accra connection to political strategies and identities

As it was noted in part one of this thesis on the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation in London, which could be viewed from the prisms of multiculturalism and essentialism. These two prisms can also be classified as homogenous and heterogenous process of identity formation. Homogenous (social groups, diaspora association, collective identity formation, social class formations, resources and capital for collective action) this process of identity formation is linked to the prism of essentialism. Whereas heterogenous (motivated by self-interest, positioning individual interest over group interest) process is associated with multiculturalism. Both prisms have contributed to the political identity formation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London and also the political identity of returnees' diaspora in Accra. For the formation of the Ghanaian diaspora political identity to emerge a process is needed, which is: firstly, the identity deconstruction, disruption, discontinuity and disconnection in migratory trajectory of Ghanaians in the UK needs to erupt. Secondly identity construction as a diaspora group in London will take place; and thirdly identity reconstruction and continuity of a new Ghanaian diaspora identity that connects to homeland Ghana emerges. These three processes all require the shift from the diaspora or returnee diasporas being viewed as "objects" in migration to being considered as a "subjects or actors" in the diasporisation of the Ghanaian community in London and return to Ghana.

This sub chapter seeks to examine the similarities and disparities of how diaspora identity formation within a transnational setting is constructed and the shift from "object" to "subject" sets the context for political participation in the UK, transnational political participation towards Ghana and returnee diaspora political participation in Ghana. Is the Ghanaian diaspora identity formation based on shared experiences abroad? If so, how is this collective diaspora identity formed abroad and used as an asset in engaging in UK politics and Ghanaian politics. Since this transnational identity is not fixed and concrete but rather socially constructed and carved which is constantly evolving, therefore how does it benefit returnees.

Does these engagement fosters the formation of a New political group or not? How does these engagements enable the reproduction of a collective transnational identity or not? To what extent does these diasporas use their cultivated position as: “brokers”, “cultured”, “évolués” or “assimilados” within the transnational space for their own personal interest in serving both host and home countries. Are returnees’ identities based on shared experiences?

Through the sociological lenses of the Habitus, I will analyse how this notion plays an important role in this intermingling process of a collective Ghanaian diaspora identity formation and returnee diaspora identity formations. I will also rely on the notion of social capital accumulation as it has been advanced by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam to explain the fusion between social capital accumulation and political engagement in London, transnational engagement towards Accra and returnee political engagement in Ghana.

Marcel Mauss defines habitus in the following terms: *l’habitus est un principe important de « l’homme total » qui fait elle-même écho à celle de « fait social total ».* Il y perçoit un « lien » englobant des dimensions diverses d’ordres physiques, psychiques, sociales et culturelles. Marcel Mauss amorce ainsi une approche multifactorielle transversale de l’homme et des faits sociaux à l’origine desquels il est ¹⁸⁶⁹. Norbert Elias in his *La société des individus*, defines habitus as follows: *l’habitus est une « empreinte » de type social laissée sur la personnalité de l’individu par les diverses configurations (systèmes d’interdépendance) au sein desquelles celui-ci agit* ¹⁸⁷⁰. Elias further states that « *L’habitus est un savoir social incorporé* » qui se sédimente au cours du temps et façonne, telle une « seconde nature », *l’identité tant individuelle que collective des membres d’un groupe humain qu’il s’agisse d’une famille, d’une entreprise, d’un parti ou d’une nation* »¹⁸⁷¹. Here the Habitus can be seen as being used to form a collective diaspora identity both first- and second-generation Ghanaians in the UK, through their accumulated social capital in the diaspora. Pierre Bourdieu defines *habitus* as follows: *L’habitus est le fait de se socialiser dans un peuple traditionnel, définition qu’il résume comme un « système de dispositions*

¹⁸⁶⁹ Mauss, M., 2004. Fait social et formation du caractère. *Sociologie et sociétés*, 36(2), p.138.

¹⁸⁷⁰ Elias, N., 2013. *Norbert Elias par lui-même*. Fayard/Pluriel.

¹⁸⁷¹ « Termes clés de la sociologie de Norbert Elias », *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire*, vol. 106, no. 2, 2010, pp. 29-36.: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-vingtieme-siecle-revue-d-histoire-2010-2-page-29.htm#>

réglées », qui permet à un individu de se mouvoir dans le monde social et de l'interpréter d'une manière qui d'une part lui est propre, qui d'autre part est commune aux membres des catégories sociales auxquelles il appartient ¹⁸⁷².

Bourdieu further notes: *le rôle des socialisations primaire (enfance, adolescence) et secondaire (âge adulte) est très important dans la structuration de l'habitus. Par le biais de cette acquisition commune de capital social, les individus de mêmes classes peuvent ainsi voir leurs comportements, leurs goûts et leurs « styles de vie » se rapprocher jusqu'à créer un habitus de classe*¹⁸⁷³. The Ghanaian political diaspora identity is formed by the notion of “*l'habitus de classe*” because of their socialisation as a group in the diaspora, especially with the case of Anglo-Ghanaian political figures within both the Conservative party and the Labour Party in British Politics. By socialising within these political parties' circles in the UK and its Black and minority ethnic group sections, has enabled people with similar social background, life trajectory and political views to emerge.

In terms of establishing the link between Habitus and political integration of people of ethnic minority descent, Ghanaians in the UK and the Brexit vote. We can assume here that voting Brexit, by some members of the Ghanaian community in London, is either influenced by full integration into host country to the point of no longer viewing themselves as migrants, or people of migrant descent. But rather a fully integral members of the British society. In other words, full integration favours political engagement, or is rather political engagement of ethnic minority groups which includes the Ghanaian community that favours full integration, via habitus of shared social codes and experiences between established migrants' community and the indigenous white British voters. To push this reasoning further, the notions of identity deconstruction, disruptions and discontinuity in the diaspora in favour of a new constructed, reconstructed and continued identity in the diaspora could be explained by full integration and political integration of the old established Commonwealth migrant's community in the UK and this leads to the shift in their voting patterns in alignments to the voting general British population.

¹⁸⁷² Héran, F., 1987. La seconde nature de l'habitus: tradition philosophique et sens commun dans le langage sociologique. *Revue française de sociologie*, p.385.

¹⁸⁷³ Héran, F., 1987. art.cit., p.389.

This notion of Habitus has enabled a political returnee diaspora and a middle class to emerge as a result of shared new social codes via shared common experiences in the diaspora. Upon their return to Ghana by living in the same gated communities they maintain and reproduce habitus via socialising in the same sports clubs, political parties, their children attending the same schools etc...

Bourdieu states: *chacune des socialisations vécues va être incorporée (les expériences étant elles-mêmes différentes selon la classe d'origine) ce qui donnera les grilles d'interprétation pour se conduire dans le monde. L'habitus est alors la matrice des comportements individuels, et permet de rompre un déterminisme supra-individuel en montrant que le déterminisme prend appui sur les individus. Cet habitus influence tous les domaines de la vie (loisirs, alimentation, culture, travail, éducation, consommation...)*¹⁸⁷⁴. In other words, Ghanaian diaspora's collective identity was formed through socialisation of a group in politics and this political groups practices have enabled a political diaspora identity to emerge through the notion of habitus, to the point where this new diaspora identity has become second nature and innate. To this effect, political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in UK politics can be understood within the context of Black and Minority Ethnic group political engagement. Earlier examples in this thesis revealed that old established Commonwealth migrants' community voting for Brexit on the backdrop of anti-EU immigrant sentiment, to some extent it demonstrates this notion of a shared habitus and reproduction of new social codes based on shared experiences among the Black and minority ethnic community with white British voters. And this invariably influences and determines the voting pattern of the Ghanaian diaspora in London, as the Ghanaian community's voting patterns is strongly linked the Black and minority group voting patterns.

To this effect Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction, cultural capital refers to transmissible parental cultural codes and practices capable of securing a return to their holders. Cultural capital embodies the total of investments in aesthetic codes, practices and dispositions transmitted to children through the process of family socialisation, or in Bourdieu's term, habitus. Habitus is an important form of cultural

¹⁸⁷⁴ Héran, F., 1987.art.cit. p.387

inheritance, reflects class position of the actors' location in a variety of fields and is geared to the perpetuation of structures of dominance (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, p 204-205). Because family habitus varies by class, only middle-class or elite cultural resources can become cultural capital valued in society. We saw with the example of Lord Paul Boateng background where his family's habitus influenced his political career, as noted that: *"My father was a Lawyer, politician and a cabinet minister in Kwame Nkrumah's government in Ghana, I became a lawyer, a politician and a cabinet minister in Tony Blairs Labour government. So, I followed my father footsteps"*. Knowledge and possession of "highbrow" culture is argued by Bourdieu to be unequally distributed according to social class and education, to be institutionalised as legitimate, and to confer distinction and privilege to those who possess and deploy it. Along with economic, social and human capitals, such cultural capital actively reproduces social inequalities¹⁸⁷⁵. This, therefore, can be viewed with social inequalities that returnee diaspora generates as a class of people apart when they return vis-a-vis the local population, as this was demonstrated with challenges returnees encountered in readjusting back home in Ghana particularly at their workplace environment.

For Coleman (1988), individual behaviours are influenced by characteristics of the social system and that players do not stand alone but are motivated by their personnel interest and decide rationally. From this idea, Coleman wants to establish a link between social interactions and individual choices and seeks to go beyond a concept of society as a simple summation of individual behaviours. To achieve this, he uses social capital like a means of transition between micro and macro. The idea is that based on exchanges motivated by self-interest, long-lasting relationships are established, and these are not only social structures, but are also resources for individuals (i.e. these resources constitute social capital). Active members of Ghanaian political party branches in London's engagement can be translated as activities based on social interaction and individual choices motivated by their personal interest within the context of collective action. As noted in previous chapters, the three main political parties in Ghana NPP, NDC and CPP all have active

¹⁸⁷⁵ Tzanakis, M., 2011. Art.cit pp.79.

political party branches in the UK, London in particular. Their active political participation in the diaspora has paved the way for the return of some members to occupy influential positions within the mother political party in Ghana. This engagement can be classified as being motivated both by self-interest and the collective interest of the group.

Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67). In this instance, the Ghanaian diaspora and returnee diaspora social capital acquisitions can be viewed from Putnam’s idea of civic culture translated in the network ties they develop which are based on horizontal and vertical ties. The networks of horizontal ties, such as those formed in voluntary associations, support the emergence of norms of reciprocity which in turn foster trust, exchange and collective engagement; and the success of past cooperation strengthens collective engagement and develops a taste for cooperation (i.e. sequential equilibrium in repeated prisoner dilemma games)¹⁸⁷⁶. “In the civic community associations proliferate, memberships overlap, and participation spills into multiple arenas of community life” (Putnam et al. 1993, p. 183). In contrast, structures with vertical ties imprison individuals in situations where patronage, mutual exploitation, and corruption are the norm. Actors remain thus eternally guided by their greed or their immediate personal interest, which create and maintain selfish behaviour against which it is difficult to protest. The horizontal networking enables the Ghanaian diaspora and returnee diaspora to form a homogenous social group based on shared experiences, shared activities, solidarity and reciprocity both at home and abroad through philanthropic activities, political engagement while in the diaspora and in Ghana. As a result of these shared activities, which has facilitated a social group to emerge based on common interest. However, it is also vertical in the sense that these activities can also be very individualistic, which means individuals positioning themselves for political careers.

¹⁸⁷⁶ Putnam, R., 1993. The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. *The American prospect*, 13(spring), Vol. 4. Available online: <http://www.Prospect.Org/print/vol/13>.

The fusion between diaspora political engagement in London and transnational political engagement towards Accra can be viewed from the lenses of shared habitus of Ghanaian diaspora and Anglo-Ghanaian politicians in UK politics, social capital accumulations, social network building and social resource accumulation. These accumulations of capitals, resources and networks facilitates on the one hand, Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in the UK for both first- and second-generation utilising their resources to engage in UK politics as belonging to an ethnic minority identity, which is the Black British ethnic background and therefore representing that group in UK politics. And on the other hand, transnational political engagement towards Ghana, is characterised mainly by first-generation political diasporas they also use their shared experiences and accumulated capitals, resources and networks to serve the political purposes of Ghana while still based in the UK. Diaspora returnees who engage in Ghanaian politics utilises these accumulated capitals in the diaspora to serve their political party in Ghana, but also to serve the advancement of their own political career or facilitate their transition into political office or position in government. Social capital production and reproduction is vital in understanding the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in the UK and transnationally towards Ghana.

Political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London towards Accra between 2010-2016, could be qualified as both conventional, direct, unconventional and an indirect form of political engagement. This form of indirect and unconventional transnational political engagement is articulated in diasporas using their social capitals, resources and networks through their active engagement in hometown associations, professional associations, religious associations and Ghanaian political party branches in the UK. As stated previously the Representation of People's Amendment Act, (ROPA) which was voted in Ghanaian parliament in 2006 while the NPP was in power to allow Ghanaians in the diaspora to exercise their political franchise abroad was not implemented during the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. As a result of this absence members of the diaspora used direct and indirect form of participation through raising financial funds to support their parties' political campaign in Ghana.

Since the change of government in 2017, there has been a paradigm change in policies pertaining to the Ghanaian diaspora political engagement. The current NPP government is in the process of implementing the ROPA Amendment in time for the 2020 general

elections. The implementation of ROPA will allow disenfranchised Ghanaians to exercise their transnational political engagement in a legal manner as required in the Ghanaian Constitution.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This thesis project has sought to elucidate the problematic and debate around Ghanaian diaspora voting rights, which has long been a contentious issue since the enactment of Ghana's fourth republic constitution in 1992. As stated throughout this thesis an amendment was voted in parliament in 2006, the ROPA Amendment Act, to extend and accord voting rights to the diaspora. Since 2006 this amendment has not been implemented to allow disenfranchised Ghanaians in the diaspora to exercise their political rights. The Ghanaian diaspora and returnee diaspora constitute the bedrock of Ghanaian political elites, they use their accumulated capitals gained from the diaspora to contribute to Ghanaian politics from a transnational vantage point, and returning to engage in homeland politics.

To this end, what are the means by which Ghanaians in the diaspora have employed to advocate this voting rights? Who advocates for this voting rights and how is it articulated both in UK politics and transnational politics towards Ghana? Does engaging in UK politics by first-and-second generation Ghanaians a marker of full integration and assimilation in the UK? As we saw throughout this thesis these are some of the questions among many that this thesis has attempted to address and answer.

In effect, Part one of this thesis focused on the general historical overview of migration to the UK but most specifically from various Commonwealth countries to the UK. How these migration waves contributed to forming an ethnic minority group and as such a multicultural urban identity. Part one also focused on the migration waves of Ghanaians to the UK and their motive for Ghanaians emigrating to Britain. How this migration waves have aided in the construction of a new identity in the diaspora.

Part two of the thesis focused on the political making of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK and their transnational political links to Ghana. How these transnational politics in the UK influences political returnees and their role in preserving Ghana's democracy. Part two of this thesis examined, discussed and provided answers to the hypothesis that were posed in this thesis.

As noted in the chapter on methodological framework of the thesis, where it was noted that the thesis being a longitudinal and ethnographic study, an earlier hypothesis in 2010 stated that the Political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in London between 2010-2015 tended to be based on a homogenous form of political engagement. This meaning, they vote mainly or towards a political party that people of ethnic minority descent in the UK identify with, by viewing that party's policies as being more sympathetic to their plight, is the Labour Party. As we saw in the chapter on ethnic minority voting pattern in the UK, the main UK political parties all have ethnic minority caucuses. These ethnic minority caucuses and ethnic minority members within the Labour Party for example are often elected to represent the Party in areas and constituencies with high concentration of people of ethnic minority communities and migrants' communities. As noted previously, history was made in 1987, when three members of the Black Section of the Labour Party were elected in UK parliament, namely: Diane Abbot of Anglo-Jamaican descent and also the first Black woman to be voted in UK parliament, Lord Paul Boateng of Anglo-Ghanaian descent and Bernie Grant of Anglo-Guyanese descent. These pioneer ethnic

minority MPs have paved way for younger generations both in Labour, Conservative and other political parties in the UK to emerge. Again, as it was demonstrated with the examples of Anglo-Ghanaian Tory MPs, such as Adam Afriyie, Sam Gyimah and Kwesi Kwarteng, but also with the 2019 UK general elections where two Anglo-Ghanaian women were elected in parliament on the ticket of the Labour Party namely: Bell Ribeiro-Addy and Abena Oppong-Asare. This therefore, indicates that political participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK is highly dominated by educated elites among first- and second-generation Anglo-Ghanaians and that the Labour Party still remains the Party that most Ghanaians in the UK identify with.

The London Mayoral elections in 2016 confirms one of the hypothesis of this thesis, which, stated in 2010, that there is a direct link between ethnic minority, votes and the Labour party as London's ethnic minority community voted massively for the Labour Mayoral Candidate Sadiq Khan this also confirms the links between the Labour Party and Black and minority votes including the Ghanaian diaspora voting Labour.

Whereas the 2016 Brexit vote demonstrated a change in this voting patterns, which was previously based on shared identity and experiences of either voting for Labour Party or voting for moderate Conservative Party. The Brexit vote revealed a shift in the direction of people of ethnic minority descent voting on populist agenda, based on discriminating and anti-immigrant sentiment towards EU migrants. This shift in voting patterns of people of ethnic minority is an indication that the hypothesis in 2010 stating the direct link between ethnic minorities and Labour vote no longer holds. As some Labour MPs of ethnic minority descent encouraged their constituents to vote Brexit and support the idea of the UK leaving the EU.

This paradigm shift of voting patterns can be explained from the following prisms: a) Old established Commonwealth migrants felt that their positions are being threatened by newly arrived EU migrant, who are better qualified for jobs which were once dominated by Jamaicans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Indians and Pakistanis. And as such, voting Brexit, is to re-establish the old status quos and re-position them as the main migrant communities based on their historic ties to Britain as part of the Commonwealth family; b) Voting Brexit by ethnic minority could also indicate that people of ethnic minority descent in the UK are well integrated and are "post-race", as they view themselves to be

part of the fabric of the British society and therefore voting on populist agenda could be an indication of such full integration via political engagement, or rather political engagement has favoured full integration in this context. The argument advanced on the historic ties between the UK and the Commonwealth on post-Brexit “Global Britain” agenda as we saw with the Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s statement at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in January 2020, that the UK was going to open-up a new business and investment partnership with Commonwealth countries. This new partnership is to cement the idea that the bond between the UK and its former Commonwealth countries is taking a new direction after the UK has exited Europe. The new post-Brexit position with the Commonwealth, confirms the sentiments of ethnic minorities who voted Brexit highlighting on a stronger relationship with Britain.

Political engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK can be viewed as a horizontal link between first-and-second generations. This political engagement is articulated via socio-professional backgrounds of both generations, as those who indicated to be interested in UK politics were often those within the professional and educated category of diasporans.

Advocating for transnational political engagement by the Ghanaian diaspora is a bottom-up approach unlike in some African countries such as Senegal where the diaspora political engagement is top-bottom approach coming from the elites as far back as the early years of independence ¹⁸⁷⁷. To this end, it was illustrated in this thesis that diaspora and returnee diaspora policies in Ghana are very politicised, though the Black Atlantic diaspora (African-American and Caribbean diaspora) policies remain stable regardless of the Party in government.

The hypothesis advanced earlier on in the thesis in 2010, stated that according transnational political voting rights to Ghanaians living abroad was highly politicised and based on partisan politics. This implies that the NPP Party is pro diaspora and the NDC party is less interested in diaspora Ghanaians politically. This assertion of the NPP being pro-diaspora is confirmed by the policies that the current government is in the process of implementing vis-à-vis the Ghanaian diaspora both politically and economically. The NDC on the other hand, has made a sudden U-turn on their scepticism as to the

¹⁸⁷⁷ Whitaker, B.E., 2011. The politics of home: Dual citizenship and the African diaspora. *International Migration Review*, 45(4), p.781.

operationalisation of implementing the Ghanaian diaspora vote, to now being in support of the idea to accord transnational voting rights to Ghanaians living abroad. The NDC Party policy U-turn on diaspora voting rights, is based on the fact that the NDC party, now has a strong diaspora base, and therefore no longer view diaspora vote as a political threat to their party's interest, rather an added value. This notwithstanding, the NDC Party, wants the voting rights to be extended all over the world and not only in countries where the NPP has a strong support base in the diaspora. This, therefore, means that transnational voting rights is no longer an exclusive terrain for the NPP Party, there has been a paradigm change.

On returnee diaspora political engagement, among the 2017-2018 sample of respondents who indicated to be interested in politics were explicit in demonstrating their political affinity as a returnee in politics, whereas among the 2011-2013 sample they were less comfortable in claiming their returnee diaspora position in politics. This is because in 2017-2018 being viewed as a returnee in politics is seen as a positive contribution to Ghana's democratic governance due to the NPP pro-diaspora policies. Previously this pro-diaspora policies was not the case under NDC government between 2009-2016. These political diaspora returnees take pride in their linkages to the diaspora and the fact that they used their accumulated capitals such as resources capital, social capital and networks to help their party win the elections in 2016. But also, their return is not definite, as these returnees have not completely cut-off the umbilical cord with the diaspora, they are still living the transnational lifestyle of "in-between" society. As this was demonstrated in the chapter on the benefit of return migration and the challenges that returnees faced in their re-adjustment process both among first-and second-generation returnees. This can be translated as maintaining the link with the diaspora is also a coping mechanism of finding a balance between readjustment in homeland and still maintaining ties with the host country. The notion of diaspora standing as a middle class and political class among the sample of respondents in 2011-2012 and 2017-2018, remained unchanged.

Finally, it has been demonstrated in this thesis project, that the Ghanaian diaspora plays a pivotal role in politics both in host and home country. The Ghanaian diaspora and returnee diaspora use their accumulated capitals in the diaspora to position themselves in

both host and home countries as “brokers” and “bridge-builders”. The politics of claiming for diaspora voting rights illustrates that there is a consensus among both political elites in Ghana on diaspora transnational voting right. It is yet to be demonstrated if the Ghanaian diaspora voting transnationally can be a game changer in Ghanaian elections. As, Smith (2015) has shown in his study on the Senegalese diaspora’s transnational voting, in which he noted that votes from expatriate Senegalese does not determine electoral and election results in Senegal. This is because their numbers are not significant enough to make a difference in electoral results.

Debates and research on the consequences of contemporary migration and return migration to Ghana have overwhelmingly been focused on the economic impact they contribute to national development via remittances. Much less attention has been paid to their role in national development through the lenses of political engagement both transnational political engagement towards homeland and returnee diaspora implication in Ghanaian politics. Additionally, not very many or much scholarly work has been undertaken on the role of first-generation and- second-generation diaspora and returnee diaspora in Ghanaian political discourses in host and homeland.

It is therefore, in this context, that this thesis project has contributed in adding knowledge and scholarship to the gap in literature and research within the field of African diaspora and ethnic minority political engagement both by first-and-second generations in their host country, particularly among Commonwealth migrants and Ghanaian migrants in the UK. This thesis has also contributed to adding knowledge on the gap in research on Ghanaian diaspora political engagement in host societies as a contributing factor to their process of integration and assimilation in the UK. This thesis project has also added knowledge and scholarship in the study of transnational political engagement by demonstrating the role that diasporans play in transnational political sphere towards their home country, especially in the case of the Ghanaian diaspora transnational activities. The role of returnee diasporas as vanguards of political stability in Ghana. First-and-second generation returnee diaspora contribution to national development through their political participation in Ghana. Challenges that returnees in general face for their reintegration process in Ghana.

Although this thesis project has contributed to adding knowledge to scholarship in the field of Ghanaian diaspora political participation in the UK, transnational participation towards Ghana and returnees participation in homeland politics.

This thesis therefore proposes the following recommendations for further and future studies :

- i. Will the Ghanaian diaspora vote, be a game changer in Ghanaian election once ROPA is implemented? And to ascertain whether returnee diaspora will continue to be a political force in the near future?
- ii. To what extent does the accumulated capitals and experiences gained from the diaspora by returnees has an impact on political and ideological changes in Ghana? What is the impact of such political and ideologies on the management of Ghana's economy based on the idea of "competence" gained from the diaspora?
- iii. What are the residues in the ideological traits and experiences that returnees come back with and its impact on the relationships they maintain with stayers (non-returnees) who occupy management and leadership positions and how is that articulated?
- iv. What are the ties between returnee diaspora elite leaders and ordinary citizens whose vision of the world is different and priorities are different from that of returnees being articulated?
- v. What are the links and relationship between political elites and traditional rulers or chiefs in a fiercely competitive political environment in Ghana?
- vi. On the Ghanaian diaspora identity construction in the diaspora and links to political participation in the UK, an in-depth study will be required to further analyse these links between social classes and active political participation among the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK.

- vii. The army cadres can also be considered as educated elites from the diaspora, as we saw with the foiled attempted coup plot in September 2019, some of the army cadre alongside the medical doctor were the mastermind of the coup. To this effect, is the army still present and relevant within the political landscape?
- viii. Is a coup d'état by the army possible in the event of political crisis among the elites?

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

African Development Bank	ADB,
Black Asian Minority Ethnic Group	BAME
Black and Minority Ethnic Group	BME
Department for International Development	DFID
Diaspora Engagement Project	DEP
Electoral Commission of Ghana	EC
Economic Commission for Africa	ECA
European Union	EU
Food and Agriculture Organisation	FAO
Ghanaians Living Abroad	GLA
Ghana Immigration Service	GIS
Global Forum on Migration and Development	(GFMD)
Greater London Council	GLC
GDP Gross Domestic Product	
International Labour Organisation	ILO
International Organisation for Migration	IOM
Labour Party Race and Action Group	LPRAG
Liberal Democratic Party	Lib Dems
Migration for Development in Africa	MIDA
Participatory Action Research	PAR
United Kingdom	UK
United Kingdom Independent Party	UKIP

United Nations	UN
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	UNCTAD,
United Nations Development Program	UNDP
United States of America	USA
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady	VSB
World Health Organisation	WHO
ROPA, Representation of People's Amendment Law	ROPAL
Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals	TOKTEN

Annexe 1: Questionnaire for Accra and names of respondents

1. Age		2. Gender		3. Profession		4. Marital Status	
30-40	1:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Male	2:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Self-employed	3:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Married with children	4:1 <input type="checkbox"/>
40-50	1:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Female	2:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Higher education	3:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Married with no children	4:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
50-60	1:3 <input type="checkbox"/>			Business person or trader	3:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Single	4:3 <input type="checkbox"/>
60-71	1:4 <input type="checkbox"/>					Widow	4:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Which country did you live before you returned for good?							
Great Britain	USA	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	France		
5:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	5:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	5:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	5:4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	5:6 <input type="checkbox"/>		
6. How long have you been back in Ghana?							
0-1yr	6:1						
<input type="checkbox"/>							
1-3yrs	6:2						
<input type="checkbox"/>							
3-6yrs	6:3						
<input type="checkbox"/>							
6+yrs	6:4						
<input type="checkbox"/>							

7. Have you always lived in this area since you returned to Ghana?		
Yes 7:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No 7:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	If NO, where did you use live? 7:3 <input type="checkbox"/> I lived in Kumasi,whiles a lecturer at the University
8. According to you what are the biggest challenges/problems you face in this area? (You can name up to three)		
Bad state of roads	8:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Power	8:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Lack of good water supply	8:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
9. To you, what distinguishes each party from the other?		
Their programs	9:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Discourse	9:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
No apparent distinction from one party to the other	9:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Other (specify)	9:4 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not know	9:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Refuse	9:6 <input type="checkbox"/>	
10. How do you find political campaigns, are you interested?		
Very much	10:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Not much	10:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Very little	10:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Not at all	10:4 <input type="checkbox"/>	
11. What means do you use to follow this year's elections campaign?		

Radio	11:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
Television	11:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sittings	11:3	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meetings	11:4	<input type="checkbox"/>
Discussions	11:5	<input type="checkbox"/>
Newspapers	11:6	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tracts	11:7	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Why do you engage in politics?		
Meeting people of influence?	12:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solve personal problems	12:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Give your opinion?	12:3	<input type="checkbox"/>
To change the situation of things?	12:4	<input type="checkbox"/>
To understand what is happening within politics?	12:5	<input type="checkbox"/>
Just to imitate what others are doing?	12:6	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Are you a member of a political party?		
Yes	13:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	13:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
If No, why? Because, no party has been able to convince me with their program.		
14. Have you voted since 1992?		
Yes	14:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	14:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. For Parliamentary elections have you voted?		
Yes	15:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	15:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. If yes, on by which criteria do you use to vote for a candidate?		

Competent candidate diaspora	Competent candidate but from different	Candidate from the diaspora	
16:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	16:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	16:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Competent candidate from the diaspora solves your towns		Incompetent candidate from the diaspora yet problems	
16:4 <input type="checkbox"/>		16:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
17. In your opinion there are candidates who represent the interest of the diaspora?			
Yes 17:1 <input type="checkbox"/>		No 17:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
18. Did you use to participate in politics in your host country prior to your return to Ghana?			
Yes 18:1 <input type="checkbox"/>		No 18:2 <input type="checkbox"/> (But was an activist, as a student)	
19. How do you find the political life in Ghana compared to your host country before you returning to Ghana?			
Very Interesting Do not know	Interesting	Not interesting	Not all interesting
19:1 <input type="checkbox"/> 19:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
20. Do you know of any parliamentarians from the diaspora who is currently in office?			
Lots 20:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Some 20:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Fewer 20:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	None 20:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
21. From your view point, what do you think about the fact that Ghanaians from the diaspora cannot vote outside Ghana?			
Good 21:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Good 21:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Not at all Good 21:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
22. Why the response above?			
23. Can we have your impression about election promises made?			

Strongly Agree; Disagree Strongly, don't know				
Agree somewhat; disagree				
Trying to achieve their promises 23:17□	23:1□	23:5□	23:9□	23:13□
They are trying but lack the capacity to do it 23:18□	23:2□	23:6□	23:10□	23:14□
They do not have our interest at heart 23:19□	23:3□	23:7□	23:11□	23:15□
They only think about themselves	23:4□	23:8□	23:12□	23:16□
23:20□				
24. Among the political parties contesting in this year's elections which one do you think has the policies for the diaspora? None				
25. Apart from the election period, are you interested in politics in general?				
Yes, all the time			25:1□	
Yes, but not all the time			25:2□	
I would like to but I do not have much time			25:3□	
I would like to but I do not understand anything in politics			25:4□	
I am not at all interested in politics			25:5□	
26. Which of the following activities do you do outside of electoral period?				
Often From time to time Not at all				
Party meetings 26:15□	26:1□		26:8□	
General meetings 26:16□	26:2□		26:9□	
Financial contributions 26:17□	26:3□		26:10□	
Political discussions 26:18□	26:4□		26:11□	
Watch political programs on TV 26:19□	26:5□		26:12□	
Listen to political programs on Radio 26:20□	26:6□		26:13□	
Reading newspapers 26:21□	26:7□		26:14□	
27. Are you a member of an association or a club?				
Yes	27:1□	No	27:2□	
28. Are you a member of a church?				
Yes	28:1□	No	28:2□	
29. Are you associated with a trade union?				
Yes	29:1□	No	29:2□	

Names of respondents in Accra

1. Prof. Naa Nabila	19. Elvina Quaison
2. Prof. Abladi Glover	20. Akua Ofosuhene
3. Dr Joel Sonne	21. Hon.Elizabeth Ohene
4. Prof. Raymond Atuguba	22. Salma Mahama
5. Prof. Kwadjo Appiagyei-Atua	23. Sara Asafo – Adjaye
6. Prof. Mariama Awumbila	24. Mona Issaku
7. Kwame Sefa	25. Odile Tevie
8. Kweku Asamoah	26. Ama Konadu Abrebese
9. Kojo Asante	27. Nana Hemaaw Awindor
10. Kwesi Owusu	28. Prof. Akusua Adomako
11. Kofi Blanson Ocancey	29. Habib Kadiri
12. Nii Obodai	30. Kofi Bentil
13. Dr.Sekou Nkrumah	31. Jeanny
14. Tsatsu Dawson	32. Allotey Bruce
15. Nansata Yakubu	33. Andrew Alhassan
16. Gloria Ofori Boadi	34. Joe Hillview
17. Cecilia Asare-Amoh	35. Prof. Gyimah Boadi
18. Makeba Boateng	35. Nana Tseasewaa III
36. Hon. Mustapha Hamid	38.Charles Hamidu
37. Felix Hamidu	40. Richard Dombo

39. Akwasi Ababio Awua	42. Yaw Sarpong
41. Prof. Peter Quartey	44. Cecilia Anderson
43. Paa. Kwesi Holbrook-Smith	46. Dr. Abena Asante
45. David Agorsor	48. Eugen Aryee
47. Charles Kwenin	50. Dr. Prosper Asima
49. Joe Addo	52. Kwaku Odame-Otchere
51. Eugene Korleley	

Annex 2: Field work questionnaire London: London December 2012-January 2013

1. Age	2. Gender	3. Profession	4. Marital Status
30-40 1:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Male 2:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Self-employed 3:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Married with children 4:1 <input type="checkbox"/>
40-50 1:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Female 2:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Teacher <input type="checkbox"/>	Married with no children 4:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
50-60 1:3 <input type="checkbox"/>		University Lecturer 3:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Single 4:3 <input type="checkbox"/>
60-71 1:4 <input type="checkbox"/>		Lawyer 3:4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Widow 4:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Doctor 3:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Separated 4:5 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Nurse 3:6 <input type="checkbox"/>	Divorces 4:6 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Accountant 3:7 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Architect 3:8 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Office clerk 3:9 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Waiter 3:10 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Security Guard 3:11 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Cleaner 3:12 <input type="checkbox"/>	

		Business person or trader 3:13 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Other (specify) 3:14 <input type="checkbox"/>	
5. Which country did you live before migrating to the UK ?			
South Africa 5:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Nigeria 5:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Côte d'Ivoire 5:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Zimbabwe 5:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
			Togo 5:5 <input type="checkbox"/>
			Libya 5:6 <input type="checkbox"/>
			Burkina Faso 5:7 <input type="checkbox"/>
			Other Specify 5:8 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. When did you leave Ghana ?			
1950s 6:1 <input type="checkbox"/>			
1960s 6:2 <input type="checkbox"/>			
1970s 6:3 <input type="checkbox"/>			
1980s 6:4 <input type="checkbox"/>			
1990s 6:5 <input type="checkbox"/>			
2000s 6:6 <input type="checkbox"/>			
7. Have you always lived in this area since you left Ghana?			
Yes 7:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No 7:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	If NO, where did you use live? 7:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
8. What prompted you to leave Ghana (Multiple choice answer – as many as you wish)			
Political reasons	8:1 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Economic reasons	8:2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Came to study	8:3 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Family reunification	8:4 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Other (specify)	8:5 <input type="checkbox"/>		
9. How often do you visit Ghana ?			
Once a year	9:1 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Every 2 years	9:2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Every 3 years	9:3 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Every 4 years	9:4 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Every 5 years	9:5 <input type="checkbox"/>		

Every 10 years	9:6	<input type="checkbox"/>
Never	9:7	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (specify)	9:8	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. How do you find political campaigns in the UK, are you interested?		
Very much	10:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
Not much	10:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Very little	10:3	<input type="checkbox"/>
Not at all	10:4	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. What means do you use to follow election campaigns? (Multiple choice answer – as many as you wish)		
Radio	11:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
Internet	11:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Television	11:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sittings	11:3	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meetings	11:4	<input type="checkbox"/>
Discussions	11:5	<input type="checkbox"/>
Newspapers	11:6	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tracts	11:7	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (specify)	11:8	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Why do you engage in politics?		
Meeting people of influence?	12:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solve personal problems	12:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
Give your opinion?	12:3	<input type="checkbox"/>
To change the situation of things?	12:4	<input type="checkbox"/>
To understand what is happening within politics?	12:5	<input type="checkbox"/>
Just to imitate what others are doing?	12:6	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (specify)	12:7	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Are you a member of a political party?		
Yes	13:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	13:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
If No, why? (two sentence)		
14. Have you voted since emigrating to the UK?		
Yes	14:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	14:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Do you vote during general election in the UK?		
Yes	15:1	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	15:2	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Do you vote during parliamentary and council elections?		

Yes	No						
16:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	16:2 <input type="checkbox"/>						
17. If yes, which party did you vote for in the last elections							
Conservative Party	17:1 <input type="checkbox"/>						
Labour Party	17:2 <input type="checkbox"/>						
Liberal Democratic Party	17:3 <input type="checkbox"/>						
UK Independent Party	17:4 <input type="checkbox"/>						
Green Party	17:5 <input type="checkbox"/>						
Other	17:6 <input type="checkbox"/>						
17. Are you interested in Ghanaian politics?							
Yes 17:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No 17:2 <input type="checkbox"/> (If no why)						
18. Did you use to vote in Ghana prior to emigrating to the UK?							
Yes 18:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No 18:2 <input type="checkbox"/>						
19. How do you find the political life in Ghana compared to the UK?							
Very Interesting	Interesting	Not interesting	Not all interesting				
Do not know							
19:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	19:4 <input type="checkbox"/>				
19:5 <input type="checkbox"/>							
20. Do you know of any parliamentarians from the diaspora who is currently in office?							
Lots	20:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Some	20:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Fewer	20:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	None	20:4 <input type="checkbox"/>
21. From your view point, what do you think about the fact that Ghanaians from the diaspora cannot vote outside Ghana?							
Good	21:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Good	21:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Not at all Good	21:3 <input type="checkbox"/>		
22. Why the response above? In two sentence							

1.

23. Can we have your impression about election promises made either in UK?					
Strongly Agree, Disagree Strongly, don't know					
Agree Somewhat, disagree					
Trying to achieve their promises	23:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:5 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:9 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:13 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:17 <input type="checkbox"/>
They are trying but lack the capacity to do it	23:2 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:6 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:10 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:14 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:18 <input type="checkbox"/>
They do not have our interest at heart	23:3 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:7 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:11 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:15 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:19 <input type="checkbox"/>
They only think about themselves	23:4 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:8 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:12 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:16 <input type="checkbox"/>	23:20 <input type="checkbox"/>

24. Can we have your impression about election promises made by politicians in Ghana?				
Strongly Agree, Disagree Strongly Don't know				
Agree somewhat, disagree				
Trying to achieve their promises 24:17□	24:1□	25:5□	24:9□	24:13□
They are trying but lack the capacity to do it 24:18□	24:2□	25:6□	24:10□	24:14□
They do not have our interest at heart 24:19□	24:3□	25:7□	24:11□	24:15□
They only think about themselves 24:20□	24:4□	25:8□	24:12□	24:16□
25. Among the political parties contesting in this year's elections in Ghana, which one do you think has the policies for the diaspora?				
NPP 25:1□ NDC 25:2□ CPP 25:3□ PPP 25:4□ PNC 25:5□ None 25:6□				
Other (specify) 25:7□				
26. Apart from the election period, are you interested in politics in general?				
Yes, all the time			26:1□	
Yes, but not all the time			26:2□	
I would like to but I do not have much time			26:3□	
I would like to but I do not understand anything in politics			26:4□	
I am not at all interested in politics			26:5□	
27. Which of the following activities do you do outside of the electoral period?				
Often From time to time Not at all				
Party meetings 27:15□	27:1□	27:8□		
General meetings 27:16□	27:2□	27:9□		
Financial contributions 27:17□	27:3□	27:10□		
Political discussions 27:18□	27:4□	27:11□		
Watch political programs on TV 27:19□	27:5□	27:12□		
Listen to political programs on Radio 27:20□	27:6□	27:13□		
Reading newspapers 27:21□	27:7□	27:14□		
Internet □	27: 8□	27:15□	27:22	

28. Are you a member of a home town, If yes name it			
Yes	28:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	28:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
29. Are you a member of a Pressure group? If yes name it			
Yes	29:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	29:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
30. Are you a member of a Trade Union? If yes name it			
Yes	30:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	30:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
31. Are you a member of a professional association? If yes name it			
Yes	31:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	31:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
32. Are you member of any other association not mentioned above? If yes name it			
Yes	32:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	32:2 <input type="checkbox"/> Other(Specify) 32:3 <input type="checkbox"/>
33. Are you Methodist?			
Yes	33:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	33:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
34. Are you catholic?			
Yes	34:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	34:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
35. Are you Pentecost?			
Yes	35:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	35:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
36. Are Anglican?			
Yes	36:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	36:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
37. Are you a Muslim?			
Yes	37:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	37:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
38. Are you Traditional believer?			
Yes	38:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	38:2 <input type="checkbox"/>
39. Are you Non believer?			
Yes	39:1 <input type="checkbox"/>	No	39:2 <input type="checkbox"/> Other 39:3 <input type="checkbox"/>

Names of respondents in London

1. Ambassador Kweku Danso-Boafo	2. Ambassador Victor Smith
3. Lord Paul Boateng of Akyem and Wembley	4. Mrs Georgina Wood
5 Mr. Mohammed Abdul Saaka	6.. Musah Iddrissu
7. Elsie Owusu	8.. Regina Sintim
9. Sophia Rodriguez	10. Nana Yaw Sarpong

11. Helen Attia	12. Fareeda Ahmed
13. Amira Ahmed	14. Nahid Egala
15. Fatawu Ibrahim	16. Jacob Anomzorya
17. Henru Bonsu	18. Decline to give name Owner of Kumasi Market Peckham (female)
19. Harriet	20. Abena Boateng
21. Gadik Salomon	22. Linda
23, Dr. Kora	24. Georgina Mensah
25. Hamidu Yakubu	26. Elizabeth Asamoah
27. Tiwaa Yeboah	28. Savahna Nightingale
29. Isaac	30. Yaw Nana
31. Kweku Amoah	32. Kojo Yankey
33. Eric Yeboah	34. Dodzie Numekevor
35. Kwesi Aboagy	36. Kwame Adu Dankwa
37. Tina Mensah	38. Helen Braimah
39. Sandra Asamoah	40. Hayford Atta Krufi
41. Richard Tando	42. Marley Okine
43. Moses Anafo	44. Alex Dadey
45. Abu	46. Araba Thompson
47. George	48. Kweku Sintim
49. Tina Mensah	50. Sahadatu
51. Joseph	52. Lydia

Annex 3: Press Cutting: Black and Minority Group Leader in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Mr. Mohammed Abdul-Saaka in British Press

16 Thursday, March 25 1999

Telephone 0181 741 1622

KCN

YOUR LETTERS

London Newspaper Group
Newspaper House
Winslow Road
Hammermith W6 9SF

Fax: 0181 741 1973 Letters should arrive by 2nd post on the Monday before publication. We reserve the right to edit letters.

LETTER OF THE WEEK

Race relations

Dear Sir,
Following the Macpherson Report on the Lawrence case the Metropolitan Police now reluctantly accept that institutional racism exists and has always festered in the police service. They are sorry and determined to prevent the errors of the Lawrence case ever happen again.

Institutional racism in the Met has resulted in the Lawrence case, the Michael Menson case, the Home Secretary's black advisor who was stopped and searched 47 times, and countless other major incidents.

The public meeting between residents and police in Lancaster Road, Labroke Grove, on March 11 did little to convince a majority of these community members that anything will change.

Unfortunately, no-one can honestly say the men from the Yard were able to win the confidence of residents at the meeting. Most of the time they came across as insensitive, patronising and sometimes even arrogant.

The deputy assistant commissioner repeatedly reminded the meeting how "I did not have to be here".

This attitude suggests the police have learnt nothing from the Lawrence case and echoed the criticism directed at the police by Mr and Mrs Lawrence.

Undoubtedly this attitude created an acrimonious atmosphere whereby people's frustration boiled over.

Attempts to find out police strategy for minimising racially-motivated violence, abuse and harassment were not satisfactorily handled.

Furthermore assurances sought by the



Borough commander Steve Otter community on adequate protection after reporting racial crimes were not given. Be that as it may, borough commander Steve Otter came across as sincere and genuine and succeeded in winning the confidence of many in attendance.

A few Irish and ethnic-minority residents are willing to collaborate with him to find solutions to some policing problems.

It would have been gratifying to end on a positive note, however, in the light of the proceedings on March 11 many who attended agreed the meeting did not appear to achieve its purpose.

M Abdul-Saaka
Chairman
Black and Minority
Ethnic Residents Group
Tullock Road
Notting Hill

Bowled over by strangers

Dear Sir,
I recently tripped and measured my length on a pavement in King's Road.

Before I had time to stand up a little group had formed around me: one passerby recovered my specs and gave them a polish, another produced clean tissues for the blood; a third dashed into a shop and returned with a cold poultice for the swelling.

A man asked: "Can you stand?", as he hauled me to my feet.

Another asks: "Do you need an ambulance?" "No", I say "I'll take a taxi." And instantly one is hailed, door held open, everyone waves goodbye.

King's Road is an international highway, these young strangers might have come from Tower Hamlets or Timbuktu but as you can see the good Samaritan is alive and well.

Name and address supplied

We would be happy to see you

Dear Sir,
Readers will be interested to know the Woodland Trust is establishing a support group in the Kensington and Chelsea area.

Providing a wide range of activities and appealing to an extensive age range, we hope the new group will help in the purchase of more woodlands for public enjoyment.

The first meeting will take place at All Saints Church Hall in Clydesdale Road, Notting Hill, at 7.30pm on Monday.

Everyone is welcome to come along and hear more about the work of the Woodland Trust.

B Earl
Local support group officer
Leamington Park
Acton

It would have been good to talk

Dear Sir,
It is regrettable that the council should have decided to prepare its response to the Government's green paper on leasehold reform without consulting the borough's leaseholder groups.

The ministerial forward to the green paper describes the residential leasehold system as "fundamentally flawed" and recognised "utmost

Noticeboard

CONCERT
CHELSEA and Westminster Hospital in Fulham Road, South Kensington, is hosting a number of concerts in the coming week.

Tomorrow the Wardo High School Choir from Vermont, USA, will be performing.

On Tuesday Yoshiko Endo will be playing music by Mozart and Chopin on the piano.

And on Wednesday Forty Singers for Easter will be performing.

All concerts take place between 1-2pm.

Admission is free.

Call 0181 846 6821.

WILDLIFE
HOLLAND Park ecology centre is hosting children's holiday activities between April 6-9 from 10am-noon and 2-4pm.

Tickets cost £2 and should be booked in advance.

Call 0171 471 9802.

ADVICE
ELDERLY and disabled people can take advantage of the London Disability Directory which lists information such as council details, travel and Orange Badge car parking information.

It also includes an A-Z listing of businesses throughout London which provide services or facilities for disabled people.

Call 01772 631 823.

EXHIBITION
THE SCIENCE Museum's exhibition on the history of Mercedes car design, entitled Steel, Stars and Glass, is running until Sunday.

The display covers Mercedes cars from the 1888 Benz to the F100 with photographs by renowned German photographer, Zoltan Glass.

Admission is £3.

Contact 0171 938 8000

CONCERT
A CONCERT featuring a range of music from Johann Strauss to John Lennon is being held in aid of Street Children Focus Year 2000.

Alpine Serenades will be directed by Herbert

Race talk was 'just arrogant'

By FIONA MITCHELL

A MEETING about crushing racism in the police force has been dubbed a farce by the ethnic community of Kensington.

Sparks flew at the hour-and-a-half long public meeting attended by more than 100 on Thursday.

The meeting, *Building an Anti-Racist Police Service*, was hosted by the Kensington and Chelsea Police Consultative Group to find a way forward after the Macpherson report.

It branded the Metropolitan Police "institutionally racist".

But the chairman of the Black and Minority Residents Group for Kensington, Mohammed Abdul-Saaka, said: "The meeting did little to convince the members that anything will now change."

He added that members of the Yard "came across as insensitive, arrogant. This undoubtedly created an acrimonious atmosphere where-by people's frustrations welled over".

Mr Abdul-Saaka said the problem was that the police would not listen. The panel included the head of the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force, Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve, and Kensington and Chelsea borough commander Chief Supt Stephen Otter.

Police assurances about the safety of people who reported racial abuse or violence were also unsatisfactory said Mr Abdul-Saaka.

Police Consultative Group chairman Peter Bull denied the meeting was fruitless. "It was a very lively and useful meeting. Various ethnic groups were well represented and they asked most of the questions," he said.

Speaking to the *Times*, Chief Supt Otter said police did listen to people at the meeting and would be organising further meetings with black and ethnic groups.

He admitted the police force was institutionally racist, but said: "Not every police officer is racist. What I want to do is to ensure all my officers give a good service to black and ethnic minority people. There is a lot of room for improvement."

"I am borough commander and I have quite a lot of autonomy over 620 police officers. It's my responsibility to get it right and I will be working very hard with the community," he added.

Friday, March 19,

1989

London, weekly Times

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Community on guard in case racists strike.

Bomb alert in markets

Cont'd from page 1

in the East End on Saturday. The blast came a week after the first bomb went off in the centre of Brixton, South London, injuring 39 people.

Now residents in Notting Hill have raised concerns the Portobello and Golborne Road markets could be targets for racist attacks.

Chairman of the Black and Minority Residents Group for Kensington, Mohammed Abdul-Saaka, said: "Even if they target black people, our community is black and white. It's about universal malice rather than malice to black people. They just want to cause mischief in society."

"We have asked people to be vigilant, not to relax their guard at any time. That's the only way to secure the community in which we live. We can minimise the risk to life and limb in this area."

Kensington and Chelsea police have responded to such concerns by raising awareness of possible threats among traders, residents and council workers in various ways, including leafletting.

More police will patrol the area especially during the market's busiest day - Saturday - and officers are to visit "vulnerable" places, such as mosques and community centres. Mounted police will also be deployed.

Borough police commander Ch Supt Stephen Otter said: "We are looking to support the community, but North Kensington is one of many potential targets across the whole of the country. We need to be vigilant and take care, but if people are at all concerned they should ring the police."

The two bombs which exploded were both moved by members of the public in efforts to minimise their effects, but Ch Supt Otter stressed people should leave suspect packages alone.

the police moves and said: "There's concern in the community, but North Kensington has long ago driven out the racists and bombing Brixton and Brick Lane and Notting Hill - areas with high ethnic minority populations - will achieve absolutely nothing except the banning of racist and right-wing terrorist groups and long prison sentences for their members. We don't tolerate racists here."

A council spokesman would not be drawn on whether rubbish collection would be stepped up in the markets to reduce the risk of suspect packages being obscured.

He said: "The police have requested assistance and we will, of course, be co-operating with them."



Pat Mason - no room for racists

Kensington Times, Friday, April 30 1989

FREE BOOKS SYSTEM TO CONTINUE

By Josephine Kyiamah
Government has no intention
abolishing the free text-books
Scheme in primary, middle
secondary schools, Mr Moham-
abdu-Saaka, Ministerial Se-
y to the Ministry of Internal
s, said in Accra yesterday.
aking at the Ministry's weekly
briefing, Mr Abdul-Saaka said

that efforts were being made to
improve the present system.

The Ministry of Education, he said,
had started taking delivery of a large
consignment of text-books which had
been lying idle at the Tema Harbour
for quite a long time.

He noted that the Ministry had
experienced some difficulties in
securing exemption from paying
customs duties, sales tax and

charge on the books.

Mr Abdul-Saaka gave
the assurance that the
various schools would
soon be supplied with
text-books as soon as all
the books had been
cleared.

REPORT

He said that the Gov-
ernment had no intention
of publishing the report
of the Essah Committee
which probed the
free text-books system

Drug theft—4 helping police

Cape Coast, Tuesday
FOUR persons are help-
ing the police here in
their investigations into
the discovery of large
quantities of drugs be-
longing to the Ministry
of Health in their homes.

The four include a
drug seller, a taxi-driver,
a store assistant, and an
unemployed.

Disclosing this to the
Ghana News Agency
could, on Page 3 Col. 1

Annex 4 : 2016 London Mayoral Elections and Brexit Vote Campaign

Dear Jamilla,

Welcome to the Labour Party. And if you're returning, welcome home. I'm delighted that you'll be able to experience just what it means to be a full member of this great democratic and diverse movement.

On 23 June we face a hugely important challenge in ensuring our country remains a member of the European Union. Our campaign; Labour In for Britain is confidently making the case for remaining in the EU: for jobs, growth and our security. We believe it is necessary to remain, and reform, to get a Europe that's better for everyone.

As your membership card below states, 'by the strength of our common endeavour, we achieve more than we achieve alone.' It is the Labour Party's responsibility to ensure we remain in the EU - defending Britain's interests and influence in our global community. And with nearly 400,000 members the Labour Party is running compelling local campaigns in every part of Britain.

Will you offer your talents and experiences to the campaign? You can get in touch with your local party using the contact details below. You can also find out more what being a member of this great movement means in the enclosed booklet.

Thank you for standing with us during this important time for our party and our country.



Jeremy Corbyn
Leader of the Labour Party

P.S. Will you help us grow our movement even more? Enclosed is a membership form, it would be great if you could ask a friend or family member to join too.

Peel off card and fold in half



 **Labour**
labour.org.uk

Make a difference. Donate to Labour today.
Go to labour.org.uk/donate or call 0345 092 22 99



My Labour Party Membership Card

MP Dr. Rupa Huq and London Assembly member Dr. Onka Sahota for the London Borough of Ealing

Rupa Huq MP

Here for you, anytime

"Thank you to those who voted for me, but even if you didn't, I will be an MP who represents all our residents."

Email me: rupa.huq.mp@parliament.uk
Call me: 020 7219 6865

 @RupaHuq
 [facebook.com/rupa4labour](https://www.facebook.com/rupa4labour)

www.rupahuq.co.uk

Visit me: I hold regular 'surgeries' across each month, please call me to book an appointment.
Write to me: Rupa Huq MP, House of Commons, London, SW1A 0AA



Your Local Labour Team

"We would like to thank everyone who voted Labour in May. The next five years under a Conservative government will be tough.

The NHS is under attack - they are closing four hospital A&E units in West London. Ealing has lost its only maternity unit and the children's unit is set to be cut.

On top of this, Ealing's Labour-run council is facing almost £185 million of government cuts meaning local services will suffer.

I will be an MP who represents all residents and defends our community at every turn. Please do not hesitate to get in touch."

Rupa Huq

London Assembly Member

Dr. Onkar Sahota

Email: contact@dronkarsahota.com

www.dronkarsahota.com

 @DrOnkarSahota

 [facebook.com/DrOnkarSahota](https://www.facebook.com/DrOnkarSahota)

Ealing Council

Customer Services & 'Report it' line - 020 8825 6000

Ealing Advice Service

www.ealingadvice.org - 03000 12 54 64

Printed and Promoted by Joseph Brown on behalf of Rupa Huq MP, both at Ruskin Hall, 16 Church Road, W3 8PP

MOMENTUM

A NEW KIND OF POLITICS



MOMENTUM is a network of people and groups working together to continue the energy and enthusiasm of the Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader campaign.

MOMENTUM is at the forefront of dynamic organising, engaging more people in politics and helping Labour become the transformative governing party of the 21st Century.

Since launching in October 2015, **MOMENTUM** has:

- ▶ Set up over 120 groups across the UK
- ▶ Run several national campaigns, including a mass voter registration drive – Democracy SOS
- ▶ Mobilised for Labour victories in local and national elections across the UK
- ▶ Developed countless local initiatives and campaigns, such as Momentum Thanet's **Poverty Is A Crime**, a year long experiment in local economic planning.

For more information about our campaigns and activities, visit www.peoplesmomentum.com

MOMENTUM

Campaign correspondence letters I received from both Labour and Conservative Party ahead of the Brexit vote

'Our ideas brought together are so much stronger than our ideas only held individually.'

Jeremy Corbyn



Join us and help shape Momentum as it grows.

- ▶ Be part of an ever-growing network of people and groups committed to building a more democratic and equal society
- ▶ Be linked up with people and campaigns on the issues that matter to you
- ▶ Participate in Momentum's regional and national coordination
 - ▶ Shape the priorities and direction of Momentum as it develops

For more information about membership, go to www.peoplesmomentum.com/join

Join Momentum.

Let's build our movement.



MOMENTUM

www.peoplesmomentum.com

[/PeoplesMomentum](https://www.facebook.com/PeoplesMomentum) | [@PeoplesMomentum](https://twitter.com/PeoplesMomentum)



Leaving the EU would hit the economy – even the Leave campaign admit this is the case. This would mean less money for our NHS and other vital public services we rely on.




Being in Europe gives us lower prices – holidays, cars and the weekly shop are all cheaper because we're in. Leaving would result in a shock to Britain's economy which would leave working people worse off.

BRITAIN IS BETTER OFF IN EUROPE

The European Union has its problems but despite that, Britain is better off **IN**. If Britain leaves then jobs, rights at work, the NHS and lower prices would be at risk. Working people would have less protection from a Tory Government which has shown it won't stand up for them.



British jobs would be lost if we left the EU. 3 million jobs depend on trade with Europe - we need to stay to protect working people and vital industries, like manufacturing, which sell their products abroad.



Our rights at work like paid leave, equal pay, maternity and paternity leave and protections for agency workers are guaranteed by the EU. Leaving would mean they were at risk from the Tory Government.

LABOUR SAYS VOTE FOR JOBS, THE NHS, LOWER PRICES AND RIGHTS AT WORK.

VOTE REMAIN 23 JUNE

INSIDE:
Your guide for making the right decision for you and your family.



ON 23 JUNE YOU FACE A BIG DECISION ABOUT OUR FUTURE

VOTE REMAIN 23 JUNE

Labour

Brexit campaign correspondences letters and campaign

Flyers received from the Conservative Party Leave Vote



Imagine the question was the other way round:

Imagine the vote on 23 June is whether we should *join* the EU – with the Euro crisis, the migration crisis, and new countries like Turkey and Serbia being lined up as new member states.

Would you vote to *join* the European Union?

If not, Vote Leave on 23 June.

5 Content from inside pages. Your data may be held on servers outside the EEA. For clarity, personal data will never be rented or sold to others, nor passed to any registered political party. Promoted by 'Matthew Elliott on behalf of Vote Leave Ltd, both of 3 Albert Embankment, London, SE1 7SP. Printed by Howard Hunt Group, Macclesfield Close, Duxford, Cambridgeshire, CB22 0DP.



OFFICIAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE REFERENDUM ON 23 JUNE 2016

Referendum Communication

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W3 8HS

0027 - GUNNERSBURY LANE
5/GREENFORD/0366787

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND YOUR FAMILY: THE FACTS

We are sending this to you as someone who cares about the future of Britain and fair access to our public services.

This document is to help you make your decision in the referendum on Thursday 23 June.

FACT: Britain's official bill for EU membership is £19 billion per year or **£350 million every week – the cost of a new hospital.**

You have to decide whether what we get back from the EU is worth this.

FACT: Five new countries are in the queue to join the EU – **Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey.**

You have to decide whether this will help Britain, Europe, and fair access to public services.

The BBC says that 'Leave' supporters are much more likely to vote than 'Remain' supporters because few are happy with the EU. It is important that people vote in this crucial referendum whatever their view.

1 Our money, our priorities

We send over £350 million to the EU every week – enough to build a modern hospital every week of the year.

If we vote to remain in the EU, we will keep sending this money to Brussels each week.

If we Vote Leave, we can spend our money on our priorities – like the NHS, schools, and housing.



2 Take back control over our laws

If we vote to remain, EU laws will overrule UK laws and the European Courts will be in control of our trade, our borders, and big decisions like whether prisoners are allowed to vote.

If we Vote Leave, UK laws will have ultimate authority and we will take back control.

We should be able to vote out the people who make our laws.



voteleavetakecontrol.org

3 Build a fairer, safer immigration system

If we vote to remain in the EU, we'll be stuck with an out-of-control immigration system which is bad for our security. The European Courts will be in charge of who we let in, and who we can remove. *Imagine if Turkey joins this broken system.*

If we Vote Leave, we will be able to have a fairer, more humane system based on the skills we need. We'll be able to control numbers without having to turn away talented people from outside the EU who want to contribute.



No need for a stamp – but it will help us if you use one!

Freepost RTSZ-LUUA-HKLR
Vote Leave
Westminster Tower
3 Albert Embankment
London
SE1 7SP

Help us **Vote Leave** and take back control

Please tear off this page and post it back to us – or sign up at www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/getinvolved

Name: _____

Address: _____

Email: _____

Telephone: _____

- I will be voting to leave the European Union
- I will display a poster during the referendum
- I can help to deliver some leaflets in my area
- I can help with local door-to-door surveys
- I can make some telephone calls to other voters
- I enclose a donation (payable to 'Vote Leave')

The information you provide will always be handled securely and in compliance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998, and all other relevant legislation. Your personal data may be shared within the campaign, and with organisations and partners with which we have a strategic relationship for the campaign, or which perform work for our campaign, so that we can keep you informed. Your data may be held on servers outside the EEA. For clarity, personal data will never be rented or sold to others, nor passed to any registered political party.
 Formed by Quattro Print on behalf of Vote Leave Ltd, both of 3 Albert Embankment, London, SE1 7SR. Printed by Howard Hunt Group, Moorhead Close, Darford, DA2 6QP

4 Free to trade with the whole world

At the moment, the UK has no trade deals with important countries like China, India and Australia. If we vote to remain in the EU, we won't be able to make our own deals. We'll keep having the same old rows about bailing out the euro (€).

If we Vote Leave, we can have a friendlier relationship with the EU based on trade, as well as regain our seat on global bodies like the World Trade Organisation.

Europe yes

EU no

voteleavetakecontrol.org

5 Vote Leave is the safer choice

If we vote to remain in the EU, we'll be locked in the back of the car going somewhere we don't want to go. **We'll keep subsidising other EU countries and losing more control every year.**

If we Vote Leave, UK laws will have ultimate authority and we will take back control. We'll be free to spend our money on our priorities. **Which do you think is safer for you and your family?**



5 positive reasons to Vote Leave and take back control



OUR MONEY
NHS
 OUR PRIORITIES

Vote Leave on 23 June

Annex 5 : Figure 0-1:Map of UK



Source : <http://ukmap.facts.co/ukmapof/ukmap.php>

*Annex : 6:
Figure 0-2: Map of Ghana*



Source : <http://ukmap.facts.co/ukmapof/ukmap.php>

Annex 7: A Ghanaian diaspora Association Petition the UK Government to intervene in Ghanaian Governance:

BONABOTO-UK Petition letter sent to Prime Minister Tony Blair on 13th March 2007

BONABOTO-UK Protest letter to Blair

Rt. Hon. Tony Blair
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister

GHANA@50: THE STATE OF NORTHERN GHANA

The United Kingdom Branch of BONABOTO has learnt that the President of the Republic of Ghana, Mr John Kufour is on a 3-day state visit to the United Kingdom from 13th March 2007, by an invitation of Her Majesty the Queen.

BONABOTO-UK is a voluntary organisation of the peoples of Bolgatanga, Bongo and Talensi-Nabdam Districts of the Upper Region of Ghana.

The BONABOTO-UK therefore is writing to humbly request that you and the Government of the UK that while you dine and wine with the President of Ghana on his state to the UK, you should raise the underlined issues and concerns about the state of Northern Ghana 50 years after independence.

Demography

The Northern Ghana which comprises Northern region, Upper East region and the Upper West Region account for

20% of the national population and about 40% of the total land mass and 84.3% of the population is live in the rural areas. Since independence in 1957, most areas in the Northern Ghana lacked basic infrastructure such roads, schools, hospitals, good drinking water and electricity.

Economy

It is heart breaking and sad to note that about 88% of the people from Northern Ghana (Northern region, Upper East region and the Upper West Region) live in poverty. According to the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS 1999/2000) 7 out of 10, 8 out of 10 and 9 out of 10 are poor in Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions respectively.

The three Northern regions are overwhelmingly reliant on agriculture. It is the main occupation of 70% of the population. The few manufacturing industries established by the first President the late Dr Kwame Nkrumah after independence has been shut down deliberately by successive governments.

The Poverty situation in Northern Ghana is historically traceable to the British colonial government policies, which deliberately denied the Northern Ghana development for the purpose of reserving the North of Ghana as a source of cheap labour for the cocoa farms and mines in Southern Ghana.

Governments in Ghana after 1966 including the current NPP government led by Mr John Kufour, who could have pursued pragmatic policies and programmes with high patriotism and urgency to address in balance and injustice of the colonial legacy have failed to do so. There are approximately six dependent people per economically active person in Northern Ghana compared to the UK where there is only 0.6 of a person dependent on each economically active person.

Education

The current educational standards and achievements in the Northern Ghana have gone from bad to worst. 60% of children over the age of 6 have never attended school, 55% of boys and 67% of girls. Also 64% of parents cannot afford to send their child to school. Furthermore 78% of adults over the age of 15 are illiterate. Until 1994, the whole of Northern Ghana had no university and the only one opened in recent times is starved of resources.

Health

Despite the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme by the Kufuor led government, the health

situation in Northern Ghana is nothing to write home about. The statistics on the health of the North of Ghana is shamefully bad. There is only one doctor per every 30,000 people. During 2005/2006, 53.8% of the population reported having malaria. Only about 21% of women have access to family planning. Approximately 40% of women deliver children unsupervised and that about 220 in every 1000 women die during childbirth.

Institutional marginalisation of the North

The discrimination and marginalisation of people of Northern Ghana today has moved from bad to worse and the inequality gap has widened more and more. While the three Northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions) account for 20% the national population and 40% of the total land mass, allocation of national resources by successive governments of Ghana have not reflected this. For example:

Private Foreign Investment

The three Northern regions together mustered a mere 1% of private foreign investment inflow of US1.5 billion over the period 1994-1999 and the picture is even worst now.

District Assembly Common Fund

For the period of 1994-1996, the three Northern regions received the lowest allocation of District Assembly Common Fund. There is slight improvement but is still not better as compared to the rest of the country.

Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Funds

The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) formula, which ranked the three Northern regions, the poorest and classified them in group A, stipulated that 48% of HIPC funds should be disbursed to them. However, the Kufour led NPP government has over the years defied the dictates of the GPRS document in the distribution of HIPC funds.

Before October 2002, the amount of HIPC funds available for disbursement through the various Districts Assemblies of Ghana throughout the country to finance poverty reduction projects was 117 billion cedis. Northern Ghana, which was entitled to 48% of the funds, had as low as 20.5%

Also in 2002/2003 the total number of HIPC funded projects in the country, according to SEND Foundation report (July 2006) entitled "Where did Ghana's HIPC Funds Go", was 1,516. Out of which the three Northern regions combined together had just 17% of the projects. While Central region and Volta region had 11.6% and 11.7% respectively. This according to the GPRS was abysmally low and totally unacceptable.

Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

It is sad again to note that not one district in both Upper East and Upper West regions has benefited from the MCA, even though those two regions are known to be poorest of poor regions in Ghana.

Presidential Special Initiative (PSI)

The Kufour led NPP government's Presidential Special Initiatives in 2002, which were aimed at reducing poverty through the stimulation of private enterprise, improvement of productivity and creation of jobs did not reach the Upper East and Upper West regions and are still not there.

Further still according to a development economist, Professor Frances Steward of Oxford University "less than 3% of the entire country's development projects are in Northern Ghana under the NPP government"

To conclude, BONABOTO-UK is calling on you and the British government, the Opposition parties and Her Majesty the Queen that while you wine and dine with President John Kufour on his state visit to the UK; there is an urgent need to bring pressure to bear upon the government of Ghana to begin to organise stakeholders' conference in the three Northern regions to develop a blue print of a 10 year development plan or policy for the North of Ghana that will bridge the current development and inequality gap.

We specifically called on you to redress regional inequality development created by the colonial authorities by targeting development aid to Northern Ghana. It will be in line with your novel goals of the African Commission Report.

Whatever contributions and pressure the British government can bring to bear on the Ghana government will contribute towards some fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Ghana's development as a whole that the British government is so passionate about.


Thank you.

Yours sincerely

David Atugiya Secretary

Cc:
Deputy Prime Minister
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Opposition Parties
UK Members of Parliament
Secretary of State International Development
IMF
World Bank
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
The Media
Ghana High Commission (UK)
The Commonwealth Secretariat Donor Agencies NGOS' BONABOTO-Ghana Friends and supporters of Northern Ghana.

Annex. 8: Thesis field work pictures with some key respondents in London and Accra



With Lord Paul Boateng in London at the residence of the Ghana High Commissioner in London 20th August 2010



With Lord Paul Boateng after interviewing him 22nd August 2010 in London



With Ghana's Chief Justice of Ghana (2007-2017) Judge Georgina Wood, at the residence of the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK, 22 August 2010



Regina Sintim Personal Assistant to the High Commissioner (left) and Elsie Owusu OBE, Anglo-Ghanaian Architect (right)



Ghanaian women professionals in London with the Chief Justice of Ghana, Judge Georgina Woods



With Sekou Nkrumah (Son of President Nkrumah): Field work interview 11th August 2011, in Accra Ghana




Prof Gyimah Boadi, Executive director of CDD Ghana, 08 May 2013, in Accra Ghana



With Prof. Abladi Glover, 10 September 2011 in Accra, Ghana



Press coverage of President John Atta Mills death, Picture was taken at a Newspaper vendor kiosk in East Legon, Accra Ghana 25th July 2012



JAMILLA HAMIDU
FRANCE

DIASPORA DELEGATE



Scan for contact



Field work: Participation of the Ghana diaspora Homecoming summit, Accra 2017



From right -left: Akwasi Awua Ababio Director of Diaspora Affairs, Office of President, Dominique Rogers Université des Antilles , Frederic Dart Director of Alliance Française d' Accra, Jamilla Hamidu, Alexandre Foulon Director of Cooperation Embassy of France Ghana, and Eric Touze Deputy director of Alliance Française d' Accra, at the colloquium : *"Ghana in the diasporas: Historic linkages between Ghana and the French Antilles"* 8th November 2018 Accra, Ghana