



Narrative (de)securitizations of Islam in Western Europe.: A comparative analysis of public discourse in Germany, Britain, and France

Jeanne Prades

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Narrative (de)securitizations of Islam in Western Europe. A comparative analysis of public discourse in Germany, Britain, and France

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Since the present dissertation is written in English, which is not my mother tongue, it may contain some errors, for which I apologise.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1. The Puzzle. Contrasting visions of the “Islamic threat” in the post-9/11 decade

The emergence of the threat of international *jihadist* terrorism following the September 11 attacks in New York and subsequent terrorist events in Europe have impacted and questioned the position of Muslims and Islam in the West. According to most literature on framing theory, folk devil theory and security studies, Muslims have become the object of suspicion, as well as the focus of state intervention and political management in Western countries. Exceedingly, these studies tend to adopt globalizing approaches and conclusions; even when they question the reification of “Islam” and/or the “Oriental Other”, they fail to deconstruct “the West” as a perceived monolithic securitizing actor. Further, most of them tend to overemphasize the 9/11 terror attacks in New York as a global starting point of securitization, overlooking the *long durée* of politicization, demonization and securitization of Muslims and Islam in Western Europe.

A first comparative study conducted in 2013 on three European weekly magazines demonstrated that even when the 9/11 (re)activated the rhetoric of the clash of civilizations, the framing of an “Islamic threat” reflected sensitivities specific to each context: the British *Spectator* framed the Islamic threat trending towards the collectivization and externalization of Islam in a Huntingtonian reading of a post-Cold War bipolarity opposing “the West” to the “Islamic civilization”. The French *Le Point* framed the Islamic threat as identity-oriented, or “societal” in Barry Buzan’s terms¹. The bipolarity having emerged from within the French Republic itself, opposing the “*Lumières*” to the “fanatics”, the “moderate” to the “extremist” Muslims. The German magazine *Focus* framed the Islamic threat as largely “terrorist”, particularly due to the discovery of the Hamburg terror cell’s involvement in the terror attacks of 9/11. The perception of Islam as a potential threat to German culture (*Leitkultur*) became more salient after the 2010-2011 national debate sparked by Thilo Sarrazin’s bestseller *Germany Abolishes Itself* (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*), in which he polemically revived the debate on immigration.

Certainly, this first observation was too narrow to draw any general conclusions. Yet, the questioning of the homogenizing vision of the “9/11 effect” was puzzling enough to allow the formulation of the following question: how does the construction of Islam and Muslims in public discourse vary from one national context to another in a region as integrated as Western Europe? Further indicators started to appear during the 2015 European migrant crisis (EMC), also known as the “refugee crisis”. On one hand, while, historically Germany

¹ Buzan defines societal security as “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom” (Buzan, 2009: 38).

has not been considered to be a net migration country – and never seen itself as such – it immediately opened its doors and offered to host over 1 million refugees in 2015 – which then declined to around 300,000 who actually obtained asylum. On the other hand, the British conservative government reacted strongly to prevent an “invasion from Calais”, while refusing to grant asylum to no more than 35,000 refugees. Similarly, in France, the Socialist government also reacted in favour of a rather cautious approach to hosting refugees. The President at the time, Francois Hollande promised to host no more than 30,000 by 2017. Nevertheless, this dissertation focuses less on contrasting European migration policies – that may be understood via economic or demographic factors – than that of the differing narrative constructions of Islam and Muslims as potential threats to national security and identity in European public discourse.

What is puzzling is the specific manner in which each national government and media framed the crisis, *narratively*. The highest German authorities broadly declared that Islam belonged to German culture – when, at the same time, *PEGIDA* (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident), an openly Islamophobic movement in Eastern Germany emerged. In France, the French Socialist and former Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared that the European migrant crisis could destroy the “foundations of Europe”². As for the British conservative government, without taking the crisis on an identity level, it offered to help neighbouring Syrian countries instead of hosting refugees in Britain, which it declared to be counter-productive in addition to a threat to the British economic security. Accordingly, a 2018 report on public attitudes, political discourse and media coverage on the EMC reached similar conclusions: in all European cases “the Crisis has been crafted according to national, not [European] union perspectives, and there have been wide cross-country variations as to how political discourse has responded to the crisis” concluding that “National political discourse has been underpinned by historical legacies” (Consterdine, 2018). The narration of a “problem”, the construction of the “Self/Other” nexus, as well as the solution offered to counter a potential “threat”, tend to vary according to each political (sub)culture.

The contrasting visions of the “Islamic threat” and the cross-national variations in framing the EMC constitute a case in point to critically use the Copenhagen School’s celebrated concept of “securitization”: when an issue, presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object, justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle it (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, 1998). Since its theorization in the 1990s, securitization studies have developed and the concept has been many times amended and broadened (Balzacq, 2005 and 2010; Williams, 2003; Huysmans, 2006; Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2011; Croft, 2012). Drawing on those

² Jérémy Collado, “‘Maintenant, nous n’accueillons plus de réfugiés’ : le ‘message’ de Valls aux Migrants”, *Marianne*, 14 février 2016.

evolutions, I shall demonstrate that the narrative securitization of the same perceived threat – “Islam” and/or “Muslims” – in an integrated region – Western Europe – can still vary from one context to another. The very meaning of security is contextual, as is the process of securitization. As pointed out by Gunther Hellmann, it would be misleading to reify “the West” or even “Europe” as homogenous and monolithic securitizing actors (Hellmann et al., 2017; Hellmann and Herborn, 2016). It is generally acknowledged in the social sciences that social phenomena are partly dependent on cultural and socio-historical contexts in which they take place, making it even more puzzling that most securitization studies assume that the process of securitization is homogeneous in the West. Yet, to date, there has been no comparative perspective applied to the construction of Islam and Muslims as security threats in public discourse in Western European countries. Moreover, while the theoretical literature on securitization is well developed, the empirical basis remains incomplete. Particularly, there is a lack of content analyses of discourse conducted systematically and over several years. Given the aforementioned absence, I seek to partially fill this void.

The approach I have taken is empirical-inductive: starting from empirical observations, I enunciate inductive generalities to formulate explanatory hypotheses. This is unusual in international relations, where hypothetical-deductive methods are widespread: the researcher starts from a problem posed by existing theory and formulates hypotheses aimed at amending or refuting it (Battistella, 2009). My starting point is not a theoretical problem but an empirical observation that I seek to account for by critically mobilising the concept of securitization. It is therefore from empirical observations that I re-read the theory and not the other way around. I am less concerned with explaining *why* securitization varies from one context to another, than accounting for *how* these variations are narratively expressed according to socio-historical specificities.

1.2. Literature Review. Explaining cross-national variations in the governance of Islam in Western Europe

Although there are no comparative studies on the construction of threats in European public discourse, number of scholars have tackled the country differences in dealing with Muslim minorities through structural hypotheses, such as resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, political ideology (1.2.1), or state church regimes and varieties of secularism in European nation-states (1.2.2).

1.2.1. Opportunity, resources, and political ideology theories

In the 1990s, some scholars implicitly used insights from resource mobilization theory to explain the political outcomes of movements for Muslim religious rights in Western Europe (Penninx et al. 1993; Anwar 1995; Bistolfi and Zabbal 1995; Nielsen 1995; Kepel 1997). According to most of these scholars, Muslim groups

were ineffective because they lacked the resources necessary to deal with the state. The absence of representative organizations explained why Western European states failed to respond to the political demands of Muslim immigrants and citizens. Various scholars also observed that national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions within Muslim communities constituted an obstacle to their political mobilization (Scantlebury 1995; Amiraux 1996; Vertovek and Peach 1997)³. Carolyn Warner (1999) even advanced that the mobilization of Muslims was limited due to “the structure and ideology of Islam itself”, where there was no formally institutionally organized body that could supervise the religious and political agenda for Muslims (Warner, 1999:5). However, a more recent comparative study run by Fetzer and Soper (2005) advanced that resource mobilization was not operational to understand how Britain, France, and Germany have responded to Muslim political and religious demands. They observed that Britain had been more accommodating than France. According to resource mobilisation theory then, British Muslims would have had group leaders with access to significant political resources that French Muslims would have lacked. Yet, Muslims in France were already well organized into central political and religious organizations (the Paris Mosque, the Union of Muslim Organizations, the National Federation of French Muslims, or the French Council of the Muslim Faith), British Muslims won more concessions from the state than French Muslims, infirming resource mobilization hypothesis (Fotzer and Sopper, 2005: 218-219) as French Muslims should have won at least as many concessions as their British counterparts.

For their part, *political opportunity structure* theories contend that institutions and policies shape how groups are politically active and whether they achieve their goals. According to these theories, regime characteristics such as the electoral system, the position of political elites, the polity form (unitary or federal), or the degree of separation of powers, guide the politics of social groups. From this perspective, inherited political institutions influence the political activism of groups in specific ways. For example, in his comparison of immigration politics in France and Switzerland, Patrick Ireland (1994) found that the political centralization of power in the French state forced immigrants to aim for national legislation to win state concessions. The difficulty of that prospect has meant that immigrants have had little policy impact. By contrast, the Swiss federal system allowed Muslim groups to mobilize at local levels, and has attained greater impact. In a comparison of the politics of ethnic conflict in Lille and Birmingham, Romain Garbaye (2000) highlighted a similar dynamic. He observed that the British parliamentary and party system that empowers

³ For example, Muslims in Britain are divided into nation of origin – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and various Arab countries, major branches of Islam – Sunnism and Shiism, and Islamic schools of thought – Deobandis, Barlewis, and Wahhabism (Foetzer and Soper, 2005: Emplacements 198-199).

organised groups at the local level allowed Birmingham city officials to work closely with ethnic groups, taking their demands seriously. In contrast, the centralised French party structure and presidential system led city leaders of Lille to ignore ethnic groups' demands. Similarly, in a comparison of the UK, France, and Germany, Koenig (2005) examined the impact of immigration on the institutional transformations of the nation-state in the religious field, and more particularly the factors that informed varying policy reactions to public claims of recognition hinged on the religious identities of migrants. He contends that divergences in responses to Muslim claims in the three countries were explained by the varying institutional designs of political organization, collective identity, and religion, that came from different historical contexts of state-formation and nation-building (Koenig, 2005; 2003 and 2007). He described the significance of neo-institutionalist polity models on citizenship regimes and other public policies for religion and political organisation in the three countries. According to him, the UK embodies the liberal polity type: religious pluralism is recognised in the public sphere, an associational model of religious organisation is privileged, and public religious policy is considered as a decentralised process of negotiation taking place in the civil society. Germany corresponds to the state corporatist polity model: religion is considered a component of the public sphere and individuals are incorporated into the collective through corporative intermediate entities. Finally, France features the statist-republican model: particularistic identities are restricted to the private and not recognized in the public sphere, where individuals are incorporated into a collective project of rationalisation. The main advantage of studies based on political opportunity structure theories is that they are inherently comparative; however, they are limited in two aspects. First, political opportunity structure theories do not take public discourse into account, eluding the central question of framing policies. Second, they fail to acknowledge the ways in which inherited institutional contexts of church-state relations in Western Europe have shaped the politics of Muslim groups. Yet, as argued by Fetzer and Soper (2005), the constitutional and legal status of religion along with the historical context through which the institutions of church and state have been related, are significant in shaping how Britain, France, and Germany have accommodated the religious needs of Muslim groups (see section 1.2.2).

Finally, *political ideology theories* centre on the effects of a nation's political ideology and ideas on citizenship, nationality, and pluralism. In a comparison of citizenship laws in Germany and France, Rogers Brubaker (1992) argued that public policies were conditioned to a fixed "cultural idiom" that determines the policy outcome. Similarly, Erik Bleich (1998) described as "ideological prior" a pre-existing set of philosophical commitments that structure debates among policymakers on immigrant rights within a particular country. Once these ideas about national identity are embedded within a political culture, they prove resistant to

change. Following this conception of the role of political ideology, Adrian Favell (1998) argued that, in France, the republican tradition, which favours a philosophy of integration rather than accommodation, is the leading principle of incorporation of immigrants. By contrast, British political ideology places greater importance in managing relations among divergent populations, indulging separate groups to preserve their distinctive identities. Plus, Britain's pragmatic political tradition favours compromises, giving preference to what works versus abstract ideas (Fetzer and Sopper, 2005: 273-276). This distinction has often been seen as an opposition between multiculturalism, applying to Britain and partially to Germany⁴, and universalism, which is considered as the French model *par excellence*. It is true that this distinction has been quite convincing, particularly since Brubaker's above mentioned work (1992). According to him, the French model would make the transition from migrant status to citizen easy, because of its universalistic and inclusive nature. On the contrary, the culturalist – or particularistic – and exclusive nature of the German model would make migrants become only settlers, and not German citizens. However, as Ayhan Kaya (2009) more recently demonstrated, the German culturalist model, while considered as a source of exclusion, led to social integration⁵, whereas the French universalist model, commonly seen as a source of inclusion, led to social segregation⁶. Besides, while the distinction between universalism and multiculturalism is pertinent in some regards, it does not help to understand why the French universalistic discourse (liberty, equality, fraternity and *laïcité*) appears to be mobilized only as far as Muslim (postcolonial) populations as concerned⁷. One remarkable comparative analysis of the three countries under study is Brunn's (2012) study of the incorporation of religion into integration policies regarding Islam and Muslims. She found that Islam was more likely to become integrated in the UK, where ideas of tolerance, appreciation of religious plurality and religious participation in the public sphere were combined with the state's interest in religious communities as actors of civil society, providing an institutionally enclosed multiculturalist integration culture. On the other hand, Germany was more likely to face institutional conflicts, because of the ambivalent relationship between opportunities of recognition for

⁴ Christian Joppke (1996) argues that multiculturalism in Germany is less consensual than in Great Britain and that it is of different nature. While in Great Britain, multiculturalism is fully interconnected with post imperial immigration, in Germany, the debate is about the protracted problem of German nationhood itself after Nazism (Jopke, 1996: 455).

⁵ The 2000 citizenship law became more liberal than the French; multiculturalism discourse in Germany led the German-Turk to represent themselves in public spheres with their own cultural identities. Plus, as indicators, Ayhan Kaya has evaluated the number of German-Turks in the local, national and European Parliaments; their visibility in the cultural sphere; the amount of investment in the domestic economy (Kaya, 2009: 30).

⁶ On the contrary, French citizenship law has been more and more restrictive. Plus, the French 'melting pot' fails to produce social and professional mobility, especially for populations of foreign origins (Tribalat, 2003). Around 80% of young people with immigrant roots between 20 and 29 are children of workers, twice that of young native French (Kaya, 2009: 31).

⁷ For example, so far, there has been no public debate presenting any non-Muslim former migrant populations, whether postcolonial (Vietnamese) or not (Chinese, etc), as a threat to French national identity, and particularly to French *laïcité*.

Muslims and attempts at instrumentalization of Islam to support integration purposes. Finally, the success of integrating Islam through the incorporation of religion into political strategies was unlikely in France, where both religious and integration policies systematically referred to republican principles, especially *laïcité*, as both internalized values and institutionalized ideas, means and goals of integration, orienting the State's interest toward the reproduction of the (secularist) Republic (Brunn, 2012: 286-287).

The main advantage of political ideology theories is that they recognize that ideas can drive policy processes as much as institutions and resources. However, too often they fail to consider state-church regimes and the weight of historical legacies in political culture(s), which impact the way Islam and Muslims are narratively constructed.

1.2.2. State-church regimes and varieties of secularism in European nation-states

Numerous studies have developed historical and comparative perspectives to parallel contemporary issues in the accommodation of Muslims to earlier processes of incorporation of minority religions in Europe (Benbassa, 2004; Safran, 2004; Lucassen, 2005; Cohen, 2006; Jansen, 2006). Here, I focus only on studies that have developed theoretical frameworks and historical perspectives on state-church relations' patterns.

Fetzer and Soper's (2005) *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* explores the policy legacy left by each country's history of church-state relations in order to explain both the demands formulated by Muslims, and the state's responses to these demands. They argue that accommodations of Muslim religious practices vary in each case according to the inherited relationships between churches and the state. According to them, in each country "Muslims inherited a web of church-state interactions based on constitutional principles, legal practice, historical precedent, and foundational conceptions of the appropriate relationship between church and state" (2005: 147). They show that the degree of state accommodation was significantly higher in Britain compared to France, with Germany in the middle. They contend that the difference could not be explained using resource mobilisation alone. Church-state aspects should be more systematically considered in political opportunity and ideology theories, being a key aspect of policy responses and the wider opportunity structure for Muslims in Western Europe. What Fetzer and Soper explain best is how the framing of Muslim demands depends mostly on the church-state relation within each political culture. According to their perspective, British Muslims are more likely to demand state funding of Islamic schools, as is the case for Christians and Jews, while German Muslims are more likely to ask for the creation of Islamic religious instruction courses in state schools, as is the case for Roman Catholics and Evangelical protestants. French Muslims would however, be less likely to ask for Islamic instruction in state schools, since it is alien to French

perceptions and practises regarding public education. However, church-state regimes do not account sufficiently for how national institutions responded to Muslim demands. The mere description of state-church regimes, immigrant incorporation policies or citizenship laws, runs the risk of overlooking the power of narratives and history. The best way to avoid such risks is to complete the comparative perspective with a deep historical investigation of state-church regimes within the long history of European paths to secularizations.

Whilst secularism is embraced as a core national value in several Western European countries and sometimes seen as a marker of Western identity (Sayyid, 2009; Amiraux and Koussens, 2016), understandings and practises of secularism strongly relate to respective states' political-cultural regimes and history (Kuru, 2008). Thus, the “secularist” paradigm of homogenous privatisation of religion in the West can be questioned and qualified as European experiences differ from one national context to another. As Casanova (2006) noted, there are multiple secularizations in the West associated with differences between Roman Catholic, Protestant and Byzantine Christianity (Casanova, 2006: 11). In “Latin-Catholic” cultural areas, there has been a *collision* between religion and the differentiated secular spheres – modern science, capitalism and the state. The Enlightenment critique of religion found ample resonance, particularly due to the French *Lumières* – “*les philosophes*”. They developed an “ideology of reason” (Himmelfarb, 2001 and 2008) specifically against religion both as faith and institution. Hence, secularist genealogy of modernity was constructed as the emancipation of reason and freedom, while religion became functionally ever more constructed as the symbol of irrationality and submission. By contrast, in the “Anglo-Protestant area”, there was *collusion* between religion and the secular differentiated spheres. Both the Scottish and the less acknowledged English Enlightenment movements⁸ (Porter, 1981) developed precisely against French *Lumières* and in accordance with the concept of individual faith⁹. As mentioned by Gertrude Himmelfarb (2008), despite “their personal familiarity with each other and with each other’s works, the British and French differed profoundly in the spirit and substance of their respective Enlightenment” (2008: 18). For its part, German *Aufklärung*¹⁰ also

⁸ On the importance and the particularity of English Enlightenment, see: Roy Porter, “The Enlightenment in England”, in: Porter and Teich (eds.), *Enlightenment in national context*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 1-18.

⁹ According to Gertrude Himmelfarb, while the French *Lumières* were based on a fiercely secularist, republican and revolutionary ‘ideology of reason’, the essence of the British Enlightenment rested on a liberal, reformist and progressive ‘sociology of virtue’. See: Gertrude Himmelfarb, “The Idea of Compassion: The British vs. the French Enlightenment”, *The Public Interest*, 2001.

¹⁰ There is actually a fascinating debate on whether German *Aufklärung* should be considered as German Enlightenment in its own right – just like the French and Scottish Enlightenments for instance – or, on the contrary, an anti-Enlightenment movement. In our view, the *Aufklärung* is part of the European Enlightenment fructuous movement. It has certainly developed against the French *Lumières*, and is therefore more an anti-French *Lumières* model than an anti-Enlightenment *per se*. As well as the Scottish Enlightenment was rather different if not opposite to the French in its form and nature, so was the German. From rather different perspectives, all three – *Lumières*, Enlightenment and *Aufklärung* – remain nonetheless part of the larger European Enlightenment movement. For a detailed review, see: Porter and Teich (eds.), *Enlightenment in national*

developed against French *Lumières* and along with the Prussian Power and the *Evangelische Kirche* (Evangelical Church) – the union of Lutheran and Reformed churches ordered by Royal Power¹¹. By the 1780's, the *Aufklärung* had become a Protestant lay theology: the *Aufklärer* worked within religious and theoretical traditions that they amended but did not reject¹².

In all three cases then, “secular” and “Christian” identities are complexly intertwined, though rarely verbalised as such among most Europeans. On the one hand, in France, secularism or *laïcité* is closely related to the Roman-Catholic hegemonic tradition averse to (religious) pluralism. On the other hand, in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, secularism is closely related to the early emergence of religious pluralism in “Protestant” contexts, i.e., numerous sects and churches in Reformed countries and official bi-confessionalism in Lutheran Germany¹³. These contrasting European experiences can help to explain why in France the notion of *laïcité* had been interpreted in terms of rupture with its Catholic past, whereas in Germany, secularism is seen as a continuity of the Christian tradition, with the separation of religion and politics as an exclusive characteristic of Christianity (Amir-Moazami, 2005)¹⁴.

Similarly, Capson (2017) showed that contrasting normative goals shaped Western countries’ practises regarding secularism. According to him, while American secularism seeks to protect religion from the State, French *laïcité* seeks to protect the state/individual from religion (Capson, 2017: 50). Consequently, France would have developed coercive, when not oppressive attitudes towards religion(s), whereas the US or the UK would have developed more accommodative attitudes. Capson’s work is founded on the two myths of the French political model, namely Republicanism and *laïcité*. The former concerns the idea of a special and static model of nationhood, integration and citizenship that would integrate immigrants on a colour-blind

context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. For a comparative perspective on French and British Enlightenments, see: Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity: the British, French and American Enlightenments*, London: Vintage, 2008, and “The Idea of Compassion: The British vs. the French Enlightenment”, *The Public Interest*, 2001.

¹¹ In Prussia, the debate was stimulated by Frederic the Great himself, who was pressing Berlin academy to publish a competition around the following question: “*Est-il utile de tromper le peuple?*” (“Is it useful to deceive the people?”). From this question, the utilitarian concept of “relative Enlightenment” emerged: all groups in society were to be educated but in relation to their social position and economical function [Porter and Roy, 1981: 108]. Meanwhile, Porter argues that the so-called Catholic *Aufklärung* was circumscribed by the Church and the University to a higher degree rendering it very different from the Protestant version of *Aufklärung*. It would have developed toward “Enlightened Absolutism”: operate a reform within the State to develop further the social and political order, not against but in cooperation with the rulers. [Porter and Teich, *op. cit.*: 107, 123].

¹² To sum up: “The German Protestant Enlightenment was thus primarily a utilitarian reform movement deeply committed to the traditional social order. Relatively free from anti-clericalism and rarely opposed to any but the most capricious tyrants, the *Aufklärer* saw the State, and by implication the Church which was subject to it, as the prime vehicle of reform”. Porter and Teich (eds.), *Enlightenment in national context*, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹³ For a detailed comparative review, see: Porter and Teich (eds.), *Enlightenment in national context*, *op. cit.* For a comparative perspective on French and British Enlightenments, see: Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity: the British, French and American Enlightenments*, London, Vintage, 2008, and “The Idea of Compassion: The British vs. the French Enlightenment”, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ In the meantime, French *laïcité* is at times mobilised as a model to follow by a secularist trend within *Die Linke*, while it is often opposed by other trends within *Die Linke* and other parties, as an extremist stand against religions.

approach, guaranteeing inclusion and equality. The latter suggests that the 2nd article of the “1905 law” actually guarantees neutrality and strict separation between Churches and the State in all cases. These two myths suggest that the French model is monist and immutable, applicable and applied instinctively to all newcomers and all religions. However, French “1905 law”, which commonly embodies the French *laïcité*, did not initially match such a concept of secularism. Rather, it is only since the end of the 1980s and the emergence of the Islamic veil as a public concern, that *laïcité* progressively turned into a meta-narrative that defines French identity. In other words, French secularism does not result in oppressive attitudes towards religions *in general*, as Capson argues. Rather, *laïcité* is mobilized in public discourse chiefly with regards to the visibility of Islam in the public space. In this case, French *laïcité* seems to express, rather than cause, the targeting of Islam and Muslims¹⁵.

Finally, Nada Afiouni’s comparative work on Muslim burial spaces and funeral practices in Britain and France (Afiouni, 2018, 2014, 2012), is of particular interest here, although she does not focus exclusively on secularism. By comparing Muslim burial sections in cemeteries in the two countries, she shows how contemporary political discourse and public policy addressing issues relative to cultural plurality are expressed in a language that speaks the weight of historical experience. According to her, British and French responses to religious pluralism are both essentially a product of their colonial past, and therefore very different, both in terms of public policy and public opinion. France’s response to cultural plurality and equality, she argues, is expressed in a terminology of *citoyenneté*, *laïcité* and republican integration, whereas in Britain the same issues are formulated in terms of race relations and multiculturalism.

Studies on cross-variations in dealing with Muslim minorities in Western Europe provide useful insights, although they all fall outside the framework of Security. Consequently, the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization appears appropriate to render these studies on governing, domesticating, and othering Muslims and Islam into the field of international relations.

1.3. Theoretical positioning. The securitization of Islam in Western Europe

Since the 1990s, international relations have been marked by the return of ideas, identity, and culture (Wendt, 1999; McSweeney, 1996; Neumann, 2004; Lebow, 2010; etc). Security defined in traditional terms as national interest no longer appears sufficient for analysing international relations. Neither the realists’ focus on material factors in the search of power (Morgenthau, 1948) nor the liberal attention to individual preferences and

¹⁵ Brunn C. (2012), *Religion im Fokus der Integrationspolitik. Ein Vergleich zwischen Deutschland, Frankreich und dem Vereinigten Königreich*, Springer VS.

cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 1972; Battistella, 2002), address the question of actors' identities in international relations. Contrastingly, constructivism identifies interacting identities (Lindemann, 2010) and accounts for factors such as beliefs in the political field, while challenging rational analysis and offering a new perspective on the origin of conflict. Lately, Frederic Ramel took the reflection one step further by offering a renewed vision of international relations founded on the Scottish Enlightenment and focused on the role of positive affects, where kindness or benevolence (*bienveillance*) coexists with power (*puissance*) in regulating international relations, both at the individual and state levels (Ramel, 2022). Factors such as beliefs and emotions in international relations refer to the construction of identity through intersubjective relationships between the Self and the Other (Neumann, 1999; Colonomos, 2002; Hansen, 2006; Ramel, 2009). Consequently, security studies were challenged and widened beyond the sole military dimension. So-called "wideners" expanded security studies across new sectors – economic, societal, political, and environmental – and deepened the agenda by introducing new referent objects – individuals, ecological system, community, nations, etc. The Copenhagen School introduced the duality of security, considered as "a duality of state security and societal security, the former having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and the latter being held together by concerns about identity" (Weaver et al., *Identity, Migration*, p. 25). According to early theorizations, securitization rests on 4 main pillars: (1) it is a *speech-act* – a problem is framed as a security concern by the performative nature of speech; (2) this speech-act must be undertaken mostly by state actors, because they are the ones who hold enough authority to do so; (3) securitization works when it raises the survival prospect of the community and its collective identity; (4) it is deemed successful when it leads to the use of extraordinary measures (Croft, 2012). Securitization is therefore particularly appropriate to address my research question because it provides for the study of both the narrative construction of the threat, and its subsequent impact on legislation and regulations. It has become a privileged framework for analysing phenomena related to the securitization of migration since the 1980s (1.2.1.), the securitization of Islam as transnational and secular form of governmentality (1.2.2), and the role of securitization in collective identity construction and reassurance (1.2.3.).

1.3.1. The securitization of migration in Western Europe

First, securitization has been used to account for the emergence of migration as a public issue since the 1980s (Huysmans, 2000 and 2006; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Ibrahim, 2005; Bourbeau, 2011; Gray and Franck, 2019; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Huysmans (2000 and 2006) showed how the European integration process has directly participated in the securitization of migration by "integrating migration policy into an internal security framework, that is, a policy framework that defines and

regulates security issues following the abolition of internal border control” (Huysman, 2000: 770). Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002), for their parts, noticed that arguments put forward in the securitization of migration are often similar, although strategies vary according to the context, and articulate around four main axes: socio-economic, with the threatening of the job market and the welfare state; securitarian, with the threatening of sovereignty, border control and both internal and external security; identitarian, with the threatening of national identity; and political, with the expectation that securitizing discourse would produce political gains (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 24). Focusing on the identitarian axis, Ibrahim (2005) illustrated the potential power of discourse and its influence on policy practises through the case study of Chinese “boat people” in Canada. Arguing that securitization of migration had become the new modern form of racism, she contended that the “migrant-as-a-threat narrative” was not based on notions of biological difference but increasingly on cultural difference (Ibrahim, 2005: 165). More recently, Bourbeau (2011) observed in a comparative study of securitization of migration in Canada and France, that although migration had been securitized in both countries, there were considerable variations in the *levels* of securitization in each case. According to him, while migration was weakly securitized in Canada, it was however strongly securitized in France. In doing so, he argued that security and securitization would be best conceptualised as a continuum rather than as a binary notion. Finally, in their article on British newspapers, Gray and Franck (2019) examined the gendered and racialized logics within which refugees have been represented both “as” and “at” risk in the reporting of the refugee crisis, arguing that media frames play an important role in (re)producing constructions of migrants as threats. They advocate for less attention to be paid to the securitizing move itself, in favour of more focus on how the securitization is made possible. According to them, successful securitizing moves rest on intertwined gendered and racialized representations of refugees as both threatening and vulnerable – tropes that are familiar rather than new to the designated audience(s).

A related body of literature focuses on the effect that securitization has on the integration of migrant-origin communities, and particularly on how anti-terrorist and anti-migration laws impact Muslim minorities (Cesari, 2009; Chebel d’Appollonia, 2015; Saed, 2016). Chebel d’Appollonia (2015) describes two opposite scenarios regarding the securitization of migration. First, according to the so-called “pessimistic scenario”, increasing securitization could lead to a growing distance between majority and migrant communities, while discrimination towards migrant minorities could lead to the radicalization of some migrants. In contrast, according to the “optimistic scenario”, migrant communities would seek peaceful integration with the majority despite discrimination. Overall, Chebel d’Appollonia’s analysis offers an optimistic scenario: migrant minorities hold rather positive views about the majority population. However, she identified a potentially

dangerous “clash of expectations” regarding integration, which may threaten relations between the minority and the majority, especially in the EU. For her part, Saed (2016) analyzed how the British media and politicians have constructed and reproduced stereotypical images of the Muslim. Following Edward Said (1978), she argued that this image should be understood in a broader historical context as a continuation of the Orientalist discourse that juxtaposed the rational and civilised West with the emotional and barbarous Middle East. According to her, while the figure of the “Muslim man” is usually an irrational radical prone to violence, the “Muslim woman” oscillates between a passive victim of male domination in need for help, and a dangerous religious fanatic ready to kill in the name of Islam. Although Chebel d’Appollonia and Saed follow different approaches to the securitization of migration, both reach a similar conclusion: politics of securitization may be counterproductive, creating fertile ground for the radicalization of migrant minorities, instead of preventing it. By treating minority groups as suspicious and requiring continuous scrutiny, these politics create a sense of isolation and alienation, which may, in turn, render minorities more responsive to extreme discourse.

Although these studies are significant to the empirical field of securitization, which has long been underdeveloped, they do not aim at refining the analytical framework for understanding securitization processes. Furthermore, they tackle different questions than the ones I ask in the present study. Still, I will borrow some findings from Bourbeau’s (2011) comparative assessment of varying degrees of securitization, and Gray and Franck’s (2019) insights on the importance of familiar and ordinary framings in facilitating securitization.

1.3.2. The securitization of Islam as transnational and secular forms of governmentality

A second major body of literature on the securitization of Islam has tackled the construction of Islam as a threat to the liberal-secular order (Asad, 2003; Moller, 2003; Mavelli, 2013) and a transnational form of governmentality (Bicchi and Martin, 2006; Humphreys, 2009; Silvestri, 2010; Kaya, 2009 and 2012). Although Talal Asad (2003) does not use the framework of securitization, his reflection on “the secular” has been ground-breaking for the field. In questioning terms such as “religion”, “secular”, “modern”, or “civilised”, Asad argued that “the secular” is an epistemic category, both formative of and consequent on Western historical narratives of the collective self. According to him, Europe’s colonial past is not a bygone era of overseas power, but rather the beginning of a global transformation that remains an intrinsic part of Europe today. Asad contends that the “secular” epistemic category underlies the belief that Muslims’ assimilation to Europe’s civilization is necessary and desirable (Asad, 2003: 170). Following Asad’s anthropological analysis, Luca Mavelli (2013) discusses how the securitization of Muslims in Western Europe was an instrumental

process of construction and reproduction of secular modes of subjectivity, based on the privatisation of religion, in order to produce “good Muslims” compliant with the secular order (Mavelli, 2013: 161, 179). He therefore contributed to the debate on the complex relations between security and religion and to the inquiry into the distinction between exception and normality in securitization studies. He argued that Islam was securitized in the West because it appeared to have “escaped” the historical trajectory of privatisation and subordination to the state power. Moreover, based on the case study of the French ban of the *burqa*, Mavelli demonstrated that securitization of Islam rested on exceptional measures as well as normal political and bureaucratic decisions (*ibid.*: 162). As a matter of fact, Sarkozy’s “securizing speech” during his first 2009 State to the Nation speech did not shift the question of the *burqa* into the depoliticized domain of security. Quite oppositely, he contributed to its great politicisation by calling on the State to intervene on a question that had so far been considered private. Moreover, Mavelli showed how Sarkozy’s speech did not create a new discursive realm, but was rather already part of the larger consolidated discursive “war on terror” (*ibid.*: 173). I add that neither the 2003 Stasi Commission, regarding the banning of headscarves in public schools, nor the 2010 Gérin Commission, regarding the prohibition of full-covering veils in public spaces, created a new regime of truth. They contributed to the reproduction and consolidation of an already existing securitizing process, tracing back to the first 1989 headscarf controversy at the latest. While I concur with Mavelli’s hypothesis and his analysis on the French case, I would qualify his globalising assumption whereby the French case is only an example of a larger homogenous phenomena in Western Europe. Although he took the French case to demonstrate his hypothesis, he took no account of the historical and narrative specificity of French *laïcité*. Plus, when put into comparison, Western European narratives of the securitization of Islam and Muslims, be it through secularism, liberalism, or feminism, are much more variable and specific between Britain, France, and Germany, than Mavelli assumed.

A related group of studies questioned the securitization as mode of governance of Islam and Muslims in Europe. Bicchi and Martin’s (2006) analysis on the European securitizing discourse towards the Mediterranean is of particular interest regarding its comparative approach. Analyzing national, European (EU), and Euro-Mediterranean partnership levels (EMP), they suggested that there was a clear process of securitizing Islam that remained predominantly at the national level. According to them, the coherence and the intensity of the securitization process fade away moving from the national to the EU and EMP levels. Due to the variety of discourses about Islam, radical Islam and jihadism within the EU, they argued, there is a lack of convergence on a securitizing agenda between Europe and its Mediterranean partners. Another interesting work on the matter worth mentioning is “Securitization and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and

Islam”¹⁶, in which Michel Humphreys (2009) explored the case of Turkish migrants in Germany and Australia. According to him, securitization and domestication are governance strategies based on logics of spatial exclusion and inclusion focused on disciplining bodies (Humphreys, 2009: 137). Both are directed at Muslims considered as threats “globalised through international migration [...], the emergence of a politicised global Islam, the circulation of itinerant radical clerics [...], and internet witnessing of Muslim suffering by the globalised *Umma*” (*ibid*: 138). Besides, Humphreys noted that despite efforts to harmonize securitization in Europe through a common EU counter-terrorism policy, sustained disagreement between the member States over the role of Islam and Muslims in terrorism has prevented it (*ibid*: 143). Following this observation, this dissertation argues that Britain, France and Germany have rather distinctive perceptions of Muslims and Islam – due to specific historical experiences – that prevent them from reacting to and dealing with Islam in the same way. Secondly, Bowen’s domestication, which refers to the state intervention in cultural and social matters in order to define limits of national values, could be directly included within the framework of securitization, reshaped as a continuum (Bourbeau, 2011). Ayhan Kaya (2009 and 2012) coined the “Age of Securitization” to grasp how “states rely on the discourse of *securitization* as a form of *governmentality* designed to unite a society politically by demonstrating an existential threat in the form of an internal, or an external enemy” since the 9/11 attacks in New-York (Kaya, 2009: 201-202; see also Kaya, 2012: 401, 407). Kaya’s studies are of particular interest for the present dissertation, given their comparative perspective on the Western European securitization of Islam, migration, and integration, particularly between Germany and France. He argued that both multiculturalist and republicanist policies failed to politically mobilise migrants and their descendants and have prompted Muslims in Europe to set up parallel communities. While “difference-conscious multiculturalism” incites minorities themselves to mobilise along ethnocultural lines, he stated, “difference-blind republicanism” fails in satisfying identity-based claims of minorities (Kaya, 2009: 205). Finally, Delphine Allès (2021) has demonstrated how references to the religious factor have increasingly permeated the representations of international actors since the 1990s. Ever since, both international relations literature and international security initiatives tend to address religion, especially Islam, as an autonomous variable explaining contemporary conflicts and insecurities. Beyond the narrative of the “return of religion”, Allès highlights the resilience and effects of the assumption that Westphalian secularism is a necessary condition for international peace and security. She discusses the foundations and consequences of the confessionalization of international security, demonstrating that this development is a symptom of the implicit victory of the

¹⁶ Michael Humphreys, “Securitization and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia”, *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, pp. 136-154.

Huntington “clash of civilizations”. According to her, this approach has progressively permeated conceptual frameworks and been validated in a performative manner by multiple initiatives aimed at regulating the “religious backlash” or mitigating its supposed security consequences. This evolution has, she says, favoured an increasing securitization of religion and religious identities.

1.3.3. Securitization, Recognition, and Identity

Finally, some studies have directly or indirectly tackled the relation between security and identity construction. For example, in his dissertation on the perception of the “war on terror” by senior officials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Okan Germiyanoglu (2014) argued that the quest for long-standing prestige, perceived as declining, may have led France to claim specialisation in the fight against terrorism to foster recognition on the international scene. He demonstrated how French identity framing did not distinguish between the quest for prestige and self-esteem and that for security and power. According to him, the fight against terrorism is a reaffirmation of France’s identity as a state through the reconstitution of the state monopoly of legitimate violence, because it constitutes an element of recognition on the international scene. Therefore, the perception of the war on terror works as a mirror of the French collective quest for international recognition and identity. Although Germiyanoglu does not use the securitization theoretical framework, the importance of his work for the present study is twofold. First, through the case study of the perception of the war on terror, he puts to the fore the continuum between identity and security, as well as domestic and international levels. Consequently, the securitization of Islam and Muslims would also constitute a mirror for British, French, and German self-constructions. These powers, perceiving their national histories as ancient and prestigious, yet challenged by the American superpower, the emergence of new powers or even by the European project, may be in search of a new image that would enhance their self-esteem. The extent to which the securitization of Islam is part of this search in the British, German, and French contexts is the purpose of the present dissertation. Second, Germiyanoglu’s use of *operational code analysis*, which was developed by Nathan Leites in the 1950s to study Soviet rulers’ beliefs, and later refined by Alexander L. Georges in the 1970s (Leites, 1953; Georges, 1969), applied to qualitative data and considering diverse political actors, will be a precious methodological tool to operationalize the narrative theory of securitization (see chapter 2).

On another level, Croft (2012) analyzed the relation between the securitization of Islam and the (re)construction of British Identity. In *Securitizing Islam*, he investigated “the ways in which “Britishness” has come to be constructed in contradistinction to a new Islamist terrorist Other; and how, in the process, everyday lives are reconstructed” (Croft, 2012: 95). He called for a “Post-Copenhagen securitization theory”

that would not only focus on the *speech-act* but on intertextuality of images and silences (Hansen, 2000); one that would broaden the field of examination to the social elite, of which includes the media, and analyze the way securitization reconstructs audiences into in and out-groups; and finally, one that would examine how exceptional measures are not only taken at the state level but also at the level of the everyday. My theoretical framework will partly draw on Stuart's amendments to the Copenhagen School model, advocating for more attention to be given to cultural resources and narratives in the securitization process.

Securitization theory has provided the most widely applied model to account for the relationship between the governance of (Muslim) migration, identity, and security. One of its strengths relies on its shift from solely material factors towards socio-cultural ones. In positing the social construction of threats and referent objects, securitization theory acknowledges the intersubjective dimension of security. However, securitization studies often take for granted the securitization process without ever demonstrating it (Bourbeau, 2011). Plus, they mobilize the expression "securitization of Islam" to refer indifferently to the politicization or securitization of (Islamic) immigration, integration, religion, or culture. Yet, these different types of politicization-to-securitization have different impacts on policy-making and on Muslim minorities. These lapses may be due to the difficulties of securitization theory to find a place within theories of international relations (Bourbeau, 2011: 30). Therefore, this study seeks to advance securitization theory by linking it even closer to constructivism, to provide a narrative theory of securitization.

1.4. Contribution. A narrative theory of securitization

According to Holger Stritzel, the concept of securitization has developed over the years through two opposing views (Stritzel, 2011). The first, mostly supported by one of the Copenhagen School's founders Ole Waever (1995), is an "internalist" reading of securitization that focuses on the *speech-act* event, grounded in the concept of performativity. According to him, it is the speech-act itself that creates authority rather than any pre-existing social or cultural context. This decisionist interpretation of securitization shares central understanding with Carl Schmitt, claiming that the success of a securitizing move rests on the authority of the speaker (Williams, 2003). In opposition to this view, the second "externalist" reading of securitization conceptualises securitization as an inter-subjective process based on the idea of embeddedness (Stritzel, 2011), that is the dependence of the phenomenon to its environment. This alternative vision calls for an approach to securitization taking historical and cultural structures into account, which condition social phenomena without determining them. Ayse Ceyhan (1998) shows in her comparison of the securitization of immigration in France and the United States that each country has its repertoire of historical and contextual themes with a

particular impact on the construction of the threat. According to this vision, securitizing discourses do not directly create security policies, but rather frame public debates, and thereby broaden or reduce the legitimate scope of action. Thus, a securitizing process may be at work without leading to the adoption of “extraordinary” measures. Conversely, exceptional measures may be taken on an issue that has not been the subject of prior discursive securitization (Watson, 2012: 25). In other words, successful securitization is not an either/or proposition, but rather a continuum of successes and failures (Vuori, 2008: 72). Finally, while securitization occurs when securitizing discourses tend to become hegemonic, they are always contested and challenged. Counter-discourse always permeate the public debate, advocating for or only participating in attempts of *desecuritization*, i.e., the withdrawal of the securitized object from the security agenda. This externalist vision of securitization was rejected at first by Wæver himself and remains underdeveloped in the empirical field of securitization studies. Yet, the variations in each Western European context question the internalist interpretation and call for the contextualization of securitizing Islam and Muslims in public discourse.

Drawing on the externalist reading of securitization, the first point of this dissertation is to tackle the construction of Islam and Muslims from a comparative point of view, to highlight how a securitization process can vary according to national semantic and narrative repertoires, even in an integrated region such as the European Union. So far, the Copenhagen School’s security agenda has been interested in the study of security dynamics within the European region, considered as a “security community”, focusing on collective security issues instead of national ones. It analysed the progressive Europeanization of security policies according to a functionalist bias that aligns security issues with the region’s economic integration. However, even though Europe, or at least Western Europe, faces collective security issues, the Europeanization at work since the 1950s does not transcend national political cultures – defined as the beliefs and ideas that shape a given society’s orientation toward politics. Understood as a stock of common evoked frames, British, French, and German political repertoires are imprinted with historical legacies inherited from both European antagonisms and imperial experiences. The framing of European and non-European issues remains largely national, as demonstrated by European responses to recent crises, from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, to the 2003 intervention in Iraq, or the 2015 European migrant crisis.

To give but one example, the Yugoslavian crisis is a case in point. Different framings of Yugoslavia as political entities have led Western European governments and public opinions to perceive and react differently to its disintegration. For French and British leaders and bureaucracies, the “Yugoslav Federation” was framed as a historical progress and a factor of peace. For Germany’s, the “Yugoslavian Federation” was framed mostly as the creation of the winners of 1918, built largely on the dismantling of the central empires, to which it once

belonged. Thus, the declaration of independence by the constituents of Yugoslavia was framed by the former as a breach in Yugoslav unity, while considered by the latter as the (re)achievement of legitimate independence and a fair application of the right of a people to self-determination. The lack of visibility of these historical divergences – or (mis)perceptions as Robert Jervis (1976) would put it – has undoubtedly hindered the emergence of a common strategic response and coordinated action between the European powers, partly explaining the so-called EU failure in the Balkans.

Yet, national and historical competing or diverging narratives remain often underestimated and therefore understudied in the field of securitization studies. For example, European states do not adopt the same definitions of terrorism, despite an effort of a universal definition in international law (Decaux, 2010). Similarly, terms such as liberalism or secularism do not resonate the same when mobilised in public discourse in Great Britain, France or Germany. In other words, such meta-narratives do not always mean the same, nor do they refer to the same myths, nor are they used to the same ends, according to the audience in which they are mobilised. Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, when Luca Mavelli (2013) considered the securitization of Islam in France as an illustration of the functional link between secular subjectivity and the securitization of Islam in Europe in general, he did not consider the historical and narrative particularities of French secularism (*laïcité*) compared to British and German ones, nor did he take into account the weight of colonial and imperial legacies with respect to their relation to Islam. The comparison in a salient manner to bring those particularities to the fore. In other words, if the securitization of Islam works as a mirror of identity, it should mirror cross-national variations in the framing of national identity(ies) in each European context (Joppke, 2009).

Therefore, this dissertation falls in between two of the security studies' agenda, namely the construction of threats (security from whom?) and the construction of objects of security (security for whom?). Through a narrative theory of securitization, this dissertation aims at understanding how the Islamic threat is constructed in three European contexts and how these constructions inform in return the framing of European national selves.

1.4.1. Case selection: Britain, France, and Germany

Why compare these three countries? First, Britain, France, and Germany share a relatively comparable amount of post-colonial or post-imperial Muslim immigration. These three countries have the highest number of people regarded as Muslims living on their soil in Western Europe. In each case, most of them come from former imperial regions: Southeast Asia for Great Britain, North Africa for France, and Turkey for Germany.

Although Germany's "Muslim" immigration is often – and rightfully – considered different from that of its two European counterparts, it is to note that economic treaties of the 1950s and the 1960s signed between Germany and Turkey are direct consequences of close imperial interactions between the *Kaiserreich* and the Sublime Porte at the turn of the 20th century. Therefore, although overlooked, Turkish immigration to Germany is a sort of post-imperial immigration, as is the North African immigration to France and the Pakistani immigration to Britain. This post-imperial immigration increased sharply in all the three countries during the 1980s with family reunification, as migration policies were being restricted, accelerating the politicisation of immigration. For a long time, religion was not a defining category for diversity-related or migration issues, rather explained through race, ethnicity, and culture. Since the 1980s onwards, a series of events and incidents such as the Rushdie Affair and the French headscarf controversy, which increased the public visibility of Muslims, changed this. This conceptual shift manifested in a semantic change in naming immigrants: ex-colonial subjects and guest workers, which had first turned into Asians, Turks, or Arabs, became Muslims. And, with the attacks of September 11, the "war on terror", and the break-up of the "Arab revolutions" and the subsequent "refugee crisis", Islam and Muslims have been placed at the centre of public debate as objects of security. The comparison will enable the examination of the form of these debates in the three European contexts.

Second, the countries in our study are all stable democracies whose commitment to religious freedom is generally recognized. Both French and German constitutions guarantee citizens' rights of religious expression and the neutrality of the State among religions. Even though Britain holds no constitutional safeguards regarding religious rights, its common law tradition protects religious pluralism and religious liberty rights, while the Human Rights Act added statutory protection to religious minorities (Fetzer and Soper, 2005). Since the 1980s, immigration regarded as "with Muslim background" seems to pose a common challenge to those commitments.

Third, they share a more or less comparable degree of secularisation – yet with a different narrative conception of secularism. Britain, France, and Germany are currently undergoing a secularising process whose main social characteristics are declining church membership and the retrenchment of religious belief into the private sphere. There has been a loss of religious influence in public institutions, and the state has continuously dispossessed Churches of some of their traditional political functions. However, this process is neither uniform nor complete across these three states. While each is a secular nation-state, in theory, religion asserts influence on politics and public policies that manifest differently in each country.

These countries also provide a good model for comparison because of how they differ. Despite some institutional similarities, these nations vary concerning institutional patterns of religious politics. There is a first classical distinction between Catholic-dominated countries such as France, Protestant-dominated countries such as Britain, and religiously mixed countries such as Germany. The second classical distinction is among nations with a tradition of strict church-state separation like France, those with a state church like Britain, and those with a bi- or more-confessional state like Germany. More precisely, religious and church influence is very limited in the French public sphere by the *laïque* orientation. The principle of separation of state and churches is predominant, which is reflected in the prohibition of state subsidy to religious communities, and the prohibition of the wearing of religious signs in public schools. This so-called “strict separation” between churches and the state is sometimes interpreted as a separation between state and religion. Germany can be described as a state with a “cooperative relationship” with churches and religious communities, which nevertheless sees itself as committed to ideological neutrality. Finally, the Anglican Church is the state church in England and is integrated into political structures through various mechanisms, however direct state subsidies are not granted (Brunn, 2012: 147).

Moreover, these three countries differ concerning their institutional foundations for integration. French and British self-image as countries of immigration shaped by colonial histories is largely undoubted. Nonetheless, both “integration philosophies” differ fundamentally from one another, due to different understandings of the role of the state and its relationship to the citizen, divergent concepts of citizenship, as well as different imperial experiences. Germany, for its part, seems to have evolved from “not an immigration country” to an “integration country” with the organisation of the *Deutsche Islamische Konferenz* (DIK) in 2006. Regarding specifically integration discourse, culture is (over)emphasised in German narrative context, while there seems to have an “exaggeration of the integration-promoting role of the state” in the French one (Bizeul 2004: 174). British narratives frame integration as a shield against discrimination, while recognizing and enforcing cultural particularities and granting special rights to groups deemed homogenous (Brunn, 2012: 177).

The three states also differ on the question of dealing with minorities. In the French self-understanding, the concept of minorities appears discursively irrelevant, as it is regarded as incompatible with the ideal of the Republic of equal and free citizens and their unmediated relationship to the state (Brunn, 2012: 176). This conception is particularly illustrated in the opposition to British “communitarianism” often emphasised in French public discourse (Bertossi, 2007: 57). Although the United Kingdom does not follow legally consistent multiculturalism, so-called ethnic, cultural or religious communities are not seen as an

obstacle, but rather as desirable and worthy medium of integration to British society. This conception is apparent in legal structures such as the Race Relations as well as political rhetoric, often pointing to the positive “contribution” of communities. Germany takes an intermediate position by officially recognizing some, but not all, long-established national minorities. The negative slogan “parallel society” often mobilized in public discourse illustrates the ambivalent relations to cultural collectives, chiefly Islam (Brunn, 2012: 176).

Finally, these three countries differ regarding their imperial experiences in the Middle East during the Age of Empire. British eastern policy aimed at an informal empire in the Gulf from the beginning of the 19th century to secure the direct route to India. The French eastern policy consisted of an increasingly particularistic policy in order to secure its domination of North Africa, particularly Algeria. German imperialism, although rarely acknowledged as such, consisted of a short colonial experience in East Africa, an alliance with the Ottoman Empire since 1890, and a call for jihad against the French and British colonial powers during the First World War (see chapter 3).

These variations, be they religious politics, integration philosophies, or imperial experiences, imply different ways of framing Islam and Muslim today, hence the centrality of history in the study of securitization discourses.

1.4.2. Put (hi)stories back in securitization studies

The specific means by which perceptions of Islam and Muslims are expressed in public discourses and implemented as policies, differ according to British, French, and German repertoires. These repertoires are imprinted with varying historical experiences and traumas, which are critical for our understanding of the securitization of Muslims in Europe. The processes of *othering* and securitization are not pure manipulations for strategic purposes. They require an environment, a pre-existing framework to anchor and resonate with the audience. Both the securitizing actor and the securitized object are codependent on the national narrative frameworks in which they evolve. These semantic repertoires, far from being immutable, nevertheless presuppose a certain stability in the perception and representation of the threat. This stability depends on mechanisms that allow representations to be embedded relatively durably in a national narrative. Some traumatic events remain anchored in the collective memory for centuries, even if they evolve and are contested, while others do not take root or even disappear. A positive anchor produces narratives – whatever value is attributed to the event, which may be negative or positive. A negative anchor produces amnesia. This is why the second objective of this dissertation is to integrate the concept of securitization into a historical perspective, to understand its variations. In his (2007) literature review on the governance of Islam in Europe, one of

Michael Maussen's recommendations for a renewed research agenda was to study the importance of imperial legacies and the presence of "indigenous" Muslim minorities in order to understand variations in the approach each European context framed and responded to Islamic presence and demands. Sayyid and Hesse explain the void of such an agenda because "the history of ex-colonial immigration to Western Europe is most often told in terms of the post-war labour shortage, [...] outside of historical processes or cultural formations. This sustains the fiction in European public culture of a termination between the imperial past and the nationalist present, as well as of a structural and political separation between racially unmarked indigenous European societies and racially marked migrants who become carriers of cultures for European consumption or proscription" (Sayyid and Hesse, 2006: 21). Yet, in the 2000s, *postcolonial studies* permeated political science, producing a fruitful body of research that explored more thoroughly the (dis)continuities between colonial and postcolonial governance of Islam, both overseas and at home – including discourses, practices, governing strategies and their contestations. These developments allowed interdisciplinary bridges between historians, working on colonialism and orientalism, and political scientists, working on contemporary Islam in Western Europe, to understand the pervasiveness of the exclusion of Muslims in the post-colonial period¹⁷. Most of these studies look the colonial period as a crucial moment for the emergence of specific patterns of government and of representations that helps understand on-going processes of accommodating Islam in Europe. To cite some examples, Bleich (2005) examined the role of policy legacies and state capacities, reactive decisions, and model transfer as potential connective tissue tying together colonial institutions and integration policies. He found that continuity in colonial and postcolonial institutions had an important yet indirect impact on contemporary integration of Muslims. According to him, open immigration and citizenship regimes caused a large demographic influx of former colonial subjects, which pushed policy decisions, sometimes reacting to the liberal policies established for colonial or decolonization purposes¹⁸. Similarly, Maussen et al. (2011) examined post-colonial governance of Islam, assuming that "patterns of governance emerging after the end of imperial systems – both in the West and in 'the Rest' – will be marked in various ways by the experience of colonialism" (Maussen, 2011: 15). In her contribution to the book, Moors found traces of colonial discourses in the references to Muslim women's gender subjugation as expression of the difference from – when not the inferiority to – Western culture, particularly strong in French discourse on "*mixité*" but also present in

¹⁷ The use of several writings of "post-colonial", "postcolonial" or "(post)colonial" is not an inconsistency. "Post-colonial" is a temporal reference to the period after the colonial empires; "postcolonial" refers to representations, reading practises, attitudes and values and suggests continuity between the colonial and the post-colonial periods. Finally, "(post)colonial" is a contraction that simultaneously refers to the colonial and post-colonial periods.

¹⁸ Bleich, E. 2005. 'The legacies of history? Colonisation and immigrant integration in Britain and France', *Theory and Society* 34(2): 171-195.

German debates on headscarves legislation (Maussen, 2011: 135-153). Among studies on postcolonial continuities in Britain, Ansari (2004) offered a comprehensive social history of the different communities of Muslims present in Britain since the beginning of the 19th century¹⁹. Sayyid and Hesse (2006), analysed the way the presence of ex-colonial immigrants became a symbol of the failure of British identity to restore itself after the loss of empire, the ruins of WWII and the end of the Cold war (2006: 24). The British Asian immigrant, coined “BrAsian”, locates itself in-between citizen and foreigner, colonial past and a national present, West and “non-West”, “us” and “them” (2006: 30). Malik (2011) compared colonial and contemporary “liberal-democratic” forms of regulation of Muslim subjectivity. She finds that British efforts to include Muslim sensitivity in blasphemy legislation and British strategies to select Muslim representatives are both (post)colonial modes of regulation of Islam in Britain (Maussen et al., 2011: 199-210). Concerning France, Blanchard et al. (2005) tried to fill a void in French literature, which was according to them “the only European country to have deliberately adopted a ‘colonial nostalgia’ and institutionalised oblivion, trying to separate colonial history from national history” until the 1990s” (Blanchard et al., 2005: 22). Drawing on English-language literature, they offered a collective review of what they called cultural effects of “postcoloniality” in France (Blanchard et al., 2005: 18)²⁰. Of particular interest here, Mas (2006) analysed the emergence and organisation of “secular Muslims” in France after the controversies following the 2004 law banning the headscarves in public schools. According to her, the self-naming as “Secular Muslims” was a reflexive response to their interpellation by the structuring function of French modes of governance (Mas, 2006: 603). She contended that *laïcité* embodied the continuity between colonial and postcolonial modes of governing Muslims and Islam in France and Algeria, then deployed to discipline the colonial society, and now crucial to winning the war against terrorism. The emergence of the “Secular Muslim” appears as a proof of the performativity of French public discourse and claims for a “Secular Islam”²¹. Davidson’s (2009) case study on the Paris Mosque analyzed the way ideas about Islam and Muslim-ness informed French governing strategies throughout the 20th century. According to her, the discourse and politics surrounding the establishment of the Paris Mosque illustrated French idea that Muslim immigrants could not be “anything other than Muslim subjects”, mostly because French perceived Islam as an “embodied religion” grounded in the performance of rituals (Davidson, 2009: 4), and that issues related to “inadequate housing, unemployment, and legal status”

¹⁹ Ansari, H. 2004. *The Infidel Within'. Muslims in Britain since 1800*. London: Hirst & Company.

²⁰ Blanchard, P., Bancel, N. and Lemaire, S. (eds). 2005. *La fracture coloniale. La société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*. Paris: La Découverte.

²¹ Mas, R. 2006. 'Compelling the Muslim subject: Memory as post-colonial violence and the public performativity of 'secular and cultural Islam'', *The Muslim World* 96(4): 585-616.^[1]_{SEP}

were constantly linked to Islam (*ibid*: 171) (see also Lorcerie 2006, Sellam 2006, Shepard, 2006).

However useful, the great majority of this literature focuses on post-colonial states rather than former imperial metropolises. Second, most of them treat one (post)colonial configuration at the time, or, when not, they intend to find common practises in imperial and colonial contexts in general. Hence, no postcolonial studies have compared European imperial powers to evaluate diverging and converging (dis)continuities in the governing, accommodating, and securitizing of Islam and Muslims in Western Europe. Moreover, postcolonial hypotheses imply a forward comparison, practice-to-practice, institution-to-institution, which limits the field of exploration to configurations that remain through the two periods – and would exclude de facto the study of Germany. Germany is rarely acknowledged as an imperial power in the Middle East during the age of empire, and hardly counted within postcolonial studies. Although Germany did not have colonial experience in the Middle East *per se*, it did have an imperial experience in and with the Ottoman Empire, as well as a colonial experience in East Africa, that might have left an imprint, yet of different nature, in the governing and securitizing of Islam. Finally, postcolonial studies focus more on institutions, policies, and practises, than on discourse, and have rarely been put in contact with the studies of securitization.

Hence, this dissertation questions the extent to which contrasting representations of Islam and Muslims stemming from European imperial experiences with the Middle East reverberate in contemporary discourses of (de)securitization²². It falls back on the wide literature on the genealogy of the construction of the Eastern Other and orientalism in Europe. One of the most influential works on the construction of the Eastern Other is Edward Said's famous *Orientalism* (1978) where he showed how "European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self" (Said, 1979: 3). Following Antonio Gramsci's conception of hegemony, Michel Foucault's notion of "power/knowledge", and Frantz Fanon's work on the link between colonialism and alienation (Fanon, 1952 and 1961), Said suggested that the ontological and epistemic distinction between the Occident and the Orient manifested itself in the systematic objectification and discursive construction of the Orient not only as an object of study but also as a subject "integral" to Western hegemony. According to him, Orientalism refers to (a) the practice of teaching about the Orient, (b) "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and 'the Occident'", and (c) a "corporate institution for dealing with the Orient" (Said, 1979: 2-3). While Said's study and conceptualisation is undoubtedly a reference point, I highlight two limits where the present dissertation can fill in. First, Said's conceptualisation

²² "(De)securitization" is a contraction that simultaneously refers to discourses of securitization and desecuritization.

of Orientalist discourse appears sometimes monolithic, undifferentiated, and uncontested. I regret that he and his readers considered orientalism as a homogenous Western mind-set to frame the Oriental Other, instead of distinguishing historical specificities within each European orientalism, as I shall expose in the chapter 3²³.

Second, Said excluded Germany from the very beginning of his book:

Yet, at no time in German scholarship during the first two thirds of the 19th century could a close partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained *national* interest in the Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa. Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli, or Nerval (Said, 1979: 19).

In fact, there is a great debate on whether the Ottoman Empire was, at the turn of the 20th century a “colony in all but the name” or a true peer (see chapter 3)²⁴. Nonetheless, one might wonder whether German “non-colonial” or “distant colonial” interaction with the Ottoman Empire, and its short colonial experience in Eastern Africa, have left a specific legacy in German narratives, regarding the dealing with Muslim minorities and Islam today.

Directly inspired by Said, Neumann’s *Uses of Other* (1999) allowed the introduction of Orientalism in the field of international relations. He demonstrated how the construction of European identity, or the European Self, has always been closely intricate with the identification of what Europe was not. In other words, the non-European barbarous and savage others, and more particularly the Turkish Other, played a central role in the evolution of the European identity. By tracing the historical evolution of Christian European narratives framing the Turkish Other, Neumann’s genealogy posits the functional role of the other in the promotion of cohesiveness. He illustrates how the figure of the mediaeval Saracen strengthened European collective identity playing the role of Christendom’s Other. Even when the Turks were invited to participate in a European Congress after their advance was halted in Westphalia in 1683, they still remained the religious and cultural other. The representations of the Turk were displaced from the Christendom’s “infidel” to the “barbarian”, and later from strong and “barbarian” Turk to the military inferior “odd-man-

²³ An indication of this variation is also, in return, the reception of such critical work on (post)colonial domination. While subaltern and postcolonial studies were in full swing in the 1980s, both Fanon and Said were long marginalised in the French intellectual and academic field. They symbolised a blind spot in the dominant French thought, reluctant to analyse the potential constitutive of the colonial phenomenon. Frantz Fanon’s view of French colonisation in Algeria was difficult to bear in a country whose self-image is framed within human rights and universal values. What was particularly difficult to admit was that orientalism might concern intellectual categories, the production of the imagination, and the construction of subjectivities. When the French translation of *Orientalism* was published in 1980, the outcry against the book was such that it took twenty-five years for a new edition of the book, which had become impossible to find. Meanwhile Edward Said had died, and his international notoriety such that it was impossible to continue to pretend that this work had ceased to exist.

²⁴ See for example the work of German historian Wolfgang G. Schwanitz as well as Hodkinson, J. and Morrison, J. (eds.), *Encounters with Islam in German literature and culture*. Rochester NY: Camden House, and more particularly, Rachel Mag Slamhrain, “Displacing Orientalism: Ottoman Jihad, German Imperialism and the Armenian Genocide”, pp. 145-165.

out". Neumann demonstrates how those discursive strategies of *othering* constitute not only national but regional identities, arguing that regions such as Europe are no less "imagined communities" than nations.

In European eyes, "the Turk", with his pagan and barbarian political culture, could not be incorporated into such a cultural consensus. Thus, while the logic of *raison d'Etat*, through diplomatic and economic contact, extended the boundaries of the European international system to encompass 'the Turk', the prevalence of the logic of culture made his status ambiguous from a societal point of view. "The Turk" remained the relevant Other for the cultural community of Europe (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 348).

While the present study is greatly inspired by Neumann's work, I contend that when changing the scale, from European to national states, it must be admitted that the Eastern Other is variable. First, *spatially*, the (Middle) East accepts different geopolitical conceptions in Britain, Germany and France at the turn of the 20th century. Second, *ethically*, the Eastern Other(s) is not discursively constructed equally in each country. For example, I will demonstrate in chapter 3 how the framing of the Turkish Other at the turn of the 20th century, varied from "friend" for the Germans to "enemy" for the French and British.

Another notable case study on the matter is Lene Hansen's *Security as Practice* (2006). She presents a post-structuralist theory of identity and foreign policy through the analysis of how the West discursively created a region, "the Balkans", as different from the West in three rather different types of discourses. The "Byronian Romantic" discourse depicts the region as an object of great admiration that should not be transformed but supported in its path to independence. The "civilizational Enlightenment" discourse constructs it as capable of liberal and economic change for which the West has a moral responsibility and geopolitical interest. Finally, the "balkanization" discourse sees the region as radically different and threatening because of its capacity to bring chaos and is therefore to be isolated (*ibid*: 42). Hansen also showed how the EU was able to overcome its violent past by constructing spatial Others, such as the Middle East, North Africa, etc. While Hansen's work is a great inspiration for studying the construction of spatial and temporal Other and will be of great use in analysing geopolitical conceptions of the (Middle) East in Europe, her globalising view of "the Western discourse" is problematic. For example, there is no such thing as a unified European – let alone "Western" – "Enlightenment" discourse. While the age of the Enlightenment was a cross-Europe movement, there were great differences, when not oppositions, between the British Enlightenment, the German *Aufklärung*, and the French *Lumières* as explained earlier in this chapter.

Thus, this dissertation aims at creating a bridge between the long tradition of interrogating historical legacies in discourses and the contemporary focused theory of securitization. Most of the studies of the securitization of Islam and Muslims take the attacks of 11 September 2001 as their starting point, while studies on the orientalist construction of the Muslim Other, tracing sometimes back to the Crusades. In a collective work *Anti-Muslim Prejudice. Past and Present*, Maleeha Malik (2009) suggests that the topic of anti-Muslim

prejudice in the West must be placed in its historical context by considering the extent to which the mediaeval period is a forerunner to contemporary forms of prejudice. “Christendom” would be a specific construction that generates external and internal, conceptual, and political divisions between the Self and the Other, and between the Good Other and the Bad Other (Anidjar, 2009). Without going back so far as the crusades, this dissertation seeks to re-historicize securitization processes.

Besides, both orientalism and securitization are taken for granted as a consensual system of (mis)representation of the Other in the West, may it be Muslim, Eastern, or migrant. On the contrary, I suggest that such (mis)representations are dependent upon each specific historical experience. According to Said (1978), orientalism is not merely a misperception of the Orient, but rather a system that operates “for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting” (Said, 1978: 273). In other words, not only representations of the Orient and the Oriental rest on particular socio-historical contexts, but they are also inseparable from political aims and geostrategic concerns. Inevitably, since the British, French, and Germans were competing and following antagonistic interests and strategies in the Middle East, they must have constructed different conceptions of the region that fuelled distinctive orientalisms, as we shall see in chapter 3.

I am aware that bridging orientalism to securitization theory might appear odd, if not bold, since Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit’s 2019 critical publication “Is securitization theory racist?” in *Security Dialogue*. The two researchers make strong claims about the “foundational role of racist thought in securitization theory”, claiming that it is “structured not only by Eurocentrism but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism” (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019: 3), and conclude that classical theorization is irredeemable and should be abandoned. As I shall detail in chapter 2, the Copenhagen School’s theorization of securitization is indeed questionable and should be critically interrogated. Notably, the binarity between “normal” politics and securitized issues is problematic and may suggest what Howell and Richter-Montpetit accuse of being a civilisationist opposition between “(white) ‘civilised politics’ and (racialized) ‘primal anarchy’” (*ibid*). That said, it seems anachronical to criticize Wæver and Buzan separately from the context of Cold War in which they have conceptualized their securitization theory. As a matter of fact, at that time, the absolute enemy that was to be securitized, i.e. the USSR communist, was essentially white while the self-other nexus was mostly structured around the opposition between the so-called Western bloc, led by the USA, and the Eastern bloc, led by the USSR. Moreover, the theory has been greatly amended and developed since its early theorization, by the so-called Welsh or Aberystwyth School (Booth, William, Krause, McSweeney, Wynn Jones), the so-called Paris School (Bigo, Tsoukala, Ceyhan, Guildà), as well as other critical

and constructivist scholars (Balzacq, McGahan, Salter, Stritzel, Hansen, Croft, among others). Such developments have allowed new generations of scholars in security studies to tackle the power associated with securitized issues such as immigration, Islam, or other states in Western Europe, and the use of securitization theory to explore these very issues of race by non-western scholars (see section 1.3. and chapter 2). Given the above mentioned, Howell and Richter-Montpetit's critique, as it stands, fails to make the case to abandon the analytical value of securitization theory. The present dissertation offers a case in point of how an amended version of how securitization theory might address and assess colonial and imperial legacies in contemporary discourse on Islam and security in Western Europe.

In short, this dissertation rests on two main claims. First, securitization cannot be reduced to an illocutionary act, the speech-act, but rather constitutes a complex intersubjective process that only makes sense in the narrative environment in which it is embedded (Balzacq, 2005, 2010; Watson, 2012; Stritzel, 2011). The securitization of Islam and Muslims manifest via different narratives according to semantic repertoires specific to each political culture. Second, those semantic repertoires are imprinted with historical experiences specific to each European power that colored contemporary semantic repertoires of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims in public discourse. Nevertheless, while analysing specific narrative modes of securitizing Islam in Britain, France, and Germany, I do not seek to identify the beliefs of a given state nor to assume that there exists a full-fledged national culture that can dictate those modes of securitization. Such an approach poses several problems raised by Thomas Lindemann (2000): it is theoretically and empirically difficult, if not impossible, to grasp a national culture and belief system that would be collectively shared. In my view, cultural and historical understandings do not result in deterministic explanations. History is not destiny, however, history does resonate and reverberate. Conversely, political cultures are neither monolithic nor immutable: they are a stock of common evoked frames in constant competition, that constrain what and how a political actor can say and speak in public debate. That is why I confine myself to studying political cultures understood as competing narratives in public discourse.

1.5. Method. Qualitative analysis of public discourses

The experience of the world is subject to, and conditioned by, language and is therefore constrained by expressions that form a cognitive filter. The ambition of this dissertation is to study the construction of the discourse on Islam and Muslims in a historical and comparative perspective and its conversion into cartographies of the imaginary in German, British, and French public discourse.

Discourse analysis is defined as the “qualitative and interpretative recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena” (Abdelal, et al., 2009: 6). Perceptions and emotions are revealed in discourse, in the choices of words and narrative structures used (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak et Meyer, 2009; Ringmar, 1996; Spencer, 2016). The interest in employing discourse analysis to uncover securitization processes is twofold. First, discourses are not simply ways of speaking about Islam and Muslims, they take part in constructing and shaping the way Muslims are perceived and should be handled. Discourses of securitization frame and shape public policies and have, therefore, concrete consequences on immigration laws, minority protections, education, health, integration, and security policies. Moreover, in political discourses on security, Islam or identity, political actors not only reflect on society but attempt to impose an explanatory framework to grasp the initiative and offer leadership. Although collective identities are constructed, they are emotionally invested so that political decision-makers can either exploit them to maintain their power or be constrained by them (Welsh, 1995). Thus, critical discourse analysis makes it possible to question how ideologies and power relations are expressed in language, combining linguistic and contextual analysis. Second, discourses of securitization work as mirrors reflecting political cultures. Studying varying political discourses, therefore, allows the unravelling of what these emotions, perceptions, identities, and common frames of references are.

My analysis limits itself to public discourse, be it political, institutional or the media. Certainly, sociological interviews would be an effective way of assessing the weight of historical narratives in (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims in European contexts. However, the tri-national nature of the panel and the political and institutional positions of the actors under study make it difficult to conduct interviews in the context of doctoral research. The advantage of public discourse is their availability and readiness for use in qualitative and quantitative analysis. Moreover, the constructivist approach to securitization contends that securitization only makes sense in an interactionist environment aimed at (public) audience(s). Therefore, public discourses are a privileged field for studying processes of securitization, as they are performative acts. For example, when governments, political parties, and the media declare that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to the survival of European civilization, these are not declaratory statements. They are performative statements that construct Islam and Muslims by integrating them into a network of meanings and frame the scope of public policy possibilities. This process also occurs in representations of Islam and Muslims in popular culture, which is a promising field for securitization studies (Croft, 2012). However, given the limited capacities associated with a doctoral dissertation, I chose not to take them into account and rather confine myself to public discourse.

There are two main approaches to discourse analysis: qualitative and quantitative, which should not be viewed as opposing one and another, but rather as supporting each other. On the one hand, qualitative reading makes it possible to uncover persuasive mechanisms, complex rhetorical formations, and analogies that quantitative methods are unable to detect. It also enables the researcher to identify protagonist designation, visions of the world, perceived challenges and solutions offered. This dissertation suggests linking securitization to narrative theories of action (Ringmar, 1996; Spencer, 2016), considering discourses as stories with a setting, a plot and a characterization. It allows us to investigate how political identities are narratively constructed on antagonisms and how discourses dispute the hegemony of the construction of such identities (see chapter 2). On the other hand, when confronted with a tri-national panel with multiple discourses and actors, it is difficult to use qualitative analysis alone to obtain a clear and precise architecture of discourse. Thus, quantitative analysis can support and reinforce qualitative interpretation by systematizing it. The qualitative discourse analysis will, therefore, be coupled with a quantitative method called “multiple correspondence analysis” (MCA) (see chapter 2). This method, which is part of geometric data analysis, is unique in that it applies only to qualitative data (Bonneuil and Auriat, 2000; Martin-Mazé, 2016). Applied to discourse analysis, MCA makes it possible to identify precisely which narrative items are mobilised, or can be mobilised on a given political terrain: what is possible, appropriate, consensual, or marginal to say to position oneself in the public debate. It also shows simultaneously how these narrative resources are distributed among the actors under study. Moreover, the dimensions exhumed by MCA provide valuable insights into the different oppositions that characterise discursive spaces. It constitutes, therefore, a privileged tool to explore dense and varied discursive spaces and reduces the risk of bias induced by qualitative analysis. It will allow me to draw a discursive map of securitizing and desecuritizing narratives on Islam and Muslims in the three European contexts. However, MCAs must be used carefully as their results depend greatly on how data sets are built, and therefore on the previous qualitative analysis. That is why this discourse analysis is part of a greater detailed and contextualized historical study of European discourses on Islam and Muslim.

It seems essential to contextualize this comparative discursive study by integrating it into the numerous studies on the construction of the other and orientalism. A deep contextualization of European contrasting interactions with the (Middle) East and Islam since the late 19th century may *inform* contrasting representations of Islam and Muslims in contemporary discourses of (de)securitization. The best way to study political speeches is to carefully read the arguments put forward in their political and historical context. The historical perspective makes it possible to grasp the implications of the ideas and the resonance of words, analogies, and metaphors. Contemporary discourses on Islam might be more intelligible when put into

European historical contexts, such as specific forms of orientalism, competing eastern policies in the Mediterranean at the turn of the 20th century, and contexts of post-war (Muslim) immigrations (see chapter 3).

Following this deep historical contextualization, this dissertation aims at producing discursive maps of the (de)securitizations of Islam and Muslims in public discourse in contemporary Britain, France, and Germany. This requires analysing official speeches from influential political and institutional leaders on topics related to (in)security and Islam in the age of securitization. As many studies had already been conducted for the period following the 9/11 attacks in New York, starting with my master's dissertation, I focus here more particularly on the decade ensuing the "Arab Spring". For example, I select public declarations and speeches of leaders from all political strands, such as the Socialist Party (PS), *La France Insoumise* (LFI), *Europe Ecologie Les Verts* (EELV), *Les Républicains* (LR – former UMP), the *Rassemblement national* (RN – former *Front National*), or *La République En Marche* (LREM) in France; the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU), the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD), the *Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen* (Grüne), *Die Linke* or *die Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany; the Conservatives, the Labour Party, the LibDems, the Greens in UK, and UKIP in Britain. To assess the coherence and diffusion of these official discourses, I extended the panel to the public, media or institutional personalities who are involved in discourses of (de)securitizing Islam through their intervention in the public debate (see empirical chapters)²⁵.

1.6. Dissertation Outline

In chapter 2, I expose the theoretical framework and research methodology. In section 1, I suggest refocusing securitization theory on narratives through the *stories* of securitization following Ringmar (1996) and Spencer (2016). In section 2, I detail the virtues and challenges of comparative and historical narrative analysis, particularly on the selection of actors and variables to preserve idiosyncrasy while allowing comparisons. This chapter specifies how I coded the corpus and how I reworked the data according to the level of comparison, among and across cases.

Chapter 3 sets the stories of securitization in European histories by offering a contextualization of the interaction between the three European cases and Islam in the *longue durée*. From their respective eastern

²⁵ To name but a few examples: in France, I studied the discourse of the President of the Observatory for *Laiïcité*, Jean-Louis Bianco, feminist essayist and secularist activist Caroline Fourest, or again Edwy Plenel, publisher of the internet-based subscription journal *Mediapart*. In Germany, I analyzed discourses of feminists such as the social scientist Necla Kelek, and the founder of feminist *EMMA* Magazine, Alice Schwarzer. As well as Daniel Bax, publizist and member of the *Neue Deutsche Medienmacher* (NdM), an association that advocates more diversity in the media. In Britain, I picked articles and declarations of the journalist and former editor of the conservative *The Sun* newspaper, Trevor Kavanagh, journalist and Labour Humanist Joan Smith, secularist publizist Steven Evans, or philosopher and proclaimed atheist A.C. Grayling.

policy at the end of the 19th century to their specific orientalist framing of the Eastern Other, I conclude with the politicization of the presence of Islam and Muslim in post-war Western Europe.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyse the securitization of Islam and Muslims in public discourse in contemporary Germany, Britain, and France (2009-2019). I show how the securitization of Islam and Muslim in Western Europe highlight “narrative civil wars” specific to each context.

Chapter 7 unravels convergences and divergences across cases while assessing the weight of histor(ies) in securitization processes. Interestingly, all cases allow the validation of the historical hypothesis while simultaneously qualifying that of an orientalist continuity.

Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation. It answers the research question and summarises the main empirical findings. Further, it discusses the implications of my theoretical argument and methodological contribution for the studies on securitization and for the research on orientalism and the self/other nexus in IR. Finally, the chapter spells out the limitations of the present research and suggests new avenues of investigation.

Chapter 2 - Theoretical and methodological framework

This chapter provides the theoretical and methodological framework of this dissertation. I make the argument that securitization occurs and reveals itself through narratives. This theoretical framework is embedded in a constructivist understanding of politics, in which social reality is constituted, re-produced or changed through discursive practises. The emphasis lies on elaborating a narrative theory of securitization.

After a critical review of the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, the first section suggests embedding securitizing processes into (hi)stories by recontextualizing securitization through narrative analysis. In the second section, I expose and justify the use of an interpretative, qualitative, and comparative methodology. More precisely, I explain the challenges of selecting and collecting data in a cross-national comparative perspective. Finally, I walk the reader through my experimental narrative analysis of Islam, identity, and security in Western European public discourses.

Section 1. A narrative theory of securitization

In this section, I first review the securitization theory and its principal limits (1.1), namely the rigidity of the speech-act model, the lack of conceptualisation of the audience, and the underestimation of the contextual factors (Balzacq, 2005; Balzacq et al., 2010; McGahan, 2009; Salter, 2008; among others). Then, I suggest an externalist reading of securitization, resting on socio-cultural contexts (1.2). Finally, I formulate a narrative theory of securitization expressed in the narratology tryptic of setting, characterization, and plot (1.3).

1.1. A critical review of securitization theory

Since the 1980s and 1990s, the field of international relations has witnessed an increasing interest in the meaning of security. How to define and measure security has been a subject of debate. Some scholars have argued that security was an “essentially contested concept” because it was fundamentally value-oriented and ambiguous (Baldwin, 1997: 10). Others, known as the so-called “traditionalists”, have considered security as the freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system with the ontological assumption that social truth predominantly results from material factors (Walt, 1991). The debate opened by the so-called “wideners” consisted in defining security by contesting the military focus of security studies. Thus, the “wideners” expanded the concept of security and deepened the agenda of security studies beyond the sole military dimension with the ontological assumption that knowledge is a social construction that cannot be separate from the social actors and the observers (Buzan et al., 1998).

In 1952, Arnold Wolfers offered a definition of security that remained, for a time, consensually accepted in the field: “security, in objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, 1952: 150). Starting from this definition, David A. Baldwin (1997) suggested that scholars should answer 7 questions to specify and define their concept of security. First, they must specify their referent object by answering the question: *security for whom?* – the individual, the state, the nation, or the international system (some, most, all of them). Second, they should specify the referent value(s) of security – *security for and of what values?* Social actors like states or individuals, have several, sometimes competing values. The traditional concept of national security includes only political independence and territorial integrity as core values. However, other values can be added such as physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, or psychological well-being. Third, Baldwin argued to specify the degree of security – *how much security?* While some scholars estimate that security is absolute, one being either insecure or secure, Baldwin argues that security is a value of which a nation can have more or less and can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure. As security is subjective, states perceive differently the degree of danger they face and the degree of security they should seek. In other words, there are varying degrees of security, for the simple fact that absolute security is unattainable (Simon, 1976). Fourth, since threats can arise from many sources, scholars must specify the referent threat of security, be it ideological, economic, military, environmental, etc. – *security from what threats?* Fifth, Baldwin suggested specifying the means of security – *which policies to implement to obtain security?* The goal of security can be pursued by a wide variety of means, also depending on the nature of the threats and of the referent object. While politico-military threats can be fought through war, diplomacy, or deterrence, economical threat can be countered by sanction, embargo, or protectionism, and environmental threat by new taxes or investments for energy transition. Sixth, Baldwin argued that the pursuit of security always involves costs. In other words, security involves the sacrifice of other goals that could have been pursued with the resources devoted to security. Some have argued that national security is the highest interest, hence pursuing whatever the costs (Leffler, 1990: 10; Baldwin, 1997: 16). However, the sacrifice of certain values for the sake of security inevitably makes security policies a subject of moral judgement. Therefore, the security policies can constitute a political cost for leaders. Finally, Baldwin emphasised the importance of time framing: rational security policies in the long run can differ greatly, or even contradict, security policies in the short run. The same goes with states and collectives. Diplomacy can be more efficient than war in the long run, while war can appear more effective in the short run. However, choosing war in the short run can jeopardise the prospect of diplomatic relations in the future. In short, Baldwin’s purpose was to define security as a policy objective distinguishable from others but comparable to them.

According to him, the value of security should remain open to investigation rather than “given” as the primary vital interest of states.

Hence, following Baldwin’s claim, the “wideners” challenged the “traditionalist” conception of security and expanded the concept of security beyond the military sector and beyond the state as the only actor, identifying new referent objects, such as national sovereignty, national economies, collective identities, or species and habitats. With the assumption that knowledge is a social construction that cannot be separated from the social actors and the observers and therefore cannot be explained with the same general laws as hard science, they abandoned traditionalist pretension to explain “*why* particular decisions were made”, in favour of explaining “*how* the subjects, objects, and interpretative dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practises were made possible” (Krause, 2012). Thus, rejecting mainstream security studies, European approaches to security emerged, focusing on the interaction between material and ideational/discursive power. They focused essentially on the construction of objects of security, the construction of threats, and the transformation of the security dilemma. However, European security studies are divided into 3 main centres: the so-called Copenhagen School (CS) and its concept of securitization, with Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in front; the so-called Welsh or Aberystwyth School, with Ken Booth, Michael William, Keith Krause, Bill McSweeney and Richard Wynn Jones; and the so-called Paris School, with Didier Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, Ayse Ceyhan and Elspeth Guild.

The Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen has worked intensely on the theme of “non-military aspects of European Security”. Their main contributions are “securitization theory” (ST), “security sector approach”, and “regional security complex theory”. The introduction of “society” and “identity” into the analysis of international security is a first step in the shift from material to cognitive structural resources and from state to human subjects of security. According to one of its main theorists, Barry Buzan, something is a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent and justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle it (Buzan et al, 1998: 21). According to him, the international system has globally become reassured – except from some isolated anarchical regions, such as the Middle East: nation-states are more secure than ever military speaking, because of internal strength and standardisation of international relations. However, while the security dilemma is mitigated, that does not mean that security issues disappeared (Battistella, 2009: 525). Quite oppositely, Buzan argued that military security is only one dimension of security among others: *political security*, i.e. the institutional and political stability of States; *economical security*, i.e. the resource access to maintain a high level of well-being; *environmental security*, i.e. the safeguarding of the biosphere. Finally, he defined *societal security* “the sustainability, within acceptable

conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom” (Buzan, 2009: 38). Buzan’s concept of security rests therefore on “a duality of state security and societal security, the former having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and the latter being held together by concerns about identity” (Weaver et al., 1993: 25). The concept of societal security relates specifically to the intensification of the politicisation of migration from a security perspective and to negative reactions to the integration process in some European countries after the Maastricht Treaty. The Copenhagen School has accounted for this phenomenon by developing the theory of securitization. CS theorists have argued that in international relations something becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to some object – a threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures. The main argument of securitization theory is that in international relations an issue becomes a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state, but rather because an actor has defined something as existential threat to some object’s survival. By doing so, the actor has claimed the right to handle the issue through extraordinary means to ensure the referent object’s survival.

The Aberystwyth School, also known as emancipatory realism, relies upon Gramscian thinking and aims at linking security to critical theory. The Aberystwyth School works within the tradition of Critical Theory, rooted in Marxism, and will therefore be taken as representing critical security studies (CSS). It is based on the pioneering work of Ken Booth²⁶ and Richard Wyn Jones²⁷, influenced by Gramscian critical theory, the Frankfurt School critical social theory, and the Neogramscian theorist Robert W. Cox. Ken Booth and Wyn Jones criticize traditional approaches and offer to reconceptualize security studies by making human emancipation their focus since, according to them, only a process of emancipation can make the prospect of human security more likely. They argue that researchers should avoid viewing the world through the lens of the state as implied by use of the “national security” concept. The state is often the problem as much as the solution, and the aim of research should be defined in relation to human beings. The best way to conceptualise security in a way that it aligns with people rather than the state is to define it in terms of emancipation. By implication, the concept of security is therefore used in a rather classical sense, but on a different referent object: it is about “real” threats directed against “real” people, and not the allegedly real ones voiced by the

²⁶ Ken Booth (1991), “Security and emancipation”, *Review of International Relations*, 17, pp. 313-26; Ken Booth (1991), “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice”, *International Affairs*, 67, pp. 527-45; Ken Booth. (ed.) (1991), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, London, HarperCollins.

²⁷ Richard Wyn Jones (1995), “Message in a Bottle? Theory and Practice in Critical Security Studies”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 16, pp. 299-319; Richard Wyn Jones (1995), “The Nuclear Revolution”, in: Alex Danchev (ed.), *Fin De Siecle: The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, London, I. B. Taurus, pp. 90-109; Richard Wyn Jones (1996), “Travel Without Maps: Thinking About Security After the Cold War”, in: Jane Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the post-Cold War World*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp. 196-218.

state. CSS as a broad movement thus includes other forms of theory that is critical, even if it is not critical theory, including feminism, normative theory, and post-structuralism (Waever, 2012: 52).

Finally, the so-called Paris School, as an acronym for Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology, inspired by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and associated with the French journal *Cultures et Conflits*, focuses on the complexity of the political game and the role of security professionals and bureaucracies, with a special commitment to detailed, empirical investigation of actual practises by various agencies—practises that often reveal patterns different from those found when studying official discourse (Waever, 2012: 54). Didier Bigo, its most prominent scholar, argues that how security is practised determines security and that “[s]ecurity is often marked by the handing over of entire security fields to ‘professionals of unease’ who are tasked with managing existing persistent threats and identifying new ones” (Bigo, 2002: 65)²⁸. These professionals are among many (in)securitizing actors in a given field, and their speech acts are not decisive, but the result of structural competition between actors with different forms of capital over contradictory definitions of security and different interests (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008: 4-5)²⁹. Hence, Didier Bigo contends that “some (in)securitization moves performed by bureaucracies, the media, or private agents are so embedded in routines that they are never discussed and presented as an exception but, on the contrary, as the continuation of routines” (*ibid*: 5)³⁰. Bigo has shown how internal and external security merge together as agencies compete for the gradually deterritorialized tasks of security policies and produce a new threat image by constantly connecting immigration, organized crime, and terror. He starts from a conception of a “field” and its actors and asks what they do, producing well documented maps of practises, including the micro level of the various agencies involved. An important advantage of this approach, according to Weaver, is that it includes routine practises and even deviation from official policy (Waever, 2012: 54). Although Bigo’s contribution to securitization studies is unquestionable, the present dissertation focuses exclusively on discourse rather than practises of securitization, and therefore contributes to mapping European discursive fields of security rather than fields of actors of security.

Among these three main centres of European security studies, the CS’s theory of securitization, taking the distinction between state and society as its starting point, has aroused the most interest for the present

²⁸ Didier Bigo (2001), “The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)”, in: Mathias Albert, Yosef Lapid, David Jacobson, *Identities, borders, orders: rethinking international relations theory*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 91-116.; Didier Bigo (2002), “Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease”, *Alternatives*, 27, p. 65.

²⁹ Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (2008), “Understanding (in)security”, in: *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal regimes after 9/11*, Oxon, Routledge, pp. 4-5.

³⁰ Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, “Understanding (in)security”, (*ibid*) p. 5.

dissertation. Although it has been criticised by McSweeney for their reification of society and identity (McSweeney, 1999: 77), I concur with the CS's claim that "even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues, using one's understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticise this fact but also to understand the dynamics of security and thereby manoeuvre them" (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). Besides, Buzan's concept of societal security could be brought closer to the concept of ontological security. Ontological security was first defined on the individual level as a stable mental state derived from a sense of continuity and order in events (Laing, 1960). It focuses on the relationship between identity, narrative, and security, which is to say that it focuses on the nature of the security of the Self rather than viewing security as survival. Further, Anthony Giddens (1991) focused on the relational aspects of ontological security. According to him, the ontologically secure individual does not worry about the meaning of life; everyday interactions are generally unproblematic and rest on intersubjective understandings of what constitutes the boundaries of the normal. When an event occurs that is not consistent with the meaning of one's life, it threatens one's ontological security by creating what psychology would call a cognitive dissonance, which may be specific to the socio-cultural context. Hence, Giddens moved the ontological security from an individual level to the societal domain, allowing the importation of the concept into the field of International Relations (Huysmans, 1998; McSweeney, 1999; Steele, 2008; Mitzen, 2006; Krolkowski, 2008). According to Steele, while physical security is important to state, "ontological security is more important because its fulfilment affirms a state's self-identity" (Steele, 2008: 2-3). Nation states seek ontological security because they want to maintain consistent self-concepts, and the 'Self' of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinised foreign policy action. Similarly, Mitzen (2006) insisted particularly on the importance of routines to secure identities, positing the state to be rational. In short, according to the former, states can feel "shame" in the same way as individuals do, while according to the latter, states can carry on harmful routines because they are essential to affirm their identity. Benedict Anderson (1983) argued that nations are not about effective links but about imagined community and communion of shared narratives and shared readings of the past. Hence, the concepts of societal and ontological security can be articulated in the sense that what is to be secured is the imagined community through shared narratives, which constitute the imagined community's identity, routinized by institutions such as the government, the media, education, etc. As McSweeney put it, the "security of the social order is inseparably linked to the identity of the collectivity which is its subject" (McSweeney, 1999: 209). Besides, based on Baldwin's seven questions on security, when applied to the perception of the Islamic threat in the three countries under study, the referent object, the referent threat, and

the referent value, can vary from one context to another. As far as discourse is concerned, in some cases the Islamic threat is largely constructed as a physical threat to national security, i.e. to the state, in others, it is perceived as threatening National identity, i.e. the imagined community.

CS's securitization is a "relatively well-defined, mid-level theory concerned with one field of social action – security – defined in terms of existential threats that justify the use of extraordinary measures" (Watson, 2012: 282). Studies in securitization draw mostly from two founding texts: Wæver's (1995) article "Securitization and Desecuritization" and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde's (1998) book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Securitization focuses on the way in which states construct security issues beyond the realm of normal politics. According to Huysmans, securitization is "a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilise politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust" (Huysmans, 2006: xi). It rests on four main pillars: (1) it is a *speech act*, defined by Wæver as an "illocutionary act in relation to security"³¹ (Wæver, 1989: 42); (2) the capabilities of securitization are most often held by the State; (3) securitizing move works by raising the prospect of the survival of the in-group; (4) a successful securitizing move can lead to exceptional measures, beyond the realm of normal politics (Croft, 2012: 1990). As Stritzel puts it, securitization articulates around two central concepts. On the one hand, the trilogy of the *speech act*, the securitizing actor, and the audience. On the other, on three "facilitating conditions" that influence the success of a securitizing move (Stritzel, 2011: 358), namely "linguistic-grammatical composition, social capital of the securitizing actor and existing social knowledge" (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Among the fructuous developments of securitization studies in the last two decades, several critiques have emerged, among which the rigidity of the *speech-act* model (a), the lack of conceptualisation of the audience (b), and the underestimation of the contextual factors (c) (Balzacq, 2005; Balzacq et al., 2010; McGahan, 2009; Salter, 2008; among others).

1.1.1. The rigidity of the speech-act

First, securitization as a *speech act* holds a too high degree of formality. According to Balzacq (2005), the "assumption of a speech act approach ultimately reduces security to a conventional procedure such as marriage in which the conditions of success must fully prevail for the act to go through" (Balzacq, 2005: 172). Plus, there is a fundamental contradiction between the CS's claim that security is, on the one hand, a *self-referential practice* (illocutionary act) and, on the other, an *intersubjective process* (*ibid*: 177). This critique goes hand in

³¹ According to Stritzel, following Austin conceptualisation, the illocutionary act of a sentence "refers to the act performed in articulating a locution, that is, the act *in* saying something (the act is performed as soon as the sentence is uttered): in uttering 'security', a state representative declares a state of emergency", in: Stritzel Holger, "Security, the translation", *SEP Security Dialogue*, 2011, p. 349.

hand with the problematic conceptualisation of securitization as an *event* or a *moment* rather than a cumulative *process* of policy responses and media framing reinforcing the construction of the threat. In other words, “discourses of threat do not directly cause policy responses. Rather, they frame policy debates, widening or narrowing choices for legitimate and appropriate action” (McGahan, 2009: 33). As Stritzel put it, it seems that the concept of securitization has developed over the years through two opposing views. The first “internalist” reading of securitization focuses on the *speech act event*, grounded in the concept of performativity. According to Wæver (along with Butler and Derrida), it is the speech act itself that creates authority rather than any pre-existing (social or cultural) context. According to Michael Williams, this reading is a strong decisionist interpretation of securitization that shares central understanding with Carl Schmitt, claiming that the success of a securitizing move rests on the authority of the speaker (Williams, 2003). Against this view, the second “externalist” reading of securitization conceptualises securitization as a *process* based on the idea of *embeddedness* (Stritzel, 2011: 359), that is the dependence of the phenomenon on its environment. This alternative vision has been rejected by Wæver himself and is quite underdeveloped in the field of securitization studies.

1.1.2. The underdeveloped conceptualisation of the audience

Second, although the CS grants a certain role to the audience, it remains largely underdeveloped, in favour of a strong decisionist model where the authority of the speaker is central. While recognizing that security and securitization are inter-subjective, the focus on the speech act as performing security depicts security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation. Thus, several scholars have denounced the CS’s vagueness and called for a reconceptualization of the audience in the securitization model. According to Balzacq (2005), the audience remains uncoun- ted for because Wæver, who relies on Austin’s theorization of language, considers the securitization to be performed through the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the articulator and the audience. Similarly, Salter regrets that “the actual politics of the acceptance [by the audience] are left radically under-determined”, when, according to him, this is “precisely the dynamics of this acceptance, this resonance, this politics of consent that must be unpacked further” (Salter, 2008: 324).

In other words, as Ringmar (1996) would have put it:

The telling of a story is not arbitrary, not pastime, and it is not something anyone does alone. In fact, there are strict limits both to the courses of action open to us and to the kinds of identities we can construct. We can neither do whatever we want to do, nor be whatever we want to be. What we can do, and can be, is instead ultimately determined by the reactions of the audiences to whom our stories are addressed (Ringmar, 1996: 79).

Hence, for an audience to consent to the securitizing discourse, such discourse must resonate with the audience. Moreover, several scholars have pointed out that the idea of the audience in traditional securitization

theory tends to reduce and simplify the possibility for multiple audiences. Drawing upon Goffman's concept of "setting", Salter (2008) called for an excursion into dramaturgical analysis to offer a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between audience and securitizing actor and the reasons of a (un)successful securitizing move (Salter, 2008: 344). According to him, there are:

[f]our different settings [that] explain variations in the form, content, and success of speech acts: the popular, the elite, the technocratic, and the scientific. In each of these different settings, the core rules for authority/knowledge (who can speak), the social context (what can be spoken), and the degree of success (what is heard) vary. This goes far beyond linguistic rules towards norms and conventions of discourse, as well as bureaucratic politics, group identity, collective memory, and self-defined interest. (Salter, 2008: 322)

Following Salter's contribution, Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert have suggested a synthesis of Kingdon's "three streams model" – problem, policy, and politics – and the securitization framework to overcome the lack of conceptualisation of the audience. In the "problem stream", an actor who aims to construct a public or policy problem addresses an audience of other decision-makers involved in the policy-making process (Balzacq et al., 2010: 66). The "policy stream" tackles the process of policy formation, where the audience to be persuaded is one of technocrats and specialists receptive to "arguments based on knowledge, rationality and efficiency" (*ibid*: 67). The "politics stream", concerns political mood, institutions, ideological distributions, etc, that addresses an audience comprising both decision-makers and the public (*ibid*: 68). According to them "it has the advantage of allowing for: (1) a more precise operationalization of the concepts of 'securitizing actor' and 'audience' and (2) a more refined conceptualisation of 'the audience' as comprising different audiences, which respond to different logics of persuasion, but are all interlinked as they are involved in a single policy-making process" (*ibid*: 69).

The question of the audience leads to that of the securitizing actor's intention. Intention is central in discourse analysis although almost impossible to pin down in practice. Is a securitizing actor fully convinced of the nature and severity of a threat while securitizing, or are they only strategically responding to a conjectural opinion poll? One might say both. Securitization is a "strategic action of discourse [that] operates at the level of persuasion and uses various artefacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence, and even lies)" (Balzacq, 2005: 172). To some extent, persuasion requires some degree of instrumentalization, to win formal and/or moral support. Formal support – from the Parliament for instance – is a prerequisite to implementing policy. However, formal support without moral support of the "general public" may result in political costs. Thus, while seeking formal support, officials also seek to draw from the semantic repertoire of the national audience to win broader moral support (Balzacq, 2005: 185). To persuade the audience, the speaker must tune his/her language to the audience's experience. According to Kenneth Burke (1955), effective persuasion requires that a speaker's argument employ terms that resonate with the listener's language (Burke, 1955: 55).

Accordingly, securitizing actors and audiences as well are constrained by their cultural, national, and transnational environment. For example, when former British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011 claimed for a “muscular liberalism”³², or when former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared in 2013 that the Islamic veil should remain an “essential fight” for the Republic³³, one can assume that they responded to what the people wanted to hear – or what the PMs *expected* the people wanted to hear. However, it is also probable that both Manuel Valls and David Cameron were constrained by their specific national framing regarding religious minorities and Islam. For example, securitizing the Islamic veil in France might be at one a political opportunity and a hegemonic narrative of “preserving” French identity (*laïcité*).

Hence, both securitizing actors and audiences interact in common “regime(s) of truth” (Stritzel, 2011; Mavelli, 2013). Securitizing actors are part of the audience themselves. For example, as Mavelli demonstrated, when in 2009, former French President Sarkozy targeted the Muslim full veil by saying that “the *burqa* is not welcome in France”, he did not *create* a securitization move “from scratch” as the problematization of the *burqa* was already part of the consolidated discursive realm of the “war on terror” (Mavelli, 2013: 172). In some ways, the French President was part of a larger national and transnational audience witnessing flows of imagery and information on oppressed women wearing the *burqa* in Afghanistan. Besides, political commentators can fully participate in the securitization of Muslims minorities while simultaneously being party to the larger national audience, granting or denying moral support to state officials. They do not extract themselves from the national audience when performing the speech-act. They are simultaneously securitizing actors and part of the audience. The “power of securitization is not exclusively the capacity to ‘speak security’ and adopt exceptional measures, but to take decisions that resonate with already-existing discursive sedimentations and therefore can be recognised to be true” (Mavelli, 2013: 180). As Bourbeau put it, the power of contextual factors is a continuum between *enabling* and *constraining* securitizing agents (Bourbeau, 2011: 46).

Hence, I argue that securitizing moves take place in Kingdon’s “politics stream” that constrains the terms of the securitization process to obtain the audience’s moral consent. In other words, while the reason *why* securitizing actors securitize can be instrumental to some extent, *how* they securitize is much more constrained by the context in which they find themselves

³²David Cameron PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference, Published 4 February 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference>

³³ Interview of Manuel Valls, Ministry of Interior on radio station *Europe 1* on 7 February 2013, regarding the situation in Tunisia, the rising of Islamism, the war on terror, and the social climate in France: <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/187119-interview-de-m-manuel-valls-ministre-de-linterieur-europe-1-le-7-f>

1.1.3. The absence of contextual factors

Although securitization depends on so-called “facilitating conditions”, contextual factors involved in the process remain ill defined (Bourbeau, 2011: 3). Facilitating conditions relate to the internal conditions – a security speech act must follow the grammar of security, and the external conditions, the social capital of the securitizing actor, and the peculiarities of the alleged threats. According to securitization theory, the speech-act fails if it does not meet these facilitating conditions. As Bourbeau relevantly points out, by “exploring the conditions that *facilitate* the securitization process, [securitization theory] overlooks contextual factors that *limit* or *constrain* a successful securitization” (Bourbeau, 2011: 40). Stritzel (2007) had before him argued that “too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality” (Stritzel, 2007: 358). According to him, CS’s securitization theory cannot integrate contextual factors in its framework. However, I stand with Bourbeau’s less radical assumption that the securitization analytical framework has sufficient fluidity to allow for the inclusion of the notion of contexts (Bourbeau, 2011: 137). The CS developed a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through the security *speech-act*, minimizing the importance of contextual factors, such as dominant narratives of identity, which yet condition modes of securitization as well as the construction of security itself.

On the contrary, Balzacq suggests an approach based on social and cultural-linguistic context against the *speech act* approach based on universal pragmatism. According to him, a “pragmatic action of discourse operates at the level of persuasion and uses various artefacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence and lies)” whereas a “speech act based on universal principles of communication [is] supposed to be functional whatever the context, culture and whatever the relative power of the actors” (Balzacq, 2005: 172). He put back the socio-cultural context at the core of the securitization model. The semantic repertoire of security is as much one of textual meaning as one of cultural meaning. For instance, liberalism, republicanism, and secularism do not resonate the same when mobilized in Britain, France, or Germany. While Luca Mavelli suggests “investigat[ing] the securitisation of Islam and the (re)production of secular subjectivity in France as part of the ‘unified analytical construct’ of European secularity” (Mavelli, 2013: 178), I argue *au contraire* that secularism has acquired specific meaning and resonance in the three countries under study, that would partially explain cultural differences in securitizing Islam in each country. As Talal Asad already observed:

For even in modern secular countries the place of religion varies. Thus although in France both the highly centralized state and its citizens are secular, in Britain the state is linked to the Established Church and its inhabitants are largely nonreligious, and in America the population is largely religious but the federal state is

secular. [...] Consequently, although the secularism of these three countries have much in common, the mediating character of the modern imaginary in each of them differs significantly. (Asad, 2003: 5-6)³⁴

Hence, drawing on these critiques, I suggest a re-contextualization of the securitization process in the following section.

1.2. An externalist reading of ST: recontextualizing securitizing discourses

Securitization theory has provided a relevant model to account for the relationship between the governance of Islam, identity, and security in Western Europe. One of its strengths relies on its shift from solely material to socio-cultural factors. In positing the social construction of threats and referent objects, securitization theory acknowledges the intersubjective dimension of security. However, as it stands, securitization theory as it has been theorized by the Copenhagen School, faces difficulties when seeking to explain variations in levels, degrees, and forms of securitization. This is partly because the Copenhagen School tends to treat security as a binary notion: either an object is designated and accepted as a security issue, or it is contested and remains within the realm of “normal” politics (Salter, 2008). In doing so, it neglects contextual factors that unravel nuances and degrees in securitization. The ambiguity between the acknowledgement of contexts and intersubjectivity on the one hand, and the underdevelopment of the audience, i.e., socio-cultural contexts, on the other, is the reason why, according to Bourbeau, securitization theory faces difficulties to find a place within theories of international relations. He therefore advocates to bring securitization theory closer to constructivism in International Relations (Bourbeau, 2011: 30).

1.2.1. Securitization and constructivism

Constructivism in international relations and securitization share many assumptions. First, constructivism refutes the realist postulate of a unified and rational state. According to constructivism, scholars need to unravel the agents behind the state to grasp the domestic sources of state identity. For instance, “the” French, “the” British, “the” German, or “the” European vision, do not exist per se: there are multiple competing visions and positions within each context, varying according to the agents who formulate them. In other words, nuances are essential rather than secondary to understanding collective identities. Secondly, instead of treating ideas as merely intervening variables, constructivism assumes that structural threats cannot exist without the

³⁴ In the three countries under study, “secular” and “Christian” identities are differently articulated. In France, secularism or *laïcité* is related to the Roman-Catholic hegemonic tradition averse to (religious) pluralism, while historically constructed as opposed to the Catholic Church. On the contrary, in Britain and Germany, secularism is related to the early emergence of religious pluralism in “Protestant” contexts and historically constructed as the continuity of Christian tradition.

ideational factors that gave them meaning and significance. Thirdly, according to constructivists, ideas are not formulated and created in a structural vacuum: social facts depend on socially established conventions. In a nutshell: (1) social reality is constructed; (2) identities constitute interests and actions; (3) agents and structures are mutually constructed (Ruggie, 1998; Price and Reusmit, 1998; Guzzini, 2000; Adler, 2002; Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Bourbeau, 2011). I believe that these assumptions are perfectly suited to securitization theory. As constructivists, securitization theory considers security as a social construction linked to identities and representations. Securitization theory underlines the intersubjective nature of security in the way collectives define the world in an intersubjective way based on ideas, beliefs, norms, and values. Finally, securitization theory extends the security agenda by including threats beyond the narrow focus of state and military.

Hence, an externalist reading of securitization closer to constructivism allows the contextualization of securitizing speeches. Why some political groups are more likely to view some objects as threatening and what role historical, cultural, and identity narratives play in legitimating singular forms of securitization, are pivotal questions to understand how securitization works in different contexts. If a securitization rested only on the sole authority of the speaker, it would be impossible to interpret variations between British, French, and German ways of (de)securitizing Muslim identities in public discourses steaming from comparable actors. Therefore, socio-cultural contexts are vital rather than only “facilitating condition[s]” to understand (un)successful securitization. As a matter of fact, the meaning of security is contextual, and so is the process of securitizing things. Securitization can vary in nature – military, economical, societal (Buzan et al., 1998), and in degree – from securitization to de-securitization, via politicisation, de-politicization, or indifference (Bourbeau, 2011: 18). The semantic repertoire of security and securitization is as much one of textual meaning as one of cultural meaning, since culturally appealing narratives stimulate particularly the identification with culturally situated characters. By contextualising securitizing speeches, an externalist reading of securitization theory stands for understanding the resonance of a securitizing speech in each time and place. In doing so, it resolves the ambiguity of the role of the audience.

1.2.2. Securitization and emotions

Understanding the resonance with the audience and the politics of consent in the securitization process requires taking into account the emotional framing of events. It would be misleading to separate rational and emotional choices as perceptions of one’s interests are only possible through one’s system of beliefs (Braud, 1996: 170). Accordingly, emotions are omnipresent and play a crucial role in world politics (Balzacq & Jervis, 2004; Lebow, 2010; Ramel, 2022). Images of the falling towers on 11 September 2001, or of Charlie Hebdo’s

attacker shooting a police officer on the ground in France on 7 January 2015 have been diffused repeatedly around the world, and thus have decisional impact on how people perceive and react to security issues. Conversely, speeches of governments and leaders in their appeal to defend the “free world” against terror are necessarily highly emotional. Hatred and fear, empathy and compassion, self-esteem, and shame, are all influential in discourses on world politics in general, and on security in particular. While *fear* is pivotal to realists in theorizing security dilemmas, Mauss (1923) demonstrated how *honour* and *standing* is decisive in societies. George Mead (1934) placed *self-esteem* at the core of social interactions, while Goffman (1982) presented the importance of the dilemma between “losing” and “saving face”. More recently, Sara Ahmed (2004) worked on *pain, hate, fear, disgust, shame* and *love* as collective and circulating emotions (Ahmed, 2004). She showed that such emotions should not be regarded as psychological states, but rather as social and cultural practises. As much as fear has a history (Robin, 2004: 28), emotions and the situations in which they become political are linked to historical, cultural, and political circumstances (Crawford, 2000: 131). They are an active component of identity and community and are an intimate part of the attachment that binds individuals or communities to objects, and consequently cannot be separated from their local context (Ahmed, 2003: 28). Even more recently, Frederic Ramel (2022) demonstrated how positive affect such as kindness (*bienveillance*) was a strong drive of multilateralism. Hence, affects play a central role in understanding how individual as well as collective identities are constructed and how perceptions of the international environment and international threats are shaped (Mercer, 1996: 13). Collective affects are central and can implicate personal emotion even though personal material interests are not at stake, such as, British resilience toward the loss of the Empire after WWII, or French crispation by the prospect of losing Algeria (Braud, 1996: 171). Some traumatic events remain anchored in the collective memory for centuries, even as they evolve and are contested, while others fail to take root or even disappear. A positive anchor produces narratives – whatever value is attributed to the event, which may be negative or positive. A negative anchor produces amnesia. The productions of narrative frameworks resulting from more or less traumatic events can be mobilized in an active (duty of memory, commemoration, etc.) or passive (elements of language, idiomatic expressions, naming, etc.) manner. As a matter of fact, collective encounters can leave strong or weak, positive or negative sediments in collective memory. While an encounter that provokes joy and pleasure can leave a “positive” relation to the object encountered, a painful encounter can leave “negative” attachment to the encountered object. For example, the traumatism of Nazism in Germany left a conflicting relation to discourse promoting particularistic *Germanness*. The promotion of mono-culturalism or/and the opposition to migration can be perceived as “dreadful ghost of a *völkish* national tradition” (Joppke, 1996: 466).

Consequently, self/other relations emerge through webs of affective narratives that (re)produce identities and regulate how the others should make the self feel and how the self should orient itself towards and engage the other (Leep, 2010: 332). Cooperative as well as conflicting practises may often be understood as the result of how emotions are repetitively bound to identities and self/other relations. Examining emotions through narratives allows the study of how emotions are central to the process of securitization. Hence, emotional framing cannot be separated from the environment in which it takes place.

1.2.3. Securitization and resonance

Since emotions cannot be separated from their environment, unpacking variations in the modalities of consent and acceptance in the audience requires borrowing the concept of “culture” to cultural studies to embed securitization in a stronger externalist wing. According to Erik Ringmar (1996), interpretation of situations “depends crucially on what we have been taught to see, to feel and to expect; it depends on how we are conditioned by our culture. (...) Matter simply does not matter, except in the form in which it is apprehended by culture and acknowledged by individual members of that culture” (Ringmar, 1996: 37). Hence, studying securitizing discourse requires investigating the cultural resources through which both securitizing actors and their audiences give meaning to the material world in which they live. According to cultural theories, human behavior is guided by socially shared and transmitted ideas and beliefs. In this sense, culture includes beliefs about the way the world is, as well as ideas about the way the world should be. In turn, political cultures refer to those beliefs and ideas that shape a given society’s orientation toward politics. Although influenced by exogenous factors, political cultures are not solely subjective reflections of objective realities: social groups with different cultural backgrounds are likely to react differently to identical stimuli.

Cultural theories are rather contested in social sciences, particularly in France, where they are often assumed to imply objectively discernible values and traditions deemed homogeneous and immutable. As a matter of fact, within securitization theory, McSweeney (1996) has mounted a strong critique against the CS’s reification of society and identity. According to him, identity is not a fact of society but an ongoing process of negotiation among people and interest groups (McSweeney, 1999: 77). Being French or English is not a natural fact but depends on a long political and historical process which constitutes the reality to be explained. Cultures and identities are not static entities independent from societies and directing the actors’ behaviour. Beliefs are continually questioned by current events, shocking events – such as terror attacks, for example, can create pressure that leads to a re-evaluation and modification of these beliefs (Hughes, 2011). The same events can also be interpreted such that they do not contradict existing norms and beliefs to avoid cognitive

dissonance. Thomas U. Berger (1996)³⁵ considers that abstract or emotionally charged beliefs that make up the core of a culture, such as preference for democracy, secularism or belief in monotheism, are resistant to change. He argues that once agreed upon, these realities tend to institutionalize and become stable, so that even a shift in power may not necessarily lead to their reconsideration. Leaders, bureaucrats, intellectuals take for granted some grounded beliefs, and the sum of these beliefs constitute the political culture of a collective group and can have lasting impacts. How nations choose to behave can have significant, system-level effects in the long run as well. For example, Berger takes the example of the US isolationism before 1941, which, according to him, delayed the US engagement in WWII (Berger, 1996: 189). Likewise, analyzing French military culture, Elizabeth Kier argued that because interwar French military culture “could not imagine short-term conscripts leading offensive operations, they dismissed intelligence reports showing that the Germans would use ‘young troops’ in the front lines” (Kier, 1995: 82)³⁶. As she rightfully put it: “that culture matters is not to argue that interests do not. Culture and interests are not distinct, discrete, competing factors. Actors’ definitions of their interests are often a function of their culture” (Kier, 1995: 84). Moreover, the policy is always dependent upon the articulation of identity, while identity is simultaneously produced and reproduced through the formulation and legitimation of policy (Hansen, 2006: 187).

However, the examination of core beliefs of a particular society is complicated: multiple political actors compete to impose their understandings as binding for the rest of society. These competitions, sometimes go as far as narrative wars (see empirical chapters), involve a reinterpretation of past events, current conditions, and future goals. In this way, understanding politics is a question of understanding which narratives persuade whom in an on-going negotiation of reality. Finally, I do not confuse identity with culture: identity is the *referent object to be secured*, while cultures are *narrative resources* that frame securitizing discourse. Stories of selves condition stories of interests: it is only as “someone” that one can have an interest in “something” (Ringmar, 1996: 190).

³⁵ Source: ‘Norms, identity, and national security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317–56.

³⁶ Similarly, investigating France’s eastern policy at the beginning of the 20th century, I remarked that French officials such as publicist Robert de Caix, considered the father of French Levantine policy, General Gouraud, or President Alexandre Millerand, held a strong “Levantine” bias and, therefore, could not imagine the existence of Arab nationalism. This blind spot led to their dismissal of intelligence reports showing that Arab nationalists were active in the region and would react strongly against a pro-Christian independent Lebanon. On the contrary, British imperial interests in the Middle East tinted with a rather “romantic” vision of the free Bedouins held by actors of the British eastern policy such as T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, or Mark Sykes made it possible to favourably receive intelligence reports establishing emerging nationalist sentiments in Syria and the Middle East. Those “national” biases were inextricably linked to geostrategic interests. The British Empire needed to secure its “direct route” to India through a soft control of the Middle East and cooperation with Arab nationalists. On the contrary, France could hardly support Arab nationalism in the Levant without jeopardising its domination in North Africa. Both colonial powers had their own imperial “jewel” to secure, namely British India and French Algeria, which both led to rather distinctive inclination towards their objects and subjects of domination.

Thus, I argue that securitizing practises involve the mobilisation of tools within a historical, cultural, political, and linguistic context to cultivate inter-subjective understandings of certain issues as existentially threatening (Balzacq, 2011: 14). Understanding culture as a semantic repertoire, or a stock of common narratives, allows the investigation of collective identity through discourse analysis, while avoiding the pitfall of collective essentialization:

“Perhaps we could imagine gathering all the reverberations which a certain society attaches to its words, and in this way to compile enormous lists of all possible metaphors and all their potential uses. Such lists would constitute a dictionary which tells us, not what things “are”, but instead what things may mean to a certain set of people in a certain time and place. Perhaps we could talk about the total collection of all such meanings as the ‘culture’ of a particular society” (Ringmar, 1996: 71).

Thus, narrative resources matter, insofar that they frame and constrain perceptions and policymaking and vary from one context to another. Consequently, I believe that an effective method of identifying divergences in securitizing Islam and Muslims in the three cases under study, is to draw on Ringmar’s (1996) and Spencer’s (2016) narrative theories. Even though identity “leaves no ‘sediment’ [and] cannot petrify” (McSweeney, 1998: 137), through *épaisseur narrative*, narratives can be reproduced and can crystallize over time; they are an expression of imagined communities and collective identities that can be empirically analyzed through discourse analysis: socio-cultural contexts and emotions are revealed in narratives.

In a nutshell, it is essential to analyze language acts within the context in which they are formulated. Attempts at securitization arise from the environment in which they emerge as much as they are constrained by it: the securitization process requires the mutual constitution of the agent and the context. Securitizing agents do not operate in a social vacuum and cannot exclude themselves from the contextual environment in which they operate. Their ability to reproduce or transform the security field is constrained and limited. Conversely, the construction and meaning of social structures depend on the interpretation of the agents. Contextual factors do not exist objectively in the social space and cannot create or impose the securitization. A contextual factor must be interpreted as having security significance for that factor to have a security impact. Social structures “have the power to legitimise and authorise, to include and exclude, and thus to exercise considerable power over agents” (Bourbeau, 2011: 45).

Following Balzacq’s claim according to which securitization “occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq, 2005: 172), the next section advances to refine the securitization’s framework by drawing a narrative contribution to securitization by linking securitization theory to Ringmar’s (1996) narrative theory of action. He explained the intervention of Sweden in the 17th century Thirty Year War as an attempt by Swedish leaders to obtain individual and

collective recognition from their European counterparts, demonstrating both the role of identity in the causes of war and the importance of narratives in the field of international relations.

1.3. A narrative theory of securitization

This section draws on the long-standing tradition of narrative research in literary studies and the more recent narrative research in political science and international relations. After defining (political) narratives (a), I explain the necessity of narrative analysis to understand resonance (b). Finally, I present the three structural components of narrative, that are the setting, the characterization, and the plot, and their relevance to study securitization (c).

1.3.1. Political narratives

Narratives represent a primary human activity and come in many forms: they are diversely comprehensive, successful, lasting, and dominant. As a practice, narratives are shared by all humanity as much as emotions are:

We dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative (Hardy, 1987: 1).

The difference between narrative and discourse is that a narrative displays a story with fixed characters. This perspective is commonly shared by narratologists as well as cultural, social, discursive, and political psychologists, stressing how intimately intertwined emotions and narratives are.

Groups (re)narrate events and past events to establish shared values and norms, which aggregate in a shared cultural identity: collective groups are “both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings” (Tarrow 2012: 189). Cultural memories are formed of narratives and provide a structure to make sense of the complex reality and to produce explanatory guidelines (Fludernik, 2009: 2). I reiterate that the productions of narratives resulting from more or less traumatic events can be mobilized in an active way (duty of memory, commemoration, etc.) or passively (elements of language, idiomatic expressions, naming, etc.). Besides, notions such as “crisis” or “security” come to exist in the first place through narrative: “although events are unquestionably real, their social import is not determined by any of their objective features” (Krebs, 2015: 825). According to this view, events do not prove narratives right or wrong, they depend on narratives to make sense in the first place. Similarly, Ringmar (2006) reflected whether the US thought of the wars they waged in terms of romance only because they had the military capacity to do so, or because their government wanted to go to war and needed legitimacy to do so. He argued that narratives may have “a material or institutional basis” but draw much more “on cultural presuppositions of the societies in which they originate”

(Ringmar, 2006: 411). In short, narratives resonate when they possess a cultural appeal and are performed in a politically favourable context.

1.3.2. Resonating narratives

Ringmar's theory centres on the role of audiences as "circles of recognition" whereby stories that can be told depend on the resonance capacity of speech. Why some narratives become dominant while others fail to gain prominence is an important yet difficult question since there is never a single narrative of a particular happening. Narratives are always competing, contested, and negotiated. To understand how one makes sense of the world is not only about understanding the words they use and the success of a narrative does not rest solely on the ability and power of the narrator telling the story, as suggested in the speech act theory based on universal principles of communication. Traditional securitization theory argues that the success of a narrative is down to the ability and power of the narrator telling the story, that is the authority of the actor. According to this view, powerful political actors can tell their story the way they like to further their interests and consolidate their position of power. Critics of such an approach however, point out that actors have a limited amount of agency over narratives: there are limits to what a narrator can say and what an audience can accept; they are unable to freely manipulate narratives to further their interests, as they are inextricably bound by the narratives that surround them (Ringmar, 1996: 48).

Lene Hansen also remarked that regarding intertextuality "the inimitability of every individual text is always located within a shared textual space, all texts make reference, explicitly or implicitly, to previous ones, and in doing so they both establish their own reading and become mediations on the meaning and status of others" (Hansen, 2006: 55). This implies that narratives cannot be freely changed or manipulated by narrators, but must conform, connect to, or overlap with previously existing ones (Spencer, 2016). While there is room for new narratives, and actors can tell new stories, their success in front of their audience depends on narratives the audience has previously heard and is embedded within. The acceptance of narratives is contingent on the intertextuality of the narratives being told and those already embedded within the audience. In other words, there must be some degree of cultural resonance. It requires understanding the experiences and memories with which words are associated, that are cultural resources. For narratives to be effective, they do not need to be "true", as suggested by Weaver's and Buzan's references to the consistency of speech with an objective threat. Rather, the narrative must be sufficiently well known and collectively shared to be relied on in communication. For example, when the word "suburb" pops up in British or German public debate, it does not resonate as the word "*banlieue*" resonate in the French context: the former is banal when the latter is

heavily charged with negative connotations. Perhaps a “cultural” equivalent to transcript the connotation conveyed by the word “*banlieue*” in the British context would be that of “parallel societies” and that of “*Parallelwelt*” in the German’s. Since collective experiences and shared memories, conveyed through narratives, are central in understanding security discourse, Ringmar’s narrative theory provides a solid path to articulate the complex interaction between the securitizing speech and the targeted audiences. Hence, it is not the truthfulness of the story that explains the acceptance of narratives since from a constructivist perspective the world is discursively constructed, and there is nothing outside of discourse on which to judge it by (Ringmar, 1996: 73, 88). To reach an audience, narratives need to follow certain pre-existing expectations embedded in existing semantic repertoires.

There is still no consensus on the criteria for determining a good or bad story. Some have pointed out particular “content rules” or “rules of configuration” such as repetition, details or particularity, or common sense (Ewick and Silbey 1995: 207; Rabinowitz cited in Mackey 2011: 45). Most importantly, Bruner has pointed to the need for “verisimilitude” without which a story would be considered boring, chaotic, unbelievable, or incomprehensible (Bruner, 1991: 4). These narrative expectations are part of the encompassing culture and are expressed and linked to pre-existing narratives (Carroll 2001: 39; Mackey 2011: 43). In other words, for narratives to be accepted, they must connect to already existing narratives. Even new narratives of new events are shaped and made familiar through implicit and explicit reference to previous narratives. When performing a speech or a securitizing action, narrators find themselves in a situation of narrative interdependence. This narrative interdependence can be linked to the concept of intertextuality where narratives do not exist in isolation but always relate to or are even part of other already existing narratives (Spencer, 2016: 49).

1.3.3. Stories of (de)securitization: setting, characterization, and plots

I suggest a narrative theory of securitization where securitization theory “facilitating conditions” i.e. the *setting*, the *characterization* of the threat and the referent of security and the *plot*, become central in order to resonate with its audience.

The setting: socio-cultural resources of narrators

A narrative draws on symbols, past experiences, collective memories, cultural scripts, complementary narratives, and pulls socio-cultural resources together. That constitutes the setting, i.e. the setting is the location and surrounding environment in which the narrative is set. The setting provides the essential discursive anchor needed for the construction of social reality, one of the main features of constructivism

(Wendt, 1992). It gives the audience hints on the context and involves guidelines for what the audience is assumed to consider appropriate in a given situation (Spencer, 2016: 36). Thus, the setting is a refinement of securization theory “facilitating conditions”. Exploring the socio-cultural setting(s) within which securitization takes place is central to understanding variations in securitization. Accordingly, socio-historical contexts shape securitizing discourses: particular national narratives, complex colonial histories, and different historical events, shape uniquely the ways Islam and Muslims are narratively constructed in each context.

The characterization of the threat and the referents of security

The narrative element of characterisation, i.e., the description of the actors involved, is an essential component of the constitution of identities by attributing characteristics to the actors involved in the narrative. On this basis, audiences are able – or not – to identify with others and form opinions of their actions (Spencer, 2016: 41). The characterization relates to the self/other nexus, central to constructivist approaches in international relations (Neumann 1999, Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006; Renner and Spencer 2013, Spencer, 2016).

In this element of narrative two further dimensions may be included, along which identity is constructed in discourse: a juxtaposition of a privileged and a devalued sign, following a *logic of difference* and *logic of equivalence* (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 128-130, Nonhoff, 2007: 83). Lene Hansen calls it a *process of differentiation* and *process of linking* (Hansen, 2006: 10-11). This characterization implies a distribution of characters (Propp, 1970, 1983) that allows, when antagonism is strong, the (de)activation of certain emotions (anger/compassion; self- esteem/shame). Applied to securitization theory, this means investigating the coherence and validity of the designation of an issue as a existential threat (other) to a referent object (self).


A constructivist reading of securitization is expressed and evolves in accordance to a cultural context, where the narration of the self and other are intertwined. Culturally appealing narratives particularly stimulate the identification with culturally situated characters, e.g. identification to General De Gaulle by politicians in France suffice to imply republicanism, patriotism, heroism, braveness, victory, etc. Importantly, narratives dispense from the detailed description of each protagonist. They construct protagonists’ characteristics only to a certain extent, while the audience must complete the picture themselves. In a nutshell, culturally appealing narratives let the audience assume not only what protagonists think and feel but also *why* they do what they are (allegedly) doing.

Discourses offer “ideal-types” constructions of identity in relation to degrees of Otherness and difference. There are therefore different forms and degrees of otherness (Hansen, 2006). The “Spatial Otherness” that can create regions as Others in order to strengthen the construction of a region’s identity: the


Orient (Said, 1979) or the Balkans (Hansen, 2006) for the West or the Ottoman Empire and Turkey for Europe (Neumann, 1999), etc. The “Temporal Otherness” such as the European fear of its own past, particularly in its reactions to wars in ex-Yugoslavia (Waever, 1996).

Hence, comparing (de)securitizing speeches of the last decade in three European contexts will offer a comprehensive deconstruction of Western European varying selves securitizing varying others.

1. Linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006)



2. Elements of narratives (Spencer, 2016)



The plot: the (de)securitizing moves in resonance with the audiences

The narrative element of plot, which relates to the constructivist feature of the co-constitution of agent and structure, is the way in which narrative is organized by a particular order of action. It allows the audience to understand new events by “outlining how and why things happened the way they did” (Spencer, 2016: 44-45). In a narrative theory of securitization, the emplotment is the equivalent of the (de)securitizing attempts, where securitizing actors, in accordance to their expectation towards the audiences, designate the other and secure the self by calling for “extraordinary measures”. A narrative involves at least one disruptive event, a break from what is seen as normal and to be expected (Kruck & Spencer, 2014), or else there would be no need to recount events in the first place. A disruptive event may be positive, but most of the time it is negative and relates to a reversal of fortune or the further deterioration of an invidious situation (Ricoeur, 1984). It indicates whether the environment is favourable or dangerous, and enumerates the challenges and threats. The plot also requires a timeframe, that is, a series of events, organized through time and, often indirectly, to space. These events are linked to each other in a more or less causal way within a narrative. The empirical studies of public

discourse in Britain, France, and Germany between 2009 and 2019 will constitute the plot of stories of “(de)securitization” (chapters 4 to 6).

In sum, by employing a cultural and narrative approach to securitization theory, this dissertation offers a constructivist contribution to securitization studies for the aim of better grasping variations in securitizing Islam and Muslims in public discourses in Britain, France, and Germany, which have, so far, rarely been analysed in a comparative and historical perspective. The next section will present the methodology I chose to explore those variations.

Section 2. Research methodology

How might the theoretical insights on the narrative elements of setting, characterisation and plot exposed in the previous section be translated and applied to the empirical analysis of chapters 4, 5, and 6? How does one practically go about conducting a narrative analysis? These are the questions I answer in the following section. I will present the research methodology, which situates how the research design, the data collection, and data analysis fit together to provide a grounded cross-national narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in British, German, and French public discourses. After outlining my research philosophy, I present my research design, exposing the cases and analytical methods. The third section focuses on the concrete selection and collection of data, as well as the challenges faced and the limits of the approach. Finally, I present how I proceeded with the data analyses, detailing the concrete steps of coding the corpus to reveal stories of (de)securitization in a comparative manner.

2.1. Research design: interpretative, qualitative, and comparative

In this section I outline the philosophy of knowledge and the overall methodological outlook of this dissertation, which is at once interpretative, qualitative, and comparative.

Analysing discursive practises requires an interpretive methodology³⁷. In asking the question “*how* is securitization of Islam expressed in European discursive practices? and how does such expression vary according to national frameworks?”, I seek to understand how British, German, and French public narrators frame their collective perception of the self/other nexus, the world they live in, the challenges and threats they face, and the solutions they offer to overcome them. This choice refers to the Weberian distinction between understanding (*verstehen*) and explaining (*erklären*). The latter would mean asking “*why* do European narrators securitize Islam differently from one and other?” However, here I am not looking into the causes of

³⁷ Methodology can be defined here as how one can access knowledge in a research project for a given research question.

securitization, rather, I am focusing on the *expressions* of securitization. Hence, interpretation is key to understanding the production of social meaning. Social meaning is in flux and varies over time, space, and groups; it is dominating, contested, and (re)negotiated. It calls for an effort to understand how the same narratives can mean something different to people living in different socio-political contexts. Narratives have consequences as they construct a particular understanding of the world and make certain behaviour appear appropriate and sensible. Narratives open cognitive and cultural spaces in which behaviour becomes possible. The causality of narrative is mirrored in the discussion of the notion of causality within constructivist discourse analysis in international relations (Wendt 1998; Kurki 2006; Holland 2013). Lene Hansen (2006) rejected the possibility of causation on the level of discourse as one would need to be able to observe independently and separate the independent from the dependent variable, something that is impossible from a constructivist perspective, where structures and agents are constituted by discourse and *vice versa* (Hansen, 2006: 26). Hence, when contemplating the consequences of discourses or narratives it appears more suitable to talk about *constitution* rather than *causation*. Narratives can be understood as a means of constituting actors and structuring what they can say and do on an individual cognitive and collective cultural level. By constituting reality, narratives can define the limits of common sense, what is considered possible and logical and what is placed outside of the sensible or acceptable. In short, while narrative analysis cannot explain why a particular course of action was taken, it can highlight the context and the structure of acceptable and available meanings that made certain courses of action likely and possible (Browning 2008: 69). However relevant interpretative methodology is to this dissertation, it is not free of bias. The researcher's attempts at understanding also impact knowledge production. In this dissertation, I will likely highlight stories that another researcher may have deemed of lesser importance or interpreted from a different perspective – and conversely. It would be presumptuous to think that I could *wholly* and *objectively* interpret a given human behavior, but I have tried and provided an interpretation that is (hopefully) convincing, for a time, in a given scientific discourse.

Second, my research methodology is qualitative, meaning that I elaborated my research design based on the collection and analysis of non-numeric data (Lamont, 2015: 79). Gathering and analyzing data rooted in language called for a qualitative approach to discourse analysis. Discourse analysis, defined as the “qualitative and interpretative recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena” (Abdelal et al., 2009: 6), has been more and more accepted as a methodological approach in international relations since the 1990s. Individuals' perceptions and emotions are revealed in their discourses and in their choice of words. Close qualitative reading will help uncover persuasive mechanisms,

analogies at work in discourses, that quantitative methods are unable to detect. Language plays an important role when it comes to perceptions, emotions and identities. They are revealed in discourses by the choice of vocabulary used. Studying discourses, therefore, allows us to uncover what these emotions, perceptions, identities, and common frame of references are. Qualitative reading also enables the researcher to identify complex rhetorical formations and also to verify if the language used is coherent with the type of document, and if it is not the case, what it reveals.

Finally, my research methodology is fundamentally comparative. One of the main challenges of a comparative study is to identify the uniqueness in each socio-cultural context that could at the same time be comparable to another, to highlight cross-national differences and similarities. Hence, while the self/other nexus literature in international relations and anthropology is mainly concerned with the comparison between “us” and “them”, this dissertation focuses on a second comparison between different European “us” speaking about “them”. French anthropologist Louis Dumont borrowed from Tocqueville the image of “turning the mirror upside down”, which allows deconstructing a Western “us” by comparing national “us” (Dumont, 1979: 375)³⁸. In other words, by comparing the securitization discourses in three European contexts, I aim at deconstructing the “West” as a homogenous securitizing actor. Hence, I concur with the assumption that comparison allows to make explicit the implicitness of collective representations, which remains invisible to the common. The comparison may unravel the ways in which three countries that refer explicitly to the same principles transcribe these principles in different ways. For instance, while “freedom of conscience” is an extension of religious freedom in the UK, in France, it is asserted as a defence against the hold of the religion. Similarly, the word *communauté* or *communautarisme* has a negative connotation in French and in France. Whereas in English, and in the British context in particular, the word community has a positive connotation, as in “community cohesion”, which is the model put forward for managing cultural plurality in British society (Afiouni, 2018).

In this thesis, it is paramount to differentiate between *actors*, or *narrators* for that matter, and cases. Here, the *narrators* are Western European political and media actors producing public discourses aimed at their respective national audience between 2009 and 2019. The *cases*, however, are the French, British, and German corpuses taken as national sets to be compared with one another. The three cases were taken *a priori* based on prior criteria such as the political regime, the degree of secularization, or the comparable amount of population regarded as Muslim living on their soil. Comparing narrators from Britain, France, and Germany

³⁸ “Le moment est peut-être venu de retourner vers nous-mêmes le miroir que l’anthropologue dirige vers des sociétés étrangères, d’essayer de formuler nos propres institutions dans un langage comparatif”, in: Louis Dumont, *Homo hierarchicus* [1967], Gallimard, Tel, 1979, p. 375.

is therefore particularly interesting because they share many commonalities, chiefly a similar regional context (Western Europe), common histories and international threats, while differing in regards to their institutional pattern of religious politics, their institutional foundations for integration and dealing with minorities, or their historical experiences with the MENA region (see introduction). Contrastingly, narrators within each case had to be selected through a large diversity of political and media actors active in debates concerning security, identity, and Islam. The representativeness of narrators selected and the number of discourses selected for each of them allows for a solid comparison of narrative practises, which takes place at three levels: (1) between competing discursive lines within each case; (2) between hegemonic discursive lines across cases; (3) between (de)securitization stories among and across cases.

After selecting actors and discourses regrouped in national case studies, I conducted a narrative analysis. There is no specific codified narrative methodology. In the humanities, narrative analyses go from the tradition of Russian formalists such as Propp (1983), to the French structuralists such as Barthes (1966), and the more recent body of work in narratology (Toolan, 2001; Bal, 2009; Fludernik, 2009). Their methodology has been recently imported into political science and international relations (Spencer, 2016; Clément et al., 2017). Narratives display what most authors call a content (themes, metaphors, etc.) and a structure (setting, characters, plot). It is the interaction between content and structure as well as the context and culture of the speech that give sense to a narrative.

Human coding entails a degree of subjectivity and interpretation. Such subjectivity is often balanced by using a mixed-method approach in order to confirm the results of a qualitative analysis via a quantitative check. By integrating quantitative and qualitative data, this method favors a deep understanding of the thematic categories and the discursive argumentations used by speakers to support their positions. Qualitative content analysis can be defined as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). It differs from quantitative content analysis as it goes beyond counting words or linguistic patterns to deeply investigate the use of language and classify large numbers of text categories that reflect the meaning of text. While I subscribe to using a combined quantitative-qualitative approach, I believe that reconstructing “master frames” is only part of the work. Exposing *which* frames become hegemonic and *how* goes further than merely studying words. First, it calls for assessing conflicting narratives on the same object. Second, it aims at finding traces of the past that can inform how some frames continue in contemporary times. Overall, the use of three sequential analyses – reconstructing competing stories on Islam, the presence/absence of securitizing moves, and assessing historical traces, is best understood under the practice

of triangulation.

My research design draws thereby on the triangulation of data and of analytical methods. The triangulation of methods can be defined as the “use [of] a different set of method tools to explore the same question.” (Lamont, 2015: 117) It differs from a mixed-method approach, which envisions the combination of a quantitative and a qualitative method. In contrast, triangulation does not hierarchize quantitative and qualitative methods and validates the use of several qualitative methods of inquiry. The specific combination of methods depends on the contents of the data. When one’s data is made of archival documents and interviews, then one might combine document analysis with narrative analysis or with discourse analysis. In this dissertation, the combination of analytical methods revolves around narrative analysis, which fits the nature of the data well, and qualitative content analysis to process the large amount of data. Finally, the triangulation of data is defined as the use of various types of data within a research project, such as official statements, archival documents, interviews, which are considered equally. Similar in principle to the triangulation of methods, triangulation of data means that no one data type is deemed more important than another. Triangulation serves to reflect the analytical process and to bring together research insights on different levels. Each qualitative analysis conducted in this thesis brings specific insights to answer the research question. They build upon one another to create a fuller picture. The complete data collection process is detailed in depth in the next section.

2.2. Data selection and collection

The tri-national collection of data was one of the greatest challenges of this dissertation.

First, I had to delimit a timeframe. As mentioned in the introduction, the first decade of the 21st century has been studied extensively and provides a large body of secondary analysis. I therefore focused on the second decade of the 21st century, marked by the revolutions in the MENA region and their consequences. Hence, to provide a comparative analysis on a decade, I only selected data produced between 2009 and 2019. However, as previously mentioned, specific moments within the decade were more relevant than others. As Ringmar calls it, there are formative moment of narrative inflation (Ringmar, 1996: 85), and in our case, key narrative moments on Islam, identity, and security.

In France, there are a number of keystone events that shaped public discourse: 2009-2010 is important due to the national debate on “National Identity” and the “*affaire de la burqa*”. Then, 2012 with the first terror attack of the decade, coupled with the Presidential electoral campaign, which is the most important political event in the 5th Republic are significant socio-political and cultural events. 2015 is pivotal with two

terror attacks in Paris (Charlie Hebdo and 13 November attacks at a music venue, the soccer stadium and a restaurant in Paris), the intensification of French intervention in the Middle East, and the outbreak of the European Migrant Crisis (EMC). Finally, 2017 is key with another Presidential electoral campaign. In Germany, 2010 is also considered to be a turning point, due to the so-called “Thilo Sarrazin’s debate” which reactivated the politicization of (Muslim) migration. Then, 2015-2016 due to the European Migration Crisis, Angela Merkel’s *Willkommenspolitik*, and the 2015-2016 New Year’s Eve sexual assaults in Cologne. Finally, in Britain, 2010 is important, being the the year of a general election; 2015-2016 is marked by the EMC and the Brexit vote; 2017 is marked by two terror attacks in London and one in Manchester. Altogether, while major events and timeframes differ according to each context, there are three key moments of narrative inflation regarding Islam, security, and identity in the last decade: 2009/2010 – 2015/2016 – and 2017.

Second, I had to select sources. As mentioned in the introduction, conducting interviews with leaders or focus groups is not only difficult but also of limited use for the purpose of this research. Beyond the restricted access to former and present European leaders, the possible data imbalance between case studies, and the bias linked to conducting interviews years after the event(s), my research goal is to analyze how narratives of securitization perform and vary, according to the assumption that no single discourse is truer than another. The most important point is that they must be directed as a public audience to participate in the process of (de)securitization. Thus, I assumed that public speeches, be they public declarations, parliamentary speeches, or media columns, are more accurate sources to study securitization processes because they were aimed at an audience, not to mention they are permanently available as they make up the public record. Securitization processes are better apprehended in the public arena, where the interaction between the speaker (potential securitizing actors) and audiences takes place. Such choice was also informed by Robinson and Gallagher’s call for the focus on the “official mind”, to explore the ideas of Islam that shape policy-making processes (Robinson & Gallagher, 1961). Finally, let us note that as a researcher, I do not aim at evaluating to what extent the actors believe what they say or write when they say or write it. Rather, I must code as actors declare their actions or else, I risk taking on another role (law enforcement or judge).

Third, I had to select actors and public discourses accordingly. How to choose comparable yet authenticable actors of the public debate? Narrators within each case had to be selected through a large diversity of political and media actors active in debates concerning security, identity, and Islam in the three countries. To discriminate between the high numbers of actors, I applied some selection criteria: position on the political field and spectrum, insights from secondary sources, and native informants’ advice. First, following the traditional securitization theory, I chose actors according to their political authority, that is

elected Presidents and Members of Parliament (MPs), leaders of political parties or again Presidents of institutions linked to the executive branch of government. For example, I chose Emmanuel Macron, although he was not particularly relevant *a priori* on the topic of Islam, *laïcité*, security, and identity (Prades, 2019). However, as President of the French Republic, he had to be included in the study of (de)securitization, following the core of securitization theory. Second, following the broadened notion of securitization theory offered by Stuart Croft (2012), I selected actors from the “everyday public landscape”, that is, publicists, authors, or others active and visible in the media. I chose actors relevant to the research question, who tackled security, identity, and Islam. Given the different socio-cultural contexts involved, I had to select actors of different status in each case, which might appear odd or peripheral in one context, but key to another. For instance, I chose Jean-Louis Bianco, the President of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* in France - an agency attached to the Ministry of Interior with the mission to assist the Government in the enforcement and respect of secularism in France, who does not have comparable counterparts in Britain or Germany, but is however important in French public discourse on Islam, identity, and security. Contrastingly, I selected Archbishop of Canterbury in Britain, who might appear inappropriate from a French point of view, but is however important in British public discourse on Islam and identity. Hence, while keeping the highest degree of comparison, I respect a degree of specificity in each socio-cultural and political context. In sum, some actors, such as Prime Ministers, Presidents, or Chancellors, were chosen because they are comparable with one another. Others, such as the British Archbishop of Canterbury, French Chief of the *Observatoire de la laïcité*, or German High Commissioner of Integration, specifically relevant to their national context were chosen. Third, I requested the help of native informants, especially for the German case. Luis Hernandez-Aguilar, specialized in German discourse on Islam in the *Deutsche Islamkonferenz* (DIK), advised me to study specific actors such as publicist Daniel Bax, known for his attempt at de-securitizing Islam and Muslim in the media, whom I would have otherwise possibly missed.

Regarding the concrete selection of discourse, I selected only those that referred to Islam and/or security and/or national identity. It would have been analytically biased to choose *a priori* texts that already linked Islam to security and/or identity, thus I searched for the three themes independently. In doing so, I evaluated the extent to which discourses on national security involved the linkage with Islam and Muslims; the extent to which discourses on Islam and Muslims referred to security and identity; and finally, the extent to which discourses on national identity involved discourses on Islam and Muslims. Moreover, considering that narratives are not interchangeable and depend on where they are told, by whom, and to whom, I sampled data with an eye for diversity (interviews, party conferences, public declarations, columns, etc). In parallel, I

relied on the idea of *saturation*, understood as the moment when, after accumulating a certain amount of data collection, further data collection and analysis seems unnecessary (Clément, 2019: 98). Saturation differs from pre-determining a sample size or including all gathered data into the analysis, saturation is a stopping point I stopped including samples in the corpus, when no significant new content emerged. In public discourse involved in the securitization of Islam and Muslims, this saturation point is quickly reached. Political leaders tend to repeat the same rhetoric and narratives over and over to convince their audiences. The same can be said concerning media columnists on the same topic. The tendency of actors to repeat their arguments is both common and logical. However, that does not mean that actors do not contradict themselves. Rather, public actors involved in security and identity issues tend to stick to their argumentation. Narrative turn around is exceptional. Therefore, reading ten to twenty speeches of Prime Ministers's Manuel Valls, David Cameron, and Chancellor Angela Merkel on the same topic tend to repeat themselves such that globally, no new content emerged with the accumulation of additional samples. Consequently, no more than ten to twenty speeches were consulted for each actor. Furthermore, not all of these texts were ultimately selected for narrative analysis. That is why in a second phase, I restricted the selection to four to seven speeches per actor, choosing those speeches that gathered the most representative content and argumentation for each actor. Finally, I arranged the gathered data into national corpuses. I classified the primary data by country and, more specifically, by narrator, the original date of publication or release, data type – newspaper/journal columns, statements and communiqués, interviews, party conferences. The following table renders the complete corpus across data type.

The quantity of data per group is not identical but happens to be relatively similar, although I observed a particular length of German discourses compared to French and German ones. As the quantitative part of the analysis draws on presence/absence of narrative items, it is not necessary that the amount of data be identical. Also, I had to transcribe several speeches from video, particularly Party Conferences, which were not always available on script. Although I analyzed the different discourses in their respective languages, I translated the German and French codebooks, and all citations I extracted in English, in order to render a homogeneous analysis accessible to the reader. In certain cases, I took the liberty of conserving the original word for *sui generis* concepts– words and expressions conserved in the original tongue are marked in *italics*.

Table 1. Amount of data and data type per case

	British corpus	German corpus	French corpus	Total
Articles and columns	47	34	42	123
Interviews	5	28	30	63
Communiqués and statements	11	2	6	19
Conferences and public speeches	13	4	25	42
Party Conference	15	5	10	30
Parliament's speech	16	41	7	64
EU speeches	4	2	1	7
International speech	2	4	1	7
Debate	1	1	3	5
Total	114	121	125	360

Overall, the data selection was a constant back and forth between identification of narrators through discourse inquiry, and selection of speeches from identified actors: while sometimes actors were chosen *a priori* given their position, others were chosen only given the speeches they gave on the topic of Islam, identity, and/or security. In other words, in some cases I already knew what I was searching for, other times, I had to grope around. This may appear to be an inconsistent strategy at first, but it was the only strategy I found to provide an honest collection of data in a tri-national comparative perspective. I also responded to an imperative of feasibility, that is the accessibility of the sources. Hence, some actors and/or discourses that were considered relevant to the research question but out of reach, and therefore had to be removed from the corpus. I further detail and justify the actors' selection in each empirical chapter (chapters 4 to 6).

2.3. Data Analysis

How do political actors active in the European discursive spaces frame the Islamic threat? Are security and Islam narratively interlinked? Are identity and Islam narratively interlinked? Through which narratives? These are the questions I ask and try to answer in the empirical chapters. Following in some ways the operational code analysis, I treat public discourse as interviews. I pose questions about their vision of the world: what are the challenges and threats faced? What are the solutions offered to overcome them? I inquire about their vision of the self/other nexus: their self-perception, their imagined community, and their idealised referent object of security to be protected. I question them about the radical enemy as well as the political adversaries and the out-group. Finally, I identified the rhetoric used as well as the themes evoked that constituted the narrator's spatial-temporal horizon of experience – transnational, national, regional,

contemporary, or historical.

These categories, “vision of the self,” “vision of the other,” or “vision of the world,” are these used by Walker (1990) to study belief systems and foreign policy in international relations. Operational code analysis has benefited from theories of social psychology applied to international relations, following the study of Leites (1953) on Bolshevism and the theoretical work of Holsti et al. (1980). It has favored the recognition of belief systems in decision-making for foreign policy, by mixing cognitive and affective aspects. Operational Code Analysis influenced international security studies. It was based on sociological interviews and intensive data mining from various sources (diaries, memoirs, correspondence). Malici (2006) demonstrated how Gorbachev’s strategy of “altercasting,” performing unexpected moves to change the adversary’s beliefs of oneself, changed the rules of the game and contributed to overcome the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (Schaffer and Walker, 2006a: 127–149). Lazarevska et al. (2006) identify potential future terrorist leaders through their linguistic and discursive differences with non-terrorist leaders, who in contrast express a positive view of politics and politicians and prefer cooperative strategies (Schaffer and Walker, 2006a: 171–184). Feng (2006) showed that China and Taiwan leaders’ beliefs played a major role in the potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait crisis during the 2004 election crisis in Taiwan (Schaffer and Walker, 2006a: 151–170). Comparing Tony Blair’s belief system with Bill Clinton’s, Schaffer and Walker (2006b) supported the dyadic version of democratic peace, suggesting that conflict behaviour of democratic states relies upon their leaders’ calculations and beliefs in dealing with non-democracies. Renshon (2008) demonstrated that, while his new role between 2000 and 2008 tended to reinforce George W. Bush’s prior beliefs, his learning in office did not significantly influence his beliefs. Rather, what changed his beliefs was the trauma of September 11, 2001 attacks in New York (Prades, 2019: 10-11). I used operational code analysis to identify major discursive lines regarding Islam, security, and identity in the public debates in each national context. However, I did not analyze belief systems as such, since I relied on public discourse rather than sociological interviews.

It is possible to distinguish between inductive and deductive content analysis, depending on whether coding categories are inferred by the text, or rather defined a priori by the researcher. To keep the narrative idiosyncrasy of each discourse, I first proceeded to conduct a fine and deep discourse analysis, coding precisely each discourse item. This allowed me to provide an exhaustive analysis of each actor under study, to identify their evolution in time and nuances of political positioning within the same trend. This reconstruction applied individually to each actor helped prevent generalization. In my case, I proceeded to an inductive fine-grained coding, going as far as 1000 codes per national discursive space, for a relatively small amount of text. The aim

is to provide a detailed discursive map of processes of (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims in each national context, which requires to unravel complex discursive articulations, nuances, implicit, and explicit specific to each context. Therefore, the refinement of variables is more important than the number of texts: the greater the variables, the finer the analysis.

First, the way security, identity, and Islam are linked in discourse does not rest on the number of texts of which the link is composed but rather how the relationship is articulated. The degree of securitization can be assessed through the extent to which it is shared across actors and political positioning, rather than the number of texts that are concerned with such securitization. The discourse analysis provided in the present dissertation appears at times opposed to “classical” critical discourse analysis (CDA) that has few code frames applied to a large amount of text. This goes with deductive coding, aiming at testing a particular hypothesis with a clear causal perspective (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Complex coding however, makes comparison impossible. First, within a national context, 1000 variables make the results of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) hard to interpret. Second, it makes it impossible to find clear structures of opposition and to provide synthetic results. Thus, I have opted for a midpoint between complex coding and CDA and it is for this reason I regroup these variables into aggregate variables to reduce the total number of variables and simplify the analysis. For example, while I distinguished between labels such as international terrorism, terrorism, terror organizations, and terror attacks in the discourse analysis, I then collated them into a single variable [TERROR]. However, I maintained the distinction between [TERROR] and [ISLAMIC TERROR], as it is important to the research question. Similarly, I distinguished between Islamic fanatics/fanatism, fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, ideological threat, political Islam or Islamism and Islamists, as it informs about the essence given to the threat – religious or political, and on whether it targets an abstract movement or people. But I regrouped all these into three upper categories: [ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM], referring to religion, [ISLAMIC EXTREMISM], referring to political violence, and [ISLAMISM] referring to political Islam in general, with no special focus on violence. In summary, from more than 1000 variables to produce the qualitative discourse analysis of each actor, I narrowed down the number of variables to 250 for each European discursive context, to produce a discursive map of each context. Finally, I came down to about 124 common variables to produce a comparative discursive map of the three countries. These 3 steps allow reconciling idiosyncrasy and comparison, going from exhaustivity to ideal typing.

Then, I reconstructed the discourse analysis into meta-categories according to narrative analysis: *setting*, *characterization*, and *plot* (Ringmar, 1996; Spencer, 2016; Clément et al, 2017; Sangar et al., 2018).

The *setting* captures the environment or narrative background in which the actors see themselves evolving. This setting meta-category is subdivided in the codebook into rhetorical/tones and spatial-temporal horizon of experience. The *characterization* of the self/other nexus captures the “in-group”, i.e. dominant identities and roles the actor identifies with, the imagined community as well as the ideal society s.he stands for, and the “out-group”, ie. the dominant identities and roles the actors reject and are subdivided into opponents (political) and enemies (existential). The *plot* captures how these characters evolve in a problem/solution nexus. It delimits challenges and threats to the self and solutions offered to overcome them. This is the securitizing “moment” where the actors designate the dangers faced by the imagined community, attribute responsibility, present the urgency to change, and delimit the terms of collective action.

Table 2. Extract of Codebook at the level of main category, category and code

Meta category	Category	Sub-category	Code
Setting	Rhetoric		<i>War-like</i>
			<i>Empathetic</i>
			<i>Didactical</i>
	Horizon of experience		<i>MENA</i>
			<i>Dark past</i>
			<i>Europe</i>
Characterization	In-group	Self	<i>Christian</i>
			<i>Conservative</i>
			<i>Democrat</i>
		Friends and allies	<i>the US</i>
			<i>Britain</i>
			<i>North-Africa</i>
	Out-group		<i>Islamists</i>
			<i>Liberals</i>
			<i>The Government</i>
Plot	Challenge		<i>Globalization</i>
			<i>Europeanization</i>
			<i>Immigration</i>
	Solutions		<i>Military intervention</i>
			<i>Border control</i>
			<i>Diplomacy</i>


I coded the entire corpus manually by units of sense. I used two programs to perform the narrative analysis. First, I used the qualitative analysis software Nvivo to code the text into variables. Illustration 1 below displays the coding process on Nvivo. At the beginning of the coding process, I encountered some issues. Since narrative codes are based on ideal types, the coder ponders for each unit of meaning, which code is most appropriate and whether more than one code could be applicable. Units of meaning present several codes simultaneously, especially if they belong to different main categories. When a unit of meaning potentially

refers to several codes belonging to the same category, I either chose the one that prevailed in the given context or I assigned several codes to it, when it was impossible to assess the prevalence of one over the other. For example, regarding the following quote of Theresa May in 2015, I coded it both to the meta-category of setting, the subcategory of tone, the code *emotional*, and to that of plot, subcategory challenges, and codes “Syria” and “the EMC”:

The plight of so many Syrian refugees who have been left homeless and whose lives have been shattered is simply heart wrenching. They have experienced things most of us cannot begin to comprehend. Many have seen their friends and family killed. Others have suffered terrible injury and trauma. Most have lost the prosperity and security they once enjoyed. As the Syrian crisis has grown over the past four years, Her Majesty’s Government have done—and will continue to do—everything we can to help those in immediate need. I hope the whole House will join me in sending a message of welcome to those refugees who will soon be arriving in this country and I commend the statement to the House (May, 2015).

I tested the codebook on part of the corpus manually and refined it. This preliminary test revealed that some codes were irrelevant because they occurred only once in the whole corpus, so I removed them. In any case, qualitative coding remains an interpretative exercise, which is not infallible. The units of sense were coded manually, in context, but it is possible that misinterpretations crept in.

Illustration 1. Coding narrations of Islam, identity, and security in Nvivo



After coding each text of each corpus, I exported a double-entry table of encoding intersections between codes and narrators’ discourses (table 3). I then used the software Rstudio to produce a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The principle of multiple correspondence analysis consists in finding the eigenvectors of the variance-covariance matrix, that is, the axes that contain most of the information regarding the correlations between the covariates. Hence, the first principal plane provides the best two-dimensional

approximation of the data (Bonneuil and Auriat, 2000: 567). In other words, a MCA consists in representing a population of statistical individuals in a Euclidean plane expressed in a scatterplot (see illustration 2). It is as if we were cutting this scatterplot to find the two-dimensional plane on which an orthogonal projection would best preserve the distances between the points. To reveal the structure of the population studied, the analysis then relies on both the two dimensions of the plane and the distances between the points resulting from the projection (Martin-Mazé, 2016). By analogy with a questionnaire, individuals who give the same answers are close in the projected space, while those who give different answers are further apart. In our case, narrators who mobilize the same narratives tend to be close in the projected space while those who do not are further apart. In addition, MCAs help to identify the most important questions. The dimensions in fact synthesise the most structuring variables, i.e. the narratives that produce the largest share of the distance between points. Projecting the first two dimensions on an orthogonal plan synthesizes the more structuring narratives. However, reducing the projection to a 2D scatterplot, i.e. reducing the narrative analysis to two dimensions only, is double-edged: on the one hand, it allows a clear visualisation and renders the interpretation of the data easier; on the other hand, it results in information loss on co-variations, since an MCA produces many more dimensions. In other words, if we were to project more than two dimensions, we could find unexpected co-variations and learn more about the corpus under study, although the interpretation would be much more difficult.


Hence, applied to discourse analysis, MCA makes it possible to identify precisely which narratives are mobilized or can be mobilized in a given political field: what is possible, adequate, consensual, or marginal in order to position oneself as a political actor. It also, and simultaneously, demonstrates how these narratives are distributed among the narrators. Further, the dimensions exhumed by the MCAs give valuable indication on the opposition that characterize a social space, in this instance, that of public discourse. At each end of the axis, there are discourses/actors that are relatively marginal in relation to the statistical population under consideration, but which are completely opposed regarding the most structuring dimensions of space (e.g. Jonathan Bartley and Gerard Batten in the British discursive space, see figure 2 of chapter 5) . The narrative cleavages make sense in the light of these structural oppositions. In short, the MCA allows us to obtain a fine architecture of discourses and to see clear nodal points around which public discourses are structured, whether they are divisive or consensual.

Table 3. Extract from data's table before running the MCA

	IN-GROUP								
	SELF								
	Anti-racist	Atheist	British Muslim	Christian	Conservative	Democrat	Enlightened	EU	Feminist
BARTLEY	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no
BATTEN	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no
CABLE	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
CAMERON	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no	yes
CHAMPION	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
CLEGG	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no
COCHRANE	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
CORBYN	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no
EVANS	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
FARAGE	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no
GRAYLING	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
HITCHEN	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
JOHNSON	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no	no
KAVANAGH	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no
KHAN	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes
MALIK	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
MAY	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
PEARSON	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes
SMITH	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes
WARSI	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
WELBY	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no
WOMACK	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes

Finally, after coding narratives and reconstructing settings, characterizations, and plots, I tested the securitization hypothesis. Following Bourbeau's remark (2011), securitization is often taken for granted, rather than proved. Therefore, I searched for co-occurrence of security discourse and/or identity discourse with the targeting of Islam and Muslim communities, which indicated a securitization process.

Illustration 2. Running an MCA on Rstudio



In doing so, I refined the hypothesis by analytically differentiating between processes of *politicization* and that of *securitization*: the former problematizes an object as an issue to be debated in the public space, while the latter is a construction of an object as a security issue, which is not to be debated, but rather fought. Then, to stick to the European security studies agenda, I differentiated between the nature of the threat, or more precisely, the “threatening” aspect of the object highlighted in discourses (religious, ideological, cultural, etc). Those qualifications rest on narrative nuances mentioned earlier, such as differences between the threat designation of Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, and Islamism. Thirdly, I also differentiated between referents of security, i.e., national security, national identity, national economy, etc. This methodological approach resulted in three national codebooks of narrating Islam, identity, and security, conserving historical idiosyncrasy and language specificities. Finally, I draw a global codebook composed of all comparable variables between the three cases, which can be seen as the narrative common toolkit of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslim in Britain, France, and Germany.

Summary

A narrative theory of securitization implies four steps. First, one needs to identify the subject of interest, here the discourses on Islam in relation to security and identity. Second, one must decide the realm of analysis, for example, the news media or speeches by the political elite as well as the timeframe. Third, one must identify the settings, characterizations, and plots, which are then used to structure the analysis of the material selected. In practice, the text material selected is dissected into individual words or phrases, which fit

into the three categories. Following several rounds of dissection, the researcher will start to gain an insight into the dominance of certain representations within each category. Finally, one identifies the main and dominant elements found in the texts and engages to retell the story by using the quotes as a collage. This methodology to study stories of (de)securitization is still experimental. It aims at bridging narratology and securization theory to provide discursive maps of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims in public discourse in Britain, France, and Germany.

Investigating narrative securitizations provides better understandings of continuity and stability in representations³⁹. Representations have a long history and take on renewed vigour according to exogenous events such as the Islamic revolution, the 9/11 or the “Arab Spring”, or endogenous events, such as terror attacks. To that matter, it is important to bear in mind that the securitization process rests on already established grids of intelligibility. Securitizing narratives should not be read a priori as ruptures in response to extraordinary circumstances but, rather, be questioned in the *long-durée*. Historical master frames do exist and are expressions of imagined communities and collective identities that can be empirically analysed through narrative analysis. According to this view, studying the securitization of Islam and Muslims requires first to investigate the original set of historical experiences that define how a given society views these objects, without undermining the competitive views among different groups. Hence, the following chapter will set the stories of (de)securitization into historical perspective by offering a contextualization of the interaction between the three European cases and Islam in the *longue durée*.

³⁹ For example, the French perception of Muslims as “non-assimilable”, Islam as “incompatible” with the French Republic can be traced back to the time of French eastern policy, when competing with Germany and Great Britain for the controlling of the Mediterranean Sea. Conversely, the paternalistic “romantic” representation of the Arab seems strongly embedded in British imaginary and can be traced back during the same period, crystallising British interests in the Middle East along with its representations of the region.

Chapter 3 - Embedding (Hi)stories: German, British, and French interactions with Islam from the 19th century to contemporary times

Before investigating contemporary discourses on Islam, security, and identity, the constructivist perspective invites the researcher to contextualize the specific relations between the three Western European powers under study, that are Britain, Germany, and France, and “Islam”. To aide in the contextualization, I will parse out the common usage of some ambiguous terms such as as “Islam”, the “Orient”, the “Middle East”, or “Muslims”, which do not cover any fixed and objective realities. “Islam” is “part fiction, part ideological label, part minimal designation of a religion called Islam” (Said, 1997), and relates therefore to a fantasized and imagined entity, in-between religion, culture, and civilization. The “Orient” and the “Middle East” both relate to a blurry region moving according to each specific European geostrategic interest in the former Ottoman Empire and beyond. Both terms refer to different conceptions and designs according to time and space. Finally, “Muslims” is also a blurry and evolving category, referring to religious, sometimes cultural, or again ethnic designations.

Hence, from a historical perspective, the present chapter will expose some key moments starting at the turn of the 20th century, when, after the unification of Germany, European powers competed for the control of the Mediterranean, to the turn of the 21st century, when what was coined the “Muslim question” or “the Muslim problem” started inflaming public debates in Western Europe. Such historical explorations follow Edward Said’s assumption according to which:

Imperialism did not end, did not suddenly become “past”, once decolonisation had set in motion the dismantling of the classical empires. A legacy of connections still binds countries like Algeria and India to France and Britain respectively. A vast new population of Muslims, Africans and West Indians from former colonial territories now resides in metropolitan Europe; even Italy, Germany and Scandinavia today must deal with these dislocations, which are to a large degree the result of imperialism and decolonisation as well as expanding European population. (Said, 1993: 282)

Each of the three European powers has experienced a peculiar encounter with what was then called “the Orient” at the turn of the 20th century. The British imperial and French colonial expansions are well acknowledged in the historiography. The former was best embodied by the creation of the “Middle East” to secure the Indian Raj (Crouzet, 2015), while the latter was centered on the preservation of domination in Algeria. The German case is less well documented, notably in France, as historiography often disregarded German activities in the Ottoman Empire as part of European imperialism.

Hence, in the first section of this chapter, I will draw on each European imperial and colonial interaction with the Orient to demonstrate that each Great Power had its own “style for dominating

restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1979: 3), and that Germany was among them. The second section will expose the competing Eastern policies between Germany, Britain, and France in the Ottoman Empire. The last section will present how such imperial experiences resulted in the shaping of the “Muslim question” in each country during the post-war period.

Section 1. Contrasting representations of the Orient in 19th century Western Europe

Before Napoleon Bonaparte’s expedition in 1798, the representation of “the Orient” was linked both to the negative memory of the Crusades, and to the fantastic universe of the *One Thousand and One Nights*, translated by the Frenchman Antoine Galland in 1704. At this time, “oriental” peoples were more or less undifferentiated, between Turks, Arabs, Mohammedans and Moors, perceived through the prism of Turkish domination. This vision remained common in Europe, without much national specificity. However, after the expedition to Egypt in 1798, which was the first founding interaction between Europe and the East since the Crusades, narrative productions *of* and *on* the Orient changed. It ceased to be a homogeneous monolith and rather became specific to each national experience with the region, in a fierce struggle for control of the Mediterranean according to antagonistic strategic interests. In the present chapter, I will successively present German, British, and French singular *orientalisms* in the 19th from a comparative perspective. Since the historiography on British and French orientalism is better furnished than German orientalism, I will purposefully review the German case more deeply than the two others, to ensure understanding on the inclusion of Germany in this study, despite the fact that the German case is often disregarded because its domination and imperialism manifests less explicitly than the French or British cases.

1.1. An Islam-oriented Orientalism among German Romantics

The acknowledgement of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire is important to this dissertation as it allows the qualification of Said’s exclusion of Germany from its study on *Orientalism* (1978). While he clearly identified the particular commitment of the French and British powers in the East in relation to any other world power (Said, 2003: 4), he excluded Germany from his conceptualization, as it has not, according to him, established a colonial relationship with the Orient:

Yet, at no time in German scholarship during the first two thirds of the 19th century could a close partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained *national* [en italiques dans le texte] interest in the Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa (Said, 2003: 19).

Because orientalism was a will to know and a will to govern linked to national interest, and since Germany did not have a national nor a material interest in the “Orient” until its unification and the advent of

the Wilhelmina so-called *Weltpolitik* in the end of the 19th, Said's assertion was considered to be correct. However, some scholars such as Kontje (2004), Le Marchand (2007), or Almond (2010) have since reintegrated Germany into European modern orientalism. According to Kontje, Germany was in search of national identity and national interest oscillating between joining the West and joining forces with some of the East against the West and thus developed a peculiar orientalism in-between Eurocentrism and anti-Westernism, as a means to "overcome their sense of cultural and political subordination to other European powers, suggesting that although they had neither nation nor empire, they nevertheless belonged to modern European civilization" (Kontje, 2004: 2-5). Almond also contended that the form of German orientalism in comparison to British or French orientalism is historically specific. He argues that Protestant antipathy to Rome colored the orientalist responses of German thinkers to an enemy's enemy, however erratically (Almond, 2010: 165). As a matter of fact, German romantic orientalism gave a prominent place to Islam. German Romantic exploration was somehow reactive to Western humanism embodied by the French Revolution. German Romantics, sensitive to the "decline of the West" symbolised by the development of industry and science, turned to what they considered the Golden Age of humanity, that is to say its primitive, artistic, and religious expressions in the East. Some of the great names of German-speaking Romanticism can be mentioned here: Lessing, Reiske, Herder, Rückert, von Arnim.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1791), a famous critic and playwright of the 18th century, made Sultan Saladin a symbol of tolerance in his doctrine against religious dogmatism. He called for more tolerance towards Islam, thus preparing the Protestant theologian Herder to write so impartially in his "Idea on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind"⁴⁰ (Mommsen, 1964: 7). His friend, Johann Jakob Reiske (1716-1774), a pioneer of Byzantine and Arabic philology and Muslim numismatics, was also the first orientalist in Germany to carry out research out of pure enthusiasm for Islamic culture and not from a Christian theological point of view with the intention of refuting the Koran. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), poet, theologian, and philosopher, disciple of Kant and mentor of Goethe, recognized the Koran as a revealed book equal to the Bible. Friedrich Rückert (1788-1866), poet and orientalist, composed the most beautiful translation of the Koran. Bettina von Arnim (1785-1859), a romantic short story writer and friend of Goethe's, devoted her last work, *Conversations with Demons*⁴¹, to the spirit of Islam and the Ottoman Emperor. Hence, in the discourse of these German-speaking Romantics, the East seemed therefore to refer to an Other reflecting the vices and inadequacy of the West as part of a reasoned criticism of modernity:

⁴⁰ "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit".

⁴¹ "Gespräche mit Dämonen"

Is it any wonder, then, that German Romanticism dreams of enrolling the rediscovered East in a vast campaign against the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution? (Gérard, 1963: 1).

The enthusiasm for Islam reached its fullest expression with Goethe's work. At the age of 23, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) wrote a poem in praise of Muhammad, and then, at the age of 70, he publicly declared that he considered "devoutly celebrating that night when the entire Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet from heaven" (cited in Mommsen, 1964: 5). In the meantime, in a pre publication of the "East-West Divan"⁴², he stated that he could not deny the allegation that the author of such work was himself a Muslim. Inspired by Leibniz, Lessing, and Herder, Goethe approached the Koran in a rational way⁴³ and without colonial prejudice. First of all, he was touched by the linguistic beauty of the Koran, the personality of Mohammed who spread the message of God not only by word but also by sword, and also found in the doctrine of the oneness of God (*at-tawhîd*) a particular resonance to his veneration of nature. He also found in Islam an alternative to the dogmatism of the Church towards a syncretism:

The idea of unity in diversity appears to be the foundation upon which Goethe builds his encounter with the Orient - one in which the conceptual roots for this model of *Weltliteratur* are to be found (Yomb, 2009: 98).

As Peter-Anton von Armin wrote in his afterword to Katharina Mommsen's *Goethe und der Islam*, Goethe's view of the East was free of colonial covetousness. The Germanic world was not yet that power aspiring to become an imperial power on a par with Britain and France. German-Islamic relations were not tinged with intimacy or hostility, but rather with a certain inclination that remained for a long time abstract and off-ground. According to Said, the particularity of the German-speaking world lies in its exclusively literary relationship with the East in the 19th century:

[T]he German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli, or Nerval (Said, 2003: 19).

But Said overlooked the changes in German relations to the Orient, which occurred in the 19th century with the unification and the rise of Imperial Germany in 1871 and its *Weltpolitik*. From the end of the 19th century on, Germany possessed "real" Oriental references prompting the development of concrete policies. By 1900, the German empire ruled approximately 3 million Muslims in its East African colonial territories, the north of Cameroon, and Togo (Schulze, 2000: 25).

More importantly, the *Kaiserreich* developed an Eastern policy, an ambivalent *Islampolitik*, as we shall see in section 2. At that time, leading figures of German orientalism such as Carl Heinrich Becker, Martin

⁴² "Westöstlicher Diwan".

⁴³ Mohamed Soffar, "Goethe and Islam", Tabah Foundation, UEA, Source: https://www.academia.edu/13900694/Goethe_and_Islam

Hartmann, and Georg Westermann, concluded that more information on Islam and Muslims was needed. Therefore, with the help of the Colonial Office, investigations on Islam were launched around 1910 to obtain first-hand information about the cultural, social, economic, and religious life of the Muslims. Scholars intended to find out how far Islam had spread in German Africa, how many forms of Islam were present, how significant Middle Eastern and Arab influences were and, finally, whether or not Islam and Muslims were a threat to German rule. Consequently, Oriental studies developed in German universities (Wokoeck, 2013), addressing the need to train civil servants working in Africa with Muslim populations for which the Colonial Institute of Hamburg was founded in 1908 where Carl Heinrich Becker, the father of modern Islamic studies in Germany, held the first chair of Oriental history and culture (Schwanitz, 2004). Thus, the Kaiser's *Weltpolitik* oriented toward the Ottoman Empire, together with the colonial and missionary presence in Africa, led to a fierce debate about the nature and position of Islam in German Orientalist circles at the turn of the 20th century.

On the one hand, German colonial policies were perceived with anxiety within some German Christian missions in Africa, which tended to consider Islam as a potential threat to German colonies and their evangelization. On the other, some orientalists such as Becker argued that the interests of the colonial state were not the same as those of the Christian missions and declared in the 1910 Colonial Congress that Islam was not a threat to colonial government but should be treated as an ally. The supposed dangers of Islam, such as fanaticism, fatalism, or the Holy War, were, according to him, exaggerated. Moreover, although he viewed Islam as backwards in comparison to German culture, Becker made a distinction between classical Islam and popular Islam, the former being viewed approvingly, in line with the German romantics' idealizations, while the latter perceived as a degenerated form. Becker concluded that the "danger of Islam" would fade away through a colonial implementation of a westerner and non-confessional education.

To sum up, a combination of increased contact with the Ottoman Empire, literary Romanticism, and early thought about national identity resulted in a specific relation to Islam in the German-speaking world during the 19th century (Gülalp and Seufert, 2013: 9-10). Furthermore, Edward Said regretted not paying enough attention to German Orientalist scholar growth during the 19th century. Although influential German-speaking romanticism and German scholar orientalism could not be compared to the British or the French structural orientalism as conceptualized by Said, it shared the "kind of intellectual authority over the Orient within western culture" (Said, 2003: 19). In the end, German Islam-oriented romanticism transformed at the end of the 19th century with the rise of imperial Germany and its *Weltpolitik*, when Germany possessed "real" Oriental references prompting the development of concrete policies (see section 2.1.).

1.2. An Arab-oriented Orientalism among British travellers

England had defeated Napoleon, evicted France; what the English mind surveyed [passing through the Near Orient] was an imperial domain which by the 1880s had become an unbroken patch of British-held territory, from the Mediterranean to India. To write about Egypt, Syria, or Turkey, as much as travelling in them, was a matter of touring the realm of political will, political management, political definitions (Said, 2003: 169).

As early as the 17th century, the British traveller George Sandy introduced in his *Relation of a Journey* (1610), the notion of an Arab “nation”, different from the Turks and eager for independence. But it was really from the end of the 18th century, with the French Revolution, the expedition to Egypt, and the beginning of European imperial projections to the East, that such a narrative spread in Britain. The translation of the *One Thousand and One Nights* by the Frenchman Antoine Galland in 1704 crystallised and rooted the visions disseminated by travellers and merchants in the 16th and 17th centuries. With the gradual economic and political conquest of India and the growing development of trade with the Levant, the British were in permanent connection with the East that gradually became subject to the Anglo-Indian imperative of securing the route to India. This participated in the unification and specification of the British perception of the “Arabs” with respect to the other peoples of the East. A more nuanced and romantic vision of the Arab began to emerge among travellers and scientists. Still perceived as relatively savage and thieving, they became to be depicted as a superior civilization opposed to the Turks, with three virtues recurrent among observers: nobility, hospitality, and independence.

Among the many observers of the time, let us focus on Thomas Assad’s (2016) *Three Victorian Travellers: Burton, Blunt, Doughty*⁴⁴, since, taken together, the views of Burton, Blunt, and Doughty are fairly representative of the late-Victorian representations on the Arab world, which later impacted those of T.E. Lawrence and its role in British policy in the region.

Sir Richard Burton (1821-1890), nicknamed Burton of Arabia, was a true admirer of the desert and a fervent defender of the Arabs against the prejudices of European explorers. Cradled in his childhood by the *One Thousand and One Nights*, he was passionate about adventure and danger, and eager to escape from puritan Victorian England. He found in the Arab of the desert all the chivalrous virtues he valued: virility, honour, and freedom. This romanticization of the figure of the Arab of the desert went hand in hand with a strong sense of British interests in the Middle East. He praised and supported the independence of the Arabs as long as they revolted against the Ottoman power and remained conciliatory towards Britain. Compared to

⁴⁴ Thomas J. Assad (2016), *Three Victorian Travellers: Burton, Blunt, Doughty*, New-York, Routledge.

its predecessors, Burton adopted a rather positive view of Islam that “systematically exalts human nature, which Christianity takes infinite trouble to degrade and debase” (cited in Assad, 2016: 39).

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840-1922) developed in his youth an interest in oppressed peoples, including the Arabs, especially in Egypt where he spent his life, dressed, and spoke as a native. According to him, while the Arabs of the city were vicious because of their tyrannical Turkish rulers, Arabs of the desert lived by the triptych “liberty, equality, fraternity”. Blunt denounced Burton’s self-interested sympathy for the Arabs and militated against British imperialism in the East, starting with the British occupation of Egypt. He took up the cause of the Egyptian fellahins and befriended Arabi Pasha. In his *The Future of Islam*, he echoed Muslim reformists, considering that the Arabs would achieve their political independence through the revitalization of Islam.

Finally, Charles Montagu Doughty (1843-1926) was passionate about oriental antiquities and biblical studies. He is considered the most “objective” and dispassionate of his time regarding the Orient. In his *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, he did not praise Arabs as exotic and described the desert as a remote, silent, and desolate place. Doughty portrayed a rather positive view of the Bedouins of the desert, as a noble and generous people with a “natural humanity”, without ever assimilating to them, claiming his English and Christian identities. As Thomas Assad concluded, “Burton’s view of the Arab was too grotesque; Blunt’s too ornate, too sentimental; and Doughty’s, too pure, too simple, too harsh” (Assad, 2016).

Even if such visions were fluctuating, particularly in the wake of geopolitical upheavals, they remained part of a romantic background rather sympathetic toward the Arabs of the Desert or the Bedouins. “(M)ost of the favourable attitudes the British had towards the Arabs” writes Sari J. Nasir, “were directly related to their love of the desert and their admiration of the Bedouin. They considered the desert to be ‘clean’ and saw the Bedouin as a free aristocrat who in the face of adversity bravely held on to his values and way of life” (Nasir, 1976: 161). Such romantic visions of the Arab influenced T.E. Lawrence, one of the principal instigators of the British imperial Eastern policy at the beginning of the 20th century (see section 2.2.).

1.3. A civilizational crusade against Islam among French orientalists

In contrast [with Britain], the French Pilgrim was imbued with a sense of acute loss in the Orient. (...). The Mediterranean echoed with the sounds of French defeats, from the Crusades to Napoleon. What was to become known as ‘la mission civilisatrice’ began in the 19th century as a political second best to Britain’s presence. Consequently, France pilgrims from Volney on planned and projected for, imagined, ruminated about places that were principally in their minds (Said, 2003: 169).

French Orientalism rested primarily on a set of collective representations created and conveyed by influential personalities, such as *philosophe des Lumières* Montesquieu, romantic traveller and writer Chateaubriand or scholars like Alexis de Tocqueville and Ernest Renan.

The French oriental imagination is indebted to Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721) and his *The Spirit of the Law* (1748), which later influenced French literature and scholarship and are still central in the teaching of the *Esprit des Lumières* in French contemporary syllabus, in which despotism became an exclusively oriental characteristic, and a typical counter-model of the ideal government prescribed to France (Vinson, 2004: 77). It introduced the idea that fanaticism and religious intolerance were peculiar to Islam. In the eyes of the French Enlightenment, Montesquieu, Volney, and Voltaire, the perceived archaism and decline of Islamic civilization could only be explained by the failure of its political government and the structure of its religion. Islam then appeared as the archetype of religion that concentrated and amplified all the defects of the historical religions. Although the thinkers of the Enlightenment could no longer mobilize the spirit of the Crusades because of its religious connotation, it remained the backdrop for some of the leading figures of French literature.

The 1798 expedition of Egypt triggered a new curiosity for Islam in the French bourgeois audience, which would be renewed by the landing of the French army in Algeria (Lorcerie, 2006: 509-510). For example, Chateaubriand's *Itinerary from Paris to Jerusalem* (1811) was set in a context of alignment between the French Emperor and the Sublime Porte, to the detriment of Russia, which displeased Chateaubriand, a russophile haunted by the mediaeval image of the Crusades. His sharp criticism of the Turks echoed that of Napoleon's politics and despotism (Catel, 2007). According to Gilles Veinstein (2006), Chateaubriand did not condemn the Turks as individuals but denounced their political system based on Islam and despotism, understood as proper oriental characteristics. Chateaubriand developed hostile narratives towards Islam in specificity. Sarga Moussa (2006) shows how the category of "race" is not operative in the *Itinerary* in contrast to Chateaubriand's systematically opposition prefers between Islam and Christianity. His criticism of Islam seems linked to the memory of the Crusades, which he praises in the *Genius of Christianity* (1802), making the Muslims the aggressors and the Christians the victims. Despite different categories of otherness, Islam concentrates the most hostile narratives and represents the absolute enemy of the West (Catel, 2007). Although Chateaubriand's criticism aimed at targeting French Emperor Napoleon, his work participated in spreading hostile narratives of Islam. The encounter of French Romantics with Islam was tinged with a return to the past, judging either archaism or the decline of the East through the sole prism of Islam. The colonial

period, and more precisely the Third Republic, sedimented this discourse in France, according to historian Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison (2019).

Scholars such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Guy de Maupassant, or Ernest Renan developed a hostile discourse within such prestigious institutions as the *Collège de France*, the *Sorbonne* and the *École libre des sciences politiques*. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville became one of the main speakers on the question of French colonisation in Algeria. He considered that, by its very nature, Islam had turned its back on progress and democracy and was therefore condemned to be dominated by Christian civilisation, which had rightfully separated the spiritual and the temporal orders since the Renaissance (Tocqueville, 2003). Tocqueville considered the confusion between the religious and the political spheres as the first cause of despotism and social stagnation. Thus, 18th and 19th century French orientalism was characterized by a rejection of “despotic” and “barbaric” Islam. The status of France as the eldest daughter of the Church remained in the background and positioned Islam as an immutable enemy. As the religious justification of the Crusades faded, it gave way to France’s civilizing mission in the ignorant East.

In such context, Ernest Renan’s theorization, often considered the French orientalist *par excellence*, came into play in the 1860s and 1880s. Renan was not an expert in Islamic studies, but was interested in Islam as a stage, supposedly over, in the development of the human spirit. During his 1862 inaugural course at the *Collège de France*, he stated: “Islam is the most complete negation of Europe”⁴⁵. And, when debating with al-Afghani, Renan claimed that Islam was “the heaviest chain that humanity has ever worn”⁴⁶. By repeating these ideas throughout his career, Renan provided the hostility towards Islam a modern theoretical form and political content. The image of a anti-scientific, anti-liberal, and anti-secular Islam was to become a public standard so that historian Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison identified as “Renanism” the theses relating to the inferiority, harmfulness and dangerousness of Islam (Le Cour Grandmaison, 2019). According to him, these have had a lasting effect on the social sciences and the law applied to colonialism.

Faced with the French orientalists, Islam suffered from a “double marginality” (Djaït, 1978: 51). Invoking their attachment sometimes to Christianity, sometimes to secularism and reason, they accused Islam either of spiritual deficiency or of theocratic rigidity, reaffirming, at the same time, their identity either as Christian, French, or civilized. Such hostility toward Islam reinforced and was fuelled by the French

⁴⁵ “De la part des peuples sémitiques dans l’histoire de la civilisation”, opening speech of the Hebrew, Chaldaic and Syriac language course at the Collège de France, 21 February 1862, in: Henriette Psichari (ed.) (1948), *Œuvres complètes de Ernest Renan*, Paris, Calmann Lévy, t. II, p. 332-333.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

geostrategic need to secure the Levant and Algeria against both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism at the turn of the 20th century (see section 2.3.).

Summary

This section explored how European contrasting geostrategic interests in the East since the 1798 expedition in Egypt fuelled different representations of Oriental populations and Islam. On the one hand, Germany had little direct contact with the East until the end of the 19th century when, with the advent of the Reich, it pursued a policy of alliance between the Central Empires and the Sublime Porte. Its relationship with the East therefore remained academic and literary for a long time. Oriental languages attracted philologists and Islam fascinated both the orientalism of Johann Jakob Reiske and Friederich Rückert, and the romanticism of Goethe. The absence of German colonial aim in the Orient coupled with its antagonisms with Western European powers fuelled an off-ground orientalism, which later influenced Kaiser Wilhelm II's policy of "distant ties" with the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War (McMurray, 2001). On the other hand, the Anglo-Indian Empire, haunted by the threat of French imperialism – real or perceived – was trying to protect the direct route to India, starting with an informal imperialism in the Gulf, between punitive expeditions and political alliances. The East was no longer confined to the Ottoman Empire but narrowed around the romantic figure of the Arab of the desert, against a pejorative vision of the corrupted Levantine, symbol of French influence in the region. It manifested into an Arab-oriented orientalism colored with cultural paternalism. Finally, in France, from 1798 on, Bonaparte's expedition imposed an unequal relationship of military, scientific, and later colonial domination. The conquest of Algeria in 1830 was to accentuate certain mistrust towards Islam, which had emerged from the Crusades. Islam was increasingly perceived as both culturally antagonistic, either to Christianity or to the ideals of the Enlightenment, and strategically dangerous for France's colonial interests in North Africa. This manifested into an orientalism hostile to Islam. These antagonistic perceptions of and interests in the Middle East nourished competing Eastern policies between the three rival European powers at the turn of the 20th century, as I shall expose in the next section.

Section 2. *La Question d'Orient* at the turn of the 20th century: competing Eastern policies between Imperial Germany, the British Empire, and colonial France

The Eastern policies of Britain, Imperial Germany, and France were shaped, in part, by what was called the "*Question d'Orient*" in the end of 19th century. In the years 1890-1920, a pivotal period marking the

transition from the concert of nations to a new world order established on the debris of the central empires, this “*question d’Orient*” manifested into an *Islampolitik* turned against European colonial powers in Imperial Germany (2.1.), an Arabic policy aimed at securing the Indian Raj in the British Empire (2.2.), and a Levantine policy aimed at securing its domination in North Africa in colonial France (2.3.).

2.1. The German *Islampolitik* against European colonial powers

Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had understood that there could be no colonial expansion without a powerful navy, had looked around the world for customers for German industry [...]. With an imagination that revealed a kind of genius, he had adopted a Muslim policy: from Morocco to Lebanon, he had given himself the role of protector of the Islamic states that were gradually absorbed by the colonial enterprises of France, England or Russia (Driault, 1898: 406).

The historiography on German *Weltpolitik*⁴⁷, and more precisely on its *Orientpolitik* since the Wilhelmina period, is generally less well provided than that on French *politique coloniale* or the British Empire, and almost nonexistent in French historiography. Moreover, the Wilhelmina *Weltpolitik* has often been studied from the perspective of understanding how German foreign policy led to the First World War, but rarely been considered and analyzed as the German version of European imperialism. Yet, the diplomacy of the late 19th century was marked by the sudden arrival of a new great power within a few years. Upon Bismarck’s retirement, Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed the *Weltpolitik* in 1897. From then on, the German Empire claimed its “place in the sun”⁴⁸.

The question of the nature of German *Weltpolitik* in the Orient has been dividing historians and internationalist researchers. On the one hand, historians such as Edwin Meade Earle have interpreted German *Orientpolitik* toward the Ottoman Empire as part of its *Kolonialreich*, according to which pan-German chauvinism pushed German expansion eastward (Earle, 1923). For the German historian Lothar Rathmann, Germany tried to subjugate the Ottoman Empire, not by force, but by indirect and capitalistic methods aimed at transforming the territory into vast German exploitation (Rathmann, 1962). “In a sense”, writes Rachel Mag Shamhràin, “(the Ottoman Empire) was a colony in all but name, and Germany’s political and economic activity nothing less than an *actio in distans* colonialism” (Hodkinson and Morrison, 2009: 146). And, British

⁴⁷ There are two main components to the *Weltpolitik*: the *Kolonialreich*, characterised by the acquisition of colonies in Africa, and the *Orientpolitik*, consisting mainly in the German-Ottoman rapprochement.

⁴⁸ “The rapid increase of our population, the unprecedented upswing of our industry, the efficiency of our merchants, in short, the enormous vitality of the German people have interwoven us into the world economy and drawn us into world politics. When the states of Greater Britain are rediscovering their Greater Britain, when Frenchmen are talking of a Nouvelle France, when Russians are in Asia, and when they are also looking to Germany’s larger countries (Bravo! right, laughter left), we are not at the bottom of the erosion, but at the bottom of the peaceful world of the United States of America’s handicapped and disadvantaged people”, Bernhard von Bülow, 1899.

historian Peter Hopkirk (1994) goes so far as to state that Kaiser Wilhelm II dreamed of a German Empire encompassing Central Asia, a dream fulfilled by his 1898 journey to the East.

On the other hand, the conventional literature, according to which the settlement of colonies is a requirement for the existence of imperialism and/or colonialism⁴⁹, tends to limit German expansionism, between the unification of the *Kaiserreich* in 1871 to the beginning of WWI in 1914, to its colonization of East Africa, the Pacific Islands, and China. According to them, German activity in the Ottoman Empire, while impressive, specifically failed to rise to the level necessary to constitute imperialism (McKale, 1998; Schöllgen, 1984; Wildenthal, 2001; Smith, 1996). However, according to Niles S. Illich, such a vision is “a relic of the eighteenth-century and, in the nineteenth-century, a poor test of imperial activity” (Illich, 2016: 2). According to him, it could be argued that Germany fits into Said’s understanding of imperialism as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory” (Said, 1993: 9), but that WWI prevented Germany from establishing formal colonies in the Ottoman Empire. This failure of German colonization does not however negate German imperialism of the earlier period as American Ambassador to Turkey Hans Morgenthau declared in 1915:

if Germany wins [the war], she will have such a preponderating position in this country [Turkey] that she [Germany] will practically govern Turkey (Morgenthau, 1915: 2).

One could therefore include German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire as a part of German expansionism. Although it did not establish any colony on the Sublime Porte’s territory, German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire conformed to a certain extent to the model of imperialism established by Britain in the middle of the 19th century⁵⁰. But, while historians of the British Empire acknowledge British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, “[t]he Kaiser’s dream of empire has mostly fallen down the memory hole, a victim both of the amnesia accorded history’s great losers and of its having been overlaid by the nihilistic horrors of Nazism” (McMeekin, 2010: 2). Yet, according to Illich, when considering the economical, political, military, educational, and cultural activities of the Germans in the Ottoman Empire, there is no doubt that Germany

⁴⁹ Conventionally, it is understood that colonialism means the acquisition of colonies and that a colonial policy leads to imperialism, which is traditionally understood as initially a protective policy for the colonies and then, in the nineteenth-century, an aggressive economic policy. In this generally accepted interpretation, colonialism must precede imperialism; while historians do not often call this “the British model,” it is too heavily dependent on the early imperial and colonial experiences of the British (and other early colonisers).

⁵⁰ In establishing an overland route between Gibraltar (1830) and Aden (1839), Britain forged a model of imperialism that would be followed by most of the other Western powers, except France. This model consisted in not formally colonising countries but only controlling in accordance to geostrategic interests. This model allowed the imposition of imperial power in the Ottoman Empire without jeopardising the balance of power.

adopted the British model of imperialism, although less successfully⁵¹, in the sense of Robinson and Gallagher's model of "the imperialism of free trade" (Robinson and Gallagher, 1953: 1-15)⁵². According to them, when the British had an option, they preferred not to move along Said's path from imperialism to colonialism. Formal colonial presence was only established when domestic political activity necessitated direct colonisation in the imperial territory⁵³. Hence, according to Illich, from the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) to the First World War, Germany became the principal political power in the Ottoman Empire (Illich, 2007: 170).

Going back further, relations between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe developed very slowly after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. However, as early as 1552, Sultan Suleyman tried to prompt Protestant German princes to revolt against the Pope and the Emperor. The spread of Protestantism is said to have benefited from the pressure exerted by the Ottomans on the Habsburgs (Inalcik, 2006: 120). In 1761, King Frederick II of Prussia recognized the value of concluding a military alliance with the Turks to repel Austria's advances during the Seven Years' War, paving the way for future interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Prussia. Half a century later, the Sublime Porte invited a delegation of Prussian military advisers led by Helmuth von Moltke to Istanbul in 1833, demonstrating Prussian loyalty to the Ottomans and leaving open the channels of communication between the two empires. Accordingly, in 1878, the new Sultan Abdulhamid was faced with bankruptcy and military inferiority and could trust neither the British nor the French, who constantly interfered in his affairs. British influence in the Ottoman Empire had flagged because British policymakers expected the Empire to collapse shortly. The annexation of Cyprus in 1878 and the

⁵¹ For a comparison between British and German imperialisms in the Ottoman Empire, see: N. S. Illich (2007), *German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Study*, (unpublished PhD Dissertation) (Texas A&M University), consulted on March the 21st, 2019, here: <https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2078/ILLICH-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

⁵² John Robinson and Ronald Gallagher coined the concept of "informal empire" in a landmark article "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, Second Series, 6, 1953: 1-15. They argued that the primary motive for British imperial expansion in the 19th century was political and aimed at the protection of India. According to them, British rulers set up a mode of indirect control of space through local agents. This contrasts with the views of Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, who argued that imperial expansion was mainly driven by economic reasons and strongly encouraged by London (see: Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, London: Pearson, 2001).

⁵³ Such "informal imperialism" manifested itself in the following ways: the exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions on another society against its will; the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organisation and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of the expanding economy; the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the expanding country; ^[SEP]the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political- economic alliance with the expanding power; the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China, in: Louis, William Roger (ed.). *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy*. New York: New Viewpoints Books, 1976: 3-5.

invasion of Egypt in 1882 ended the special relationship between London and Constantinople. An alliance with Russia seemed also impossible given the Russian ambition for the Straits as well as Russia's imperial adversities in Bulgaria (1885-1888) (Illich, 2007: 287). Finally, after the Prussian defeat of France (1870), Constantinople did not consider the French an adequate protector, for she had colonised significant portions of the Ottoman Empire and concluded a treaty with Russia. Hence, the Sultan believed that a partnership with Germany, sympathetic and non-corrupt, would solve both problems, and he hoped to build his besieged empire while preserving its territorial sovereignty on the model of Imperial Germany.

Before 1900, Bismarck laid the first foundations for German Eastern policy (Rich and Holstein, 1965). Although he declared in December 1876 that he had no interest in the Eastern Question, he intended to use it as a lever to secure Eastern Europe. In 1887, he had succeeded in establishing a Mediterranean agreement with Britain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy, and had signed the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. The era of German influence thus extended from the centre to the peripheries of the continent. But for Germany, whose Empire was formed very late in relation to the other European powers, this meant preserving the status quo through conflict mediation and without territorial conquest. There was thus an explicit difference in nature between the colonization of Africa (*Kolonialreich*) and the alliance relationship with Turkey (*Bundnis*), an economic policy aimed at a mutuality of advantages.

By renouncing the colonization of foreign territories, Germany promoted a cautious military policy with fewer opportunities for intervention. According to the historian Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, the young German nation used the Eastern Question to define and consolidate its own identity. He identified three pillars of Berlin's policy towards the Near and Middle East (Schwanitz, 2004). First, Berlin's *Orientpolitik* rested on the respect for and renunciation of territory claimed in the Ottoman Empire. Second, Bismarck used the Eastern Question as a proxy for his American and European policies, as a means of exerting pressure in Europe's disputes. However, since Berlin did not aspire to colonies, Germany was able to position itself as a mediator. Thus, an inclination for Germany grew among those of the Ottoman elites who sought their national freedom. The third pillar was therefore based on mediating through a critical attitude towards empires, and on sympathy for the nationalists who expressed anti-colonialism through Islam.

Consequently, an opportunity developed for the newly established Germany to assert itself in the Ottoman Empire. German influence in the Ottoman Empire addressed strategic interests, such as providing a presence in the Suez Canal, while adjusting to the developing framework of *Weltpolitik* that most among the German ruling elite advocated. The *Weltpolitik* was not limited to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Yet, "[t]he Kaiser's vision", writes Sean McMeekin, "was the most romantic, and arguably the most sympathetic, of all of (...)

imperial projects. The subjects he wished to push into the modern age were not primitive tribesmen, but the once-great peoples of the Near East, whose ancestors had given the world writing, Abrahamic religion, democracy, philosophy and science... Germany would build her own economic empire in the very cradle of Western Civilization” (McMeekin, 2010: 2).

Kaiser Wilhelm II's imperial project embodied the encounter between German specific distant orientalism and geostrategic ambitions to compete with European colonial powers. After 1888, the Germans became the most important political power in Constantinople. This position increased as Wilhelm II made a personal visit to the Empire in late 1898, the first ever by a European head of state. During his journeys, where he visited Constantinople and Damascus, the Kaiser declared himself as a “friend of Islam” and the protector of the sultan and the Muslim world against the colonial powers, not without German imperialist interest in mind. Besides, in a letter to his cousin, the Russian Czar, he shared his admiration for Islam, the sobriety of the architecture of his places of worship and the fervour of the faithful, contrasting with the “shameful” idolatry of the Christians in Jerusalem:

My personal feeling in leaving the Holy City was that I felt profoundly ashamed before the Moslems and that if I had come there without any Religion at all I certainly would have turned Mahometan! (Don Levine et al., 1920).

In addition, he admired the role of the Sultan, whom he saw as a model for the use of religion to legitimise temporal power (Gülalp and Seufert, 2013: 4). In the imperial travelogue the Kaiser stated that the Crusades were “an historical error” ... and that the Germans shared with Islam the same romantic values (Wilhelm II, 1898(1): 86-87). Muslim Turks are described as the *Herrenvolk* and appear to be better partners than the “corrupt” Eastern Christians. Besides, Germany was relatively unknown in the Ottoman lands at the end of the 19th century, they represented a blank page on which to write and weave the relationships she desired. Kaiser Wilhelm II also questioned the rhetoric of “Muslim fanaticism” forged by the British and the French in order to delegitimize the Muslim oppressor in Crete and promote Christian national liberation:

The source from which the latest excesses spring, was doubtless not a clear one, and surely not the usual so-called ‘mussulman fanaticism’ generally talked of in the European press. I venture to suppose that, intrigues of a certain meddlesome Power [la Grande Bretagne] have had something to do with them (Don Levine et al., 1920: 55).

Moreover, the German project of the Berlin-Baghdad railway (BBB), aimed at linking the East to the West in the heart of the Central Empires, is a case in point of German informal imperialism in the East that served the mutual interests of both Empires, giving Germany a new space for resource exploitation while providing the Sublime Porte for rapid military deployment in case of internal upheavals (McMurray, 2001; McMeekin, 2010).

The BBB, a historical oblivion of the “losers” of the First World War, was nevertheless an essential moment in the German *Drang nach Osten*⁵⁴ towards Central Asia. In doing so, the German ruling elite thought they were playing the Islamic card against the other European powers. While the Orient Express is associated in the collective imaginary with the British, particularly in the popular culture spread from Agatha Christie to James Bond, after the setbacks between Britain and the Sublime Porte, it was the German Empire that was commissioned by the Ottoman Minister of Public Works, Zihni Pasha, on 23 December 1899, to build a railway line linking Konya to Basra via Baghdad. In doing so, the Kaiser was betting on the Sultan’s political future, since the spread of pan-Islamism sympathetic to the *Kaiserreich* through the BBB would be a great lever to world power. The BBB challenged the traditional Russian and British expansion lines on the route to India, making the railway project a competitor to the Suez Canal. German railways in the Ottoman Empire served a dual purpose of exercising German imperial influence while fetching profits to the German companies who built them, epitomising the imperial significance of the German involvement in the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, German imperial *Islampolitik* manifested into the planning of a jihad “Made in Germany” during the First World War. The concept of *Heiligen Kriegen* (Holy War) was forged at the propaganda office of the German Foreign Office, *the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient* (NfO) – an equivalent of the British Arab Bureau in Cairo, by Baron Max von Oppenheim. In his “Memorandum concerning the fomenting of revolutions in the Islamic territories of our enemies”⁵⁵, he promoted war through the revolution of the Muslims against their common enemies, the French and the British. Through this asymmetrical approach, Berlin made itself an exporter of Islamist revolts alongside Constantinople. Max von Oppenheim, who initiated this policy, belonged to the mainstream of German orientalist politicians. He advocated a policy of territorial status quo in the Middle East, but was active in economic and cultural matters. To this end, he imagined the creation of a political bureau, made up of linguists dedicated to the awakening of the Islamic world and the rapprochement of pan-germanism and pan-Islamism. This received little attention. Although there is solid work on Max von Oppenheim as a researcher and diplomat, his role as the German father of the Holy War, Abu Djihad, was not sufficiently investigated, until Schwanitz’s (2004) study of Max von Oppenheim’s *Memorandum*.

⁵⁴ “Drive to the East” or “push eastward”, is the motto of the 19th century German nationalist movement, which referred to the idea of German territorial expansion towards Eastern Europe initially into the lands of Slavic nations. In historical discourses, it also reflected German expansion in general.

⁵⁵ “*Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde*”.

Max von Oppenheim lived in the East for more than 12 years and was a fine connoisseur of the language, history, and culture of the Arab civilization, so that his idea of Jihad and its implementation were not the result of fantasies. He wrote his text at the beginning of November 1914, shortly before Karl E. Schabinger led to the proclamation of Jihad to Constantinople on November 14th. The plan outlined the tasks of the Reich and the division of labour: the Germans lead the revolution to Jihad, while the Ottomans realized it through war. The baron planned that Germans should remain in the background, while the aura of the Sultan Caliph and the psyche of the Oriental would play the main role (Schwanitz, 2004: 37).

Max von Oppenheim was not alone in his view of revolutionizing the Islamic territories of (German) enemies. Arthur Zimmermann, once Undersecretary of State in the Federal Foreign Office, forwarded the Jihad Plan to the Emperor while Ambassador Hans von Wangenheim coordinated all these activities with the Young Turks. On the German side, revolutionizing Asia was particularly advocated. Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer (1885-1948), German General and spy referred to as the German Lawrence, led an expedition to revolutionize India from Afghanistan. Werner Otto von Hentig (1886-1984), German Army officer and diplomat, was to establish an alliance with the Afghan emir. Wilhelm Waßmuß, German diplomat and spy known as "Waßmuß of Persia", sought to revolutionize Persia. Besides, orientalist previously mentioned such as the Islamic scholar Carl Heinrich Becker, the Indologist Helmuth von Glasenapp, the Arabist Martin Hartmann, the political scientist Ernst Jäckh, also participated actively in the plan (Schwanitz, 2004: 32).

Oppenheim's propaganda would be transmitted in words and pictures in 48 hours to the outermost borders of the Ottoman Empire. And, by the beginning of 1916, he had 36 newsrooms in the Ottoman Empire built for Jihad agitation from there. During the war, the Ottomans with their 70 German officers in key positions ran against the Suez Canal. Troops of the enemy were bound. There were riots and defections. Admittedly, the great revolution of Egypt and India failed to take place. A total of seven projects in the colonial hinterland were considered unfulfilled during the First World War⁵⁶. Oppenheim's concept of Jihad was ultimately met with little success. The Arab and Muslim elites, well aware of German intentions, mostly ignored the call for Jihad. The only point on which indirect warfare was successful was the destabilization of

⁵⁶ A second *Memorandum* from Oppenheim was issued in July 1940. Yet, the context had changed. With the abrogation of the Caliphate in 1924, there was no longer a recognized religious authority that could call for jihad and Turkey had declared itself neutral in the war. On the other hand, nationalist aspirations had not been satisfied in the British-French empires with the new system of mandates in the Middle East. The National Socialist regime first subcontracted Eastern policy to Rome and then turned its attention to it after the French defeat. However, according to Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, the racial ideology of German National Socialism had very little resonance in the East, in contrast to the modernist and rationalist aspect of Third Reich nationalism. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem spread jihad against the Allied powers from his exile in Berlin, thus building on a German tradition of the First World War. Oppenheim's second Memorandum met however with as little success as the first one.

Russia by helping to revive Lenin's revolution. Hence, Germany lost the war, together with the Ottoman Empire. However, the *Bundnis* between Germany and Turkey survived the collapse of the Central Empires through economic and political partnership in the 20th century.

2.2. The British Arab policy to secure the Raj

The British Empire and British imperialism have a large historiography. If the British Empire was above all marked by the conquest and foundation of the Indian Raj, considered the jewel of the crown, the present section will only focus on the "*Question d'Orient*" as it emerged at the turn of the 19th century. By the middle of the 19th century, the securing of the "overland" route to India became the first strategic goal of the British Empire, which became the greatest Muslim power on earth, counting nearly 100 million Muslim subjects by the eve of the First World War, scattered across the Indian sub-continent, the Gulf States, Egypt, and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Still, one cannot grasp the complexity of British Eastern policy without taking into account the Anglo-Indian Empire as both object and actor of this policy. It should therefore be noted from the outset that the Eastern Question in Britain is not one-dimensional. The perception of the East and its integration into British foreign policy did not rest on a centralized vision coming from London but on an interaction between London, Calcutta, Bombay and, from the second half of the 19th century onwards, Cairo.

If the British Ottoman policy became important from the 18th century and the acquisition of territories in the East onward, it is at the time of the conquest of Egypt by Mehmet Ali that it really took shape. It was originally based on European concerns about the balance of power. Relations between France, Russia, and Britain in the 1830s led to the doctrine of territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted until 1914. This allowed the preservation of British interests in the Mediterranean by protecting itself from French and Russian ambitions while neutralizing European ambitions on Constantinople. French imperialist ambitions at the beginning of the 19th century led to a double and sometimes contradictory evolution of British Eastern policy.

On the one hand, London pursued a policy of rapprochement with the Sublime Porte, respecting the principle of territorial integrity of the Empire. This first British Ottoman policy was initiated by Stratford Canning, ambassador to Constantinople in the 1840s, according to whom the survival of the "sick man of Europe" required major reforms and it was Britain's duty to implement them. This early liberalism was based on a universal definition of welfare and happiness. But the end of the 19th century was marked by the rise of a "second" liberalism of Germanic inspiration, based on a personal and intimate vision of happiness that varied according to cultures and nations. The mission of development was therefore no longer to help nations to

achieve a predefined ideal but to lead them progressively towards self-determination. Thus, the Liberals stopped believing in the English mission towards the East. Britain then had to lead the East towards self-determination, which was in its own interest, a turnaround that took place from the First World War onwards and was achieved by the introduction of the system of mandates (Kedourie, 1978, chapter 2).

On the other hand, as early as the 1820s, Bombay developed an “informal” imperialism in the Mesopotamian-Khalijian space to secure the Indian Empire and create a “direct route” between London and India via Baghdad⁵⁷, a competing and complementary route to the Suez route (Crouzet, 2015). There was then a desire to recreate the mythical and historical space and time that is Mesopotamia in order to “structure an axis, a secure British corridor, in the Ottoman lands where the Russians [and later the Germans] sought to gain a foothold” (Crouzet, 2015: 293). In the 1820s and 1830s, Guillemette Crouzet tells us, the very image of the Arabs changed. Former bloodthirsty pirates justifying British intervention on the coasts, the “Arab soul” is then praised as trustworthy and with whom one can negotiate. An inversion of representations also took place regarding the region, from a desolate to revitalised Gulf with a glorious past (Crouzet, 2015: 302).

Thus, from 1834 onwards, the Gulf no longer had the status of a periphery but became a key space of British domination and backbone against competing imperialisms. The Euphrates became central in preserving the integrity of the Gulf-Indian sphere, and, in the 1870s, the Anglo-Indian government set out to exploit the Upper Gulf. However, the Russians and the Germans also had interests in the region. The Russians saw the Gulf as a natural extension of their empire because, geographically, Persia was a “transcaucasian power” (Crouzet, 2015: 515). They developed a project for a naval base on the island of Qishm and a railway linking the Caucasus to Persia. For their part, the Germans had many commercial interests in the Gulf as well as the BBB, as mentioned in the previous section. In this context, the British agreement on Kuwait was signed in 1899 to counter any Russian or German desire for an Arab axis in the Gulf (Crouzet, 2015: 534). Viceroy Lord Curzon’s tour of the Gulf in 1903 marked the culmination of a century of Anglo-Indian politics that completed what Guillemette Crouzet called the “indianisation of the Gulf” which coincided with the birth of the concept of the “Middle East”.

The arrival of the German Empire in the concert of nations in the 1870s, and in particular the ambitious *Weltpolitik* of Kaiser Wilhelm II, upset the balance of power in Europe. A system of continental alliance was then put in place to contain Germany, leading to the gradual removal of Britain from the Ottoman Empire as the latter drew closer to Germany. To secure the route to India against Wilhelminian ambitions, the

⁵⁷ See Robinson and Gallagher’s controversy op cit. in section 2.1. regarding German imperialism.

British Empire clearly moved away from the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to support Arab separatist movements, starting with the placing of Egypt under British guardianship. Although Egypt had been autonomous since the reign of Mehmet Ali (1804-1849), it remained officially vassal of the Ottoman Empire until 1882. Initially, it was the Egyptian public finances that were placed under Franco-British trusteeship after its bankruptcy in 1876. This European financial consortium provoked a strong nationalist reaction that engendered a revolt led by Urabi Pasha and the abdication of the Khedive in 1879. France and Britain intervened to protect their financial interests. France took the initiative in January 1882 in support of Khedive Tawfik. While Urabi Pasha consolidated Alexandria, Britain led an offensive in July 1882, while France, victim of its ministerial instability and wanting to avoid war, withdrew. The Battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September 1882 marked the installation of the British in Egypt and the end of French influence in the Nile Valley, and with it the end of the British "Ottoman" policy. Although the province remained theoretically dependent on the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became in fact a British protectorate. At the same time, Britain began to support Arab nationalists from Egypt to Syria via the Arabian Peninsula.

With the alliance between Constantinople and Berlin and the declaration of the jihad in 1914, and with the fall of the Ottoman Empire predicted and decided between Britain, France, and Russia, Britain chose to support an Arabic pan-Islamism in order to withdraw the Caliphate from the Sultan and give it to the Arabs. Britain needed a military strike force against the Ottoman Empire on the Eastern front but could not mobilize its troops, occupied to defend a potential attack on the Suez Canal in Egypt. France, on the other hand, was entirely mobilized on the Marne. The British Empire then simultaneously approached the Hashemite, guardians of Mecca, and their enemies, the Saud, symbol of a struggle between London and Bombay for control of the Middle East. Hence, London supported the Hashemite, whose father, Hussein of Mecca, was the guardian of the holy places, and whose two sons, Abdullah and Faysal, represented the Arab unity. London offered the Caliphate to the Sheriff of Mecca for the first time in a message from Lord Kitchener, Consul-General of Egypt, and renewed it in a letter from McMahon on August 30, 1915:

It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good way come by the help of God out of the evil that is now occurring⁵⁸

We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race.⁵⁹

These statements changed the Sheriff's perspective. His ambitions over Mecca and the Arab provinces of the

⁵⁸ Memorandum on British commitments to King Hussein'. Peace Congress file, March 15, 1919. The National Archives, London. Ref: FO 608/92.

⁵⁹ Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, Cmd. 5957 (1939), p. 4.

Ottoman Empire then extended to the entire Muslim Empire. Thus, the revolt of 1916 no longer called for fighting against the oppressors of the Arabs but against an atheist government (the Young Turks), unholy and immoral. From 1914 onwards, and under the impetus of two men, T.E. Lawrence and Mark Sykes, the Arabs became partners on an equal footing with the French. T.E. Lawrence was, according to Sari J. Nasir, “[...] by far the most important English personality, who was greatly instrumental in influencing the contemporary image of the Arabs in both English and the West [...]” (Nasir, 1976: 124). His biography conflates myth and reality. Born in Wales in 1888, he read the works of the archaeologist Layard at a very young age and decided at the age of 18 to go to Syria to visit the Crusader castles. He began to learn Arabic and made contact with the orientalist Charles Doughty and Lord Curzon. He returned from Syria to study history at Oxford, with “a love of the silent desert” (*ibid*: 125). In 1910, he accompanied Hogarth on his trip to Syria and helped him with his archaeological excavations. Hogarth said of him: “Lawrence was an Arab: a street Arab” (Garnett, 1992: 16). He befriended Sheikh Hamoudi and was hired by the Arab Bureau during the First World War for intelligence missions in Egypt. Although he is perceived in British and most Western imagination as an Anglo-Arab desert warrior, T. E. Lawrence was above all for many observers, a liaison officer between his government and the Arabs. Thus, for Nasir, he loved his mission more than the Arabs. On his part, Mark Sykes was, according to Shrane Leslie:

the Chief motive force in London behind the British government’s Near Eastern policy in the war. He inspired both Arab and Jewish policies and was chiefly responsible for securing their adoption by ministers at home (Leslie, 1923: 288).

During his travels in Asia, Mark Sykes, who had an unfavorable idea of the Western influence on the East, thought that it was from the Eastern wisdom that regeneration would come. He was therefore in favor of the Arab nationalists, convinced that they would be able to regain their former glory and combine the most sophisticated European techniques with the piety and tolerance of the Muslims of the Golden Age. In contrast, he described the Christians of the East as an “abominable race” which provoked in him “feelings of contempt and hatred” (Sykes, 1900: 80). For him, the “Levantine”, the transmitter of European vices to the European, symbolized the “monster” of the East, more than the Arab or the Muslim.

Hence, at one point during the First World War, the British almost chose their Arab partner over their European counterpart. After the publication of the Sykes/Picot agreements by the Bolsheviks on 23 December 1917, seven Syrian notable members of the new Syrian Unity Party based in Cairo, anonymously published a memorandum calling for guarantees on the independence of the Arab nation. On 16 June 1918, Sir Henry McMahon in turn issued a Declaration to the Seven in which he undid the Sykes/Picot agreements. Osmond Walrond, an agent of the British intelligence services and influential adviser to Lord Milner, Secretary of State

for War, defended the idea of an Arab empire confederation of Iraq, Syria, and Arabia. Then, Faysal was proclaimed king in Damascus while Allenby was there. The Cherifian flag was hoisted over the city, signalling a tacit recognition of Britain in the eyes of the nationalists. Until the last minute, the Arab nationalists, likely to revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and to Germany by the same token, were considered equally relevant allies, as was France. For a long time, the British Empire hesitated between securing French claims in the Levant, perceived as dangerous and illegitimate, and Arab nationalists' claims in the peninsula, perceived as legitimate and sometimes advantageous for the British Empire's own interest. Hence, Lloyd George arrived at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 convinced that for the sake of British interests and peace in the Middle East, France would reconsider her ambitions in the Levant to satisfy Arab nationalists. But at the end of the War, when the Ottoman Empire and Germany were defeated, and Britain had to choose between her Arab interlocutors and her European partner after the proclamation of Faysal, she chose the latter (Kedourie, 1978, chapter 5). Hence, the Sykes/Picot agreements were realized with the establishment of the British mandates in Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan.

2.3. The French *Levantine* policy to secure Algeria

The French colonial expansion in North Africa and then in the Near East was motivated by a need for national cohesion and international status, especially after the defeat in Sedan against Prussia in 1870, and a belief in France's civilizing mission. The conquests of Algeria in 1830, of Tunisia in 1881, and the extension of French influence in Morocco, are the consequences of determined generals on the ground rather than that of any overarching imperial strategy (Meouchy and Suglett, 2004). As Robert Montagne, director of the French Institute in Damascus wrote in 1946:

The French plans, conceived on the scale of a particularistic policy, were too often marked by the absence of broad views, to the extent that Beirut was never linked to Damascus by a tunnel, which obviously had to be pierced, that Tripoli remained a precarious maritime base, that local industries were never encouraged by us, that the summer in Lebanon, from which immense cultural and political advantages could be drawn, remained abandoned or left to the chance of mediocre efforts (Montagne, 1946: 492).

By the time France had conquered its second colonial Empire with its jewel of North Africa, Algeria, her Eastern policy consisted mainly in an Ottoman policy, of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in which it had important financial and economic interests. Since the agreement between Francis the 1st and Suleiman the Magnificent, France's traditional policy had been based on good relations with the majority, symbolized by the Sublime Porte, which had enabled it to play the role of protector of minorities, particularly Christian minorities. It was gradually and informally that France became the increasingly exclusive protector of "indigenous" Catholics. After decades of informal, mainly commercial, capitular arrangements

between the Sublime Porte and France, Francis the 1st and Suleiman the Magnificent signed the first official capitulation agreement in 1528. Over the years, this privilege became an institution and rival European powers had to borrow French ships to enter Ottoman ports. Moreover, the French pilgrims, merchants, and travellers were able to enjoy complete religious freedom. These agreements were renewed several times in 1569, 1604, 1673, and 1740, the latter giving permission to all members of Christian nations to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem under the French flag, however this did not apply to Eastern Christians. A letter from Louis the 14th to the Maronite Patriarch of Antioch dated April 28, 1649, declared that the King of France took under his protection the Patriarch and all the Maronite prelates, clerics, and laymen of Lebanon. This policy was updated by Napoleon on October 18th, 1802. Thus, the Catholic clergy of Lebanon gradually escaped local control and came under the special protection of France. And, gradually, as long as the other powers did not claim a diplomatic position in the Levant, France became the representative not only of the Catholics but of all the Christians of the East. The 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war⁶⁰, which led to the signing of the Organic Regulations of Lebanon in June 1861, only further solidified this position.

The influence of France in the Levant thus reached its peak in the middle of the 19th century, with the work of Guizot, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Louis Philippe, who focused his action on the Christian question in the Ottoman Empire. He believed that the civilizing mission towards the East could only be carried out by Christians and thus gave the concept an increasingly religious meaning. This focus on the Christian question explains France's progressive retreat on the Lebanese question in the Near East (Laurens, 1990: 118)⁶¹. This evolution may be understood in the perspective of France feeling threatened by her European counterparts.

First, on the religious level, the emergence of Anglo-Saxon influence in the East through the Protestant missions in the 18th century indicated that the Catholic foundations of five centuries of French presence in the Ottoman Empire were being called into question. French influence with the Eastern Christians then took a second blow when the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Honetaux refused to intervene with the Sublime Porte in the Armenian Affair between 1893 and 1897 out of fear of alienating Russia. According to the contemporary historian Frantz Despagnet, this policy cost France dearly, leading to a significant decrease in influence in the East, where France's prestige was based above all on the protection of the Christians (Despagnet, 1904: 659). And, if France found in the Papacy an unfailing ally before 1905, the law of separation

⁶⁰ This refers to the civil conflict in Mount Lebanon during Ottoman rule in 1860-1861 fought mainly between the local Druze and Maronites, which precipitated a French-led international military intervention.

⁶¹ Henry Laurens (1990), *Le Royaume impossible*, Armand Colin, Paris, p. 118.

of Church and State created a delicate situation that benefited Italy. Between 1905 and 1914, a considerable number of clerical establishments and their Levantine clientele abandoned France in favour of Italian protection. Thus, the anticlericalism of the metropolis damaged France's prestige in the East and pushed to concentrate its protectorate more and more exclusively on Syria and *a fortiori* Lebanon.

Second, the French defeat at Sedan in 1870 marked the decline of the privileged French diplomatic and political influence in the Ottoman Empire to the benefit this time of Germany, which "won" the confidence of Sultan Abdul Hamid II for the construction of the BBB and became the protector of the Protestants. Hence, the more France felt threatened in her Ottoman policy, the more it retreated into the Levantine Christians, and more specifically the Maronites, such that they became to be known as "the Eastern French"⁶². According to William I. Shorrock, from 1914 onwards, France sacrificed its future political influence and her power of attraction among the Syrian majority to secure a small sphere of economic influence and religious guarantees for its Maronite "protégés".

Hence, while Britain, conscious of the geostrategic importance of this nascent Middle East, mobilized a powerful military force on the Eastern front, France had only a symbolic presence in the East. France had to abandon its military presence in the East and fall back on its narrow Levantine policy. This policy resulted from a tension between two philosophies. The first, recommended by the Orientalist Louis Massignon, the Foreign Minister Berthelot, the diplomat Georges Picot, and supported by the President of the Council Clémenceau, advocated for the continuity with the French Ottoman policy of alliance with the majority and the protection of minorities. The second, carried by the publicist Robert de Caix, the High Commissioner of the Levant Gouraud and supported by the President of the Council Millerand, defended on the contrary a particularist policy based exclusively on minorities.

On the one hand, Louis Massignon, a great Arabist and fine Islamic scholar, held a global vision of the Arab world as well as an intimate knowledge of its universe. He saw France playing a long-term role and tried, during the second Faysal/Clémenceau negotiation, to resume the traditional French policy of alliance with the majority to protect minorities. Besides, Clémenceau, who had little knowledge of Eastern affairs but was radically anti-colonial, was well disposed towards Arab nationalists. Anxious to reconcile the Franco-British Sykes/Picot agreements and the promises made to the Arabs during the Hussein/McMahon exchanges, he managed, with the help of his Foreign Minister Berthelot, to make the Emir Faysal's distrust give way by

⁶² Mgr. Emmanuel Pharès, secretary of the Maronite Archbishop of Sidon called the Maronites, "*les Français d'Orient*", in: Mgr. Emmanuel Pharès (1908), *Les Maronites, leur vie et leurs mœurs, leurs rapports avec la France, leur situation actuelle*, Lille, pp. 20-32.

agreeing, under the influence of Massignon, to make Arabic the official language of the Syrian State. Hence, on January 6th, 1920, the Faysal/Clemenceau provisional agreement was a failed attempt to establish an Arab and Muslim policy replacing French traditional Ottoman policy. However, Clemenceau's defeat in the 1920 elections and the Faysal's inability to convince his supporters in Damascus to collaborate with France, gave way to the action of one man, Robert de Caix, who succeeded in changing the terms and philosophy of the agreement. After Clemenceau's departure, colonial circles were once again able to exert a decisive influence in the Middle East. By 1920, the new President of Council Millerand was more sensitive to the arguments of Robert de Caix than those of Massignon and Berthelot, whom he did not appreciate.

Robert de Caix (1869-1970), a French "publicist" and diplomat marked in his youth by the defeat at Sedan, is considered the father of French Levantine politics. Like his ancestors before him in the 18th century, he forged very strong links with the French colonialist party in the 19th century and then became editor-in-chief of the *Bulletin du Comité de l'Asie française* in 1901. Presented as the French specialist of the Levant at the end of the First World War, his political writings are an essential gateway to French Eastern policy, given his profile and his role in the establishment of the mandates in Syria and Lebanon. Nevertheless, unlike Louis Massignon, he knew the Ottoman Empire better than his Arab provinces. He did not see the region as a whole but remained focused on France's immediate interests vis-à-vis Britain. In June 1916, he was appointed Secretary of the French Action Committee in Syria. In 1919, he took part in the first negotiations between Emir Faysal and Clemenceau. In 1920, he defined his policy for the Levant, which inspired the policy of Paris and of the High Commission. In 1923, he became the accredited representative of France to the Permanent Commission of Mandates in Geneva. Unlike Massignon, whom he saw as a naive "caught in the mirage of Francophile pan-Arabism", Robert de Caix did not consider Arab nationalists and Emir Faysal as serious interlocutors. He considered Arab nationalists as sometimes extremist, sometimes fanatical⁶³. In a 1926 memorandum on the organisation given to Syria and Lebanon, he noted:

In no country in the world do Muslims accept the authority of infidels.... And the day when the religious fanaticism of the old turbans is replaced by a less religious feeling, it only turns into the most modern nationalism, but just as exclusive of young Tunisians and other young people of the same tendency as we find in the Syrtes in Morocco [...] (de Caix, 1926).

Such a negative view of the Arabs and their nationalist movement was not, however, isolated to Robert de Caix but widespread in the French political and military fields. Even Louis Massignon, who was relatively committed to the Arab cause, used the term "Muslim religious fanaticism":

⁶³ As expressed in Robert de Caix notes and letters found in Private archives and archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs analysed in: Gérard D. Khoury (2006), *Une tutelle coloniale. Le mandat français en Syrie et au Liban*, Paris, Belin.

Although no Islamic religious fanaticism has manifested itself in the Legion [...the Christian soldiers] have not abdicated anything of their old separatism [...] nor, unfortunately, of their aversion to the profession of arms [...].⁶⁴

Hence, Robert de Caix wanted to create a Levant like “a stained-glass window whose seal was French” (De Caix, 1920(1)) and went so far as to affirm that France would have:

more interest in seeing Mosul remain in the British sphere and Palestine handed over to the Zionists, that is to say, in seeing the Arab world maintained in its division and even diminished by Zionist policy, than in being in the presence of a large Arab state apparently controlled by [France] (de Caix, 1920(2)).

What characterized the Levantine policy of Robert de Caix was his opposition to Arab unitarianism, which represented, according to him, a significant risk for the interests of France in North Africa. Robert de Caix's influence on French politics was all the more important because he had forged strong ties with the High Commissioner General Gouraud. Being from the same generation, they had known each other for fifteen years and lived in the same Parisian district. The High Commissioner, who had a relatively limited and exclusively military vision of the Levant, relied almost wholly on Robert de Caix's notes addressed to the Foreign Office, from which he took the personal initiative of proclaiming, on September 1st, 1920, the creation of Greater Lebanon. For historian Gérard D. Khoury, this was a “turning point” in French Eastern policy. Since the agreement between Francis the 1st and Suleiman the Magnificent, France's traditional policy had been based on good relations with the majority, symbolised by the Sublime Porte, which had enabled it to play the role of protector of minorities. Just as Britain oscillated during the First World War between an Islamic- and an Arab-oriented policy, France had hesitated between an Arab- and a Levantine- oriented policy. With the Levantine policy of Robert de Caix, the traditional balance of the Ottoman Empire from majority to minority was overturned, putting the Sunni majority in the Middle East on the defensive vis-à-vis France. Thus, in the words of historian Khoury, the “action of Robert de Caix for the constitution of the States of Syria and Lebanon shows how a man can modify the policy of a State like France” (Khoury, 2006: 29).

Although France remained a diplomatic ally of the Sublime Porte, from the second half of the 19th century, French interests in North Africa and her rivalry with the European powers in the Ottoman Empire led to a geostrategic retreat on the protection of Eastern Christians, and more specifically on the Maronites. The French East was therefore thought of through the prism of the Levant under Ottoman control, leaving little room for the “Mohammedans”, dominated both in the Levant and North Africa, and French Eastern policy developed increasingly against pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, culminating in the creation of the

⁶⁴ In: “Le sous lieutenant Massignon à M.G. Maugras”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nantes.

mandates in Syria and Lebanon.

Summary

Hence, as I explored in the previous section, the *Question d'Orient* manifested itself differently within the three countries under study. German *Weltpolitik* consisted mostly in a rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire since the 1890s and a call for *jihad* against the colonial powers during the First World War. This Ottoman *Islampolitik* instilled an imperial ambition without colonial aims – or at least prevented by Germany's defeat in the WWI, further protracted with a strong partnership with Turkey. Whereas, the British Empire's Eastern policy broadly aimed at an “informal empire” in the Gulf from the beginning of the 19th century that led to the Trucial States and the support of Arab nationalism during the First World War. This Arab policy illustrated an imperial experience, which tended to couple colonial expansion with a global imperial project, and left a lasting impact in British post-war multiculturalism, as we shall see in the final section. Finally, French Eastern policy evolved toward a nearly exclusive support of Eastern Christianity, the Maronites in particular, and a strategic “retreat” to the Levant at the turn of the 20th century. France's Levantine-oriented policy acted in the Mediterranean world against pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, both considered as a threat to French domination in North Africa. The French colonial rule laid upon and without the Muslim majority created rather conflicting colonial terms, which reached its climax during the Algerian war between 1954 and 1962.

This far-reaching contextualization in mind, I shall now move to the period following the two world wars, which led to mutual and mass destruction in Europe. Although both of these wars broadly impacted the “Orient” and its relations to the three European countries under study – such as the imposition of the mandates in the Middle East and nationalist protestations in the colonial possessions, the present dissertation will not continue the contextualization all through the first half of the 20th century. The next section will address the “post-war” period, marked by the reconstruction of Europe and the loss of the European colonial Empires, and the emergence of what has been coined the “Muslim question” by Anne Norton in her 2013 eponymous book⁶⁵, to understand how the three specific historical antecedents explored in the previous sections have left lasting imprint contemporary relations to Muslim populations in Western Europe.

⁶⁵ Anne Norton (2013), *On the Muslim Question. Why “the Muslim question” is really about the West and its own anxieties—not Islam*, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Section 3. The “Muslim question” in contemporary Western Europe

The “Muslim question” emerged in Western Europe in varying historical contexts and offers a window into the interaction between European versions of modernity and Muslims in Europe. As we shall see in the following section, the question of Islam and Muslims in Germany is linked to German special relationship with Turkey and Turkish immigration in the post-war period (3.1.). In Britain, the perception of British Muslim is imprinted with its imperial experience that forged British modern multiracial state (3.2.). Finally, the Muslim question in France is inextricable from its colonial history with North Africa, and particularly with the conflicting decolonization of Algeria (3.3.).

3.1. From *Gastarbeiter* to Muslims in post-war Germany

The “Muslim question” in Germany, framed as the question of immigration and integration of Turkish migrants into Germany, is intimately linked to its relation to Turkish migrants and Turkey itself. As a matter of fact, the “Muslim question” had already emerged at the time when the Kaiser Wilhelm II elaborated his *Islampolitik* with the Ottoman Empire, although not in those terms. In 1905, the Berlin Colonial Congress addressed the “Muslim question” in ambivalent terms. On the one hand, Islam, considered as the Ottoman empire and its power over the Muslims populations living in the Orient, was perceived as a strategic asset in the struggle against Western European powers. On the other hand, Islam, considered as a religious, political, and social force among the dominated populations in East Africa, was seen as a potential threat to German colonies. And, after the end of both the German and Ottoman empires, the special relationship between the two powers continued through economic agreements between Germany and Turkey and the immigration of millions of Turks in post-war Germany. In such context, an ambivalent position vis-à-vis Islam re-emerged in contemporary political discourses, under new terms. The Muslim question has remained at one a matter of foreign policy, when it comes to its relationship to its historical Turkish partner, and become a question of domestic policy, questioning German state model, its immigration and integration policies, as well as its religious policies.

Since the late 19th century and the unification of the country, Germany has practised labor importation through short-term contracts to people who did not hold German nationality. Until the First World War, this involved foreign migrants from Eastern European regions in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, as well as Italy, who had to return home once their contracts ran out. This state-controlled migration intensified during the First World War as labor deficits, as a result of conscription, meant a greater need for foreign migrants. And, while this demand lessened during the interwar economic crisis, it took off again with the

growth of Nazi economy in the 1930s. Consequently, the Nazis started a process of labor exploitation, which led to approximately 12 million foreigners working in Germany during the Second World War (Penayi, 2004). Afterwards, the economic miracle of the post-war era (*Wirtschaftswunder*) in the German Federal Republic resulted in an increased demand for labor, all the more as the construction of the Berlin Wall ended Germany's access to cheap East German labour. As a response, Germany started recruiting what would be called "guest workers" (*Gastarbeiter*) and signed agreements with 8 Mediterranean countries⁶⁶, with Turkey in front given the historical partnership (Kaya, 2009).

Hence, several agreements between Germany and Turkey in the 1960s led to the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Turks to Germany. Such agreements provided that Germany would establish labor recruiting offices in Turkey while the Turkish government would decide which of its citizens could work in Germany. The *Gastarbeiter* were hired as temporary workers who would come to Germany in a rotation process. Both Turkey and Germany would benefit from this arrangement. For Turkey, it was an opportunity to lower unemployment, to increase its access to foreign exchange currency, and to build a more efficient industrial labor force. Hence, by 1973, more than 2.5 million foreigners lived in West Germany⁶⁷ (Carle, 2007: 150). When the Oil Crisis of 1973 precipitated a severe economic recession and unemployment in Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt halted the import of foreign labour to Germany. At the same time, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) agreed on the guidelines for naturalization of non-ethnic Germans in 1977. While these guidelines opened German citizenship to non-ethnic Germans, it discouraged foreign workers from seeking citizenship as was explicitly stated in the document: "Germany is not a nation of immigration; it does not seek to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation" (cited in Carle, 2007: 151). Consequently, it distinguished between three groups of individuals: "*Inländer*" or native Germans, "*Aussiedler*" or ethnic Germans living outside Germany, and "*Ausländer*" or foreign resident. While the *Ausländer* had to reside 10 years in Germany and surrender their nationality, the nearly 15 million ethnic German refugees *Aussiedler* from Eastern automatically gained full civil rights. However, these differentialist and exclusionary citizenship policies highlighted by Brubaker in 1992, became increasingly inclusionary and liberal at the turn of the 21st century as enhanced by Kaya in 2009. By 2000, the lack of a skilled labor force was damaging strategic sectors of the German economy such as the information technology where thousands of vacancies needed to be filled if Germany were to remain

⁶⁶ Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Kaya, 2009: 40).

⁶⁷ rising to 4,8 by 1989, due to family reunion.

competitive. Consequently, Chancellor Schröder announced a “Green Card” Program in February 2000 that would enable businesses to hire specialists from outside the EU (Carle, 2007: 153). In doing so, the new law partially changed the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*) that had so far been the country’s traditional basis for granting citizenship into the principle of birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) (Kaya, 2009: 47). In a way, the transformation of migration, integration, and citizenship policies progressively turned the country into a country of immigration (*Einwanderungsland*). As a result, discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity, and pluralism developed in Germany.

In the early 21st century then, Germany has the largest Muslim minority in Western Europe after France, among which approximately more than three quarters are immigrants from Turkey and/or their descendants. As we just saw, Turkish migrants arriving in Germany were not labelled primarily as Muslims but as guest workers. Terms such as “*Gastarbeiter*” (guestworker), “*Ausländer*” (foreigner), or “*Mitbürger*” (co-citizen) underlined their “otherness”, as outsiders or non-ethnic German in German public discourses (Kaya, 2009: 45). The categorical shift from guest worker to Muslim occurred around the 1980s, when the German government realized that the “guest workers” were staying, in the broadly context of the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie affair in Britain and the first “headscarf debate” in France, or again German reunification, changes in the German naturalization law in 1999, and the ensuing *Leitkultur* debate. The political “discovery” of Islam in Germany dates to the 1998 veil affair when a school in Baden-Württemberg refused to employ a veiled teacher. The regional government ruled in favor of the school, considering that the veil was not a religious sign but a sign of a woman’s submission. In 2003, this decision reached the Federal Court of Justice recognizing the right of the Länder to ban the veil. Thus, the Brandenburg government passed a law banning the wearing of the headscarf for civil servants. However, such law was later revoked because the veil was permitted for female teachers who were Catholic sisters. Thereafter, a discursive operation occurred whereby migrants became more and more associated with Islam (Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010). Guest workers re-categorized into “Muslims”, once foreigners were now part of the German imagined community. Yet, they remained problematic and linked to deficits in education, unemployment, and after 9/11, to terrorism in public discourse (Hernandez Aguilar, 2018: 69). The 9/11 attacks were not exactly a turning point in term of security law since the country had already experienced Red Army terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, by 2001, security had already become a state asset giving priority to security considerations over individual liberties. However, the discovery that the attacks had been planned on German soil by the terror “Hamburg cell” contributed to the diffusion of the category “Muslims” Islam in the political debate as posing a potential threat to national security. Consequently, the government passed a series of security packages, law

amendments, initiated a system of religious profiling, and banned Islamic organisations deemed as threatening to the German nation and its constitution. The German government's reaction towards this alleged threat also articulated through integration politics, among which the establishment of the German Islam Conference, *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* (DIK)⁶⁸, is the most representative (Hernandez Aguilar, 2018: 19).

The DIK has been an initiative of the German government seeking to enhance the integration of Muslims and Islam into German society and the German institutional framework. In doing so, the DIK was established to alleviate what has been progressively perceived as the “Muslim question” or “problem”. In 2006, Angela Merkel and Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated that Islam was part of Germany, and that Germany was home to 14.5 million Germans with a migrant background: “Islam is part of Germany and Europe. It is part of our past and our future. Muslims are welcome in Germany”⁶⁹. These gestures were important symbolic signs, particularly from conservative politicians. For Muslim organizations, the DIK was hoped to be the pathway to obtain official recognition as “corporation of public law” and all related privileges. The German constitution codified a semi-public state-church relationship, according to which religious communities figure as corporate actors who cooperate with the state in the delivery of public social services in areas such as health care, social work, and religious education⁷⁰. The state collects taxes on behalf of legally recognized religious communities and funds their faith-based welfare organisations and religious instruction in public schools. Religious communities can apply to gain this legal status if their legal structure and organisation indicate their permanence and if they are represented by an executive organ that can speak on behalf of the community (Lewicki, 2014: 62-63). Because of their non-recognition as “corporation of public law”, Muslim communities have also had only limited access to political institutions. Since its inception in 2006, the DIK has functioned as a pivot between different levels of government, institutions, and civil society

⁶⁸ By initiative of the Minister of the Interior, the government established the DIK as a forum of dialogue between state and Muslim representatives. From the outset, the DIK was comprised of 30 participants, 15 representatives of the state and 15 Muslim representatives selected by the Ministry of the Interior. Regarding Muslim representatives, the Ministry allocated 5 seats to spokespersons of the Muslim organizations, and 10 seats to non-organized Muslims, including well-known critics of Islam such as Necla Kelek (Shooman 2010; Hernandez Aguilar 2015). According to the DIK (DIK and Chalil Bodenstein 2009), this segmentation responded to the idea that the organizations represent only a third of the Muslim population, thus the non-organized Muslims would allegedly represent the rest of the Muslim population. Despite being portrayed as open and democratic, the structure of the DIK was heavily criticized in particular for excluding Muslim women wearing headscarves from the forum and discussion (Shooman 2010; Hernandez Aguilar 2015).

⁶⁹ Wolfgang Schäuble (2006), “Islam is part of Germany”, *Süddeutsche.de*, September 36, 2006: from <https://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/060925sz.pdf> (last accessed on November 26th, 2020). Then, right after the declaration, the government launched the DIK cycle in three phases. The first one encompassed the preliminary and preparatory steps from its foundation in 2006 until 2009. The second from 2010 until 2014 focused on the implementation of the results achieved during the first stage. A third phase was launched in 2014.

⁷⁰ Grundgesetz article 7 and 40 as well as articles 137–141 from the Weimar constitution, which were inserted into the current constitution.

organisations, to provide what was considered solutions to a range of discursive “problems” posed by Islam and Muslims in Germany. Those solutions ranged from the prevention of extremism, radicalization, and Islamism, to initiatives to stop gender inequality within Muslim communities, as well as introduce Islamic courses in public schools and establish Islamic theology centres in German universities. Retrospectively, the launch of the DIK was a pivotal moment in the relations of the state with Muslim organizations, Islam, and Muslims in Germany in responding to two explicit aims of the German government. First, the DIK fostered and enhanced the integration of Muslims into German society. Second, it helped institutionally incorporate Islam within the existing relations of the German state with religious communities. According to Luis Aguilar Hernandez, the DIK was, therefore, the moment when German federal authorities publicly and widely acknowledged the belonging of Islam in the German imagined communities. However, it was also a moment of political construction of Islam as public concern. Hence, the DIK can be thought of simultaneously as the public construction of the “Muslim question” in Germany, and as the German government’s attempt at offering solutions to this question: integration (Hernandez Aguilar, 2018: 20-22).

At the same time when the German federal authorities took the initiative of institutionalizing and recognizing Islam, a controversy broke in 2010 after the publication of *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, roughly translated as *Germany Undoing/Abolishing Itself*, by Berlin’s former senator for finance Thilo Sarrazin, reviving the debate on immigration. The book called for stricter immigration policies and the reduction of welfare benefits, on the arguments that, first, Muslims and immigrants as a group were taking advantages of the German welfare system and, second, Muslims were inherently violent and involved in criminality and terrorism. Thilo Sarrazin also predicted that Germany would eventually disappear through the higher birth rates of Muslim migrant women, in comparison with native German women. Sarrazin’s book became Germany’s best-selling book in 2011 and ignited a heated debate between defenders and detractors of his ideas. Moreover, it prompted discussion about political correctness in Germany, namely, the alleged inability of Germans to freely criticize religions without being reminded of the anti-Semitism of the past.

In sum, at the start of my empirical study on the German field in 2009 (chapter 4), the tone of public discourse on Islam is ambivalent. On the one hand, federal authorities and official discourses opened a new phase of symbolic and institutional recognition of Islam, making Germany acknowledge herself as a country of immigration and integration. On the other, and in response to such evolution, Thilo Sarrazin’s bestseller unleashed hostility against immigration and so-called “political correctness”, participating directly or indirectly, in the rise of openly Islamophobic movements such as *Pegida*, and the creation of the new Far-Right and anti-immigration party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in the mid-2010s.

3.2. From British subjects to British Muslims in post-imperial Britain

Before the Alien Act of 1905, which lays the cornerstone of modern British immigration control, barriers hardly existed in the 19th century British Empire (Gainer, 1972; Panayi, 2004). With a multinational state with imperial legacy and common law tradition, both British immigration and British citizenship were characterized as liberal. And, throughout the 20th century, the race-relation framework and the protection of the right to difference were both supported and unchallenged in the public realm as British modern multiculturalism – at least until 2006.

British multiculturalism takes roots back to the creation of the multinational British state in 1707 and the idea that the rights and duties of social membership did not aim at promoting full political participation in the state, as is the case in France, but at securing communal living (Pryce and Parkes, 2007: 10). This multicultural inclination aroused in large part from earlier socio-political answers to the challenges of governing a culturally diverse territory. The politico-institutional set-up of the Union of Scotland and England conceded a large degree of regional and cultural particularism and provided grounds for the system of multiculturalism in Britain. Moreover, Colley (1992) demonstrated that the struggle against France and the subsequent period of colonization forged a distinctive understanding of Britishness indelibly linked to its imperial role (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018: 4).

Decolonization, however, posed a direct threat to Britain's understanding of itself and its place in the world, and it was the political response to this dilemma that created what we understand as modern multicultural Britain (*ibid*: 5). Facing the prospect of decolonization, the Attlee Government tried to preserve British identity and influence through legislation aimed at securing Britain's position at the head of a renewed Commonwealth (Hansen, 2000). In the post-war period, the major group of immigrants came from areas controlled by Britain, among which over a million came from Ireland and the other major part came from the British Empire. They all possessed the same civil rights since they possessed British citizenship under the British Nationality Act of 1948 (BNA 1948). This BNA 1948 granted a majority of individuals in the Empire and Commonwealth the right to immigrate to the UK and created a new form of British citizenship conferred on almost everyone who was not a citizen of an independent country (*ibid*: 45–49). This reform was a symbolic manner of reasserting Britain's status as the "mother-country" (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018: 5). Hence, unlike in Germany, there had never been a large influx of people with foreign nationalities into post-war Britain. Labor migration to the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s consisted largely of citizens from Britain's former colonies, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean and, as subjects of the Crown, Commonwealth citizens had full civil rights.

However, while formally politically included, post migration minorities were nevertheless affected by socio-economic disadvantage, racial discrimination, and racism. Therefore, at the time, the Government's objective was to offer the new citizens equality of opportunity and to promote a spirit of "good race relations" as a way to integration. Thus, one of the key political responses to Britain's growing ethnic diversity was the British anti-discrimination legislation. The first Race Relations Act (RRA) was passed in 1965 and subsequently amended in 1968, 1976, and 2000, and an enforcement body, the Commission of Racial Equality (CRE), was set up in 1976 (Lewicki, 2014: 121). The RRAs attempted to guarantee selected racial groups the kind of cultural tolerance granted to members of the cultural majority to certain "native" minorities. Until recently then, ideas of limited state intervention, liberalism, and cultural tolerance have been stressed. It reflected a notion of the supremacy of society over state, with the state's role confined to ensuring that individuals could practice the highest degree of cultural expression in the public and private spheres. Beyond this limited state intervention, Britain's anti-discrimination policy bears other hallmarks of its broader immigrant policy model: the use of social exclusion was confined to the border, with strong border controls seen as a necessary counterpart to the preservation of social freedoms. In other words, successful integration required strict immigration control. Moreover, British policies have tended to offer relatively extensive liberties to members of minority groups with little emphasis put on their reciprocal duties. This reflected the conception of the nation-state as subordinate to a nonhomogeneous society. Hence, the unsuccessful attempt to secure the post-imperial Commonwealth vision immediately after the Second World War created a political and legal legacy that intertwined race, citizenship, and immigration with the search for "Britishness" after decolonisation. Part of this legacy was a distinctive bifurcated and bipartisan "regime" of British multiculturalism (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018: 6). Such consensus on British post-war multiculturalism culminated in the publication of the report by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 (Meer and Modood, 2019). However, the policization and securitization of Islam at the turn of the 21st century following ethnic riots and terrorist attacks triggered a re-evaluation of such multicultural consensus.

Contrary to Germany, the political emergence of "the Muslim" in Britain is older and dates to the imperial period. Muslims in the British Empire organized themselves for the first time around their Muslim identity in 1938 by protesting historian HG Wells' book, *A Short History of the World*, in which he is said to have depicted an unflattering vision of the Prophet⁷¹. The real shift in the polarization of Islam in Britain happened after the Satanic Verses controversy, also known as the Rushdie Affair in 1989, when the

⁷¹ "British Moslems Resent H. G. Wells' History: Veto Demanded", *The Telegraph*, 13th August 1938.

publication of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*, inspired in part by Muhammad's life, provoked the heated reaction of Muslims all over the world. In 1989, the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa ordering Muslims to kill Rushdie. The Iranian government supported the fatwa against Rushdie and numerous killings, attempted killings, and bombings resulted in response to the novel. The so-called Rushdie affair participated in drawing the line between what is perceived to be the core Western value of freedom of expression and the view of many Muslims that representing the Prophet in an unfavorable light was an insult to Islam and Muslims themselves. Later on, the 2001 ethnic riots in northern England, followed by the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York, provoked a great shift in British political and public sphere and triggered a re-evaluation of multicultural policy. New Labour began to emphasise the need for immigrant and minority communities to assimilate British values and traditions. "Community cohesion" became the slogan of the ruling Labour Party to talk about integration with "shared values" as their nodal point. Thereby, good relations between communities took precedence over anti-discrimination and public support for minorities. Besides, questions over loyalty arouse about the position of Muslims and Muslim organizations regarding terrorist attacks⁷². In such suspicious context, the 2005 London bombings increased this shift in British narratives, as perpetrators of the attacks were born in Britain. The 7 July 2005 London bombings, also known as 7/7, were a series of coordinated Islamist suicide attacks in London that targeted commuters during the morning rush hour, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700. Since then, public discourses started to link the internal threat to terrorism and Islam became properly securitized.

Between 2000 and 2008, attention increasingly focused on extremism and the cultural difference of Islam, while attention on discrimination against Muslims diminished. The first securitizing move toward Islam was initiated by Blair's speech in December 2006, which for the first time publicly linked the integration of Muslims to the fight against terrorism. By that time, securitizing Islam and Muslims in Britain therefore meant securitizing integration with a slight narrative shift from multiculturalism to assimilationism. This shift remained primarily only narrative and was not followed by legislation that infringed on the rights of Muslims. Integration, no longer framed as the praise of diversity but centred on "shared values", understood indistinctly as the rule of law, freedom of expression, equal opportunity, responsibility and respect toward other religions, democracy, human rights, and gender equality, was then seen as the main solution against terrorism. These

⁷² Two days after the 9/11 attacks, the expression of Muslim leaders was viewed as insufficient in terms of condemning terrorism even though the Muslim Council of Britain's condemnation of the attacks was reported, similarly to Britain's Federation of Muslim Organizations and the UK Islamic Mission positions (Ajala, 2014: 130). As exemplified by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who stated that she had not "heard enough condemnation from Muslim priests" and that "The people who brought down those towers were Muslims, and Muslims must stand up and say that that is not the way of Islam": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1578377.stm (last accessed on November 30th, 2020).

changes in tone and policy by the New Labour government and the following Conservative governments have given rise to a perception that British multiculturalism was undergoing a “crisis” (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018: 6). This was evidenced by the statement of Ruth Kelly, then-Secretary of State for Communities: “We have moved from a period of uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism, to one where we can encourage that debate by questioning whether it is encouraging separateness”⁷³. Hence, the British modern consensus around multiculturalism has been shaken for the first time and continued under the Cameron governments, with the then Prime Minister famously declaring that the “state doctrine of multiculturalism” had failed, explicitly citing it as a cause of domestic terrorism, and calling for a “muscular liberalism” in response (Cameron, 2011). Several pieces of “anti-extremism” legislation have followed and there has been further tightening of immigration restrictions (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018: 6).

On the other hand, in response to the rising scrutiny over British Muslims, the British state progressively acknowledged Islamophobia and changed the law to recognize and sanction anti-religious prejudices and protect British Muslims. Since the end of the British Empire, cultural groups were defined exclusively in racial terms. For a long time, the UK anti-discrimination law left Muslims as a religious group unprotected. During the 1970s and 1980s, case law had created a situation whereby Sikhs and Jews were defined as ethnic groups in the sense of the Race Relations Act and thereby protected, whereas Muslims were not. Until the 1990s, the British Government was reluctant to include religion as a protected characteristic and supported the anti-discrimination framework in its racial inclination. Some Muslims were deemed to belong to a racial minority and gained indirect protection against religious discrimination. However, the racial inclination of the RRA raised discontent among those Muslims who defined themselves as part of a religious-cultural, rather than a racial group. In reaction to the dissatisfaction expressed by Muslims, Britain has undergone far-reaching changes regarding religious discrimination. In 2000, Lord Ahmed, the first Muslim Peer in the House of Lords, introduced a bill to amend the RRA with a provision on religious discrimination. He proposed adding “religion” as a new category to the existing law. This legal situation garnered academic attention so that in 1997, the Runnymede Trust published a report that engaged with manifestations of Islamophobia in Britain and put forward a comprehensive definition of Islamophobia that has since become a key reference for international research (Lewicki, 2014: 122). Finally, the Equality Act of 2006 provided broad protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and established an integrated Commission on Equality and Human Rights.

⁷³ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5281572.stm (last accessed on November 30th, 2020)

To sum up, at the start of my empirical study on the British field in 2009 (chapter 5), the tone of public discourse on Islam is ambivalent. On the one hand, since 2005-2006, the hegemonic discourse of British multiculturalism has been challenged by New Labour's new rhetoric of "community cohesion", questioning Muslims' loyalty. The rising scrutiny over Muslims led to the emergence of the English Defence League in 2009, which organised anti-Muslims demonstrations on a regular basis. In a way, it also led some politicians to conflate anti-Muslim and anti-immigration feelings to promote Brexit. On the other hand, such hostility toward British Muslims has encouraged the British state to acknowledge the phenomenon of Islamophobia and to change the law to recognize and sanction anti-religious prejudices and protect British Muslims.

3.3. From *indigènes* to Muslims in post-colonial France

Finally, the "Muslim question" in France is intimately linked to its colonial relation to North Africa. As seen in section 2, French politics toward Islam have always been correlated to the safeguard of its domination of North Africa, and particularly Algeria. Consistently, the great majority of French Muslims originate from North Africa and, the question of Islam in France, from public discourses to state regulation, is tinted with colonial legacies.

Although most migration of Muslim populations to France happened after World War II, the first wave dates to the 19th century, and, by the beginning of World War I, hundreds of Berbers lived in France. The first Berber workers were recruited at the time when Italian guest workers started striking at the turn of the 20th century. After the successful recruitment of Berbers workers, French companies started to recruit more Algerian labor. In the meantime, during World War I, the colonial authorities recruited labor from the French colonies and protectorates, and migrants were used as infantrymen in the army. After the end of the war, those soldiers recruited from the colonies decided to settle in France (Kaya, 2009: 62). Besides, as the need for foreign labor increased due to the reconstruction of the country, the *Société Générale d'immigration* (SGI) was created in 1924 to regulate the recruitment process. This need for a cheap labor force increased even more in the aftermath of World War II, and France received migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1970s. Aside from labor immigration, French immigration is marked by the decolonization of North Africa, and more particularly the Algerian war (1954-1962). Following the defeat of France, French nationals living in Algeria, known as "*pièdes-noirs*" ("black feet"), and many Muslim Algerians who had allied the French Army during the war, known as *harki*, left Algeria, and settled in France. To allow these *harki* to flee to France and avoid execution, France maintained open borders with its former colony. This generated the migration of hundreds of thousands of individuals over the following half-decade, many of whom were fleeing the

economic fallout of the eight-year struggle for independence. Furthermore, shortly after the signing of the Evian agreements in 1962, the French and the Algerian governments signed a workforce agreement that led to a concentration of Algerian population in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. In 1963 a labor recruitment agreement was also concluded with Morocco, leading to a significant increase in the number of Moroccan workers from 33 000 in 1962 to 260 000 by 1975. Family reunification increased from the early 1970s. However, in 1973, an oil embargo by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) followed the nationalization of Algerian oil resources, which were under French control up to that point, provoked an oil crisis and growing unemployment in France. Consequently, labor immigration was halted in 1974 and part of the French public opinion to associate the oil impoverishment and the economic crisis with “Arabs” adding to the post-colonial resentment present in part of the French population, which was coupled with a growing stream of anti-Arab violence between 1971 and 1973. Since then, the “problem of immigration” has become a pivotal issue in the public space (Jelen, 2005: 4). However, the “problem” was associated with the Muslims in general, and Arabs in particular, rather than with other immigrants of European origin such as Portuguese for example. This was the beginning of the marginalization of North African immigrants (Scott, 2007: 68).

The changing perception of foreign labor by the French public can also be through the transformation of the naming of non-European immigrants. Since the 1980s, “immigrant” in France has been synonymous with North African known as “*maghrébins*”. The use of the word “*immigré*” has become highly politicized and has come to bear very negative implications, in contrast with that of “*étranger*” (foreigner). The former refers to those non-European foreigners, who are mostly Muslims originating from North Africa, Sub-Sahara, and Turkey, whereas the use of the latter is mainly reserved for other foreigners of European or Westerner origin. Besides, the use of the term “*immigré*” did not only apply to actual immigrants, but also the children of immigrants born and raised in France. Progressively, conflation came with the word Muslim to refer to all immigrants of North African origin, whatever their religion. No further distinction was made between North Africans, Arabs, and Muslims, although not all North Africans were Arabs, not all Arabs were Muslims, and not all Muslims were North Africans: ethnicity and religion were conflated and negatively reinforced one another. Although Arabs were not referred to as a separate “race”, as the word “race” has largely disappeared from French vocabulary since WWII, their status as former colonial *indigènes* amounted to the same, in the insistence on their fundamental difference and inferiority (*ibid*: 44). Though the Algerian War had ended in 1962, those who had opposed independence were still active. Two million soldiers had fought to keep Algeria French of which thirty-five thousand died, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of *pieds-noirs* who vehemently resented both the newly independent colony, and the French government for abandoning it. Such

experience left a trauma that continued long after the signing of the Evian Accords in 1962. While OAS commandos⁷⁴, pursued by the police, vagabonded the French countryside, some disaffected *pieds-noirs* were mobilized by what would eventually emerge as the National Front. On the other side, part of the French Left who had supported the liberation of the former colony, watched with apprehension the development of the new Algerian nation. Besides, the geographical and historical “closeness” of North African countries has increased the perception of unstoppable waves of people coming to France. And, as millions of migrants arrived in France, from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia as well as sub-Saharan countries⁷⁵, the question of what it means to be French emerged in public discourse. Hence, the stereotypes of colonialism were revived in debates about “*immigrés*”, but the language of conquest was reversed. Now the question was whether the former colonial subjects would overrun the French homeland and France would undergo “Islamization”. Muslims became an enemy within, neither entirely foreign nor yet full members of the French imagined community. Besides, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 changed the terms of these conversations, drawing attention away from economic and social influences to religion⁷⁶. The conclusion, repeatedly, was that unless North Africans gave up Islam, they could not become French, recalling to a certain extent the “*code de l’indigénat*” (Scott, 2007: 81).

Consequently to the problematization of North African and Muslim immigration, the government revised the code of nationality in 1993 and stipulated that citizenship would no longer be extended as a matter of course to children born in France of foreign-born parents. These second-generation residents now had to ask to become citizens, indicating their desire as individuals to enter the social contract and their willingness to put communitarian loyalties behind. Further, children of Algerians who were born before independence needed to supply proof of “*enracinement*” (rootedness) to qualify for citizenship. What was predominantly complained of in general by the political elite and public was the increasing visibility of the non-European and Islamic way of life in everyday life in France. While France became a *de facto* multicultural country, it still held a strong assimilation model, quite unique among its European counterparts. France is usually perceived as being very rigid regarding multiculturalism and known to reject any recognition of groups on an ethnic,

⁷⁴ OAS: *Organisation Armée secrète*, meaning Secret Armed Organisation).

⁷⁵ From 410 000 Algerians living in France on the eve of the independence in 1962 (Weil, 1996), by 1999, they were more than 700 000 together with some 1 million French citizens of Maghrebi origin (Lanier, 1991; and de Haas, 2005: 8). Besides the North Africans who came to France, there were also thousands of Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa who chose France as their final destination (Kaya, 2009: 63).

⁷⁶ Those on the left, who had cheered Third World revolutions, found little to hope for in this religiously driven uprising; those on the right, who feared such revolutions, were confirmed in their hostility. Both sides converged on images of veiled women as emblematic of the loss of rights the Iranian revolution represented.

cultural, or religious basis. In the French imagined community, as Imène Ajala noted, the acceptance of minority politics would imply a form of renunciation to the Republican myth of integration and to the general interest (Ajala, 2014: 128). This assimilationist model of integration seems to bear a resemblance with France's colonial civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*) (Bleich, 2005). In the 19th century, advocates of assimilationism assumed that natives of the colonies would go through a stage of cultural assimilation before being eligible for French citizenship. Unlike the British model of colonialism, the French colonial elite preferred to form and strictly control centrally planned mission schools in her colonies, whereby colonised *indigènes* were indoctrinated through universal values to become a part of the civilized imagined community. Hence, the visibility of a different way of life, particularly with the first affair of the veil at the end of the 1980s, was perceived by the general public as a threat against the French and Western civilisation, which has always been the constitutive leitmotiv of the French Republic assimilationist model.

The shift in the politicization of Islam in France began when the question of the "*foulard*" or "*voile*" (Islamic headscarf) first hit the headlines in October 1989. Ernest Chenière, a headmaster of Creil, a suburb of northern Paris, refused to authorize three girls to come to school wearing their headscarves because this would contradict the republican principle of *laïcité*. The then Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, intervened and overturned the suspension order, declaring that even students who insisted on wearing headscarves had to be accepted in the school. However, Jospin underlined the secularity of public schools, which should not tolerate proselytism. He urged parents to accept that their religion should be treated as "a private affair" in the name of furthering their children's social integration. Hence, while Jospin discursively discouraged students from arriving in headscarves in the name of French secularity, he ultimately declared: "the school must not exclude children" (Thomas, 2000: 183). Still, both the French right and the left condemned Jospin's decision and supported Chenière's original suspension in the name of the French Republican tradition of *laïcité*. Intellectuals like Régis Debray and Alain Finkelkraut went as far as associating Jospin's decision to that of France and Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany, comparing the growth of Islam in France to the rise of the Third Reich. Another famous French intellectual, Bernard-Henri Lévy, described the headmaster's action as a victory for the enlightenment over the forces of darkness and obscurantism. Consequently, the headscarf issue was mostly presented in the public debate as a demarcation line between modernity and tradition, between Western civilization and Islamic fundamentalism, and between *laïcité* and Islamism. Several prominent feminists like Gisèle Halimi, member of the *SOS-Racisme*, Yvette Roudy, a former Minister of Women's Rights, and Dominique Schnapper, a leading sociologist, supported this position and argued for the exclusion of girls wearing headscarves. This moment of

politicization of the Islamic veil was aggravated by the eruption of the Algerian conflict on the French territory in the 1990s, when Islamist networks sought to recruit followers, especially in France, to help the GIA (the Algerian Armed Islamic Group). This culminated in the 1995 Paris bombings in protest of the French support to the Algerian military regime. The fact that the leader of the operation, Khaled Kelkal, was born and raised in France marked the shift from politicization to securitization. Hence, the securitization of Islam predated 9/11, which aggravated the process rather than igniting it. A couple years after the attacks in New York, the veil affair re-emerged in the public sphere when the French government passed a law prohibiting the wearing of signs or clothing that “ostensibly” manifested religious affiliation in public schools. Although the wording was neutral, everyone understood this law as the prohibition of the Islamic headscarf. It was based on the recommendations of two commissions formed in 2003, one by the Parliament, the other by President Jacques Chirac – the Stasi Commission. Their statements and the media coverage of the episode presented Islamic radicalism as a serious danger to French society and its secular tradition. Both commissions voted almost unanimously in favor of a law that was adopted by a large majority in the National Assembly and the Senate and took effect in September 2004. This politico-legal moment in 2004 inaugurated a decade marked by the proliferation of public interventions in the religious domain focused on Islam, which culminated with the adoption in September 2010 of a law banning the full veil from the public space⁷⁷.

On the other hand, and despite the paradigm of secularism, the French state has pursued a national Islam policy since the beginning of the 2000s, as shown in particular by the efforts to establish a representative Muslim body. The French government, in particular the Ministry of the Interior, has made an effort at institutionalization, also had the symbolic intention of assigning Islam a place in the republic. This led to the creation in 2003, under the impulse of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM). The CFCM was created as the official interlocutor of the public authorities soliciting advice on all matters relating to Islam, such as the training of imams, the building of mosques, and the maintenance of cemetery places (Kaya, 2014: 198). It was also aimed at legitimizing Islam to a certain extent, as part of the French Republic (Brunn, 2012: 81). This development, according to Christin

⁷⁷ On 27 June 2008, the Council of State refused French nationality to a Moroccan national, married to a Frenchman, considering that she had “adopted a radical practice of her religion, incompatible with the essential values of the French community, and in particular with the principle of gender equality”. A year later, a second case arose in France when a family was denied access to social housing because they had worn the full veil in Vénissieux, a suburb of Lyon. In June 2009, at the instigation of André Gérin – Communist deputy and mayor of Vénissieux – a group of parliamentarians called for the creation of a commission of enquiry into the wearing of the full veil. The then President Nicolas Sarkozy seized the debate during his speech to Congress where he stated that “the burqa is not welcome on the territory of the Republic”. The following day, a parliamentary fact-finding mission composed of 32 deputies from all sides was set up to work for six months on the issue of the wearing of the full veil in France. A year later, the law banning the wearing of the full veil in the public space was definitely adopted by the Parliament.

Brunn, was a consequence of the French state's strategy, which intensified since 1990, not only to control Islam and define the relationship of the second largest religious community to the state but also to nationalize Islam (*ibid*). Later on, during his presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy has repeatedly advocated a French Islam and praised the CFCM as “a factor of integration and appeasement”⁷⁸.

In sum, at the end of the 2000s, when my empirical study starts on the French field (chapter 6), France has the largest Muslim minority in Western Europe and the Muslim question punctuates the public debate, particularly regarding the compatibility between Islam and the French Republic through the question of the Islamic veil. And, while the government has begun to allocate a place for Islam within the French Republic, and with it, the “Frenchization” of Islam through the creation of the CFCM, it has also legislated to reduce Muslim freedom of religion. This context will be significantly aggravated following the terror attacks on French soil in 2012 and onwards.

Summary

In this chapter I identified, the “Muslim question” in Germany, Britain, and France as linked to specific historical backgrounds and special relationships to the Orient since the turn of the 20th century. Such specificities had lasting effects on immigration, integration, and religious policies in contemporary Germany, Britain, and France. Hence, when my empirical research on public discourse starts in 2009, the three countries are facing particular political contexts regarding Islam. The German public tone on Islam is ambivalent, in between federal recognition and integration and a popular rise of Islamophobia, particularly in East Germany. In Britain, the hegemonic discourse of multiculturalism has been challenged by the New Labour rhetoric of “community cohesion” in the mid-2000s while, at the same time, successive governments have progressively acknowledged and sanctioned anti-religious prejudices to protect British Muslims. Finally, the French public debate has been punctuated with regular controversies on the compatibility between Islam and the French Republic or French *laïcité*, while the attempt at institutionalizing Islam through the CFCM has been regarded with great criticism. With this in-depth historical contextualization in mind, the next three chapters will investigate the narrative stories of (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims in public discourses in the three countries under studies between 2009 and 2019.

⁷⁸ Nicolas Sarkozy (2007): “Allocution du Président de la République lors de la rupture du jeûne à la Grande Mosquée de Paris”, : <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/167925-declaration-de-m-nicolas-sarkozy-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-pl>, last accessed on December 13th, 2020

Table 4. Synthetic (bi)stories of German, British, and French interactions with Islam from the 19th century to contemporary times

Case	Historical frame	Stories		
		Self	(Eastern) Friends and Foes	Relations to the Orient
Germany	Orientalist vision	Easterner-Westerner, Protestant, materialist, declining	<i>Friends</i> : Islam as religion spiritual, exotic, mysterious	Distant, off-ground inclination to Islam
			<i>Foes</i> : The corrupted Levantine, fatalist and degenerated	
	Imperial interactions	Easterner-Westerner, Protector of Islam against colonial powers	<i>Friends</i> : the Turkish <i>Herrenvolk</i> Warriors, superior to the Arabs	Alliance to the Ottoman Empire
			<i>Foes</i> : The Levantine (French allies) and Arab nationalists (British allies)	Pan Islamic policy against French and British colonial powers
	Contemporary relations	Westerner, liberal-democrat	<i>Friends</i> : educated, economically useful and with low demographic rate Muslim	Post-war immigration from economic partnerships (Turkish in majority) Culturalist – multiculturalist
			<i>Foes</i> : Uneducated, low skilled, economical drain who tarnish the German economic miracle	
Britain	Orientalist vision	Westerner, Puritan, Christian	<i>Friends</i> : The Romantic Arab of the Desert Nobility, hospitality, independence	Paternalistic, intimate relation to the Bedouins
			<i>Foes</i> : The corrupted Levantine, French of the East, and transmitter of European vices to the East	
	Imperial interactions	Westerner, sophisticated, Protector of the Arab nationalists	<i>Friends</i> : The Arab nationalists	Indirect rule Arabic pan-Islamism
			<i>Foes</i> : The Levantines (French allies) and the Turkish rulers (German allies)	
	Contemporary relations	Westerner, liberal, tolerant	<i>Friends</i> : Muslims from the commonwealth organised in religious communities, committed to political and economic liberalism	Post-imperial immigration (Southeast Asian in majority) Multiculturalist
			<i>Foes</i> : traditionalist, anti-liberal, separatist Muslim, who does not engage in the community	
France	Orientalist vision	Enlightened/ Christian	<i>Friends</i> : Eastern Christians, oppressed by the Muslim majority	Fear and hostility toward Muslims
			<i>Foes</i> : Islam as the absolute enemy Despotic, barbaric, hostile	
	Imperial interactions	European, civilised, Protector of Eastern Christians	<i>Friends</i> : Eastern Christian (Maronites)	Direct rule Particularistic policy against pan Arabism and pan Islamism
			<i>Foes</i> : Muslim and Arab nationalists, extremists, fanatics, dangerous	
	Contemporary relations	Westerner, Republican, <i>laïque</i>	<i>Friends</i> : moderate, enlightened, and secularized Muslim, who practices discretely	Post-colonial immigration (North Africans in majority) Assimilationist
			<i>Foes</i> : Obscurantist, extremist Muslims, veiled Muslim women or beard Muslim men who practice ostensibly	

Chapter 4 – Narrating Islam, security and identity in public discourse in contemporary Germany (2009-2019)

This chapter explores the way Islam, security, and identity, are interlinked in contemporary public discourse through the narrative analysis of 118 speeches of 22 German actors from the political elite and the media set up between 2009 and 2019. As exposed in the methodology chapter, I combine deductive and inductive methods of discourse inquiries. I establish meta-categories drawing on both OPCODE literature (*vision of the self, vision of the other, vision of the world*) and narratology, including the *setting(s)*, the *characterization(s)*, and the *plot(s)*. Then, I inductively code each discourse insisting on individual particularities, while checking the presence of security and/or identity narratives regarding Islam and Muslims. Finally, I proceed to a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to map out the German discursive landscape of (de)securitization of Islam. Accordingly, section 1 presents the selection of German narrators, section 2 exposes German settings, characterizations, and plots, and the final section 3 explores the extend and degrees of (de)securitization of Islam and Muslim in the German public discursive space.

Section 1. German narrators

The selection of German narrators follows a double exigency of providing idiosyncrasy and allowing the comparison to the British and French cases. First, they have to represent the German political landscape involved in the debates on Islam, identity, and security in a comprehensive way. More precisely, I selected narrators taking part in (de)securitizing processes, understood in a broad sense, or a “post-Copenhagen” sense, that includes actors of the opposition as well as actors of the media set up. Second, German narrators have to be somehow comparable to those of the British and French cases. Hence, I chose actors whose involvement and audience in the public debate on Islam, security, and identity were comparable, even if they did not hold the same position in their respective country. For example, I selected more local leaders in the German case, consistently with German federalism, as I did in the more centralized French case. To focus the selection on the German case, where my prior knowledge was less than in the British and the French cases, I had the help of an informant, Dr. Luiz Hernandez Aguilar, specialized in German discourses on Islam in the *Deutsche Islamkonferenz* (DIK)⁷⁹. With the aid of his insights, I selected official state leaders within the Union in power

⁷⁹ Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the project *EnGendering Europe's Muslim Question* (NWO Vici project, 2018-2023). Previously, he was a Fellow at the Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Technical University Berlin, and Researcher at the project: *Counter-Islamophobia Kit Project: Countering Islamophobia through the Use of Best Practice in Counter-Narratives in EU Member States*, funded by the European Commission – Directorate of Justice. Luis M. Hernandez research

(CDU/CSU), political leaders from the main parties alternatively in- and out the coalition during the period under study (SPD/FDP), as well as political leaders within traditional and new opposition parties (*Die Linke*, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, and *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD)). Consequently, I selected narrators in power, narrators running for power, and I added 8 narrators from the German media set-up. For each of them, I selected 4 to 8 speeches between 2009 and 2019, particularly around 2015-2016 and the outbreak of the European migrant crisis, according to 3 criteria. First, I selected speeches according to the status and audience, meaning that the more important the status, the more speeches selected. Second, I selected speeches following the principle of saturation, meaning that I dropped speeches when the addition of new data did not bring anything more to the analysis. Finally, I selected discourses according to their relevance to my research question, that is, discourses dealing with security, identity, and Islam, through various topics going from refugees to terrorism, *Leitkultur*, or foreign policy in the MENA region. Following these methodological exigencies and in accordance with the necessities of the comparative perspective, I selected 118 speeches steaming from 22 German actors, whom I will briefly present in the next sections. In the following sections, I draw up a synthetic biography of each selected narrator with a special focus on their relevance to the study of securitizing processes in general and to that of the public debate on Islam in particular. However, since the present dissertation focuses less on the weight of personal trajectories than on that of collective imaginaries on the processes of (de)securitizing Islam, I provide superficial rather than systematic investigation (such as sociological interviews or photographic research).

1.1 Political actors in or running for power

I selected three members of the so-called Union between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Party (CSU)⁸⁰. Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Minister of the Interior Thomas De Maizière (CDU) represent the liberal-conservative trend in power, while Hans-Peter Friedrich, leader of the CSU and former Minister of the Interior, represents a more conservative tendency. Angela Merkel has been Chancellor of Germany since 2005, leader of the CDU between 2000 and 2018, and member of the Bundestag since German reunification. She originates from a Lutheran family in East Germany, where she was a research scientist in chemistry until the fall of the Berlin Wall. She is considered to have played a central role in the

focuses on theories of race and racism, Islamophobia, theories of the state, postcolonial theory, gender, and sexuality, as well as discourse analysis. His monograph *Governing Muslims and Islam in Contemporary Germany, Race, Time, and the German Islam Conference* was published by Brill in 2018. Source: <https://www.uva.nl/en/profile/h/e/l.m.hernandezaguilar/l.m.hernandez-aguilar.html?cb> (retrieved on June, 7th, 2021).

⁸⁰ *Die Union* is the centre-right and Christian-democratic political alliance at the federal level of two “brother parties”, the Christian Democratic Union present in all Lander except from Bavaria, and the Christian Social Party, present only in Bavaria.

politics of the EU and was President of the European Council during the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon. She dedicated her Chancellorship to strengthening transatlantic economic relations and managing the financial and sovereign debt crisis at the European level, and, at the national level, to health care reforms, energy transition and the European migrant crisis management. She tends to be compared to Margaret Thatcher (“The Iron Frau”) and to Otto von Bismark (“Iron Chancellor”). As leader of Germany since the beginning of my case study, she is naturally a preferred narrator to study discourses of (de)securitization in German public discourses. I selected 7 speeches from 2012 to 2018, tackling the government policy and the European migrant crisis (2015(2), 2017(3)), security (2017(1)), terrorism (2015(1)), and the EU (2012, 2017(2), 2018), in various contexts such as the European Parliament, the Bundestag, or press conferences. Former Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizièrè had been in Chancellor Merkel’s cabinet during the entire period under study and has been a member of the German Bundestag for Meissen since 2009. He comes from a French Huguenots family who fled to Prussia at the end of the 17th century. He became a member of the West German team in the negotiations on German Reunification and worked afterward to the democratization of structures in the former German Democratic Republic. While he served as Federal Minister of the Interior (2009-2011 and 2013-2018) and Minister of Defence (2011-2013), Thomas de Maizièrè was marked as being at the centre of the NSA-spying scandal. He played a special role in preventing foreign fighters after the surfacing of ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2014 and called for limiting the number of asylum seekers during the European Migrant Crisis of 2015, sometimes as a counter to Merkel’s stand on the matter. He is of particular interest to this study for his promotion of German *Leitkultur* (“guiding” or “core culture”) defended in a 2017 column published in the *Bild am Sonntag*. I selected 7 speeches, running from 2014 to 2017, tackling domestic policy (2014), the European migrant crisis (2016(1) and (2)), terror (2015(1) and (2)), and German *Leitkultur* (2017(2)), both in the Bundestag and in the media. Finally, former Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich who originates from Bavaria where he has been a member of the CSU since 1975. After working in the economic department of the German Embassy in Washington he was elected to the Bundestag in 1998. In 2005, his party joined Merkel’s coalition and later, he succeeded Thomas de Maizièrè as Minister of the Interior (2012-2013), shortly thereafter he was sworn in as Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture in 2013 and resigned in 2014 on charges of betrayal of state secrets. Since then, he is vice-president of the Bundestag along with Thomas Oppermann. Hans-Peter Friedrich has been controversial for his 2011 declaration that Islam belonging to Germany was not supported by history, contradicting Merkel’s official position on the matter. I selected 6 speeches from 2012 to 2018, of which three media interviews and three

interventions in the Bundestag, tackling the European migrant crisis (2012, 2015(2)), Islam in Germany (2015(1)), foreign policy (2016), the EU (2017), and the AfD (2018).

I selected three members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), former Party leader Thomas Oppermann, Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in Berlin Bundesrat, Raed Saleh, and former Federal Minister of Justice and current Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas. Thomas Oppermann was born in West Germany and spent some time in the USA after his *Abitur*, working for the German organisation Action Reconciliation Service for Peace (ASF), aimed at confronting the legacy of Nazism. He has been member of the SPD since 1980, becoming a member of the Bundestag in 2005 within the Seeheim Circle⁸¹. During the 2009 campaign, he was appointed shadow minister of the Interior as counterpart of Wolfgang Schäuble. He was the leader of the SPD parliamentary faction in the Bundestag between 2013 and 2017 and took part in the drafting of the SPD electoral program for the 2017 elections, when the SPD experienced the worst results since 1945. Since 2017, Thomas Oppermann has been the vice-president of the Bundestag. I selected 6 discourses between 2013 and 2019, of which 4 speeches in Bundestag on the topics of: German citizenship (2013), terror attacks in Paris (2015), German foreign policy (2016), and the EU (2017(2)). Further, one column about the European migrant crisis published in the FAZ (2017(1)) and an interview given to the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on EU-USA relations (2019) were also chosen. Raed Saleh is a Palestinian born German politician, confessed Muslim, and son of a “guest worker” (*Gästarbeiter*) who arrived in Germany in 1882. Entrepreneur since 2005, he entered the Berlin House of Representatives in 2006, where he worked in several committees as well as integration policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group, before he became chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in December 2011. Raed Saleh defines himself as a moderate and a social democrat and defends three main political lines: education, economic strength, and integration. His discourse is even more relevant to this study as he called for a debate on a new German *Leitkultur*, to which he dedicated his book *I German: The new guiding culture* (2017)⁸². I selected 5 discourses from 2014 to 2017, of which Saleh’s letter for Berlin mayor election (2014), two columns on German *Leitkultur* (2015(2); 2016), and two speeches on terrorism, one published in the *Tagesspiegel* (2015(1)), and a one given in the Berlin Bundesrat (2017). Finally, Heiko Maas originates from a catholic family in Saarlouis, where he served as lawyer and leader of the SPD from 2000 to 2018. There, he also successively served as Minister of the Environment (1998-1999), Minister of Economy and Deputy Minister-President (2012-2013), before he was sworn in as

⁸¹ *Seeheim Kreis* is an internal grouping of the SPD, founded in 1974 and self-defined as “undogmatic and pragmatic”, supporting liberal-economic politics. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seeheimer_Kreis

⁸² Raed Saleh, *Ich deutsch: Die neue Leitkultur*, Hamburg, hoffmann und campe verlag, 2017.

Federal Minister of Justice in Chancellor Merkel's Cabinet IV in 2013 and as Federal Foreign Minister in 2018. During his former office, he adopted a generous policy regarding the European migrant crisis, for which he has been the recipient of death threats from the Far Right. He also passed laws to fight terrorism, making military training abroad a criminal offense, and to allow the retention of data for criminal investigations. As Foreign Minister, he has hardened the tone against Russia, supported UN resolutions against Israel, and opposed US sanctions against Iran. I selected 8 discourses, among which one speech in the Faculty of Law of the Humboldt University (2016(1)), four interviews given in local and national newspapers on the situation in Syria (2015(3)), terrorism (2015(2); 2017(2)) and integration in Germany (2016), two interventions in Bundestag about terrorism (2017(1)) and Global migration (2018(1)), and his inaugural speech of Federal Foreign Minister (2018(1)).

To represent the German liberal trend in and out government during the period under study, I selected old and new leaders of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Guido Westerwelle and Christian Lindner. Before passing away in 2016 from leukaemia, Guido Westerwelle was a native of North Rhine-Westphalia, and a lawyer who joined the FDP in 1980 where he founded *Junge Liberale* (Young Liberal). He was first elected in Bundestag in 1996 before taking the lead of the Party in 2001 until 2011. In the 2009 elections, he led the FDP to the best result in its post-war history with 14.6 percent of the votes, committing his party to a "black-yellow coalition" with the CDU/CSU. He then became Vice-Chancellor (2009-2011) and Federal Foreign Minister (2009-2013) of Merkel's second Cabinet. I selected 5 discourses from 2010 to 2013, 2 in Bundestag (2010(1) and (2)), one speech at the Munich Security Conference (2012(1)), one speech in the UN (2012(2)), and one interview in a local newspaper (2013). Also native of North Rhine-Westphalia, Christian Lindner has a background in political science, but he never completed his doctorate due to his political engagements. He joined the FDP in 1995 and became the youngest elected MP in the Landtag in 2000 at the age of 21. In 2004, he became the secretary general of the FDP in North Rhine-Westphalia before he was elected chairman in 2013 when the party got ruled out of government and parliament. In 2017, after unsuccessful negotiations to form a coalition, the FDP entered the opposition along with *Die Linke*, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* and the AfD. I selected four speeches, two in the Bundestag (2010 and 2018(1)), one at the Federal Party Congress (2018(2)), and one interview in the national newspaper *Die Zeit* (2019).

To represent the opposition and the anti-capitalist stream within the German Left, I selected former leader Gregor Gysi and MP Sahra Wagenknecht from *Die Linke*. Gregor Gysi is one of the central figures of the German Left who has had a formative influence on political events in Germany since the political change of 1989/1990. Former member of the East German Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), he was Deputy

Governing Mayor of Berlin in 2002, leader of *Die Linke* from 2005 to 2015, and President of the Party of the European Left since 2016. His political successes include the transformation of the former SED into the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and finally to *Die Linke*. Gregor Gysi contributed significantly to the nationwide establishment of his party before the change of leadership to the benefit of Sahra Wagenknecht. I selected 6 discourses between 2013 and 2018, of which 5 speeches in Bundestag, tackling domestic (2013) and foreign policy (2018), terrorism (2015(1)), the European migrant crisis (2015(2)), and religious freedom (2016), as well as an interview on the EU (2018). Born in East Germany from an Iranian father and a German mother, Sahra Wagenknecht joined the future PDS in early 1989. After the fall of the Berlin wall, she became a member of the orthodox Marxist faction of the PDS and represented it in the European Parliament by 1999. Recently, Sahra Wagenknecht is one of the most contested figure of *Die Linke* because of her fierce critique of Merkel's open policy regarding the European migrant crisis⁸³ and her intervention following the 2015/2016 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne, claiming that "whoever abuses the right of hospitality forfeits that right"⁸⁴. Since 2018, she has participated in the creation of the left-populist movement *Aufstehen*, which has been compared to the French *La France Insoumise* (FI). I selected 5 discourses from 2014 to 2018, two addresses to the Bundestag (2014; 2016(1)) and 3 interviews in the media (2016(2; 2018(1) and (2)), tackling the European migrant crisis, domestic policy, and *Aufstehen*.

I selected the co-chairmen of the Alliance '90/The Greens Party (*Bundnis 90/Die Grünen*), aka the Greens, for the period 2013-2018, Cem Özdemir and Simone Peter, represent two traditional lines within the Greens, respectively the "*Realos*" and the "*Fundis*". The former defends a pragmatic line toward the centre, while the latter is attached to a leftist anchorage. Cem Özdemir is born near Stuttgart, from a Turkish "guest worker", where he worked as educator and freelance journalist before he became the first of Turkish descent elected in the Bundestag in 1994. He was member of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2009, co-chaired the Green Party from 2009 to 2018, first with Claudia Roth and then with Simone Peter. Cem Özdemir declares himself as a "Secular Muslim" and a fierce opponent to Turkish President Erdogan, to such a degree that he opposed the accession of Turkey to the EU under his presidency. I selected 5 speeches, of which one interview on the topic of German migration politics (2011), one press conference following the Paris terror attacks (2015), one column on integration published in the FAZ (2016), and two speeches in the

⁸³ Stating for example that "the admission and integration of a large number of refugees and migrants are much more difficult than what Merkel wanted us to believe with her frivolous 'we can do that' last fall", in: Matthias Meisner, "Linke fallen über Sahra Wagenknecht her", *Der Tagesspiegel*, July 27th, 2016, consulted on January, the 24th, 2018.

⁸⁴ Kevin Hagen, "Wagenknecht und das Asylrecht. Die Gast-Rechte", *Spiegel online*, January, 14th, 2016: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/sahra-wagenknecht-zum-asylrecht-die-gast-rechte-a-1071614.html>

Bundestag regarding Europe (2017(1)) and German general situation (2017(2)). Simone Peter has been a member of the Greens since 1996. She holds a doctorate in microbiology and has worked as research associate and editor for the journal *Solarzeitalter* before entering the Agency for renewable energy in Berlin, where she worked from 2004 to 2009 before becoming its honorary president. After being spokesperson of the Greens on several occasions between 1999 and 2004, she became State Minister of the Environment, Energy and Transport of Saarland. She is known for non-consensual positions within her party, criticizing the exportation of arms to the Kurdish forces in the struggle against ISIS, and on the police handling of the assaults of 2016 New Year's Eve in Cologne. I selected 5 speeches, of which two speeches in the Party Federal Congress (2013, 2016(2)), and three interviews given in national and online media on terrorism (2015), the European migrant crisis (2016(1)), and the situation of the Green Party (2017).

Finally, I selected former leader and leader of the Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland* – AfD)⁸⁵, Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland. Chemist, businesswomen and member of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Saxony, Frauke Petry was the spokesperson (2013-2015) and the leader of the AfD (2015-2017) before leaving the party in 2017, in opposition to what she called anarchy in the party. She defines herself as national conservative and is sometimes considered as such⁸⁶, while others describe her as representative of the far right of the party⁸⁷. Leaving the AfD after her election in the Bundestag in September 2017, she created the Blue Party (*Blau Partei*) to offer a more moderate and credible conservative line. I selected 6 discourses, of which 2 speeches of the Party Federal Congress when she led the AfD (2016; 2017), and 4 speeches in the Bundestag after her withdrawal from the AfD, on Islam (2018 (1)) and migration (2018(2), (3) and (4)). Co-founder of the AfD party, Alexander Gauland was born in former East Germany but fled as a refugee to West Germany at the end of the 1950s where he completed a PhD in International Law. He worked in the Office of the Mayor of Frankfurt before joining the cabinet of the Hessian Prime Minister. Formerly a member of the CDU, Gauland failed to make the party more conservative, and Merkel's handling of the Greece crisis led him to co-found the future AfD. He became chairman of the AfD in the Bundestag before he succeeded Frauke Petry at the head of the party in 2017. I selected 8 speeches from 2016

⁸⁵ AfD was founded in 2013 during the Eurozone crisis by conservative intellectuals who opposed the euro-bailout and rescue packages, especially the German contribution to the Greek bailout.

⁸⁶ Frank Decker: *Alternative für Deutschland und Pegida. Die Ankunft des neuen Rechtspopulismus in der Bundesrepublik*. In: Frank Decker, Bernd Henningsen, Kjetil Jakobsen (Hrsg.): *Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus in Europa. Die Herausforderung der Zivilgesellschaft durch alte Ideologien und neue Medien* (= *International Studies on Populism*. Bd. 2). Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-1206-9, S. 75–90, hier: S. 80.

⁸⁷ Mudde, Cas (13 March 2016). *"One Alternative for Germany or Many? The Mixed Message of the German State Elections"*. *The Huffington Post*.

to 2019, including one declaration after the New Year's Eve assaults in Cologne (2016), one *Parteitag* speech (2017(1)), and 6 speeches in Bundestag regarding German foreign policy in the Middle East (2017(2) and (3); 2018(2)), general government policy (2018(1)), migration (2018(3)), and Europe (2019).

1.2. Media actors

First, I selected four actors within German feminism, who are solicited and active on the public debate on Islam and immigration. On the one hand, I chose representatives of the so-called Islam-critic trend (*Islamkritiker*), Alice Schwarzer and Necla Kelek, who publicly adopt a critical stand on Islam on behalf of feminism. I chose two representatives of the feminist trend. Alice Schwarzer is a German self-declared feminist and Islam-critic. After studying in France, she free-lanced as a journalist in Paris in the 1970's. In April 1971, she published alongside Simone de Beauvoir and Catherine Deneuve the *Manifesto of the 343* and was one of the founders of the famous French *Mouvement de Libération des Femmes* (MLF) that she subsequently exported to Germany. Embedded in the Second wave feminism, Alice Schwarzer is in favor of prohibiting women wearing the hijab in schools or any other public settings. She argued on her 2014 blog and her journal *EMMA* that there exists an Islamic 'conspiracy' behind Muslim women's demands for self-determination, politically symbolized by the wearing of the hijab. She repeatedly warned that the "Islamization" of Europe would lead to an erosion of women's rights. I selected 4 discourses between 2010 and 2018, of which a column about Necla Kelek's work published in der FAZ (2010), a tribune to support a potential burka ban in Germany published in her magazine *EMMA* (2014), an interview given to *Der Spiegel* in reaction to the New Year's Eve assaults in Cologne (2016), and finally, a column regarding the Merkel-Seehofer debate on whether Islam belongs to Germany, published in *EMMA* (2018). Necla Kelek is a Turkish born German social scientist and feminist, who publishes in Alice Schwarzer's magazine *EMMA*. Educated in a Left Turkish background, she is considered a secular Muslim and has been at the core of several controversies regarding migration and Islam, particularly after the publication of her books *The Foreign Bride* (2005)⁸⁸ and *The Lost Sons* (2006),⁸⁹ where she depicts Turkish culture and Islamic religion as obstacles to integration. Since then, she has been solicited as expert on Islam in Germany and took part, in that respect, in the DIK in 2009 where she exposed her vision of the headscarf as being a religious misinterpretation. She also half-heartedly supported Thilo Sarrazin's position on immigration. I selected 4 discourses, of which a column on Thilo Sarrazin published in the FAZ

⁸⁸ Necla Kelek, *Die fremde Braut. Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens in Deutschland*, Cologne, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2005.

⁸⁹ Necla Kelek, *Die verloren Söhne. Plädoyer für die Befreiung des türkisch-muslimischen Mannes*, Cologne, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2006.

(2010), a tribune on immigration published in Focus (2015), and two interviews on the European migrant crisis (2016(1)) and the New Year's Eve assaults in Cologne (2016(2)).

On the other hand, in contrast to Islam-critic trend (*Islamkritiker*) described above, I selected two representatives of so-called “net feminism” (*netzfeminismus*), Anne Wizorek and Mithu Sanyal, who often oppose Islam-critic feminists. Anne Wizorek is a German feminist, known for her tweets #outcry (#aufschrei)⁹⁰, followed by her book *Because one outcry is not enough* (2014),⁹¹ which triggered a national media-led controversy on sexism. Anne Wizorek grew up in Rüdersdorf near Berlin and studied literature at the Free University of Berlin and Scandinavian Studies at the Humboldt University of Berlin. From 2013 to 2018, she ran the socio-political and pop-culture blog *kleinerdrei*⁹². After the sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015-2016, she used the new hashtag #withoutexception (#Ausnahmslos) against sexism and racism, deploring the German double standards in the reporting of the sexual assaults that occurred at the NYE celebrations in Cologne compared to those that occurred during Oktoberfest. From 2015 to 2017, she was a member of the expert commission for the Federal Government's Second Equal Opportunities Report and became ambassador of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency against gender discrimination in 2014. I selected 4 interviews given mostly to online papers, the *ARD* (2014), the *Frankfurter Rundschau* (2016(1)), *Der Spiegel* (2016(2)), and the *Südkurier* (2017). Mithu Melanie Sanyal is a German cultural scientist, journalist and author, whose main topics are pop culture, postcolonialism and feminism. She was born in 1971 in Düsseldorf, to a Polish mother and Indian father. She studied German and English literature and wrote her doctorate on the cultural history of the female genitals, which resulted in the book *Vulva* (2009),⁹³ which is considered a pioneering work. Since 1996, Mithu Sanyal has been a permanent author for *Westdeutscher Rundfunk Köln* (WDR), for which she makes features and radio plays. In addition, she writes for several German media, and was an honorary editor of the feminist magazine *Wir Frauen*. Since the publication of her second book *Rape* (2016),⁹⁴ Mithu Sanyal has been frequently invited as an expert for articles and public discussions. After her article “You Victim” with the journalist Marie Albrecht, where they suggest replacing “victim” by “experiencing sexualized violence”, Sanyal was accused of trivializing sexualized violence by several

⁹⁰ In the night from 24 to 25 January 2013, she and other feminists used the hashtag #aufschrei to gather and make visible experiences with sexism and sexual violence against women under this slogan. This can be seen as a German version of American led #metoo and French led #balancetonporc.

⁹¹ Anne Wizorek, *Weil ein Aufschrei nicht reicht. Für einen Feminismus von heute*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 2014.

⁹² <http://kleinerdrei.org/>

⁹³ Mithu Sanyal, *Vulva. Die Enthüllung des unsichtbaren Geschlechts*, Berlin, Wagenbach, 2009.

⁹⁴ Mithu Sanyal, *Vergewaltigung. Aspekte eines Verbrechens*, Hamburg, Nautilus GmbH, 2016.

feminist media, among which Alice Schwarzer's magazine *EMMA*⁹⁵. She also received harsh attacks from right-wing medias and the AfD. I selected 4 speeches, two interviews, one on the NYE's assaults in Cologne (2017(1)) and the other on the "experiencing sexualized violence" controversy (2017(2)), and two of her columns published in her rubric "Mithulogie" in the *Die Tageszeitung* (TAZ) on tolerance (2017(3)) and racism (2018).

Second, I selected four publicists active in the media on issues regarding Islam. On the one hand, I chose conservative journalists Birgit Kelle and Henryk Broder. Birgit Kelle, member of the CDU, is columnist for *Focus*, *Die Welt* as well as right-wing catholic editions. She fights what she calls "new feminism" and "*Netzfeminismus*" that force women to work for emancipation. In (2013) *Then close your blouse. An outcry against paranoia*⁹⁶ published in response to Wizorek's #Aufschrei, she advocates for the revaluation of family and the role of housewife and stay-at-home mother. While she distances herself from Alice Schwarzer's and Necla Kelek's emancipation feminism, she joins their critic of Islam, although with different sensibilities. I selected 5 speeches, one guest commentary published in the *Wirtschaftswunder* (2016(1)), two columns published in *FOCUS*, one on a potential *burqa* ban (2016(2)) and the second on giving asylum to young girls (2016(3)), one column published in *Die Welt* on freedom from religion (2018), as well as an intervention on TV on *Leitkultur* together with CSU Bavarian Interior Minister Johachim Hermann, Berlin SPD State secretary Sawsan Chebli and writer Hans-Ulrich Jörges (2017). Henryk M. Broder is a Polish-born German publicist known for his polemical columns and comments in written and audio-visual media. Son of two survivors of Nazi death camps, Broder moved to Cologne with his family in 1958, where he studied economics, law, and psychology. In the early 1980s, he left Germany to work in Israel for a time. From 1995 to 2010, Broder mainly wrote columns and polemics for the magazine *Der Spiegel* and the Berlin daily newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel*. Since 2011 he has been working for the conservative daily newspaper *Die Welt*, *Welt am Sonntag* and *Welt Online*, and is also co-operator and author of the blog *The Axis of the Good*⁹⁷. Broder is especially interested in Islam, Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seeing a close relationship between German criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism. His books (2006) *Hurrah, we capitulate!*⁹⁸ and (2015) *That's crazy! My German diary*⁹⁹ are two bestsellers. In his (2008) *Critic of pure tolerance*,¹⁰⁰ Broder draws a harsh

⁹⁵ <https://www.emma.de/artikel/opfer-sollen-nicht-mehr-opfer-heissen-334215>

⁹⁶ Birgit Kelle, *Dann mach doch die Bluse zu: Ein Aufschrei gegen den Gleichheitswahn*, Aßlar, adeo Verlag, 2013.

⁹⁷ *Die Achse des Guten*: <https://www.achgut.com/>

⁹⁸ Henryk M. Broder, *Hurra wir kapitulieren! Von der Lust am Einknicken*, Pantheon, 2007.

⁹⁹ Henryk M. Broder, *Das ist ja irre! Mein deutsches Tagebuch*, Munchen, Penguin TB Verlag, 2015.

¹⁰⁰ Henryk M. Broder, *Kritik der reinen Toleranz*, Pantheon, 2008.

critic on Islam and Muslims. I selected 6 of his columns published in *Die Welt* from 2016 to 2019, tackling Islam in Germany (2016(1) and 2018(2)), security (2016(2)), *Leitkultur* (2017), and migration (2018(1) and 2019).

On the other hand, I selected Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman, two columnists known for their antiracist engagement and particularly active on public debates regarding Islam. Daniel Bax is a German-Dutch journalist and author who completed Islamic studies at the Free University of Berlin. Between 1998 and 2017, he was editor for the *TAZ*, where he was appointed responsible for integration and migration policy. Since 2014, he has been a member of the board of directors of *Neue Deutsche Medienmacher* (NdM) and since 2017 he has been editor at the *Integration media service* (*Mediadienst Integration*), an information platform for media professionals. He tackles topics such as Turkish right-wing extremism, Islam and pop culture, or racism in everyday life, for several issues of the network “School without Racism – School with Courage”¹⁰¹. His two books, (2006) *Fear for the Occident*¹⁰² and (2018) *The People’s Seducers*¹⁰³ warn against Western rising Islamophobia and populism. I selected 7 discourses, of which 6 published in the *TAZ* and one in the information platform *Integration media service*, tackling Thilo Sarrazin’s thesis (2009, 2010, 2015(3)), terrorism (2015(1)), the European migrant crisis (2015(2)), the NYE attacks in Cologne (2016), and Sahra Wagenknecht’s new movement *Aufstehen* (2018). Ferda Ataman is a German journalist and publicist born in Stuttgart from Turkish parents. She worked as a consultant for the North Rhine-Westphalia Integration Minister Armin Laschet and was head of the public relations department at the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency. She wrote for the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the *Tagesspiegel*, *Der Spiegel* and the *Jüdische Allgemeine*, and is best known for her column “*Heimatkunde*”¹⁰⁴ in the *Spiegel Online* since 2018. Like Daniel Bax, she is co-founder and co-chair of the association NdM, and co-spokesperson of the initiative “New German organisations – the post migration network”,¹⁰⁵ a nationwide association committed to diversity and against racism. Ataman is also known for her launching of the hashtag #fromhere (#vonhier), which led to the publication of her book *I’m from here. Stop asking*¹⁰⁶ triggering a nationwide debate on belonging in Germany. She had a public dispute with the Federal Minister of Interior Horst Seehofer, whom she criticized for his

¹⁰¹ “*Schule ohne Rassismus - Schule mit Courage*”.

¹⁰² Daniel Bax, *Angst ums Abendland. Warum wir uns nicht vor Muslimen, sondern vor den Islamfeinden fürchten sollten*. Frankfurt, Westend, 2015.

¹⁰³ Daniel Bax, *Die Volksverführer. Warum Rechtspopulismus so erfolgreich ist*, Frankfurt, Westend, 2018.

¹⁰⁴ “*Heimatkunde*” refers to the academic subject of history, geography and biology of a local area.

¹⁰⁵ “*neue deutsche organisations - das postmigrantisches netzwerk*”

¹⁰⁶ Ferda Ataman, *Ich bin von hier! Hörst auf zu fragen*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 2019.

discourse on the German *Heimat*, considering it as excluding. I selected 4 speeches, of which one column from the *Tagesspiegel* where she questioned the DIK, three columns in the *Spiegel Online*, where she defends multiculturalism against the CSU (2018(1)), and where she criticizes the “Islamization” and discrimination by the German state of Germans with a migration history (2018(2), 2019).

Section 2. Narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in German public discourses: settings, characterizations, and plots

A first rough textual analysis of the German corpus offers an interesting look at the material. Table 1 sums up the 50 most frequent words of the panel, after elimination of grammatical words, prepositions, and modal verbs. First, these words correspond to the political nature of the sources, hence the terms “people”, “Germany”, “policy”, “state”, “society”, “Government”, or “political”. Second, they are consistent with the research question, hence the words “Islam”, “Refugees”, “Security”, “Integration”, or “Muslims”. However, alone, this textual glance does not say much on the way security, identity and Islam are narratively interlinked in German discourses, but only that they stand purposely at the core of the selected discourses. Hence, the necessity of encoding the discourses into units of meaning (codes) that allows the narrative analysis. Although meta-categories are applied *a priori* to the three European samples, codes are then created from the qualitative analysis, in order to retain the idiosyncrasy of each narrative field (see the German codebook in appendix 4). According to the three narrative meta-categories, a first quantitative look at the German corpus shows a high level of “plot” narratives (fig. 1). The following section will successively account for the *settings* (2.1), *characterizations* (2.2), and *plots* (2.3) of the German discourses under study.

The following narrative analysis focuses on the way Western European narrators construct, share, and promote their vision of the world, or one might say, their storytelling. I classified and encapsulated their discourses into ideal types that I coined, consistently with the philosophy of the present dissertation, by analogies and metaphors steaming from the field of international relations: founding historical moments (ex: Westphalian setting), renowned scholars (ex: Kant, Locke, Rousseau), theories (ex: the clash of civilization), concepts (war, border), or paradigms (ex: liberalism). These categories are knowingly reifying, simplistic, and above all arbitrary. First, they do not render reality in an exhaustive manner. Second, they are subjective, in the sense that another researcher undertaking the same research could have likely chosen other analogies, and therefore coined those ideal-typical discourses otherwise. However, I accept the arbitrary nature of such categorizing as narratives, which are the core object of the present dissertation, are by essence arbitrary themselves.

Figure 1. Distribution of narratives in the German corpus




Table 1. 50 most frequent words in the German corpus

Word	Frequency %	Word	Frequency %
1. People	0,50%	24. Political	0,15%
2. German(y)	0,50%	25. Work	0,15%
3. Europe(an)	0,34%	26. Freedom	0,15%
4. Countr(ies)	0,25%	27. Together	0,15%
5. Right	0,25%	28. Course	0,15%
6. State(s)	0,23%	29. Good	0,14%
7. Left	0,22%	30. Integration	0,14%
8. Policy	0,21%	31. Important	0,12%
9. Federal	0,21%	32. Merkel	0,12%
10. Islam	0,21%	33. Religion	0,11%
11. Year(s)	0,20%	34. Long	0,11%
12. Time	0,20%	35. Muslims	0,11%
13. Women	0,19%	36. Future	0,11%
14. Society	0,18%	37. President	0,11%
15. Union	0,18%	38. Life	0,10%
16. Question	0,17%	39. Debate	0,10%
17. World	0,17%	40. Minister	0,10%
18. Refugee(s)	0,17%	41. Migration	0,10%
19. Party	0,17%	42. Turkey	0,10%
20. Government	0,16%	43. Members	0,10%
21. Security	0,15%	44. Fact	0,10%
22. Today	0,15%	45. Great	0,10%
23. Social	0,15%	46. Possible	0,10%
		47. Religious	0,10%
		48. Believe	0,09%

2.1. Setting the scene

As Spencer notes, “the narrative element of setting provides the essential discursive anchorage needed for the construction of social reality. It gives the reader, listener, viewer clues on the context of the story and thereby automatically involves guidelines for what the audience is supposed to consider as appropriate behaviour in that situation” (Spencer, 2016: 36). In short, the setting gathers the spatial-temporal contexts in which the narrative is set, and the story unfolds.

Table 2 gathers all setting codes, divided into two sub-categories: rhetorical tones adopted by narrators and spatial-temporal horizons of experience, which capture the environment(s) in which narrators see themselves and their in-group(s) evolving. A first glance at this quantitative table shows *German past, history, East-West divide*, and *Middle East, integration country, terror*, and *immigration country*, gather the highest frequencies of spatial-temporal narratives horizons ($n > 10$). Regarding rhetorical tones, *self-promotion, irony, emotional, binary*, and *dialectical* tones, gather the highest occurrences ($n > 10$). Those quantitative insights are consistent with the political nature of the sources, while showing some particularity of the German case, namely negative reference to German dark past. However, as frequent as these discursive items are, the qualitative analysis of the distribution of these narratives shows that they are not consensual throughout the actors, as fig 2 shows. With the exception of *Middle East*, which stands at the origin of the axes, and *terror*, standing on the lower left-hand side, all other codes of this category stand on the right-hand side of the graph. A clear distinction appears therefore between the left-hand side with a contemporary and westerner horizon evoking cultural battles against the right-hand side of the graph showing a transnational and historical horizon, evoking *German past, history, immigration*, and *Eastern Europe*. Does this mean that quantitative and qualitative results are contradictory? Not quite. Rather, this means that narratives that gather the highest frequency of occurrence are not systematically consensual and representative of the whole German discursive space. Only those standing at the centre of the axes do not distinguish actors from one another, and can be interpreted sometimes as “consensual”. Concretely, only references to the *Middle East* and *history* are both quantitatively predominant and qualitatively representative of the German discursive field under study, meaning that most actors under study refer to the Middle East and history in their horizon of experience. In contrast, only narrators standing on the lower left-hand side of the graph refer explicitly to *Leitkultur*, while those standing on the lower right-hand side refer explicitly to Germany as an *immigration country*, but they do it with narrative intensity, hence the high frequency occurrence. Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative analyses complement each other to understand the German discursive field under study.

The left-hand side of the graph represents a zero-sum game setting with two variants: (a) the upper

left-hand side of the graph, which encloses 13.6% of German narrators, characterises a *Westphalian* setting, sharing *binary* and *reproving* tones in a Germano-centric horizon of experience; while (b) the lower left-hand side, enclosing 36.3% of German narrators, represents the *Kulturkampf* setting, playing the clash of cultures and/or civilizations. The right-hand side of the graph represents a win-win setting with two variants: (c) the lower right-hand side of the graph, which encloses 31.8% of German narrators, represents the *Kantian* setting defending liberal democracy as German ideal, while (d) the upper right-hand side of the graph, enclosing 9% of German narrators, represents the *Brandtian* setting, playing the North-South inequalities. Finally, 9% of the remaining narrators stand close to the origin of the axes, representing in-between discourses.

Figure 2. Repartition of setting narratives in German public discourse 2009–2019



2.1.1. The Westphalian setting

I coined the upper left-hand side of the graph *Westphalian* setting in reference to the Peace of Westphalia, identified by IR scholars as the origin of principles crucial to modern international relations, ie. the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states and became known

as Westphalian sovereignty. I did so because the story takes place in a binary world framed within the traditional frames of National states in an international self-help system. Let us note that characterizing political discourses as binary may appear tautological, since all political discourses are founded on binary rhetorics and dichotomies, sketching the world in an opposition between the self and the other. However, the present narrative analysis aims to draw ideal-types, therefore caricatural and simplistic, and to differentiate between *more* or *less* binary rhetorics. Hence, the Westphalian setting is characterised by the highest level of binary narratives of the panel – although not the only ones. Second, since it is ideal-typical, although discourses of Sahra Wagenknecht (*Die Linke*), and AfD leaders Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland stand on the same part of the graph because of the similarity in their rhetorical tones and spatial horizon of experience, their respective discourses by no means share the same narrative content. For example, Sahra Wagenknecht multiplies binary oppositions between the innocent German people, the “taxpayers” or “workers”, and the destructive “banksters”, “the neoliberal elites”, and “Goldman Sachs capitalism”:

Mr. Schäuble, you and the Federal Government have promised that taxpayers will never have to bleed again for the risky business of banksters (...). Anyone who believes that the former Goldman Sachs boy and future supervisor of all banks, Mr. Draghi, will now really feel the banks on the tooth must really be beaten with naivety (Wagenknecht, 2014).

This meant something other than the market-conform administration of a globalised predatory capitalism, which destroys the middle class and divides this society ever more deeply socially (Wagenknecht, 2016(1)).

We no longer want to abandon the Internet and the street to the neoliberal elites and the right (...) The SPD has lost many voters because over the past 20 years it has helped shape the transformation into an unleashed Goldman Sachs capitalism: Temporary workers, Hartz IV, pension cuts, she still defends all that today. (Wagenknecht, 2018(2)).

Alexander Gauland also displays binary oppositions, however opposing German society to “them”, speaking of refugees:

They don’t belong in our country. They don’t belong in our society. They should be deported as soon as possible (Gauland, 2016).

Regarding their spatial horizon, they all set their story in an exclusively national setting, referring to German interests and borders (Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(3), 2019; Petry, 2016, 2017, 2018). Even Sahra Wagenknecht, while referring to a traditional international ideal, frames her discourse from an exclusively national point of view:

‘Open borders for all’ is unrealistic. And if the core concern of left-wing politics is to represent the disadvantaged, then the no-border position is also the opposite from the left. All successes in taming and regulating capitalism have been fought for within individual states, and states have borders (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

However, they differ regarding their temporal horizon of experience. While Frauke Petry and Sahra Wagenknecht set their stories in an exclusively contemporary horizon, never referring to German past or

history, Alexander Gauland involves a high number of historical narratives. For instance, he compares what he considers to be the German *establishment* to the SED Communist dictatorship and Chancellor Merkel to Hitler (2017(1)). Moreover, he uses numerous quotations from politicians, philosophes, historians, and sets himself particularly in line with Otto von Bismarck whom he quotes three times in seven speeches (2018(1), (2) and (3)), always in a favourable way, to promote *Realpolitik* against German *Weltpolitik*, and oppose interventionism in the Middle East.

2.1.2. The Kulturkampf setting

I coined the lower left-hand side of the graph the *Kulturkampf* setting in reference to the conflict that took place from 1872 to 1878 between the government of the Kingdom of Prussia led by Otto von Bismarck and the Roman Catholic Church led by Pope Pius IX¹⁰⁷. By analogy, the term *Kulturkampf* is used in contemporary studies to describe conflict between secular and religious authorities or deeply opposing values, beliefs between sizable factions within a nation, community, or other group. The *Kulturkampf* can be brought together with Samuel Huntington's theorization as the German version of the clash framed in cultural rather than civilizational terms. The left-hand side of the graph represents another ideal type of zero-sum game, however framed within cultural or civilizational rather than national boundaries. All discourses standing here refer to a civilizational environment and stand out by their pessimistic, defensive as well as binary tones, although with different contents.

The *Kulturkampf* setting divides narrators into two opposing sides. On the one hand, Birgit Kelle, Henryk M. Broder, Necla Kelek, and Alice Schwarzer seem to validate the clash scenario, while on the other, Daniel Bax, Ferda Ataman, Anne Wizorek, and Mithu Sanyal, seem to invalidate such a vision. For example, Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer oppose (Enlightened) "we" and (Muslim) "them", democracy and theocracy, tolerance and intolerance, knowledge and faith, freedom and subjugation (Kelek, 2010, 2016(1), (2); Schwarzer, 2010, 2018):

In both of them some self-appointed representatives or imams paid from abroad speak a double language: in German apparently enlightened and tolerant - in Arabic sharia-believing and deeply intolerant (Schwarzer, 2018).

Similarly, Henryk Broder and Birgit Kelle systematically oppose German (*Leit*)kultur, freedom, and Western Civilization, to the Middle East, Islamic culture and migrants while delimiting between what is right or wrong, good or bad (Kelle, 2016(2); Broder, 2016(1)):

¹⁰⁷ The main issues were clerical control of education and ecclesiastical appointments.

But the Kulturkampf has long been taking place. What have we been discussing since September 11, 2001? Which topics determine the public discourse? Whether terrorism is a weapon of the poor in the fight against the rich. Whether a teacher who works at a public school is allowed to wear a headscarf or not. Whether separate times for women, meaning Muslim women, should be introduced in swimming pools. Whether Muslim pupils have a right to their own prayer rooms in schools. Whether the burqa and other forms of full-body disguise should be banned, although the ban on disguise already contains an answer to this question (Border, 2016(1)).

This goes hand in hand with a *pessimistic* vision characterized by a fatalistic apprehension of the capacity of newcomers to “integrate”. They see German integration task as a zero-sum game: either “they” assimilate and “we” accept them, or it is a lose game where Germany excludes “them” or Germany “*schafft sich ab*” (Kelek, 2016(2); Border, 2017, 2018(1), (2); Kelle, 2016(3)):

Deutschlandradio Kultur: Well, do you tend to be pessimistic at the point that Islam, which is preached here, is becoming even more conservative?

Necla Kelek: Yes, because the Islam guards are the associations. They control every form of reform. And they have support in politics. We also have the integration commissioner in politics. I don't know why it is called integration commissioner at all, because it is only there to ensure that the different cultures and Islam can simply be lived here, but does not stand for integration (Kelek, 2016(2)).

In contrast, Daniel Bax, Mithu Sanyal, Ferda Ataman, and Anne Wizorek adopt *pessimistic* and *defensive* tones to warn against racism and Islamophobia of German society and its incapacity to integrate newcomers accordingly to its humanistic values (Ataman, 2010, 2019; Wizorek, 2016(1); 2017):

She continues to fuel the racist sentiment just as unnecessarily as others do. This is nothing new with Alice Schwarzer. But as a feminist I think it's important to show that this is not the only feminist position. I also find it disturbing that the debate is not about better help for those affected. Rather, it is about demonstrating to many people that this group of men stands for the alleged behaviour of all men with an immigrant background (Wizorek, 2016(1)).

Finally, in addition actors distinguish themselves rhetorically. On the one hand, Birgit Kelle and Henryk Broder use irony like the AfD leaders (Kelle, 2016(1) and (3), Broder, 2016(1) and (2), 2017, 2018(2)), explaining their position closer to the upper-left hand side of the graph. On the other, Daniel Bax and Mithu Sanyal are very *dialectical*, trying to offer a sociological approach by highlighting the complexity of social phenomena (Bax, 2015(1), Sanyal, 2017(1), (2), and (3); 2018) and getting therefore closer to the lower right-hand side of the graph.

Regarding their spatial-temporal horizons, most of them share a transnational setting, particularly referring to the MENA region, except for Ferda Ataman and Anne Wizorek who set their stories almost exclusively in a local environment, referring to inner political debates on feminism and minorities. Alice Schwarzer positions her story within a French feminist socialization and her relation to Algeria, while Daniel Bax and Mithu Sanyal refer to the MENA region in order to de-homogenize the perception of the region and deconstruct the “clash of civilization”. As for Necla Kelek, Birgit Kelle, and Henryk M. Broder, they refer more or less explicitly to their “migration background”, however, to stand in the camp of German host society in

the current debates on integration and the place of Islam in Germany. This national focus can be seen as a de-transnationalization or distancing from a non-German background. This is especially the case of Necla Kelek who aims at distance herself from her Turkish background, while, at the same time, positioning herself as German “with Muslim background”, to strengthen the legitimacy of her vision, knowing the community from within. In contraposition, Ferda Ataman also refers to her migration background, but she deplores it as an imposed identity by German society. She advocates for the de-transnationalization of German Turks and the recognition of Germans with migration backgrounds as fully German (Ataman, 2010, 2019). Regarding their temporal setting, narrators divide into two groups. The feminists Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Mithu Sanyal and Anne Wizorek have a rather contemporary horizon of experience, while the publicists Birgit Kelle, Henryk M. Broder, Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman share historical horizons of experience. For example, Kelle invokes the slogan “*Dann geh doch nach drüben*” (“Then go over there”) launched to DDR nostalgic in Germany, inviting “friends of veiling” to go elsewhere:

We already know the “Then go to the other side” as a statement to the East German nostalgics. But while we can no longer refer to “there”, there is the absence of an “over there”, things are different with the ladies and gentlemen friends of veiling: they find worldwide societies in which they can even pursue their desire for veiling with a state guarantee (Kelle, 2016(2)).

Henryk Broder alludes to German *Kulturkampf*, claiming that it has taken place since September 11, 2001, as mentioned above (Broder, 2016(1)). On the other side, Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman refer to WWII and Nazism to alert on racism and Islamophobia. Bax links Thilo Sarrazin’s discourse to the tradition of Hitler and Goebbels (Bax, 2009), comparing *Deutschland Schaff sich Ab* to *Mein Kampf* (Bax, 2010), while Ataman refers to the Holocaust to alert on right-wing hate crimes (Ataman, 2018(2), 2019):

We don’t even know how many Muslims live in Germany. We do not record religious affiliation systematically in Germany, with good reason (Ataman, 2018(2)).

Bax also refers to the Cold War, criticising Sahra Wagenknecht’s accusation of Germany fetching Syrian doctors (Bax, 2018), when Ataman refers to Bavarian historical tradition of diversity to criticise the CSU culturalist trend (Ataman, 2018(1)).

2.1.3. The Kantian setting

I coined the lower right-hand side of the graph the *Kantian* setting in reference the famous Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant¹⁰⁸, whose “perpetual peace” theory inspired the coining of “Kantian anarchy” in

¹⁰⁸ Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) is one of the central Enlightenment thinkers. Renowned for his theorization of transcendental idealism, Kant was also an exponent of the idea that perpetual peace could be secured through universal democracy and international cooperation, and that perhaps this could be the culminating stage of world history.

Alexander Wendt's theorization, in which state actors recognize one another as partners, value cooperation, and frame the international structure as global cosmopolitan society (Wendt, 1999). As a matter of fact, all actors standing in this part of the graph set their stories in a global cosmopolitan society, with a particular focus on historical self-understanding. All actors refer abundantly to German past and history. They use German *Kulturkampf*, WWI (Merkel, 2018) and WWII (Westerwelle, 2010(1), (2); Saleh, 2014; 2015; Maas, 2015, 2018(1); Merkel, 2015(1), 2017(2), Özdemir, 2017(1)) or the Cold War (Merkel, 2012, 2017(1)), as negative-charged historical background to delegitimize, trigger fear or foster self-criticism (see chapter 7):

The family histories of Muslims in Germany are not linked to the guilt of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, all Germans, regardless of their origin or religion, bear the same historical responsibility, and that means to me: Jews should never again have to be afraid to identify themselves as Jews in Germany, not even in Neukölln or Kreuzberg (Maas, 2015).

They particularly insist on the painful division between East and West Germany, as well as European past confrontations to advocate for peace. Less often do they refer to the German imperial period (Özdemir, 2017(2), Oppermann, 2013).

However, some of these actors also use historical settings as positive triggers. For example, while Christian Lindner refers to European history to defend religious freedom inside and multilateralism outside (Lindner, 2018(2)), while Heiko Maas and Raed Saleh mobilize German historical experience of religious pluralism to advocate for the recognition of Islam in Germany (Maas, 2015; Saleh, 2015). Cem Özdemir also used an analogy to the welcoming of French Huguenots in the 17th century to support *Willkommenskultur* towards Middle Eastern Migrants (Özdemir, 2011):

Sorry for interrupting, but we know in the Huguenots' case it took around one century, and they were privileged people because they had the same religion, most of them were officially invited, the Prussians supported them as much as they could. And there it took one century. I don't know what the situation will look like in 30 or 50 years from now, but part of the difference is the examples you've given—and I think they are very good examples—are examples of assimilation. Because what is left from the Huguenots? Just the family name, nothing else, and some names of villages (Özdemir, 2011).

However, they show some differences with regards to their spatial horizon of experience. On the one hand, Angela Merkel, Thomas von Oppermann, Guido Westerwelle, and Cem Özdemir share a clear transnational frame, setting their story within a globalised context of interaction with the Middle East, Africa or Eastern Europe (Oppermann, 2017(2); Merkel, 2015(2), 2017(1), 2017(3); Westerwelle, 2010(1), 2012(1), (2), 2013) and recognizing Germany as a country of immigration, either for economic benefits or for moral reasons (Özdemir, 2011; Oppermann, 2013; 2015(1); Raed Saleh, 2015, 2016; Merkel, 2015(2); Maas, 2015(3)):

14 years ago, Red-Green and Chancellor Schröder launched the first major modernisation of our citizenship law. For the first time it was regulated that the children of long-term residents living in Germany automatically receive German citizenship. This was a fundamental departure from the imperial and citizenship law and

represented a clear break in immigration policy with a clear rejection of nationalist Germanism, ladies and gentlemen. Finally, we have taken account of the fact that we are an immigration society (Oppermann, 2013). Cem Özdemir also positions himself as having a “hyphenated identity”, ie. one of a German politician and a migrant’s descent (Özdemir, 2011). On the other hand, Christian Lindner, Raed Saleh, and Heiko Maas set their stories in a more national context of division, be it between East and West Germany or regarding the debate on Islam belonging to Germany.

Rhetorically wise, all but Angela Merkel use explicit *self-promoting* tones, unsurprisingly given their status as political leaders. Besides, most of them use emotional triggers of urgency, tragedy and compassion as well as value-oriented narratives such as dignity, humanity, tolerance, respect when talking about the Refugee’s crisis. They also refer to German “dark” past or “hatred” in order to condemn right-wing extremism (Merkel, 2012, 2015(1) and (2), 2017(1) and (2), 2018; Westerwelle, 2010(1), Lindner, 2018(2), Saleh, 2014, 2015). Thomas Oppermann, Guido Westerwelle, and Cem Özdemir additionally appeal to compassion and understanding for complexity, with more didactical and dialectical tones. However, Maas and Lindner stand out by their punctual use of binary tones, dividing the world into two antagonist poles, namely a negative nationalist, authoritarian, and bellicose side, against a positive open, democrat, and cooperative one (Lindner, 2018(2); Maas, 2018(1)):

But one thing can be seen, namely that liberal values are questioned worldwide by authoritarian ones. Also with us, as just seen. Isolation against openness. Status quo against progress. Courage against fear.

Yet, whether they set their story in global or national contexts, they all set their story in a cosmopolitan and cooperative frame.

2.1.4. The Brandtian setting

I coined the upper right-hand side of the graph *Brandtian* setting in reference to the Brandt Report (1980), chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt. This became a renowned measure to describe the general divide between an influential North and a poor South in world economics and politics. Hence, actors standing on this side of the graph set their story in an unfair world, steaming from North-South inequalities. Gregor Gysi and Simone Peter’s discourses remain, if we may say, on a traditional oppositional line, using self-promoting and emotional tones. Simone Peter triggers fears to address the urgency of climate change and greener politics:

No dear friends, that can only be the cold sweat of fear among people who are affected by climate change, who have to flee from thirst, aridity and floods (Peter, 2013).

Both Simone Peter and Gregor Gysi also trigger compassion, especially regarding terrorism and the European migrant crisis:

This attempt was made every time and remained ineffective. In France, there is extensive data retention and very close cooperation between the secret services and the police. However, this did not prevent the terrible attack. The opposite is true: comprehensive civil rights and a stronger democracy are important prerequisites in the fight against terrorism (Gysi, 2015(1)).

The lamenting is useless. The refugees need our protection. Some of them are fleeing precisely from the terrorists who are responsible for the attacks in Paris. We must talk about a better distribution of refugees in Europe, but not about upper limits (Peter, 2015).

Regarding their respective horizon of experience, striking is the poor level of analogies and metaphorical references in Peter's sample, with almost no reference to spatial-temporal frames. However, they share an international horizon of experience, understanding Germany in its interaction with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. More particularly, both Peter and Gysi share their framing of Africa as "exploited" continent, showing a Third-Worldist affiliation:

But we must also do something about hunger, hardship and poverty. I want to tell you what we in Europe have been living on, even if many people do not want to admit it: We in Europe lived from the fact that people in Africa did not know how we lived. (...) Now people in Africa know how we live. Questions arise, questions that also lead to flight. (...) Let me give you one example: We subsidise food. That may be right for us here in Germany and Europe. But exporting subsidised food to Africa is a cheek, because it prevents the emergence of one's own agriculture in Africa. That cannot be our task (Gysi, 2015(2)).

Look at Africa when a continent is systematically exploited (Peter, 2016).

However, Gysi's international setting is more prolific, including interactions with the USA as well as international organisations. Finally, while Peter never refers to history, Gysi stands aside by his abundant historical settings. He refers here to the Crusades and Nazi Germany to alert against threats to religious freedom...

When we discuss freedom of religion or belief, we must also look at European history. You all know: In the Middle Ages, from the 11th to the 13th century, there were terrible crusades (Gysi, 2016).

... there to the Cold War to warn against German (or European) systematic alignment on the US foreign policy agenda (Gysi, 2015(1); 2018):

Trump is not only waging economic war against China, he is also prepared to do so against the EU as long as it benefits his national egoism. Unlike Trump, you, Mr Maas, are still stuck in the old enemy images, (...) according to the motto "On the side of the USA against the Soviet Union". You have to learn to think anew! The Soviet Union no longer exists (Gysi, 2018).

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the few number of narrators standing on this section of the graph shows the relative marginality of this ideal type on the German public discursive landscape.

2.1.5. In-between settings

Finally, the centre of the graph represents in-between settings straddling on different ideal types. Thomas de Maizière and Hans-Peter Friedrich stand at the crossroads of all settings and cannot be enclosed within a single ideal-typical discourse. They adopt a rather contemporary setting, Thomas de Maizière

referring once to history, precisely to the Reformation to address the question of secularisation (De Maizière, 2017). While Hans-Peter Friedrich has a rather national perspective, insisting on German sovereignty and Christian identity (Friedrich, 2015(1), 2017), he also refers to Africa's dependence on the North's development policy (Friedrich, 2015(2), 2017). De Maizière's spatial setting is evolving. From a transnational setting, acknowledging Germany as an immigration country with tight relations with the Middle East and defending Merkel's *Willkommenskultur* in 2016, he progressively narrows the field to a national perspective, opposing immigration in favour of integration through the promotion of German *Leitkultur* in 2017:

Democracy, respect for the constitution and human dignity apply in all Western societies. I mean: there is more. There is such a thing as a "*Leitkultur* for Germany". Some people have already come across the term "*Leitkultur*". (...) For example: Beyond language, constitution and respect for fundamental rights, there is something that holds us together at heart, that distinguishes us and distinguishes us from others. I like the term "*Leitkultur*" and would like to stick to it. Because it has two word components. Firstly, the word culture. This shows what is at stake, namely not rules of law, but unwritten rules of our coexistence (De Maizière, 2017).

Rhetorically wise, both actors share self-promoting tones, appealing here to reason and there to self-criticism. However, Thomas De Maizière also uses both dialectical and didactical tones, appealing sometimes to *reason* when tackling economy issues (De Maizière, 2015, 2016), and sometimes to *emotions* when talking about terrorism (De Maizière, 2017(1)).

Summary

As exposed in this section, most German discourses under study set their story in relation to the Middle East, as enhanced by both quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis, and consistently with the topic under study. Moreover, more often than not, German actors tend to set their stories in a historical horizon of experience, either to condemn or promote, to foster self-criticism, or patriotism. However, the MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of settings, namely the *Westphalian*, the *Kulturkampf*, the *Kantian*, and the *Brandtian*, coined in reference to founding doctrines, moments, or philosophers in international relations. Noteworthy, 73% of German narrators stand on the lower side of the graph, evenly distributed between left and right, suggesting that while *Kulturkampf* and *Kantian* visions are mainstream, *Westphalian* and *Brandtian* settings remain marginal in German public discourses.

Table 2. Occurrences of setting narratives

Rhetoric codes	Number of occurrences	Horizon of experience	Number of occurrences
Self-promoting	33	German Past	49
Ironical	23	Middle East	26
Emotional	19	History	19
Binary	17	Integration	12
Dialectical	10	Terror	12
Didactical	9	East-West division	11
Empathetic	8	Immigration country	11
Reproving	8	Africa	9
Optimistic	4	Cologne NYE's assaults	9
Alarming	4	<i>Leitkultur</i>	8
Defensive	3	Women Victim	8
Pessimistic	3	Dignity	7
Reasonable	3	Islam	6
		Veil	6
		Eastern Europe	5
		Refugee crisis	5
		Otto von Bismark	4
		Trump	4
		Customs	3
		Brexit	2
		German Turks	2
		Thilo Sarrazin	2

2.2. Characterizations

According to Spencer “the narrative element of characterisation is an essential part of how humans constitute their own and other identities by ascribing particular characteristics to the actors involved in the narrative. It is on the basis of these that the audience is able or unable to identify with others and thereby form opinions on their actions” (2016: 41). Investigating the typical self/other nexus in studies on identity in IR, I shall expose in the following section how actors frame antagonistic protagonists within the settings previously typified.

A first quantitative glance at the corpus illustrated in table 3 shows that *democrat*, *liberal*, *EU*, *victim*, the *West*, and *humanist* gather the highest frequencies of self-narratives while the *people*, *USA*, *Turkey*,

*Kulturmuslimen*¹⁰⁹, *NATO*, and *religious communities*, gather the highest frequencies of friends and allies (n>10). Concerning out-group narratives, *right-wing extremism*, the *Government*, the *GroKo*¹¹⁰, *Islamists*, and the *EU*, gather the highest frequencies (n>20). Qualitatively though, the in/out-group nexus varies according to the position on the graph of figure 3, with a higher representation of self-narratives on the lower right-hand side of the graph and a higher representation of out-group narratives on the upper left-hand side. Besides, characterization narratives discriminate between the different quarters of the graph: (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph corresponds to a *national-populist* characterization, with a self-designation as *victim* (or scapegoat) and real *democrat*, representing the *people* and opposed to the so-called *establishment*, with its leftist variant on the upper side and the right-wing variant on the lower side; (b) the lower left-hand side of the graph corresponds to a *cultural* characterization, opposing Islam-critics to antiracists; (c) the lower right-hand side of the graph corresponds to a *liberal* characterization, with its classical and economical variant on the middle and its social and political variant on the lower part; (d) the upper right-hand side of the graph which holds a very low characterization, corresponds to a *leftist* self-understanding befriended to *Russia* and opposed to *terrorists*. Interestingly, none of the most frequent narratives aforementioned stand on this side of the graph.

2.2.1. The People vs. the Establishment

The upper-left hand side of the graph shows a strong oppositional discourse, where out-group designation exceeds in-group narratives. Frauke Petry, Alexander Gauland, and Sahra Wagenknecht share a strong opposition to the *establishment*, among which the *Government*, the *GroKo*, the *media*, and the *Volksparteien*¹¹¹ (Wagenknecht, 2016(1), (2); Petry, 2016, 2017, 2018; Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(3), 2019):

Mainstream politics, which we have had for years, no longer reaches the people because it actually runs counter to the interests of the majority. When such politicians complain about “populists”, a certain envy shines through that the scolds reach the voters (Wagenknecht, 2016(2)).

As an Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*) we are the political latecomer among the numerous European parties, some of which for decades have been the urgently needed democratic corrective to

¹⁰⁹ *Kulturmuslimen* is a term specific to German context, referring to people considered as Muslim of origin and tradition but not religious. See the German codebook in Appendix 4.

¹¹⁰ The *GroKo*, as diminutive of *Große Koalition*, is used in the German public discursive space to refer to the Grand Coalition. See the German codebook in Appendix 4.

¹¹¹ The *Volkspartei(en)* can be congruent to “catch-all party”, even though it is specific to the German political landscape. used to describe a party that is in principle open to voters and members of all social strata, generations, and different world views. This distinguishes it from other party types such as the class or interest party and the party of honour. According to Dieter Nohlen, *Volkspartei* is “a self-designation of large parties such as the SPD, CDU, and CSU, which strive for as many votes as possible for strategic majorities by expanding their voter base. Their political rhetoric and advertising self-portrayal is based on the claim that they want to include broad strata of the electorate across all social strata and ideologies and to represent them in a balanced manner in their diversity of interests”, in: Dieter Nohlen: *Kleines Lexikon der Politik*. Beck’sche Reihe, München 2001.

the borderless, multicultural and socially destructive ideology of the left, the Greens and increasingly also the so-called “People’s parties” (*Volksparteien*) (Petry, 2017).

The freedom of the individual and the right to a self-determined life are threatened today. Technocrats take power over our thinking and feeling. They want to incapacitate people into unattached, arbitrarily movable pieces on the global chess board (Gauland, 2019).

There is however a difference between the highest and the lowest parts of the upper-left side of the graph, Wagenknecht’s out-group including also international organisation under the aegis of the *USA* and *capitalism*:

Former US President Jimmy Carter called the USA an “oligarchy with unlimited political corruption” years ago. That a superpower that has chaotized entire regions of the world with its oil wars that are contrary to international law and its drone murders and thus strengthened Islamist terror gangs to such an extent that it is failing as a champion of democracy and freedom (...) (Wagenknecht, 2016(1)).

The SPD has lost many voters because over the past 20 years it has helped shape the transformation into an unleashed Goldman Sachs capitalism: Temporary workers, Hartz IV, pension cuts, she still defends all that today (Wagenknecht, 2018(2)).

Except for their self-understanding as *democrats* and *only opposition*, the three narrators tend to differ according to their self-understanding. On the one hand, AfD leaders designate themselves as strong *realists* (Petry, 2017, 2018; Gauland, 2017(1)) and scapegoats of the German political field, sometimes as “the bad guys of German politics” (Petry, 2016), sometimes as “the enemy (...) in the warehouse” (Gauland, 2017(1)). On the other hand, Sahra Wagenknecht designates herself as part of the *International Left*, including Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn, allied to *Russia* and indirectly to former *secular dictatorships* (Wagenknecht, 2016(2)).

However, all three actors systematically refer to the *People*, Frauke Petry as “the silent majority” (Petry, 2016, 2018(1)), Alexander Gauland as the “German *Volk*” (Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(1)), and Wagenknecht as “workers” and “taxpayers” (Wagenknecht, 2014, 2016(1), (2), 2018(1), (2)). Finally, the three actors include *European countries* in their in-group, as opposed to the EU (Gauland, 2019; Petry, 2016; Wagenknecht, 2016(2)). Sahra Wagenknecht sees European countries as partners whose relationship should be “repaired” after the *GroKo*’s foreign policy deemed unilateral:

We should rather repair our relationship with France and our other European partners. Within Europe there was sometimes quite a bit of annoyance about Germany going alone - not only in the refugee crisis. I am not suspected of being a supporter of Helmut Kohl. But his foreign policy was much more oriented towards good neighbourliness with France. Kohl coordinated his decisions with his European partners and sat in the sauna with the Russian President (Wagenknecht, 2016(2)).

As for the AfD’s leaders, Alexander Gauland includes Eastern Europe who refuses Brussels’ diktat (Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(1)) ...

And again, it is the freedom-loving Polish and Hungarians who are the first to rebel against the orders from the Brussels Kremlin (Gauland, 2017(1)).

... while Frauke Petry includes Austria, which represents an example to follow for the AfD:

We should not be timid. The situation in Austria shows how quickly majorities can change. And Austria is the only proof for me. We do not want to disappoint all those citizens who are urgently awaiting a change of course in Germany and Europe, and who trust us that we, as a party, will be the right time when the time comes (Petry, 2016).

Finally, Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland both include *Israel* in their in-group (Gauland, 2017(3), Petry, 2018), particularly for its opposition to immigration policies at the international level, which is not the case of Sahra Wagenknecht:

Recognised Western democracies, including nine European states and Israel, will not sign this agreement (UN Migration Pact) (Petry, 2018).

2.2.2. Islam critics vs. anti-racists

As evidenced in the setting section, the lower left-hand side of the graph displays a narrative battle between two opposite camps within the same part quarter. On the one hand, Birgit Kelle, Henryk M. Broder, Necla Kelek, and Alice Schwarzer share the self-designation as *westerner*, *democrats*, and *Islam critics* against *Islamists* and *multiculturalists*. On the other hand, Daniel Bax, Ferda Ataman, Mithu Sanyal, and Anne Wizorek share the self-designation of *anti-racist* opposed to *Islam-critics*. Hence, the out-group of the first side is the in-group of the second, and vice versa. In detail, nuance can be made within each side. Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer designate themselves as *Enlightened*, *secular* and *feminists*...

I define Islam not only as a faith, but as a political ideology and a social system: a system that denies the separation of religion and state, secularity, and enlightenment, that practices the vertical separation of men and women, that discriminates against women (Kelek, 2010)

I know that because I have been fighting against it since 1995, just like all the women the *Spiegel* likes to call the “old feminists.” For us feminist pioneers, fighting sexual violence, which until then was totally silenced -- be it abuse, rape within marriage or sex killings -- has always been given top priority (Schwarzer, 2016).

... contrasting with Birgit Kelle’s self-understanding as *ethnic German (Ausliederin)* and *Christian* (Kelle, 2016, 2017). They share a very low amount of friends and allies designation. Only Alice Schwarzer designates friends and allies, among which “*Kulturmuslimen*”, alternatively called “enlightened”, “secular” or “cultural” Muslims, who are considered as “normal believers” if they pray discretely and do not wear a veil, as German objective allies (Schwarzer, 2010, 2018).

However, the four actors share most of their out-group designation. They put *Islamists* and *multiculturalists* on equal footing and designate a *new Left* and *netzfeminismus* as threats to Germany, adopting a negative other-presentation, cultural collectivization, and binary oppositions (Kelek, 2016; Schwarzer 2018; Kelle, 2016 (2) and (3); Broder, 2016(2)) For example, Birgit Kelle states that “*the Sharia and the German Minister of Justice are much closer to each other than they themselves think*” (Kelle, 2016(2)). More

particularly in the cases of Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer, there is a continuum between *Islam* and *Islamism*, as their references to refugees and migrants are systematically connected to their identity as Muslim, understood sometime as religion, sometime as culture. Alice Schwarzer even compares Islamism to National Socialism, both, she claims, centre on “reconstructing masculinity” and anti-Semitism:

No, the Islamists have never made a secret of their intentions. As little as the National Socialists once did. Also, in “Mein Kampf” everything was already in it. (...) And it's no coincidence that the women are the first to be targeted in both. After all, Islamists like National Socialists are also - if not above all - concerned with the reconstruction of masculinity. (...) At the same time both, Islamists, and fascists, take the “Jews” to heart, these eternally “others”. Then follow all who still dare to think and live freely. (Schwarzer, 2010).

Finally, they particularly target German *Islamic associations* and *imams* as the Trojan horse of Islamism. Necla Kelek warns against the threat of Islamic associations that are gaining too much and undesirable power in Germany...

The Islamic associations are happy that they are getting even more support. They will enforce their political Islam even better because they presume to speak on behalf of all Muslims. At some point they will also threaten us (Kelek, 2016(2)).

...while Alice Schwarzer alarms against the “enemies of democracy”:

We must stand by them instead of talking to the Sharia-believing radicals. For them – and for us! - we must safeguard our hard-won, inalienable values against these enemies of democracy: Freedom of expression! Rule of law! And gender equality! (Schwarzer, 2018)

On the other side, all four columnists share their self-definition as *anti-racists* (Wizorek, 2016(1); Sanyal, 2017(1); Bax, 2018) but differ otherwise. While Daniel Bax stands indirectly as *humanist, liberal* and *democrat*, Ferda Ataman defines herself as a *patriot* and a *Kanak*¹¹² (Ataman, 2019), and Anne Wizorek and Mithu Sanyal as *feminists*. However, they share their out-group definition, targeting *right-wing extremism* as main “danger” to Germany and democracy (Sanyal, 2017(2), Wizorek, 2014, 2017):

Sanyal: I think what is really, really dangerous is that we overlook or don't pay enough attention to certain issues, which is why right-wing people like Marine Le Pen have the opportunity to pick up a lot of women's votes, because the saleswoman at the checkout in the supermarket often feels unrepresented by mainstream feminism (Sanyal, 2017(2)).

They also designate *Islam-critics*, among which Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, feminist association *Terre des Femmes*, and Ralph Giordano, as principal opponents (Sanyal, 2017(2) and (3); Wizorek, 2016(1); Bax, 2009, 2010, 2015(1) and (3); Ataman, 2010):

Many other prominent publicists had already done this - from Henryk M. Broder to Alice Schwarzer and Necla Kelek to Ralph Giordano – and thus received a lot of encouragement (Box, 2015(3)).

¹¹² *Kanak* refers to an ethnic group originating from Central Asia. In Ataman's discourse, it is used to condemn German discrimination against descendants of immigrants. In such a context, she deplores the use of “from migration background” as hypocritical, given the underpinning discrimination and sometime racism.

Right-wing conservatives, and unfortunately also some feminists, are now using the events in Cologne for racist incitement (Wizorek, 2016(1)).

The “Emma” (Alice Schwarzer’s magazine) has very big problems, for example with Muslim women and so on, with the headscarf (...) (Sanyal, 2017(2)).

Ferda Ataman and Daniel Bax also oppose supporters of *Leitkultur*, such as former Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière or Leader of the Bavarian CSU and Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer, while refusing the use of terms such as *Leitkultur* or *Heimat* deemed nationalists (Bax, 2018; Ataman, 2018(1) and 2019):

Former party leader Sigmar Gabriel said they had been “naïve” on the refugee issue and warned against “Anything goes”. Instead, terms such as “homeland” (*Heimat*) and “leading culture » (*Leitkultur*) should be used positively. His successor Andrea Nahles emphasises that one cannot “take in all refugees” – as if someone had demanded it - and is in favour of more severity against immigrants “who do not abide by the rules” (Bax, 2018).

So resistance is slowly growing. On the net, countless activists are self-confidently fighting back, for example under the pseudonyms “Migrantifa” or “Quattromilf”. In Erfurt, post migrant artists have founded the Kanakistan collective and are bringing their unease to the stage. The Maxim Gorki Theater in Berlin hosted a conference in October with the programmatic title “De-heimatize Belonging” and talked about all this (Ataman, 2019).

2.2.3. Liberals vs. right-wing extremists

The lower right-hand side of the graph characterises a liberal characterization; however, nuances can be made between an internationalist stand in its highest side, interpreting liberalism primarily as multilateralism...

We do not want nuclear disarmament in order to be able to wage conventional wars more easily, but for us as a Christian-liberal federal government and, I hope, also for the whole House, nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament go hand in hand (Westerwelle, 2010(1)).

As liberals, we hold on to openness, multilateralism, and diplomacy. Not because we are naive, but because that is the lesson of history (Lindner, 2018(2)).


...and a more domestic stand in its lower side, considering liberalism as political progressiveness:

The SPD – a progressive, great, courageous party. I would like to continue this wonderful story with you! (Saleh, 2014)

From our point of view, liberal thinkers in particular should take a much more self-confident stance (Özdemir, 2016).

A terrorist attack is not just an accident. It is a targeted attack on our liberal society – and by that it means all of us (Maas, 2017(2)).

Figure 3. Repartition of characterisation narratives in German public discourse 2009-2019



This liberal stand pairs with a self-designation as *democrat* (Saleh, 2017; Oppermann, 2015(1); Lindner, 2010; Özdemir, 2011; 2015; 2016; 2017(1)) and/or *humanist* (Saleh, 2017; Oppermann, 2017(1); Merkel, 2015(2); Westerwelle, 2010(1); Özdemir, 2011), and a sense of belonging to *Europe* and the *EU* (Oppermann, 2017(2); Merkel, 2012, 2015(2), 2017(1), (2),(3); Lindner, 2018(2); Maas, 2018(1); Westerwelle, 2012; Özdemir, 2017(1)):

We Germans will never forget that the happy development of our country is inextricably linked to the history of the European Union. We will never forget that we also owe a debt of gratitude especially to our eastern neighbours for their courageous yearning for freedom (Merkel, 2012).

Besides, some narrators link their liberalism to the defence of religious diversity, Heiko Maas from a *multiculturalist* stance (Maas, 2015), and Christian Linder and Guido Westerwelle from a *Christian* one (Westerwelle, 2010(1); Lindner, 2010).

In addition, most of these narrators frame a multilateral in-group, with a range going from traditional German allies such as the *USA*, *Turkey*, and the *EU*, to *Eastern European* countries, *Russia*, and *Muslim countries*, sometimes positioning Germany as intermediary between “East and West”, echoing German position at the turn of the 20th century (see chapter 3):

A stronger CSDP must be open to new partnerships. In concrete terms, this means the participation of the United States of America, Russia, Turkey and other partners in EU operations. It is high time to overcome the absurd blockade between the EU and NATO (Westerwelle, 2012).

I firmly believe that the challenges of today's world cannot be overcome by one country alone. These challenges require joint efforts. This is why I believe we need multilateral international structures, which we must strengthen and make more efficient. This goes for the European Union, NATO and the United Nations (Merkel, 2017(1)).

Third, we need partners far away and close to home. We finally want to take up the new European momentum from France just as vigorously – but I also want us to take the many other member states that want Europe to be renewed with us. And even more so, the West and East of Europe must not drift further apart – and for this we Germans in the middle, especially with our painful experience of division, bear a special responsibility (Maas, 2018(1)).

But we strongly believe that the European-American partnership, especially the German-American partnership is a cornerstone of our basic values – like freedom, democracy, the social market economy. And we believe that we would not have achieved prosperity and security without the strong friendship of the United States (Oppermann, 2019).

On the other hand, Cem Özdemir and Raed Saleh have a rather cosmopolitan and domestic in-group, designating *Muslims*, *Islamic associations*, and *religious communities* as partners to the Federal State:

That is why we need vigilance and good cooperation between the police, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, associations, and religious communities (Saleh, 2015(1)).

Independent Muslims who are not represented by the associations and who represent the majority of Muslims in Germany can also be heard there (Özdemir, 2016).

Despite nuanced in-groups, all the aforementioned actors target *right-wing extremism*, including the *AfD* and *Pegida*, as enemy to German political stability (Saleh, 2015(1), (2); 2017; Oppermann, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(1), (2); Merkel, 2015(1), (2); Maas, 2015(1), (2), 2018(1); Lindner, 2018(2); Özdemir, 2011, 2016, 2017(2)):

What challenges me is that we have such hatred and such a mood in our country (steaming from right-wing extremist demonstrations). My answer to that is quite clear: there must be a very clear demarcation here. There can be no excuse here. Of course, we call our arguments, but the point here is that there is – I would say – no trace of understanding (Merkel, 2015(2)).

But the danger for the European Union is not only from outside, but also from within through nationalist and right-wing populist parties (Oppermann, 2017(2)).

I also want to make it clear on behalf of my group that the *AfD*'s image of humanity has nothing to do with that of the Federal Republic of Germany (Özdemir, 2017(2)).

In addition, they oppose *nationalists* that support an exclusive interpretation of German *Leitkultur* in cultural terms:

This was a fundamental departure from the imperial and citizenship law and represented a clear break in immigration policy with a clear rejection of nationalist Germanism, ladies and gentlemen (Oppermann, 2013).

One notices here very clearly what the words of the occidental culture or the "Christian-Jewish guiding culture" aim at: It is above all about the privileging of Christianity; it is about preserving for the majority what one would like to deny to the minority (Maas, 2015).

However, Raed Saleh offers a new (multicultural) version of German *Leitkultur* rather than dismissing it all together:

It is not the arrogant and marginalising nationalism of Pegida and other new rights that makes our country so special, but a well-dosed, never arrogant form of patriotism that places the common and the unifying in the foreground. It should be part of our guiding culture (*Leitkultur*) (Saleh, 2016).

Finally, some actors also target *terrorist organizations*, among which *ISIS* being a direct enemy to Germany, and the *Hamas* and the *Hezbollah*, as enemies to the world (Merkel, 2015(1) and (2), 2017(1); Maas, 2015(2) and (3)) as well as *religious fundamentalism* (Westerwelle, 2010; Saleh, 2015, 2016):

Thirdly, ladies and gentlemen, there is a great threat. With regard to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, I mentioned the threat of Islamist terrorism, which has constantly grown since then through IS and other organisations such as Boko Haram (Merkel, 2017(1)).

Therefore, a leading culture (*Leitkultur*) is never in danger of being arbitrary - because it excludes right-wing extremists as well as religious fundamentalists and anti-Semites (Saleh, 2015).

2.2.4. Leftists vs. right-wing extremists

The upper right-hand side of the graph is almost void of characterising narratives, meaning that actors standing there have a low self/other nexus and poorly dichotomous narratives. Simone Peter and Gregor Gysi have a narrow self-definition, designating themselves as *European*, *democrat*, and *humanist*, as for the lower right-hand side. But what discriminate themselves from liberals is their affiliation to the Left:

The Left – I repeat – is a gain for democracy because we represent the majority of the population on these issues. Without us, it would not even be represented here with an argument. I know that we are only a minority, but that is how we enrich this country. I think that this alone - you have said several times - is enough to explain who we are. I have to say the same thing now - that I have to choose left (Gysi, 2013).

I stand for not forgetting our roots. Some in the party think that we should go more to the centre or win over liberal voters. I think it is wrong for all parties to be in the centre. Then they are less distinguishable. This leads to disenchantment with politics and even to a shift to the right, as you can see in Austria. We should therefore remain a left-wing, emancipatory party (Peter, 2017).

Peter does not designate any friends and allies, when Gysi mentions the *UN* (Gysi, 2016), the *people* (Gysi, 2013) as well as *Muslims* in Germany:

I hope that especially the organisations of peaceful Muslims in Germany will distance themselves as decisively as possible from this abuse of their religion and condemn it in announcements, demonstrations, and rallies (Gysi, 2016).

However, they still have an oppositional discourse, targeting above all *right-wing extremism* as the radical Other, either as their antithesis and a threat to German public order and political stability:

With the AfD, right-wing national to right-wing extremist ideas have entered the Bundestag. We Greens see ourselves as the antithesis to the AfD, and we will certainly not leave the agenda to them. We also demand a clear stance from the other parties. That has been missing too often lately (Peter, 2017).

Our task is to reduce abstract fears. But above all there is right-wing extremism and right-wing populism from the AfD to the Nazis, which try to stir up fears, to take them in and to radicalise them. More than 60 attacks on asylum shelters are shameful. This must be tackled decisively (Gysi, 2015(2)).

Gysi also insists on the dangerous diffusion of German *Leitkultur* (Gysi, 2015(2), 2018). Finally, they also differ from the lower right-hand side with their strong opposition to the *government* and its policy, responsible for *war* and *terrorism*. Peter targets particularly the *FDP*, *neoliberalism*, and *nationalism*, while Gysi uses challenges of terrorism and ISIS to criticize European and German foreign policies:

But the German government is pursuing a climate policy based on the motto of talking globally, avoiding at home. So this will become nothing to Altmaier. Climate protection needs pioneers. In Brussels, climate protection was literally produced this week. With the dirty deal with the car lobby against stricter CO₂ limits. Merkel blocks, BMW pays. So emissions trading goes to CDU manière, dear friends (Peter, 2013).

I have listened to all of you and found that the Chancellor and Mr Brüderle are very pleased with themselves. Whether that is enough, however, is another question. (...) First of all. Not a single Bundeswehr war mission has yet been decided against one of your factions. All four groups have always agreed. Only the Left has always consistently voted against. (...) Three. The completely wrong ways to overcome the euro crisis were always taken by four of you: Union, FDP, SPD and Greens (Gysi, 2013).

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen. It turns out once again that it is only when problems become serious that a government looks for solutions and takes steps that are, to a large extent, right and important, at least as far as the direction of the steps is concerned. But we have been asking for this for years - without any reaction (Gysi, 2015(2)).

And when I hear the words of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of the Interior de Maizière, that we have to break through the illegal ways, I wonder where the legal ways are (Petrer, 2016(1)).

2.2.5. In-between characterizations

As highlighted in the previous section, Thomas de Maizière and Hans-Pieter Friedrich are not easily classifiable as they generally stand between each ideal-types. They both declare themselves as *democrat* and *Christian*, although Friedrich with more confidence than De Maizière:

With this identity (Christian democrat), with this self-confidence, I can meet my Muslim friends, the Buddhists, the Hindus, reach out my hand to them and say, beautiful, that you have your faith, I have my faith. But I stand firm on my culture, on my tradition, on my German identity (Friedrich, 2015(1)).

De Maizière also insists on his *European* and *Enlightened* identity and his *patriotism*. Concerning friends and allies, Thomas de Maizière positions Germany clearly within the West, allied to the *USA* and the *EU*, (De Maizière, 2015, 2017) while Hans-Peter Friedrich only refers to *Turkey* as international ally in the corpus under study (Friedrich, 2015(2)). On the domestic level, de Maizière designates *religious communities* (De Maizière, 2015) to be the main ally to the Federal State, while Hans Peter Friedrich refers mainly to the *people*. (Friedrich, 2015(1), 2017).

Regarding their out-group delimitation, Friedrich designates mostly *right-wing extremism*, but as a political adversary rather than an enemy (Friedrich, 2015(1)), and insists more on targeting the *SPD* and the *EU* (2017) for taking too many competences to European member states:

Let the citizens decide on the future of Europe. Let me make a suggestion: you and your socialist friends will go into Brussels and formulate a vision of your socialist Europe (...) (Friedrich, 2017).

Do you seriously believe that German workers will pay for the socialist governments in southern Europe's inability to reform the labour market and make it competitive? You don't believe that in all seriousness. (...) And believe me: Bavaria will not hand over educational competence to Brussels simply because some in southern Europe are not in a position to pursue a sensible education policy (*ibidem*)

On the other hand, de Maizière has a low out-group designation, and only targets once *terrorist organizations* as the main threat to Germany:

In 2014 more than 33,000 people were victims of international terrorism. Four institutions alone are responsible for this: IS, Boko Haram, Taliban and al-Qaida. We have different perpetrators: Individual perpetrators, coordinated groups, micro-groups. We have different goals: political goals, people on vacation, praying, working. There are many explanations. Of course, like all of you, I have been very involved with these issues. But in the end it remains incomprehensible to me where this hatred comes from, through which one is able to kill people who are innocent, who work, who recover and who pray (De Maizière, 2015(1)).

Table 3. Occurrences of characterisation narratives

In-group	Number of occurrences	Out-group	Number of occurrences
Self			
Democrat	29	Right-wing extremism	52
Liberal	16	The Government	46
The EU	13	<i>Die GroKo</i>	24
Scapegoat	13	Islamists	23
The West	11	The EU	21
Humanist	10	The Establishment	19
Christian	9	Islam-critics	18
European	9	Terrorist organizations	18
Feminist	7	Capitalism	17
Left	7	The SPD	17
Enlightened	6	Multiculturalists	16
Multiculturalist	5	Islamic associations	15
Realist	5	<i>Leitkultur</i>	12
Anti-racist	4	New Left	12
Opposition	4	Erdogan	11
Islam-critic	2	Gulf states	10
Migration background	2	The Greens	10
Moderate	1	Nationalists	10

Muslim	1	ISIS	9
Republican	1	<i>Netzfeminismus</i>	9
Friends and allies		Religious fundamentalists	9
The People	22	Turkey	9
The USA	13	Islam as scandals	7
Turkey	13	The Media	7
<i>Kulturmuslimen</i>	12	The Bureaucracy	5
NATO	11	The USA	5
Religious communities	10	Neoliberalism	4
European countries	8	Laicism	3
Muslims	8	Trump	3
Islamic associations	7	Conservative Islam	2
Israel	7	NATO	2
German Turks	6	Putin	2
The UN	6	The FDP	1
Russia	5		
Eastern Europe	4		
International Left	3		
Trump	2		
MENA	1		
Secular dictatorships	1		

Summary

As exposed in this section, the self/other nexus is not consensual in the German corpus under study. The MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of characterization, namely the *populist*, playing the People *vs* the Establishment, the *culturalist*, playing Islam-critics *vs* anti-racists, the *liberal*, playing the liberals *vs* right-wing extremists, and the *leftist*, playing the leftists *vs* right-wing extremists and the government. These ideal types appear to confront two antagonistic characterizations, where the in-group of one side is the out-group of the other. The first narrative war opposes the *populists* to the *liberals* along the second bisector, while the second opposes *Islam-critics* to *antiracists*, within the lower left-hand side of the graph. Although the position of antagonist discourses in the same quarter seems odd, when looking more closely into the actors' speeches it makes sense. Even if actors take opposing stands, they use similar *cultural* narratives to oppose one another.

2.3. Plots

According to Spencer, the plot “allows the audience to understand the relationships between the setting, characters and events by outlining how and why things happened the way they did. Only through the establishment of this relationship is the audience able to form an opinion on the actions of characters in a particular setting” (Spencer, 2016: 44-45). A first quantitative glance at the corpus illustrated in table 4 shows that *social (in)security*, *immigration*, *Islamic culture*, *Refugee crisis*, *terrorism*, *Islam*, and *racism* gather the highest frequencies of occurrence within the corpus ($35 < n < 40$), followed by *integration*, *Islamophobia*, *societal (in)security*, *interventionism*, *war*, *radicalization*, and *democracy crisis* ($20 < n < 30$). Concerning solutions, *cooperation*, *European integration*, *strong state*, *integration* and *Wilkommenskultur*¹¹³ gather the greatest frequencies ($30 < n$), followed by *foreign policy*, *realism*, *education*, and *deportation* ($n > 20$). This quantitative approach a priori infers the conclusion of a high degree of securitization of Islam in the German corpus. However, the qualitative analysis of the repartition of these narratives represented in figure 4 shows that they are not consensual throughout the actors. Only challenges of Refugees crisis and terrorism, and cooperation as solution, standing close to the origin of the axes, are both quantitatively and qualitatively predominant. However, all other plots narratives discriminate between the different quarters: (a) the upper left hand side of the graph shows a focalisation on *immigration* as both challenge and threat to Germany, calling for State and borders control; (b) the lower left-hand side of the graph is primary concerned with *Islam*, with two opposite discourses of assimilation on the extreme left-side and recognition on the lowest side of axis 2; (c) the lower right-hand side of the graph is concerned with *globalization*, with a focus on economic challenges on the extreme right-side and on social challenges on the lowest side; (d) the upper-left hand side of the graph displays concerned with *interventionist* German foreign policy in the Middle East.

2.3.1. The border issues

The upper left-hand side of the graph displays a problem-oriented emplotment. Sahra Wagenknecht, Frauke Petry, and Alexander Gauland share the perception of *immigration* as threat to Germany, although to a variable extent (Wagenknecht, 2016(1), (2), 2018(1), (2); Petry, 2016, 2017, 2018; Gauland, 2016, 2017(1), 2018(1), (3), 2019):

None of us know if they were refugees, asylum seekers, or were they people from the last parallel culture that we could not integrate. Nobody knows yet. But it has become clear since that two things happened. Firstly,

¹¹³ The German term of *Wilkommenskultur* (welcoming culture) is a debated concept that designates both a positive attitude towards foreigners, especially migrants, and all the measures promoted by such an attitude. The term also expresses the will to prevent discrimination towards these newcomers. See German codebook in Appendix 4.

there have been many people with a migration background. (...) And dear friends, I don't care what kind of people they are. They don't belong in our country. They don't belong in our society. They should be deported as soon as possible (Gauland, 2016).

They do not refer to the European migrant crisis as a "Refugee crisis" but as an immigration issue, questioning the consistency of differentiating between migrants and asylum seekers. Moreover, they link immigration issues to a crisis of representative democracy, illustrated by censorship, political correctness, and lack of pluralism. They accuse a borderless and destructive ideology (Petry, 2016; Gauland, 2017(1); Wagenknecht, 2018(1)):

As an alternative for Germany, we are the political latecomer among the numerous European parties, some of which for decades have been the urgently needed democratic corrective to the borderless, multicultural and socially destructive ideology of the left, the Greens and increasingly also the so-called people's parties (Petry, 2016).

Migration is presented in this document exclusively as a source of prosperity and sustainable development. Not a word about how migration can destabilise countries. (...) Left dreamers and globalist elites want to secretly transform our country from a nation state into a settlement area (Gauland, 2018(3)).

However, they diverge regarding the consequences of such ideology. Alexander Gauland and Sahra Wagenknecht accuse this ideology to foster German interventionism in the Middle East, going against German national interests and worsening immigration, and question what they perceive as German alignment on Western imperialism:

There is no parallel. I didn't like the paint bag, but I fully share the criticism of Fischer's policy. Fischer and Schröder sent the Bundeswehr into its first war contrary to international law. Fischer thus broke not only with the military restraint of post-war Germany, but also with a fundamental tradition of his own party, which came from the peace movement (Wagenknecht, 2016(2)).

I am not even sad about that. For today's crises - be it the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours, be it that between Sunnis and Shiites, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, be it the homelessness of the Kurds or the disintegration of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon - have their reasons in the misguided interventions of Western powers (Gauland, 2017(3)).

However, Wagenknecht also deplores the unrealistic of borderlessness in the regulation of capitalism and is concerned with the cheap competition migrants would oppose to German workers:

Labour migration means increasing competition for jobs, especially in the low-wage sector. It is understandable that those affected are afraid of this. There are also not unlimited dwellings, certainly not affordable ones. People who are persecuted need protection. (...) But those who want to overcome the shortage of skilled workers should rather invest more money in our education system (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

Frauke Petry adopts a different perspective, focusing more on integration problems fostered by a multicultural ideology. In line with Islam-critic's discourses, she problematizes German *Islampolitik* as *false tolerance* and "*Kulturalrabatte*", that is accommodation toward Muslims on cultural grounds:

Is Sharia law in all its variants, if you like, part of Germany? The answer is yes, unfortunately. As early as 2011, lawyers Joachim Wagner and Seyran Ates warned that Islamic parallel justice had established itself in the shadow

of the German rule of law (...). There must then be no so-called cultural discounts (*Kulturrabatte*). But it is precisely these that are reality in Germany (Petry, 2018(1)).

Besides, she explicitly poses Islam as a problem, which “*bloody past and present*” should not be minimizing, and as a major cause to German anti-Semitism (Petry, 2018). On the contrary, even though Shara Wagenknecht links immigration to problems of *integration, parallel societies*, and *Islamic terrorism*, she frames immigration as a socio-economical rather than societal threat, which would explain why Sahra Wagenknecht and Frauke Petry stand so far apart on the upper left-hand side of the graph:

Last year, Germany spent a good 25 billion euros on integration. On the one hand, even this enormous sum is far from sufficient to achieve integration, given the many people who are now with us (Wagenknecht, 2016(2)).

Integration fails when parallel worlds (*Parallelwelten*) emerge and the children and grandchildren born here still do not feel like citizens of our country (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

Accordingly, all three actors advocate for *national borders*. However, the AfD leaders are more explicitly defending a Europe of sovereign nations (*Vaterlanders*) against Europeanization, while Sahra Wagenknecht’s critics of the EU does not go that far:

We agree that we want to create another EU, or rather another Europe, a free Europe of sovereign homelands (*Vaterländer*) (Petry, 2016).

If you think that together, the solution is clear. Let’s close the border. Let’s get out of all UN resettlement programs. Let’s send everyone home who is staying here without permission. And let’s help those who really need help with a car cell. (...). But we must stop importing problems into our country without end. It is our country (Gauland, 2017(1)).

All successes in taming and regulating capitalism have been fought for within individual states, and states have borders. It is not without reason that the BDI has been drumming up an immigration law for years (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

Those who want the United States of Europe must abolish the nation states and the national parliaments. Those who want the United States of Europe must disempower the European sovereigns. (Christian Dürr (FDP): Nonsense!) (Gauland, 2019).

Additionally, Sahra Wagenknecht and Alexander Gauland share their reading of foreign policy, advocating for cooperation with all parties, Putin, and Assad alike (Wagenknecht, 2016(2); Gauland, 2018(2)). However, Sahra Wagenknecht adopts a traditional Third-World position by calling for development policy, international aids, and collective peace (Wagenknecht, 2016(1), (2), 2018(2)), while Alexander Gauland advocates for international disengagement, if not isolationism under the banner of realism (Gauland, 2018(2), (3)). Frauke Petry, on the other hand, focuses once more mainly on domestic politics.

2.3.2. The Muslim question

The lower left-hand side of the graph is also problem oriented, with a special focus on Islam, as culture, religion, or ideology, and German Identity. However, consistently with the setting and the plot, two sides tell

antagonistic plots. On the one hand, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Birgit Kelle and Henryk M. Broder perceive Islam as a threat, advocating for cultural assimilation of Muslims. On the other hand, Daniel Bax, Ferda Ataman, Mithu Sanyal, and Anne Wizorek perceive Islamophobia and racism as a threat, advocating for recognition of Muslims and/or migrants.

Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Henryk M. Broder and Birgit Kelle share an insecure vision of the world, threatened by Islam, be it ideology, religion, or culture (Schwarzer, 2010, 2014, 2018; Kelle, 2016, 2017; Kelek, 2010, 2016(1), (2); Border, 2016(1), 2017, 2018(2)). Kelle, Kelek and Schwarzer refer more explicitly to Islamic *culture*, invoking *forced marriages*, *honour killing* and *veiled* women on German soil, influenced by Islamic countries and German *Islampolitik*:

The men who are now coming to us from Islamic cultural circles are, of course, shaped by conditions there, which are still much more antiquated than here (Schwarzer, 2016).

It begins where girls from schools disappear and are forcibly married to “cousins” from abroad. It begins where we have long become accustomed to the so-called “honour killings”. It begins where German dishes are dragged through the ring by women who don’t even want to get rid of their niqab as witnesses in court. And it is there, where the Mazyeks of the nation fall into an immediate victim attitude including “Islamophobia” shouts with every criticism of the oppression of women in Islam (Kelle, 2016(2)).

This right forms the family and controls women’s sexuality in particular. That is the alpha and omega. That is a cultural difference. Just as we encounter an individual, a human being, a citizen here in society – that is a completely contrary social order (Kelek, 2016(2)).


Broder addresses Islam as religion:

The question that hovers unanswered in the room is: Is Islam a religion like Christianity and Judaism, which one can join and leave, which one can make fun of, which comes to terms with other religions, or rather an ideology like communism and fascism, which wants to demonstrate its superiority and impose it on others? (Broder, 2018(2)).

However, all of them link more or less directly the challenge of Islam to immigration and integration. Be it within Turkish communities or Syrian refugees, the “cultural imprint” of migrants from Muslim background threatens to spread macho cultures into German receiving society. However, Kelle is the only one to take explicitly part in the *Leitkultur* debate (Kelle, 2017), questioning to what extent Germany should want Islam in its *Gesellschaftsbild*, while Broder invokes a new *Kulturkampf* between secularism and Islam (Broder, 2016(1)). According to all of them, Germany has a problem of defining itself, both cause and consequence of *political correctness* and *false tolerance* toward Islam and/or Muslims, steaming from German particular relationship to Turkey (Schwarzer, 2010, 2014, 2016; Kelle, 2016(2), 2017; Kelek, 2016(1), (2); Broder, 2018(1)):

The threat of being accused of racism gave birth to false tolerance (Schwarzer, 2016).

Figure 4. Repartition of plot narratives in German public discourse 2009-2019



Schwarzer and Kelek go further by questioning the foreign financing of Islamic associations, while deploring the Islamization of institutions allowed by the Greens and Leftists.:

No wonder, then, that Necla Kelek with her bitter truths has not only made friends from the victims' perspective. For the Islamic associations (...). The converted German ex-ambassador Murad Hofmann, already a professed Islamist and founder of the "Central Council of Muslims" during his time in office, declared in the 1980s that most new Muslims were Greens and leftists. Since then, these converts have made their way through the institutions (Schwarzer, 2010).

However, while they all share a high perception of societal insecurity, Broder is the only one to link Islam to national insecurity (Broder, 2016(2), 2018(1)), while explicitly disregards the threat of right-wing extremism:

Of all the dangers threatening Europe, right-wing extremism is probably the least presently. But it is best served by pleasurable fears. That, of course, is a completely different story. It is called: Catching up on the resistance (Broder, 2018(1)).

While depicting an alarming picture of Germany and the West, these actors hold the lowest level of solution offering in the German panel. They all advocate more or less directly for *assimilation*. Broder and Schwarzer state implicitly their position. The former asks the rhetorical question "*should the immigrants adapt to the locals or the locals to the newcomers?*" (Broder, 2016(1)), and the latter encourages the enlightening

of people from Islamic cultural groups, opposing knowledge to faith (Schwarzer, 2016). Birgit Kelle and Necla Kelek are more explicit. The former invites veiled women, called “*whole-body condoms*”, to assimilate or “*live (their) dream at the Hindu Rush, in Iraq, in Syria or in Turkey*” (Kelle, 2016(2)). The latter invites Muslims to “*to change their habits if they want to be accepted in this society*” (Kelek, 2016(2)).

In contrast, Daniel Bax, Mithu Sanyal, Anne Wizorek and Ferda Ataman perceive *racism*, *Islamophobia*, *discrimination*, and *migrant bashing* as main threats to Germany’s integrity. On the one hand, Mithu Sanyal and Daniel Bax insist particularly on *Islamophobia* and Muslim rejection: Sanyal points the disproportion of the feminist association *Terre des Femmes* regarding the Muslim headscarves (Sanyal, 2017(3)):

The trigger for the open letter was the decision of this year’s TdF (*Terre des Femmes*) general assembly to lobby for a law banning the headscarf for minors - better known as the ban on the headscarf for children or day-care centres. (...) In such cases, Terre des Femmes believes that “fines would be very effective” – “as soon as she steps out onto the street” (Sanyal, 2017(3)).

... while Bax considers that the way Germany targets its own Muslims threatens its integrity:

In previous years, there had hardly been a more detailed and emotional debate on any topic than on the integration of Muslims and Islam in Europe. But apparently that was not enough for many. Or the political consequences of these debates did not go far enough for them. (...) The discriminatory debates about Islam and integration, however, are unlikely to have come to an end yet. With demands for a burqa ban and an Islam law based on the Austrian model, which prohibits the financing of Muslim communities from abroad, some CDU/CSU politicians are already warming up to compete with the AfD (Bax, 2015(3)).

On the other, Ferda Ataman and Anne Wizorek interpret discrimination and xenophobia through the prism of *racism* (Wizorek, 2016(1) and (2), 2017; Ataman, 2018(1)):

No. Why should it? All people who do this must be punished. The difference is that the incidents are now being instrumentalized – especially by people who played down such incidents during the outcry debate (*#Aufschrei*). Right-wing conservatives, and unfortunately also some feminists, are now using the events in Cologne for racist incitement (Wizorek, 2016(1)).

In Bavaria, a whole generation of migrant children were either sent to “special schools” or to classes for foreigners. Apart from a few exceptions, none of us received a recommendation for the Gymnasium. The local patriot in me could now say: We Bavarians are just honest. We don’t cowardly conceal racism between the lines. Here it is clearly communicated: “You, foreigner, no high school! You later putzi putzi toilet!” At least you know where you stand (Ataman, 2018(1)).

Similarly, they both warn of the danger of a *Leitkultur* debate, particularly implying a zero-sum game between forced assimilation and exclusion. Finally, Bax stands aside of the group, addressing the threat of *left-wing populism*, mentioning Sahra Wagenknecht or Nils Heisterhagen (SPD)¹¹⁴ in Germany, Jean Luc Mélenchon

¹¹⁴ German politist and publicist, keynote speaker for the SPD state parliamentary group in Rhineland-Palatinate until 2018 and author of *Die liberale Illusion: warum wir einen linken Realismus brauchen* (2018) and *Kritik der Postmoderne: warum der Relativismus nicht das letzte Wort hat*, (2018).

in France, Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK (Bax, 2018). According to him, “migrant bashing” coming from Left-wing parties fuels legit right-wing Islamophobia.

Similarly, to their opponents, the four columnists provide very few solutions. However, they all call for *recognition* as more legit and effective than simple tolerance in order to overcome the unilaterality of integration (Wizorek, 2014; Bax, 2015, 2018; Sanal, 2017(1), 2018):

Journalist: What would be more sensible interventions for you?

Sanyal: Reconnaissance. Sounds bad at first because it implies that only “the others” need to be educated. That’s not what it means (Sanyal, 2017(1)).

Ataman is more radical and calls indirectly for minorities’ resistance against German rejection (Ataman, 2019):

The journalist Walid Nakschbandi also wrote a text in the “Tagesspiegel” this year that was a real challenge – a kind of call to revolt: “Dear Muslims, I address you now directly: (...) Your inaction, your agony, this apathetic behaviour only makes everything worse. What is true in German schoolyards is true in life: If you don’t gain respect, you’ll always be the losers. For 60 years you’ve tried to be loved by the Germans. No more currying favour and obedience (...)” (Ataman, 2019)

In other words, in addition to a *Willkommenskultur*, advocated by German leaders positioned on the right-hand side of the graph, Daniel Bax, Ferda Ataman, Anne Wizorek, and Mithu Sanyal also advocate for *Anerkennungskultur*, that is the recognition of the multicultural host society and the constant redefinition of German self in accordance to its multicultural citizens.

2.3.3. The stakes of globalisation

The lower right-hand side of the graph displays a balance between challenges and solutions, with a special focus on *globalisation*, perceived as a challenge rather than a threat. All narrators frame multifaceted and globalized challenges, going from *new technologies*, to *unilateralism*, *nationalism*, and *xenophobia*. However, while Angela Merkel, Thomas Oppermann, Guido Westerwelle and Christian Lindner, focus on economic aspects of globalisation, Heiko Maas, Raeh Saleh, and Cem Özdemir focus on its political aspects.

On the one side, Angela Merkel, Christian Lindner, Thomas von Oppermann and Guido Westerwelle fear a rising *anti-liberalism* and *isolationism*, embodied by Trump, the Brexit and characterised by *unilateralism* and *Europhobia*, however they diverge on some details (Merkel, 2015(1), 2017(1), (2), 2018; Lindner, 2018(2), 2019; Oppermann, 2017(2); Westerwelle, 2010(1)). For instance, Angela Merkel is the more concerned with the European migrant crisis, which she addresses successively as “forced migration” (Merkel, 2014), “refugee crisis” (Merkel, 2015), and moves to “accommodating refugees” (Merkel, 2017):

The crises and conflicts in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood are too serious, too profound, too various, the global challenges of displacement and migration, of hunger – look at Africa now – and suffering too great, the challenges of world trade or climate protection too major for Europe to be in a position to concentrate only on itself for the next two years; Brexit doesn’t change that (Merkel, 2017(3)).

Guido Westerwelle, whose leadership of the FDP from 2001 to 2011 was marked by the 9/11 terror attacks of New-York, holds a rather traditional vision of (in)security, namely *war* and *terrorism* that he directly links to the challenge of globalization:

International terrorism, including the swamp of radical ideologies in the world and no longer only in regions, the networking of fundamentalism, radicalism, contempt for humanity and inhumanity, is of course a scourge of our time, a result of technological progress and globalisation (Westerwelle, 2010(1)).

Finally, Thomas Oppermann is primarily concerned with *division* and the crisis of *democracy*, while Christian Lindner is the only one to address environmental issues (Lindner, 2018(1), 2019). Accordingly, these four narrators offer global solutions within multilateralism as only *realpolitik*. They advocate for international *cooperation* and *European integration*. Christian Lindner and Angela Merkel particularly insist on the importance of the transatlantic alliance and the need to differentiate Trump, who embodies isolation and unilateralism, from the USA, which remains the first ally to Germany:

Incidentally, this does not contradict from the outset my deep conviction that the transatlantic partnership, based on our values and interests, will continue to be of paramount importance to us all, not just to us Europeans. It is in this spirit, in any case, that I will have my talks with President Donald Trump in Washington next week (Merkel, 2017(2)).

Dear friends, the United States is our traditional ally, but there is no doubt that these relations are undergoing an intense stress test. The Foreign Office even speaks of a rupture. (...) But the United States is not trump. There is also a civil society there. (...) It is precisely when relations are difficult that there is no need for less dialogue, but rather more dialogue. I repeat myself, but I am convinced that Donald Trump's four or even eight years must not destroy what has been built up over decades (Lindner, 2018(2)).

Concerning European integration, they share the strongest narratives, from the strengthening of the economic union via the development of the eurozone, the protection of the free market and Schengen, the promotion of competitiveness and the stabilisation of the financial market, to the Europeanization of the asylum policy and the promotion of a European defence policy (Oppermann, 2017(1); Merkel, 2012, 2015(2), 2017(1), (2), (3), 2018; Westerwelle, 2010(1), 2012, Lindner, 2018(1), (2)). Besides, Merkel and Oppermann insist on the need for responsible foreign policy toward MENA region and Africa, advocating for public aids and development policy, as part of German response to the European migrant crisis and international terrorism (Oppermann, 2017(1), (2), 2019; Merkel, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2)). Westerwelle distinguishes himself by advocating for *moral politics* and claiming “*German foreign policy is guided by interests and values*” (Westerwelle, 2010(1)). Finally, all but Westerwelle advocate for immigration as both a humanitarian duty and material interest for Germany in need of skilled workers.

On the other side, Raed Saleh, Cem Özdemir and Heiko Maas introduce socio-political and identity aspects of globalisation. They are concerned with the rise of xenophobia in general, including *racism*, *Islamophobia*, and *anti-Semitism* (Maas, 2015; Özdemir, 2011, 2015, 2016; Saleh, 2015(1))

Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are carved from the same wood: Whoever fables about the Jewish world conspiracy serves the same fears as those who swagger about the threatening Islamization of the West (Maas, 2015).

They also address the radicalization/integration nexus, presenting integration at once as a challenge and solution (Saleh, 2015(1), 2017; Maas, 2016, 2017; Özdemir, 2015, 2016). Cem Özdemir distinguishes himself by his unease regarding *German-Turkish*, accusing Erdogan of stimulating Islamism and preventing the integration of German Turks. Thereupon, he calls for the de-transnationalization of Islam through German *Islamic instruction*, *imam training* and the diffusion of a “*democratic understanding of Islam*” in order to promote German Turk integration:

On the other hand, actors who do not act against radicalisation and hostility to democracy or even support them must not be considered as partners. Islamic associations and mosque communities could be important partners, but their structures and dependencies often stand in the way of each other. They must clarify whether they and the imams are actually in a position to link up with the world in which young people live, to recognise radicalisation tendencies at an early stage and to tackle them (Özdemir, 2016).

Apart from that, all narrators promote international *cooperation* and, on the domestic level, *Willkommenskultur* and *integration*, especially through *education* and *prevention* (Saleh, 2016, 2017; Oppermann, 2013, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(1), (2); Merkel, 2015(2), 2017(1); Maas, 2015(2), (3); Özdemir, 2011, 2016):

At the recent integration summit, Mrs Merkel spoke out in favour of a culture of welcome (*Willkommenskultur*). (...) We must make young people feel that way: You are welcome, you are with us. You can take responsibility here in our society, you can work here and be citizens (Oppermann, 2013).

Nuances can be made between Raed Saleh, who promotes a new German *Leitkultur*, emphasising the role of *civil society* (Saleh, 2015, 2016) and Maas, who refers almost exclusively to the *rule of law* as best response to contemporary challenges (Maas, 2015(3), 2016, 2017). Finally, they all call to a variable extend for the differentiation between Islam and terrorism, particularly in the media around the 2015 European migrant crisis and the Syrian conflict (Maas, 2015; Saleh, 2015(1), 2017; Özdemir, 2015).

2.3.4. The calamity of wars

The upper right-hand side of the graph also strikes a balance between challenges and solutions, with a special focus on wars. Gregor Gysi's and Simone Peter's samples under study focus on their concern on military *interventionism* and *arm* export, considered to be causing the *European migrant crisis* and terrorism (Gysi, 2013, 2015(1), (2), 2018(1), (2); Peter, 2015, 2016):

Al Qaeda and the “Islamic state” are also the result and products of military interventions. Al Qaeda emerged during the war in Afghanistan during the occupation by the Soviet Union. At that time the USA rearmed the Taliban and this terrorist group in the fight against the Soviet Union according to the motto “The enemy of my enemy is my friend”. This was also the logic of the civil war in Syria. The USA, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other

Gulf states supported terrorist organizations in the fight against Assad. The “Islamic State” came into being. Only late, much too late this open support was stopped. The Iraq war of 2003 was contrary to international law and a big mistake with devastating consequences (Gysi, 2015(1)).

The arms exporters to Saudi Arabia must not be surprised about war refugees from Yemen. And anyone who impoverished cheap European meat in Africa has no right to label small farmers as economic refugees (Peter, 2016).

They target the *Bundeswehr* war missions in the Middle East, and the American regime change foreign policy, considering German transatlantic allegiance to be the main cause of German engagement in armed conflicts:

The EU has never acted in accordance with its interests in this conflict but has ultimately allowed itself to be drawn into US attempts to manoeuvre Russia into a geostrategic disadvantageous situation (Gysi, 2018(1)).

Further, Gysi emphasises how the refugee crisis challenges Germany, triggering *abstract fears*, *Islamophobia*, and negative media portraying, while Peter alerts on the issue of *migrants bashing*. Finally, Peter addresses the potential State’s security drift caused by the permanent surveillance as a threat to the rule of law (Peter, 2015, 2017).

To counter global injustice and conflicts, they both advocate for peace, justice, a fairer society and an unconditional *Willkommenskultur* (Peter, 2015, 2016(1), 2017; Gysi, 2015(1), (2)):

The lamenting is useless. The refugees need our protection. Some of them are fleeing precisely from the terrorists who are responsible for the attacks in Paris. We must talk about a better distribution of refugees in Europe, but not about upper limits (Peter, 2015).

A democratic, tolerant, and cosmopolitan coexistence with peaceful citizens, also with other cultures and religions, must be promoted. The vast majority of people took to the streets for these goals (Gysi, 2015(1)).

They urge for proportional and *moderate* state responses to perceived insecurities in respect to the *rule of law*. However, while Peter almost never refers to Europe, Gysi calls for more *European integration* and for hosting more refugees. He criticizes “Brussels bashing” as, according to him, the “*EU is often used by national governments when they cannot get through with certain projects, such as social cuts in their own country*” (Gysi, 2018). His promotion of European integration is consistent with his strong opposition to Atlanticism. According to him, “Europe must finally define its own interests and act accordingly” (*ibidem*).

2.3.5. In-between plots

Again, discourses of Thomas de Maizière and Hans-Peter Friedrich stand at the crossword of several ideal-typical plots and are therefore difficult to characterize. The main challenges they present are *international terrorism* and the *refugee crisis*, both being the most commonly shared challenges of the German panel. In details, De Maizière is concerned firstly with *terrorism* and secondary with the *European Refugee Crisis*. Friedrich conversely tackles the refugee crisis steadily between 2015 and 2018, mostly criticizing Merkel’s policy, while only referring twice to terrorism (Friedrich, 2016, 2017). Moreover, De Maizière is

linking the issue of *terrorism* to that of *radicalization* from 2015 onwards, while Friedrich never refers to radicalization:

We are successful. But we are not very successful in breaking through the processes of radicalization among ourselves. I am talking about people who have gone to our schools, to our associations, to our mosques, who come from our parental homes and are in our circles of acquaintances. They allow themselves to be radicalised for an indescribable hatred. There are many explanations for this. This week I spoke with the great women and men who are doing counselling work in this context. You can't take your hat off deep enough for this work (De Maizière, 2015)

Finally, De Maizière holds a higher insecurity perception than Friedrich, its referent object being at time Germany, Europe, and the West, making him closer to the lower left-hand side of the graph.

De Maizière and Friedrich both share a high rate of solution offering, which is consistent with their position as members of government. To counter both terrorism and the European refugee crisis, they call for a responsible foreign policy based on generous *development policy* toward Africa (Friedrich, 2015(2), 2016; De Maizière, 2016) ...

Finally - and this has already been mentioned - the issue of Africa. As Europeans, we have a responsibility for Africa, not least because we have instigated enough unrest in Africa itself over the last 200 years. I believe that only together - the Valetta Conference was a good start - can we achieve a responsible Africa policy in Europe (Friedrich, 2016)

... and strong *cooperation*, within Europe, with the USA or with the MENA region, through sharing *intelligence* and strengthening European borders (*Frontex*) (Friedrich, 2012, 2015(2), 2016, 2017; De Maizière, 2014, 2015(1), 2016(1), (2), 2017(1)). However, while De Maizière frames solutions within the EU, Friedrich advocates for cooperation between European sovereign nations (*Vaterländer*):

In Europe we need a security union. And outside Europe we need security partnerships. All this starts with the exchange of intelligence between the security authorities and between the intelligence services (De Maizière, 2015(1)).

Ladies and gentlemen, if this European project is to have a future, we must correct these two weaving errors. We must ensure that the parliamentary element is strengthened in European decision-making. The best and quickest way to achieve this is to shift as many competences as possible back to the Member States, the national level and the national parliaments in the respective states (Friedrich, 2016).

Finally, De Maizière and Friedrich have a common interest in the need for self-definition debate in Germany, under the forward narrative of *Leitkultur* in De Maizière's corpus, and a more implicit *German identity* in Friedrich's. Although De Maizière's narrative could have placed him on the lower right-hand side of the graph, along with Merkel, Lindner and Oppermann, his 2017 tribune on *Leitkultur* must have weighted on the general world vision, placing him closer to the lower left-hand side of the graph. Integration issues became more important than the need for skilled workers, so that the need to secure German core culture became more pregnant than making Germany attractive for migrants. With the European migrant crisis, De Maizière's

discourses shifted from the promotion of Germany as an *immigration* country to that of an integration country, in need of a guiding *Leitkultur* :

I like the term “*Leitkultur*” and would like to stick to it. Because it has two-word components. Firstly, the word culture. This shows what is at stake, namely not rules of law, but unwritten rules of our coexistence. And the word “leading” is something other than prescribing or obliging. Rather, it is about what guides us, what is important to us, what is a guideline. (...) We are a cultural nation. Hardly any other country is as shaped by culture and philosophy as Germany. Germany has had a great influence on the cultural development of the whole world. Bach and Goethe “belong” to the whole world and were Germans (De Maizi re, 2017).

Summary

As exposed in this section, although the *European migrant crisis* and *terrorism* are unanimously perceived as challenges or threats to German narrators, plots are not consensual on the discursive field under study. The MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of plots, namely the *border issue*, the *Muslim question*, the *stakes of globalization*, or the *calamity of war*. Here again, surface the oppositions exposed in the previous section. On the one hand, the upper left-hand side defends national preferences against the lower right-hand side, which advocates multilateralism and openness. On the other, the lower left-hand side displays a narrative war for discursive hegemony on the Muslim question, the one advocating for *assimilation*, while the other advocates for *recognition*. Noteworthy, German narrative analysis reveals a consensual appeal to realism as positively valued on the political field, as opposed to ideology-charged discourses.

Table 4. Occurrences of plot narratives

Challenges	Number of occurrences	Solutions	Number of occurrences
Social insecurity	48	Cooperation	107
Immigration	39	European integration	61
Islamic culture	38	Strong state	40
Racism	36	Integration	33
Islam	35	<i>Wirkommenskultur</i>	33
EMC	35	Foreign Policy	28
Terrorism	35	Realism	28
Integration	26	Education	26
Islamophobia	24	Deportation	21
Societal insecurity	23	Democracy	19
Interventionism	23	Rule of Law	19
War	23	Development policy	18
Radicalization	21	Social cohesion	18
Democracy crisis	20	Strong economy	17
Parallel societies	19	<i>Vaterl�nder</i>	16

Islamic terrorism	18	Police	15
<i>False Toleranz</i>	17	Prevention	15
Migrants bashing	17	Intelligence	14
Economic insecurity	16	Humanitarian	13
Environmental insecurity	16	Peace and disarmament	13
Veil	16	Reform	11
Division	15	Enlightenment	11
Political Extremism	15	Fairer society	11
Islamism	14	Transatlantic alliance	10
Brexit	13	Diplomacy	10
Discrimination	12	Frontex	10
<i>Ostpolitik</i>	12	<i>Leitkultur</i> debate	10
Anti-liberalism	11	Consensus	10
Arm	11	Self-criticism	10
Utopianism	11	Stability	10
Anti-Semitism	10	Assimilation	9
Unilateralism	10	Control immigration	9
German – Turkey's relations	9	Fight for women	9
National insecurity	9	Immigration	9
Europhobia	8	Proportion	7
Forced assimilation	7	Recognition	7
Sexism	7	Greener economy	5
Transatlantic alliance	6	Moral politics	5
German Middle Eastern policy	6	Resistance	3
Globalisation	6	Turkey deal	3
Left wing populism	6	German Islam	2
Demography	5	Intervention	2
Salafism	5	Market economy	2
Islamic fanaticism	4	Secularism	2
<i>Islampolitik</i>	4	Innovation	1
Self-definition	4	Transparency	1
Securitarian state	3		
Techno revolution	3		
German Turks	2		
Organised Crime	2		
Perversion of Islam	2		
Privatisation	2		
Religious persecution	2		
Iran nuclear	1		

Section 3. Stories of (de)securitization and the post-war identity trouble in Germany

Interestingly, the MCA has revealed two narrative battles being fought simultaneously in the German public debate. Narrative battles are wars fought by delimited camps for imposing a hegemonic framing over a question. These narrative civil wars imply securitizing and desecuritizing moves. The first, opposing the upper left-hand side to the lower right-hand side of the graph, resolves around the (de)securitization of *immigration* and involves exclusively political leaders (3.1.), while the second, opposing two sides within the lower left-hand side of the graph, resolves around the (de)securitization of *Islam* and involves exclusively publicists of the media set up (3.2). As any critical discourse analysis investigating hegemonic projects and counter discourses, I examine both securitizing and de-securitizing narratives. Desecuritization can occur through politicization, that is moving issues from security to political arena, or through the securitization of an alternative object. The following section will focus only on narratives that inform the research question on the (de)securitization of Islam in the German corpus. Therefore, discourses not directly involved in the narrative wars considered here are excluded from the following analysis, namely *Bundnis 90/Die Grüne* Simone Peter and *Die Linke* Gregor Gysi, standing on the upper right-hand side of the graph, and (CSU) Hanz Peter Friedrich and (CDU) Thomas de Maizièrè, standing at the centre of the graph. Finally, the last section will analyse how those narrative wars underpin great tensions framing the German Self in post-war Germany (3.3.).

3.1. The (de)securitization of immigration in the political arena

In the corpus under consideration, a narrative war on immigration opposes the upper left-hand side of the graph, with former and current leaders of the AfD, Alexander Gauland and Frauke Petry, as well as current leader of *Die Linke*, Sahra Wagenknecht, to the lower right-hand side, with (FDP) Christian Lindner and Guido Westerwelle, (SPD) Thomas Oppermann, Raed Saleh, and Heiko Maas, *Bundnis 90/Die Grüne*'s Cem Özdemir, and Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The first story takes place in a *Westphalian* setting and stages a binary confrontation between the (German) People and the Establishment, accused of promoting a borderless ideology instigated in mass migration. In this story, the European migrant crisis is not framed as a "Refugee crisis" but enclosed in a wider immigration problem threatening German stability, as Frauke Petry explicitly states:

For the crisis regions in Africa and Asia, from which migratory flows are to be expected in the future, it is no longer possible to determine whether there is war or peace there. The status you are proposing is therefore null and void, because it can basically apply to everyone and nobody (Petry, 2018(2)).

The three discourses show a securitizing move on migration, framing the arrival of migrant masses as a threat to Germany and calling for limiting access. However, the securitizing story varies according to the speaker. In the AfD's case, it goes together with the securitization of German post-national ideology, which threatens German societal security. According to Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland, this "destructive" ideology inhibits freedom, pluralism, and democracy, and goes against German national interest. In Sahra Wagenknecht's case, however, immigration threatens German social security, by competing employment and levelling down wages. Although the three actors share a securitizing move, they have different narrative approach toward Islam. Alexander Gauland securitizes immigration as well as newcomers' integration, without explicitly referring to Islam or Muslims, at least in the corpus under study. He securitizes immigration by designating Europe and the Government as the adversary, not migrants directly:

(...) the United States of Europe as a deindustrialised, inhabited area covered with windmills, in which national identities have been abolished, which is open to immigrants from all over the world who are indifferent to European values (...) and which do not have to integrate into European societies because they are best integrated and preserved in the respective parallel society (Gauland, 2019).

Contrastingly, Frauke Petry spreads negative-charged description of Islam, depicted as *fanatical*, *illiberal* and source of anti-Semitism, but does not frame Islam nor Muslim as threats to German security:

Already Thomas Mann put the words into the mouth of the Jesuit Naphta: A liberalized Islam, that is enlightened fanaticism. And if you prefer a current example: A look into the former secular (*laizistische*) Turkey is enough (Petry, 2018(1)).

Finally, in Sahra Wagenknecht's case, the securitization of immigration does not go along with the securitization or politicisation of migrant's identity. Her negative-other description applies to capitalism and the Government as responsible for cheap immigration and main adversary to German peace and prosperity:

Your combination of state wealth management and "We can do it" (*wir schaffen das*) has dramatic consequences. Because of the additional tasks, the indebtedness of many cities and municipalities grew further last year, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia (Wagenknecht, 2016(1)).

In sum, the three discourses attempt at securitizing immigration without explicitly securitizing Islam. However, it remains implicit, particularly in the AfD's cases, whose discourse is characterized by the labelling of "refugees" as "migrants", and the conflation of terminologies such as refugees, migrants, Muslims, and people of colour.

On the opposite side, the second story takes place in a *Kantian* setting and stages a challenging globalization, where liberals resist the global rise of isolation and right-wing extremism. In this story, the European migrant crisis is framed as a "Refugee crisis", appealing to German humanistic responsibility and international cooperation. The "Refugee crisis" is framed within a wider conception of immigration as beneficiary to German economic and social strength. On the other hand, if all actors address either

international terrorism or religious fundamentalism as a global threat, they take special care not to link either of these to Muslims or Islam, as religion, culture, or ideology. Rather, by attributing to right-wing extremism the status of “enemy within”, actors standing on this side make a securitizing move on right-wing extremism, using binary negative-charged othering, insisting on “their” bad doings while denying causes or explanations:

My answer to (right-wing extremist demonstrations) is quite clear: there must be a very clear demarcation here. There can be no excuse here. Of course, we call our arguments, but the point here is that there is – I would say – no trace of understanding. No biographical experience, no historical experience, nothing, but nothing at all justifies such an approach (Merkel, 2015(2)).

A democracy can only function if people live together with respect for one another and if the state guarantees internal peace. If a party such as the AfD, which deliberately creates a mood against refugees and immigrants or against foreigners, now enters parliament for the second time with over 20% in a state election, that is a danger to the peaceful coexistence of the people in our country (Oppermann, 2016).

(SPD) Heiko Maas and Raed Saleh, as well as the Green Cem Özdemir have another narrative strategy, posing Islamic terrorism and right-wing extremism as equally dangerous threat to Germany:

It became very clear to me at the beginning of the year that the clocks tick a little differently when it comes to religion. At that time, in January, the world was shaken by the attack on Charlie Hebdo; at the same time Pegida made headlines in Dresden and elsewhere (Maas, 2015(1)).

Therefore, a leading culture is never in danger of being arbitrary - because it excludes right-wing extremists as well as religious fundamentalists and anti-Semites. In the face of the anti-democratic forces of our society, we must demand this guiding culture, which has grown out of our historical experience, again and again - and we must not tire of defending it (Saleh, 2015).

On the other hand, it is indispensable for the state to be able to defend itself in all directions, whether the danger comes from right-wing radicals or from Islamists (Özdemir, 2016).

The frequent references to German “dark” past when targeting right-wing extremism, work as powerful negative emotional triggers (Saleh, 2014, 2015; Merkel, 2015(1), 2017(2), 2018; Maas, 2018(1); Özdemir, 2017(1)). The focus on both physical and symbolic violence seems to infer that right-wing extremism threatens German public order as well as German identity. Some discourses adopt binary narratives opposing liberals, openness, and freedom, to international isolationism, populism, and nationalism, in a “clash” that does not involve Islam or Muslims but takes place within the “West” itself (Lindner, 2018(2); Maas, 2018(1)). While actors standing on this side of the graph often advocate for pragmatism and moderation regarding security issues, when it comes to right-wing extremism, criminalization, censorship, or zero tolerance approaches are called for. In doing so, actors tend to call for what the Copenhagen Schools’ have coined “extraordinary measures”, to counter right-wing extremism (Buzan et al., 1998). In a nutshell, in those discourses, the desecuritization of immigration operates through the securitization of right-wing extremism. Another narrative strategy consists in implementing a top-down discourse of reconsidering migrant’s and Muslims’ presence in a cosmopolitan and multilateral Germany, both pragmatically and symbolically. This echoes what

has been coined *Willkommenskultur*¹¹⁵ and appears as one justification of the federal and local governing forces, to bridge pragmatic needs of cheap skilled workers and humanitarian claims of hosting war refugees. Chancellor Merkel, (SPD) Thomas Oppermann, and (FDP) Christian Lindner make similar humanitarian and material arguments for hosting refugees:

Firstly. The fundamental right of politically persecuted persons to asylum applies. We can be proud of the humanity of our Basic Law. (...) We have always said - and this is also the general discussion - that I need an immigration law in order to serve Germany's particular interests, namely the need for workers and skilled workers, sensibly and to find the right answers to them. We have done a great deal in law and in law, some of which is not even known, because we do not call the whole thing "immigration law", but "residence law". Among them are many things that the OECD says we were one of the most progressive countries in existence (Merkel, 2015(2)).

The SPD, on the other hand, has a clear plan: we want to reconcile Germany's humanitarian obligations with its legitimate economic interests and improve the chances for social consensus and political stability (2017(1)).

Let us be clear: our country needs qualified immigration. The Council of Experts has just quoted the figures. In future, either 500 000 qualified immigrants a year or a pension at 70 will apply. That is the decision this society faces. I suspect that we will combine them. But we will need qualified immigration and for that we must remain a country open to the world (Lindner, 2018(2)).

This could be interpreted as a way to gain a competitive workforce able to balance German poor birth rate while "restoring" German self-image, not only in regard with its reputation after the handling of the Greece debt crisis, but also in regard with German "dark" past. As exposed in the previous section, Germany's own history, particularly National-Socialism and communism, work as a German radical other. Hence, as Shoshan notes, "(w)ith anger over German policy toward Greece still fuming and uncanny historical comparisons in the air, during the second half of 2015, the so-called refugee crisis painted Chancellor Merkel in a different, almost opposed light. Whereas numerous EU-member states pressed for strict asylum policies and tightened border controls, the German government has advocated for European solidarity with and responsibility for the refugees" (Shoshan, 2016: 262). The *Willkommenskultur* narratives appear as a practical answer to tackle Germany's present demographic challenges and its symbolic past to become "the good guy in the (hi)story".

3.2. The (de)securitization of Islam in the media arena

Another narrative war centred on Islam and Muslims in Germany opposes two sides within the lower left-hand side of the graph. On the securitizing side, Islam-critics can be divided into two archetypal discourses, namely the conservative, embodied by Birgit Kelle and Henryk Broder, and the feminist, embodied by Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer. On the (de)securitizing side, opponents to Islam-critics can also be divided into

¹¹⁵ "Islam belongs to Germany", "Germany needs skilled workers", "*wir schaffen das*", "*Willkommenskultur*".

two archetypal discourses, namely the antiracist discourse, embodied by Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman, and the *netzfeminismus* discourse, embodied by Anne Wizorek and Mithu Sanyal¹¹⁶.

The first story takes place in a *Kulturkampf* setting, where the Enlightened or free West opposes the Muslim other and supports the hypothesis of the securitization of Islam: Islamists are the radical others, Islamic culture is the main threat, and specific measures going from selecting refugees to assimilating Muslim are called for. In this story, narrators frame Islam, be it as religion, culture, or ideology, as the main threat to German societal security and the Western (Enlightened) world in an a-historical and binary horizon of experience. However, narrators do not always articulate the Islamic threat the same way. Necla Kelek, Alice Schwarzer, and Birgit Kelle do not apprehend Islam as a threat to *national* security, but only as a *societal* threat in Buzan's sense, that is a threat to German identity. For instance, Birgit Kelle claims for the defence of "the free West" wherever it is called into question (Kelle, 2016(2)). She designates Islamic culture or Islam as a threat to German culture and the veil as a threat to the *Gesellschaftsbild*, particularly insisting on the sexual violence against women, without adopting "feminist" rhetoric *à la* Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer. Alice Schwarzer perceives Muslim religious practices such as wearing the veil or public prayers as political offensive. Schwarzer tends to evaluate Muslim radicalization according to their religious practice and devotion:

Public prayer is still not common among normal believers – that is, Muslims who are not fanatical or ideologized - even today. (...) Of the three generations of the extended family (in Algeria), most are believers, some Ramadan Muslims, and a few unbelievers. For believers it is obligatory to pray five times a day. But I have not even seen anyone pray in all these weeks. The devout went discreetly to an adjoining room. "Prayer is something very intimate for us", they explained to me. "It is a dialogue between us and Allah" (Schwarzer, 2018).

As for Necla Kelek, she sees Islam as a "regime" essentially misogynist and totalitarian, citing Koranic verses while refusing to differentiate between Islam and Islamism (Kelek, 2010; 2016(1) and (2)):

I define Islam not only as a faith, but as a political ideology and a social system: a system that denies the separation of religion and state, secularity, and enlightenment, that practices the vertical separation of men and women, that discriminates against women (Kelek, 2010)

Schwarzer identifies the threat in religious *practices*, which she interprets as political gestures, while Kelek identifies threats within Islamic *dogma*, often referring to the Koran or the Sunna. This nuanced interpretation might be explained by a different socialisation. While Necla Kelek is a Turkish born migrant, who experienced suffering from cultural orthodoxy attributed to Islam:

My first decision was not to marry a Muslim macho. I knew that when I was five, six years old – and I wasn't lying. In Istanbul we had an open house and one visit from an American. I liked him so much because he was so different. He was dressed casually and came with a bouquet of flowers. And then I said to myself, "I want a man

¹¹⁶ Here are non-exhaustive list of selected actors. One can add publicists such as Ralph Giordano, or Weber, etc...). Besides, this does not mean that any discourse labelled as feminist or conservative imply de facto the securitization of Islam. Rather, it means that in the panel of Islam critic discourse under study, two different articulations can be identified, namely a feminist and conservative.

to give me flowers.” With my mother I read many photo novels. They were Italian stories with beautiful men, not machos. I wanted to live in this romantic world. In the Turkish novels there was almost only pain, renunciation, fear. And so it happened that I was only ever with German men together (Kelek, 2016(1)).

Schwarzer’s socialization in French feminist circles provided her with French specific framing of religion, namely the perception of religious expression in public space as political engagement¹¹⁷. Finally, while Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, and Henryk Broder share mostly civilizational narratives, Birgit Kelle is the only one to explicitly adopt a cultural framing. Defining herself as a ethnic German (*Aussiedler*)¹¹⁸ and picturing a German core:

But what is amazing is that the culture was the same (in her native Romania and Germany). There is a German core...one also lived worldwide. It is amazing ...in two regions with the same language, the same culture, the same children’s books. So, there exists something like a German culture (Kelle, 2017).

On the other hand, Henryk Broder’s corpus is characterized by both identity and security narratives, highly concerned with national (in)security induced by Islamic terrorism. He conflates Islam as both security and identity threats, although positioning himself as an outsider, calling for extraordinary measures only on the implicit:

Whether terrorism is a weapon of the poor in the fight against the rich. Whether a teacher who works at a public school is allowed to wear a headscarf or not. Whether separate times for women, meaning Muslim women, should be introduced in swimming pools. Whether Muslim pupils have a right to their own prayer rooms in schools. Whether the burqa and other forms of full-body disguise should be banned, although the ban on disguise already contains an answer to this question (Broder, 2016(1))

In short, both conservative and feminist archetypal discourses self-described as Islam-critics support the hypothesis of securitization, however, Henryk Broder is the only one to frame Islam as both national and societal (in)security, while the three other actors only frame it as an identity threat.

On the other side, the story takes place in-between the *Kulturkampf* and *Kantian* setting, where liberals confront the nationalist and Islamophobic other, implicitly advocating for cultural recognition. In this story, Islam is desecuritized through two processes: first, by de-politicizing Islam through the recognition of Muslims’ and/or migrants’ agency; second, by securitizing an alternative other, namely Islam-critics and right-wing extremism. Although all actors clearly target right-wing extremism as a danger to Germany, Anne Wizorek and Mithu Sanyal are more identity-oriented than security-oriented:

¹¹⁷ French secularism, aka “*laïcité*”, is not only about decline and privatisation of religion but also about the substitution of the Lumières’ legacy of the “ideology of reason” [Himmelfarb, 2001 and 2004]. As Mirtaheri points out, in places where subjective secularism is the prevailing ethos, religious symbols in the public sphere might be perceived as political (Mirtaheri, 2010: 81).

¹¹⁸ German law distinguishes between three groups of individuals: *Inländer*, native Germans, *Aussiedler*, ethnic Germans living outside Germany, who can claim citizenship, and *Ausländer*, foreign residents (Carle, 2007: 150).

The right-wing populism that we experience in Germany, but also in other countries such as the USA, is dangerous. (...) We must take a clear position on this and say: we do not want that, we do not want a step backwards, we want a future in which people can live non-violently and in diversity (Wizorek, 2017).

Sanyal: I think what is really, really dangerous is that we overlook or don't pay enough attention to certain issues, which is why right-wing people like Marine Le Pen have the opportunity to pick up a lot of women's votes, because the saleswoman at the checkout in the supermarket often feels unrepresented by mainstream feminism. (Sanyal, 2017(2)).

However, Ferda Ataman and Daniel Bax adopt security narratives to target right-wing extremism, providing a securitizing move. Ataman depicts German situation as threatening migrants or Germans of migration background and calls for "resistance" of migrants and Muslims against threatening discourse and behaviour from nationalist Germans:

Many people with a Kanaken background are alarmed because they hear more often than usual news about alleged right-wing extremist attacks and networks. I think that in view of the threatening political situation, millions of people are showing a lot of calm and serenity. (...) Germany's minorities are quite well-behaved. They have never gone on the barricades, there have been no violent riots worth mentioning, which you sometimes hear about from the USA, Great Britain or France. Probably the worst thing that can happen to the political centre in Germany is that even the ethnically disconnected find their own political home (Ataman, 2019).

Yet, Ataman does not directly tackle Islam but Germans with "immigrant background", calling for the de-Islamization of migrants:

People like me are counted among these Muslims in Germany. I belong to the category of "non-believing Muslims". You have heard correctly: non-believing Muslims. (...) "All Muslims", so these are also people who are not really Muslim. We use this attribution as a cultural stigma that you can't get out of. Muslim remains Muslim. Whether you are a believer or not (Ataman, 2019(2)).

Daniel Bax's story also shows an attempt at securitizing right-wing extremism while politicizing Left-wing populism, using German history, comparison, and irony. The ghost of German history is omnipresent. On the one hand, he refers to WWII and Nazism, linking Thilo Sarrazin's discourse to the tradition of Hitler and Goebbels (Bax, 2009), comparing *Deutschland Schaff sich Ab* to *Mein Kampf* (Bax, 2010). On the other, he refers to the Cold War, criticising Sahra Wagenknecht's accusation of Germany fetching Syrian doctors:

There is some echo to the accusation of "republic flight", which was raised in the GDR against people who often wanted to turn their backs on their country for economic reasons (Bax, 2018).

To sum up, the narrative war on Islam occurs mostly in the media arena, while the political arena struggles with the immigration issue since the turn of the 21st century and more intensely since the European migrant crisis. If settings, characters, and plots vary from a narrative war to another, de-securitizing moves materialize in two similar narrative processes: first, by promoting a top-down "tolerance" or *Willkommenskultur* discourse in the political arena, and a "recognition" or *Annerkennungskultur* discourse in the media arena; second, by securitizing right-wing extremism as greater or only threat to Germany. In both cases, the securitization of

right-wing extremism articulates around German “dark” past used as scaremongers, showing the particular weight of history in German post-war self-understanding.

3.3. Trouble in post-war German identity

Discourses of (de)securitization work as mirrors of identities. The narrative analysis on discourses on Islam, identity, and security, unravels a deeper narrative war on German self-understanding. The cleavage between *Willkommens-* and *Leitkultur*, recognition and assimilation, which have intensified since the European Migrant Crisis and Merkel’s “*wir schaffen das*”, demonstrates the lack of consensual and inclusive self-image in Germany. On the one hand, both quantitative and qualitative analysis tends to make what scholars such as Jürgen Habermas, Sternberger or Müller have coined constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*)¹¹⁹ a hegemonic discourse since the 2000s¹²⁰. On the other hand, Thilo Sarrazin’s controversy and the European migrant crisis have evidenced the return of national preference and the debate on the contested *Leitkultur* against so-called false-tolerance and political correctness.

Constitutional patriotism offers an alternative to the ethnic or traditional understanding of German as a homogenous and cultural kern, by promoting a common reference to the *Rechtsstaat* (the rule of law) and the *Sozialstaat* (the welfare state), in which the “culture” of modern and democratic Germany lies in the values fixed by the Constitution. Most actors in or running for power, such as (FDP) Christian Lindner and Guido Westerwelle, (SPD) Thomas Oppermann, Heiko Maas, and Raeh Saleh, as well as (*Grüne*) Cem Özdemir and Simone Peter, (*Die Linke*) Gregor Gysi, and (CDU) Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as antiracist publicists, such as Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman, and *netzfeminist* Anne Wizorek and Mithu Sanyal, share the adhesion to *Verfassungspatriotismus*. This is expressed in a narrative commitment to the *rule of law* (including references to the Basic Law and the Constitution), *democracy*, *freedom*, *tolerance*, and *diversity*, which gather the highest coding frequency of *Gesellschaftsbild* of the corpus (81>n>24). Besides, they all insist on the virtue of *moderation*, the centrality of *religious freedom* and the importance of historical *self-criticism*. All references to Germany prior to the reunification are negatively charged, with rare exceptions.

By associating German “good patriotism” to the Constitution, the rule of law and constellation of positive referents such as “democracy”, “freedom”, “welfare state”, or “economic strength”, promoters of

¹¹⁹ Political scientist Dolf Sternberger, 1979 explicitly introduced the concept of constitutional patriotism on the occasion of the thirtieth birthday of the Federal Republic (Sternberger, 1979). Constitutional patriotism is understood as a post-national form of democratic political allegiance.

¹²⁰ In reference to Martin Nonhoff’s “hegemonic project” in: Nonhoff Martin, “L’analyse hégémonique : à propos du développement récent de l’analyse de discours politique dans les sciences politiques”, *Langage et Société*, juin 2007, n°120, p. 83.

constitutional patriotism have framed political debates on German identity in such a way that it seems difficult to contest its terms, without being linked to German ethnic nationalism. In German discourses where constitutional patriotism is valued, the backward and dangerous other appears to be Germany's past. Constitutional patriotism is also hegemonic in the sense that most political leaders in or running for power, that is, actors holding authority and audience to diffuse it, promote it. Hence, constitutional patriotism appears as a "top-down" hegemonic discourse that mitigates securitizing moves toward Islam, through greater securitization of right-wing extremism and German past. The figure of right-wing extremism (*Rechtsextremismus*) personifies the radical other and is pivotal to the German political and discursive field.

Withal, political actors frame constitutional patriotism differently according to their political agenda. For example, Angela Merkel, Christian Lindner, and Thomas Oppermann insist above all on *freedom* to promote economic neoliberalism, understood as the cement of German strong economy, with the promotion of values such as *achievement*, *opportunity*, *willingness*, and *competitiveness*. Heiko Maas, Raed Saleh, Cem Özdemir, insist more particularly on *diversity* and the centrality of *religious freedom* in order to promote a cosmopolitan *Gesellschaftsbild*. Cem Özdemir states that the German Constitution should stand "above the Bible, the Koran, or other holy books" (Özdemir, 2016). According to him, "Germanness" rests on the loyalty to the Constitution and the Basic Law rather than a hard German *Leitkultur*, understood within the frame of European patriotism. Raed Saleh, who chooses to use the controversial term of *Leitkultur*, promotes a new (multicultural) version of German *Leitkultur* that should be based on the constitution (Saleh, 2016). Daniel Bax, Ferda Ataman, Anne Wizorek, and Mithu Sanyal, also insist on diversity and more particularly on tolerance, which, in their case, actually means recognition. It should be noted that tolerance discourse held by political actors is different and even criticised by those media actors. According to them, tolerance sets asymmetrical power relations between the one who tolerates and the one that is tolerated, when recognition values individual agency as well as the identity dimension of individual freedom, considered as a fundamental human right and vital for achieving equality and justice. Although rarely using the term "multiculturalism" (*Multikulti*) their discourses frame Germany as a cosmopolitan society, committed to diversity, tolerance and "living-together", in response to both right-wing extremism attacks on migrants and Islam-critics. These narrative variations of so-called constitutional patriotism evidence an evolution in the articulation of German post-war nationhood. Scholars such as Habermas (1991), Borneman (1997) or Huyssen (2000) have observed that in West Germany the notion of nationhood structured around narratives of material prosperity and economic competitiveness, coined as "prosperity Germany" (*Wohlstand Deutschland*). However, with the decline of a prosperity promised by the German state, German hegemonic discourse reconfigures around the

pairs of democracy vs. right-wing extremism, tolerance vs. racism, and cosmopolitanism vs. xenophobia. As argued by Shoshan, the “management of hate” allows the rethinking of the German national imagined community, regarding both legacies of National Socialism and German division during the Cold War. Our study actually shows that the hegemonic move toward cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism has intensified with the European migrant crisis. From this time, political leaders in charge at the federal and local levels, tried to defend a *Willkommenskultur* while securitizing right-wing extremism, marking a narrative transition from “prosperity Germany” (*Wohlstand Deutschland*) to “multicultural Germany” (*Multikulti Deutschland*) (Shoshan, 2016: 267).

However, hegemonic discourses are always contested, and the explicit or implicit return of culture-based narratives on the German public space appears as a counter-discourse to this top-down constitutional patriotism. Yet counter-discourses, such as the AfD’s, frame their nationalist response to a certain extent *within* narratives of constitutional patriotism, claiming a particular commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and freedom. This adds to the hegemonic character of constitutional patriotism in Germany. The rise of nationalist and populist discourses toward a top-down destructive ideology actually rarely takes ethnical or cultural narratives. The AfD leaders, for example, frame their ideal referent as (Western) *democracy*, (individual) *freedom*, *self-determination* against Europeanization and “standardisation”. Frauke Petry particularly conforms to this discourse by referring constantly to the *rule of law* and the State *responsibility*. However, as for their opponents, they frame democracy and freedom according to their political agenda. They defend a democratic culture of debate, pluralism and freedom of speech considered endangered by the establishment. According to them, the AfD remains the only political party to embody democracy against political correctness and false tolerance. Besides, opposition to multiculturalism, borderlessness, and self-criticism, as side effects of this top-down ideology, takes more civilizational than cultural forms. For example, Necla Kelek and Alice Schwarzer’s *Gesellschaftsbild* never refers explicitly to a German (*Leit*)*kultur*, but to unwritten rules and values of the German “receiving society” (Kelek, 2015, 2016) or “majority society” (Schwarzer, 2016): *gender equality*, (sexual) *freedom*, *secularism*, and the *Enlightenment*. Henryk Broder also refers abundantly to (western) *civilization* and *security* (Broder, 2017). On the margins though, Birgit Kelle adopts cultural narratives, invoking a German *kultur*, German *kern* (2016(2)), when Alexander Gauland clearly assumes *völkisch* referents such as the German *Volk* or *Heimat*:

Dear friends, we hold fast to the notion of the people (*Volk*). This is not an ethnically exclusive community. That has never existed. But success has to do with lineage, with traditions, with cultural commonalities, with home. Home is a human right. (Gauland: 2017(1))

Finally, interestingly, very few German political actors explicitly assume the term *Leitkultur*. (CDU) Thomas De Maizière and (SPD) Raed Saleh are few exceptions. The former defines German *Leitkultur* as the importance of *language, consensus, federalism, freedom, and openness*:

I like the term “*Leitkultur*” and would like to stick to it. Because it has two-word components. Firstly, the word culture. This shows what is at stake, namely not rules of law, but unwritten rules of our coexistence (De Maizière, 2016).

The latter offers a new (multicultural) version of German *Leitkultur*, summed up as follow:

We can proudly represent what all the world positively associates with Germany: Hard work, good education and training and a strong welfare state are just as much a part of our guiding culture as civic involvement in sports clubs or in the voluntary fire brigade (Saleh, 2016).

Interestingly then, while some promoters of constitutional patriotism and multiculturalism use cultural narratives, some promoters of German *Leitkultur* use narratives of constitutional patriotism. Therefore, whether to support or oppose the use of culture, as explanatory or discriminatory variable, cultural prism remains a patent yet controversial setting in contemporary Germany. As the present study has demonstrated, whenever politicized or securitized, Islam is narratively framed under the banner of culture rather than religion. In-group Muslims deemed secular or enlightened are referred to as “cultural Muslims” (*Kulturmuslimen*), and Islam-critics denounce a “cultural discount” (*Kulturabatte*) concerning the State false tolerance toward Muslim crimes. On the other side, Islam-critic’s opponents deplore the “cultural trap” consisting in explaining negative-behaviour through cultural explanations. The framing of Islam as “culture” might express two phenomena: religion is sacred and thus cannot be attacked without great political cost, and/or religion and culture are seen, if not as synonymous, at least as inherent to each other. The conflation of culture and religion is common to German and British narratives, while alien to French ones, where cultural framing is taboo, and critics of religion are common.

Summary

The narrative analysis of discourses on Islam, identity, and security in the German corpus has unravelled two narrative battles being fought simultaneously, each implying different securitizing and de-securitizing moves. On the one hand, the political arena struggles with the (de)securitization of immigration since the turn of the 21st century, and more intensely since the European migrant crisis, as displayed in the opposition between the upper left-hand side of the graph, defending national preferences against the lower right-hand side, advocating multilateralism, openness, and a *Willkommenskultur*. On the other, the media arena, incarnated in the lower left-hand side of the graph, displays a contemporary *Kulturkampf* on the Muslim question, the ones advocating for assimilation against the others promoting an *Annerkennungskultur*,

or the recognition of Islam and Muslims in Germany. Those narrative wars on immigration and Islam have highlighted how “constitutional patriotism” has become a top-down hegemonic project of re-imagining of the German self after the reunification that seems to have somehow mitigated some securitizing moves toward Islam in the political arena. Although the narrative analysis has showed how settings, characters, and plots varied according to different ideal types, the promotion of constitutional patriotism tends to be paired with de-securitizing moves toward Islam and securitizing moves toward right-wing extremism as greater threat to Germany. Yet, the explicit or implicit return of culture-based narratives within some securitizing discourses on Islam, stemming from conservative and feminist Islam-critics as well as right-wing populists such as the AfD leaders, appear as a counter-hegemonic discourse around the revivalism of a cultural version of German *Leitkultur* against migrants and/or Muslims. These tensions in the expression of the German self reflect a double traumatic historical legacy specific to post-war Germany, as I shall expose in the final chapter.

Chapter 5 – Narrating Islam, security, and identity in public discourses in contemporary Britain (2009-2019)

In line with chapter 4, this chapter explores the way Islam, security, and identity, are interlinked in British contemporary public discourses through the narrative analysis of 114 speeches of 22 actors of the political and media elite between 2009 and 2019. Following the same method as exposed in the previous chapters, section 1 will present the selection of British narrators, section 2 will expose the settings, characterizations, and plots, while the final section 3 will analyze the extend and degrees of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims in the British public discursive space and its consequences on the framing of British identity.

Section 1 – British narrators

In accordance with the methodology I employed to sample the German corpus and with the exigency of the comparison, I selected actors in or running for power from all the major political forces in Britain, namely the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrat Party, the Green Party, and UKIP. Given the centrality of Parliament in the British case, I selected a particularly high number of interventions in the House of Commons and the House of Lords¹²¹. I added 7 actors of the media set up, steaming from the National Secular Society (NSS), conservative tabloids or antiracist columns. Regarding the text sampling, as for the German case, I paid particular attention to the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis, which is all the more important in the UK since it corresponds to the Brexit campaign. I also focused on the 2017 terror attacks in London and Manchester.

1.1. Political actors in or running for power

I selected three actors from the Conservative Party that have been successively elected Prime Minister during the period under study, namely David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson, and one MP of the House of Lords, Baroness Warsi, which has been central to the question of Islamophobia in the Party. David Cameron was born in London in an upper-middle class family. He was educated in the prestigious Eton College before he graduated from the Brasenose College, Oxford, in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

¹²¹ I collected Parliamentary debates between Members of Parliament (MPs) of the House of Commons from the Hansard online Parliament database, which uploads the edited verbatim of debates within the British Parliament. The key words of “Islam”, “Muslim(s)”, “Security”, “Terror(ism)”, “Immigration”, were searched in Hansard between the dates of the decade under study.

Cameron considers himself a “real mixture of Scottish, Welsh, and English”¹²² and identifies as a liberal and one-nation conservative¹²³, opposed to neo-conservatism. He is also a proclaimed practising christian. Cameron worked for the Conservative Research Department from 1988 to 1993 and became successively Special advisor of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont, and Special Advisor of the Home Secretary Michael Howard. After a short career as Director of Corporate Affairs at Carlton Communication (1994-2001), Cameron was first elected MP in 2001 when he came to work for the Commons Home Affairs Selected Committee. In 2003, he was appointed a Shadow Minister of the Privy Council Office and became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005. During his leadership, Cameron has been accused by the traditionalist fringe of the Party of capitulating to social liberalism – see for example Peter Hitchen, selected in the present panel. Following the victory of Conservatives in the 2010 General election, Cameron became PM in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and appointed Nick Clegg – also selected in this panel – as Deputy PM. Cameron’s premiership is known for his economic austerity that particularly targeted the NHS and the education system, military interventions in Libya and in Syria and Iraq against ISIL. Domestically, the Scottish independence referendum and that of British membership to the EU marked his premiership. Following the success of the Leave vote, Cameron resigned as PM in 2016, and was succeeded by Theresa May. I selected 7 speeches between 2011 and 2016, one speech at Munich Security Conference (2011), 2 Party Conference (2013, 2015(2)), 3 10 Downing Street’s speeches after his election as PM (2015(1)) and on Brexit (2016(1) and (2)), and one address to the House of Commons on the fight against ISIL in Syria (2015(3)). Born in Sussex in an Anglo-Catholic family, Theresa May graduated from St Hugh’s College, Oxford, in Geography. Like Cameron she identifies as a one-nation conservative and has had political ambition since the earliest age. She is also a Christian practitioner, member of the Church of England. After working for the Bank of England and the financial sector, Theresa May was first elected MP of Maidenhead in 1997. She served several times in Shadow cabinets and was appointed chairwomen of the Party in 2002, before she became Home Secretary under Cameron’s premiership (2010-2016), where she added restriction to immigration

¹²²Iain Martin and Andrew Porter, “David Cameron flies the flag for Britain”, *The Telegraph*, December 10, 2007: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/1572058/David-Cameron-flies-the-flag-for-Britain.html> Consulted on March 30, 2020.

¹²³ One-nation conservatism, also known as Tory-democracy is a “paternalistic” form of British political conservatism, advocating for the preservation of established institutions and traditional principles combined with political democracy and a social and economic program. According to this political philosophy, society should be allowed to develop in an organic way, where members have obligations towards each other and particularly emphasises paternalism, meaning that those who are privileged and wealthy pass on their benefits. See: “Tory democracy”, *Dictionary*. Merriam-Webster, Retrieved on March 31, 2020 : <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Tory%20Democracy>; and “One-nation conservatism”, *wikipedia*, retrieved on March 31, 2020 : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-nation_conservatism#cite_note-4

among other things. She succeeded Cameron as PM and leader of the party in 2016, becoming the second female PM after Margaret Thatcher. Often compared to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Theresa May has been accused by some traditional fringe of bringing the party to the left, especially due to her social reform. Most of all, her premierships were marked by the Brexit negotiations. While she had publicly stated her support for the Remain vote, after the victory of the Leave vote, she supported the full withdrawal and prioritised immigration controls over remaining in the EU single market. After her Brexit withdrawal agreement was rejected three times in Parliament, she resigned, leaving the way to Boris Johnson. I selected seven speeches between 2015 and 2019, among which 3 addresses in the House of Commons on migration (2015), counterterrorism (2016), and the 2017 London's terror attacks (2017(1)), one Party Conference speech (2018), and 3 Downing Street's speeches on terror attacks in the UK (2017(2) and (3)) and her announcing her resignation (2019). Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, known as Boris Johnson, is a controversial journalist and politician and actual British PM, born in New York from an upper-middle class English family. He was educated in Eton as his predecessor Cameron and graduated from Balliol College, Oxford, with a degree in Classics. He is part of the Oxford undergraduate generation of Conservatives such as David Cameron or Michael Gove that will dominate British politics and media in the 2010s. As his homologues, he defines himself as one-nation Tory, although rarely acknowledged as such, but rather as social liberal conservative or libertarian. Although he abandoned Catholicism to join the Church of England, he considers himself as not being a serious practising Christian. During his career as journalist for the Time, the Daily Telegraph and The Spectator, he became a preeminent Eurosceptic voice, which he rendered attractive to the British right, according to his biographer Andrew Gimson. He began his career in politics in 2001 when elected Conservative MP for Harley and served as Junior Shadow Minister under Michael Hovor and David Cameron. From 2008 to 2016, he served as Mayor of London, where he followed a socially liberal conservative policy supporting immigration. In 2016, Boris Johnson became a central figure of the Leave campaign, and after the Leave victory and the resignation of David Cameron, Theresa May appointed him Foreign Secretary, but he resigned two years later in disagreement with May's Brexit policy. In 2019, Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May as PM and Leader of the Conservative Party. The UK withdrew from the EU under his premiership on January 31, 2019. I selected 6 speeches between 2016 and 2019, one speech for the Vote Leave campaign (2016(1)), one address to the House of Commons on the counter-Daesh campaign (2016(2)), one Party Conference speech (2017), one tribune on the burqa published in *The Telegraph* (2018), Boris Johnson's first speech as PM (2019(1)), and one interview to the BBC after the 2019 London Bridge stabbing (2019(2)). Sayeeda Hussain Warsi, Baroness Warsi, is a British Lawyer and politician, born in West Yorkshire from a

Pakistani Muslim immigrant family. Warsi attended the University of Leeds and the College of Law, York, where she completed a professional legal training and qualified as a solicitor in 1996. She gave up soliciting in 2004 to stand for Parliament in Dewsbury but lost to the Labour's candidate. In 2007, Warsi was appointed Shadow Minister of Community Cohesion and raised to the peerage as Baroness Warsi, becoming the first Muslim woman to sit on the front bench of a political party. In 2010, Cameron appointed her in the Cabinet before she was sworn in in the Privy Council. During her service, she fought militant secularism and defended the unique position of the Church of England and the role of faith in British public debate. She resigned in 2014 in disagreement with the government's policy in the Israel-Gaza conflict. Warsi is known for her opposition to xenophobic narratives of the 2016 Leave campaign and the raising of the issue of Islamophobia in the Conservative Party. In 2018, she urged PM Theresa May to publicly acknowledge it. I selected 5 speeches between 2012 and 2018, one speech given in the Holy See (2012), one tribune on ISIS and British Muslims published in *The Guardian* (2015), and 3 addresses to the House of Lords on Brexit and human rights (2017), counterterrorism (2018(1)), and Islamophobia (2018(2)).

I selected three actors from the Labour Party, from the leader of the opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, to the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, and local MP Sarah Champion. Jeremy Bernard Corbyn is the Leader of the Labour Party and the Leader of the Official Opposition since 2015 and has been MP for Islington North since 1983. Born in Chippenham, Wiltshire, from a middle-class family, Corbyn joined Labour very early. Moving to London, he became a Trade Union representative and a contributor to the monthly political magazine *London Labour Briefing*. During this time, he campaigned for nuclear disarmament, against the Vietnam War and engaged in Anti-Fascist Action and Anti-Apartheid Movement. Being backbencher since 1983, he has been one of the most opposing MPs to the Labour whip during Labour governments between 1997 and 2010, opposing the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars among other things. Since his election as Leader of the Party and the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn has moved the Party to the Left, advocating for renationalization, the end of austerity on the domestic level. Regarding foreign policy, he advocated for the end of military interventions and the withdrawal from NATO, opposing for example military intervention against ISIL in Syria. Regarding the EU referendum, Jeremy Corbyn timidly supported continuing membership, while criticising the EU and avoiding taking a firm stand. I selected 5 speeches between 2015 and 2019, among which two addresses to the House of Commons on ISIL in Syria (2015) and the London attack (2017), one speech on the EU during the Brexit campaign (2016), and two Party Conference speeches (2018, 2019). Sadiq Khan is a major figure of the British Labour Party and Mayor of London since 2016. Born in South London from a British Pakistani working-class Muslim family, Khan graduated in Law from the

University of North London. He began a career as a practising solicitor specialised in Human Rights Law at the beginning of the 1990s. During his parliamentary career, Khan criticised PM Tony Blair and UK's Foreign Policy, especially British intervention in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Under Gordon Brown's premiership, Sadiq Khan moved up the parliamentary ranks becoming a party whip and later appointed Minister of State for Communities (2008) and Minister of State for Transport (2009), making him the first Muslim to sit in in the British Cabinet. Sadiq Khan was an ally to Labour candidate Ed Milliband who appointed him Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, Shadow Lord Chancellor, and Shadow Minister for London. By winning the 2016 London mayoral elections, Khan is the first Muslim to become Mayor of a major Western capital. During his term, Sadiq Khan pursued a social liberal policy, freezing public transport fare, reducing polluting vehicles, and promoting inter-communities' tolerance. Sadiq Khan was a supporter of continuing membership in the EU. I selected 6 speeches between 2015 and 2019, one speech to the House of Commons on the Paris attack (2015), one debate with Zack Goldsmith for London Mayor's election (2016(1)), Sadiq Khan's Mayoral victory's speech (2016(2)), one Party Conference speech (2017), and two tribunes published on *Labourlist.org* (2018) and in *The Guardian* (2019). Sarah Champion is a British politician, Labour MP for Rotherham in the House of Commons since 2012. Originating from Maldon, Essex; she graduated in Psychology from the University of Sheffield in 1991. After a career as Art development officer, Sarah Champion entered the House of Commons in 2012, as MP of Rotherham. Jeremy Corbyn appointed her successively Shadow Minister for Preventing Abuse (2015) and Shadow Minister for Women and Equalities (2016), when she launched the campaign Dare2Care to prevent child abuse. Sarah Champion has been caught in a controversy after her 2017 opinion column in *The Sun* "British Pakistani ARE raping and exploiting white girls...and it's time we faced up to it", which provoked disapprovals within the Party. Sarah Champion occasionally writes for the *HuffPost*, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. I selected 5 speeches between 2015 and 2017, among which 4 addresses to the House of Commons (2015, 2016(1) and (2), 2017), and one column on Pakistani sexual abuse published in *The Sun* (2017(2)).

I also selected two actors from the Liberal Democrats, in and out power, Nick Clegg and Vince Cable. Sir Nicholas William Peter Clegg, or Nick Clegg, is a former British politician and major figure of the Liberal Democrat Party since the 2000s. Born in Buckinghamshire to an upper-class Dutch-English family, Clegg studied Archaeology and Anthropology in Robinson College, Cambridge. After studying and working in the US, notably as intern of Christian Hitchen – brother of Peter Hitchen, selected in the panel – at *The Nation* in New York, he pursued a promising career as journalist for the *Financial Times* in the 1990s. In 1999, He entered the European Parliament and became Trade and Industry spokesman for the European Liberal

Democrats Reform Group. After leaving the EU Parliament, he entered the House of Commons as MP for Sheffield Hallam in 2005 and was promoted Home Affairs spokesperson of the Party in 2006 before he was elected leader of the Party in 2007. Considered an *Orange book*¹²⁴ liberal, Clegg conciliates socially liberal to market free policies and considers himself a radical centrist, committed to tolerance and pluralism. After the 2010 general election, Nick Clegg was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Lord President of the Council through a coalition with the Conservatives under David Cameron premiership. During his term, the Liberal Democrats saw a significant drop in support, which led to poor results in the 2015 general election and the resignation of Nick Clegg. In 2016, Nick Clegg was a strong supporter of the Remain vote and served as spokesperson for Exiting the EU and for International Trade and called for a soft Brexit and a People's vote. Since 2018, Nick Clegg has been a lobbyist and public relation officer for Facebook and has moved to California. I selected 5 speeches between 2011 and 2017, one speech on multiculturalism delivered in Luton (2011), one speech at the UN General Assembly (2013), one Party Conference speech (2014), the 2015 general election's manifesto (2015), and one interview to *BBC News* (2017).

Vince Cable, born in York to a working-class Conservative family, is also a major figure of the Liberal Democrat Party. He studied Economics in Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, and later graduated with a PhD in Economics in the University of Glasgow. He pursued a dense career in economics, as Treasury Finance Officer to the Kenyan Government (1966-1968), First Secretary to the Latin American Department of the Foreign Office and worked for the Oil Company Royal Dutch Shell (1990-1997). Politically, after a first membership in the Labour Party (1966-1982), Cable joined the Social Democrat Party (SPD), which later merged with the Liberal Democrat. Vince Cable entered the House of Commons in 1997 as MP for Twickenham. Also, a contributor to the Orange Book, he describes himself as a social democrat and an open market liberal and contributed to the shift of the Party towards economic liberalism. Deputy leader of the Party between 2006 and 2010, he played a key role in coalition talks during the 2010 general election and was appointed Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. After a short elimination from Parliament in 2015, he returned in 2017 and became Leader of the Party. Vince Cable firmly opposed Brexit and supported a second referendum. He compared himself to French President Emmanuel Macron, at the time when he was Minister of the Economy. Finally, he publicly refers to his personal life in a multicultural marriage and family to defend multiculturalism and a strong stance against racism and discriminations in Britain (Cable, 2017(2)). I selected 4 speeches between 2017 and 2018, one stand

¹²⁴ *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism* was written by a group of British Liberal Democrat politicians including among others Vince Cable and Nick Clegg. It therefore refers to politicians in the party who subscribe to the book's emphasis on greater personal choice and market solutions. The book offers liberal solutions, stressing the role of choice and competition, to societal issues such as public healthcare, pensions, the environment, globalisation, or the EU.

for the 2017 Liberal Democrat leadership's election (2017(1)), two Party Conference speeches (2017(2), 2018(2)), and one address to the House of Commons on military action overseas (2018(1)).

I selected two actors of the Green Party of England and Wales, one co-leader and national spokesperson Jonathan Bartley, and Deputy Leader and local political actor Amalia Womack. Jonathan Charles Bartley was born in London to a middle-class family and graduated from the London School of Economics in 1994. After working as cross-party researcher and parliamentary assistant in the UK Parliament, he founded Ekklesia in 2002, a Christian think-tank investigating the role of religion in public life, and the Accord Coalition in 2008, working on religious discriminations in schools of England and Wales. After being the Green Party's National Work and Pension spokesperson and candidate for Streatham in 2015, Bartley has been elected co-leader of the Green Party in 2016 together with Caroline Lucas and again in 2018 together with Sian Berry. He has also contributed to several audio-visual and written British media such as the BBC and *The Guardian*. I selected 5 speeches between 2012 and 2017, one critic on capitalism published in *The Guardian* (2012), one interview published in the *London Green Left* blog (2016), one lecture given at the William Temple Foundation (2017) and two Party Conference speeches (2018, 2019). Amalia Helen Womack is also a British politician figure of the Green Party, Deputy leader since 2014. Born in Newport in South Wales, she graduated in Environmental technology from the Imperial College London in 2009. Member of the party since 2000 and End Ecocide Campaigner, Womack was elected Deputy leader of the Green Party at the age of 29, becoming the youngest party deputy leader of the UK. Womack is known for her pro-migrant and feminist positions. I selected 4 speeches between 2015 and 2019, 2 articles published in the *HuffPost* on refugees (2016) and Brexit (2016), and 2 Party Conference speeches (2018, 2019).

I selected former Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and leaders of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) Nigel Farage and Gerard Batten. Nigel Paul Farage is a prominent Eurosceptic in the UK since the 1990s and is well known for his speeches in the European Parliament. Born in Farnborough, Kent, to a middle-class family, he has been an active conservative and admirer of Enoch Powell from his early years in school. After leaving school, he was employed in London trading commodities. In 1992, Farage left the Conservative Party in protest of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and contributed to the founding of the UK Independent Party in 1993. In 1999, he was elected MEP, leading a UKIP contingent, and co-leading the Eurosceptic group Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy in the European Parliament. In 2006, Nigel Farage was elected Leader of UKIP, which he led to win the 2014 European Parliamentary Election. Major figure of the Leave vote in 2016, he resigned from the leadership of UKIP after the Brexit referendum. In 2018, Farage resigned from the party after 25 years membership in protest with new leader Gerard Batten's

appointment of anti-Islam activist Tommy Robinson as advisor. In 2019, he became leader of the Brexit Party who won most of the UKIP seats in the 2019 European Parliamentary Election. Nigel Farage stands as an anti-euro, environmental septic, and supporter of Enoch Powell's view on immigration, targeting particularly Romanian and Eastern European economic migrants. Nigel Farage has been active in UK and American media, appearing in the American television network *Fox News* and hosting *The Nigel Farage Show* on the UK talk radio station LBC. I selected 5 speeches between 2013 and 2019, two Party conference speeches, when he was UKIP's leader (2013) and for the Brexit Party (2019), one interview to the BBC on 2015 general election (2015), one speech in the European Parliament (2016), and one speech to the AfD in Germany (2017). Gerard Joseph Batten, founding member and former leader of UKIP, was born in Romford, Essex, where he worked as a salesman before entering politics. Batten was the first General Secretary of UKIP (1994-1997) and its first MEP in 2004 for the London constituency, before he became Chief whip of the party in the European Parliament between 2009 and 2014. In 2016, Batten became UKIP's spokesperson for Exiting the EU and was elected Leader of the party in 2018. During his leadership, Gerard Batten shifted the party toward anti-multiculturalist and anti-Islam rhetoric, appointing anti-Islam activist Tommy Robinson as party advisor. This led to the resignation of key members and the founding of the Brexit Party, UKIP's defeat in the 2019 European Parliamentary Election. I selected 5 speeches between 2014 and 2019, among which 3 speeches in the European Parliament (2014, 2018(3), and 2019), one UKIP Conference's speech (2018(1)), and one interview with *Sky News* (2018(2)).

Finally, as particularity to the Britain terrain, I selected the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, leader of the Anglican Church and member of the House of Lords. Born in London, Justin Welby had a difficult childhood and was educated in Eton College and Trinity College, Cambridge. He graduated in 1978 in History and Law. Whilst in Cambridge, he experienced a personal conversion at the age of 19. While working in the oil industry for 11 years, he became a member of the evangelical Anglican church of Holy Trinity in Brompton, London. From 1989 to 1992, Welby studied theology and trained for the priesthood at St John's College of Durham. He was successively ordained a deacon, a priest, a curate, and became rector of St James' Church and later vicar of St Michael and All the Angels, Coventry. In 2002, Welby was appointed canon residentiary of Coventry Cathedral and co-director for the International Ministry at the International Centre for Reconciliation. After being appointed dean of Liverpool, he was consecrated as a bishop at York Minster in 2011 and introduced to the House of Lords in 2012. Shortly afterwards, Welby was elected Archbishop of Canterbury and appointed to the Privy Council in 2013, becoming primate inter pares of England and head of the worldwide Anglican communion. Sitting in the House of Lords, he has among other

things supported British airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and opposed restrictions on child refugee's admission in the UK. On societal issues, Welby is mostly engaged in issues regarding social inequalities, healthcare and education, and has been warning against dangerous rhetoric during the Brexit campaign. I selected 5 speeches between 2015 and 2018, among which one address to the Muslim Council of Wales (2015(1)), one speech in the House of Lords on Syria (2015(2)), one lecture on religious motivated violence (RMV) at the Church of Ireland Theological Institute (2016(1)), one speech on common good and shared vision (2016(2)), and one address to the UN Security Council (2018).

1.2. Media actors

First, I selected publicists known for their conservative comments and sometimes-polemical positions on Islam and/or migration, English conservative journalist Peter Hitchen, former political editor of *The Sun*, Trevor Kavanagh, and British columnist and author Allison Pearson. Peter Jonathan Hitchen was born in the Crown colony of Malta and studied back to Britain in the University of York where he graduated in Philosophy and Economics in 1973. Peter Hitchen is brother to journalist Christopher Hitchen, with whom he publicly argued on Christopher's book *God Is Not Great*, Peter being a Christian Anglican believer. After a short career as parliamentary journalist, Peter Hitchen moved to foreign reporter, mostly reporting from the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s. He was first Moscow correspondent for the *Daily Express* before becoming its correspondent in Washington. Back to Britain in 1995, Peter Hitchen joined the *Mail on Sunday* and contributed to *The Spectator* and *The American Conservatives* magazines and occasionally to *The Guardian* as well as *Prospect* and *The New Statesman* magazines. In 2010, he won the Orwell prize in political journalism. Politically, Peter Hitchen describes himself as a conservative and Anglican Christian, fervent critic of so-called political correctness and opponent to British military interventionism, in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq in defence of British national interest. He is also an ardent campaigner against recreational drugs in his columns. I selected 6 articles published in the *Mail on Sunday* between 2012 and 2017, on the "alien nation" (2012), the EU (2015(1)), refugees (2015(2)), the US (2016), the BBC (2017(1)), and interventionism (2017(2)). Trevor Michael Thomas Kavanagh was born in Surrey, England, and left school at 17 to work in newspapers, mostly in Australia, where he emigrated between 1965 and 1978. Back in the UK, he worked for *The Sun* before he became its political editor. Trevor Kavanagh is known for his controversial pieces, particularly his article "The Muslim Problem" published in *The Sun* in relation to MP Sarah Champion's "Pakistani men ARE raping white girls" mentioned earlier, where his rhetoric has been compared to Nazi propaganda. I selected 4 articles between 2009 and 2017, among which one on Britain's decline published in *The Spectator* (2009), and 3

published in *The Sun* on Manchester terror attack (2017(1)), the “Muslim problem” (2017(2)), and a response to accusations of Islamophobia (2017(3)). Finally, Judith Allison Pearson is a Welsh writer born in Carmarthen. After studying English at Clare College, Cambridge, she started a career as a journalist for the *Financial Times* and *The Independent*. Since 2015, she is columnist and chief interviewer of the *Daily Telegraph*. She became a television critic, for which she won an award at the British Press Awards in 1993. Besides hosting some shows on Channel 4 or BBC radio, Pearson writes columns for the London *Evening Standard* and the *Daily Mail*. She is also known for her 2002 bestseller *I Don’t Know How She Does It*. Allison Pearson has supported the Leave vote during the Brexit campaign and has provoked several controversies after her reactions to terror attacks in Belgium (2016) and Manchester (2017). I selected 6 columns published in *The Telegraph* between 2011 and 2019, on the veil (2011 and 2019), the war on ISIL (2015(1)), the “problem” of integration (2015(2) and 2016), and the placement of a Christian child with a Muslim foster care family (2017).

I selected actors that campaign to a variable extent for secularism in the UK, such as philosopher and author A. C. Grayling, writer Joan Smith, chairman of Labour Humanists, and Stephen Evans, CEO of the National Secular Society (NSS), campaigning for the separation of church and State in Britain. Anthony Clifford Grayling was born and raised in Northern Rhodesia, now Malawi, before moving to England in his teens. There, he went to the University of Sussex, completed a BA in Philosophy at the University of London before obtaining a doctorate in Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1981. A. C. Grayling moved up the academic rank from lecturer to professor in 2005 at Birkbeck, London, from which he resigned in 2011 to become the first master of the independent undergraduate New College of the Humanities in London. Beside his philosophical research on the problem of scepticism in epistemology, A. C. Grayling engages in the public debates, particularly on secularism and human rights. He is patron of Humanists UK (former *British Humanists Association*), a charitable organisation that promotes rational thinking, humanism and “aims to represent people who seek to live good lives without religion or superstitious beliefs”¹²⁵, and honorary associate of the NSS and writes column and blog pieces in *The Guardian*, *Prospect* and *New Scientists* magazines. In 2017, A. C. Grayling was appointed Commander of the British Empire (CBE) for his services to Philosophy. I selected 4 columns between 2009 and 2015, 2 published in *The Guardian* on faith groups (2009) and humanism (2013), and 2 published in *Prospect* magazine on migration (2015(1)) and ISIL (2015(2)). Joan Alison Smith is an English writer and Human rights activist. After reading Latin in the University of Reading

¹²⁵ <https://humanism.org.uk/humanism/humanism-today/non-religious-beliefs/>


in the 1970s, she joined the Sunday Times in 1979 and free-lanced for major British newspapers such as *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The New Statesman*. Although internationally known for her crime novels, Joan Smith is a political activist committed to feminism, republicanism, and atheism. She supports the pressure group Republic and is a member of the Humanists UK and the NSS like A. C. Grayling. In 2015, she was even elected as chair of Labour Humanists, an influence group that “brings like-minded people together to influence Labour Party policy on key humanist and secularist issues” (note). I selected 4 columns between 2015 and 2017, among which 3 published in *The Independent* on Jeremy Corbyn (2015(1)), the Paris attacks (2015(2)), and feminism (2016), and one published in *The Guardian* on ISIL (2017). Finally, I selected Stephen Evans for his position as chief executive officer the National Secular Society and his regular publications on secularism and Islam in the *Huffington post* or on the NSS website, although no biographical elements are available to the public. I selected 5 articles published on the NSS website between 2016 and 2018, on Islamic adverts (2016), terror (2017(1)), anti-Muslim hate (2017(2)), secularism (2017(3)), and *burqa* bans (2018).

Finally, I selected progressist journalist, namely fourth-wave feminist activist and novelist Kira Cochrane and anti-racist Sudanese-born columnist Nesrine Malik. Kira Cochrane was born and raised in Loughton, Essex. She studied American Literature at the University of Sussex and the University of California. Initially working for the *Sunday Times*, Cochrane was appointed Head of Features of *The Guardian* where she writes about women’s empowerment and female leaders. She also contributes to *The New Statesman* and the *HuffPost*. Kira Cochrane has published several novels, among which *All The Rebel Women* (2013) and *Modern Women 52 Pioneers* (2017). I selected 4 articles published in *The Guardian* between 2013 and 2014, tackling the Femen (2013(1)), the niqab (2013(2)), asylum seekers (2014(1)), and feminism (2014(2)). Nesrine Malik was born and raised in Khartoum and attended the American University of Cairo and the University of Khartoum. Coming to Britain, she graduated from the University of London and started working as a columnist for *The Guardian* and a panellist on the BBC. Her work focuses on Sudanese politics, inequalities, and Islamophobia, for which she has been nationally recognized. In 2015, she confronted Peter Hitchen on Channel 4 to discuss the place of hijab and Muslim identity. In 2019, Nesrine Malik published *We Need New Stories*, in which she discusses British cultural wars and questions mainstream narratives. I selected 5 columns published in *The Guardian* between 2013 and 2019, on anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia (2013, 2019), on *Charlie Hebdo*’s front page (2016), on Westminster attack (2017), and the “hostile environment” policy (2018).

Section 2. Narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in British public discourses: settings, characterizations, and plots

A first glance at the 50 most frequent words in the British corpus offers an interesting look at the material (table 1). As for the German case, most of these words correspond to the political nature of the sources, hence the terms “people”, “countr(ies)”, “Britain/ish”, “government” or “European”. However, while they have in common “security”, “Muslim”, and “religious”, what’s striking is the difference in the words consistent with the research question. Words most frequent in the German panel such as “Islam”, “refugees”, “integration”, or “immigration” are absent from the British cluster. That does not mean that sources are inconsistent with the research question, i.e., the narrative interlinking of Islam, security, and identity, but rather that it is not treated in the same way. For example, frequent words such as “faith”, “communit(ies)”, “liberal” or “values”, are linked to questions of Islam and security, and translate *a priori* a most explicit focus on identity in the British corpus than in the German one. That being said, a quantitative look at the British corpus shows almost the same distribution of the three narrative meta-categories as the German case, that is a high amount of plot narratives, followed by characterization and setting narratives (fig. 1). The following section will successively account for the *settings* (2.1), *characterizations* (2.2), and *plots* (2.3) of the British discourses under study.

Figure 1. Distribution of narratives in the British corpus



2.1. Setting the scenes

A first look at the most frequent setting codes present in the British corpus (table 2) shows that “immigration” reaches the 4th rank, although the word did not appear among the 50 most frequent words. Regarding spatial-temporal horizon of experience, the *MENA* region and *Europe* as well as *British past* and the *future* gather the highest number of codes. Contrary to the German panel, topics such as *terror*, *Islam*, or East-West divide

seems secondary while topics such as *Brexit*, *immigration*, *economy*, *youth*, *family*, and *women's right* are much more frequent. Concerning the rhetorical tones, there is an over representation of binary tones (n=40), followed by *emotional*, *optimistic*, and *self-promoting* (n>30), and *alarming*, *war-like* and *empathetic* (n>20). However frequent these discursive items are, the qualitative analysis shows that they are not consensual throughout the British narrators (fig. 2). Setting codes discriminate between the different parts. Regarding temporal horizons, the upper side of the graph seems turned toward the past, primarily referring to the British proud past, while the lower side of the graph seems more concerned about the future. Spatially speaking, the upper right-hand side seems more outward looking, evolving in interaction with the *MENA* region, *Eastern Europe*, and concerned about foreign policy, while the rest of the narrators seem more focused on a national horizon of experience, tackling questions of *identities*, *religion*, and *immigration*.

Hence, one can identify four setting ideal types; (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph, where 23% of British narrators stand, corresponds to a *Britannia* setting, with binary and reproving narratives, playing the British Islands against the continental Europe; (b) the middle left-hand side of the graph, where 27% of the narrators stand, essentially from the media set up, corresponds to an *Enlightenment* setting, replaying common debates on religion, reason and the public sphere ; (c) the lower side of the graph, where 31% of narrators stand, corresponds to a *Lockean* setting, as for the German case, sharing empathetic and optimistic tones, anchored in a multilateral horizon; (d) the upper right-hand side of the graph, where 13,6% of narrators stand, displays a *hero-protector* setting, sharing self-promoting, emotional and war-like tones, anchored in a strong and world leading Britain.

Table 1. 50 most frequent words in the British corpus

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
1. People	1,09%	26. Faith	0,17%
2. Countr(ies)	0,50%	27. Good	0,17%
3. Government	0,47%	28. Econom(ic)	0,16%
4. Party	0,40%	29. Muslim	0,16%
5. Britain(ish)	0,40%	30. Brexit	0,16%
6. Right(s)	0,35%	31. Political	0,16%
7. Labour	0,32%	32. Communities	0,15%
8. Years	0,31%	33. Support	0,15%
9. World	0,31%	34. Police	0,15%
10. Time	0,30%	35. Believe	0,15%
11. Work(ing)	0,29%	36. Clear	0,15%
12. New	0,27%	37. Young	0,15%

13. Europe(an)	0,25%	38. Home	0,15%
14. Today	0,22%	39. National	0,14%
15. Women	0,21%	40. Liberal	0,14%
16. Year	0,20%	41. Great	0,14%
17. (Prime) Minister	0,19%	42. London	0,14%
18. Children	0,18%	43. Human	0,14%
19. Free	0,17%	44. Never	0,14%
20. Life	0,17%	45. Better	0,14%
21. Public	0,17%	46. Deal	0,14%
22. Together	0,17%	47. House	0,13%
23. Change	0,17%	48. Religious	0,13%
24. Future	0,17%	49. Society	0,13%
25. Security	0,17%	50. Values	0,13%

2.1.1. The Britannia setting

I coined the setting of the upper left-hand side “Britannia” in reference to the personification of Great Britain, particularly during the British Empire when Britain “ruled the waves”¹²⁶. The stories in cluster (a) take place in a binary and narrow world, centred on Britain and the Commonwealth against external forces. UKIP former leaders Gerard Batten and Nigel Farage, and columnists Peter Hitchen, Allison Pearson, and Trevor Kavanagh, all share *binary*, *reproving* and *emotional* tones, although contents vary from a narrator to the other, as we shall see in the characterization section. For example, Gerard Batten and Nigel Farage oppose the Great and righteous Britons to the EU, Brussels, etc (Batten, 2018(1); Farage, 2013, 2017, 2019). Allison Pearson, Trevor Kavanagh, and Peter Hitchen oppose the courageous and patriot Britons to the cultural other, namely the Muslims (Pearson, 2017, Kavanagh, 2017(3)) or the coward and anti-patriots who open doors to refugees (Hitchen, 2015(2)):

To those who condemn reasonable calls for national self-defence as bigotry, hatred and intolerance (which they are not), I make only this request: just don’t pretend you’re doing a good and generous thing, when you’re really cowardly and weak (Hitchen, 2015(2)).

Regarding their horizons of experience, narrators mainly set their story spatially in the British Islands, or the Commonwealth, and temporally in a historical national pride and the “worth of the Island” (Farage, 2013,

¹²⁶ An image first used in classical antiquity, the Latin *Britannia* was the name applied to the British Isles, Great Britain, and the Roman province of Britain during the Roman Empire. After centuries of declining use, the *Britannia* was revived during the English Renaissance as a rhetorical evocation of a British national identity, specially following the Acts of Union in 1707, which joined the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, *Britannia* was used as an emblem of British maritime power and unity, most notably in the 1740 poem “Rule, Britannia” by James Thomson and the eponymous patriotic song.

2015; Hitchen, 2015(1), (2); Pearson, 2015(1)):

Britain is a desirable place to live mainly because it is an island, which most people can't get to. Most of the successful civilizations survived because they were protected from invasion by mountains, sea, deserts or a combination of these things (Hitchen, 2015(2)).

I have to confess I do have a slight preference (for Commonwealth's migrants)... I do think naturally that people from India and Australia are in some ways more likely to speak English, understand common law and have a connection with this country than some people that come perhaps from countries that haven't fully recovered from being behind the Iron Curtain (Farage, 2015).

Gerard Batten, Peter Hitchen, Trevor Kavanagh, and Allison Pearson also share a common reference to the MENA region, however only in an oppositional or interventionist discourse. They warn against immigration and demographic revolution coming from the region (Batten, 2014, 2018; Hitchen, 2015(2), Kavanagh, 2017(2) and (3)), against the risk of hosting terrorists within migrants (Kavanagh, 2017(1) and (2)), or critic Pakistan and Pakistanis (Kavanagh, 2017(3), Pearson, 2016):

An England that might as well have been rural Pakistan, so great were the restrictions placed upon her tiny person (Allison, 2016).

Thousands of disaffected young Muslim men have been identified by security services as potential terrorists, some trained in Pakistan or battle-hardened in Syria (Kavanagh, 2017(1)).

Peter Hitchen also blames British special relationship to Middle Eastern regimes (Hitchen, 2017(2)) while Kavanagh supports on the contrary military intervention in the region (Kavanagh, 2009, Pearson, 2015(1)). Finally, Peter Hitchen, Gerard Batten, and Nigel Farage set Britain into a Christian heritage (Hitchen, 2017(1); Farage, 2015; Batten, 2018(3)):

This compact is a plan to increase the mass importation into Europe of millions upon millions of people from non-Christian cultures in Africa, the Middle East and beyond (Batten, 2018(3)).

Although narrators tend to refer to historical national pride, they also punctually refer to European past, mainly to oppose and delegitimize the EU or Continental Europe referring to European aggressions or divisions (Batten, 2018, 2019; Hitchen, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(1)):

The safest period of my lifetime was the Cold War, when Europe was more sharply divided than ever (Hitchen, 2015(1)).

You have done what Philip of Spain, what Napoleon, what Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler couldn't do: you have brought Britain to its knees, without firing a single shot (Batten, 2019).

2.1.2. The Enlightenment setting

I coined the middle left hand side of the graph, where philosopher A.C. Grayling, writer Joan Smith, NSS's CEO Stephen Evans, Labour MP Sarah Champion, Conservative Sayeeda Warsi, columnists Nesrine Malik, and Kira Cochrane stand, the *Enlightenment* setting, in reference to common debates on the foundation of western European culture, such as the place and role of religion in the public sphere. This is expressed in topics

like the *veil* (Champion, 2017(1); Cochrane, 2013(2)), *women's right* (Grayling, 2009; Smith, 2016; Cochrane, 2013(1)), *secularism* (Evans, 2017(2); Grayling, 2009), and *religious identities* (Smith, 2015(2), 2017; Warsi, 2012, 2018(1) and (2)). Although it echoes the *Kulturkampf* setting of the German case, British narrators in question never frame their discourse within a cultural or civilization setting. Besides, there is no narrative war being fought between the two distinct sides.

However, one can identify two distinct groups, i.e., a “secular” setting, enclosing A.C. Grayling, Stephen Evans, and Joan Smith, and a “religious” setting, including Sayeeda Warsi, Nesrine Malik, and Kira Cochrane. The former set their story in what they considered should be a secularised horizon, where religion retreats from the public debate. They tend to use *binary* and *emotional* narratives opposing the rationalist to the believer (Grayling, 2009, 2013, 2015(2)), British “way of life” to evil ideologues (Evans, 2017(1)), republicanism to the archaic and undemocratic monarchy (Smith, 2015(1)):


What is the difference, in your mature, rational, evidence-based, and carefully thought-out view, between utterly spurious claims about the existence of supernatural entities requiring their votaries to indulge in irrational, discriminatory, divisive and sometimes violent behavior, and those that putatively are not? Have you got an answer? (Grayling, 2009).

An evil ideology that uses scripture to glorify martyrdom and promise salvation through suicide attacks clearly has a noxious influence on the minds of the gullible and pathetic individuals who are driven to murder innocent people in the name of Allah (Evans, 2017(1))

The “religious” setting uses more *empathetic*, deploring the tension between self-confident religious identities, be it Christian, Jewish or Muslim, and secularism in Europe, or between the Christian or secular majority and Muslim minority:

Where individuals' stronger rooting in their own religion will inspire a stronger understanding of faith. And there is no better remedy to the distortion of our respective faiths (...). Whether it's Christians in Pakistan... Muslims in the USA... Or Jews in Britain... Targeted, victimised and facing the backlash of actions by their co-religionists. It's unacceptable and it must stop (Warsi, 2012).

Fig 2. Repartition of setting narratives in the British corpus 2009-2019



Too much of the defence of Islam as a vehicle for radicalism refuses to be introspective or critical. But one could be more or less certain that Charlie Hebdo would draw the wrong conclusions. The climate, so toxic with righteous fear and anger, demands it (Malik, 2016).

Cochrane's approach is more *dialectical*, using interviews and indirect discourse to provide external highlights (Cochrane, 2013(2)). Only Sarah Champion adopts an in-between stance, neither *binary* nor understanding.

Regarding their horizon of experience, most narrators set their story into contemporary times and issues, except for Sayeeda Warsi, who refers to religious and national histories as central to the interpretation of faith (Warsi, 2012), and A.C. Grayling, who refers once WWI to explain the actual of the Middle East as a result of European "unstable arrangements"...

First World War that created the unstable arrangements which have become an international running sore (Grayling, 2015(1)).

2.1.3. The Lockean setting

Setting of cluster c resembles the German *Kantian* setting. I coined it the *Lockean* setting in reference to the

famous English philosopher of the Enlightenment, John Lock, considered a father of liberalism and toleration and an influencer of Immanuel Kant¹²⁷. As for the German *Kantian* setting, the *Lockean* setting also refers to the Lockean culture of anarchy theorised by Alexander Wendt, where states recognize one another as both rivals and potential partners in an international society. This cluster shares the most homogenous setting of the panel. All narrators share *empathetic* and *optimistic* tones, using lexical such as “hope”, “confidence”, and “positive” (Cable, 2017(2); Clegg, 2014, Corbyn, 2018, 2019; Khan, 2016(2), 2017, 2018; Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1), 2018; Bartley, 2016, 2017, 2019; Womack, 2018), as well as “compassion”, “respect”, “tolerance”, “fairness”, “comprehensive”, “empathy”, and “kindness” (Cable, 2018(2); Clegg, 2014, 2015; Corbyn, 2015; Khan, 2015; Bartley, 2019; Womack, 2015, 2019). More generally, narrators of cluster c tend to rationalise deviant behaviours or looking to understand the “root cause” of violence, forming the basis of a non-judgmental or empathetic perspective on both the domestic and the international levels:

But a turn to violent extremism cannot be explained simply in economic terms. There are much deeper and more complex forces at work. The scholar Louise Richardson describes the causes of terrorism as ‘a lethal cocktail containing a disaffected individual, an enabling community and a legitimizing ideology’ (Clegg, 2011).

Perhaps most importantly of all, is the Prime Minister able to explain how British bombing in Syria will contribute to a comprehensive negotiated political settlement of the Syrian war? Such a settlement is widely accepted to be the only way to ensure the isolation and defeat of ISIL. ISIL grew out of the invasion of Iraq, and it has flourished in Syria in the chaos and horror of a multi-fronted civil war (Corbyn, 2015).

If we can learn how to set conflict transformation in a framework of reconciliation – including at the grass roots, and not only by elites in conferences – we open ourselves to working together in new and more effective ways as we strive for peace, as the Secretary-General has just said (Welby, 2018).

Rather than criminalising drug users we need to start treating addiction as a health issue (Womack, 2019).

Moreover, they share the same temporal horizon, turned toward the *future*, either as government of the future, provider of a future, carer of future generations, or tackling the future of the planet, change and novelty (Bartley, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; Womack, 2016, 2018, 2019; Cable, 2017(2); Clegg, 2014; Khan, 2017; Welby, 2018):

I’m so proud to call myself British and to call myself a Londoner. I’m confident that both London and the UK have bright futures ahead (Khan, 2017).

They are symbols of the past which have no place in a future in which people and the planet can thrive (Bartley, 2017).

I see our future as a party of government. Our party is not just a Coalition partner of the past, we are the government of the future. And my role, as your leader, is to be a credible potential Prime Minister (Cable, 2017(2)).

¹²⁷ John Locke (1632 – 1704) was an English philosopher whose theory of mind is often cited as the origin of modern conceptions of identity and the self, figuring prominently in the work of later philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant - hence echoing the corresponding settings in the German and the French cases.

Interestingly, narrators also mobilise *history*, either as trigger for action, such as Vince Cable, calling for “*leading the Resistance to the forces of illiberalism (...) a crusade to give the people the final say on our future in Europe*” (Cable, 2018(2)), or as scaremonger, using the two World Wars and the Cold War to warn against European division (Corbyn, 2016; Welby, 2016(1)):

When the last referendum was held in 1975, Europe was divided by the Cold War, and what later became the EU was a much smaller, purely market-driven arrangement (Corbyn, 2016)

Noteworthy, none of the narrators standing on this part of the graph use British history to foster national pride. Spatial horizons are the only setting narratives to discriminate between narrators of this cluster. On the one hand, Nick Clegg, Jeremy Corbyn, and Justin Welby refer abundantly to the *MENA* region, mainly in contexts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab revolutions or the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Clegg, 2011, 2013, Corbyn, 2018, Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1)). On the other hand, Vince Cable and Justin Welby refer abundantly to *Europe* mostly to praise the European construction (Cable, 2017(1) and (2), 2018(2); Welby, 2016(2)). Finally, Khan has an exclusively national horizon of experience.

2.1.4. The Hero-Protector setting

I coined cluster *d*, enclosing all British Prime Ministers, David Cameron, Theresa Mays, and Boris Johnson, the *Hero-Protector* setting, in reference to Clément, Lindemann, and Sangar’s (2016) conceptual model to analyse how political leaders manufacture collective emotions to foster public consent to the use of force. Such narratives are structured around *emotional*, *war-like* and *binary* tones to trigger anger and fear or compassion (Clément, Lindemann and Sangar, 2016). As a matter of fact, narrators share *self-promoting* narratives, Boris Johnson promoting himself as a person (Johnson, 2016(1), 2019(2)), while Cameron and May promoting their party and policies. Besides, they use *emotional* narratives to trigger disgust and anger toward terror attacks in Britain and Africa (Cameron, 2015(3); May, 2016, 2017(2) and (3); Johnson, 2016(2), 2017, 2019(2)):

ISIL has brutally murdered British hostages. It has inspired the worst terrorist attack against British people since 7/7 on the beaches of Tunisia, and it has plotted atrocities on the streets here at home (Cameron, 2015(3)).

All acts of terrorism are cowardly attacks on innocent people but this attack stands out for its appalling, sickening cowardice, deliberately targeting innocent, defenceless children and young people who should have been enjoying one of the most memorable nights of their lives (May, 2017(2)).

I do absolutely deplore the fact that this man (a radical released from prison) was out on the streets, I think it’s absolutely repulsive and we are going to take action against it (Johnson, 2019(2))

... or pity and compassion toward refugees or poverty (May, 2015, 2018):

(...) men, women and children taking extraordinary risks as they have travelled to reach Europe, some by rickety vessels over the sea, others by land and by foot. Many are fleeing the brutal conflict in Syria, where war has wrought devastation and destruction on so many innocent lives (May, 2015).

Cameron and May also share *war-like* narratives when tackling the fight against terror (Cameron, 2015(2);

May, 2017(1) and (3)):

As a country, our response must be as it has always been when we have been confronted by violence. We must come together, we must pull together, and united we will take on and defeat our enemies (May, 2017(3)).

Besides, Theresa May shares with Boris Johnson *binary* narratives, although to different aims. May uses emotional dichotomies when tackling “despicable”, “barbaric”, and “appalling” terror attacks (May, 2016, 2017(1), (2), and (3)), whereas Johnson uses binary narratives when tackling *Brexit*, dividing:

(...) between a dynamic liberal cosmopolitan open global free-trading prosperous Britain, or a Britain where we remain subject to an undemocratic system devised in the 1950s that is now actively responsible for low growth and in some cases economic despair (Johnson, 2016(1)).

In addition, all narrators set their story in a historical perspective. They most exclusively use the British past to trigger national pride. More specifically, they refer to British historical “heroism” and “particularism” as a peacekeeper during European wars from Napoleon to the two World Wars, as well as the Cold War (Cameron, 2015(1) and (2), 2016(1); May, 2018; Johnson, 2016(1)). For instance, David Cameron implicitly evokes memories of WWII and the fight against fascism to persuade the House of Commons to vote in favour of extending military operations against ISIL into Syria in 2015:

Throughout our history, the United Kingdom has stood up to defend our values and our way of life. We can, and we must, do so again (Cameron, 2015(3)).

They also share an international setting, anchoring their discourses in a global context of interaction with (*Eastern*) *Europe* (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2); Johnson, 2016(1), the *MENA* region (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2), May, 2018; Johnson, 2016(2), 2017), and *Africa* (Cameron, 2013; May, 2015; Johnson, 2017). Finally, they tackle mostly *economical* topics (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2); Johnson, 2016(1), 2019(1)), the *Brexit* and the defence of *national interest* (Cameron, 2013, 2016(1); May, 2018, 2019; Johnson, 2017):

And I have just one yardstick: how do we best advance our national interest? Keeping our people safe at home and abroad, and moulding the world in the way that we want – more peaceful, more stable, more free, with the arteries of commerce and trade flowing freely (Cameron, 2016(1))

Putting the national interest first. (...) That is never more true than when our national security is threatened. (...) When I have to ask our brave servicemen and women to put themselves in harm's way. To protect our citizens. To support our allies, as we would expect them to support us. To uphold the international rules on which our security depends. (...) But my job as Prime Minister is to do what I believe to be in the national interest. (...) So this is our proposal. Taking back control of our borders, laws and money. Good for jobs, good for the Union. It delivers on the referendum. It keeps faith with the British people. It is in the national interest. (May, 2018)

Summary

As exposed in this section, setting elements in British discourses are less consensual than in the German case. Narrators standing on the upper side of the graph share historical horizons, while those standing on the lower side set their stories in a present or future horizon. The MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of settings,

distributed along the two bisectors: the *Britannia*, the *Enlightenment*, the *Lockean*, and the *Hero-Protector*. It is notable, as in the German case, that there is a division between political actors standing in majority on the right side of the graph, and media actors standing on the left side. Besides, although only three narrators stand on the upper right-hand side of the graph, this locates the highest amount of narratives and the most concentration of power. This means that, contrastingly with the German case, the top-down *Hero-Protector* frame held by officials is quantitatively marginal, whereas the *Lockean* frame is politically in opposition but quantitatively predominant.

Table 2. Occurrences of setting narratives

Rhetoric codes	Occurrences	Horizon codes	Occurrences
Binary	80	MENA region	76
Emotional	72	Brexit	62
Optimistic	68	Immigration	54
Self-promoting	60	Future	50
Dialectical	41	History	48
War-like	40	Europe	40
Alarmist	39	Economy	36
Empathetic	31	Youth	30
Reasonable	31	British past	28
Ironical	16	Family	20
Reproving	16	Women's right	20
Defensive	12	National interest	16
Pessimistic	8	Terror	16
Pacific	4	Africa	15
		Identities	14
		Christian Tradition	12
		Secularization	11
		Northern Ireland	10
		Foreign policy	9
		Religious identities	9
		Veil	8
		Eastern Europe	6
		Islam	5
		BRICS	2

2.2. Characterizations

A first quantitative look at the corpus illustrated in table 3 shows that *liberal* and *the West* are far ahead with

more than 20 occurrences each, followed by *conservative*, *patriot* and *Leftist*, gathering more than 10 occurrences each, and *moderate*, *multiculturalist*, *radical*, and *World leader* (n=10). Except for the *people*, which gather the highest frequency of friends and allies narratives in both the German and British cases, friends and allies vary from one context to another. Here, *Europe*, *innocent victims*, *Muslim communities*, *NATO*, and the *Commonwealth* gather the highest frequencies (n>10). Out-group narratives show a strong polarisation between *Labour* (n=59) and *Conservatives* (n=48), followed by the *EU* and *extremism* (n>30), *Daesh*, the *Establishment*, and the *Far-Right* (n=27). The bipartite and *Brexiters/Remainers* polarizations are specific to the British corpus, whereas the opposition to the *EU*, *extremism*, the *Far Right* and the *government* are common with the German corpus. However, while *Islamists* appeared among the highest frequent codes in the German case, it reached the bottom of the out-group coding in the British corpus (n<5). Qualitatively though, the in/out-group nexus varies according to the position on the graph (fig. 3). Unlike the German case, the self-reference to *the people* and *feminism* do not discriminate between the different narrators, as they stand at the center of the graph. Except for these, the above mentioned narratives discriminate between the different quarters of the graph: (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph, where none of the most frequent self-narratives stand, corresponds to a *populist* self, opposed to the continental *Establishment*; (b) the middle left-hand side of the graph, corresponds to a polarisation between a secularist and religious self against extremists; (c) the lower part of the graph corresponds to a *progressivist* and *multiculturalist* self, opposed to all kinds of *nationalists*; (d) the upper right-hand side of the graph corresponds to a *patriot* and world leading self, opposed to *ideologues* and *extremists*.

2.2.1. British populists vs. the continental Establishment

The characterization of the cluster (a) resembles the *populist* characterization of the German case. However, in the British case, UKIP leaders refer both to the people and actually define themselves as “populists” in a positive way (Batten, 2018(1) and (2); Farage, 2017), while columnists Peter Hitchen, Trevor Kavanagh, and Allison Pearson, never refer to the British people but share populist designation of the *Establishment* as the enemy. On the one hand, UKIP leaders claim their affiliation to “ordinary”, “normal”, “decent” or “little” people (Batten, 2018(1); Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017):

What happened last Thursday was a remarkable result, it was indeed a seismic result, not just for British politics, for European politics but perhaps even for global politics too because what the little people did, what the ordinary people did, what the people who have been oppressed over the last few years and see their living standards go down (...) (Farage, 2016).

... as well as their alliance to the nationalist English Defence League (Batten, 2018(2)) and the German AfD (Farage, 2017). On the other, the columnists claim their belonging to the threatened *West* (Hitchen, 2017(2);

Kavanagh, 2017(1), (2), (3); Pearson, 2015(2), 2019):

While the Danes and the Dutch are valiantly defending western values, all liberals in the UK can do is squeal that Boris's light-hearted "letterbox" remark about the hideous, dehumanising burka was racist. Pathetic (Pearson, 2015(2)).

But this suicide bombing bears all the hallmarks of similar atrocities against western targets around the world (Kavanagh, 2017(1)).

The once-wealthy and powerful West is falling to bits. It is bankrupt and increasingly at the mercy of people who have begun to demand something in return for their trade and their loans (Hitchen, 2017(2)).

Their in-group include Western organizations and countries, such as the *NATO*, *France* or *North-America*, considered as co-victims of terrorism (Batten, 2014; Hitchen, 2015(2); Kavanagh, 2009; Farage, 2017). Trevor Kavanagh and Allison Pearson also designate France as a righteous prohibitor of the *burqa* (Kavanagh, 2017(1); Pearson, 2011) and *Israel* as the only democracy of the Middle East (Kavanagh, 2017(3)). Finally, they also differ regarding their self-designation: Peter Hitchen and Trevor Kavanagh, both define themselves as *conservatives* (Hitchen, 2012; Kavanagh, 2017(2)) while Peter Hitchen also defines himself as a *Christian* (Hitchen, 2017(1)), and Allison Pearson as *enlightened* and *feminist*:

My youthful feminist instincts may have grown slack with disuse, but the website's ruling on female clothing made me want to kick and shout. Muhammad the Agony Uncle advises: "There should be no imitation of the Kuffar (non-believers) because 'whosoever imitates a nation is amongst them'." (Pearson, 2011).

Regarding their out-group, they share a general opposition to the European and national *Establishment*. On the one hand, they fiercely oppose the *EU*, personified by Angela Merkel or Jean-Claude Juncker, or symbolised by Brussels or "pro-Brussels fanatics" (Batten, 2018(1); Hitchen, 2015(1); Kavanagh, 2017(2); Farage, 2019):

It makes a fool of pro-Brussels fanatics such as Tony Blair and ex-Chancellor George Osborne, who got every Project Fear scare story wrong and is now using an influential newspaper as his personal propaganda sheet to scupper Brexit (Kavanagh, 2017(2)).

But I can see right now that by giving Boris half a chance, by keeping him honest and holding him to account by getting people in, and by stopping the fanatics in the Liberal Democrats who'd sign us up to everything, wouldn't they, the United States of Europe, European army, you name it, I mean they even want to revoke the result of the referendum (Farage, 2019).

Symbolically, Peter Hitchen sees with great disapproval that the Queen Elizabeth is legally considered European citizen:

She may claim to be 'By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith' but in the eyes of the EU (which doesn't believe in God or Faith) she's just Citizen Liz (Hitchen, 2015(1)).

On the other, at the domestic level, besides classical opposition to the *Government* and British mainstream parties, particularly the *Labour* party (Batten, 2018(1), 2019; Farage, 2013, 2017, 2019; Kavanagh, 2009, 2017(2) and (3); Pearson, 2017), UKIP Leaders particularly attack what they call *the Establishment*, considered as a "*conspiracy of Conservatives and Labours*" (Batten, 2018(1)), or an alliance with "big businesses" (Farage,

2013; Batten, 2018(1)). Nigel Farage has a particular obsession with the “liberal metropolitan elite”, which he demonises as the “London-based snobbery” (Farage, 2015), the “London commentariat” (Farage, 2013), or again “the London-dominated Labour” (Farage, 2019). This *Establishment* is also opposed as vehicle of *political correctness* and *cultural relativism* (Hitchen, 2017(1); Pearson, 2015(2), 2016), together with HR militants and the *BBC* (Batten, 2018(1), (2); Hitchen, 2017(1); Kavanagh, 2017(2), Pearson, 2016), as perfectly instanced in Allison Pearson’s following statement:

What an almighty mess the politically correct establishment has got us into. The police, social workers, human rights lawyers, politicians, the BBC... all of them turning a blind eye to conditions in which extremism and abuse may flourish (Pearson, 2016).

2.2.2. Secularists vs. religious defenders

As previously evidenced, the middle left-hand side of the graph displays a narrative debate on contents of the Enlightenment and civilizational aspects, without being systematically oppositional. This translates into a division in the in-group/out-group characterization. On the one hand, A. C. Grayling, Stephen Evans, Sarah Champion, and Joan Smith all identify with the *West* and/or *Europe* and stand as *liberal* and *modernists*. However, A. C. Grayling and Stephen Evans stand strongly as *atheist* and *secularist* (Evans, 2017(1), (2), and (3); Grayling, 2009), while Joan Smith and Sarah Champion define themselves as *feminist* (Smith, 2016; Champion, 2017(1)). In specificity, Stephen Evans stands as *anti-racist* (Evans, 2017(2)), Joan Smith as a “committed republican” committed to the Enlightenment (Smith, 2015(1), (2)), while A. C. Grayling defines himself as *humanist* in direct opposition to religion:


The answer is: something far better, deeper, kinder and warmer – and far more rational – namely: humanism. Humanism is a non-religious ethical outlook based on an interest in human affairs at the human scale. It is not a doctrine or a set of rules; it is a starting point, its founding idea being that ethics must be based on the facts of human experience (Grayling, 2013).

On the other hand, Sayeeda Warsi, Nesrine Malik, and Kira Cochrane define themselves as (religious) minority defenders. On the one hand, Sayeeda Warsi and Nesrine Malik define themselves as both *British Muslims* and from a *migration background* belonging to Muslim minority community (Warsi 2012, 2015, 2018(1), (2), Malik, 2017):

When I was growing up, as the daughter of Pakistani immigrants, the debate in my country was not about religion but race (Warsi, 2012).

As a British Muslim parent whose children are likely to be vulnerable and to be approached by those who want to lead them astray, whether into extremism, terrorism or elsewhere, I would be the first in line to say this policy needs to be supported. But I do not want a policy on our books, which has a statutory basis, which is badly implemented (Warsi, 2018(1)).

Fig. 3. Repartition of characterization narratives in the British corpus 2009-2019



... while Kira Cochrane stands as an anti-racist in solidarity with the Muslim minority (Cochrane, 2013(2)). However, they also differ as Nesrine Malik defines herself as a Londoner and a moderate leftist (Malik, 2017), while Kira Cochrane indirectly defines herself as *feminist* (Kochrane, 2013(1)) and Sayeeda Warsi as *religious* (Warsi, 2012). These three narrators stand on the multicultural side of the Enlightenment debate, considering religious and cultural identities as victims of secularist or modernist universalism, as I shall expose in the plot section.

However, both sides share common out-group narratives, primary the *government*, targeting both Conservatives and Labours (Warsi, 2015; Malik, 2013; Champion, 2017(2); Grayling, 2009), and political and religious *extremism*:

And for all the talk of the secular 'war on Christmas', secularists aren't the ones standing in the way of anyone celebrating Christmas. In India, right-wing Hindu nationalists are the ones threatening to obstruct seasonal festivities. Plan a Christmas party in Saudi Arabia and you can expect a visit from the authorities, whilst celebrating the birth of baby Jesus in Brunei can land you up to five years in jail. Meanwhile, in Indonesia 90,000 police officers are being deployed to protect festive celebrations from militant attacks. Closer to home, British boxer Amir Khan received a barrage of abuse and even death threats from joyless Islamists for putting up a

Christmas tree (Evans, 2017(3)).

This association between mainstream politicians and anti-Muslim extremists was raised during evidence heard by the APPG as the process of making Islamophobia “respectable” (Warsi, 2018(2)).

More surprising, narrators of both secularist and religious defenders’ sides oppose what they consider to be “too much secularism” – coined *laicism* on the graph of figure 3 – particularly regarding the wearing of the veil. Sayeeda Warsi deplores the marginalising of faith and warns against:

The people who dine out on free-flowing media and sustain a vocabulary of secularist intolerance...attempting to remove all traces of religion from culture, history, and public discourse (Warsi, 2012).

Sarah Champion opposes a secularist understanding of neutrality based on a “*particular meaning of secularism, which does not resonate in Britain*” (Champion, 2017(1)). Regarding the banning of the *burqa* in some European countries, Stephen Evans also deplores the anti-liberal focus on women closing which runs the risk of criminalising marginal women rather than emancipating them (Evans, 2018). However, they also frame different out-group narratives. For example, Sarah Champion, Nesrine Malik, and Sayeeda Warsi oppose the *Far Right* and the xenophobic side of Brexiters and Conservatives (Champion, 2017(1); Malik, 2013, 2017, 2018; Warsi, 2018(1), (2)):

Already, the far right across Europe is rallying on the judgement (Champion, 2017(1)).

The Tories have successfully ignited Brexit’s anti-immigration fumes by sharpening the tone and rhetoric. A UN representative has even reported a Brexit-related growth in racism (Malik, 2018).

Joan Smith, A. C. Grayling, and Stephen Evans fiercely oppose puritanism, be it “religious puritans” (Evans, 2018) “religious traditions” (Grayling, 2013), or “coercive conformity” (Smith, 2015(1)). Finally, Joan Smith, as the only overt republican questions and opposes the Monarchy as part of puritanism, criticising Jeremy Corbyn’s lack of opposition to royal traditions (Smith, 2015(1)):

It has never been easy to be a republican in the UK. The monarchy is entwined in the nation’s political institutions to a degree that denies individual freedom and undermines democracy, a fact confirmed by the way in which the leader of the Labour Party is referred to during parliamentary business. (...) Last week’s meeting of the Privy Council, when Corbyn was due to be sworn in, was an opportunity to demonstrate that his handling of the Battle of Britain service was an aberration. (...) What he actually did was disappear for a few days, apparently on a trip to Scotland, leaving a member of the Shadow Cabinet to make the lame excuse that no one had “explained what actually happens” at the Privy Council (Smith, 2015(1)).

Put in a nutshell, two clusters emerge from a different relation to religion. The first sees itself as modern and liberal Europeans, however the content of this modernity narratively oscillates between insistence on secularism, humanism, feminism, or the Enlightenment. The second sees itself as defenders of religious minoriti(es). However, they do not oppose each other as shown by their common out-group narratives including the government and extremist ideologies.

2.2.3. Cosmopolitans vs. nationalists

Consistently with the *Lockean* setting, the characterization of cluster *c* is relatively homogenous. Labour leaders Sadiq Khan and Jeremy Corbyn, Liberal Democrat leaders Nick Clegg and Vince Cable, as well as the Greens' leaders Amalia Womack and Jonathan Bartley and Archbishop Justin Welby share a self-definition as *European*, or part of Europe (Clegg, 2014; Cable, 2017(1) and (2), 2018(2); Bartley, 2019; Womack, 2016; Corbyn, 2016, 2018; Khan, 2016(1); Welby, 2016(2)):

Why do you think I took on Nigel Farage in the TV debates at the European elections? Because I thought it would be easy? – me defending Britain's membership of the EU, him bashing Brussels. No, I did it for the same reason this party must now come out fighting: Because someone has to stand up for the liberal Britain in which we and millions of decent, reasonable people believe. For tolerance, compassion, openness, unity – the values this party holds so dear (Clegg, 2014).

He established our very clear identity as the only real, undiluted pro-European party (Cable, 2017(2)).

So Europe needs to change. But that change can only come from working with our allies in the EU. It's perfectly possible to be critical and still be convinced we need to remain a member (Corbyn, 2016).

They also present themselves more or less explicitly as *multiculturalist*, welcoming or supporting diversity, and highlighting the importance of communities (Welby, 2015(1); 2016(1); Womack, 2019; Clegg, 2011, 2014; Khan, 2016(1); Corbyn, 2015; Cable, 2018(2)):

For me, multiculturalism has to be seen as a process by which people respect and communicate with each other, rather than build walls between each other. Welcoming diversity but resisting division: that's the kind of multiculturalism of an open, confident society (Clegg, 2011).

Through hospitality we need the dignity of good disagreement in which we view diversity as a blessing and not a threat (Welby, 2016(1)).

We have even further to travel in ensuring that we have proper Black, Asian and Minority representation at all levels (Cable, 2017(2)).

This multiculturalist self-definition often goes hands in hands with a strong *anti-racist* stance (Clegg, 2011; Corbyn, 2015, 2018; Womack, 2018; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2)). However, they also differ according to personal and political self-narratives. For instance, Justin Welby, Jonathan Bartley, and Sadiq Khan put forward their religious identity (Welby, 2015(1), 2016(2); Bartley, 2016, 2017; Khan, 2015). Hence, Sadiq Khan's self-definition as British Muslim puts him closer to Sayeeda Warsi on the graph of figure 3.

Logically, on the political level, Vince Cable and Nick Clegg define themselves as *liberals* (Cable, 2017(2); 2018(2); Clegg, 2011, 2013), while Jonathan Bartley and Sadiq Khan define themselves as *leftist* (Bartley, 2016; Khan, 2017, 2018). Noteworthy, Jeremy Corbyn never defines himself explicitly as a leftist but as a *democrat* and *progressive* ((Corbyn, 2015, 2017, 2018). However, while Nick Clegg and Vince Cable position themselves as *moderate* (Clegg, 2015; Cable, 2018(2)), Jonathan Bartley assumes a *radical* political stance (Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2018) - and is the only political actor of the panel to do so:

It is the Green party that now embodies the natural political expression of the more progressive traditions found in dissenting movements such as Quakerism and radical Catholics (Bartley, 2012).

We don't have to compromise or change what we stand for. We just need to be clear in the messages that we present and be aware of the voters that we are appealing to. And I think that with Corbyn as leader, our policies can be even more radical and creative (Bartley, 2016).

Similarly, this cluster displays a relatively homogenous out-group. Narrators oppose first and foremost the *conservatives*, be it the Tory Party or the Conservative government and conservative Brexiters (Corbyn, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019; Womack, 2016, 2018, 2019; Khan, 2016(1), 2018; Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2018, 2019; Clegg, 2014, 2017; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2)):

I have put the Conservative Brexiters into categories. There are 'the True Believers', 'the Chancers', and 'the Conscripts'. (The Brexit is a) Tory project, pursued for Tory ends, of which working people will be the main victims (Cable, 2018(2)).

And then there's the Tories. Reckless and cruel. From gambling with peace in Northern Ireland to the despicable treatment of the Windrush generation (Bartley, 2018).

I want to send a clear message to all Labour members and parliamentarians to remember that we can only win a general election by focusing all our efforts on fighting the Conservative Party. That means uniting as a movement to beat the Tories and dismissing any talk of a split. I understand why people are frustrated – we've been in opposition for eight years and it's a hard slog working every day while we watch our country slide backwards under a Conservative government (Khan, 2018).

Labour stands for the real change Britain needs after years of Conservative cuts and failure. We will rebuild and transform our country so that no one is held back and no community left behind (Corbyn, 2019).

They also oppose relatively unanimously *extremists*, particularly political extremists (Clegg, 2011, 2014, 2015; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Corbyn, 2016, 2019; Bartley, 2016, 2017, 2018):

And yet something very un-British is taking root in our politics. A growing movement of people who want to pull us apart. Salmond, Farage, the bitter tribalism of left and right – in their different ways they're all doing the same thing. A growing pick-a-side politics, in a world of us-versus-them. Worried about your job? Your business? Your children's future? Your way of life? No matter, just blame Europe/Brussels/foreigners/immigrants/the English/the South/professional politicians/Westminster/big business/anybody claiming benefits/ even onshore wind farms... (Clegg, 2014).

In a Britain increasingly dominated by extremists and ideologues, I want us to fill the huge gap in the centre of British politics (Cable, 2017(2)).

The alt-right, the extremists, are well organised and operate as smoothly across frontiers as any multinational company (Cable, 2018(2)).

... but also, religious extremists, particularly London's Mayor Sadiq Khan (Clegg, 2011; Khan, 2015, 2016(1), 2019; Welby, 2015(2)):

And to defeat the extremists we simply must do more to stop radicalisation in Britain. It doesn't just affect us in these awful moments of violence and terror. It is a cancer eating at the heart of our society - all the time. And if we're honest - not enough has been done to root it out. And in this week of all weeks that makes me angry. Angry because for too long we have buried our heads in the sand (Khan, 2012).

This incident is yet another warning that we must do far more to root out the poison of extremism (Khan, 2019).

Narrators also express internal political competitions within the cluster (c). On the one hand, Lib Dem leaders oppose the Labour Party and Jeremy Corbyn (Clegg, 2014; Cable, 2017(2)). Conversely, Labour leaders oppose the Liberal Democrats (Corbyn 2019; Womack, 2019). Finally, the Greens' leaders oppose both the Labour Party and the Lib Dems (Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2019; Womack, 2019). Archbishop of Canterbury is out of the political competition, adopting no oppositional narratives against either British political fraction.

2.2.4. Pragmatic patriots vs. dangerous ideologues

The cluster of British PMs standing on the upper right-hand side of the graph shares a relatively homogenous self-definition as *patriots*. Besides calling for “more national pride” (Cameron, 2015(2)), Cameron pleads for a “*patriotic case for Britain to remain a member of the EU*” (Cameron, 2016(1)). Theresa May stands for a patriotic Conservative government, yet different from what she considers to be nationalism (May, 2018, 2019):

They want to support a party that is decent, moderate, and patriotic. (...) A party of patriotism, but not nationalism. (...) To be the moderate, patriotic government this country needs (May, 2018).

Boris Johnson more emphatically takes pride in the flag and praises British “*inventiveness, (...) humour, (...) universities, (...) scientists, (...) armed forces, (...) diplomacy*” (Johnson, 2019(1)). Moreover, all PMs frame an international in-group, positioning Britain as part of a series of circles of influence form starting with the *Union* and the *Commonwealth*, following by the *West* - including *North America*, *NATO* and the *UN*, and ending with *Europe* (Cameron, 2011, 2015(1), (2), (3), 2016(1); Johnson, 2016(1), 2017, 2019(1), (2); May, 2015, 2017(1), (3), 2018, 2019). Hence, British PMs frame Britain's international position as first turned toward the seas and only second toward the continent:

I love every part of our country. England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland – we are one nation, and I will defend our Union with everything I have got (Cameron, 2015(2)).

In our desperation to meet our hopeless so-called targets, we push away brilliant students from Commonwealth countries, who want to pay to come to our universities; (...) It is absurd that Britain – historically a great free-trading nation – has been unable for 42 years to do a free trade deal with Australia, New Zealand, China, India and America (Johnson, 2016(1)).

[Jeremy Corbyn] says Britain should disarm herself in the hope others follow suit. I say no – we must keep our defences strong to keep our country safe. He says a strong NATO simply provokes Russia. I say no – it is the guarantor of our freedom and security (May, 2018).

More specifically, David Cameron and Boris Johnson position Britain as both leader and protector of the world community (Cameron, 2011; Johnson, 2017):

It is time to be bold, and to seize the opportunities and there is no country better placed than Britain. Which is not only the place where the atom was first split but has become a gigantic cyclotron of talent in which people are coming together from every discipline to produce constant flashes of inspiration and indeed we are the global capital of innovation we export more TV programs than any other country in Europe – five times more

than the French (Johnson, 2017).

David Cameron describes Britain as the “improbable hero of history” and the liberator of Europe (Cameron, 2013; Cameron, 2016(1)), and develops strong patriot narratives responding to Russian provocations:

When the world wanted rights, who wrote Magna Carta? When they wanted representation, who built the first Parliament? When they looked for compassion, who led the abolition of slavery? When they searched for equality, who gave women the vote? When their freedom was in peril, who offered blood, toil, tears and sweat? And today – whose music do they dance to? Whose universities do they flock to? Whose football league do they watch? Whose example of tolerance ... of people living together from every nation, every religion, young and old, straight and gay ... whose example do they aspire to? (Cameron, 2013)

And, later on, he makes his “patriotic case” on the Remain vote:

We’re the fifth largest economy in the world. Europe’s foremost military power. Our capital city is a global icon. Our national language, the world’s language. Our national flag is worn on clothing and t-shirts the world over – not only as a fashion statement, but as a symbol of hope and a beacon for liberal values all around the world. People from all 4 corners of the earth watch our films, dance to our music, flock to our galleries and theatres, cheer on our football teams and cherish our institutions. These days, even our food is admired the world over. Our national broadcaster is one of the most recognised brands on the planet, and our monarch is one of the most respected people in the world. Britain today is a proud, successful, thriving nation, a nation the world admires and looks up to, and whose best days lie ahead of it (Cameron, 2016(1)).

Boris Johnson seems to reclaim some lost British leadership “*on security, on counter-terrorism, on foreign and defense policy, as we always have*” (Johnson, 2016(1)), and wants “*to give this country the leadership it deserves*” (Johnson, 2019(1)). Finally, they share with the cluster (c) a *multiculturalist* stance, although to a lesser extent: David Cameron takes pride on “*the proudest multi-racial democracy on earth*” (Cameron, 2015(2)); Theresa May acknowledges “*modern Britain in all its diversity*” (May, 2018); and Boris Johnson stands “*in the tradition of the liberal cosmopolitan European enlightenment*” (Johnson, 2016(1)). Noteworthy, they differ on political affiliations, which position themselves far from one another on the graph. On the one hand, Boris Johnson and David Cameron define themselves as both *conservatives* and *liberals* (Johnson, 2016(1), 2017; Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2)), while Theresa May is neither of the two. She only insists on being a *moderate* (May, 2018, 2019), which puts her closer to the lower right-hand side of the graph.

Regarding their out-group, their first opposition is toward the *Labour* Party, consistently with the bipartite polarisation of the British political field (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2); May, 2018; Johnson, 2017, 2019(2)). Second, they oppose *extremism*, be it religious (Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); May, 2017(3)), or political, from the *far-left*, including communism and Russia (Cameron, 2016(1); May, 2018; Johnson, 2016(1), 2017), to the *far-right* (Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); Johnson, 2016(1)):

So, it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion, whether that is through forced repatriation, favoured by some fascists, or the banning of new mosques, as is suggested in some parts of Europe. These people fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument (Cameron, 2011).

We need to confront – and I mean really confront – extremism. When I read what some young people born

and brought up in this country are doing, it makes me feel sick to my stomach. (...) If you believe that the fight against extremism is the fight for our existence (Cameron, 2015(2)).

And whose response to the grisly events in Venezuela is to side with the regime – simply because they are fellow lefties (Johnson, 2017).

We all saw the sickening pictures of a far-left extremist shouting abuse at Jacob Rees-Mogg's children (May, 2018).

More specifically, in contrast with the cosmopolitans, who also oppose far right and religious extremists, the *patriots* oppose *extremism* as dangerous ideologues, counter positioning themselves as “decent” pragmatists and moderates. For example, they designate *terrorists* in general, and *ISIL* in particular, as dangerous ideologues, enemies to Britain (May, 2016, 2017(1); Johnson, 2016(2), 2019(2); Cameron, 2015(2), (3), 2016(1)). David Cameron defines the British mind as “*rightly suspicious of ideology, and sceptical of grand schemes and grandiose promises*” (Cameron, 2016(1)). Similarly, in a Party Conference speech, Theresa May stands for a “*party that is not in thrall to ideology, but motivated instead by enduring principles*” (May, 2018).

Boris Johnson even uses ancient Greece comparison to oppose the Remain vote as “absolutist ideology”:

and we will win for exactly the same reason that the Greeks beat the Persians at Marathon – because they are fighting for an outdated absolutist ideology, and we are fighting for freedom (Johnson, 2016(1)).

Finally, they differ regarding their position on the Brexit debate, which also explains their different position on the graph. Boris Johnson's engagement as Brexiter positions him closer to the UKIP leaders, whereas David Cameron's stance as Remainer positions himself farther from them. Finally, Theresa May's mid-tone on the matter positions herself in-between.

Put in a nutshell, this cluster embodies a pragmatic, patriotic, and heroic self, consistently with the *Hero-protector* setting, opposed to what they consider to be ideologues, from the leftists, considered dangerous utopians, to the religious ones, considered dangerous fundamentalists.

Summary

As exposed in this section, the self/other nexus is not consensual in the British corpus under study. The MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of characterization, namely the *populist*, the *secular/religious*, the *cosmopolitan*, and the *patriot*. Similar to the German case, characterization seems to unravel narrative wars being fought on the British political field, opposing frontally cluster (a) to cluster (c), and cluster (d) to both of the latter to remain in power.

Table 3. Occurrences of characterization narratives

In-group codes	Occurrences	Out-group codes	Occurrences
Self			
Liberal	44	The Labour	118
The West	42	The Conservatives	96
Conservative	28	The EU	70
Patriot	28	Extremists	68
Multiculturalist	25	ISIL	57
Leftist	22	The Far-right	55
Moderate	20	The Establishment	54
Radical	20	The Government	38
World leader	20	Laicism	29
Anti-racist	18	Brexiteers	24
Humanist	18	Terrorists	24
Feminist	17	The LibDems	20
Progressive	15	Remainers	18
Secularist	15	Boris Johnson	16
Christian	14	Russia	16
The EU	14	Communists	14
Hero	14	Cultural relativists	14
Religious	14	Trump	14
The Union	14	Imperialists	13
Democrat	12	The BBC	12
British Muslim	10	Merkel	10
Populist	10	Capitalists	10
Enlightened	8	Puritans	10
Modernist	8	Eastern Europeans	8
Atheist	6	The Far-Left	8
Republican	6	Ideologues	8
Londoner	4	The Monarchy	8
Migration background	2	Islamists	6
Friends and allies		The US	6
The People	51	Assad	4
Europe	46	Frackers	4
Muslim communities	29	Human Rights's lobby	2
NATO	22	The UN	2
Commonwealth	20		
The UN	15		
North America	12		

Trump	8
Extinction Rebellion	4
Turkey	4
The AfD	2
Merkel	2
EDL	2
The Holy See	2
Israel	2
Obama	2

2.3. Plots

A first quantitative glance at the corpus illustrated in table 4 shows that *terrorism*, *economic* and *social (in)securities* gather the highest frequencies of plots codes ($n > 50$), followed by environmental (in)security, *Islamophobia*, *political correctness*, *Islam*, *religion*, and *ideological threat* ($n > 30$). Numerous challenges such as *social insecurity*, *immigration*, *Islam*, *Islamophobia*, the *EMC* or *terrorism* are common with the German corpus, although they do not follow the same hierarchy of importance. In the British corpus, *terrorism*, *social* and *economic insecurities*, and *Islamophobia* reach the highest frequencies, suggesting *a priori* a counter-securitization of Islam and a strong securitization of terrorism. Concerning solutions, *cooperation*, *more state*, *reform*, and *create jobs* gather the greatest frequencies ($n > 30$), followed by *hosting refugees*, *community cohesion*, *counter-extremism*, *military intervention*, *localism*, *redistribution*, and a *Greater Britain* ($20 < n < 25$).

Qualitatively though, except for *terrorism*, the *EMC* and *religious freedom*, which stand at the center of the graph, plot narratives discriminate between the four clusters - consistently with the settings and characterization: (a) the upper left-hand side is problem-oriented and focuses on the continental threat, instanced primary in the migration problem, and the need to *take back control*; (b) the middle left-hand side gathers poor plot narratives and leans toward the *secularization dilemma* instanced in the threats of both religious extremism and laicism (or to much secularism); (c) the lower side of the graph displays the *progressive struggle* articulated mostly on social and environmental insecurities; (d) finally, the upper right-hand side displays the threats of *ideological evils*, calling for muscular state solutions.

2.3.1. Taking Back Control

Plot (a) is characterised by a high perception of political and societal insecurities calling for “taking back control” of immigration and national borders. Interestingly, while the characterization was turned against the EU as enemy to British sovereignty, challenges, and threats concern more particularly immigration

and Islam as corollary to the loss of sovereignty. Narrators first problematize *immigration* and the *EMC*, and sometimes *British Asian*, as a major issue to British societal and economic stability. Nigel Farage frames Eastern European immigration as “*the biggest single issue facing this country. It affects the economy. The NHS. Schools. Public services. The deficit*” (Farage, 2013). Gerard Batten uses alarming expressions such as “massive” or “uncontrolled immigration” (Batten, 2018(1)) to alarm on the threat of immigration to Europe:

European political and economic integration is disastrous but, worse than that, you [Angela Merkel] have opened up Europe’s borders to untold millions of migrants. Your decision to open Europe’s borders to indiscriminately import millions of people will do untold damage to European societies for generations to come (Batten, 2018(3)).

Columnists standing on that part particularly frame large scale immigration as a major threat to Britain, considered as putting too much pressure on some communities, as a deliberate plot, and fueling the “Muslim problem”:

It was, therefore, with joy and relief that I read Dame Louise Casey’s superb and damning report into Opportunity and Integration. Among several “unpalatable truths”, Dame Louise points out that the pace and scale of immigration has been too much for some communities. While foreign-born residents made up only 13 percent of the population in 2011, 27 percent of births in 2014 were to mothers born outside the UK (predominantly to Polish, Pakistani and Indian mothers). That would work absolutely fine if those children grew up to participate fully in British life, but too often they don’t. (Pearson, 2016).

I have deliberately left migration to the end. The figures are astonishing, with one in ten people in England and Wales now born abroad, and the rate of increase over the past few years equally astounding – almost half of these new citizens have arrived here since 2001. (...) But the really important fact is that this revolution is the result of a deliberate, planned attempt to change this country forever, and we have the evidence of this (Hitchen, 2012).

The problem began with Tony Blair opening the doors to mass immigration and silencing critics by branding them “racist”. It was turbocharged when German Chancellor Angela Merkel indiscriminately waved in a million more so-called refugees from Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan. One day soon, if Philip Hammond and Liam Fox are right, we will be back in charge of immigration. What will we do about the Muslim problem then? (Kavanagh, 2017(2)).

Second, they frame *Islam*, *British Muslims* or *Islamic countries* as problematic. Trevor Kavanagh and Alison Pearson target specifically Islam as a religious and a cultural problem, conflating Muslims, British Asian, and criminals (Kavanagh, 2017(2) and (3); Pearson, 2015(1), (2), 2016, 2017):

And, boy, did they [community leaders] succeed. Jihadi John, gruesome Beheader-in-Chief of Isil, attended a London secondary school where 70 per cent of the pupils were Muslim. Might such a closed existence, untouched by the boisterous give and take of ordinary British life, have nurtured a narrow and poisonous perspective? Would John have loathed the kuffar quite so much had he actually had the chance to sit next to one of us in double maths? You’re not allowed to ask that, I’m afraid. It’s Islamophobic (Pearson, 2015(2)).


So, as ever when writing about Islam this week, I was treading on eggshells as I described the very specific problem of “some” Muslim men and their attitude to white Western women. The article followed the trial and imprisonment of 17 mainly British-born men from the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish communities who groomed, raped and abused scores of vulnerable young, mainly white, girls over many years. They were among many gangs operating in Britain but police and local authorities turned a

deliberate blind eye. It was left to the courage and tenacity of Times reporter Andrew Norfolk to bring them to book (Kavanagh, 2017(2)).

.... while Gerard Batten sees it as an ideological problem, lying in the Koran:

In case of Catholic church abuses, no ideological justifications, whereas there is one in the Koran (Batten, 2018(2)).

Fig 4. Repartition of plot narratives in British public discourses 2009-2019



On the other hand, Peter Hitchen and Nigel Farage are more cautious on directly attacking Islam. The former does not frame the Islamic religion as a problem, but rather the demographic potential overrepresentation of Muslims over Christians in Britain, due to immigration and birth rate (Hitchen, 2012, 2015(2)), while Nigel Farage only mentions the problem of sharia laws (Farage, 2015). That being said, they all link the threats of immigration and/or Islam to those of *political correctness* and *state multiculturalism*, even though they differ again in their targets. On the one hand, Trevor Kavanagh, Gerard Batten, and Allison Pearson consider the accusation of racism and Islamophobia as political correctness that allows passive tolerance of the intolerable (Kavanagh, 2017(2), (3); Pearson, 2015(1), (2), 2016, 2017; Batten, 2018(1), (2), (3)):

Fake claims of Islamophobia are the price journalists risk today if we dare question the conduct of a minority hostile to the host community (Kavanagh, 2017(3)).

In the warped world of political correctness, it's fine to deduce that a foster family is racist because they support Ukup; God forbid you imply that a woman wearing a black sack, who refuses to be seen or touched by non-Muslims, is a bigot (Pearson, 2017).

Not only that, if anyone is bold enough to criticise these policies it seeks to criminalise that dissent by means of so-called hate speech and xenophobia laws (Batten, 2018(3)).

On the other hand, Peter Hitchen and Nigel Farage have a more anti-Establishment definition of political correctness, linked to mainstream BBC or pro-Europeans preventing free speech (Hitchen, 2015(2), 2017(1); Farage, 2013):

If the choice is between our being browbeaten through political correctness to stay within the current received wisdoms or to be a party of free debate then be in no doubt we must be the party of radical alternatives and free speech (Farage, 2013).

As to what those angry, confident and forceful young men actually are, I'll leave you to work it out, as I am too afraid of the Thought Police to use what I think is the correct word (Hitchen, 2015(2)).

Noteworthy, cluster (a) seems to divide into two subgroups, with Trevor Kavanagh, Allison Pearson, and Gerard Batten on one side, conflating the migration issue with Islam, and Nigel Farage and Peter Hitchen on the other, linking immigration issue to the wish to restore British independence and power.

Unsurprisingly, due to the representation of columnists in this cluster, the plot is poorly solution oriented. That being said, they all tend to support key states solutions, such as border and immigration control (Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016; Batten, 2014, 2018(3); Kavanagh, 2017(1), (2); Pearson, 2016; Hitchen, 2015(2)):

We know that only by leaving the union can we regain control of our borders, our parliament, democracy and our ability to trade freely with the fastest-growing economies in the world (Farage, 2013).

The most significant LSE poll finding is not on the economy but on border controls. Even Remainers want to halt free movement. Terrorist attacks here and across Europe will have heightened anxiety. So will mounting anger over the way some young, single migrant men treat Western women (Kavanagh, 2017(2)).

Mr President, if we were going to have a UN global compact on migration it should be one that sets out a plan to control immigration and protect the borders of nation-states (Batten, 2018(3)).

UKIP leaders insist on leaving the EU as the only way to take back control (Farage, 2016, 2017, 2019; Batten, 2018(1) and (2)). Besides, they also insist on strong state solutions such as military *intervention* against ISIS (Pearson, 2015(1)), stronger *defence* (Kavanagh, 2009), *prison-repression* (Kavanagh, 2017(1), Batten, 2018(1)). Nigel Farage stands aside by his ambivalent plea for national sovereignty from the EU without calling for a strong state.

2.3.2. The Secularisation dilemma

Cluster (b) strikes by the lack of homogeneity of the *plot*. It displays a secularisation debate articulated around the role of religion and religious identities in the public space. On the one hand, A. C. Grayling, Stephen Evans,

and Joan Smith problematizes *religion* as a threat to British political stability - among which religious clerics, religious morality, religious privileges, the power of faith communities, and the emergence of religious ideologies and religious motivated violence (RMV) (Evans, 2017(2); Grayling, 2009; 2013, 2017(1), (2), (3); Smith, 2015(2), 2017):

Are these not "faith groups" whose outlooks have precisely as much credibility and evidence-base as the Christians and Muslims? Are you going to include them and give them some of our tax money too? Can I start an "I Believe in Fairies" church and can I come to your meetings and get some government hand-outs too? If not, why not? (Grayling, 2009).

Showing a healthy lack of deference to religion is a modern British value. Secularism has long challenged religion's desire to control every aspect of people's lives. Secularism has dismantled religion's control over women's reproductive rights, its control of who can marry, who can have sex, who is permitted to sit Parliament, what we can or cannot say about religion (Evans, 2017(2)).

It may be that a history of domestic abuse is common among would-be jihadis. The link has come up so often that men who support Islamist ideology, and have a record of violence against women, must surely be of particular concern (Smith, 2017).

On the other side, Sayeeda Warsi, Nesrine Malik, and Kira Cochrane problematize religious *persecutions*, *Islamophobia* and Muslim *demonization*, as threats to British liberal tradition (Malik, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2019; Warsi, 2012, 2018(2); Cochrane, 2013(2)). Sayeeda Warsi expresses it best in her 2018 address to the House of Lords:

This is a take-note debate on the impact of Islamophobia in the UK. So we could take note of the breadth of Islamophobia in Britain today: from murder—the killing of Maz Saleem, a grandfather from Birmingham—to violent crime, much of it targeted at women and children; from discrimination in the workplace to bullying in the playground; from demonising in the tabloids to distasteful coalitions between fascists and other religious minorities; from the perpetuating of myths by the far right to the political hosting of Islamophobes by Members of this House. This has far surpassed the "dinner table test" that I laid out in 2011: it is, sadly, Britain's bigotry blind spot (Warsi, 2018(2))

Sarah Champion stands aside by her special focus on child sexual exploitation (Champion, 2015) and on "*British Pakistani men raping and exploiting white girls*" (Champion, 2017(2)). She never refers to Islam or religion as a problem, strongly defending religious unconditional freedom. However, she insists on their migrant identity as Pakistani, accusing the Left of passive tolerance and political correctness, just like columnists Allison Pearson or Trevor Kavanagh:

The irony of all of this is that, by not dealing with the ethnicity of the abusers as a fact, political correctness has actually made the situation about race. (...) The perpetrators are criminals and we need to deal with them as such, not shy away from doing the right thing by fearing being called a racist (Champion, 2017(2)).

Joan Smith also stands aside in focusing on *terrorism* and *violence against women* that she links together by interpreting both as an expression of "toxic masculinity" (Smith, 2016, 2017).

Just like cluster (a), cluster (b) offers few solutions. On the one hand, Stephen Evans and A.C. Grayling call for more secularisation. The former, as CEO of the group « Secularists in the UK », challenges religious entitlements and privileges without opposing religion as faith:

Secularists want a level playing field between those who are religious and those who are not. That's all. People with a religious worldview aren't excluded from the secular sphere, they're just there on equal terms as everyone else. So, for example, if we had a secular House of Lords, bishop Nick Baines could still serve there, but if he did he would be there on merit and not 'as of right' – a situation he currently enjoys on the basis of him being an Anglican bishop (Evans, 2017(3)).

The latter takes a more atheist stance by calling for the people's liberation from religion in the name of humanism:

Because humanism draws on 2,500 years of non-religious ethical thinking since Socrates, it is a deep, rich tradition of insight, wisdom and inspiration, and it is this without any supernaturalistic beliefs involved. That means that it offers the possibility of truly global ethics that everyone could live by. Consider a utopia in which people, having been liberated from religion at last, can agree to base their ethics on a generous view of human nature and needs (Grayling, 2013).

On the other hand, Sarah Champion and Kira Cochrane insist on the unconditionally of religious freedom in the debate on wearing the veil and the danger of stigmatizing Muslim women (Champion, 2017(1); Cochrane, 2013(2)):

I thank the Minister for making a clear statement today that people can express their faith, in a professional manner, in the workplace, but can she confirm that this Government believes that preventing women from wearing the hijab, as exemplified in this case, is simply and unconditionally wrong? (Champion, 2017(1)).

... while Nesrine Malik goes one step forward by calling for an urgent fight against Islamophobia (Malik, 2016, 2017, 2019):

The sad truth is that racism – and especially Islamophobia – only carries a political cost when the victims occupy a position that momentarily humanises them, as we saw, however briefly, with the Windrush scandal. In their repeated refusal to take Islamophobia seriously, the Tories are demonstrating that they understand this truth all too well. As long as Muslims remain invisible, then nothing needs to change (Malik, 2019).

Sayeeda Warsi finally insists particularly on the role of faith communities in the public sphere as well as interfaith dialogues (Warsi, 2014).

2.3.3. The liberal struggle

Plots of cluster (c) resemble the German *stakes of globalisation*, which displays an endeavour in tackling the challenges of globalisation and fostering global cooperation, with an additional focus on opposing all forms of anti-liberalism as a major threat to political security. Anti-liberalism, supported by “*enemies of liberty (...) who have closed their minds*” (Clegg, 2011), encloses all forms of *nationalisms*, as well as forms of xenophobia such as *racism* and *Islamophobia* (Clegg, 2011, 2013; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Corbyn, 2015, 2018, 2019; Bartley, 2017, 2018, 2019; Welby, 2016(1); Khan, 2017):

But I hope today to draw attention to a different Luton; Luton as the home of some of the most vibrant campaigns against racism, extremism and Islamophobia (Clegg, 2011).

We hear the cry, and fear its echo across Europe, especially in those countries where the roots of democracy are shallow and the weeds of authoritarianism spread far and wide (Welby, 2016(1)).

And now there is an upsurge of xenophobia and racism, which many of us dared to hope had been banished for good (Cable, 2017(2)).

A new wave of attacks on the poor and the powerless. A war on human rights, civil liberties, workers and our environment. Opening the floodgates to a new tide of racism and nationalism (Bartley, 2018).

When Boris Johnson compared Muslim women to letterboxes or bank robbers, it wasn't a flippant comment, it was calculated to play on people's fears. Displays of racism, Islamophobia or antisemitism are not signs of strength, but of weakness (Corbyn, 2019)

Finally, anti-liberalism is opposed as trigger of politics of fear after terror attacks and the EMC, and the way it led to the Brexit (Clegg, 2014, 2017; Khan, 2016(2); Corbyn, 2017, 2019; Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1); Womack, 2015; Bartley, 2018):

...Life is so simple when you know who – or what – to blame. It's seductive and it's beguiling. That much may even be proved tomorrow, if the people of Clacton give the UK Independence Party an MP. But resentment, the politics of fear, doesn't pay the bills or create a single job. Claiming to address people's acute anxiety about the modern world, it provides nothing but the false comfort of grievance. Dressed up as the politics of hope, it is in fact a counsel of despair (Clegg, 2014).

Fear is the greatest enemy of any dialogue, hospitality attracts suspicion. Hospitality to Islamic finance alternatives in the City of London as alternatives to being consumed by the prevalent culture, are often criticised as giving in to the enemy (Welby, 2016(1)).

Fear does not make us safer, it only makes us weaker, and the politics of fear is simply not welcome in our city (Khan, 2016(2)).

Brexit hangs over our heads, fires rage from the Amazon to the Arctic, and democracy is under attack (Bartley, 2017).

Second, narrators of cluster (c) focus on *economic*, *social*, and *environmental* threats, yet to a various extent, while disregarding societal insecurities. Unsurprisingly, Lib Dem leaders highlight economic challenges (Clegg, 2011, 2013; Cable, 2017(1)):

For the 'True Believers' – the fundamentalists – the costs of Brexit have always been irrelevant. Years of economic pain justified by the erotic spasm of leaving the European Union. Economic pain felt – of course – not by them but by those least able to afford it (Cable, 2018(2)).

... whereas Labour's leaders insist more on social insecurities linked to poverty, discrimination, and the high cost of living (Corbyn, 2016, 2018, 2019; Khan, 2016(1)):

In the next Labour government, (...) will be carrying forward the struggle to protect and extend democratic rights. And we will honour the heroes of Peterloo by being true to their cause, with a Labour Party fighting for democracy and social justice against poverty, inequality and discrimination (Corbyn, 2018).

... and the Greens' leaders centre on environmental threats (Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2018, 2019; Womack, 2018, 2019):

The climate catastrophe is affecting everyone, even the rich, but those causing most of the emissions are outsourcing the damage. To poorer countries and future generations. This summer - fires were burning in the arctic circle. Floods washed away homes and lives in India. Storms raged all across the world. You'd have to be wilfully ignorant to not see that climate chaos is upon us. I'd like to think people have woken up to the climate emergency (Womack, 2018).

Solutions offered rest on *social justice* and global *cooperation*. All narrators, including Lib Dem leaders and Archbishop Welby prone the *welfare state* to foster justice, although they do not frame it in the same way. For example, Sadiq Khan sees social justice through the lens of equal justice before the law (Khan, 2019); Jonathan Bartley through the lens of "restorative justice" (Bartley, 2016); and Justin Welby as the only provider of peace (Welby, 2016(1)); while Jeremy Corbyn supports nationalisations as provider of social justice. Besides, Labour leaders plead for a *fairer* society, whilst the Greens leaders advocate for a *greener society*:

That we can build a fairer Britain. A more prosperous Britain. A safer Britain (Khan, 2017).

Your presence today shows your commitment to building a better future. A greener future (Womack, 2019).

To foster social justice, narrators advocate for (international) cooperation. Finally, Jonathan Bartley, Amelia Womack, and Justin Welby advocate for global cooperation as a humanistic value to foster global peace (Welby, 2015(1); Bartley, 2018, Womack, 2018), while political leaders advocate for concrete multilateralism through the European Union (Clegg, 2013, 2017; Cable, 2018(2); Khan, 2016(1); Corbyn, 2016, 2018; Womack, 2015):

Human flourishing requires religious-led track 2 diplomacy, today bringing together religious leaders from the 60-country anti-Daesh coalition. There must be a religiously motivated peace, articulating a religious response that addresses the underlying political motivations. (...) And that means there must be overt, active and relentless diplomatic effort to put together such coalitions as may be necessary, and eventually to restrict and defeat extremism in the ways set out above. The actions of nations like Russia, seeking primarily their own good, will cause generations of conflict for all of us (Welby, 2016(1)).

The European Union – 28 countries and 520 million people – could have made us stronger, by defending our steel industries together. (...) And that goes for other employers of high skilled staff too – from Airbus to Nissan – they have made it clear that their choice to invest in Britain is strengthened by our membership of the European Union. (...) Again, it has been regulations agreed in Europe that have improved Britain's beaches and waterways and that are forcing us to tackle the scandal of air pollution which will kill 500,000 people in Britain by 2025, unless we act (Corbyn, 2016).

Now is the time to say yes to Europe (Womack, 2019).

However, they also diverge regarding the role of the state. Lib Dem narrators plead for a *stronger economy*, necessary to provide the welfare state (Clegg, 2014, 2015; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2)), while the Greens' and Labour's leaders tend to plead for more state regulation and a *new economy* (Khan, 2016(1), (2), 2018; Womack, 2016; Corbyn, 2016, 2018, 2019):

Because without a successful economy we won't have the resources to fix an overstretched NHS, underfunded schools, understaffed police forces, and perilously overcrowded prisons. (...) What the country needs...more investment; more innovation; more training and retraining; more patient, long term capital; the renaissance of

manufacturing and the nurturing of creative industries; the greening of the economy. (...) We made some progress under the Coalition when we launched and pursued the Industrial Strategy, working with both sides of industry – management and workers (Cable, 2017(2)).

The choice is now clear: investment and a fairer society under Labour, or austerity under the Tories, timidly accepted by the SNP. (...) We will rebuild the public realm and create a genuinely mixed economy for the 21st century (Corbyn, 2018).

Finally, most narrators of cluster (c) plead for *community cohesion* (Corbyn, 2018, 2019; Khan, 2015, 2017; Welby, 2016(1) and (2); Clegg, 2011). Archbishop Welby and Labour leader Sadiq Khan focus particularly on the social and political role of *faith communities* and explicitly support *multiculturalism* (Khan, 2015, 2016(1), 2018; Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1), (2), 2018):

Yet God's creation of human society is far more than individual or bureaucratic: it is relational, and for it to be so every form of human relational institution from the base community of the family, to the small and medium sized business, or the church, or anything else must be treated as possessing legitimacy and value in the rich and luxuriant mix of European human society. It is, after all, these intermediate groups that have been behind the success of our countries and societies (Welby, 2016(2)).

Our celebrated multiculturalism and diversity are under attack – not just here in London but around the world (Khan, 2018).

Noteworthy, Jonathan Bartley is the only one to call for *de-growth*, growth being an outdated variable to measure wellbeing according to him (Bartley, 2012, 2017, 2018).

2.3.4. Ideological Evils

The cluster (d) expresses the British government's political emplotment since the 2010s. It gathers the highest perception of national insecurity of the panel, mostly triggered by the threat of *terrorism* (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2), (3), 2016(1); May, 2016, 2017(1), (2) and (3); Johnson, 2016(2), 2017), *radicalization* (Cameron, 2011, 2015(2) and (3); May, 2016, 2017(3)), and extremist *ideologies* (Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); May, 2017(1), (2), (3), and (4), 2018; Johnson, 2016(2)). In this story, Britain must fight ideological wars against terrorism, Islamist-inspired extremism, Far-Right and Far-Left extremisms, and Islamophobia:

This ideology, this diseased view of the world, has become an epidemic – infecting minds from the mosques of Mogadishu to the bedrooms of Birmingham (Cameron, 2015(2)).

Daesh's defeats on the battlefield are helping to counter its ideological narrative (Johnson, 2016(2)).

First, while the recent attacks are not connected by common networks, they are connected in one important sense. They are bound together by the single evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches hatred, sows division and promotes sectarianism (May, 2017(3)).

Noteworthy, PMs are very cautious and reluctant to coin terrorism as "Islamic". They refer to "terrorism", "terrorists", or "terror attacks" without religious qualification, and explain them through an "evil" or "warped" ideological interpretation of Islam. Besides, British PMs make the difference between violent extremism, mostly allowed by "preachers of hate" responsible of radicalization, and "non violent extremism"

(Cameron, 2011, 2015(2)). Narrators position Britain as a hero-protector, both warrior against extremists, and protector of British Muslims against preachers of hate and the far right. They recognize *Islamophobia* and the demonization of Muslims as an ideological threat to the community cohesion (Cameron, 2011; May, 2016, 2017(3); Johnson, 2019(2)). David Cameron and Theresa May tend to put Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, and Islamophobia, on equal terms:

On the one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism, and just say that Islam and the West are irreconcilable - that there is a clash of civilizations. (...) These people fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument. (...) On the other hand, there are those on the soft left who also ignore this distinction. They lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances, and argue that if only governments addressed these grievances, the terrorism would stop (Cameron, 2011).

This act of terror was not done in the name of a religion; it was done, as I said earlier, as a result of a warped ideology. All acts of terror are evil acts underpinned by warped ideologies of different sorts, but whatever the ideology, it is an attempt to divide us and to destroy our way of life that drives the evil acts of the terrorists. We stand together with the Muslim community and with other communities around this country and say that what unites us is greater than what divides us. We must be very clear that we share the values of democracy, of the rule of law and of freedom. These are what make the society in which we all live (May, 2017(1)).

As I said here two weeks ago, there has been far too much tolerance of extremism in our country over many years – and that means extremism of any kind, including Islamophobia (May, 2017(4)).

Noteworthy, the EMC is far less present in the British state leaders' discourse than in the German panel, even though they frame it as a challenge to British stability as for 2014-2015.

In order to fight this ideological battle, narrators call for muscular state responses, be them value- or action-oriented. Noteworthy, although British leaders plot an insecure world due to ideological battles, they position themselves as pragmatists sceptical to ideologies, as exposed in the characterization section. They advocate for classical states solutions such as *intelligence*, *police*, and *prison* inside and *military intervention* outside (Cameron, 2011, 2013, 2015(2) and (3), 2016(1) and (2); May, 2015, 2016, 2017(1), (2) and (3), 2018; Johnson, 2016(2), 2017, 2019(2)), as well as counter-narrative strategies, including asserting British values through what Cameron coined “muscular liberalism”:

Now, second, we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home. Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty (Cameron, 2011)

Theresa May follows this rhetoric after the 2017 London attack, stating that:

now is a time for us to come together to promote the values of tolerance and understanding to which he referred, and to recognize that what motivates the terrorists is a warped ideology and a desire to destroy the values that

we share and that underpin our democracy—those values of the rule of law, human rights, tolerance and understanding, and democracy itself (May, 2017(1)).

Boris Johnson also uses the same rhetoric, however not in response to religious or political extremism, but rather in relation to Brexit (Johnson, 2019(1)). This “muscular liberalism” discourse goes hand in hand with the plea for a *Greater Britain*, offering leadership to the world. On the one hand, Cameron sees British Greatness uniquely within the EU, and as a mean to make Britain’s leadership greater again:

A Greater Britain. Where people have greater hope, greater chances, greater security. I really believe we’re on the brink of something special in our country.

(...) A Greater Britain is one that is strong in the world – and that should mean one that is strong in Europe, too (Cameron, 2015).

Not just a great country in the history books, although it surely is that. But a great country right now, with the promise of becoming even greater tomorrow (Cameron, 2016(1)).

Theresa May defends a deal with the EU, which would also “*renew (British) role in the world, strike new trade deals with other countries*” and adopts the same rhetoric as Cameron:

“We have fundamental strengths as a country. English is the global language. We can trade with Shanghai over morning coffee and San Francisco at tea time. Our courts are incorruptible. Our universities, world-leading. Our soft power, unrivalled. A driving force in the Commonwealth. A permanent member of the UN Security Council. And soon we will retake our own seat at the World Trade Organisation” (May, 2018).

On the other hand, Boris Johnson sees in Brexit an opportunity to return to British lost greatness, which implies a redirection toward the Commonwealth. According to him, Brexit is a zero-sum game:

(...) between taking back control of our money – or giving a further £100bn to Brussels before the next election. Between deciding who we want to come here to live and work – or letting the EU decide; between a dynamic liberal cosmopolitan open global free-trading prosperous Britain, or a Britain where we remain subject to a undemocratic system devised in the 1950s that is now actively responsible for low growth and in some cases economic despair (Johnson, 2016(1)).

Summary

Consistently with the settings and characterizations, the plot section has shown a lack of consensus in the British corpus under study. Cluster (a) tells the story of Britain taking back control to counter external threats such as mass immigration and the EU; cluster (b) replays the debates on secularisation; cluster (c) plots the liberal struggle against rising anti-liberalism and intolerance; and cluster (d) fights ideological battles through muscular state responses.

Table 4. Occurrences of plot narratives

Challenges codes	Occurrences	Solutions	Occurrences
Terrorism	158	Cooperation	81
Social insecurity	154	More state	80
Economical insecurity	114	Reform	64
Environmental insecurity	86	Create jobs	60
Political correctness	86	Community cohesion	56
Islamophobia	78	Counter-extremism	53
British Muslims	64	Host refugees	50
Religion	64	Localism	48
Ideological threat	60	Redistribution	48
Immigration	52	Military solutions	47
Religious motivated violence (RMV)	47	Greater Britain	40
Sexism	46	Non-military solutions	35
National insecurity	45	Prevention	34
European Migrant Crisis (EMC)	45	Brexit	32
Islamic ideology	41	Faith communities	32
Discrimination	39	Prison	32
Islamic culture	39	Stronger economy	32
Radicalization	38	Intelligence	30
Organized crime	37	Integration	28
Racism	33	Police	28
Muslim sex crimes	32	Liberalism	26
Brexit	30	The EU	26
Societal insecurity	30	Freedom of religion	26
Demonization	28	Humanitarian help	26
State multiculturalism	28	Secularism	26
Division	24	Justice	25
Globalization	24	Border control	24
Grievance narratives	24	Free trade	24
Anti-Semitism	22	Remain	24
Migrant bashing	22	Defense	23
Politics of fear	22	Greener Society	23
Religious persecution	22	Less state	23
Asian British	20	Fight Islamophobia	22
Austerity	20	Handle the deficit	22
War	20	Sovereignty	20
Interventionism	17	Pragmatism	19
Anti-liberalism	16	Bigger society	18

Religious privilege	16	Fairer society	18
Clash narratives	15	The rule of law	18
Nationalism	14	New economy	16
Veil	14	Control immigration	14
Benefit trap	12	De-growth	14
Perversion of Islam	12	Science	14
Cyber insecurity	9	Wellbeing	14
Hate-crimes	8	Multiculturalism	12
Integration	8	People's vote	12
Weakened British identity	8	Innovation	12
British Empire Nostalgia	6	Patriotism	8
Tech revolution	6	A Constitution	4
Securitarian state	4	Development	4
Arm export	2	Fight Islam	4
		Trans-Atlantic alliance	4
		Assimilation	2
		Forfeiture of nationality	2

Section 3. Stories of (de)securitization and the quest of world status in the British corpus

Let us remember the German case. Clear narrative wars were being fought around the pivotal topics of *immigration* and *Islam*. The first, opposes a top-down discourse of de-securitization of immigration to provide cheap workers while displaying an empathetic national image, to a marginal discourse of securitization of immigration, claiming for the return to national preferences. The second, polarized in the media set-up between well-established Islam critics from feminist and conservative sides, and anti-racists who defended multicultural recognition of the German self. In the British case, narrative lines are less clear regarding both immigration and Islam. Yet, one can identify two pivotal (de)securitization discourses. The first one conflates the securitization and politicization of *immigration* and *Islam* within one single battle opposing clusters (a) and (c). However, this centers as much (de)securitizing *immigration* and/or *Islam* as on (de)securitizing of continental Europe. In the British case, immigration and Islam appears as corollary narratives to the (de)securitization of the continent rather than the object of securitization itself: there is actually a narrative correlation between securitizing Europe and securitizing immigration and Islam, and vice versa. The second (de)securitization story takes place within the PMs' cluster (d) and displays simultaneously a securitization of "Islamist ideology" and a de-securitization of Islam and British Muslims.

3.1. The (de)securitization of continental threats: the EU and immigration

Similarly to the German case, a narrative war on *immigration* opposes narrators of the cluster (a), standing on the upper left-hand side of the graph, with former UKIP leaders, Nigel Farage and Gerard Batten and conservative publicists Peter Hitchen, Allison Pearson, and Trevor Kavanagh, to the cluster c, standing on the lower side of the graph, with Lib Dem leaders Nick Clegg and Vince Cable, Labour leaders Jeremy Corbyn and Sadiq Khan, the Greens' leaders Jonathan Bartley and Amelia Womack, and Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby. Notably, Boris Johnson's securitizing narratives resemble that of the cluster a, positioning him halfway in between clusters (a) and (d). For this reason, his narratives are included within the analysis of the securitization of continental threats.

The first story takes place in *Insular* Britain and stages a binary confrontation between the British "ordinary", "decent" or "working" *people*, and the liberal, pro-Brussels, multicultural *Establishment*. In this story, the main enemy is the *EU*, a supranational entity that tries to rule over British sovereignty, and impose a political union, embodied by Brussels, Angela Merkel, or Jean-Claude Juncker. This external enemy is supported by accomplices on the inside, namely the "liberal", "metropolitan", "London-based" elite, accused of bending the knee to Brussels (Batten, 2018(1); Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Johnson, 2016(1); Hitchen, 2015(1); Kavanagh, 2017(2)). This is best expressed in UKIP Gerard Batten 2019 address to the EU Parliament:

Has the whole Brexit process fiasco been an elaborate conspiracy between Mrs May and the EU, or is it just due to her monumental incompetence? Either way, we have to hand it to you, Mr Juncker and Mr Barnier. You have done what Philip of Spain, what Napoleon, what Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler couldn't do: you have brought Britain to its knees, without firing a single shot. But you could not have done any of these things without the connivance of the traitors, quislings and collaborators in the British Parliament and British establishment (Batten, 2019)

In this story, the EU is destroying European nations and most of all the British nation. First, the EU is diluting the national sovereignty by undermining the power of the Parliament and the scarcity of the crown (Farage, 2019; Batten, 2018(1) Hitchen, 2015(1); Johnson, 2016(1), 2018) as best expressed by Boris Johnson and Peter Hitchen:

Look at that list of Lisbon competences (...) and you can see why the House of Commons Library has repeatedly confirmed that when you add primary and secondary legislation together the EU is now generating 60 per cent of the laws passing through parliament. The independence of this country is being seriously compromised. It is this fundamental democratic problem – this erosion of democracy - that brings me into this fight (Johnson, 2016(1)).

When this country was still independent, the Queen was the one who had subjects. Now, she is subject to others. Forget the Coronation Oath and a thousand years of the British constitution. Our sovereign is someone else's subject (Hitchen, 2015(1)).

Second, the EU's open border policy is threatening British economic stability (Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Johnson, 2016(1), 2017) or diluting British national identity into mass migrations (Batten, 2018(1) and (3); Hitchen, 2012, 2015(2); Pearson, 2016; Kavanagh, 2015(2)). In other words, British Islands are under *continental* threats, instanced in undesired legislation, national humiliation, and undesired immigration coming from Eastern Europe or "the jungle of Calais". For example, Boris Johnson conflates mass migration and the EU in a single threat to Britain:

It is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands – and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands, so that we add a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all the extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services. Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for some member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are intensifying and not diminishing. (Johnson, 2016(1))

Nigel Farage also amalgamates the securitization of the EU to that of immigration through the specific figure of the Eastern European migrant (Farage, 2013, 2015), and more particularly that of the Romanian criminal gang, for which he blames the EU's regulations:

There is an even darker side to the opening of the door in January. London is already experiencing a Romanian crime wave. (...) 92 per cent of ATM crime is committed by Romanians. (...) Mr. Cameron, Clegg and Milliband are you listening? If they are listening there's not a thing they can do. They are tied up in the cat's cradle of EU laws, regulations, directives and treaties. The only way this can be dealt with is by leaving the EU. (Farage, 2013)

Trevor Kavanagh and Gerard Batten also conflate the securitization of the EU and that of immigration through the figure of the Muslim or Middle Eastern migrant. According to them, mass immigration, which is directly caused by the EU, threatens to change Europe and Britain forever:

One of the main reasons that migrants flood to Europe from all corners of the world is the EU's open borders policy (...). We only have to look at the chaos and anarchy in Calais where thousands of illegal immigrants daily fight to gain entry to Britain after having travelled across Europe to do so (Batten, 2014).

That means taking control again over our laws, our trade and, especially, immigration. (...) It was turbocharged when German Chancellor Angela Merkel indiscriminately waved in a million more so-called refugees from Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Kavanagh, 2017(2)).

European political and economic integration is disastrous but, worse than that, you have opened up Europe's borders to untold millions of migrants. Your decision to open Europe's borders to indiscriminately import millions of people will do untold damage to European societies for generations to come (Batten, 2018(3)).

Peter Hitchen also securitizes both immigration and the EU, however separately. According to him, mass migration "is the result of a deliberate, planned attempt to change this country forever" for which he does not blame the EU but mostly the Labour Party. Emphatically, Hitchen considers mass migration to mark the end of "Britain as we knew it" (Hitchen, 2012). He does also securitize the EU who "reigns over our borders, our laws... and now our Queen" (Hitchen, 2015(1)), without, however, linking it directly to the threat of migration. Finally, Allison Pearson only securitizes immigration (Pearson, 2016).

Besides, narrators sometimes conflate the securitization of immigration with the targeting of Islam, particularly in Gerard Batten's, Trevor Kavanagh's, and Allison Pearson's cases. Gerard Batten presents Islam as both a "death cult" and an ideological threat (Batten, 2018(2)) and links mass migration with "Islamist fundamentalism":

I am sorry, on the news bulletins for the last few years we have seen hordes and hordes of people in Calais trying to get through to Britain by hiding themselves in vans, in lorries, in anything that they can get into, so there are literally thousands, tens of thousands, of people that have come by that route and are still trying to do so. Also, I do not understand why you would not want me to condemn a form of Islamic fundamentalism, which is butchering people and persecuting people of all religions and driving them out of the Middle East (Batten, 2014).

Allison Pearson securitizes Islam as both a culture that "cuts off the sexual parts of little girls or demonizes gay people or Jews or teaches its young boys that white women are no better than a sweetie in the gutter" (Pearson, 2015(2)), and an ideological threat which inspires British "enemies" and oppose integration (Pearson, 2015(1)). She also conflates religious and cultural belongings stating that "*Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage tend to live in more segregated communities. Blackburn, Birmingham, Burnley, and Bradford contain wards with between 70 per cent and 85 per cent Muslim populations. Muslim kids are the most segregated of any youngsters*" (Pearson, 2016). Trevor Kavanagh also directly accuses Islam of being the "common denominator" between terrorism and sex gang, while framing British Muslims as a "problem" in Britain (Kavanagh, 2017(2) and (3)).

Finally, the securitization of the continent goes in pair with a deep sense of historical pride, expressed in British exceptionalism in contrast with continental Europe. Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson express best this sense of British particularism in geographical and historical terms, and explicitly in relation to "the continent":

Our geography puts us apart. Our history puts us apart. Our institutions produced by that history put us apart. We think differently. We behave differently. (...) The roots go back seven, eight, nine hundred years with the Common Law. Civil rights. Habeas corpus. The presumption of innocence. The right to a trial by jury. On the continent – confession is the mother of all evidence. (...) The idea of free speech was a reality in England when Europe was run by princes with tyrannical powers. Throughout Europe, England was known as the land of liberty (Farage, 2013).

And of course there will be some in this country who are rightly troubled by a sense of neighbourly duty. There are Remainers who may agree with much of the above; that the economic advantages for Britain are either overstated or non-existent. But they feel uneasy about pulling out of the EU in its hour of need, when our neighbours are in distress; and at this point they deploy the so-called "Peace in Europe" argument: that if Britain leaves the EU, there will be a return to slaughter on Flanders Fields (Johnson, 2016(1)).

Trevor Kavanagh exposes British historical particularism negatively by highlighting its decline as imperial power (Kavanagh, 2009), while Peter Hitchen praises Britain's particularism for being a secure island, whose "advantages depend very much on our shared past, our inherited traditions, habits and memories" (Hitchen,

2015(2)). As for Allison Pearson, she praises Churchill's and Thatcher's war-readiness to "defend the Island, whatever the cost" when confronted to a direct threat, as "the massacre of 30 British citizens" in Tunisia (Pearson, 2015(1)). Finally, Gerard Batten does not directly refer to British particularism, but implies it in a paradoxical hero/victim positioning of Britain against European historical attempts to bring "Britain to its knees", from Philip of Spain, Napoleon, and Wilhelm II to Hitler (Batten, 2019). Unsurprisingly, narrators framing these continental threats call for extraordinary measures to counter them, going from taking back border control to leaving the EU (Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019; Batten, 2014, 2018(1), (2) and (3); Kavanagh, 2017(1) and (2); Pearson, 2016; Hitchen, 2015(2); Johnson, 2016(1), 2017, 2019(1) and (2)).

On the opposite side, the second story takes place in a *Kantian* or cosmopolitan setting and stages a challenging globalization, where European and multicultural liberals resist to the forces of illiberalism (Clegg, 2011; Cable, 2018(2)), division (Clegg, 2013; Bartley, 2018) and xenophobia (Clegg, 2011; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Corbyn, 2018; Bartley, 2017, 2018, 2019). However, as mentioned in the previous section, the opposition is less clear than in the German case, as the cosmopolitan side does not exclusively oppose the populist side. They oppose as much the Far-right (Clegg, 2011; Corbyn, 2019; Bartley, 2016, 2017), including UKIP (Corbyn, 2016; Clegg, 2015; Cable 2017(2); Bartley, 2018), as the Conservatives (Clegg, 2014, 2017; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2018, 2019; Corbyn, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019; Womack, 2016, 2018, 2019; Khan, 2016(1), 2018). Hence, political polarization has a much stronger weight in the British discourses relating to Islam, security, and identity, than it had in the German case. However, they clearly oppose the populist side by attempts at de-securitizing the EU and migration through three narrative strategies. First, narrators frame British identity as European and solutions to the stakes of globalization within European integration (Clegg, 2013, 2017; Cable, 2018(2); Khan, 2016(1); Corbyn, 2016, 2018; Womack, 2015). Second, they warn against all sorts of demonization steaming from the European migration crisis, the Brexit debates and terror attacks:

The last Government's conflation of social policy and security policy was damaging. It resulted in Muslim communities feeling stigmatized, and money being wasted (Clegg, 2011).

The public is being fed a constant diet of hyperbole about hordes of dangerous criminals roaming the Channel Tunnel, assaulting British citizens and storming Britain's borders. A mood of anxiety and hostility risks creeping over the public, with growing demands for the UK to close its borders and weed out 'illegal' immigrants from British life. But behind this rhetoric is a very different reality, and it's that reality that we will be confronting today as we visit the 'jungle' camp in Calais (Womack, 2015).

When you see the scapegoating of disabled people. Of migrants. Of those on benefits (Bartley, 2019).

It is sometimes easier to blame the EU, or worse to blame foreigners, than to face up to our own problems (Corbyn, 2016).

Third, narrators attempt at securitizing extremisms, mostly the Far Right, as threatening British stability and safety:

And yet something very un-British is taking root in our politics. A growing movement of people who want to pull us apart. Salmond, Farage, the bitter tribalism of left and right – in their different ways they’re all doing the same thing. A growing pick-a-side politics, in a world of us-versus-them (Clegg, 2014).

Far-right extremism has given us cause to fear for the safety of our communities (Bartley, 2016).

It’s about a small rightwing group who are trying to hijack the referendum result to rip up our rights and protections to shift even more power and wealth to those at the top. (Corbyn, 2019)

If you say, “You’re this faith and therefore you’re good and they’re that faith and therefore they’re bad,” it’s pretty straightforward. And if you use the hook of religion for long enough, as a pretext, sooner or later it begins to become the reality (Welby, 2016(1)).

The alt-right, the extremists, are well organised and operate as smoothly across frontiers as any multinational company (Cable, 2018(2)).

Sadiq Khan stands aside by insisting particularly on “Islamist extremism” as perversion of Islam requiring State action (Khan, 2015, 2016(1), 2019)¹²⁸. Finally, contrastingly with the proud understanding of Britain that characterized the previous story of securitization, this story displays a more contemporary understanding of Britain, evoking history in a less patriotic way. Moreover, narrators tend to deplore mystifications of the past (Cable, 2017(2); Bartley, 2017), or what Archbishop of Canterbury called the “Golden Age Syndrome” (Welby, 2015(1)). As we shall see in the final section, there is a clear correlation between the securitization of the continent and the use of British past as national pride, and a correlation between the de-securitization of the continent and the lack thereof. Let us remember that this correlation was reversed in the German case, where the use of German “dark” past was aimed at securitizing right-wing extremism while de-securitizing immigration.

3.2. Securitizing Islamists and de-securitizing Islam at the head of British state

The second story of (de)securitization takes place in cluster (d), i.e., the upper right-hand side of the graph, where all three British PMs, David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson stand. In this story, narrators display the highest perception of national insecurity. They frame “Islamist-inspired terrorism”, such as the Islamic State or homegrown terrorists, as posing a direct and imminent threat to Britain’s survival (Cameron, 2015(3); May, 2016, Johnson, 2016(2)), and focus even more heavily on the ideological threat posed by “Islamist ideology”. As mentioned in the previous section, British PMs fight narrative battles against an ideological threat of “extremism” in general, as extremism itself is considered an ideology – “the ideology of extremism is the problem” (Cameron, 2011), and “Islamist ideology” in particular:

¹²⁸ That could be interpreted in regard to his Muslim identity as well as the suspicion he has been under during the 2016 London Mayor elections campaign against Zack Goldsmith

We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where these terrorist attacks lie. That is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism (Cameron, 2011).

And if we can drive on that great cause of female empowerment and education, the Swiss army knife that solves so many problems, then I believe we will eventually find a cure for the psychological contamination of radical Islamist extremism. Just as we have eradicated smallpox and polio (Johnson, 2017).

First, while the recent attacks are not connected by common networks, they are connected in one important sense. They are bound together by the single evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches hatred, sows division and promotes sectarianism (May, 2017(3)).

Narrators use negatively charged and binary narratives to frame “Islamist ideology” as a “warped”, “evil” ideology, or a “death cult”, which inspires terrorist attacks in the UK (Cameron, 2011; 2015(2) and (3); May, 2017(1), (2)). Therefore, this threat justifies the call for extraordinary measures. First, Britain must military intervene in the Middle East to “eradicate”, “destroy”, and “defeat” the enemy (Cameron, 2011, 2015(2), (3), 2016(1); May, 2016, 2017(1), (3), Johnson, 2016(2)). Second, Britain must build counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategies, the former resting mostly on intelligence and detention, the later on a counter-narrative offensive on the Internet. Interestingly, while narrators engage in an ideological war against “Islamist ideology” through counter-narrative offensive, they frame Britain and themselves as essentially non-ideological:

We approach issues with a cast of mind rooted in common sense. We are rightly suspicious of ideology, and sceptical of grand schemes and grandiose promises. But above all we are obstinately practical, rigorously down to earth, natural debunkers (Cameron, 2016(1)).

It is a truth that the British people instinctively understand. Because they are not ideologues (May, 2018).

While British PMs securitize “Islamist ideology” as being the greatest threat to Britain and the world, Cameron and May simultaneously engage in de-securitizing moves regarding Islam and British Muslims:

It is vital that we make this distinction between religion on the one hand, and political ideology on the other. Time and again, people equate the two (Cameron, 2011).

This act of terror was not done in the name of a religion; it was done, as I said earlier, as a result of a warped ideology (May, 2017(1)).

These de-securitizing moves follow three main narrative strategies: 1) the caution in the use of adjectives relating to Islam to characterize terrorism, 2) the care of including “Islamist-inspired” terrorism or extremism within a wider cluster of terrorisms and extremisms, and 3) the recognition of and the fight against Islamophobia in the positioning of Britain as protector of Islam and British Muslims. First, the threat of *terrorism* is mobilized with great caution, and the multiplicity of expressions used to express terror attacks pursued in the name of Islam in narratives show a reluctance in the British leaders discourses to put adjectives that would target a religion in particular. They use most frequently the single term of “terrorism”, and less frequently “international terrorism” (Cameron, 2016(1); May, 2016). They almost never use adjective such as “Islamic” next to terrorism. Rarely, they use “Islamist-inspired terrorism” (May, 2017(3)) or “Daesh-inspired

terrorist attacks” (May, 2016). Second, Cameron often takes care to put “Islamist-inspired terrorism” in perspective with terror attacks steaming from other movements:

It is important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. My country, the United Kingdom, still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland. Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and in Italy, and of course, yourselves in Germany were long scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction (Cameron, 2011).

Let us note that such cautiousness in labelling terrorism is shared beyond the PMs cluster. For example, Archbishop of Canterbury Welby uses the expression “religiously justified violence” to prevent the stigmatization of both religion and Islam (Welby, 2016(1), (2)). Even polemical columnists such as Allison Pearson and Trevor Kavanagh, who display securitizing moves toward migrants and Muslims, never put adjectives relating to Islam to characterize terrorism. Similarly, Cameron and May take care of including “Islamist ideology” into a wider cluster of ideological threats, be it religious or political:

It is important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. My country, the United Kingdom, still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland. Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and in Italy, and of course, yourselves in Germany were long scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction (Cameron, 2011).

All acts of terror are evil acts underpinned by warped ideologies of different sorts, but whatever the ideology, it is an attempt to divide us and to destroy our way of life that drives the evil acts of the terrorists (May, 2017(1)).

This act of terror was not done in the name of a religion; it was done, as I said earlier, as a result of a warped ideology. All acts of terror are evil acts underpinned by warped ideologies of different sorts, but whatever the ideology, it is an attempt to divide us and to destroy our way of life that drives the evil acts of the terrorists (May, 2017(3)).

“This restraint”, argued Bicchi and Martin in 2006, “is ascribed in part to the concern that community relations should not suffer by over- emphatic articulation of the Islamic nature of terrorism and reflects the reaction of civil society, particularly community and faith groups and civil liberties activists to proposed counter-terrorism measures and their impact on Muslim communities” (Bicchi and Martin, 2006: 192). Finally, the political recognition of *Islamophobia* as a criminal offence and as an extremism on its own, as well as the warning against demonization, strike as a third narrative strategy to de-securitize Islam:

We need to argue that prophecies of a global war of religion pitting Muslims against the rest of the world are nonsense. (...) On the one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism, and just say that Islam and the West are irreconcilable - that there is a clash of civilizations (Cameron, 2011).

As I said here two weeks ago, there has been far too much tolerance of extremism in our country over many years – and that means extremism of any kind, including Islamophobia (May, 2017(4)).

British leaders under study operate a delicate balancing narration to address the “Islamist-inspired” threat between 2009 and 2019. On the one hand, they securitize Islamist extremists as an existential threat to the national survival. On the other, they show attempts at de-securitizing Islam and Muslim. According to Bicchi and Martin, UK official discourses already showed such a simultaneous process following the 2005 London

bombings: a process of ideological securitization of Islamic extremists, by means of new legislation and security measures which framed them as an existential threat to national survival and a wariness in official discourses in pinpointing Islam and Muslim culture as a security challenge (Bicchi and Martin, 2006: 192). However, it is worth mentioning that neither Cameron or May adopt the narrative strategy of securitizing right-wing extremism as a greater threat to Britain, as is the case in the cosmopolitan stories of both German and British panels. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous section, Boris Johnson stands aside of the PMs cluster, as 1) his securitizing discourses are much more directed toward the EU and immigration than toward Islamist ideology, and 2) the corpus under study does not include de-securitizing moves toward Islam and British Muslims.

In sum, security and identity narratives targeting directly Islam are hard to find in the British corpus, except for marginal polemical columnists such as Trevor Kavanagh and Allison Pearson. However, the British corpus displays other securitizing narratives that impact indirectly British Muslims: 1) the securitization of immigration conflated with that of European integration as political and economic threats to Britain independence, and 2) the securitization of Islamist extremism as an ideological threat to Britain survival. However, in both cases, the (historical) relations to Europe, rather than the relation to Islam, takes central place in the construction of British contemporary identity. Hence, discourses of (de)securitization have unravelled struggles in defining British “place in the sun” in the post-imperial order.

3.3. Trouble in British particularism in the post-imperial and Europeanized order

Recall in the German case, discourses of (de)securitization work as mirrors of identity. German discourses of securitization unravelled narrative wars for defining German *identity* opposing a post-national patriotism centred on the constitution and the rule of law to the “return” of cultural and national preferences. Similarly, the British case displays narrative struggles for 1) (re)defining *liberalism* as British particularism in face of diffuse threats and 2) (re)assessing *British role* in the post imperial international order. (de)securitization discourses resolve as much if not more on continental Europe as on the Islamist threat, which highlight a British trouble in conceiving its role in the post-Empire international order.

As a matter of fact, there is a striking cross-political consensus on the unique and insularly character of the British nation as “decent” (Clegg, 2014, 2015; Cameron, 2013, 2015(2); Cable, 2018(2); Batten, 2018(1); May, 2018, 2019; Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1); Grayling, 2015(1); Farage, 2013, 2017; Corbyn, 2015, 2018; Khan, 2016(2); Kavanagh, 2017(3)), “pragmatic” (Cameron, 2016(1); Corbyn, 2015; Farage, 2016) and “tolerant” (Cameron; 2013, 2016(1) and (2); Malik, 2017; Warsi, 2018(2); Batten, 2018(1); Pearson, 2016; Grayling,

2013; May, 2017(1); Khan, 2015; Corbyn, 2018; Clegg, 2011, 2014, 2015). Besides, the signifier of *liberalism*, and its associated narratives of “freedom”, “democracy”, and “equality”, is uncontested in the British panel. All narrators, from Labour Jeremy Corbyn to UKIP Gerard Batten define themselves as either “liberals” (Kavanagh, 2017(3); Smith, 2016; Johnson, 2016(1); Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Clegg, 2011, 2013; Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); Champion, 2017(1); Pearson, 2011, 2019; Evans, 2017(1), 2018; Grayling, 2015(1)) or as supporter of “liberalism” (Corbyn, 2016; Warsi, 2018(2); Malik, 2016; May, 2018). *Liberalism* is to the British case what the *rule of law* was to the German case. However, the content and consequences of such *liberalism* draw dividing lines in the British political field between *liberalism as British way of life* – or “muscular liberalism”, mobilized offensively to secure this way of life against Islamist and continental threats...

An ugly ideology that condones arbitrary violence, the subjugation of women and the supremacy of God's law over secular law is not compatible with the British way of life, and people of all faiths and none must unite in rejecting it (Evans, 2017(1)).

... and *liberalism as modus vivendi*, framed as the management of different ways of life and mobilised defensively to secure British multicultural tradition against populist and nationalist threats. The former has become more and more hegemonic since David Cameron 2011 famous “muscular liberalism” and increasing debates on British relationship to the EU and the EMC. The latter, however, appears today as a counter-discourse of (re)affirmation of liberalism as management diversity in multicultural Britain.

On the one hand, liberalism as the British way of life rests on three related historical readings of British particularism: 1) un-invaded Britain is the mother nation of freedom, 2) the inventor of free government and 3) free trade. First, the British Islands were never enslaved by any other nations and therefore developed as the first free nation. Historian of British nationalism Linda Colley remarked, “British are defined less by what they have in common, than negatively – whatever these people are, we are told, they are not slaves” (Colley, 2003: 11). Columnist Peter Hitchen follows this rhetoric: “*thanks to a thousand years of uninvaded peace, we have developed astonishing levels of trust, safety and freedom*” (Hitchen, 2015(2)). This goes in pair with the second narrative of Britain being the cradle of free government, especially embodied in the sacristy of the British Parliament:

We meet here, in the oldest of all Parliaments, because we know that democracy, and the values that it entails, will always prevail (May, 2017(1)).

The freedom that our grandparents and great grandparents fought for against tyranny. The freedom that swept across Eastern Europe when the Soviet Union collapsed, and nations were reborn in sovereignty and independence (May, 2018).

They cherish their liberty and their democracy. They see Britain as the country that did more than any other to unlock their shackles and enable them to take their rightful place in the family of European nations (Cameron, 2016(1)).

(...) and that in this home of democracy we are incapable of honouring a basic democratic mandate (Johnson, 2019(1)).

Indeed, “a reverence for Parliament became (...) a vital part of elite patriotism. (...) Parliament’s importance in Britain distinguished its government from that of almost every other European state” (Colley, 2003: 50). According to her, a “cult of Parliament” emerged during the 18th century and fostered British unity in contrast with Europe. Third, liberalism as British way of life rests on the narrative promotion of economic prosperity through the advocacy of free trade, free market, and free competition:

(...) and yes, let’s start now on those free trade deals because it is free trade that has done more than anything else to lift billions out of poverty. All this and more we can do now and only now, at this extraordinary moment in our history and after three years of unfounded self-doubt it is time to change the record, to recover our natural and historic role as an enterprising, outward-looking and truly global Britain, generous in temper and engaged with the world (Johnson, 2019(1)).

they really are the solution because it’s not the government that creates jobs, it’s businesses ... it’s businesses that get wages in people’s pockets, food on their tables, hope for their families and success for our country (Cameron, 2013).

The UK has always been an outward-looking trading nation. And as Conservatives, we believe in the power of a well-regulated free market – the greatest agent of collective human progress ever devised (May, 2018).

Linda Colley highlighted the fact that there was a historical interaction between British patriotism and free trade, as, since the 18th century “trade followed the flag, then, but it also helped to keep the flag flying” (Colley, 2003: 99-100). According to her, free trade as both ideal and self-interest, helped to bring together the different regions of Great Britain (Colley, 2003: 99-100). To sum up, liberalism as a way of life rests on three main narratives: British particularism as a historical hero 1) never invaded, 2) mother of self-government, and 3) inventor of free trade and free competition.

On the other hand, liberalism as *modus vivendi* rests on a more contemporary and multicultural understanding of Britain, focusing on justice, diversity, and toleration:

To argue, as Ed Davey did on Sunday, for a liberal approach to managed migration and to the refugee crisis, for compassion, for the right to a better life...and for respecting family ties (Cable, 2018(2)).

How Britain responds to this new environment will determine whether we succeed in remaining a tolerant, diverse, liberal inclusive democracy, and the canaries in the coal mine are British Muslims (Warsi, 2018(2)).

(...) the British liberal and human rights tradition (Champion, 2017(1)).

(...) standing up for liberalism, fundamental rights and freedoms (Evans, 2018).

Maintaining a liberal, open nation also demands a fierce allegiance to shared values. The values of liberal citizenship. The values of responsibility, tolerance and openness (Clegg, 2011).

You can be British as well as Scottish, English, Northern Irish, Welsh...ish. At the same time you can be black, white, Asian, Indian, African, European, mixed, not-mixed. You can be gay, straight, bi-sexual, transgender. Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, atheist (Clegg, 2014).

However, in the British case, narrative wars centre less on signifiers of British identity, than on British world status in face of an ever more integrated Europe and the loss of empire. The narrative battle opposes

proponents of an “anglobalization”, where Britain would lead the Anglosphere against continental Europe, and those of a New Britain part of the European project. This narrative battle has inflated since the 2010s and the debates on British relationships to the EU, and more particularly since the EMC.

Summary

The narrative analysis of discourses on Islam, identity, and security in the British corpus has showed that narrative lines are less clear regarding both immigration and Islam than it was in the German case. Yet, one can identify two pivotal narrative battles being fought simultaneously, each implying different securitizing and de-securitizing moves. The first one opposes clusters (a) and (c) and conflates the (de)securitization of *immigration* and *Islam* within one single battle, centering as much on (de)securitizing *immigration* and/or *Islam* as on (de)securitizing continental Europe. In the British case, immigration and Islam appear as corollary narratives to the (de)securitization of the continent rather than the objects of securitization themselves. The second takes place within the PMs’ cluster (d) and displays simultaneously a securitization of “Islamist ideology”, against the utopianism of cluster (c), and a de-securitization of Islam and British Muslims, against the populism of cluster (a). In other words, although security and identity narratives targeting *directly* Islam are harder to find in the British corpus than it was in the German one, British discourses display some securitizing moves that *indirectly* impact British Muslims and Islam in Britain: 1) the securitization of immigration, including Muslim migrants, conflated with that of European integration as political and economic threats to Britain economic and political security, and 2) the securitization of Islamist extremism as an ideological threat to Britain national security. Those narrative battles have highlighted how liberalism as British way of life to be secured, has emerged as a top-down hegemonic discourse of (re)imagination of British particularism at the turn of the 21st century against the perception of both Islamist and continental threats. In contrast, liberalism as *modus vivendi*, framed as the management of different ways of life and mobilized defensively to secure British multicultural tradition against populist and nationalist threats, emerges as a counter-discourse within the political opposition and the media arena. Those opposing conceptions of British historical liberalism centre less on signifiers of British identity, than on British world status in face of an ever more integrated Europe and the loss of empire, and rest on an antagonistic use of history, as I shall demonstrate in the last chapter.

Chapter 6 - Narrating Islam, security, and identity in public discourses in contemporary France (2009-2019)

In line with chapters 4 and 5, the present chapter will explore the way Islam, security, and identity, are interlinked in contemporary public discourses through the narrative analysis of 125 speeches of 22 French actors from the political elite and the media set up between 2009 and 2019. Following the same method as exposed in the previous chapters, section 1 will present the selection of British narrators, section 2 will expose the settings, characterisations, and plots, while the final section 3 will analyse the extend and degrees of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims in the French public discursive space and its consequences on the framing of French identity.

Section 1. French narrators

In accordance with the German and the British corpuses and the exigency of the comparison, I selected actors in or running for power from all the major political forces in France, namely the Gaullist Party *Les Républicains* (LR) – former *Union pour un mouvement populaire* (UMP), the Socialist Party (PS), the Liberal Party *La République en Marche* (LREM), the Leftist Party *La France Insoumise* (LFI), the nationalist Party *Rassemblement national* (RN) – former *Front national* (FN), the sovereignist Party *Debout la France*, and the Green Party *Europe Ecologie-Les Verts* (EELV). Given the centrality of the *Président de la République* in France, I selected a particular number of Presidential speeches and campaign speeches from the 2012 and 2017 Presidential elections. I added eight actors from the establishment media, from both conservative and progressive newspapers. Given the specific place of *philosophes* or so-called *public intellectuels* in the French media, I selected two philosophers active in the media circuit on questions relating to Islam, identity, and security. Regarding the text sampling, as for the German and the British cases, I paid particular attention to moments of narrative inflation such as the 2012 Arab Spring, the 2015-2016 EMC, as well as the 2015 terror attacks in Paris or again the 2017 presidential campaign, as a right time for political positioning (see appendix 6)¹²⁹.

1.1 Political actors in or running for power

I selected four actors of the right-wing Gaullist Party LR, the former President Nicolas Sarkozy, the former PM and candidate to the 2017 election François Fillon, the former Party leader Laurent Wauquiez,

¹²⁹ This selection was subject to preliminary discussions at the *French École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales* (ÉHESS) in 2018.

and the former Minister of Justice and Mayor of Paris 7th District Rachida Dati. Nicolas Sarkozy (in his full name Nicolas Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa) was born in 1955 in Paris. His mother was a lawyer from French and Greek Sephardic Jewish descent. His father belonged to the Hungarian gentry; he exiled to France in 1948 and was an advertiser and painter. He attended a Catholic school and graduated in Private Law before obtaining a Master's degree in Political Science at Parisian University *Nanterre*. He practised as a lawyer some years, while committing himself to politics very early. He was elected mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine, the wealthiest borough of Paris urban area, at only 28, then MP. He held several positions as Senior Minister under President Chirac before taking leadership of the Gaullist party UMP and being himself elected President in 2007. All along his career, he built an image of a strongman by constantly campaigning on securitization, which seems to have biased his postures on religious questions. In 2003, as *Ministre de l'Intérieur* under President Chirac - as such, being also *Ministre des Cultes*, in charge of government relations with Churches – he launched the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM), in order to institutionalize those relations with *Islam de France*, on a par with what has already been done decades ago with French Christians and Jews. On one and the same TV show¹³⁰, he spoke in defence of the UOIF – a Muslim organization allegedly close to the Muslim Brotherhood - he then advocated the appointment of a *préfet musulman* as an affirmative action move to empower members of the Muslim minority, and he confronted Tariq Ramadan in defence of women's rights threatened by Islamism. During the 2004 hot row over President Chirac's decision to launch the “headscarf ban”¹³¹, Sarkozy was at first rather cautious, as it might contradict his own strain to appear as keen to religious minorities. He then rallied the strong move in his political party towards the so-called *nouvelle laïcité* as enacted by the mentioned bill, which would protect French republican values against Islamism. When elected President in 2007, he purported to modify the relationship between the French Republic and Churches, causing uneasiness among classical *laïques*, but fell back on *nouvelle laïcité* in front of the perceived Islamic threat. In 2010 he supported - but did not initiate – the “burqa ban”¹³². To his view, the “burqa” — actually the *Niqab* — was “not welcome in France”. It was “not a religious problem but a problem of equality and dignity for women”¹³³. I selected 7 discourses between 2009 and 2015, three Presidential statements on the government's policy (2009(1)), security (2010), and French *laïcité* (2012(1)), one column on immigration (2009(2)), one statement

¹³⁰ 100 minutes pour convaincre, 20/11/2003 France 2.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auELCVGk-7c> Consulté le 17/08/2020

¹³¹ The bill forbidding the wearing of any conspicuously religious outfit by pupils of *laïques* secondary schools.

¹³² The bill forbidding one to wear in public an outfit designed to conceal one's face, actually the *niqab*.

¹³³ Statement to the Congress of Parliament, 22/06/2009.

<https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/175696-declaration-de-m-nicolas-sarkozy-president-de-la-republique-devant-le>

as candidate for the 2012 Presidential elections on the fight against terrorism (2012(2)), one speech at the LR's foundation congress (2015(1)), and one statement regarding the attacks of 13 November (2015(2)). François Fillon was born in 1954 in Le Mans. His mother became a university professor after bringing up four sons, and his father was a notary. Both his parents were Gaullist supporters, although with a different hue, more social for his mother, authoritarian for his father. He attended a Jesuit school, and defines himself as a Roman Catholic. He obtained a Master's degree in Public Law at the Parisian University *Descartes* and began his career as parliamentary assistant of a Gaullist MP, before being himself elected in his deceased mentor's constituency. After holding senior ministerial positions on Social Affairs and Education under Jacques Chirac, he was Nicolas Sarkozy's Premier. As such, he launched the 2010 "*burqa* ban", while he did not initiate the project. He strongly claimed France's Christian roots and warned against the Islamist threat¹³⁴. I selected 6 discourses from 2009 to 2017, when he was successively PM, member of the opposition and LR's candidate for the 2017 Presidential elections: two statements on identity (2009) and security (2010), one interview on the attacks of 13 November (2015), two pieces of campaign (2016(1), 2017) and one interview on "Islamic totalitarianism" (2016(2)). Laurent Wauquiez was born in 1975 in Lyon, the last of four children in a once wealthy industrialist family from Northern France. He was brought up by his mother, a museum curator, project manager for public television and later involved in local politics, as his father, a bank executive, left the family one year after his birth. He attended elitist Parisian *lycées* before gaining admission to the highly selective *Ecole Normale Supérieure* where he specialised in History, and passed the *Agrégation d'Histoire* examination, with no intention to be a teacher. Meanwhile he attended *Sciences Po*, obtained a Master's degree in Public Law and entered *ENA*. He was a civil servant for some years and began his political career by being elected MP at 29. He held several ministerial positions in François Fillon's governments, was elected President of the central Region *Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes*. He also became President of Right-wing party *Les Républicains* (LR) in 2017 but had to quit after less than two years, following a severe setback in European elections. While claiming to be the voice of the French conservative and republican Right with a "social Right" stance, he is often depicted as promoting a new "hard line" within the Right, authoritarian, hostile to immigration and European integration. Since 2014, he has put French *laïcité* at the core of his political struggle. According to him, *laïcité* is a vehicle for reaffirming the authority of the State and protecting French values, respectful of the "Christian roots" of France but uncompromising with regard to Islam and Muslim demands, deemed communitarian. He supported the campaign against *halal* food and advocated the enacting of a "pact for *laïcité*" in order to

¹³⁴ *Vaincre le totalitarisme islamique*, Paris, Albin Michel, 2016.

extend the prohibition of religious symbols in public institutions, while defending the presence of Christian symbols as an expression of French culture. I selected 5 discourses from 2015 to 2018, when he was successively, when he was successively vice President and leader of *Les Républicains*, three interviews on the *Charlie Hebdo* shooting (2015(1), on his election as LR's leader (2017) and his opposition to Edouard Philippe's government (2018), one speech at LR's Party Convention (2015(2)), and one intervention in French National Assembly after the attacks of 13 November (2015(3)). Finally, Rachida Dati was born in 1975 in the surroundings of Chalon-sur-Saône (Burgundy), from working-class parents who emigrated from North Africa. Her mother was a housewife coming from Algeria and her father, a bricklayer, came from Morocco. She was raised among ten siblings, attended a Catholic school run by nuns, then a *lycée laïque*, and graduated in Economics and Public Law at the University before attending *ENM* to qualify as a magistrate. While acknowledging her North African and Muslim roots, she often referred to herself as a French girl from a modest background¹³⁵, and regularly attends Mass on Sundays¹³⁶. Her political career has been closely linked to Nicolas Sarkozy. She was Minister of Justice in his government and was elected on his party's lists as MEP and mayor of the *VII^e arrondissement* in Paris. In the last years, however, she criticized her political friends' distorting *laïcité* and endless campaigning against the threats of Islam and immigration¹³⁷. I selected 5 interviews from 2009 to 2017, when she was successively Minister of Justice and MEP as well as Mayor of Paris' 7th District: one on her candidacy for the European elections (2009), one on the UMP's opposition to François Hollande's presidency (2013), two on the attacks of 13 November (2015(1) and (2)) and one on her mayorship (2017).

Then, I selected four actors from the Socialist Party, former President François Hollande, former Minister of Interior and PM Manuel Valls, former Minister for Education and candidate for the 2017 election Benoît Hamon, and former Minister of Labour, former First Secretary of the *PS*, and Mayor of Lille, Martine Aubry. François Hollande was born in 1954 in Rouen. His mother was a social worker and his father a physician. Both were Roman Catholics, with opposite political views, his mother inclined to the socialist Left and his father to the Far Right. He attended a Catholic school in his birthplace, then a *lycée laïque* in Neuilly-sur-Seine. He graduated in Law before studying at top business school *HEC* and entering *ENA*¹³⁸. Raised as a

¹³⁵ Claude Askolovitch, Rachida Dati, *Je vous fais juges*, Paris, Grasset, 2007, p. 61-62.

¹³⁶ <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2014/01/08/01002-20140108ARTFIG00424-rachida-dati-la-foi-fait-partie-de-ma-vie.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹³⁷ <https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/rachida-dati-je-ne-referai-pas-une-campagne-sur-la-burqa-ou-le-halal-04-06-2015-4831497.php>. https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/07/07/islam-voile-immigration-les-desaccords-de-rachida-dati-avec-son-camp_4674054_823448.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹³⁸ The *Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA)* is the elitist nursery for French politicians and civil servants.

Roman Catholic, he defines himself as non-religious. As First Secretary of the Socialist Party, he supported the 2004 “headscarf ban”¹³⁹. As a socialist MP, following his party whip, he abstained from voting on the 2010 “*burqa* ban”. As President, following the 13 November 2015 killings, he stated that France was “at war” against a “jihadist army, *Daech*”, in the national territory as well as in Midde-East and Africa¹⁴⁰. Soon after, he attempted, with his Premier Manuel Valls, to extend deprivation of nationality to French-born binational citizens convicted of a crime, while that sanction so far could only apply to naturalised citizens. Most of the *djihadistes* were born in France to parents born in former French colonies in Africa, and they were the avowed targets of the project, but it would have indirectly questioned the “Frenchness” of millions of Muslim citizens with the same background. The project failed to gain the transpartisan support requested for a constitutional reform, and was marred with unconstitutionality, as the new ruling would have introduced inequality between French-born citizens¹⁴¹. When François Hollande announced that he would not run for a second term as president, he openly expressed “regret” for having launched that project¹⁴². I selected 7 discourses from 2012 to 2016, when he was successively the PS’ candidate for the 2012 Presidential elections and elected President, one piece of campaign (2012(1)), three statements on the fight against terrorism (2012(2), 2014, 2015(3)), one declaration on the role of education (2015(1)), two discourses on the EMC (2015(2), 2016). Manuel Valls was born in 1962 in Barcelona, from a Swiss mother from Ticino and a Spanish father from Catalonia, belonging to a prominent Catalan Catholic family of bankers, press publishers and influential politicians. He was brought up in Paris where his father was established as a painter, and was naturalised as a French citizen in 1982, while still holding Spanish nationality. After joining the PS very young, Manuel Valls was elected Mayor of Evry from 2001 to 2012 and was first elected to the National Assembly for Essonne in 2002. He was regarded as belonging to the Socialist Party’s social liberal wing, sharing common orientations with Blairism. He became Minister of Interior in 2012 before being appointed Prime Minister from 2014 to 2016 under François Hollande’s presidency. Manuel Valls was a candidate in the Left primary for the 2017 Presidential election during which he defended a “strong” Left, able to meet contemporary security issues. After losing in the second round to Benoît Hamon, he endorsed Emmanuel Macron despite having previously pledged to support the Socialist candidate. Since June 2019, Manuel Valls has served as a Barcelona City Counsellor. Until

¹³⁹ https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2004/02/03/le-parti-socialiste-souhaite-voter-la-loi-sur-les-signes-religieux_351538_1819218.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁴⁰ <https://www.senat.fr/evenement/archives/D46/hollande.html>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁴¹ https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2016/03/30/francois-hollande-renonce-a-la-decheance-de-nationalite-et-au-congres_4892426_4809495.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁴² <https://video-streaming.orange.fr/tv/hollande-regrette-la-decheance-de-nationalite-CNT000000yjq3b.html>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

recently, he was active in contemporary debates regarding French *laïcité*, which became the core of his political struggle in 2005, when he co-wrote *La laïcité en face* (2005) in which he advocated the evolution of the “law of 1905”. He is known for his radical stands vis-à-vis Islam: in 2002, as mayor of Evry, he opposed a branch of the national grocery store chain *Franprix* deciding to sell only halal-certified products and products that do not contain alcohol; he supported the director of the Babyloup nursery in conflict with one of her veiled employees; he supported the 2010 “burqa ban”; he opposed veiled women to accompany school outings; he advocated for banning the Islamic veil at the university. Besides, during the Tariq Ramadan affair, which pits the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo against the founder of *Mediapart*, Manuel Valls violently attacked Edwy Plenel¹⁴³, within a general fight against “islamo-gauchisme”¹⁴⁴. And, in 2017, when President Emmanuel Macron opposed those who advocated the “radicalization of secularism”, Manuel Valls replied: “I don't understand the idea of a radicalised secularism. (...) It is a way of disqualifying the defenders of the Republic and of secularism. The real danger in French society is radical Islam, not radicalized secularism”¹⁴⁵. Finally, on March 26, 2018, he called for a ban on Salafism¹⁴⁶. I selected 6 discourses from 2013 to 2017 when he was successively Minister of Interior, Premier, and candidate for the Socialist Party for the 2017 Presidential campaign, tackling the fight against terrorism (2013, 2015(1)), the French *laïcité* (2015(2)), one interview published in *Libération* on his political positioning (2016), and two pieces of campaign (2017(1) and (2)).

Benoît Hamon was born in 1967 in Brittany, his mother was a secretary and his father a shipbuilding engineer. He spent part of his childhood in Dakar, Senegal, where he attended a Catholic school. He graduated in History at *West Brittany* University where, as a student, he took part in a powerful protest against a government bill intended to reform the Universities, and soon joined the Socialist Party. He began his career as parliamentary assistant of a socialist MP, then became president of the Young Socialists Movement *MJS*. He took advantage of that position to become one of the leaders of the Left wing in his party. He was a staff member for Martine Aubry when Minister of Labour. After being elected MEP, then MP, he held several positions as junior then Senior Minister in François Hollande's governments. He ran for President in 2017 as the winner of the Left's primary election against Manuel Valls. He stood for a “Left of the future”, that is social-democratic, European, and ecological. He opposed the attempts to extend the ban of religious symbols

¹⁴³ “Je veux qu'ils rendent gorge: Valls attaque violemment Plenel et Mediapart”, *Nouvelobs.com*, 5 November 2017, Retrieved on 29 September 2020.

¹⁴⁴ Arthur Berdah, “Manuel Valls dénonce à son tour l'islamo-gauchisme”, *Lefigaro.fr*, 22 May 2016, Retrieved on 29 September 2020.

¹⁴⁵ “*Laïcité: Manuel Valls sermonne Emmanuel Macron*”, 9 January 2018, Retrieved on 29 September 2020.

¹⁴⁶ “*Valls plaide pour l'interdiction du salafisme et des mesures contre les fichés S les plus dangereux*”, *BFMTV*, 25 March 2018, Retrieved on 29 September 2020.

in public and supported protests against Islamophobia. He was among the « agents of influence for Islam » denounced by the right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro Magazine* as belonging to a so-called “*Islamosphère*”¹⁴⁷. I selected 6 discourses from 2009 to 2017, when he was successively MEP, spokesperson of the PS, Education Minister, and candidate for the Socialist Party for the 2017 Presidential campaign, opposing Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency (2009), supporting François Hollande’s Presidency (2012), on French *laïcité* (2014), deprivation of nationality (2015), and two pieces of campaign (2017(1) and (2)). I selected 5 discourses from 2009 to 2017, when he was successively MEP, spokesperson of the PS, Education Minister, and candidate for the Socialist Party for the 2017 Presidential campaign, opposing Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency (2009), supporting François Hollande’s Presidency (2012), on French *laïcité* (2014), deprivation of nationality (2015), and two pieces of campaign (2017(1) and (2)). Martine Aubry (née Delors) was born in 1950 in Paris. Her father was Jacques Delors, a catholic trade unionist, French Minister of Finance and President of the European Commission, her mother a housewife from Basque origin. She married twice but still uses her first husband’s name. She attended a catholic school, then a *lycée laïque*, graduated in Economics at the Parisian University *Assas* and attended *Sciences Po* before entering *ENA*. She began a career as a civil servant in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, where she managed legal projects at a top level before joining the private sector as senior manager. She has been Minister of Labour in several socialist governments, First Secretary of the Socialist Party, and mayor of Lille. During her four terms as mayor, she has been repeatedly attacked for her supposed complacency with local Islamist organizations, namely for breaking *laïcité* by granting Muslim women groups a female-only time slot for the use of a municipal swimming pool¹⁴⁸. As leader of the Socialist Party, she criticised the launching of the 2010 “*burqa* ban” which she suspected to use the *burqa* as a red rag¹⁴⁹, and whipped her party to abstain from voting on the bill. I selected 5 discourses from 2009 to 2016, when she was First Secretary of the *PS*, candidate at the *Primaires de la Gauche* for the 2012 Presidential elections, and Mayor of Lille: one statement on the values of the *PS* (2009), one debate with François Hollande at the *Primaires de Gauche* (2011), two columns on the EMC (2015(1)) and François Hollande’s Presidency (2016), and one interview on the attacks of 13 November (2015(2)).

To grasp an institutional discourse on *laïcité*, I added Socialist Jean-Louis Bianco. Born in 1943 in Neuilly-sur-Seine, he attended the elite *Lycée Jeanson de Sailly*, gained admission to the highly selective

¹⁴⁷ « L’islamosphère : enquête sur les agents d’influence de l’islam », *Le Figaro Magazine*, N°22754 6 October 2017.

¹⁴⁸ https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/aubry-a-t-elle-vraiment-reservee-des-creneaux-de-piscine-a-des-musulmanes_1098551.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁴⁹ https://www.liberation.fr/france/2010/01/13/la-gauche-aussi-se-dechire-sur-le-voile_604125. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

engineering school *Ecole des Mines*, attended *Sciences Po* and entered *ENA*. He was appointed General Secretary of the Presidency by President François Mitterrand and held that position for ten years, before entering government under President Mitterrand as Minister of Social Affairs, then Minister of Equipment, Housing and Transportation. He was also elected MP, mayor, and President of a *Département* in the South of France. In 2013 he was appointed President of the *Observatoire de la Laïcité* – an agency attached to the Ministry of Interior with the mission to assist the Government in the enforcement and respect of secularism in France. As such, he asserted that France had no problem with its *laïcité*, albeit it is under pressure of *communautaristes*, as its principles and values are deeply shared in the country¹⁵⁰. In the aftermath of the *Charlie Hebdo* and *HyperCacher* killings, January 2015, he issued an Advice by the *Observatoire*¹⁵¹, with proposals deemed “angelic” from within and without the *Observatoire*, and he was bitterly accused of paying more attention to the rise of Islamophobia than to potential violations to French *laïcité*¹⁵². In 2016 he wrote *La France est-elle laïque?* a book through which he tried to refocus the permanent dispute by reasserting the principles and rules of *laïcité*, but he was regularly confronted by *Républicains laïques* such as Caroline Fourest and Manuel Valls in controversies and public debates. He was also among the « agents of influence for Islam » denounced by the right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro Magazine* as belonging to a so-called “*Islamosphère*”¹⁵³. I selected 6 discourses from 2013 to 2018, two columns on French *laïcité* (2013, 2018), and 4 interviews on *Charlie Hebdo* shooting (2015), on Manuel Vall’s statements regarding French *laïcité* (2016(1)), on the terrorist attacks in Nice (2016(2)), and for the promotion of his book *Is France Secular* (2017).

I also selected the President and founder of the centrist party *LREM* Emmanuel Macron. Born 1977 in Amiens (Picardy), both his parents were physicians, as would later be the case for his two younger siblings. He was raised in a non-religious family, but attended a Jesuit secondary school in his birthplace, and he requested to be baptised a Roman Catholic at age 12¹⁵⁴. His parents sent him to Paris to prestigious *Lycée Henri IV*, where he prepared for the highly selective *examination* to enter *Ecole normale supérieure* but failed. He obtained a master’s degree in Public Administration at *Sciences Po* while also graduating in Philosophy at

¹⁵⁰ https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2014/07/jean-louis_bianco_texte_de_toulon.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵¹ https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/02/avis_de_lodl_sur_la_promotion_de_la_laicite_et_du_vivre_ensemble.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵² <https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/France/Les-tensions-montent-au-sein-de-l-Observatoire-de-la-Laicite-2015-01-19-1269740>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵³ “L’islamosphère : enquête sur les agents d’influence de l’islam”, *Le Figaro Magazine*, N°22754 6 October 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Bernard Gorce, “La jeunesse très catholique des candidats à la présidentielle”, *La Croix*, 10/04/2017 <https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Laicite/La-jeunesse-tres-catholique-candidats-presidentielle-2017-04-10-1200838526>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

Parisian University *Nanterre*, before entering *ENA*. When a student, he worked briefly as an editorial assistant for Protestant philosopher Paul Ricoeur, before joining the editorial board of *Esprit*, a Christian Left inspired magazine. At different times in his political career, he expressed liberal views upon *laïcité* and distanced himself from legal projects aiming to go further in prohibiting Islamic symbols in public. After the 13 November 2015 killings, he claimed that the French society was partly accountable for giving a breeding ground to *djihadisme*, by its failing to face inequalities¹⁵⁵. At the same moment, although Senior Minister in Manuel Valls' Cabinet, he criticised the government's attempt to deprive of their nationality the French-born *djihadistes*¹⁵⁶. However, after two years as President, he seemed to come closer to the *républicains laïques* by focusing on *séparatisme* as, in his words, promoted by Islamist movements in France¹⁵⁷. I selected 7 discourses from 2016 to 2019, when he was successively candidate to the 2017 Presidential elections and elected *Président de la République*, one piece of campaign (2016), his inaugural speech as President (2017(1)), two discourses on the fight against terrorism (2017(2), 2018(2)), one speech on Islam in France (2017(3)), on statement on French *laïcité* (2018(1)), and one statement on the migration crisis (2019).

I added the leader of the *LFI* party, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Born in 1951 in Tangier (Morocco) from French parents of Spanish descent settled in Algeria, his mother was a schoolteacher and his father a postmaster. His mother raised him as a Roman Catholic, but he attended *laïques* schools in Normandy and Franche-Comté, before graduating in Philosophy and Literature at Besançon University. He was a teacher and a journalist while being involved in a Trotskyist party. He then joined the socialist party and began a political career on the Left wing of the party. He was a senator, a Junior Minister in Lionel Jospin's cabinet, before launching his own movement under which banner he was elected MEP, ran twice for President, and was later elected MP. While still claiming to be a man of catholic culture¹⁵⁸, he was a Free-Mason till 2020, and always insisted on *laïcité républicaine* against the hold of religions. After having criticised the notion of Islamophobia, "a word we don't like", he acknowledged that it was an imperative to « fight the hate of Muslims » and joined protests under the banner "Stop Islamophobia"¹⁵⁹. I selected 6 discourses between 2012 and 2019, both as

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/11/21/97001-20151121FILWWW00145-djihadisme-responsabilite-de-la-societe-francaise-macron.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2016/02/09/25002-20160209ARTFIG00392-decheance-pour-macron-on-ne-traite-pas-le-mal-en-l-expulsant.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵⁷ https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/02/18/emmanuel-macron-en-deplacement-a-mulhouse-veut-lutter-contre-le-separatisme-islamiste_6029978_823448.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵⁸ <http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.famillechretienne.fr%2Fpolitique-societe%2Fpresidentielle-2017%2Fje-suis-de-culture-catholique-je-connais-la-maison-%21-212179>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/la-tres-nette-evolution-de-melenchon-sur-la-question-de-l-islamophobie-10-11-2019-8190327.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

leader and candidate for the *Front de Gauche* in 2012 and *La France insoumise* in 2017, two pieces of campaign (2012, 2017), one interview on religious polemics (2016(1)), on speech on terrorism and security (2016(2)), one column on French *laïcité* (2018), and one speech on migration to the National Assembly (2019).

To represent the Far-Right party *RN*, I chose its leader Marine Le Pen. Marine (Marion Anne Perrine, known as) Le Pen was born in 1968 in Neuilly-sur-Seine. She was the third daughter of the leading far-Right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen and his first wife Pierrette, a former model and housewife from Gascony. Raised as a Roman Catholic, she attended a *lycée laïque*, she obtained a master's degree in Criminal Law and was trained as a lawyer. She practised several years as a barrister and began a career in the National Front, her father's party. When she succeeded him as leader of the party, she distanced herself from her father's anti-Semitic stance and focused on the Arab-Muslim immigration. All along the constant political turmoil about Islamic symbols and practices, she outbid the successive governments on every occasion. She claimed to be the true advocate of *laïcité* against Islamization of France, since *laïcité* is grounded in a Christian culture¹⁶⁰, and she notoriously compared the Muslims' street prayers in French towns to a foreign occupation, albeit without tanks or soldiers¹⁶¹. As a presidential contender in 2012 she campaigned against the *halal* meat supposedly sold unbeknownst to the consumer in most butcher's shops of the Paris region¹⁶². I selected 7 discourses, as both FN then RN's leader and FN's candidate for the 2017 Presidential election, one speech on French *laïcité* (2012), one statement on the 13 November Attacks (2015), one speech on the EMC (2016(1)), one speech on French civilization (2016(2)), one piece of campaign (2017), on *RN's* Party Conference (2018), and one speech on Labour Day (2019). I also selected Nicolas Dupont-Aignan from the sovereignist party DLF. Born in Paris in 1961 as Nicolas Dupont, both his parents belonged to the wine world, and were non-practising Roman Catholics. Yet he attended Catholic schools and defines himself as « *a Doubting Christian or a Believing Agnostic* »¹⁶³. He graduated at *Sciences Po* and obtained a master's degree in Business Administration before entering *ENA*. He began his career as a civil servant and was growingly involved in the Gaullist political movement, first inside the Gaullist party, then creating his own. He shifted from a social stance to an increasingly nationalistic one, and accordingly changed the name of his party from “*Rise up Republic!*” to “*Rise*

¹⁶⁰ <https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/marine-le-pen-donne-sa-definition-d-une-france-laique-28-01-2011-1247059.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110607220930/http://www.rnw.nl/english/bulletin/le-pen-says-she's-no-wilders>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶¹ https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/12/11/marine-le-pen-compare-les-prieres-de-rue-des-musulmans-a-une-occupation_1452359_823448.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶² <http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.leparisien.fr%2Felection-presidentielle-2012%2Fcandidats%2Fmarine-le-pen-veut-saisir-la-justice-et-cible-la-viande-halal-18-02-2012-1867138.php>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶³ <https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Laïcité/La-jeunesse-tres-catholique-candidats-presidentielle-2017-04-10-1200838526>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

up France!”. He would define his Gaullism as social and patriotic rather than nationalistic and he insisted on distancing himself from the Far Right. Yet he supported the National Front candidate Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election in 2017 and was ready to be her Premier, would she be elected. I selected 5 discourses from 2012 to 2019, as both *Debout la République* then *Debout la France*’s leader and candidate for the 2012 and 2017 Presidential elections: two pieces of campaign (2012, 2017), one speech on the attacks of 13 November (2015), one column on communitarianism (2016), one speech as *DLF*’s leader (2019).

Finally, from the Green Party, I selected former *EELV* leader and Minister for Housing Cécile Duflot. Born in 1975 in the Paris urban area (Villeneuve-St-Georges), her two parents were trade unionists, her mother as a teacher, and her father as a railway worker. She obtained a Master’s degree in Geography at the Parisian University *Diderot* before entering the top business school *ESSEC* and obtaining a Master’s degree in Urban Economics. As a student she was an activist in the Young Christian Workers movement (JOC), and she referred to her Catholic sensibility several times in her political career, while strongly disagreeing with the Church¹⁶⁴. As she was leader of the Green Party (*Les Verts*, then *EELV*) she opposed the 2010 “*burqa* ban” and warned against scapegoating the Muslims, comparing rising Islamophobia in 2011 France to anti-Semitism in the Thirties¹⁶⁵. She was Minister for Housing in two governments under François Hollande, but resigned when Manuel Valls became Premier, saying she opposed Valls’ stance regarding minorities, namely Roms¹⁶⁶. In 2016, when turmoil aroused from seeing *burkinis* on French beaches, Duflot, then MP, warned against constant Muslim bashing in France¹⁶⁷. I selected five discourses from 2014 to 2016, when she was successively *EELV*’s member and candidate for the 2017 Presidential elections: one speech at the *EELV*’s federal council (2014), two interventions in French Parliament on the attacks of 13 November (2015(2)) and anti-terrorist measures (2016(1)), two columns on the EMC and the ecological cause (2015(1), 2016(2)).

1.2. Media actors

To illustrate the media controversy on Islam, security, and Identity, I chose several media commentators known for their active comments and sometimes-polemical positions, notably on French *laïcité*. First, I chose five commentators active in the media on issues regarding Islam. On the one hand, I chose

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/France/Primaire-ecologiste-Cecile-Duflot-avant-fibre-chretienne-2016-10-06-1200794332>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶⁵ <http://www.islamophobie.net/en/2011/03/14/cecile-duflot-islamophobie-antisemitisme/>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶⁶ http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lepoint.fr%2Fpolitique%2Ffroms-duflot-envoie-valser-valls-26-09-2013-1735555_20.php. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.islametinfo.fr/2016/08/22/cecile-duflot-islamophobie-burkini/cecile-duflot-islamophobie-burkini/>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

conservative columnists Yves Thérard and philosopher Pascal Bruckner. On the other, I selected leftist and progressive columnists Edwy Plenel and Laurent Joffrin. Finally, I added caricaturist and editorialist Riss, member of the editorial board of *Charlie Hebdo*, the satirical magazine victim of the so-called *Charlie Hebdo* shooting on 7 January 2015.

Yves Thérard was born in 1960 in the Paris urban area (Boulogne-Billancourt). After graduating in Law and Literature, he was a journalist for a French regional newspaper in France and East Africa. He has been deputy managing editor of *Le Figaro* since 2000, and a regular contributor on news TV channels¹⁶⁸. In one occasion, he notoriously declared, in one breath: “*Islamophobia does not exist*” and “*I hate the Muslim religion*”, before trying to clarify in the following days¹⁶⁹. I selected 5 columns published in the *Figaro* between 2009 and 2019, two on French national identity (2009, 2017), one on the Arab Spring (2012), one on the attacks of 13 November (2015), and one the EMC (2019). Pascal Bruckner was born in 1948 in Paris. His father was a French Protestant engineer, Nazi sympathizer and strongly anti-Semitic. He was also, according to his son, a violent husband and father. His mother was a college teacher and a practising Roman Catholic. He was raised as a Catholic, in Austria, Switzerland, then in Lyon, where he attended a Jesuit college. He graduated in Philosophy at *Sorbonne* University and obtained a PhD on Charles Fourier’s sexual utopia. He spent most of his professional life teaching in American Universities, while publishing numerous novels and essays on cultural criticism in France, through which he became a well-known columnist for newspapers and TV-shows. As a student, in the aftermath of May 68, he sympathised with Leftist movements, but soon shifted to mainstream politics with a conservative stance. He defines himself as a hedonist, with a libertine temperament¹⁷⁰. All across the constant political dispute about Islam in France and how to face a rising Islamist threat, he regularly stood for *laïcité* against Islamic symbols and practices and supported various campaigns against Islamism. He emphatically and repeatedly claimed that “Islamophobia” did not exist, that the word itself “infected” the language and should be banished from our vocabulary¹⁷¹, as conveying an “imaginary racism” designed to forbid any critical debate on Islam¹⁷². I selected 5 columns published between 2010 and 2019, one published in *Libération* on Islamophobia (2010), three published in *Le Point* on the colonial lobby

¹⁶⁸ <https://blog.lefigaro.fr/threard/yves-threard.html>.

¹⁶⁹ <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2019/10/15/actualite/medias-actualite/je-deteste-la-religion-musulmane-yves-threard-du-figaro-en-roue-libre-sur-le-voile/>
<http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ozap.com%2Factu%2F-je-deteste-la-religion-musulmane-yves-threard-reconnait-s-etre-tres-mal-exprime-sur-lci%2F584711>

¹⁷⁰ <https://france-amerique.com/fr/pascal-bruckner-un-philosophe-libertin-a-new-york/>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁷¹ https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2010/11/23/l-invention-de-l-islamophobie_695512. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁷² Pascal Bruckner, *Un Racisme imaginaire : islamophobie et culpabilité*, Paris, 2018, Grasset.

(2014), the attacks of 13 November (2015), and the war on terror (2016), and one published in the *Figaro* opposing the march against Islamophobia (2019).

Edwy (Hervé Edwy) Plenel was born in 1952 in Nantes. His father was an academic and civil servant whose career was broken by the Gaullist government when he voiced his support to independentism in the French Caribbean Islands. He grew up in Martinique, then in Algiers. While studying political science he joined a Trotskyist organisation in the aftermath of May 1968 and did not graduate. Instead, he trained as a journalist on the job for his party's weekly then daily newspaper *Rouge*, before beginning a career for mainstream *Le Matin de Paris* and *Le Monde*. He specialised in Education and Police sections and acquired recognition in investigative journalism by disclosing several major political scandals. He was successfully managing editor for *Le Monde* for eight years, before launching his own project, *Mediapart*, an on-line independent Left newspaper that gained success through exposing corruption cases among senior politicians. Plenel famously published in 2014 a Zola-inspired¹⁷³ pamphlet *Pour les musulmans*, in defence of the French Muslim minority against the assertion that there would now be a "Muslim problem" in France as there was said to be once a "Jewish problem"¹⁷⁴. In the aftermath of the 2015 Jihadist killings, *Charlie Hebdo* and several mainstream newspapers accused Plenel and *Mediapart* of collusion with Islamists — namely Tariq Ramadan — and even of moral complicity with the killers¹⁷⁵. Some weeks before, the Right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro Magazine* had denounced Plenel, among others, as an "agent of influence for Islam" at the centre of a so-called "*Islamosphère*"¹⁷⁶. I selected 5 columns published in *Médiapart* between 2009 and 2018, one on the debate on national identity (2009), one on the Tunisian revolution (2011), one in defence of French Muslims (2013), one on the attacks of 13 November (2015), one on the EMC (2018). Laurent Joffrin (pen name for Laurent Mouchard) was born in 1952 in Vincennes. His father was a publisher and business associate of the far-Right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, his mother a housewife. He attended the elite Catholic *Collège Stanislas* in Paris, before graduating in Public Administration at *Sciences Po* and in Economics at the University. While a student, in the aftermath of May 68, he joined the *MJS*, youth organisation of the Socialist Party, and became a National Secretary. He gained a first hands-on experience as a contributor for the Socialist Students' bulletin, but he soon gave up political activism to train as a professional journalist at the *Centre de Formation des Journalistes (CFJ)*. He created the business section for the Left-wing newspaper *Libération*,

¹⁷³ See Emile Zola *Pour les Juifs* : <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k283648d/f1.item.zoom>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Edwy Plenel, *Pour les musulmans*, 2014, Paris, La Découverte.

¹⁷⁵ *Charlie Hebdo* N°1320, 8 November 2017. N°1321, 15 November 2017.

¹⁷⁶ "L'islamosphère : enquête sur les agents d'influence de l'islam", *Le Figaro Magazine*, N°22754 6 October 2017.

where he became managing editor after some years. From then on, he shifted several times along the years from *Libération* to the centre-Left weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* and back again to *Libération*, with the position of managing editor or publisher. In 2020 he announced he was going back to political activism and chose to quit *Libération* in order to launch a new centre-Left movement. As a columnist for his own newspaper and for multiple talk shows on TV, he kept a moderate stance in the recurrent quarrel about *laïcité*, Islam and Islamism. In 2011 he claimed that the political class, or part of it, was literally “*malade de l’islam*”, infected with the Islam question¹⁷⁷. Following the 7 January 2015 massacre, he hosted the *Charlie Hebdo* team on the premises of *Libération* for nine months, in order to allow them time to find new premises. However, the Right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro Magazine* pinned Joffrin among other “agents of influence for Islam”, belonging to a so-called “*Islamosphère*”¹⁷⁸. I selected 6 columns published in *Libération* between 2009 and 2018, on national identity (2009), on the Arab Spring (2011), on the situation in Syria (2014), on the attacks of 13 November (2015), and on French *laïcité* (2016). Riss (pen name for Laurent Sourisseau) was born in 1966 in Melun. His father was an undertaker and her mother a housewife. He graduated in Law at the University, and worked several years as a railway shift worker, while beginning to send cartoons to satirical papers. He joined the anti-war magazine *La Grosse Bertha* in 1991 and shifted to the new weekly *Charlie Hebdo* when it was re-launched in 1992 by a new team after having disappeared ten years before. Riss became managing editor, then publisher, and he now owns 70% of the shares in *Charlie-Hebdo*. He constantly supported the editorial line of *Charlie* which became its hallmark, upholding the right to criticise all religions and fighting for *laïcité* against Islamism. He personally focused on denouncing those in the French Left whom he accused of collusion with islamism and moral complicity with the killers of 7 January 2015, most notably Edwy Plenel and *Mediapart*¹⁷⁹. I selected 5 columns published in *Charlie Hebdo* between 2015 and 2019, on Islam, Mohammed Mehra’s trial (2017), the fight against Salafists (2018), the 1905 French Law (2019(1)), and censorship (2019(2)).

Second, I selected three actors within French feminism, who are solicited and active on the public debate on Islam and *laïcité*. On the one hand, I selected feminist and secularist essayist Caroline Fourest and philosopher Elisabeth Badinter. On the other, I selected feminist and anti-racist Rhokaya Diallo, also considered as member of so-called “new feminism”. Caroline Fourest (born Guillemot, her mother’s name)

¹⁷⁷ <https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20110325.OBS0243/cette-classe-politique-malade-de-l-islam-par-laurent-joffrin.html>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁷⁸ “L’islamosphère : enquête sur les agents d’influence de l’islam”, *Le Figaro Magazine*, N°22754 6 October 2017.

¹⁷⁹ *Charlie Hebdo*, N°1321, 15 November 2017. <https://charliehebdo.fr/2017/11/politique/jamais/>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

was born in 1975 in Aix-en-Provence. She attended a Catholic school in her birthplace, then a *collège laïque* in Paris after her parents' divorce. She graduated in History, and obtained a master's degree in Political Communication at *Sorbonne* University. She began a career as a journalist and writer, defining herself as feminist and lesbian, chiefly committed to defending minorities against *intégrismes religieux*. At first, she focused on Right-wing Christian anti-abortion and homophobic movements. Then, after being appalled by the 2001 Durban World Conference against Racism, which she attended, and by the 9/11 attacks in the following days, she turned against Islamic fundamentalism as a mortal foe of women's rights and *laïcité*¹⁸⁰. She was an outspoken contender in the successive rows on the "headscarf" in 2004 and the "*burqa*" in 2010, and throughout the permanent debate upon the threatening Islamic communitarianism. Among other books she published *Frère Tariq. Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan* (2004) through which she meant to disclose Tariq Ramadan's pernicious "doublespeak". From then on she became Ramadan's nemesis in the French media and, as a columnist for *Le Monde*, *Marianne*, *France Culture* and *Charlie-Hebdo* during several years, one of the most vocal and controversial among the so-called *républicains laïques*. As such she routinely condemned the use of the word "Islamophobia" and campaigned relentlessly against the "*idiots utiles de l'islamisme*", namely those in the Left and far-Left that she accused of betraying *laïcité* by being complacent with Islamism. I selected 5 discourses from 2010 to 2018, two columns published in *Le Monde* on the full veil (2010) and on the 2012 terrorist attacks in Nice (2012), one interview for the promotion of her book *Eulogy of Blasphemy* (2015), and two columns published in *Marianne* on French *laïcité* (2017) and immigration (2018). Elisabeth Badinter (née Bleustein-Blanchet) was born in 1944 in Boulogne-Billancourt. Her mother, Sophie Vaillant, a Roman Catholic converted to Judaism following her marriage, was a granddaughter of famous Left-wing politician, *Communard* and socialist MP Edouard Vaillant. Her father was Maurice Bleustein-Blanchet, born to a Russian Jewish immigrant family, founder of *Publicis*, a major global advertising and communication company. She married Robert Badinter, Minister of Justice under President Mitterrand, and an icon in French politics since he inspired and launched the abolition of the death penalty in 1981. She attended the exclusive Parisian private school *Ecole alsacienne* before graduating in Philosophy at *Sorbonne* University and qualifying as teacher by passing the *Agrégation de Philosophie* examination. She began to teach Philosophy at *lycées*, then at *Ecole Polytechnique* for more than two decades. At her father's death she became a major shareholder and Chairman of the Board of *Publicis*. She published history books on French XVIIIth century Enlightenment and cultural critic essays about equality and gender relations that put her at odds with

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https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/05/11/caroline-fourest-missionnaire-de-la-laicite_770627_3224.html#vQiMrV413GWkF8eY.99

most French contemporary feminists. She claimed to draw on the Universalist legacy of the *Lumières* to fight differentialism in current cultural disputes and labelled her own stance as “contrarian feminist”¹⁸¹. Since the first episode in the endless controversy about Islamic symbols — the 1989 headscarf affair in secondary schools — she has been a leading figure in the defence of *laïcité* against Islamist threats. She strongly supported and provided legal assistance to the *crèche Baby loup*, a day nursery in suburban Paris, when its headmistress dismissed a Muslim employee who refused to remove her *hijab* when at work. She campaigned in favour of the 2004 “headscarf ban” and the 2010 “*burqa* ban”, and loudly protested against the selling of Islamic modest fashion clothing in French stores. She once asserted that Marine Le Pen was the last politician to truly defend *laïcité*¹⁸², and urged people “not to fear being called an Islamophobic”, as Islamophobia is “a weapon against *laïcité*”¹⁸³. I selected 5 discourses between 2011 and 2018, one column on the veil affair in the crib of Baby-Loup (2011), and four interviews on French *laïcité* (2013), the Charlie Hebdo shooting (2015), Islamic fashion (2016), and the veil (2018). Finally, Rokhaya Diallo was born in 1978 in Paris, from working-class parents of West-African origin. Her father was a mechanic from Senegal and her mother a sewing teacher from Gambia. She attended *laïques* schools in a popular suburb of Paris and graduated in International and European Law at the Parisian University *Assas* before completing a master’s degree in Broadcast Marketing at a Business School. After working some time for local administrations as well as large private companies, she soon became a renowned journalist, writer, documentalist and columnist contributing to French and global media, while emerging also as a leading activist against racism and Islamophobia. She co-founded *The Indivisibles*, an organisation aiming to fight ethnical discriminations and “divisions” on the basis of the French Constitutional principle, which defines the Republic as “indivisible”. The organisation launched the notorious “*Y a Bon Awards*”, a media event intended to mockingly reward the most notable racist interventions of the year in public debate. She distanced herself from an unconditional support to *Charlie Hebdo* when its premises were first attacked in 2011, and that previous lack of support was harshly reminded and reproached to her when the *Charlie* journalists were actually murdered in 2015. She was appointed to a government advisory board on digital medias but had to resign after a few days under pressure of Right-Wing MPs¹⁸⁴. She was denounced, among other “agents of influence for Islam”, as belonging to a so-called

¹⁸¹ <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/25/against-nature>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁸² https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/09/30/selon-elisabeth-badinter-marine-le-pen-est-desormais-seule-a-defendre-la-laicite_1580470_823448.html. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁸³ <https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-invite/l-invite-06-janvier-2016>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

<https://www.marianne.net/societe/elisabeth-badinter-il-ne-faut-pas-avoir-peur-de-se-faire-traiter-dislamophobe>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

¹⁸⁴ <https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/141217/le-gouvernement-impose-au-cnum-l-exclusion-de-rokhaya-diallo>. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

“*Islamosphère*”, by the right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro Magazine*¹⁸⁵. I selected 6 columns between 2013 and 2018, three published in the *Huffington Post*, among which two on immigration (2013, 2015(5)), and one on the November 2015 Paris attacks (2015(1)), two published in *The Guardian* on systemic racism (2017) and French obsession with the hijab (2018(2)), and one published in *Slate* on the veil (2018(1)).

Section 2. Narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in French public discourses: settings, characterizations, and plots

A first glance at the 50 most frequent words in the French corpus offers an interesting look at the material (table 1). As for the German and British cases, most of these words correspond to the political nature of the sources, hence the high frequency of the terms “people”, “countr(ies)”, “France/French”, “government”, “Europe”, or “political”. However, while all of the three corpuses have in common “security”, “terror” and “religion”, words consistent with the research question differ from a case to another. Words most frequent in the German panel such as “Islam”, “refugees”, “integration”, or “immigration” are absent from the French cluster. Yet, as was the case for the British case, that does not mean that sources are inconsistent with the research question. Rather, it suggests that the interlinking of Islam, security, and identity, in public discourses is not expressed the same way. For example, frequent words such as “*laïcité*”, “freedom”, “women”, or “values”, are linked to the question of Islam, and imply *a priori* an explicit focus on identity in the French corpus. That being said, a quantitative look at the French corpus shows almost the same distribution of the three narrative meta-categories as the German and the British cases, that is a high amount of plot narratives, followed by characterization and setting narratives (fig. 1). The following section will successively account for the *settings* (2.1), *characterizations* (2.2), and *plots* (2.3) of the French discourses under study.

¹⁸⁵ “L’islamosphère : enquête sur les agents d’influence de l’islam”, *Le Figaro Magazine*, N°22754 6 October 2017.

Figure 1. Distribution of narratives in the French corpus




Table 1. 50 most frequent words in the German corpus

Words	Frequency	Words	Frequency
1. We	1,13%	26. Minister	0,08%
2. France	0,44%	27. People	0,06%
3. French	0,3%	28. Place	0,06%
4. Country	0,26%	29. National	0,06%
5. Republic	0,23%	30. Think	0,06%
6. Right/good	0,22%	31. Europe	0,06%
7. Say	0,19%	32. War	0,06%
8. Against	0,18%	33. Terror	0,06%
9. Political	0,17%	34. Together	0,06%
10. World	0,13%	35. Government	0,06%
11. Laïcité	0,12%	36. Democracy	0,06%
12. Left	0,12%	37. Nation	0,06%
13. President	0,11%	38. Sense	0,05%
14. Today	0,10%	39. Project	0,05%
15. Freedom	0,10%	40. François	0,05%
16. Time	0,10%	41. Debate	0,05%
17. Law	0,10%	42. Rights	0,05%
18. Work	0,09%	43. Children	0,05%
19. Will	0,09%	44. Better	0,05%
20. Right	0,08%	45. Security	0,05%
21. Women	0,08%	46. Reason	0,05%
22. Power	0,08%	47. School	0,05%
23. Question	0,08%	48. Needs	0,05%
24. Society	0,08%	49. Strength	0,05%
25. Values	0,08%	50. Religion	0,05%

2.1. Setting the scenes

A first look at the most frequent setting codes present in the French corpus (table 2) shows that “Islam” reaches the 5th rank and “immigration” the 13th, although none of the two words appeared among the 50 most frequent words. Regarding spatial-temporal horizon of experience, the *MENA* region gathers the highest


number of codes while Europe is far behind. Setting references to French *greatness* (“grandeur”), French *Lumières* and French *proud past* reach a high amount of coding ($n > 20$) compared to *Dark history* or the *future* ($n < 15$). Contrary to the German and British panels, the French corpus includes narratives of *civilization* ($n = 18$) and *laïcité* ($n = 14$). Concerning rhetorical tones, contrary to the two other European corpuses, the French panel has an over-representation of *alarmist* tone ($n = 64$), followed by *binary*, *emotional*, *optimistic*, *self-promoting* ($60 > n > 50$), and *war-like* ($n > 30$), and a relatively poor number of *empathetic* narratives ($n < 20$).

Whatever frequent these discursive items are quantitatively, the qualitative analysis shows that they are not consensual throughout the French narrators under study (fig. 2). Except for *emotional* rhetoric and the topic of *terror*, standing at the centre of the graph, setting codes discriminate between the different parts of the graph of figure 2. Rhetorically, axis 1 contrasts an *alarmist* image of the world on the right-hand side of the plane with a more *peaceful* one on its left-hand side. Besides, the tone is generally *empathetic*, *dialectical*, and *didactic* on the upper left-hand side and more *offensive* and *war-like* on the right-hand side. The lower part of the graph is more *ironical* and *pessimistic*. Regarding temporal horizons, the upper left-hand side of the graph seems turned toward the *future* while mobilising *dark history*, while the upper-right hand side of the graph is turned toward the past, primarily referring to French historical *greatness*. The lower side of the graph seems more set in contemporary settings. Spatially speaking, the upper right-hand side seems more civilizational grounded into the *Judeo-Christian* civilization, tackling conservative topics of hard work and *family*, while the lower part of the graph sets their story in interaction with the *MENA* region, tackling issues of *Islam*, *immigration* and *secularism*, and the upper left-hand side sets their story in interaction with *Africa*, tackling issues of *foreign policy*.

Hence, one can identify four ideal types of setting narratives: (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph, where close to 32% of French narrators, including chairman of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* Jean-Louis Bianco, former Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon, former President François Hollande, Socialist Mayor of Lille Martine Aubry, President Emmanuel Macron, journalists Edwy Plenel and Rokhaya Diallo, corresponds to a *Rousseauist* setting, characterized by pacifist and understanding tones and strong belief in *vivre-ensemble*; (b) the lower part of the graph, where almost 41% of French narrators stand, including former Premier Manuel Valls, secularist and feminist essayist Caroline Fourest, feminist philosopher Elisabeth Badinter, philosopher and essayist Pascal Bruckner, caricaturist Riss, and journalist Laurent Joffrin stand, as well as former *LR* leader Laurent Wauquiez, *LR* former Minister of Justice Rachida Dati and publicist Yves Thérard, corresponds to a *Renanist* setting, playing an alarming and ironical fight between the French Republic and Islam; (c) the upper right-hand side of the plane, where nearly 18% of French narrators stand, including former President Nicolas

Sarkozy, former *LR* candidate François Fillon, *RN* leader Marine Le Pen and leader of *Debout la France* Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, corresponds to a *Gaullist* setting, referring the greatness of France in a binary and insecure world.

Figure 2. Repartition of setting narratives in French public discourse 2009–2019



2.1.1. The Rousseauist setting

Setting of cluster (a) resembles the German *Kantian* and British *Lockean* settings. However, I coined it the *Rousseauist* setting in reference to Genevian philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) who particularly influenced the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution. He is mostly known for his theory of the social contract, direct democracy, and his focus on education as foundation to citizenship. In that case, it is expressed in topics like *school* (Aubry, 2011; Bianco, 2018 ; Hamon, 2014 ; Hollande, 2015(1) ; Macron, 2018(1)), or that of the French *Lumières* (Aubry, 2009, 2015(1); Diallo, 2015(1) and (2); Dufлот, 2016(1); Macron, 2017(1); Plenel, 2009), mobilised to question and remind French humanism vis-à-vis refugees or religious freedom. This goes hand in hand with generally *empathetic* and *pacifist* rhetoric, advocating for the understanding of causes of terrorism (Bianco, 2015; Hollande, 2014), interfaith dialogue

and religious freedom (Bianco, 2016(1), 2018), social justice (Bianco, 2017), or hosting refugees (Diallo, 2015(2)). In sum, the *Rousseauist* setting is expressed in the upholding of the “*vivre-ensemble*”, a French political neologism expressing the ideal of a harmonious cohabitation of all individuals, whatever their political leanings, origins, or religions.

Regarding their temporal horizon of experience, most narrators set their story into contemporary times and are turned toward the *future of youth generations*. President Emmanuel Macron presented himself as candidate who would “bring France into the 21st century” (Macron, 2016). Similarly, former Socialist candidate for the 2017 Presidential elections and present leader of *Génération*, Benoît Hamon, positioned himself as “President for preparing the future” (Hamon, 2017(2)). Green candidate Cécile Duflot also campaigned for “reclaiming the future” (Duflot, 2016(2)). Besides, when mobilizing history, they often refer to dark memories such as French participation to *slavery* (Aubry, 2009; Hamon, 2014, 2017(2)), French *colonisation* (Aubry, 2009; Hamon, 2017(2); Plenel, 2011), German *occupation* and French *collaboration* to the Holocaust during the WWII (Aubry, 2009; Hollande, 2012(2); Duflot, 2016(1); Plenel, 2009, 2013). The mobilization of French dark past is used to foster self-criticism regarding the handling of French Muslims or refugees, to warn against authoritarian drifts of the State and warns against a France “withdrawn into an illusory past” (Macron, 2017(1)), or in a “pathological regression” (Plenel, 2011). However, the mobilization of French dark past as scaremonger does not prevent some narrators from mobilizing at the same time French proud past and particularly the French Revolution or the French Resistance to German occupation during WWII (Hamon, 2017(2), Plenel, 2011). A particularity to the French panel lies in the cult of great men expressed in the systematic references to French thinkers or famous Republicanists considered as heroes and holders of French historical greatness: Léon Blum (Hamon, 2017(2)), Jean Jaurès (Macron, 2018(1)), Léon Gambetta (Duflot, 2014), Jules Ferry (Hollande, 2015(1)), Jean-Paul Sartre (Plenel, 2009) or Emile Zola (Hamon, 2017(2); Plenel, 2013). Finally, regarding their spatial horizon, narrators of cluster (a) set their story within an integrated Europe, although punctually referring to French interactions with French former colonial Empire such as North Africa (Duflot, 2016(1); Hamon, 2015, 2017(1) and (2), Plenel, 2011, 2013), Sub-Saharan Africa (Aubry, 2011; Hollande, 2016; Diallo, 2015(2)) and the Near East (Hamon, 2017(1) and (2); Hollande, 2016).

2.1.2. The Renanist setting

I coined the cluster (b) standing in the lower side of the graph, the *Renanist* setting in reference to the French Orientalist Ernest Renan (1823-1892). Although he is best known for works on the origins of early

Christianity and his political theories regarding nationalism, I refer to what historian Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison called “*renanisme*” in reference to Renan’s theses on the inferiority, harmfulness and dangerousness of Islam developed during the Third Republic colonialist expansion at the end of the 19th century (Le Cour Grandmaison, 2019). According to him, Renan’s thesis lastingly affected the social sciences, and the scholarly hostility was coupled with the dissemination among the public of a negative vision of Islam, a religion presented as hostile to the free exercise of reason and the progress of science (see chapter 3, section 1.3.). *Renanism* could be interpreted as a specific French version of the clash of civilization, prefiguring Samuel Huntington’s theory (Lorcerie, 2005/6: 509).

In concrete, such setting is structured around *alarmist*, *reproving* and *war-like* rhetoric vis-à-vis topics such as *immigration* (Bruckner, 2014; Valls, 2013, 2017(2); Wauquiez, 2015(1)), *Islam* (Fourest, 2017; Joffrin, 2009; Valls, 2015(1) and (2), 2016, 2017(2); Thérard, 2012, 2017) and French *secularism* (Bruckner, 2010; Valls, 2013, 2015(2), 2016, 2017(1) and (2); Thrard, 2009; Riss, 2019(1)). More particularly, narrators standing their tackle *Islam* – be it as religion, as ideology, or again Islamic terrorism or migration from Muslim countries, as threats to French *laïcité* and the French Republic. For instance, publicists Laurent Joffrin and Yves Thérard, former Minister of Justice Rachida Dati, and former *LR* leader Laurent Wauquiez particularly used alarmist and *war-like* tones to tackle the threats of Islamic terrorism (Dati, 2015(2); Joffrin, 2014; Thérard, 2015; Wauquiez, 2015(1) and (3)) as instanced in Dati’s 2015 declaration on the November 2015 Paris attacks:

We are facing a new form of war, which is this barbarism, which is this terrorism. No, these terrorists do not carry out indiscriminate attacks. They are targeted attacks. They target everybody. They want to destabilize, they want to terrorize, they want to destroy our society and our values (Dati, 2015(2)).

For their part, philosophers Elisabeth Badinter and Pascal Bruckner, publicist Caroline Fourest and former Socialist Premier Manuel Valls are particularly alarming and pessimistic regarding the imminent threat of Islamism (Badinter, 2011; 2015(1), 2016; 2018; Bruckner, 2015, 2019; Fourest, 2015, 2017; Valls, 2013, 2015(2); Riss, 2019(2)) as instanced by Vall’s call for the “urgent need to reconnect with the sense of *laïcité* [French secularism]” as “[French] republican model, based on liberty, equality, fraternity, and obviously secularism, was precisely targeted” (Valls, 2015(2)). Finally, publicist Yves Thérard is particularly alarming and war-like regarding the imminent threat of mass migration coming from Muslim countries:

With all due respect, all the figures show that at the rate at which people are entering the country - the number of asylum applications alone has doubled in four years – France will soon be overtaken (Thérard, 2019).

This goes hands in hands with a *pessimistic* vision of the capacity of newcomers or Muslims to “assimilate” to the French Republic, as instanced in Badinter’s fatalism regarding the surrender of reason in the face of (Islamic) fanaticism:

The France of the Enlightenment is therefore the very enemy of the fanatics. I'm afraid that reason can no longer do much against fanaticism. It does not reach the fanatic's intellect. If in certain schools one can no longer question beliefs and prejudices, then the fight is lost. (...) Today, the credo has replaced the cogito. (...) The immense world of beliefs can impose itself on reason. We step back, we step back. Reason is today, in many places, standing knockout (Badinter, 2015).

Regarding their horizon of experience, their alarming tones go hands in hands with an exclusively contemporary focus, with no reference to the future and rare references to the past (Badinter, 2018; Bruckner, 2014; Joffrin, 2009, 2018). However, regarding their spatial horizons, most narrators set their framing of Islam, immigration and secularism, into a Mediterranean horizon, referring abundantly to the peril of Islamism steaming from the Algerian 1990's civil war (Badinter, 2016), the Arab Spring (Badinter, 2018; Joffrin, 2011; Thérard, 2012; Valls, 2013; 2019), the collapse of the Middle East (Dati, 2015(2); Joffrin, 2014), or again the importation of the Israel-Palestine conflict in France (Bruckner, 2014; Fourest, 2012).

2.1.3. The Gaullist setting

I coined the cluster (c) standing in the upper right hand side of the graph, the *Gaullist* setting in reference to French General and former President Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) and its legacy known in France as “Gaullism”. This specially refers to the defence of a strong state, French sovereignty and the pursuit of a policy of *grandeur* steaming from the perception of French exceptionalism. The Gaullist setting is halfway between German Westphalian and the British hero-protector setting. Narrators share with the German setting the attachment to the National state sovereignty in an international self-help system and with the British setting their use of French past as trigger of national pride. This is to note that as for the German Westphalian setting, the Gaullist setting is an ideal-typical designation, hence discourses of *LFI* leader Mélenchon, *RN* leader Marine Le Pen, sovereigntist leader Dupont-Aignan as well as *LR* leaders Sarkozy and Fillon by no means share the same narratives. As a matter of fact, Mélenchon stands closer to the upper left-hand side of the graph, sharing narratives with cluster (a). They do share *binary* tones however the content of these dichotomies might vary from a narrator to another as we shall see further on (see section 2.3.). They all divide between the good *People* and a bad *Establishment*, be them financial capitalism (Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019; Le Pen, 2012, 2018; Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017, 2019) Sarkozy, 2009(1)), the technocratic EU (Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1), 2018, 2019; Mélenchon, 2012; 2017, 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017; Sarkozy, 2015(2)) or “*mondialistes*”, ie. globalist ideologues (Fillon, 2009; Le Pen, 2012, 2016(2), 2017, 2018, 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2019). Besides, they also share their temporal horizon of experience with the mobilisation of French proud history and French historical “*grandeur*” to trigger national pride. Unsurprisingly, except for Mélenchon, all narrators refer to the General de Gaulle. Nicolas Sarkozy refers to General de Gaulle as saviour

of the French Republic in 1958 and 1962 (Sarkozy, 2015(1)) and to his political realism (Sarkozy, 2015(2)). François Fillon défends de Gaulle's "*certaine idée* of France", that is a France of "exceptional history [and] brilliant culture, whose international influence must be firmly defended" (Fillon, 2009; 2017). Dupont-Aignan plebiscites what he calls "l'Europe du General de Gaulle" (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017). Interestingly, even Marine Le Pen cites abundantly Charles de Gaulle's policy of grandeur (Le Pen, 2017, 2019). Such narrative move is consistent with the *RN*'s wish to come in line with the French Gaullist tradition to integrate the so-called Republican Front always mobilised against the peril of the Far-Right she embodies. However, Marine Le Pen is the only one to refer also positively to French colonial past (Le Pen, 2016(2)). Mélenchon, for his part, refers exclusively to French revolutionary past, be it the French Revolution (Mélenchon, 2012, 2016(2)) or the French Commune (Mélenchon, 2017), citing Victor Hugo's poem on the French Revolution:

Today, for the whole world, France is called a revolution. And from now on, this word - revolution - will be the word of civilization until it is replaced by the word 'harmony' (Mélenchon, 2017)¹⁸⁶.

Finally, although they all set their story into a *civilizational* spatial horizon, Mélenchon refers to the "human civilization" (Mélenchon, 2017, 2019), while, on the contrary, Le Pen, Dupont-Aignan, Fillon and Sarkozy refer to the "French civilization" (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2016, 2019; Fillon, 2010, 2016(1); Le Pen, 2016(2), 2017, 2018; Sarkozy, 2015(1) and (2)). Finally, Marine Le Pen and Nicolas Sarkozy include "French civilization" within a broader Judeo-Christian civilization (Le Pen, 2019; Sarkozy, 2009(2), 2015(1)).

Summary

As exposed in this section, most French narrators use emotional tones and tackle the topic of terrorism, as enhanced by both quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis, and consistently with the research question. However, the MCA exhumed three main ideal types of settings, namely the *Rousseauist*, the *Renanist*, and the *Gaullist*, coined in reference to French historical figures. Noteworthy, most French narrators tend to set their stories in a historical horizon of experience, however for a different purpose. While in the *Rousseauist* setting, narrators tend to mobilize French dark past such as slavery, colonisation, and collaboration, to foster self-criticism, in the *Gaullist* setting tend to mobilize French historical greatness to foster patriotism. Finally, in the *Renanist* setting, narrators tend to step aside with a rather contemporary horizon of experience.

¹⁸⁶ Cited in Mélenchon's discourse in France : "Aujourd'hui, pour toute la Terre, la France s'appelle révolution. Et, désormais, ce mot – révolution – sera celui de la civilisation jusqu'à ce qu'il soit remplacé par le mot 'harmonie'" (Mélenchon, 2017).

Table 2. Occurrences of setting narratives

Setting codes	Occurrences	Rhetoric codes	Occurrences
Greatness	28	Alarmist	64
MENA	26	Binary	60
School	22	Emotional	54
<i>Lumières</i>	22	Promotional	53
Islam	21	War-like	36
Ecology	20	Dialectical	28
Proud Past	20	Reproving	26
Work	20	Empathetic	17
Civilization	18	Optimistic	16
Dark History	15	Didactical	14
<i>Laïcité</i>	14	Defensive	11
Terror	14	Pacifist	7
Immigration	11	Ironical	5
Youth	10	Pessimistic	3
Europe	9		
Family	8		
Future	7		
Foreign Policy	6		
Identity	6		
Africa	4		
Judeo-Christian tradition	4		

2.2. Characterizations

A first quantitative look at the characterization narratives illustrated in table 3 shows that *French civilization*, *Republican*, *universalist*, *laïque*, or *intellectual* are specific to the French corpus. However, *democrat*, *victim*, *right*, *hero*, *progressive*, *rational*, and *feminist* ($n > 20$) are common to the other European corpuses. Regarding Friends and allies, except for the *people*, which gather the highest frequency in the three European narratives, and international allies, friends and allies vary from one context to another. Here, the *People*, *Germany*, *North Africa*, *Islam des Lumières*, the *Kurds*, the *EU*, and *Turkey* gather the highest frequencies ($n > 10$). Further, out-group narratives show a rather low polarisation between *the Left* and *the Right*, reaching only 9th and 10th ranks of most frequent codes respectively. However, the French corpus is

characterised by a strong opposition to *the government* and *fanatics* (140<n<90) followed by the *FN* (former *Front National*, now *Rassemblement national*) (n=75), *finance*, and *Islamists* (80>n>60). Most oppositional narratives, such as the opposition to the *EU*, the *Far Right*, the *government*, *terrorists*, or international actors are common with the German and the British corpuses. However, oppositions to so-called “*islamo-gauchistes*”, the *Observatoire de la Laïcité*, or the *CCIF*¹⁸⁷ are specific to the French context.

Qualitatively, the closest variables to the origins of the axes are *republican*, *democrat*, and *European*, meaning that French narrators do not distinguish from one another through these variables. To be heard on the French public scene, a public actor has to define himself as *republican*, *democrat*, and *European*. However, it is to note that self-definition as “European” does not mean self-identification to the EU, which ranks last in the in-group codes. Hence, except for these, the above mentioned narratives discriminate between the different parts of the graph (fig. 3): (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph corresponds to a social-democrat self opposed to the reactionary other; (b) the lower side of the graph opposes the same other, embodied in *Islamists* and the so-called *islamo-gauchistes*, however from a universalist and secularist Left perspective on the lower-left hand side, and from a conservative self on the lower-right hand side; (c) the upper right-hand side of the graph corresponds to a *patriot* self opposed to a *globalist* other.

2.2.1. Social democrats vs Reactionaries

Cluster (a) resembles the British *Cosmopolitan* characterization, although no French narrator explicitly defines themselves as multiculturalists. Instead, narrators standing there define themselves as social *democrats* (Aubry, 2011, 2015(2); Bianco, 2016(2), 2018; Diallo, 2015(2), 2018(1); Duflot, 2014, 2016(1); Hamon, 2012, 2017(1) and (2); Macron, 2016, 2017(2), 2018(1); Plenel, 2009, 2011, 2015), and share a strong belonging to the *EU* in opposition to nationalists and anti-liberals (Aubry, 2009, 2011; Bianco, 2018; Duflot, 2014, 2015(1); Hamon, 2017(1) and (2); Hollande, 2012(1), 2015(2) and (3); Macron, 2016, 2019).

Their out-group is composed of unanimous opposition to reactionaries obsessed with identity tensions (Bianco, 2018; Diallo, 2015(1), 2018(2); Hamon, 2017[2], Plenel, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2018). This out-group includes a classical opposition to the *Far Right* embodied in the RN of Marine Le Pen (Aubry, 2011, 2015(2); Diallo, 2015(1) and (2), 2017; Duflot, 2015(1); Hamon, 2014, 2015, 2017(1) and (2); Hollande, 2012(1)). Some narrators also designate “fundamentalist secularists”, ie. *laïcistes*, as reactionaries, obsessed with the visibility of Islam in the public space:

It was, moreover, by a president, Vincent AURIOL, known for his open-mindedness in the religious field at a


¹⁸⁷ Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France.

time when his party among others displayed what was then called a fighting secularism. But it still took almost three decades for this moment to take the form we know it. No longer that of a succession of protocolary hearings, but a common ceremony finally restoring the image of a diverse landscape of faith that the state considers without prejudice or bias (Macron, 2018(1)).

This blindness is evidenced by the misinterpretation usually committed by those on the left who confuse religion and fundamentalism, thus transforming a tolerant and pluralist secularism into a warlike and unambiguous secularism (Plenel, 2013).

It all started on 12 May when the political scientist Laurent Bouvet, known for his activism and sometimes referred to as a “gladiator of secularism”, published on his Facebook page an image taken from a televised interview with the elected president of the Sorbonne branch of the national student union (Unef), Maryam Pougetoux. (...) So what did Pougetoux do wrong? She dared to wear a religious symbol while being a union leader. Bouvet asserted that he was simply observing an inconsistency: “How is it possible simultaneously to defend progressive/feminist principles (contraception, abortion, marriage for everyone ...) and ostentatiously display religious belief?” (Diallo, 2018(2)).

Figure 3. Repartition of characterization narratives in French public discourse 2009–2019



2.2.2. Laïques vs Islamosphère

The cluster (b) resembles the German characterization of “Islam-critics”, as it shares a common opposition to political Islam, targeted sometimes as “Islamists”, sometimes as “Islamic totalitarianism”, considered the mortal enemy of the French Republic (Badinter, 2016; Bruckner, 2014, 2015, 2019; Dati,

2015(1); Fourest, 2015, 2017; Joffrin, 2016; Riss, 2015, 2019(1); Thérard, 2012; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2), 2016, 2017(1) and (2); Wauquiez, 2017(1)) as instanced in former Minister of Interior Manuel Valls's designation of "Islamic fascism":

Yes, there is Islamic fascism on the rise just about everywhere - be careful of the words we use, of course, but this obscurantism, which sometimes bears the name of a number of Muslim Brotherhoods, or of Salafism, must obviously be condemned, because here we are once again denying the rule of law, this democracy for which the peoples of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt have fought. There have been deaths, there have been people who very courageously fought for these values (Valls, 2013).

Besides, narrators target what they consider to be Islamist's accomplices, which are called "*islamo-gauchistes*" (Islamist-leftists), the "*islamosphère*" (Bruckner, 2017), the "communitarian Left" (Fourest, 2017, 2018), or the "colonial lobby" (Bruckner, 2014):

There is no longer a need for Islamists to silence the cartoonists; now there are feminists who have taken over to intimidate those who dare to laugh at Islam and religion. The watchdogs of *islamo-gauchistes* have been well trained. They no longer need their masters to bite the calves of their opponents and are doing very well on their own (Riss, 2019(2)).

Some out of anti-capitalism, others out of Third Worldism, others out of hatred of France, others out of aversion to Israel or the Jews: all these motivations structure what is called the Islamosphere (...). Finally, there are the real accomplices, the agents of influence at the orders of the Muslim Brothers or the Wahhabites, Edwy Plenel, capo dei capi, Vincent Geisser, François Burgat and others. The Islamosphere intends to control any word on the religion of the Prophet in order to exonerate him from his responsibilities in the jihadist crimes and to attribute them solely to the Western nations, guilty by essence (Bruckner, 2017).

Islamo-gauchistes are certainly a minority, but they are influential and widely relayed by the major left-wing media and journalists who, by the same token, cut themselves off from the real country (Badinter, 2016).

On the other hand, Joffrin, Wauquiez, Dati, and Thérard accuse the lenient and so-called "*bien-pensants*", too afraid of stigmatising French Muslims:

[Jean Birnbaum] had already succeeded in pinpointing the left's blindness to religious fact, winning public and critical acclaim. He did it again with the Religion of the Weak, where he explains how jihadism challenges the old beliefs of a certain left, and especially of a certain extreme left. The Religion of the Weak, he says, is no longer Islamism, which is wrongly presented as the doctrine of the victims of the West, but on the contrary, a certain lazy and self-righteous Western progressivism, which judges everything by the yardstick of anti-capitalism (Joffrin, 2018).

I have not heard any clear condemnation of communitarianism from him. I know too well how it works: one is complacent, hoping to get the voices of this or that, instead of saying things. This is the worst betrayal for an elected representative. (Wauquiez, 2017)

RD: Why? Because there have been evolutions, changes in behaviour, events...phenomena in French society, and some people have said "no, no, we mustn't talk about it", it's an excess of laxity or naivety in saying: "no, we risk stigmatising" (Dati, 2015(2)).

There are many people who terribly confuse the criticism of ideas with the criticism of identities and are therefore able to confuse the right to blasphemy with the right to racism, which is obviously completely different (Fourest, 2015).

However, narrators of cluster (b) defer according to their self-definition. On the one hand, Manuel Valls, Caroline Fourest, Elisabeth Badinter, Pascal Bruckner, Riss, and, to a lesser extent, Laurent Joffrin, refer to a

trend within the French Left self-defined as republican, mostly defined as *progressive* and *universalist*. On the other, Rachida Dati, Laurent Wauquiez and Yves Thérard represent a conservative and republican Right. Wauquiez defines himself as *Christian* – he is the only one in the French corpus to explicitly do so (Wauquiez, 2015(1)), while Rachida Dati and Yves Thérard defend French Christian roots (Dati, 2015(2); Thérard, 2012). Either as Left or Right-wing Republican, all narrators of cluster (b) define themselves to a various extent as *laïque* (Badinter, 2011; Bruckner, 2019; Dati, 2015(1); Fourest, 2015, 2017; Joffrin, 2011; Thérard, 2009; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2); Wauquiez, 2017).

2.2.3. Patriots vs. Globalism

The cluster (c) standing on the upper right-hand side of the graph shares a relatively homogenous self-definition as fervent *patriots*. Le Pen, Dupont-Aignan, Sarkozy and Fillon share a common reference to *French civilization* (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2016, 2019; Fillon, 2010, 2016(1); Le Pen, 2016(2), 2017, 2018; Sarkozy, 2015(1) and (2)), or the French nation (Dupont-Aignan, 2016; Fillon, 2009, 2010, 2016(1); Le Pen, 2018; Sarkozy, 2015(1)), or again French culture (Dupont-Aignan, 2016; Fillon, 2009; Le Pen, 2012). However, Mélenchon only refers to the “*patrie républicaine*” – the Republican Fatherland (Mélenchon, 2012, 2016(2), 2017, 2019) and never to the French nation, in order to differentiate himself from nationalist narratives.

However, they differ according to their political affiliation. On the one hand, Fillon is the only one to affiliate explicitly and consistently with the French right-wing (Fillon, 2015, 2016(1), 2017(1)). On the other, Le Pen, Sarkozy, and Dupont-Aignan never explicitly refer to the right of the spectrum. They all claim to transcend the right-left cleavage:

I’m doing this campaign, not to speak to the right, to the left, to the centre ... I want to speak to the people of France (...) (Sarkozy, 2012).

This France that wants to be free, that wants to stand up and be watched by the whole world, it is not the left, it is not the right, as General de Gaulle used to say, it is all of us! (Sarkozy, 2015(2))

This movement [the RN] embodies the movement of the French Nation. It transcends the right-left divide because its only driving force is the love of France, of all France, of those French people of all origins who carry it in their hearts (Le Pen, 2018).

Finally, the third reason is that many French people no longer recognize themselves in this right-left divide. The challenge is to unite our compatriots who love France, its values, its exceptions, and its terroirs. (Dupont-Aignan, 2019).

Finally, while Mélenchon affiliated to the Left in 2012, when he was candidate for the *Front de Gauche* for the presidential elections, he stopped ever since, referring only to “the people” sometimes in a mystical way:

Here we are, not for us, not for this moment, but by virtue, for you, our people! And for love, for you, our France! (Mélenchon, 2017)

Hence, narrators of cluster (c) share a populist drift, transcending the right-left divide to appeal to the French

people. Besides, they share a common opposition to the *government* starting from 2012 onward (Fillon, 2016(1) and (2), 2017(1); Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017, 2019; Le Pen, 2012; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017(2), 2017, 2018, 2019; Sarkozy, 2015(1)), and to “*globalists*”, that is supporters of borderlessness and the dissolution of national states:

Globalisation as a pretext. Europe as an instrument. Democracy as an alibi. What has not been said in its name? Destroying authority? It was democracy! No, it was a weakness. Erasing boundaries? That was democracy! No, it was a contradiction in terms. (...) Multiculturalism? That was democracy! No, it was the opposite of our national identity! (Sarkozy, 2015(2))

In globalisation, it is pluralism and the richness of homelands, languages and legacies that thwart the unilateralism of the most powerful States and the impoverishing standardisation that threatens our humanity (Fillon, 2009).

Because you are informed observers of political life, you will have noted that this national-globalist divide that we have theorised and that the French presidential election has crystallised is now gradually spreading throughout Europe (Le Pen, 2018).

We must listen to the criticism that the French people sometimes address to us. While France has always been a civilization of equality and benevolence, some have fallen into the trap of the globalists (Dupont-Aignan, 2019).

As Le Pen explains, “*mondialisme*” designates both a “savage economic system”, but also an “ideology of standardisation:

Globalism is not just a wild, outdated economic system. It is not just a technical phenomenon, an intensification of commercial and financial exchanges at the international level, which uses, pressurises and then throws out the employed to turn them into the unemployed or the working poor, considering labour as the only adjustment variable. No, globalism is also an ideology, which goes beyond simple globalisation, and which aims to standardise cultures, to encourage nomadism, the permanent movement of uprooted people from one continent to another, to make them interchangeable, in short, to make them anonymous (Le Pen, 2012).

Even Mélenchon opposes globalisation, although as the vector of exploitation, rather than on an identity level:

Overcoming exploitation means clearly fighting against the effects of globalisation! (Mélenchon, 2012).

Mélenchon, Dupont-Aignan, Le Pen and even Sarkozy share a strong opposition to the *EU* accused to be the instrument of that globalisation (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017; Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1), 2018, 2019; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019; Sarkozy, 2015(2)). Besides, in Dupont-Aignan’s, Mélenchon’s and Le Pen’s cases, it goes in pair with a designation of *finance* in general as the enemy (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017, 2019; Le Pen, 2012, 2018; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019). On the other hand, François Fillon does not share this common targeting of a European or financial Establishment, but only targets *Islamists*, be them “fundamentalists”, “fanatics”, or “Islamic totalitarianism” (Fillon, 2015, 2016(1) and 2016(2), 2017(1)).

Summary

As exposed in this section, the self/other nexus is not consensual in the French corpus under study. Same as the setting, the MCA exhumed three main ideal-types of characterization, namely the *social-democrat*, the *laïque*, and the *patriot*. As was the case in German and the British corpuses, characterization seems to

unravel narrative wars being fought in the French public field, opposing frontally cluster (a) to both clusters (b), deemed secular extremists (“*laïcistes*”) and cluster (c), deemed nationalists.

Table 3. Occurrences of characterisation narratives


In-group codes	Occurrences	Out-group codes	Occurrences
<i>SELF</i>			
Republican	112	The Government	140
French civilization	66	Fanatics	99
Leftist	60	The FN	75
Universalist	49	Finance	65
<i>Laïque</i>	37	Islamists	62
Patriot	37	The EU	56
Democrat	29	Terrorists	52
Victim	27	Daesh	48
Right	24	The Right	44
Hero	23	The Left	43
Progressive	23	Laicism	36
Rational	22	Islamic totalitarianism	34
Feminist	20	Globalism	28
The West	16	<i>Islamogauchistes</i>	24
European	12	The Establishment	16
Antiracist	10	The CCIF	15
Liberal	9	Conservatives	13
Atheist	6	The Enemy within	13
Humanist	6	Anti-liberalism	12
Christian	4	Secularist dictatorships	10
Conservative	4	Liberals	10
Green	4	Capitalism	8
Intellectual	4	Merkel	8
Migration background	4	Muslim Authorities	8
Moderate	4	New feminism	8
Muslim	4	Trump	8
The EU	4	Turkey	8
<i>FRIENDS & ALLIES</i>		<i>Observatoire de la laïcité</i>	
		7	
The People	76		6

Germany	22	Putin	6
North Africa	16	The US	6
<i>Islam des lumières</i>	14		
Kurds	14		
The EU	13		
Turkey	10		
Assad	8		
The CFCM	6		
Muslims	6		
The UN	6		
Britain	5		
Israel	4		
Russia	4		
The US	4		
Five star movement	2		
<i>Francophonie</i>	2		

2.3. The Plots

A first quantitative glance at the corpus illustrated in table 4 shows that numerous challenge codes such as *social insecurity*, *immigration*, *Islam*, *Islamophobia*, the *EMC* or *terrorism* are common to the three European corpuses, although they do not follow the same hierarchy of importance. However, *communitarianism* and *societal insecurity* reach respectively 2nd and 3rd in the French corpus, followed by *national insecurity*, the *veil*, and *immigration*, showing *a priori* a high securitization of *Islam*. Conversely, most frequent solution codes are specific to the French corpus, such as *Republican ideal*, the *national state*, *state authority*, and *legal secularism* (n>40). Other, such as *cooperation*, *more state*, *reform*, *national cohesion*, *counterterrorism*, or *intervention* are common to the other European panels. Interestingly, the highest plot narratives, such as *terror*, *national insecurity*, and the *Republican ideal* are also qualitatively consensual, as they stand at the centre of the graph (fig. 4). Except for these, plot narratives tend to discriminate between the three clusters as follow: (a) the upper left-hand side of the graph displays the *progressive struggle* revolving around social and environmental insecurities; (b) the lower side of the graph displays the *Islamic peril* resolving around societal insecurities; (c) the upper right-hand side displays the *National State struggle* resolving around economical and societal insecurities.

Figure 4. Repartition of plot narratives in French public discourse 2009–2019



2.3.1. The Progressive Struggle

Plots of cluster (c) resemble the German and British plots of *progressive struggle*, which displays challenges to deal with globalisation and social insecurities while resisting the temptation of political and identitarian closure and opposing the *civilizational clash* discourses:

No, France has not become that, it will never become that, it simply cannot be that country huddled up inside itself, afraid of the other as of the plague and looking at the world as a single threat (Hamon, 2017(2)).

The ideologues of the clash of civilizations, who essentialize identities, cultures, and religions, do not care about the uncertainties and precautions of a complex thinking of this multifaceted crisis, (...) (Plenel, 2013)

Emotion and sensitivity are even more exacerbated when society is going badly. In such a context, the religious question, sometimes assimilated to a question of identity, becomes even more important (Bianco, 2018).

There is growing open doubt about the compatibility between French culture and Islam. Even though Muslims belonging to the poorest fringes make up less than 10% of the population, there is a glimpse of an Islamic invasion that would metamorphose the nature of French identity. This is the theory of the “great replacement” widely relayed by extreme right-wing groups but also by opinion leaders to whom the media complacently provide loudspeakers. (...) Civilizational anxieties, identity obsessions, fantasies of purification of the “French strain” (Diallo, 2015(1)).

According to all narrators, such closure and retreat come from *social, economic, and environmental* insecurities, such as unemployment and poverty, or climate change, rather than essential incompatibilities and mutual

hostilities. While narrators fear securitarian reactions such as *state of emergency*, or *deprivation of citizenship*, they particularly warn against consequences of such crisis on democratic societies, and particularly xenophobic reactions. Interestingly, while they consensually use terms of *xenophobia*, *racism*, and *anti-Semitism*, they do not all use the term of *Islamophobia*. For instance, while President of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* Bianco and publicists Plenel and Diallo plead for the recognition and use of the term “Islamophobia”, but former President Hollande and present President Macron prefer to use the term “anti-Muslim acts” as less polemical and more consensual:

No xenophobic, anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim act should be tolerated, and if certain individuals engage in the glorification of terrorism in certain places, in associations, in de facto groups, the bill presented this morning to the Council of Ministers provides that they may be dissolved. They will be dissolved immediately (Holland, 2015(3)).

In this respect, I welcome the meticulous work done in liaison with the services of the Ministry of the Interior and the DILCRAH, by the CFCM, against all anti-Muslim acts, in particular by the Observatory it has set up for this purpose (Macron, 2017(3)).

In this context, one of our concerns will therefore be the obvious rise in Islamophobia in our country. When we advocate this or that measure, or possibly this or that law, we will have to ask ourselves whether it is stigmatising for some people, whether it contributes to calming or hardening relations between the French (Bianco, 2013).

Yesterday it was a story about the press, just as today the issue of Islamophobia is primarily the responsibility of the media, so many representations that build the stigmatisation of a population, men, women and children, on the pretext of their religious identity, are disseminated and trivialised in the form of evidence (Plenel, 2013).

I thought of the four million Muslims who, like me, would be summoned to answer for the acts of monsters but who would not, like me, have a microphone to answer on France's leading radio station. I could already see the end of the national consensus in the face of the pain caused by the murderous attacks. I could see the Islamophobic attacks, the attacks on mosques that would take place in the days to come (Diallo, 2015(1)).

Consequently, narrators tend to suggest classical solutions of the *Welfare state* to achieve social *justice*, such as redistribution and/or affirmative action. Besides, regarding consensual challenges linked such as the EMC, terrorism, or the Muslim question, they offer what they consider to be *moderate*, *pragmatic*, *legalist*, and *humanist* solutions. First, regarding the EMC, they plead for the hosting of refugees (Aubry, 2009, 2015(1), 2016; Diallo, 2015(2); Duflot, 2015(1); Hamon, 2017(2); Hollande, 2015(3); Macron, 2018(1), 2019; Plenel, 2018) and the acceptance of immigration as an enrichment rather than a burden, as well as a pro-active effort on integration, as instance in 2015 Aubry's plea:

Welcoming refugees should be a state duty. It is an international obligation, and, above all, it is a simple question of values, of what our continent is founded on. To show humanity, which is sorely lacking in this Europe that saw the birth of the Age of Enlightenment (Aubry, 2015(1)).

Second, regarding the threat of terrorism, they plead for *cooperation*, *diplomacy*, and *prevention*, and the understanding the social roots of terrorism to prevent radicalization. Finally, regarding the religious question, and particularly the Muslim question, they defend an attachment to *diversity* (Aubry, 2009, 2015(2); Diallo, 2013; Duflot, 2015(2); Hamon, 2014; Hollande, 2015(3); Macron, 2018(1); Plenel, 2009, 2013, 2015) and

religious freedom (Bianco, 2013, 2016(1), 2018; Diallo, 2018(1); Macron, 2017(3), 2018(1); Plenel, 2013), especially regarding the mobilisation of *laïcité* against Muslims:

Secularism is not the forgetting of beliefs or whatever conflict with religions; secularism is freedom of conscience, but it is also rules, which mean that religions have no place in schools. This does not prevent the secular teaching of religions (Hollande, 2015(1)).

We must always reaffirm that in our country there are no Muslims on one side and the French on the other. But there are only French people, from all walks of life, of all convictions, all citizens within a Republic whose secularism guarantees freedom and equality to everyone and offers fraternity as a common project (Macron, 2017(3)).

The debate today is no longer so much about the very principle of secularism. It is not even so much in the old struggle of 1905 between Aristide Briand style secularism and anti-religious secularism. It is today between a secularism that sticks to the historical and juridical reality, which is ours, and a more restrictive conception that would like to increase the field of neutrality (Bianco, 2018).

It should be remembered that the principle of secularism in no way prohibits the wearing of religious symbols, including in the public space. On the contrary, secularism protects freedom of conscience. Only the State and its representatives must be neutral (Diallo, 2018(1)).

2.3.2. The Islamic Peril

The cluster (b) standing in the lower side of the graph plots an insecure world, both military- and identity-wise, where French “republican values” such as *laïcité*, freedom of speech, or gender equality, as being threat by Islam(ism):

In this new context, when more than 80% of the French believe that secularism is in danger, there is, in my opinion, only one possible attitude: taking back in hand, affirming, applying, explaining, in short, teaching, again and again, what secularism is, what it allows (Valls, 2015(2)).

Panicking about the inexorable rise of political Islam, there is a great temptation for the authorities to turn to the 1905 law [of *laïcité*], presenting it as an obstacle that could prevent adequate measures from being taken, in the name of the separation between Church and State. It is easier to make those who defend secularity look outdated than to affront and lay low the Islamists. Because it will always be easier to do anything than to affront and lay low the Islamists (Riss, 2019(1))

Yes, there is a fundamentalist component in Islam that is constantly trying to assert itself a little more and that is at odds with some of our values. In particular the equality of men and women and secularism. Values on which, little by little, we have resigned. (...) The problem of secularism is Salafism and the wearing of the burqa (Wauquiez, 2017).

One need only think of the struggles of Tunisian women to know that women have an important role to play in all these debates. Tunisian women fought for their freedoms. They are on a path to liberation, whereas we in France are witnessing the opposite path of women's voluntary submission. We in France are generally in a process of withdrawal and separatism. Withdrawal into communities and religions and separation of the sexes (Badinter, 2015).

Narrators share an insecure vision of the world, threatened by Islam as ideology, aka *Islamism* or political Islam (Joffrin, 2018 ; Riss, 2017, 2018, 2019(1) ; Thréard, 2012, 2017, 2019 ; Valls, 2013, 2015(2) ; Wauquiez, 2018), Islam as culture, especially through phenomena of communitarianism and ghettoization (Badinter, 2015, 2016, 2018, Fourest, 2017, 2018 ; Dati, 2013, 2015(1); Thréard, 2017, 2019 ; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2), 2016, 2017(1) and (2) ; Wauquiez, 2015(1) and (2), 2017) but also by Islam as religion (Badinter, 2013,

2016 ; Bruckner, 2010, 2019 ; Dati, 2015(1) ; Joffrin, 2016 ; Riss, 2015, 2019(1) ; Thérard, 2012 ; Valls, 2015(2), 2016, 2017(2) ; Wauquiez, 2017), as instanced in the French controversies regarding the veil or the so-called *prières de rue* :

It was in my town of Evry, in 2002. It was unacceptable that in a supermarket, which is the only outlet where the inhabitants of a neighbourhood come to shop, one could only find halal' products (Valls, 2015(2)).

Street prayers, for example. We end up with a system in which moderate Muslims are left in the grip of fundamentalist Islam (Wauquiez, 2017).

Islam has become a subject of anguish (Dati, 2015(1)).

The little thugs of November 13 did the same. Even if we are surprised by their rapid conversion and zeal, it is still true that religion is the source of these horrors (Riss, 2015).

Narrators often conflates religion, ideology, and culture, as a single phenomenon, seeing the veil as sign of

Islamism per se:

No! we must support all those who are fighting to maintain its values and become aware, and I am obviously addressing our compatriots, of the damage (and the word is weak) of the despotism of this Islamism which today, through obscurantism, denies values and seeks to lock Tunisian women in particular in a veil (Valls, 2013).

We are still waiting for his great speech on secularism. He flees the subject, he who had explained in Lyon that there is no French culture. It is time to have the courage to put words to reality. The radicalization that must be fought is that of Islamism (Wauquiez, 2018).

Besides, they see the multicultural ideology, and the leftist "*bien-pensance*" and *laxism*, as corollary threats:

Is Republican France, secular, one and indivisible, renouncing its principles? Is its value base doomed to be swept away by the whirlwind of globalisation and multiculturalism? (Thérard, 2009).

In the name of the right to be different advocated by the left, we have closed our eyes, we did not want to see. We said, "It's better that they are in the faith than in the drug trade". We let self-proclaimed imams take over (Dati, 2015(1)).

I do not disagree under the guise of loosening the "noose" of universalism, differentialism is a deadly trap (Badinter, 2015(1)).

It is not the multiculturalist United Kingdom or Germany that will win against the Islamists, only France can stand up to them in Europe. We have no right to fail (Bruckner, 2019).

According to some of the narrators, the Islamic threat is far greater than that of the Far-Right:

Vincent Peillon, former Minister of Education] is convinced that the priority danger remains the extreme right and its racism. It has been a long time since he warned against Tariq Ramadan coming to the European Social Forum. Since his withdrawal from the national debate, precisely the two years in which Islamism has bruised France like never before, the former Minister of Education has been more worried about "slippages" in the name of secularism than about its retreat (Fourest, 2017).

To counter the threats of Islam(ism) narrators tend to mobilize an offensive *laïcité*, supposed to counter both national insecurities of terrorism and radicalization, and societal insecurities of obscurantism and communitarianism. Bruckner considers that the "French, scalded by centuries of clerical domination, want a discreet display of beliefs", discretion asked particularly to the Muslims (Bruckner, 2010). Wauquiez, for his part, explicitly calls for assimilation: "the return to the foundations of the republic. The republic is assimilation and not communitarianism" (Wauquiez, 2015(2)).

2.3.3. Struggle for the Nation State

Cluster (c) plots an insecure world, both economically- and identity-wise, as is shown by the perception of *globalisation*, *decline*, and *relativism* as major challenges. According to narrators standing on the upper right-hand side of the graph, *globalisation* causes both economical and identity insecurities, by destructing national borders and identities:

Globalisation makes identity problematic because everything in it contributes to undermining it, and at the same time it reinforces the need for it because the more open the world is, the more intense the circulation and intermingling of ideas, people, capital and goods, and the more we need anchoring and reference points, the more we need to feel that we are not alone in the world. This need to belong can be met by the tribe or the nation, by communitarianism or by the Republic (Sarkozy, 2009(2)).

This great debate will now, at last, take place. The French must seize this historic opportunity that is opening. For the great issue at stake in this election is unbridled globalisation, which is endangering our civilization. The French have a very simple choice: Either we continue along the path of total deregulation, without borders and without protection, with the following consequences: relocations, unfair international competition, mass immigration and the free movement of terrorists. This reign is that of king money (Le Pen, 2017).

You, who have understood that the world without borders is the world of barbarians, you, who have understood that the world of finance is a world hostile to the general interest, you, who know deep down inside yourself that the Fatherland is what brings people together across divisions and classes (...) (Dupont-Aignan, 2012).

During these years of preparing my candidacy, I travelled across the country to meet you and I saw men and women who did not accept being diluted in a meaningless globalisation (Fillon, 2017(1)).

Besides, those identity anxieties are comforted by moral or cultural relativism, often held by leftist and multiculturalists:

To those who took the floor to try to awaken consciences to the dangers of the intellectual, cultural, spiritual and moral disarmament to which this nihilism led, witchcraft lawsuits were brought. (...) On the white page, more Nations, more States, more frontiers, more identities, more attachments, more heritage. This claimed nothingness was preparing for disaster (Sarkozy, 2015(2)).

That is why in France, imitating other European countries, we wanted to defend cultural relativism and multiculturalism (Le Pen, 2012).

However, while Sarkozy, Le Pen, Dupont-Aignan, and Fillon focus on both economical and national identity threats caused by globalisation, Mélenchon focuses exclusively on economic and social threats caused by global deregulation and the retreat of the state:

This crazy organisation of the world has no objective reason to exist. For the objects that are produced elsewhere at low prices are not of a better technical level: workers do not know how to do more beautiful things than they can do here. So, the only difference is the exploitation of the workers. Overcoming exploitation means clearly waging war on the effects of globalisation! (Mélenchon, 2012)

Yet, all narrators, from the *LFI* to the *RN* fear for the perceived *decline* of France:

As you can see, the country's great challenges are not being met. Our country is seeing its jobs and talents disappear while welcoming populations that are no longer assimilating. The scientific revolution of the 21st century is left to American or Chinese multinationals and the great institutions that used to be the pride of our Republic: the high school and the public hospital are abandoned (Dupont-Aignan, 2019).

Lack of means is not the only aspect that reveals the collapse of the authority of the republican state. This is not the subject today, but the crisis of the State is such that I believe that we must not only think about its overhaul,

the overhaul of the State (...) (Mélenchon, 2016(2)).

Of all my competitors, I am the only one to say it like it is: our nation is declining (Fillon, 2016(1)).

The West blinded itself to its power when it was already retreating on the world stage without even realising it (Sarkozy, 2015(2)).

Paradoxically, while they all deplore and warn against the decline of French Nation State, they also deplore what they consider to be declinist speeches, that is discourses that focus on France's decline in the world:

A few years ago, it was fashionable in some circles to denigrate our country and mock its fundamental principles and symbols (Fillon, 2009).

But to do so, we must rediscover what made us strong and stop indulging in so-called decadence. France will still be great in the future, I am certain of it (Le Pen, 2016(2)).

But first, I would like to tell you the following: many people speak to you about France in a tone that I do not like... "declinist" is done with the word decline. They're there, it seems to please them: "France is lagging behind!", they come and say on the television sets, the drop of saliva on the edge of their lips, "she doesn't know, she can't! We have not done this, we have not done that, we're good for nothing!" How is it then that we are the 5th economic power in the world, if we are good for nothing? (Mélenchon, 2012).

But we are not a small country. It is an unbearable discourse (Dupont-Aignan, 2017).

To counter the threats of globalisation, narrators all call for the return of the state's authority:

The strong state will be the best protector of secularism. And this protector, we need him very quickly. My message takes on its full meaning when one carefully reads the words of the candidates of the UMP and the Centre. It is clear that they are all leaning towards Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, sometimes to the point of absurdity, such as the absurd idea of granting a holiday to Jews for Kippur and to Muslims for Eid-el-Kebir (Le Pen, 2012).

First, we must dare to say stop the "migratory and communitarian submergence" of the country. It is necessary to rebuild a regalian state that is finally capable of being respected (Dupont-Aignan, 2019).

So much so that we have put ourselves in a ridiculous situation.

where it was again shown that [state] authority was not. Nothing is worse than using authority to show that it is not (Mélenchon, 2016(2)).

The best service we can render to our country, but also to the world, is to embark resolutely on the road to recovery, to restore national cohesion and the authority of the state (Fillon, 2017(1)).

Without authority there is no rule of law worthy of the name. Without republican authority, there is only the law of the strongest, the law of the jungle, the law of the brute against the weak. The Republic is the authority at the service of the law (Sarkozy, 2015(1)).

Le Pen, Dupont-Aignan, Sarkozy and Fillon agree on the need for muscular solutions to counter terrorist threat or massive immigration, such as *border control*, *deprivation of nationality*, the *state of emergency* and *military interventions* in the MENA region (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2015, 2019; Fillon, 2015, 2016(2); Le Pen, 2015, 2019; Sarkozy, 2010, 2012(2), 2015(2)), as best summarized by Sarkozy's 2015 declaration after the Paris attacks:

I approve the state of emergency, I approve the forfeiture of nationality for dual nationals who betray France, I approve house arrest, I approve the exceptional powers given to the Government, the Prefects, the administrative authorities, the police, the gendarmerie, to flush out the assassins, those who manipulate them, those who arm them (Sarkozy, 2015(2)).

Yet, they differ regarding the relation to Europe. Fillon and Sarkozy advocate for the return of a strong state

within an intergovernmental Europe, while Le Pen and Dupont-Aignan call for a strong national *protectionism*, going as far as the withdrawal from the Eurozone:

In order to avoid perpetual indebtedness and the social devastation that will inevitably end in a financial cataclysm, we must prepare for the organised exit of the euro and the return to national currencies (Le Pen, 2012). A free France is a France without the euro. So, of course, European leaders are opposed to it today, but you will see that tomorrow, as with Schengen, as with the European preference, they will join us, and will later call for the euro to be abandoned. But it will be too late! (Dupont-Aignan, 2012)

(...) it will be in euro-franc. It will be a flexible currency, a common currency. We will have the advantages of the euro without the disadvantages, that is to say that when there is a crisis we will be able to avoid the suffering that we imposed on the Greeks (Dupont-Aignan, 2017).

Finally, Mélenchon steps aside as he never calls for muscular responses deemed nationalists, but pleads instead for a complete popular *revolution*:

We want to start in this country and on this continent what our comrades, women, and men, from South America did by starting citizen revolutions! They have reduced poverty; they have improved the education of the people; they have shared wealth (Mélenchon, 2012).

You must have this citizen revolution if you do not want to suffer an ethnic coup or a financial coup, or both! (Mélenchon, 2017)

Summary

This section has shown a lack of consensus regarding plot narratives. Cluster (a) plots the progressive struggle against the clash of civilizations; cluster (b) plots the secularist struggle against the Islamic threats; cluster (c) plots the national state's struggle in the face of globalisation.

Table 4. Occurrences of plot narratives

Challenges codes	Occurrences	Solutions codes	Occurrences
Terror	82	Republican ideal	86
Communitarianism	48	Nation State	59
Societal insecurity	44	State authority	55
National insecurity	36		
Veil	35	Democracy	31
Immigration	34	Cooperation	30
Economical insecurity	33	Education	30
Radicalization	30	Laïcité	27
Social insecurity	30	Humanitarian	26
Demonization	28	(Social) justice	25
Islam	28	EU	23
Softness	25	Create jobs	22
Globalisation	22	Intervention	20
EMC	20	National cohesion	19
Islamism	20	More state	19

<i>Laïcité</i> under threat	20	Embrace immigration	18
Racism	20	Police	18
Islamophobia	17	Diversity	17
Nationalism	17	Self-criticism	17
<i>Bien-pensance</i>	16	Environmental Policy	16
Veil obsession	15	Prison	16
Anti-Semitism	14	Control immigration	15
Decline	13	Assimilation	14
Environmental threat	13	Intelligence	14
Integration	13	Moderation	14
Sexism	13	Patriotism	14
Civilizational discourse	12	More work	14
Multiculturalism	12	Veil ban	13
Criminality	11	Border control	13
Ghettoization	11	Freedom of religion	13
Politics of fear	11	Pragmatism	13
Xenophobia	11	State of emergency	12
Migrant bashing	10	Freedom of speech	12
Obscurantism	10	State neutrality	12
Technological revolutions	10	Counterterrorism	11
Discrimination	9	Handle the deficit	11
Salafism	8	Revolution	11
Hand-outs	7	Protectionism	9
Crisis of democracy	7	Innovation	8
Islamization	7	Welfare state	8
Interventionism	7	Forfeiture of nationality	7
Cultural relativism	7	Deportation	7
Austerity	6	Institutionalize Islam	7
Proselytism	6	Diplomacy	6
Religions	6	Stronger economy	6
State of emergency	5	Religious neutrality	6
<i>Fracture coloniale</i>	5	Cut taxes	5
Assimilation	4	Integration	5
Grievance narratives	4	Frexit	4
Persecution of Christians	4	Peace	3
		Prevention	3

Section 3. Stories of (de)securitization and struggles within French republicanism in post-colonial France

Let us remember the German and British cases. In the former, two narrative wars were being fought around the pivotal topics of *immigration* and *Islam*: the first one opposed a top-down discourse of de-

securitization of immigration to provide cheap workers while displaying an empathetic national image, to a marginal discourse of securitization of immigration, claiming for the return to national preferences; the second polarized in the media setup between well-established Islam critics from feminist and conservative traditions, and anti-racists who defended multicultural recognition of the German self. In the latter, two pivotal (de)securitization discourses were identified: the first conflated the (de)securitization and (de)politicisation of *immigration* and *Islam* with that of continental Europe ; the second (de)securitization story took place within the PMs' cluster and displayed simultaneously a securitization of "Islamist ideology" and a de-securitization of Islam and British Muslims. In the French case, one can identify two stories of (de)securitization, the first one tackles globalization (3.1.), the second deals with Islam (3.2.).

3.1. The (de)securitization of globalisation

The first narrative war on globalization opposes the upper left-hand side of the graph, where former President François Hollande, former Minister of Education Benoît Hamon, Mayor of Lille Martine Aubry, former Leader of the Greens Cécile Duflot, President of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* Jean-Louis Bianco, and publicists Edwy Plenel and Rokhaya Diallo stand, to the upper right-hand side of the graph, where former President Nicolas Sarkozy, former PM François Fillon, Leader of the *Rassemblement National* Marine Le Pen, Leader of *Debout La France* Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, and Leader of *La France Insoumise*, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, stand.

In the securitizing story, narrators display the highest perception of economical and identity insecurities both linked to globalization and the dissolution of the nation-state. This story stages a binary confrontation between the French people and the Establishment, accused of promoting a globalist ideology, borderlessness, and vector of economical exploitation, as posing a direct and imminent threat to French National State:

Globalisation makes identity problematic because everything in it contributes to undermining it, and at the same time it reinforces the need for it because the more open the world is, the more intense the circulation and intermingling of ideas, people, capital and goods, and the more we need anchoring and reference points, the more we need to feel that we are not alone in the world. This need to belong can be met by the tribe or the nation, by communitarianism or by the Republic (Sarkozy, 2009(2)).

This great debate will now, at last, take place. The French must seize this historic opportunity that is opening. For the great issue at stake in this election is unbridled globalisation, which is endangering our civilization. The French have a very simple choice: Either we continue along the path of total deregulation, without borders and without protection, with the following consequences: relocations, unfair international competition, mass immigration and the free movement of terrorists. This reign is that of king money (Le Pen, 2017).

You, who have understood that the world without borders is the world of barbarians, you, who have understood that the world of finance is a world hostile to the general interest, you, who know deep down inside yourself that the Fatherland is what brings people together across divisions and classes (...) (Dupont-Aignan, 2012).

During these years of preparing my candidacy, I travelled across the country to meet you and I saw men and women who did not accept being diluted in a meaningless globalisation (Fillon, 2017(1)).

This crazy organisation of the world has no objective reason to exist. For the objects that are produced elsewhere at low prices are not of a better technical level: workers do not know how to do more beautiful things than they can do here. So, the only difference is the exploitation of the workers. Overcoming exploitation means clearly waging war on the effects of globalisation! (Mélenchon, 2012)

Narrators show a securitizing move on globalization as a multifaceted threat to the French nation-state and call for extraordinary measures to counter it. Hence, narrators use negatively charged and binary narratives to frame *globalists*, the EU (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017; Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1), 2018, 2019; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019; Sarkozy, 2015(2)) or Finance (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017, 2019; Le Pen, 2012, 2018; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019) as the enemy. However, while Sarkozy, Fillon, Le Pen, and Dupont-Aignan link the globalist threat to an identity insecurity, as vector of standardization, anonymization, and the loss of national identity (Dupont-Aignan, 2019; Fillon, 2009; Le Pen, 2012, 2018; Sarkozy, 2015(2)), Mélenchon insists more exclusively on globalisation as an economical threat to the French people's social security by legalising exploitation (Mélenchon, 2012). Therefore, the threat of globalisation and dissolution of the French nation-state justifies the call for extraordinary measures, although different from a narrator to another. Right-wing republican Fillon and Sarkozy call for the return of a strong state within an intergovernmental Europe, while Right-wing populists Le Pen and Dupont-Aignan call for a strong national protectionism, going as far as the withdrawal from the Eurozone (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017; Le Pen, 2012). On the other hand, Mélenchon steps aside from the cluster by calling for a popular revolution against the evils of global finance, including Brussels (Mélenchon, 2012, 2017). However, they all securitize globalisation through a mobilisation of the French exceptional past. They all defend a "certain idea of France", either in national or republican terms, highlighting French historical greatness, from the French Enlightenment to the French Revolution and the French Liberation by de Gaulle.

On the opposite side, the de-securitizing story takes place in a *Rousseauist* setting and stages a challenging globalisation, where democrats oppose all forms of reactionaries:

The ideologues of the clash of civilizations, who essentialize identities, cultures, and religions, do not care about the uncertainties and precautions of a complex thinking of this multifaceted crisis, (...) (Plenel, 2013)

I hear some people who think that our country is in decline, that the worst is yet to come, that our civilization is fading away. They propose retreat, civil war, or the recipes of the last century (Macron, 2016).

No, France has not become that, it will never become that, it simply cannot be that country huddled up inside itself, afraid of the other as of the plague and looking at the world as a single threat (Hamon, 2017(2)).

Emotion and sensitivity are even more exacerbated when society is going badly. In such a context, the religious question, sometimes assimilated to a question of identity, becomes even more important (Bianco, 2018).

The spectre of national-populism haunts Europe (Duflot, 2016(2)).

Although narrators also perceive globalization as a challenge, they advocate the resistance to the temptation of political and identitarian closure embodied in the *civilizational clash* discourses. In doing so, narrators often

refer to *dark memories* such as French participation to *slavery* (Aubry, 2009; Hamon, 2014, 2017(2)) French *colonization* (Aubry, 2009; Hamon, 2017(2); Plenel, 2011) or German *occupation* and French *collaboration* to the Holocaust (Aubry, 2009; Hollande, 2012(2); Duflot, 2016(1); Plenel, 2009, 2013) during the WWII, in order to foster self-criticism and to warn against authoritarian drifts of the State and warns against “a France withdrawn into an illusory past” (Macron, 2017(1)) or a “pathological regression” (Plenel, 2011). However, the British case, the opposition is less clear than in the German case, as the social democrat side does not exclusively oppose the national-populist cluster. They oppose as much the Far Right, the Conservative, and the extremist secularist standing on the lower part of the graph, as we shall see in the next section. Furthermore, such oppositional narratives do not fall into security narratives, as they do not frame the Far Right as a threat to French survival as was the case in the German case. Narrators of cluster *a* clearly oppose the upper right-hand side by attempts at de-securitizing the EU. First, narrators try to counter the obsession of French national identity fostered by the cluster *d* (Mélenchon put aside), as best expressed by Edwy Plenel regarding the migration crisis:

[Philosopher Edouard Glissant] was the first to warn, in 2007, at the very beginning of Nicolas Sarkozy's five-year term, about the French return of this political poison: national identity, this closing in on ourselves, this closure to others, this oblivion of the relationship with the world (Plenel, 2018).

Second, they frame their solutions to the stakes of globalisation within European integration (...), as summed up in Macron's 2016 candidacy:

France can succeed. To do so, it must first relaunch Europe. I hear so much hate speech on this subject, so much talk of renunciation or withdrawal. Europe is our opportunity in globalisation, and our responsibility here is immense (Macron, 2016).

Finally, they warn against all sorts of demonization steaming from the European migration crisis or terror attacks and call for what they consider to be *moderate, pragmatic, legalist, and humanist* solutions. First, regarding the EMC, they plead for the hosting of refugees (Aubry, 2009, 2015(1), 2016; Diallo, 2015(2); Duflot, 2015(1); Hamon, 2017(2); Hollande, 2015(3); Macron, 2018(1), 2019; Plenel, 2018) and the acceptance of immigration as enrichment rather than a burden.

In short, the first narrative war revolves around French reaction and position vis-à-vis globalization, opposing a national/republican populist to a social democrat side. As we shall see next, this narrative battle overlaps with another yet correlated war resolving around French relation to Islam and French Muslims.

3.2. (De)securitizing Islam in the name of French *Laïcité*

The second narrative war centres on Islam and Muslims in France and opposes the lower side of the graph, which securitizes Islam as threatening French *laïcité*, to the upper left-hand side of the graph, which tends to de-securitize Islam and call for the recognition of Islamophobia. The securitizing side (cluster *b*) can

be divided into two archetypal discourses, namely the Republicanist Right, embodied by Laurent Wauquiez, Rachida Dati, and Yves Thérard, and the Republicanist Left, embodied by Manuel Valls, Caroline Fourest, Riss, Laurent Joffrin, and Elisabeth Badinter, with Pascal Bruckner in-between. The de-securitizing side (cluster *a*) can also be divided into two archetypal discourses, namely the antiracist discourse steaming from the media, embodied by Edwy Plenel and Rokhaya Diallo, and the social-democrat discourse steaming from the political field, embodied by Martine Aubry, François Hollande, Cécile Duflot, Benoît Hamon, Emmanuel Macron, and Jean-Louis Bianco. Let it be noted that cluster *c* is not exempt of such narrative battles on Islam. However, for the sake of clarity, I will only describe the narrative war opposing the upper left-hand side to the lower side of the graph and re-integrate the cluster *c* into the analysis on republicanism in the next section.

The first story takes place in a *Renanian* setting, where the *laïques* oppose Islam, as both religion and ideology, and their accomplished from the “Islamosphere” – leftist, and *bien pensants*. Islamists, considered as the new fascists (Valls, 2013), are the radical others, Islam is the main threat, and specific measures going from deporting refugees, banning the veil, change the 1905 law, and the return to assimilation are called upon. Although narrators differ according to their self-definition from republican left wing to conservative and republican right wing, they plot the threat in the same way. In this story, Islam, be it as religion, or ideology, is the main threat to French societal security, and particularly French *laïcité*, in an a-historical, alarmist and war-like horizon of experience. Most of the time, narrators conflate security and identity threats, framing a continuum between Islamic terrorism, Islamic extremism, Islamic communitarianism, Islamic proselytism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Caroline Fourest mixes the question of immigration with that of (Islamic) communitarianism and fundamentalism:

To hold a naïve discourse on immigration would be simply suicidal, especially coming from a camp that is sometimes rightly suspected of having flattered communitarian clientelism at the price of a great complacency toward fundamentalism (Fourest, 2018).

Elisabeth Badinter, Laurent Joffrin, and Yves Thérard explicitly or implicitly conflate Islam, communitarianism, and Salafism:

We are in France in a process of withdrawal and separatism. Withdrawal into communities and religions and separation of the sexes (Badinter, 2015).

Fighting fundamentalism? Essential, pressing, decisive objective. In the neighbourhoods, in the mosques, Salafism seeks to gain influence and bring under its control a growing number of disoriented Muslims (Joffrin, 2016(2)).

Is it reactionary to be indignant about it? While some claim it, communitarianism has developed, proselytism has done its work in the mosques and elsewhere, Islamic militancy has become more and more virulent and provocative (Thérard, 2017).

Manuel Valls and Riss go farther and establish an explicit continuum between orthodox Islam or Salafism with Islamic terrorism:

France, with the assassinations of Montauban and Toulouse and the recent dismantling of a terrorist cell, is also confronted with a process of radicalization. Real enemies “from within”, of French nationality, often converted to radical Islamism, can act. (...) This threat of Salafism obliges us to an extremely firm and coordinated response (Valls, 2012).

Yes, there is an Islamic fascism that is on the rise just about everywhere – beware of the words we use, of course, but this obscurantism, which sometimes bears the name of a certain number of Muslim brothers, or of Salafism, must obviously be condemned, since here we are once again denying the rule of law, this democracy for which the peoples of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt have fought (Valls, 2013).

Mohamed Merah killed because he knew he was supported and encouraged by that ideology, Islamism. And his brother Abdelkader, although acquitted of complicity to murder, is impregnated with this same ideology, even if he has done everything, he can to banalise it, calling himself an “orthodox” Muslim (Riss, 2017).

Accordingly, they all call for fighting the Islamic threat: be it via muscular State solutions including the suspension of fundamental rights for individuals suspected of radicalization, such as the state of emergency (Valls, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(2); Dati, 2015(2)), deportation of migrants (Bruckner, 2015; Thréard, 2016; Wauquiez, 2015(3)), deprivation of nationality (Dati, 2015(2); Wauquiez, 2015(3)), and war in the Middle East (Bruckner, 2015; Valls, 2013, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(1) and (2)), or through the “Republican ideal”. Most narrators call for the (re)assertion of Republican values, in the first chief of which, reasserting French *laïcité* against Islamic provocations:

“Colonialism” has become a catchword that no longer designates a precise historical process, but the whole of what various lobbies, and notably that of the Islamists, challenge in France, the republican ideal, secularism, equality between men and women (Bruckner, 2014).

Faced with this, our answer, we must say it loud and clear, without prevarication, without ambiguity: The Republic, the whole Republic, nothing but the Republic! (...) Since the beginning of the new school year, thanks to the mobilisation of the School for the values of the Republic, the entire system of teaching our values - both in the programs and in the practises - has been re-founded: teacher training, moral and civic education, secular teaching of religious facts, the necessity of which Régis Debray has shown, mobilisation of a citizen reserve, installation of academic referents on secularism (Valls, 2015(2)).

The third way is not only a large part of the left and the right, it is the republican demand. And I think that this majority current in France does not feel sufficiently represented and supported. This path, inherited from the Third Republic, refuses to buy social peace through communitarianism and the recognition of the primacy of religion over politics. But this third path cannot be reduced to reminders of the law and prohibitions. It must be accompanied by a concern for the most destitute. Bringing this fringe of the secessionist population back into the bosom of the Republic must be France’s absolute priority (Badinter, 2016).

Of all this, the presidential candidates spoke little, except for François Fillon and Marine Le Pen. All of them claim their attachment to secularism. But it is still necessary to give oneself the means to ensure that it is respected in the face of the blows of those who resist the republican order (Thréard, 2017).

Because it is quite possible to introduce complementary laws, that do not touch the 1905 text, to forge new weapons to combat the strategies of the religious fundamentalists (Riss, 2019).

Such reassertion of French *laïcité* often goes hand in hand with the support of the veil ban in schools (2004) or the full veil in the public spaces (2010), which narrators interpret as either an application or an enrichment of the 1905 law:

No humanist should relativize the violence of this outbidding on the pretext that there are only a few thousand cases in France. Contemporary slavery concerns only a few thousand cases in Europe. Yet it deserves to be fought.

In the case of the full veil, the small number even pleads rather in favour of the law. It is better to legislate if this phenomenon is marginal. What is already complicated in the face of 2,000 cases would become untenable in the face of 20,000 (Fourest, 2010).

This is because it is not feminist enough! Gallantry, the subtle play between the sexes, is all very well, but it is the icing on the cake. If the burqa or even the veil displeases so many of our fellow citizens, it's not only because they limit gender mixing, but because they violate gender equality. Behind the wearing of the veil, there is the idea that it is I, the woman, who is responsible for man's sin. This is unbearable, and not only to militant feminists (Badinter, 2013).

And in my opinion, in our society that is open to the world, where people and ideas circulate, where influences collide, these two texts of 2004 and 2010 have enriched the 1905 law. They have adapted it to our contemporary realities (Valls, 2014(2)).

Finally, the (re)assertion of "republican values" sometimes implicitly or explicitly calls for a policy of assimilation, even if it is called "integration":

The right has a duty to propose a real integration policy, based in particular on learning the values of the Republic (Dati, 2013).

This can no longer continue - it is time to return to the foundations of the republic. The republic is assimilation and not communitarianism (Wauquiez, 2015(2)).

Of course, it is necessary to radicalise our prisons (and thus depopulate them). One could imagine a new status of mediators to "secularise" hospital and prison chaplains paid from public funds, to make them real psychological coaches at the service of de-radicalization. Develop the secular referents set up by the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of the Civil Service. Ensure that these agents of the State can report violations of the 1905 law committed by local authorities (Fourest, 2017).

In short, both Republican Right and Left archetypal discourses, sometimes self-proclaimed as Islamophobic (Badinter, 2016), support the hypothesis of securitization, framing Islam as both societal and national threats to the French Republic, and calling upon extraordinary measures to counter them.

On the de-securitizing side, the story takes place in the *Rousseauist* setting, where social democrats confront the reactionary other, be them Right-wing or secularist extremists, or again xenophobes. In this story, Islam is de-securitized through two processes. First, narrators attempt at de-securitizing the Islamic threat through the opposition to securitarian measures aiming at suspender fundamental rights such as the state of emergency or deprivation of citizenship (Hamon, 2015; Duflot, 2016(1)). On the contrary, they tend to call for moderation and pragmatism on sensitive topics linked to Islam and Muslims. For instance, Cécile Duflot calls for moderation in the face of terrorist attacks and temptations of constitutional revision:

Our old nation needs moderation and a spirit of concord to resist the evil wind that is blowing across the continent. A hastily concocted law of circumstance risks altering our conception of the equality of all French people before the law (Duflot, 2016(1)).

Benoît Hamon calls for "discernment" regarding accompanying mothers on school outings wearing the headscarves rather than a systematic banning:

I'm telling you this because I know it because I've seen it. Today when most parents who accompany or are in a situation to accompany children, especially mothers who do not wear the niqab but just a scarf or a veil, it is now a reality in many cities. (...) I think today that it is necessary to look on a case-by-case basis and to be discerning in this area (Hamon, 2014).

Jean-Louis Bianco calls for a legalist and dispassionate approach on *laïcité*, consisting in applying the 1905 law without discrimination at Muslims:

Citizens need to know what freedoms are guaranteed to them or to what extent a religious request is admissible or not. A final document entitled The Legal Framework for Sanctioning Acts Contrary to the Minimal Requirements of Social Life makes it possible to realise that, in the face of problematic or conflicting situations, there is no need to invoke secularism, nor to invent new laws: it is enough to know what already exists and to apply it (Bianco, 2018).

Second, they attempt at de-politicizing Islam through (1) the call for recognizing Islamophobia:

In this context, one of our concerns will therefore be the obvious rise in Islamophobia in our country. When we advocate this or that measure, or possibly this or that law, we will have to ask ourselves whether it is stigmatising for some people, whether it contributes to calming or hardening relations between the French (Bianco, 2013).

Yesterday it was a story about the press, just as today the issue of Islamophobia is primarily the responsibility of the media, so many representations that build the stigmatisation of a population, men, women and children, on the pretext of their religious identity, are disseminated and trivialised in the form of evidence (Plenel, 2013).

I thought of the four million Muslims who, like me, would be summoned to answer for the acts of monsters but who would not, like me, have a microphone to answer on France's leading radio station. I could already see the end of the national consensus in the face of the pain caused by the murderous attacks. I could see the Islamophobic attacks, the attacks on mosques that would take place in the days to come (Diallo, 2015(1)).

And (2) the respect of a constitutional *laïcité* respectful of pluralism and religious freedom against an ideological one:

Let us preserve secularism, let us not touch the law of 1905: it is not only the treasure of our nation, it is our most beautiful export to the violent world of the 21st century (Aubry, 2009).

Even today, it is in unity that we must fight against fanaticism and that we must refuse all amalgams. Radical Islamism is not Islam. And we must ensure that everyone in the Republic can be protected, whatever their origins, whatever their beliefs, whatever their religion. It is the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the secularism on which our Republic is founded (Hollande, 2012(2)).

Moreover, the debate had been settled in 1905. Aristide Briand, Ferdinand Buisson, Jean Jaurès and, finally, Georges Clemenceau, had recalled that the law of separation of Church and State was first and foremost a 'law of liberty' (Bianco, 2016(1)).

We must always reaffirm that in our country there are not, on one side the Muslims and on the other the French. But there are only French people, from all walks of life, of all convictions, all citizens within a Republic whose secularism guarantees freedom and equality to everyone and offers fraternity as a common project. (...) That is to say, a secularised society and a pluralism of spiritual and philosophical convictions (Macron, 2017(3)).

Let us recall that the principle of secularism in no way prohibits the wearing of religious symbols, including in the public space. On the contrary, secularism protects freedom of conscience. Only the State and its representatives must be neutral (Diallo, 2018(1)).

Notably, they do not attempt at securitizing an alternative other as is the case in the German case, as narrators of cluster *a* do not use security narratives in their oppositional discourse against Right-wing or secularist extremists.

In sum, the French corpus under study displays two main securitizing stories that overlap one another:

1) the (de)securitization of globalization, opposing defenders of the national state to supporters of European integration to face the stakes of globalization; 2) the (de)securitization of Islam, opposing supporters of an

offensive *laïcité* against the Islamic threat, to defenders of a legal *laïcité* including French Muslims in the French Republic. Hence, French *laïcité*, mobilized as both securitizing and de-securitizing tools vis-à-vis Islam, appears to be the privileged framework for interpreting sociocultural, identity and security issues regarding Islam, showing that there has been no consensus on secularism and republicanism since the 1980's and the first Foulard Affair.

3.3. Trouble in French republicanism in the post-colonial era

As in the German and the British cases, discourses of (de)securitization work as mirrors of identity. German discourses of securitization unravelled narrative wars for defining German *identity* opposing a post-national constitutional patriotism to the “return” of cultural and national preferences. The British case displayed narrative struggles for redefining *liberalism* as British particularism in face of diffuse threats and re-assessing *British role* in the post imperial international order. The French corpus also presents a quarrel between divergent conceptions of the founding principles of the French Republic summarized in the motto “liberty, equality, fraternity” and *laïcité*. The problematization and securitization of Islam emerged in 1989 with the Islamic veil controversy in the city of Creil and has been fuelled ever since by international crises¹⁸⁸. Since then, Islamic religious signs have raised national concern as symbols of political Islam. As the previous section has demonstrated, French *laïcité* has become the privileged framework for interpreting socio-cultural, identity, and security issues regarding Islam.

From a political philosophy standpoint, Cécile Laborde (2008) has analyzed the French *laïcité* through the debates regarding French 2004 law banning Islamic headscarves at school. According to her, the interdiction could not be based on the spirit of “1905 law” but rather fell under what she called “laicism”, a radical version of *laïcité* going beyond the neutrality of the State towards its responsibility to emancipate individuals, sometimes against their own will (Laborde, 2008, 2010). However, since *laïcité* was only a case study within her critique of republicanism, she did not identify competing conceptions of *laïcité* in public discourses. For his part, sociologist Jean Baubérot (2015) developed a socio-historical review of representations of *laïcité* in France since the 19th century. According to him, French *laïcité* is not unique. However, there is a socially dominant conception of what *laïcité* should be at a given time. He identified four historical representations of *laïcité* within two opposing trends: two representations of *laïcité* as “civil religion”, namely

¹⁸⁸ The Islamic revolution in Iran, the war in Afghanistan, the Salman Rushdie case, the interruption of 1991 elections in Algeria to prevent the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and the first terror attacks in France by the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria (GIA) in the 1990s, and the September 11 attacks in New York.

anti-religious laïcité and *Gallican laïcité*, and two representations of *laïcité* as “pact with the society”, namely *laïcité of strict separation* and *laïcité of inclusive separation*. On the one hand, antireligious *laïcité* advocates State intervention against religion – namely Catholicism in 1905 – while Gallican *laïcité*¹⁸⁹, advocates subordination of Churches and religions to the State. On the other hand, the two *laïcités* of separation focus on State neutrality and freedom of conscious and religion but bear two different conceptions of separation. *Laïcité* of “strict separation” takes into account only the individual-citizen, while *laïcité* of “inclusive separation” also incorporates a collective dimension of religion. According to Baubérot, these representations of French *laïcité* as social contract prevailed in 1905 but were superseded by the representations of French *laïcité* as civil religion today. Baubérot also distinguishes three “new” visions of *laïcité*: “open-minded” *laïcité*, defending believers from an atheism deemed proselyte; “identitarian” *laïcité*, opposing “native” to “imported” religions; and “concordatarian” *laïcité*, recognizing and organising the cults, as is the case in French Alsace-Moselle (Baubérot, 2012, 2015). Jean Baubérot and Cécile Laborde both analysed French *laïcité* and its representations but neither of them focused on the object against which it is mobilized in public discourses, namely Islam and Muslims. Yet, analyzing discourses of (de)securitization of Islam in French public discourses highlighted a hegemonic war on *laïcité*. For that matter, I distinguish between an ideological mobilization of *laïcité* – which may be simultaneously identitarian, antireligious and Gallican in the sense of Baubérot, and almost exclusively mobilized against Islam (Badinter, 2016; Bruckner, 2010, 2014; Riss, 2019; Thérard, 2017; Valls, 2015(2)), and a constitutional approach to *laïcité* – as expressed in constitutional laws and provisions¹⁹⁰ (Bianco, 2013, 2016(1) and (2), 2017, 2018; Diallo, 2018(1); Hamon, 2009, 2014, 2017(1) and (2); Hollande, 2012(2), 2015(1) and (3); Macron, 2017(3), 2018(1)). Those two modes of mobilizing French *laïcité* in public discourses are directly correlated to securitizing and de-securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims, as exposed in the narrative analysis.

On the one hand, the mobilization of ideological *laïcité* is correlated to the high perception of national and societal insecurities crystalized in the threat of Islam(ism) (Dati, 2013, 2015(1), 2017; Fourest, 2015, 2017; Joffrin, 2018; Riss, 2017, 2018; Thérard, 2015, 2019; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2), 2017(1) and (2); Wauquiez, 2015(1), (2) and (3), 2017). Therefore, *laïcité* is credited to work as a shield against communitarianism, radicalization and terrorism (Badinter, 2018; Bruckner, 2010; Fourest, 2015, 2017; Riss, 2018; Thérard, 2017; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2), 2016, 2017(1) and (2); Wauquiez, 2017) as best expressed in caricaturist Riss’

¹⁸⁹ The doctrine of Gallicanism (derived from *Gallia*, Gaul) originates in France and refers to the belief that civil authority, represented at times by the monarch, at time by the state, over the Catholic Church should prevail over or equate that of the Pope. It translated in the French kings’ repeated attempts to subordinate the Catholic Church to the French monarchy.

¹⁹⁰ “Jules Ferry laws” of 1882, the “1905 law” on separation of the Churches and state, and the preamble of the French Constitution

reminder that “it is quite possible to introduce complementary laws, that do not touch the 1905 text, in order to forge new weapons to combat the strategies of the religious fundamentalists” (Riss, 2019(1)). Hence, since the turn of the 21st century, ideological *laïcité* seems to have become a value of Republican self-definition itself. The Baroin’s report *Pour une nouvelle laïcité*, commissioned by former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in 2003, referred for the first time to “national identity”¹⁹¹. Besides Bernard Stasi wrote in the introduction to his 2003 commission’s report regarding the application of the *laïcité* principle “France has raised *laïcité* to the level of a founding value”¹⁹² in a context of problematization of the Islamic headscarf. Since then, the principle of *laïcité* is invoked in public discourses as a founding pillar of French identity applying to society, and to citizens themselves. As Elisabeth Badinter later wrote, “*laïcité* is not a pile of texts or an electoral argument, it is a way of living together, a common grammar” (Badinter, 2011).

However, ideological *laïcité* is not static; it rather varies depending on whether it is mobilised by the Right or by the Left. The conservative and populist Right represented by Laurent Wauquiez, Rachida Dati, or Yves Thérard, but also Nicolas Sarkozy, François Fillon, or, to a certain extent, Marine Le Pen, mobilize French *laïcité* as a shield to protect what they call the “French values” in the face of Muslim demands deemed communitarian (Dati, 2013, 2015(1); Fillon, 2009(2); Le Pen, 2012; Sarkozy, 2009; Thérard, 2017, 2019). In his interview on the controversy over the establishment of a Christmas crib in his town hall, Laurent Wauquiez argued that nativity scenes did not undermine French *laïcité* as much as Muslim “street prayers” did:

You don’t think it’s the street prayers, the provocation? The problem with secularism is not putting a cross on a statue of John Paul II. The problem of secularism is Salafism and the wearing of the burqa. The problem of secularism is the impossibility today of teaching the Shoah in a certain number of classes in France because you have people who contest it. I believe that we can return to an open Republic where we adhere to France (Wauquiez, 2017).

In defending nativity scenes while condemning Muslim “street prayers,” Laurent Wauquiez does not refer to *laïcité* as a principle of Church-State separation and of regulation of public services, but rather as a means to defend “French values,” which according to him are inseparably Christian and republican. Hence, ideological *laïcité* mobilized by the conservative and populist Right is framed as covering value bridging the gap between French Christian roots and Republicanism. Such ideological mobilisation of *laïcité* resembles what Brubaker has identified as “civilizationalism”. He argues that the shift from nationalism to “civilizationism” has been driven by a convergence in the last fifteen years around the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam (Brubaker, 2017: 3), taking the example of Marine Le Pen’s emphasis on the “Christian roots” of France,

¹⁹¹ François Baroin, *Pour une nouvelle laïcité*. Paris, June, 2016. Rapport au Premier ministre. Club Initiative et Dialogue

¹⁹² Commission Stasi, “Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République : rapport au Président de la République”, sur <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr>, December, 11, 2003.

“secularized” by the Enlightenment (Le Pen, 2017, 2019). In this civilizational perspective, secularism is a value to be defended in the fight against Islam. On the other hand, the republican and secular Left represented by Manuel Valls, Caroline Fourest, Elisabeth Badinter, or Riss, invokes *laïcité* as the keystone of the republican construct. *Laïcité* prevails in social relations and ensures gender equality:

But secularism, later on, played a great role: it helped to enlighten minds and, in this sense, served considerably to advance gender equality. There is no feminism without secularism (Badinter, 2018).

Besides, ideological *laïcité* is mobilized as both identity and military shield against the perceived ambitions of Islam and manifests into the desire to reinterpret the French “1905 law” in reaction to Muslim practices or religious symbols (Badinter, 2013; Fourest, 2010) as best expressed by former Socialist PM Manuel Valls in 2014:

And in my opinion, in our society that is open to the world, where people and ideas circulate, where influences collide, these two texts of 2004 and 2010 have enriched the 1905 law. They have adapted it to our contemporary realities (Valls, 2014(2)).

Finally, the mobilization of ideological *laïcité* by the republican Left is correlated to the systematic denial of Islamophobia (Badinter, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016; Bruckner, 2019; Fourest, 2015, 2017; Riss, 2015, 2019(2); Valls, 2016, 2017(2)), considered a way to censor legitimate critic of Islam, as best expressed by Pascal Bruckner in 2010:

The term Islamophobia fulfils several functions: to deny, in order to better legitimise it, the reality of a fundamentalist offensive in Europe, to attack secularism by assimilating it to a new fundamentalism (Bruckner, 2010).

Whether mobilized by the Right or by the Left, ideological *laïcité* shares three common denominators. First, it is mobilized against the same adversary: Islam and Muslims. Second, it holds the same Catholic heritage: it is thought of as a mode of regulating social interactions in the place formerly occupied by the Catholic Church, yet in a different way. As Joppke puts it, ideological *laïcité* promoted from Right to the Left shares a nationalist variant of Republicanism, which implies the idea that a “neutral public space” would require the suppression of (Islamic) religious expressions on the part of citizens (Joppke, 2007: 337). Third, *laïcité* understood in ideological terms is always perceived as being threatened (Badinter, 2011; 2013, 2018; Bruckner, 2010, 2014; Fourest, 2010; Riss, 2019(1); Valls, 2015(1)) as best expressed by Laurent Wauquiez in 2017:

It is necessary to be very lucid and not caricatural. Yes, there is a fundamentalist component in Islam that is constantly seeking to assert itself a little more and that is at odds with some of our values. In particular, the equality of men and women and *laïcité*. Values on which, little by little, we have resigned (Wauquiez, 2017).

The gap between the invocation of this ideological *laïcité*, with the claims for prohibiting public religious signs, and what the constitutional provisions allow, creates the impression that French *laïcité* is at once in danger and helpless. The fact that the 1905 law does not allow the prohibition of the full veil in public space,

the hijab at university, or the *burkini* at the beach, no matter that these practises are perceived as provocations or attacks on French *laïcité*, marks the limits of this ideological mobilisation of *laïcité*. Hence, ideological *laïcité* both expresses Baubérot's identitarian new *laïcité* and perpetuates the historical trend of setting up French *laïcité* as a republican religion, with its two variants: rather anti religious in the Left, and Gallican in both Left and Right.

On the other hand, constitutional *laïcité* is mobilized in counter-speech by a social-democratic Left represented by Benoit Hamon, Jean-Louis Bianco, Edwy Plenel, or Rokhaya Diallo, to defend French Muslims against what they consider to be Islamophobic or racist attacks (Bianco, 2013, 2016(1), 2018; Macron, 2017(3), 2018(1); Plenel, 2013), as best expressed in Rokhaya Diallo's defence of the wearing of the veil in the public space:

Let us recall that the principle of secularism in no way prohibits the wearing of religious signs, including in the public space. On the contrary, secularism protects freedom of conscience. Only the State and its representatives must be neutral (Diallo, 2018(1)).

Besides, the constitutional interpretation of *laïcité* frames the "1905 law" primary as a law of religious freedom, which excludes the extension of state neutrality to citizens, therefore defending the right for Muslim women to wear the veil:

Moreover, the debate had been settled in 1905. Aristide Briand, Ferdinand Buisson, Jean Jaurès and, finally, Georges Clemenceau, had recalled that the law of separation of Church and State was first and foremost a 'law of liberty' (Bianco, 2016(1)).

Let us recall that the principle of secularism in no way prohibits the wearing of religious symbols, including in the public space. On the contrary, secularism protects freedom of conscience. Only the State and its representatives must be neutral (Diallo, 2018(1)).

In doing so, constitutional *laïcité* tends to keep the status quo on the "1905 law", as advocated by the President of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* Jean-Louis Bianco:

Citizens need to know what freedoms are guaranteed to them or to what extent a religious request is admissible or not. A final document entitled The Legal Framework for Sanctioning Acts Contrary to the Minimal Requirements of Social Life makes it possible to realise that, in the face of problematic or conflictual situations, there is no need to invoke secularism, nor to invent new laws: it is enough to know what already exists and to apply it (Bianco, 2018).

The mobilization of constitutional *laïcité* is also correlated to the promotion of the right to difference and the fight against Islamophobia (Bianco, 2013; Diallo, 2015(1); Hollande, 2015(3); Macron, 2017(3); Plenel, 2013). Finally, the mobilisation of constitutional *laïcité* is correlated to a perception of social, economic and environmental insecurities, such as unemployment and poverty, or climate change, rather than identity and military threats (Aubry, 2011, 2016; Bianco, 2016; 2017; Diallo, 2015(1); Duflot, 2015(2), 2016(2); Hamon,

2009, 2012, 2015, 2017(2); Hollande, 2012(1), 2015(1); Macron, 2016, 2017(1); Plenel, 2009), as best expressed by Martine Aubry in 2009:

And let us put it simply. What is cracking today is first and foremost this social model. And those responsible are those who promote selfishness to the detriment of the collective, who call into question social protection and public services, who impose the tax shield and injustice. Those who today, in the name of national identity, try to divide the French instead of uniting them. How can we fail to recall this sentence of General de Gaulle: “There are two categories of French people: those who say there are two categories of French people, and the others” (Aubry, 2009).

Be that as it may, whether to fight Islam(ism) or to defend Muslim’s religious rights, political actors must speak of *laïcité* and position themselves in relation to it in order to exist in the conquest of power or in the conquest of minds. This recalls to some extent the political struggle that marked the genesis of the “1905 law” of separation of Churches and State in France. The “1905 law” concluded more than a century of war between “the two Frances,” one monarchical, hierarchical, and clerical, the other Republican, egalitarian, and secularist (Joppke, 2007: 318)¹⁹³. The Christian Right on the one hand, wished to restore the influence of the Church, lost in the Revolution. The Republican camp, on the other, adopted an anticlerical stand in response to the Catholic Church’s counter-revolutionary ambition. This conflict resulted in a compromise between anticlerical – when not anti religious – Republicans and Catholics on a separatist and inclusive version of secularism embodied by the “1905 law”, which was seen afterwards as embodying *laïcité* itself. Hence, as Joppke observed, in positing the Republican state against (Islamic) religion, the 1989 first Foulard Affair has revived the *guerre des deux France* and reinvigorated a “*laïcité* of combat” (Joppke, 2007: 319). Interestingly, while 1905 has been considered the shift from *laïcité* as 19th ideology to *laïcité* as legal rule (Rivero, 1960), so that “*laïcité* implies no longer a uniformity of thinking and of doctrine but a consensus on pluralism” (Messner et al., 2003: 124), the end of the 20th century seems to display the reverse phenomenon. From a legal rule, *laïcité* has turned back to ideology of reason and neutrality and the privatisation of reason.

Republican intellectuals coined the 1989 affaire de Creil the “Munich of the Republican school,” associating what they considered a lax interpretation of *laïcité* toward Islam with the “appeasement” policy of France and Britain toward Nazi Germany in 1938¹⁹⁴ (Joppke, 2007: 320). Hence, the 19th century conflict between Republican forces against the Catholic Church gave way to a narrative hegemonic war between two different understandings of a *laïcité* that, while mobilized by all parties, is given opposite interpretations according to the narrator.

Narrative wars emerging in confrontation to Islam highlighted key correlations, which draw the main

¹⁹³ One observer even called the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State the “last act of the French revolution” (Barbier 1993:78).

¹⁹⁴ E. Badinter, R. Debray, A. Finkielkraut, E. de Fontenay, C. Kintzler, “Profs, ne capitulons pas!,” *Le Nouvel Observateur* 2 November 1989.

lines of force in the contemporary French political landscape. Ideological *laïcité* carried by the republican and secular Left denotes part of the republican heritage that can be described as Jacobin, in that it supports a centralised republican State around a strong executive power, is attached to equality more than to liberty, and is openly anticlerical, when not anti religious. Ideological *laïcité* defended by the conservative and populist Right represents what Baubérot called Gallican *laïcité*, wanting the subordination of churches and religion to the state, while promoting the Catholic legacy of France. Constitutional *laïcité* mobilized in counter-speech by a social-democratic trend within the Left and the centre relates at once to historical socialism, with the primacy of the social question, and historical liberalism, with the primacy of individual freedom. Narrative analysis of French public discourse also highlights a quarrel between divergent conceptions of the Republican founding principles “liberty, equality, fraternity” within the French Left. The republican and secular Left tends to reduce equality to what they call “equality between men and women,” while the social democratic trend addresses (in)equality from a social and anti-racist stand. Hence, according to the formers, gender equality has become a primordial Republican value considered as corollary to French *laïcité*: those who do not share this value (Muslims for that matter) are deemed incompatible to French values. Besides, the former bear a universalistic ideal of fraternity, framed as the antithesis of communitarianism, which sometimes passes through cultural assimilation. On the contrary, the latter defends a pluralist ideal of fraternity, which involves economic and social integration and a “right to be different”. Lastly, the former regard freedom as the absence of domination and emancipation as responsibility of the State, while the latter defines freedom as individual autonomy and self-fulfilment.

Summary

Discourse analysis on Islam, identity, and security and the successive veil affairs that have emerged in France since the 1980s illustrate that two main narrative wars are being fought on the political fields implying different (de)securitizing moves toward Islam. On the one hand, the (de)securitization of globalisation, opposing defenders of the national state in the cluster (*c*) to supporters of European integration to face the stakes of globalisation in cluster (*a*). On the other, the (de)securitization of Islam opposes supporters of an offensive *laïcité* against the Islamic threat in cluster (*b*) to defenders of a legal *laïcité* including French Muslims in the French Republic in cluster (*a*). Hence, French *laïcité*, mobilized as both securitizing and de-securitizing tools vis-à-vis Islam, appears to be the privileged framework for interpreting sociocultural, identity and security issues regarding Islam, showing that there has been no consensus on secularism and republicanism since the 1980’s and the first Foulard Affair. Ideological *laïcité*, incarnating French way of life to be secured, has

progressively become the socially accepted representation of French secularism and has become equated with modernity, the opening to democracy, and reason, in contraposition to (Muslim) religion conflated to tradition, superstition, and fanaticism, while constitutional *laïcité* appears as counter-discourse defending the liberal spirit of the “1905 law”. Such narrative war underlies a postcolonial tension between amnesia and recognition of the French colonial past, as I shall expose in the last chapter.

Chapter 7 – Comparison among and across cases

In the preceding 3 chapters, I have analyzed the narrative (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims in public discourses in contemporary Germany, Britain, and France between 2009 and 2019. I showed how discourses of (de)securitization in Western Europe highlighted specific narrative wars in each context. However, to perform a true comparison, I shall now proceed to a narrative analysis of the three cases sampled into one unique European case. Hence, in the following chapter, I will unravel convergences and divergences across and among the German, British, and French cases, through a cross narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in the European corpus. Following the same method as the previous empirical chapters, section 1 will expose the settings, characterizations, and plots of the European case; section 2 will highlight European stories of (de)securitization. Finally, section 3 will assess and compare the uses and weight of historical experiences and memories in European narratives.

Section 1. Narrative analysis on Islam, security, and identity in the European case: settings, characterizations, and plots

To create the European corpus, I sampled the discourses of the 66 European narrators and selected the common codes that were present at least in 2 of the 3 national codebooks (see appendix 7). To perform a cross-European comparison I had to select only comparable narratives, that is, narratives that had their equivalent in each context. This was not an easy task since there are common narratives that relate implicitly to different conceptions, such as liberalism, freedom, or secularism, as well as country-specific narratives that relate to cross-European realities, such as the solution code of “cohesion”, which takes different shades according to the national context. In the German corpus, narrators call for “*social cohesion*” (Lindner, 2010, 2018(1); De Maizière, 2014, 2017(1), (2); Gysi, 2013, 2015(1); Merkel, 2017(3); Oppermann, 2013, 2016, 2017(2); Peter, 2015, 2016(1), (2); Wagenknecht, 2018(1), (2)); in the British case, narrators call for “*community cohesion*” (Grayling, 2009; Clegg, 2011; Khan, 2017; Corbyn, 2018); and in the French case for “*national cohesion*” (Aubry, 2009; Badinter, 2015; Sarkozy, 2015(2); Thérard, 2019; Macron, 2018(1); Le Pen, 2012; Hollande, 2015(1); Fillon, 2017; Dati, 2015(1)). These narrative subtleties are not insignificant, rather they reveal specificities in the perception of the national self. In the German case, the historically and negatively charged category of community (*Gemeinschaft*) gave way to the counter mobilization of “society” (*Gesellschaft*) and a social characterization of the German national self; in the British case, the communities have always been at the core of the imagined community since the construction of the Union and only recently put into question

(see chapter 3); in the French case, the national referent goes back to the Republican ideal of the “indivisibility” of France. In addition, there are also country-specific narratives that relate to singularly country-specific contexts and are difficult to translate, such as French *vivre-ensemble* or German *Leitkultur*, as well as common narratives that relate to common issues. Finally, there are country-specific narratives that travel and are commonly shared through the three European repertoires, without becoming “global” or “European” narratives, such as French *laïcité* or British multiculturalism. Be that as it may, some codes were absent from one context but essential to the two others. In these instances, I retained the code in the European codebook, although an entire cluster of the narrators would not be represented. For example, the characterization of “multiculturalist” is common to the German and British in-group narratives but does not exist in the French corpus since French narrators hardly define themselves as multiculturalist. Similarly, the challenge/solution code “*assimilationism*” does not exist in the British codebook since assimilation is rarely advocated or opposed in the British discursive field. Still, I decided to maintain both those narratives into the European codebook as shared possibilities since debates on multiculturalism and assimilation are closely linked to that of the (de)securitization of Islam in public discourses and remain therefore informative to my research question, as I shall demonstrate in the following section.

Thus altogether, the sampling of the European corpuses comes down to a European corpus of 66 narrators, 356 texts, and a table of 129 codes – among which 26 setting codes (14 rhetorical tones and 12 horizon of experience’s codes), 43 characterization codes (28 in-group, 15 out-group), and 60 plot codes (34 challenges, 26 solutions) (see appendix 7). In comparison to the national codebooks, which counted approximately 210 codes each, the number of comparable codes is reduced by half. Such gap confirms the complementarity between the within case narrative analysis that provides idiosyncrasy, and cross-cases narrative analysis through a European case that allows the comparison. Accordingly, the following section will successively account for the *settings* (1.1), *characterizations* (1.2), and *plots* (1.3) of the German discourses under study.

1.1. Setting the scenes

The qualitative analysis shows that setting narratives are not consensual throughout the European narrators under study (fig. 1). Except for the topic of the *MENA* region, standing at the upper centre of the graph, setting codes discriminate between the different parts of the graph. Rhetorically, axis 1 contrasts an *empathetic* tone on the right-hand side, with a *binary* tones on the left-hand side, while axis 2 contrasts *promotional* rhetoric on the upper side, hence the number of political leaders and state officials, to *reproving*

rhetoric on its lower side, hence the number of leaders of the opposition and actors of the media set up. Noteworthy, rhetorical tones are the most shared categories of narratives. All European discourses, due to their political nature, share the same rhetoric, except for the nexus *war-like/pacifist*, which is absent from the German corpus. Warlike speeches are discrediting the German political field, and therefore counter pacifist speeches are not needed (see graph of figure 2 in chapter 4).

Regarding horizons of experience, the left-hand side is grounded into the *Judeo-Christian* civilization, concerned with *secularism* and *Islam*, while the right hand side is turned toward *history*, tackling topics of *immigration* and *identity* in an international set-up. Noteworthy, references to the national past and history do not bear the same connotation in each case. In the German case, references to the “German past” are generally negatively charged while in the British case, references to the “British past” are exclusively positively charged with national pride. However, in both cases, references to global “history” are more generally neutral than references to national pasts. Finally, in the French case, references to the “French past” are generally positively charged with “greatness” (*grandeur*), while references to “history” are often negatively charged and implicitly refer to European “dark history”. Interestingly, the lower part of the graph displays no element of horizon narratives. This might be due to two factors: 1) the reduction by half of the number of narrative codes from the national codebooks to the European one, 2) the general unbalance of the cloud toward the upper side of the graph. This does not mean that narrators standing on the lower side of the graph do not set their stories in spatial temporal settings. Rather, it means that those variables are not the most discriminating regarding their discourses, in comparison to narrators standing on the upper side of the graph.


Hence, European settings are consistent with the national empirical studies and display a classical debate between Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Graph 2 discriminates between (A) zero-sum game settings on the left-hand side, framed either in civilizational boundaries, recalling Samuel Huntington’s theorization of the *Clash*, or within national boundaries; and (B) win-win game settings on the right hand-side, characterised by a collaborative vision of interactions from which participants can profit in some way, recalling Francis Fukuyama’s theorization of global unification around the liberal democratic model.

1.1.1. Zero-sum game settings

The left-hand side of the graph, where 47% of narrators stand, among which 45,1% French, 15,1 % British, and 10,6% German, represents a zero-sum game setting. However, nuances can be made between two variants. One of them sets their stories within national boundaries, i.e. within the National state and the tradition of national pride, as well as classical interstate geopolitical concerns, as is the case for Alexander Gauland, Frauke

Petry, Sarha Wagenknecht, Gerard Batten, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Peter Hitchen, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, and François Fillon:

Figure 1. Repartition of setting narratives in the European corpus 2009–2019



After so many months and years where words of division have succeeded in speeches of suspicion between French people, suddenly we rediscover the importance of belonging to a single community, the national community (Dupont-Aignan, 2012).

In order for everyone to feel fully patriotic, the fatherland must be a driving force in our daily lives! It is not enough to teach the Marseillaise to schoolchildren to reassure parents about the future of their children! And it takes more than trumpet blasts to restore the confidence of the unemployed. And then, I believe that French identity is confused with the battle for national sovereignty. We doubt our identity because France is dissolving in globalisation (Fillon, 2016(1)).

The answer is reform, and devolution of powers back to nations and people, and a return to intergovernmentalism, at least for this country – and that means Vote Leave on June 23 (Johnson, 2016(1)).

All successes in taming and regulating capitalism have been fought for within individual states, and states have borders. It is not without reason that the BDI has been drumming up an immigration law for years (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

This applies to the end of the ideological project EURO as well as to an overdue change of course in Europe back to a Europe of sovereign nation states (...) (Petry, 2017).

The second variant set the stories within civilizational boundaries and focuses more on societal and ideological

topics, as is the case for Laurent Wauquiez, Yves Thérard, Caroline Fourest, Manuel Valls, Laurent Joffrin, Riss, Birgit Kelle, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Henryk M. Broder, Trevor Kavanagh, Allison Pearson, AC Grayling, Elisabeth Badinter, and Pascal Bruckner:

The BBC plans to 'question the very concept of civilisation' in a new and lavish TV series (Hitchen, 2017(1)).

Matthias Heine wrote in the "Welt" that we should stop talking about "culture" and use the term "civilization" instead. This is a good, constructive suggestion, which I would like to support. Culture is when I cut off someone's head and make a flower pot out of it. Civilization is when I go to jail for it (Broder, 2017).

In the jihadists' project, there is no understandable insurrection of the reprobate: much more a violent, theorized enterprise, rooted in a long history, of destroying the very principles of European democratic civilization, based on a religious ideology that opposes it point by point and sees emancipation only in submission to the Koranic letter (Joffrin, 2018).

Noteably, French leader of the FN, Marine Le Pen, and French former President, Nicolas Sarkozy, set their stories at times within national narratives (Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1), (2), 2017, 2018, 2019; Sarkozy, 2009(2), 2012(2), 2015(1), (2)), at times within civilizational ones (Sarkozy, 2009(1), (2), 2015(1); Le Pen, 2018; 2019):

We will be with all those for whom the heritage of Christian civilization and the heritage of the Enlightenment are not options! But loyalty to roots that we do not intend to deny (Sarkozy, 2015(1)).

No, France is not finished! It still has so much to say to the world. The Nation is not finished! (Sarkozy, 2015(1)).

Our Europe is not sixty years old but is several thousand years old. It is not a market! It is a geographical reality, a historical reality, a civilizational reality (Le Pen, 2019).

The European Union was originally presented as an international organisation: "international" that is to say literally between nations. (...) Nations are human ecosystems that we must protect. (...) Our project is profoundly national and in that it is profoundly human (Le Pen, 2019).

This second variant seems to fall into what Brubaker has conceptualised as "civilizationism", ie. both a new *articulation of* and an *alternative to* nationalism where "the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of self and other are reconceptualised in civilizational terms" (Brubaker, 2017: 21). According to him, Western European populism constitutes a particular cluster since it constructs the self/other nexus not only in national terms but in broader civilizational terms, driven by "a striking convergence in the last fifteen years around the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam" (Brubaker, 2017: 3). Noteworthy, there is a difference between French populism, which falls in Brubaker's concept of civilizationism, grounded on the notion of a societal threat of Islam, and British and German populisms, which he himself excluded from his conceptualization. As a matter of fact, British populists such as UKIP leaders or Boris Johnson have been much less rhetorically preoccupied with Islam than with the European continental threat, as exposed in the British case study. Conversely, German populists such as the *AfD*'s leaders or *Die Linke*'s leader Sahra Wagenknecht have been more concerned with immigration in general than Islam in particular, as exposed in the German case. Still, in both the British and the German samples, we find narrators that fall into the civilizationist setting although

they do not, per se, belong to populist parties, for eg. Birgit Kelle, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Henryk M. Broder in Germany and Allison Pearson, Trevor Kavanagh, or AC Grayling in Britain.

However, whether they fall into the civilizational or the national variants, narrators standing on the left part of the graph set their story in a zero-sum game setting characterised by a *binary* vision of the world. Such binary setting is expressed either vertically, playing *the people* vs the *Establishment*, as is the case for left-wing populists such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon or Sahra Wagenknecht, or Brexiters such as Nigel Farage; or horizontally, playing the clash of civilizations/nations, although with varying contents (see section 1.2). This dichotomy opposes insiders (“us”) to outsiders (“them”), including “internal outsiders” such as minorities, or forces and institutions that are seen as threatening such as globalization, the European Union, or again radical Islam (Brubaker, 2017: 2).

1.1.2. The win-win game settings

On the other hand, the right-hand side of the graph, where half of European narrators stand, among which 39,4% British, 36,3% German, and 24,2% French, represents the win-win game settings, which resembles the IR Fukuyama’s theory of the post-ideological consensus on liberal democracy, where state actors recognize one another as partners, value cooperation, and frame the international structure as a global cosmopolitan society. This also recalls the German *Kantian*, the British *Lockean*, and to a certain extent, the French *Rousseauist* settings. Most narrators standing there share rather *empathetic* tones, appealing to compassion and understanding complexity, with more didactical and dialectical tones, using lexical such as “hope”, “confidence”, and “positive” as well as “compassion”, “respect”, “tolerance”, “fairness”, “comprehensive”, “empathy”, and “kindness”. Some of them also tend to rationalize terrorist violence by stressing the “root cause”, forming the basis of a non-judgmental and comprehensive perspective, like Cem Özdemir’s call for a “*comprehensive prevention strategy*” (Özdemir, 2016) to foster integration, or François Hollande’s urge for “*fighting against the causes of terrorism: despair, misery, inequality, everything that breeds fanaticism*” (Hollande, 2014). However, most narrators standing on the upper right-hand side appeal to *self-promotional* rhetoric, which is unsurprising given their status as political leaders¹⁹⁵.

Regarding their horizon of experience, they set their stories into the *future* (Macron, 2016; Duflot, 2016(2); Hamon, 2017(2); Bartley (2016); Cable, 2017(2); Womack, 2018; Gysi, 2018; Bax, 2009, 2016; Lindner, 2018(1), (2), 2019; Merkel, 2012, 2017(2), (3)):

¹⁹⁵ Merkel (2015(2)), Cameron (2015(1)), May (2017(1), 2018, 2019), Clegg (2015), Corbyn (2016, 2019), Hamon (2012, 2017(1) and (2)), Aubry (2011, 2015(2)), Lindner (2018(2)), Maas (2015(3), 2017(2)), Westerwelle (2012(1) and (2)), Özdemir (2011, 2017(1)), Gysi (2013, 2018), or Oppermann (2016, 2017(1), 2019).

I want to bring France into the 21st century, I want my country to get its head back on its shoulders and, to do this, to rediscover the thread of our millennial history, this crazy project of emancipation of people and society (Macron, 2016).

Our party is not just a Coalition partner of the past, we are the government of the future (Cable, 2017(2)).

Dear friends, because we want to grow, we must, above all, continue to be the future laboratory of German politics (Lindner, 2018(2)).

Interestingly, narrators also mobilise *history*, either as a trigger for action or to foster self-criticism¹⁹⁶. For example, French Socialist Martine Aubry claims for French history to be faced up to:

To love France is to accept to look its history in the eye. Like all histories, it is rich. It has its glory days as well as its darker sides (Aubry, 2009).

... while German SPD Raed Saleh promotes a German *Leitkultur* that would critically address its dark past:

What shapes us Germans is the - hard-won - self-critical way in which we deal with our history. And this aspect of our guiding culture is not negotiable: Those who do not understand the Holocaust and the German responsibility for ensuring that something like this never happens again can hardly be Germans (Saleh, 2015).

Again, regarding the topics addressed, one can identify some nuances between the upper right-hand side, more focused on global and economic issues, and the lower right-hand side, more focused on identity politics¹⁹⁷ (see section 1.3).

Summary

As exposed in this section, setting elements are conflicting in Western European discourses under study. Narrators standing on the left-hand side of the graph share binary narratives characterizing the zero-sum game setting, while those standing on the right-hand side of the graph share more empathetic narratives characterizing the win-win game setting. Notably, the temporal horizon of experience is not particularly discriminating since all quarters set their stories in relation to history, but differ according to their narrative uses, as I shall see in the last section.

1.2. Characterizations

Qualitatively, the in/out-group characterization varies according to the position on the graph (fig. 2). The closest variable to the origins of the axes is *democrat*, meaning that European narrators do not distinguish themselves from one another through this variable. In other words, to be heard on the European public scene, a public actor must define him.herself as a democrat. Otherwise, the characterization narratives discriminate between the different quarters of the graph. While the left part shows a stronger out-group designation than

¹⁹⁶ Özdemir, 2017(1); Westerwelle, 2010(2); Maas, 2015, 2018(1); Merkel, 2015(1); Saleh, 2015, 2016; Duflot, 2015(2); Plenel, 2009; Aubry, 2009, 2015(1); Bianco, 2018; Welby, 2016(1); Cochrane, 201(2); Warsi, 2012; Corbyn, 2016.

¹⁹⁷ Medias are unsurprisingly more focused on identity and politicians on regalian and economical issues because the former is more concerned with selling their paper while the latter are more concerned with gaining votes.

the right-hand side, axis 1 contrasts a *heroic* and *patriotic* self, opposed at once to *Islamism* and the *Establishment*, to a *liberal* and *multiculturalist* self, opposed to reactionaries, be they the *Far Right* or secularist extremists (*laicism*). Strikingly, “*liberal(s)*” do not exactly resonate the same in the three contexts, particularly when they are designated as the out-group. In Germany, “liberals” are opposed as “neoliberals”, mostly coming from the left of the political spectrum. In Britain, “liberals” are opposed as the Liberal Democrat Party, coming from the Conservatives, Labours, and the Greens. Finally, in France, “liberals” are opposed as both political liberals are deemed too progressive or economical neoliberals deemed too capitalist. Axis 2 discriminates between an international in/out-group nexus on the upper side to a more individual characterization on the lower part. The in-group category of “*formal colonial states*” standing in the upper left-hand side of the graph notably designates the reference to the British and French colonial *pré-carrés*, respectively designated as the “Commonwealth” and the “*Francophonie*” in the national case studies. This category is absent in the German corpus, and quite discriminating since no German narrator stand in the upper left-hand side of the graph.

Hence, the graph of figure 2 discriminates between four main ideal types of characterization: (a) the *populists*, (b) the *Islam-critic secularists*, (c) the *cosmopolitans*, and (d) the *democrats* with a more social and a more liberal variant.


1.2.1. European populists vs the Globalist Establishment

Cluster (a), where 21.2% of European narrators stand – among which 42.8% French, 35.7% British, and 21.4% German – with Boris Johnson, François Fillon, Nicolas Sarkozy, Laurent Wauquiez, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, Gerard Batten, Alexander Gauland, Frauke Petry, Peter Hitchen, Trevor Kavanagh, Sahra Wagenknecht, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, gathers European populist discourses, from the right to the left of the political spectrum. Let us note that Jean-Luc Mélenchon stands exactly in-between two clusters, namely the *populist* and the *liberal*, and must therefore be treated with caution. However, since he displays common features with left-wing populist narratives, such as those of its German counterpart Sahra Wagenknecht, I include some of his discourses in the populist ideal type.

Although there is no consensual definition of populism, despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, the main difference between left and right-wing populisms is that left-wing populism “define[s] the enemy in terms of bearers of socio-economic structures and rarely as particular groups”, as is the case in right-wing populism (Gandesha, 2018). In both cases though, populist rhetoric is binary as shown in the setting section. As a matter of fact, the upper-left hand side of the graph shows a strong oppositional discourse, where out-

group narratives exceed by far in-group narratives. Narrators standing there share a strong opposition to the *Establishment*, embodied at times by the *EU*, and its chief leader Angela Merkel, at times by *globalists*:

Figure 2. Repartition of characterization narratives in the European corpus 2009–2019



You are selling us here a banking union as a major breakthrough, although the essence of this union is that everything continues as before, only that public liability for this madness is Europeanised. I believe that this is really intolerable (Wagenknecht, 2014).

If you walk around London today, you will notice that the 12 star flag of the EU is flying all over the place. That is because this is Schuman day. It is the birthday of the founder of this project, and the elites have decreed that it should be properly marked (Johnson, 2016(1)).

In 2005, and in 2012, against the vote of the French people, against their clearly expressed will, Messrs. Sarkozy and Hollande, successive presidents of the 5th Republic, gave, without any legitimacy, the agreement of the fatherland for an organisation of the European Union that confiscates the sovereignty of the people and submits it to the sovereignty of money (Mélenchon, 2017).

The never—ending process of European integration will destroy democratic nation states. If Britain had a Prime Minister with any guts or backbone, we would have left long ago. Exit cannot come fast enough (Batten, 2018(2)).

(...) and by stopping the fanatics in the Liberal Democrats who'd sign us up to everything, wouldn't they, the United States of Europe, European army, you name it, I mean they even want to revoke the result of the referendum (Farage, 2019).

Our Eurocrats are looking for a vision of the future for Europe. One is gradually beginning to suspect what it should look like: the United States of Europe (Gauland, 2019).

This globalist and/or European *Establishment* goes sometimes hands in hand with the demonization of *finance* as the enemy (Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2017, 2019; Le Pen, 2012, 2018; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019; Farage, 2013; Batten, 2018(1); Wagenknecht, 2016(1), 2018(1)) – although *finance* does not resonate the same when targeted by the National Front, where it was not long ago tinted with anti-Semitism, or Sahra Wagenknecht where *finance* is opposed in strictly social sense. The Establishment and its destructive ideology are guilty of welcoming immigrants and refugees; of favoring mixing and multiculturalism; of speaking for minorities rather than the majority; and of denouncing “ordinary” people as racist and Islamophobic. As noted by Brubaker, the populist in-group is characterised by an identification to and defence of “the People”, that is “ordinary” people regarded as virtuous, struggling, hard-working (Le Pen, 2017, 2018, 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2012; Mélenchon, 2012, 2017, 2019; Sarkozy, 2009(2), 2012(2), 2015(1); Wauquiez, 2017; Batten, 2018(1) and (2); Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Mélenchon, 2017; Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(1); Petry, 2016, 2018(1); Wagenknecht, 2014, 2016(1), (2), 2018(1), (2)):

UKIP talks about it honestly. Directly. We have had a lot of stick for it. Normal, decent people have been bullied out of the debate (Farage, 2013)

... while the so-called elite or Establishment is seen as corrupt and paralyzed by *political correctness*, and indifferent to the concerns of “ordinary” people (Brubaker, 2017: 2). Finally, populists often put themselves in the position of victims or scapegoats while being the only real opposition, as is particularly the case for Alexander Gauland (2017(1)), Frauke Petry (2016), and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2012, 2017).

1.2.2. Islam-critic (secularists) vs Islam

Cluster (b), where 25,7% of European narrators stand – among which 29.4% British, 47.5% French, and 23.5% German, gathers what I coined “European Islam-critic (secularists)”, since they tend to mobilize secular referents such as the Enlightenment, secularism and secularization, the privatization of religion, or feminism, as a frame to address anti-Muslim feelings, both in the Left and the Right. As a matter of fact, Manuel Valls, Caroline Fourest, Yves Thréard, Rachida Dati, Elisabeth Badinter, Pascal Bruckner, Laurent Joffrin, Riss, Allison Pearson, AC. Grayling, Stephen Evans, Sarah Champion, Joan Smith, Brigit Kelle, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, David Broder, share a rather homogenous in-group as *secularist*, and/or *Enlightened*, and belonging to the *West*:

He pours scorn on secularists, which means the majority of the population who, whatever their faith or lack of it, are secularist in the sense that they do not wish religion, still less any one particular religion, to be in the driving seat of policymaking in this country (Grayling, 2009).

I define Islam not only as a faith, but as a political ideology and a social system: a system that denies the separation of religion and state, secularity and enlightenment, that practices the vertical separation of men and women, that discriminates against women (Kelek, 2010).

Why should the Iranian model be automatically imposed, when it is rejected by the majority of Iranians and when pluralist Turkey, governed by legalist Islamists, is an example, admittedly negative in the eyes of a secular republican, but otherwise attractive than the night of the ayatollahs for Muslim peoples? (Joffrin, 2011).

Our crime is to exist, we are guilty of living in free and egalitarian societies. (...) To tolerate the West, it would be to make a pact with the progress of reason, of free examination, of individualism (Bruckner, 2015).

The Enlightenment taught us that reason, tolerance and critical thinking are the best guides for human behaviour (Smith, 2015(2)).

On the recent tenth anniversary of the 7/7 bombings, a poll by the Huffington Post revealed that 56 per cent of Britons now believe that Islam (not Islamist extremists) is a major or some threat to Western liberal democracy (Pearson, 2015(2)).

Freedom must be defended wherever it is called into question. The free West must not allow itself to be corrupted in the name of tolerance. Instead, it must be a permanent attraction. The second is much more difficult to sustain (Kelle, 2016(2)).

Committed by Mohamed Merah, these killings were the result of an ideology that has theorised hatred of western democracies and explicitly describes how to attack them to destroy them (Riss, 2017).

It's this sense of entitlement and privilege that secularists seek to challenge, rather than faith itself (Evans, 2017(3))

A democracy would have to stand at the side of the enlightened, peaceful Muslims. We should help them to liberate Islam from Islamism (Schwarzer, 2018)

Besides, they share a strong opposition to Islam considered both a threat to national security and Western/European/national identity – from political Islam, targeted sometimes as “Islamists”, sometimes as “Islamic totalitarianism”, to *religious fundamentalists*, and *Islamic national authorities* (Badinter, 2016; Bruckner, 2014, 2015, 2019; Dati, 2015(1); Fourest, 2015, 2017; Joffrin, 2016; Riss, 2015, 2019(1); Thréard, 2012; Valls, 2013, 2015(1) and (2), 2016, 2017(1) and (2); Wauquiez, 2017(1); Kelek, 2016(1) and (2), Schwarzer, 2018; Kelle, 2016 (2) and (3); Broder, 2016(2) ; Pearson, 2016). Such demonization is particularly instanced in Valls’ comparison of Islamism with fascism or Alice Schwarzer’s comparison of Islamists with National Socialists (Schwarzer, 2010):

No, the Islamists have never made a secret of their intentions. As little as the National Socialists once did. Also in “Mein Kampf” everything was already in it (Schwarzer, 2010).

Yes, there is an Islamic fascism that is on the rise everywhere - be careful with the words we use, of course - but this obscurantism, which sometimes bears the name of a certain number of Muslim brothers, or of Salafism, must obviously be condemned, because once again we are denying this rule of law, this democracy for which the people of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt have fought (Valls, 2013).

However, nuances can be made, especially regarding British narrators, who tend to oppose religious

puritanism and coercions in general from a secularist or humanist stance, rather than focusing on Islam in particular (Smith, 2015(1); Grayling, 2013; Evans, 2018):

Religions, despite what people think of as their personal consolations, have not served the world well. They create division and conflict, they impose unlivable moralities of denial and limitation, and they demand that we think of the world as our remotest ancestors did, thousands of years ago (Grayling, 2013).

But I dislike quite a lot of things without thinking there should be laws to ban them. Like many British Muslims I look on in horror at the religious puritans who reject progressive values and would happily (or perhaps miserably) drag us all back to the dark ages (Evans, 2018).

1.2.3. Cosmopolitans vs. the (Far) Right

Cluster (c), where 48.5% of European narrators stand – among which 41.2% British, 35.3% German, and 23.5% French, gather what I coined the “cosmopolitans”, since they tend to define themselves as *anti-racists* and as *religious*, or as ethnic minority defenders. On the one hand, Sadiq Khan, Sayeeda Warsi, Nesrine Malik, Rhokaya Diallo, and Ferda Ataman define themselves either as *Muslims* or as coming from a *migration background* belonging to the Muslim minority community (Warsi 2012, 2015, 2018(1) and (2), Malik, 2017; Ataman, 2019; Diallo, 2015(2)). On the other, Kira Cochrane, Daniel Bax, Mithu Sanyal, Edwy Plenel, Anne Wizorek, Vince Cable, Simone Peter, Jonathan Bartley, Amalia Womack, and Jean-Louis Bianco stand as *anti-racists* and include Muslim and ethnic minorities in their imagined community (Cochrane, 2013(2); Bax, 2018; Sanyal, 2017(1); Wizorek, 2016(1); Plenel, 2013; Bianco, 2015; Cable, 2017(2), 2018(2); Womack, 2018; Cochrane, 2013(2)). Besides, those narrators take pride on the diversity of their community, such as Sadiq Khan about London (2016(1)) and Amalia Womack about the Green Party (2019), or, on the opposite, lament the lack thereof, as illustrated in Vince Cable regretting that “*our party is still very pale and very male*” (2018(2)).

Cosmopolitans oppose first and foremost the *(Far) Right* as a threat to the political polity conceived as multicultural¹⁹⁸. Edwy Plenel fears for the return of “*the ideology of the far right, the one that was in power with Philippe Pétain under Vichy, this right that is at the same time Maurrassian, Orleanist and elitist and that has never admitted liberal democracy, is stated at the top of the Republic*” (...) (Plenel, 2009) and Cécile Duflot for the “spectre of national-populism” hunting Europe (Duflot, (2016(2)). Anne Wizorek warns against “*the right-wing populism that we experience in Germany, but also in other countries such as the USA* (threatening) *the rights of women, homosexuals or people with a migration background*” (Wizorek, 2017), while Ferda Ataman and Simone Peter bemoan “racial nationalism” and “right-wing extremism” entering the

¹⁹⁸ Malik, 2013, 2017, 2018; Warsi, 2018(1) and (2); Bartley, 2016, 2017; Diallo, 2015(1), (2), 2017; Plenel, 2017; Duflot, 2015(1), 2016(2); Wizorek, 2014, 2017; Peter, 2016, 2017; Sanyal, 2017(2); Saleh, 2015(1), (2), 2016, 2017; Bax, 2010, 2015(3), 2016, 2018; Ataman, 2019.

Bundestag (Ataman, 2019; Peter, 2017). Finally, Jonathan Bartley fears a “*war on human rights, civil liberties, workers and our environment (...) opening the floodgates to a new tide of racism and nationalism*” (Bartley, 2018). Cosmopolitans also oppose what they consider to be “too much secularism” – coined laicism on the graph of figure 2. They particularly deplore the stigmatization of veiled women, as instanced in Diallo’s remark that “*for three decades now, controversy around the headscarf in France has been never-ending: visibly Muslim women have again and again been singled out for criticism, denied their own agency or intellect, and prevented from engaging in public life*” (Diallo, 2018(2)). They also deplore the marginalization and discrimination of faith (Warsi, 2012; Plenel, 2013; Diallo, 2018(2)), as instanced in Warsi’s speech at the Holy See:

It is what the Holy Father called ‘the increasing marginalisation of religion’ during his speech in Westminster Hall. I see it in the United Kingdom and I see it in Europe. Spirituality, suppressed. Divinity, downgraded. Where, in the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury, faith is looked down on...as the hobby of ‘oddities, foreigners and minorities’. Where religion is dismissed as an eccentricity...because it’s infused with tradition (Warsi, 2012).

Finally, some narrators, particularly British Green leaders, stand aside by an explicit opposition to neoliberalism and sometimes *capitalism* (Bartley, 2012, 2016, 2019; Womack, 2019).

1.2.4. Democrats vs. Extremists

Finally, cluster (d), where 24.25% of European narrators stands, among which 43.75% German – with Gregor Gysi, Christian Lindner, Cem Özdemir, Guido Westervelle, Thomas Oppermann, Heiko Maas, and Angela Merkel, 31,25% British – with David Cameron, Theresa May, Justin Welby, Jeremy Corbyn, and Nick Clegg, and 25% French – with Emmanuel Macron, François Hollande, Benoît Hamon, and Martine Aubry, represents the *Democrat* characterization. All narrators standing on the upper right-hand side of the graph define themselves as strong *democrat*¹⁹⁹. However, nuances can be made between the *liberal* democrats, that are those who conflate representative democracy with economic liberalism, and the *social* democrats, who advocate economic and social interventions to promote social justice within the framework of a liberal polity and a capitalist market economy. The first trend is commonly expressed in an adherence to liberalism understood as a strong defence of economical *laissez-faire*, market economy, and private property, as is the case for most European leaders standing here, such as David Cameron, Theresa May, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, as well as other political leaders such as Christian Lindner, Guido Westerwelle, Nick Clegg, and Vince Cable. The second trend is expressed here in a strong defence of the welfare state and state

¹⁹⁹ Gysi, 2013, 2015(1); Lindner, 2010; Oppermann, 2015(1); Özdemir, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2017(1); Westerwelle, 2010(2), 2012; Maas, 2015(1), (2), 2018(1); Hamon, 2012; Macron, 2017(2); Aubry, 2015(2); Corbyn, 2015, 2017; Clegg, 2013; Cameron, 2016(2); Welby, 2015(1), 2016(1); May, 2016, 2017(1), (3), 2018, 2019.

intervention in economic regulation, as is the case for French Socialist leaders Benoît Hamon and Martine Aubry, as well as German SPD leaders Thomas Oppermann and Heiko Maas.

Most democrat narrators, be they liberal or social, frame a multilateral in-group. They define themselves as *European*²⁰⁰, and sometimes as *multiculturalist*²⁰¹, and designate multilateral friends and allies such as the *UN*, *NATO*, *North America*, the *EU*, the *MENA* region, *Turkey*, and *Israel*. However, they have a rather low oppositional discourse in comparison to the left-hand side of the graph, targeting first and foremost *extremists* as threats to political stability, as best instanced in Merkel's rejection of all extremism after the 2015 Paris terror attacks:

Freedom and tolerance never have the slightest understanding for violence by left or right-wing extremism, for anti-Semitism or for violence in the name of a religion (Merkel, 2015(1)).

Those extremists are as much political, among which *Right-Wing* extremists and *nationalists*²⁰²...

We will vote in a few weeks when the Brexit has taken place, when Europe is in danger of unraveling before our eyes, when Trump has become President of the United States, when Putin seems to be in control, when the xenophobic dynasty of the National Front is at the gates of power in our country, when DAECH is still and always putting us to the test (Hamon, 2017(2)).

But imagine for a moment, what will become of Britain in the next five years if Nigel Farage and his friends on the right wing of the Conservative Party are calling the shots. Our public services cut to the bone; our communities divided; our shared British values of decency, tolerance and generosity cast aside (Clegg, 2015)

But above all there is right-wing extremism and right-wing populism from the AfD to the Nazis, which try to stir up fears, to take them in and to radicalize them (Gysi, 2015(2)).

But the danger for the European Union is not only from outside, but also from within through nationalist and right-wing populist parties (Oppermann, 2017(2)).

... and left-wing extremists²⁰³:

And every Liberal Democrat MP is a barrier between Nigel Farage and Alex Salmond and the door to 10 Downing Street (Clegg, 2015)

There are, by the way - and I will say this without relativising right-wing extremism in any way - quite harsh extreme left-wing events, which are not non-violent either (Merkel, 2015(2)).

... as they are *religious extremists*²⁰⁴:

Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority (Cameron, 2011).

The first fight is the fight against fanaticism and its spread, our determined fight against the terrorism of Daech

²⁰⁰ Hamon, 2017(1) and (2); Hollande, 2012(1), 2015(2) and (3); Macron, 2016, 2019; Clegg, 2014; Cable, 2017(1) and (2), 2018(2); Welby, 2016(2); Cameron, 2011, 2015(2), 2016(1); May, 2015, 2017(1); Maas, 2015(3), Peter 2016(1); Merkel, 2012.

²⁰¹ Cameron, 2015[2]; May, 2018; Welby, 2015(1); 2016(1); Özdemir, 2011; Maas, 2015; Peter, 2017.

²⁰² Corbyn, 2016, 2019; Clegg, 2011, 2014, 2015; Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); Oppermann, 2015(1), 2016, 2017(1), (2); Merkel, 2015(1), (2); Maas, 2015(2), 2018(1); Guys, 2015(1), (2), 2016; Lindner, 2018(2); Özdemir, 2011, 2016, 2017(2); Hamon, 2014, 2015, 2017(1), (2); Hollande, 2012(1).

²⁰³ Clegg, 2015; May, 2018; Merkel, 2015(1), (2).

²⁰⁴ Maas, 2015; Westerwelle, 2010(1), Özdemir, 2016; Clegg, 2011, 2014; Cameron, 2011, 2015(2); Welby, 2015(2); May, 2017(3); Macron, 2017(3), 2018(1); Hollande, 2012(2); Aubry, 2015(2).

and the totalitarian ideology that supports it (...) (Macron, 2017(3)).

Especially those who have fought for equal rights for women, for the emancipation of lesbians and gays or against reactionary tendencies in the churches must not find it difficult today to apply the same standards when it comes to Islamic fundamentalism, nationalism and extremism among migrants (Özdemir, 2016).

Summary


As exposed in this section, the self/other nexus is not consensual in the European corpus under study. The MCA exhumed four main ideal-types of characterization, two ideal-types within the zero-sum game setting, namely the *populist* and the *Islam-critic*, characterized by a highly oppositional discourse and a restrictive in-group, and two ideal-types within the win-win game setting, namely the *cosmopolitan* and the *democrat*, characterized by a lower oppositional discourse and a more including in-group.

1.3. The Plots

As explained in the introduction of the present section, there is a clear unbalance of plot narratives toward the upper side of the graph. Only the threat of *terrorism*, standing at the centre of the graph, is consensual and shared throughout the panel. Otherwise, plot narratives discriminate between the different sides of the graph. Axis 1 discriminates between a high perception of societal insecurities, calling for more national *sovereignty* and *assimilation*, on the left side, and the perception of environmental and social concerns, calling for *cooperation* on the right side. Axis 2 seems to contrast state or regalian concerns on its upper side, which encloses mostly actors in or running for power, to concerns about identity on its lower side, which encloses more actors from the media set up and the political opposition.

Despite nuances in characterization narratives between the four quarters of the graph, one can identify two main ideal-types of plot overlapping the two ideal-types of setting described in the section 1.1: (A) the Clash scenario on the left-hand side of the graph, characterised by a high perception of insecurity and high level of problem-oriented narratives and (B) the Counter Clash on the right-hand side of the graph, displaying challenges rather than threats while resisting the temptation of political and identitarian closure.

Figure 3. Repartition of plots narratives in the European corpus 2009–2019



1.3.1. The Clash Scenario

The left-hand side of the graph, enclosing clusters *a* and *b* identified in the characterization section, is problem-oriented and plots an insecure world, in terms of national, economical, as well as societal insecurities. On the one hand, narrators focus on the threat of *Islamic terrorism* drawing a continuum between Islam, Islamism, and terrorism²⁰⁵:

At the time of writing, it is not known who was to blame or whether their youthful pleasures were seen as punishable by death under some twisted interpretation of Islam (Kavanagh, 2017(1))

The headscarf is only the first step - the next is the burka. When in autumn 2008 France passed a ban on all religious and political signs, and thus also on the headscarf, for female teachers and students, the then Al-Qaeda leader Abou Moussab Abdoul Wadoud threatened to assassinate them. “We will take revenge on France in the name of the honour of our daughters and sisters”, he sounded and continued: “Today it’s the chador, tomorrow it’s the niqab”. And tomorrow the whole world? (Schwarzer, 2014).

I undertook to write this book after the Nice attack. Because I'm tired of the endless debates after each attack, which lead nowhere because they deal with the consequences and not with the causes of the evil. There is a rise of Muslim fundamentalism in French society. But it is the sponsor who must be attacked, the one who trains, who sets objectives, who disseminates his deadly ideology (Fillon, 2016(2)).

²⁰⁵ Kavanagh, 2017(1), (2); Smith, 2017; Pearson, 2015(1), (2), 2019; Johnson, 2016(2), 2017; Grayling, 2015(1), (2); Schwarzer, 2014, 2018; Wagenknecht, 2016(1), (2); Kelek, 2016(1); Thréard, 2017; Fillon, 2016(2)).

However, one can identify some nuances between a Westphalian scenario, in the upper-left hand side, which focuses specifically on the threat of *immigration* and the need to control national borders²⁰⁶...

I have deliberately left migration to the end. The figures are astonishing, with one in ten people in England and Wales now born abroad (...). But the really important fact is that this revolution is the result of a deliberate, planned attempt to change this country forever, and we have evidence of this. (Hitchen, 2012).

Labour migration means increasing competition for jobs, especially in the low-wage sector. It is understandable that those affected are afraid of this. There are also not unlimited dwellings, certainly not affordable ones. People who are persecuted need protection. That is what the right of asylum is for, and that must not be undermined. But those who want to overcome the shortage of skilled workers should rather invest more money in our education system (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

Whatever the nice people say, all the figures show that at the rate at which people are entering the country - asylum applications alone have doubled in four years - France will soon be overtaken. In thirty years, the African population will have doubled, reaching 2.3 billion. As for Eastern Europeans, they are increasingly coming to try their luck here, in the wake of Leonarda, the young Kosovar who humiliated François Hollande on live television (Thréard, 2019).

...and a huntingtonian scenario on the lower left-hand side, which shows a more exclusive focus on the threat of *Islam* requiring the need for assimilation. Depending on the narrator, Islam is framed either as foreign *culture*²⁰⁷, as indicated in German sociologist Necla Kelek determinist interpretation...

In Islamic countries submission is imprinted. This is a serious foreign culture, which acts collectively: with the Islamic world view, which also defines the family, which calibrates the children to obedience like the woman. This different culture has been at work and the identity of Muslims for centuries (Kelek, 2016(1)).

... or as alien *religion*²⁰⁸ as instanced in French publicist Riss:

And at the same time we take advantage of this to put forward the lousy side of these tragic buffoons, to make disappear little by little the element triggering this violence, the [Muslim] religion. (...) We are slowly erasing religion from this case. (...) Can we simply reflect, ask ourselves questions about this religion, about its origins and its construction? (Riss, 2015)

Let us note that the challenge code of “*Islamic culture*” is absent from the French corpus. The narrative category of *culture* understood as the social behaviour and norms found in a particular human society, is discrediting in the French political field. French narrators do not designate an out-group due to their cultural belongings. French political narrators talking about “culture” almost exclusively refer to the provision of cultural practises and services in modern societies, particularly in the field of arts and letters. When referring

²⁰⁶ Hitchen, 2012, 2015(2); Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Pearson, 2016; Batten, 2018(3); Kavanagh, 2017(2); Johnson, 2016(1), 2017; Valls, 2013, 2017(2); Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1), 2017, 2018, 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2015, 2019; Fillon, 2009, 2016(1); Thréard, 2019; Wauquiez, 2015(1), (2), 2018; Bruckner, 2015; Sarkozy, 2010, 2012(2), 2015(2); Wagenknecht, 2016(1), (2), 2018(1), (2); Schwarzer, 2016; Kelle, 2016(3), 2017; Kelek, 2010, 2015, 2016(1), (2); Petry, 2017, 2018; Border, 2018(1); Gauland, 2016, 2017(1), 2018(1), (3), 2019.

²⁰⁷ Broder, 2016(1); Kelek, 2010, 2015, 2016(1), (2); Kelle, 2016(2), (3); Schwarzer, 2010, 2016, 2018; Pearson, 2011, 2015(2), 2016; Smith, 2016.

²⁰⁸ Broder, 2017, 2018(2); Kelle, 2016(1), 2017, Schwarzer, 2014; Thréard, 2012; Riss, 2015, 2019(1); Joffrin, 2016; Bruckner, 2010, 2019; Badinter, 2013, 2016.

to “Islam” as a problem, it is almost exclusively as a religion and never explicitly as a culture, which is generally opposite in the German and British cases, where “*Islamic culture*” can be brought out as a problem, but religion cannot²⁰⁹. In any case, all these narrators tend to play the clash between Islam(ism) and European nations and identities. They tend to link what they consider to be a Muslim problem and the Islamic threat to the nexus immigration/integration.

Identity anxieties are also caused by the peril of *multiculturalism*, framed as both a negative factual situation and a destructive ideology. First, as a fact, it is expressed by the concerned of ghettoization, labelled *Parallelwelt* in Germany²¹⁰, parallel societies in Britain²¹¹, and *communautarismes* in France²¹²:

Those who called for an Islam of France and who denounced the dangers of communitarianism were Islamophobes. Communitarianism? That was democracy! No, it was the beginning of the destruction of our society (Sarkozy, 2015(2)).

I was brave when I expressed my fear that one particular child I adored could never enjoy the life chances available to other girls because she was trapped in a parallel England. An England that might as well have been rural Pakistan, so great were the restrictions placed upon her tiny person (Pearson, 2016)

Integration fails when parallel worlds (Parallelwelten/gesellschaften) emerge and the children and grandchildren born here still do not feel like citizens of our country (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

Second, as destructive ideology, multiculturalism is expressed by a *political correctness* toward Islam and/or Muslims, also framed as *False Toleranz* in Germany, passive tolerance in Britain, and *bien-pensance* in France²¹³:

But here again, the self-righteous [*bien-pensance*] denial of difficulties serves no purpose (Joffrin, 2009).

I have no desire to pretend in the name of religious freedom or so-called tolerance that I understand it, because I have none. The multicultural dreamers who for years have wanted to sell us this as cultural diversity are the real problem and, by the way, close the way for these women into our society (Kelle, 2016(2)).

The irony of all of this is that, by not dealing with the ethnicity of the abusers as a fact, political correctness has actually made the situation about race. The perpetrators are criminals and we need to deal with them as such, not shy away from doing the right thing by fearing being called a racist (Champion, 2017(2)).

While depicting an alarming picture of the situation in their country, Europe, and even the West, these

²⁰⁹ Of course this is a narrative nuance that does not erase the stigmatisation of cultural practice within the designation of an alien religion, or, conversely, the implicit targeting of religion through the stigmatisation of alien cultures.

²¹⁰ Kelek, 2015, 2015(1), 2016(1), (2); Kelle, 2016(2), 2017; Schwarzer, 2016; Wagenknecht, 2016(2), 2018(1); Petry, 2018(1); Gauland, 2016, 2018(1), 2019.

²¹¹ Farage, 2015; Pearson, 2011, 2016, 2017; Grayling, 2009.

²¹² Valls, 2013, 2015(1), (2); 2016, 2017(1), (2); Le Pen, 2012, 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2016, 2019; Fillon, 2009, 2016(1); Dati, 2013, 2015(1); Thérard, 2017, 2019; Fourest, 2015, 2017, 2018; Wauquiez, 2015(1), (2), 2017; Badinter, 2015, 2016, 2018; Sarkozy, 2009, 2012(1), 2015(1), (2).

²¹³ Broder, 2016(1), (2), 2017, 2018(1), 2019; Kelek, 2016(1), (2), Kelle, 2016(2), 2017; Schwarzer, 2014, 2016; Petry, 2017, 2018; Kavanagh, 2017(2), (3); Hitchen, 2015, 2017; Champion, 2017(2); Pearson, 2015(1), (2), 2016, 2017; Batten, 2018(1), (2), (3), 2019; Farage, 2013; Evans, 2017(1), (2), 2018; Dupont-Aignan, 2019; Fillon, 2016(1); Dati, 2015(1), (2); Joffrin, 2009, 2016, 2018; Fourest, 2018; Wauquiez, 2015(2); Bruckner, 2015; Sarkozy, 2010; Badinter, 2016(1).

narrators hold the lowest level of solution offering in the European panel. On the one hand, they call for more national sovereignty on immigration and border control²¹⁴:

Who still wants the Europe of Schengen? The presence in Saint-Denis of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the organizer of the terrible Islamist attacks, should prompt all the zealots of the Europe of free movement to finally open their eyes. Starting with the French government. For a long time, it rejected any reform before resolving, a few hours after Friday's tragedy, to introduce border controls (Thréard, 2015))

I think it bewilders people to be told that this most basic power of a state – to decide who has the right to live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels (Johnson, 2016(1)).

All successes in taming and regulating capitalism have been fought for within individual states, and states have borders. It is not without reason that the BDI has been drumming up an immigration law for years (Wagenknecht, 2018(1)).

... or expulsion and deportation of migrants²¹⁵:

We also can't be naïve when it comes to the refugees. Men who commit violence should of course be deported to their countries of origin. We already have enough problems here and we don't need to import anymore (Schwarzer, 2016)

Expulsion of foreigners, loss of nationality for those with dual nationality, but also, and this is the heart of the problem, detention centres for those born in France: this is what we must consider today without taking the risk of waiting. This is no longer the time for legal arguments (Wauquiez, 2015(3)).

On the other, they call for a strong *assimilation*²¹⁶. For example, German sociologist Necla Kelek explicitly invites Muslims to “*to change their habits if they want to be accepted in this society*” (Kelek, 2016(2)), when French Right-Wing politician Laurent Wauquiez explicitly states that “*the republic is assimilation and not communitarianism*” (Wauquiez, 2015(2)). Finally, British columnist Peter Hitchen also indirectly calls for assimilation by opposing Labour former leader Ed Miliband's position on assimilation:

But he then swiftly dismissed the idea – which would be the only hope of future harmony – that migrants should assimilate, saying this was ‘wrong for our country’. He proclaimed: ‘One Nation doesn't mean one identity. People can be proudly, patriotically British without abandoning their cultural roots.’ Is this true? In the days when the USA still sought to assimilate its migrants, it certainly didn't think so. It insisted that they became Americans in every way, and as soon as they could (Hitchen, 2012).

1.3.2. The Counter Clash Scenario

The right-hand side of the graph, which encloses clusters *c* and *d* identified in the characterization section, is solution-oriented and focuses more on global challenges than threats. Most narrators focus on

²¹⁴ Petry, 2016, 2017, 2018; Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(3), 2019; Wagenknecht, 2018(1); Le Pen, 2012, 2015, 2016(1), 2019; Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019; Fillon, 2015; Sarkozy, 2012(2), 2015(2); Thréard, 2015; Kavanagh, 2017(1), (2); Champion, 2016(1); Batten, 2014, 2018(3); Farage, 2013, 2105, 2016; Johnson, 2016(1); Hitchen, 2015(2); Pearson, 2016.

²¹⁵ Schwarzer, 2016; Kelle, 2016; Gauland, 2016, 2017(1); Dupont-Aignan, 2015, 2019; Fillon, 2015; Wauquiez, 2015(3); Buckner, 2015.

²¹⁶ Broder, 2016(1); Schwarzer, 2016; Kelle, 2016(2); Kelek, 2016(2); Sarkozy, 2015(1), Wauquiez, 2015(2), Fourest, 2017; Fillon, 2016(1); Hitchen, 2012.

challenges linked to globalization and social insecurities, going from *new technologies*, *unilateralism*, the *EMC*, and *xenophobia*, as well as the *civilizational clash* discourses²¹⁷:

Anyone who sees the opportunities of globalisation will, of course, also recognize the dangers. As I have often done in the mornings of general debates, I do not want to talk about the domestic, economic and educational issues of globalisation, but about foreign policy. Globalisation offers many opportunities, but it also has its downsides, for example the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Westerwelle, 2010(1)).

Globalization, digital technology, climate change, the growing inequalities of our globalization, geopolitical conflicts, terrorism, the democratic crisis of Western societies, the doubt that is settling at the heart of our societies (Macron, 2016).

People of moderate, decent, humane views are being marginalised as this new Illiberal International takes shape (Cable, 2018(2)).

More precisely, the upper right-hand side focuses on economic and geopolitical aspects of globalisation, fearing for unilateralism and isolationism embodied by the Trump-led USA or the Brexit UK, considered as the corollary to populist electoral success²¹⁸:

Isolationism has never served this country well. Whenever we turn our back on Europe, sooner or later we come to regret it (Cameron, 2016 (1)).

We will vote in a few weeks when the Brexit has taken place, when Europe is in danger of unraveling before our eyes, when Trump has become President of the United States, when Putin seems to be in control, when the xenophobic dynasty of the National Front is at the gates of power in our country, when DAECH is still and always putting us to the test (Hamon, 2017(2)).

The United States has fallen back into unilateralism in terms of civilization, and China has the open ambition in this century to become a superpower politically and economically. Foreclosure, unilateralism, and military escalation are gaining ground in the world (Lindner, 2018(2)).

Accordingly, these narrators tend to offer global solutions within multilateralism. They frame their country's foreign policy within international *cooperation* and *European integration*²¹⁹. German SPD leader Heiko Maas embodies perfectly this kind of multilateral and liberal plot by opposing two sides on the international stages:

There's a crack.

- between those who advocate openness to the world and tolerance and those who preach isolation and a return to nationalism;
- between those who believe in the positive power of democracy, open markets and living civil societies, and those who place the promise of the authoritarian "strong hand" above the individual's rights to freedom;
- between those who believe in the fruits of international cooperation according to common rules and those who

²¹⁷ Cable, 2018(2); Clegg, 2011; 2013, 2014; Cameron, 2011, 2016(1); Corbyn 2018; Bartley, 2018, 2019; Welby, 2016(1); Warsi, 2018(2); Hamon, 2017(2); Plenel, 2009, 2017; Bianco, 2018; Diallo, 2015(1); Macron, 2016, 2017(2); Hollande, 2016; Aubry, 2009; Saleh, 2015; Merkel, 2015(1); Bax, 2018; Lindner, 2018(2), 2019; Özdemir, 2016, 2017(1).

²¹⁸ Lindner, 2018(2); Maas, 2018(1); Merkel, 2017(1), (2), (3); Oppermann, 2017(2); Gysi, 2015(2); Westerwelle, 2010(1) Hamon, 2017(1), (2); Macron, 2017(2); Hollande, 2016; Aubry, 2009; Cameron, 2016(1), (2); Clegg, 2011, 2013; May, 2018; Corbyn, 2016, 2018, 2019; Welby, 2016(2).

²¹⁹ Özdemir, 2016, 2017(1); Lindner, 2018(1), (2), 2019; Westerwelle, 2010(1), 2012(1), (2), 2013; Maas, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2), 2018(1); Merkel, 2012, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2), (3); 2018; Oppermann, 2017(1), (2), 2019; Hamon, 2012, 2017(1), (2); Macron, 2016, 2017(2);, 2018(1), (2), 2019; Hollande, 2015(2), (3), 2016; Aubry, 2009, 2011; Corbyn, 2016, 2018; Clegg, 2013, 2017; Cameron, 2015(2), (3), 2016(1); Welby, 2016(1), 2018; May, 2015, 2017(1).

only play “everyone against everyone” on the world stage, only practice uncompromising and confrontation (Maas, 2018(1))

Moreover, they insist on the need for responsible foreign policy toward the MENA region and Africa, advocating for public aids and development policy, as part of German response to the European migrant crisis and international terrorism.

On the other hand, the lower right-hand side, which shows a poorer challenges/solutions nexus, introduces socio-political and identity aspects of globalisation. They are concerned with the rise of *xenophobia* in general, including *racism*, *discrimination*, and *migrants bashing*²²⁰:

A mood of anxiety and hostility risks creeping over the public, with growing demands for the UK to close its borders and weed out ‘illegal’ immigrants from British life. But behind this rhetoric is a very different reality, and it's that reality that we will be confronting today as we visit the 'jungle' camp in Calais (Womack, 2015).

Problems remain, as do misunderstandings. Discrimination, lack of hope, unemployment persist (Bianco, 2015).

I think it is very important here: we must think intersectionally, we must - very importantly - take racism into account. It is precisely women's rights and migration rights that are being played off against each other. We must not allow them to be played off against each other in order to use our strengths, that is to say, to stand up for people who are disadvantaged, and to give each other the strength to develop them (Sanyal, 2017(2)).

It is notable that the challenge of “*Islamophobia*” is explicitly referred to as such only in the British case, where it has been recognized by the Parliament and consensually mobilised in the political field since the Runnymede report in 1997. In the German and the French cases, the term is not consensual and usually replaced by Anti-Muslim hate, discrimination, or prejudice in the State official speeches. Hence, the resulting solution code of “*desecuritize Islam*” (fig 3) is actually explicitly designated as “*fight Islamophobia*” in the British case, but designated as fight discrimination, prejudices, or racism against Muslims in the two other panels.

Accordingly, narrators offer few solutions and exclusively on the domestic level, such as classical welfare solutions to achieve social justice, as well as *hosting refugees* and *integration* and the acceptance of immigration as an enrichment rather than a burden²²¹:

Today, it is our turn to welcome those who are fleeing wars and persecutions. Lille is ready to receive a hundred refugees, to house them, to educate their children, to help them integrate into this country they do not know. I ask that each city, each agglomeration does the same thing, according to its population. I also appeal to the solidarity of the people of Lille and more generally to all our fellow citizens. Human warmth will be essential to help them survive these tragedies (Aubry, 2015(1)).

It's Labour that's finally making social integration and community cohesion a priority so we can put a stop to the grooming and radicalization of our young people (Khan, 2017).

²²⁰ Cable, 2017(2), 2018(1); Warsi, 2018(2); Bartley, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; Malik, 2017, 2018, 2019; Cochrane, 2014(1); Womack, 2015; Wizorek, 2014, 2016(1), (2), 2017; Sanyal, 2017(1), (2), 2018; Bax, 2009, 2010, 2015(3), 2016, 2018; Ataman, 2018(1), 2019; Peter, 2016, 2017; Saleh, 2015(1), 2015, 2016; Plenel, 2009, 2011, 2018; Bianco, 2015, 2016(2), 2018; Diallo, 2013, 2015(2), 2017; Duflot, 2015(1), (2), 2016(1).

²²¹ Aubry, 2009, 2015(1), 2016; Diallo, 2015(2); Duflot, 2015(1); Plenel, 2018; Cable, 2017(1), (2), 2018(2); Warsi, 2012; Bartley, 2017, 2018, 2019; Womack, 2015; Khan, 2017; Cochrane, 2013(2), 2014(1); Wizorek, 2016(2); Peter, 2015, 2016(1), 2017; Sanyal, 2017(1), 2018; Saleh, 2015, 2016, 2017; Bax, 2015(1), 2018.

For us, the individual basic right to asylum has always been the first and non-negotiable right. There was a clear rejection of an upper limit and of further suspension of family reunification (Peter, 2017).

Finally, regarding the religious question, and particularly the Muslim question, all narrators standing there defend an attachment to *diversity*²²² and *religious freedom*²²³.

Summary

As exposed in this section, although the threat of *terrorism* is unanimously shared by European narrators under study, the MCA has showed a lack of consensus regarding plot narratives. Two main scenarios, namely the *Clash* on the left-hand side and the *Counter-Clash* on the right-hand side, which embraces the oppositions exposed in the setting and the characterization sections, try to impose their visions of the world on the political field. Such plots, which unravel implicit narrative wars on the European conception and tradition of liberalism, have opposite impacts on the (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims, as I shall discuss in the next section.


²²² Aubry, 2009, 2015(2); Diallo, 2013; Duflot, 2015(2); Hamon, 2014; Hollande, 2015(3); Macron, 2018(1); Plenel, 2009, 2013, 2015.

²²³ Bianco, 2013, 2016(1), 2018; Diallo, 2018(1); Macron, 2017(3), 2018(1); Plenel, 2013; Cable, 2017(2); Clegg, 2011, 2014; Warsi, 2012; Welby, 2016(1); May, 2018; Wizorek, 2017; Peter, 2016, 2017; Saleh, 2015, 2016, 2017; Ataman, 2018(1).

Section 2. Stories of (de)securitization and cross-European struggles on liberalism in the European panel

As showed in the previous sections, although some variations in characterizations between the European *populists*, the European *globalists*, the *Islam-critic* (secularists), and the *cosmopolitans*, it seems that one main narrative war of (de)securitization is being fought between two even sides along axis 1 (fig. 4). The left-hand side of the graph displays securitizing moves toward Islam and immigration, while the right-hand side displays attempts at de-securitizing Islam and Muslims through de-politicization or alternative securitizing moves toward right-wing extremism and nationalism (2.1). Such de-securitization stories unravelled a cross-European struggle on the framing of liberalism as European foundation of democracy and its implication regarding the integration of Islam in Western Europe (2.2).

Figure 4. Repartition of European narrators along the narrative war on (de)securitizing Islam(ism) and Muslims (2009-2019)



2.1. The (de)securitization of Islam(ism) in Western European narratives

The main (de)securitization story at play in the European corpus opposes the left-hand side, which encloses 45.5% of all European narrators, among which 43.3% French – with Nicolas Sarkozy, François Fillon, Manuel Valls, Laurent Wauquiez, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Marine Le Pen, Rachida Dati, Pascal Bruckner, Caroline Fourest, Yves Thérard, Elisabeth Badinter, Riss, and Laurent Joffrin; 33.3% British – with Boris Johnson, Peter Hitchen, Nigel Farage, Gerard Batten, Trevor Kavanagh, Allison Pearson, A.C. Grayling, Stephen Evans, Sarah Champion, and Joan Smith; and 23.3% German – with Henryk Border, Necla Kelek, Birgitt Kelle, Alice Schwarzer, Frauke Petry, Alexander Gauland, and Sahra Wagenknecht, to the right-hand side, which gathers 50% of all European narrators, among which 43.3% Germans – with Angela Merkel, Heiko Maas, Guido Westerwelle, Thomas Oppermann, Cem Özdemir, Gregor Gysi, Christian Lindner, Simone Peter, Daniel Bax, Raed Saleh, Ferda Ataman, Anne Wizorek, and Mithu Sanyal; 36.3% British – with David Cameron, Theresa May, Justin Welby, Jeremy Corbyn, Nick Clegg, Vince Cable, Sadiq Khan, Jonathan Bartley, Amelia Womack, Sayeeda Warsi, Nesrine Malik, and Kira Cochrane; and 24.2% French – with Emmanuel Macron, François Hollande, Benoît Hamon, Martine Aubry, Jean-Louis Bianco, Cécile Duflot, Edwy Plenel, Rokhaya Diallo. The 4.5% resting narrators are the 3 standing perfectly on the middle of axis 1, that are French leader of the LFI's Party Jean-Luc Mélenchon, former German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, and former German Interior Minister Thomas De Maiziere. Since they cannot be classified in one of the two opposing (de)securitizing sides, they are therefore excluded from this section's analysis.

On the one hand, the securitizing side tends to perform securitizing moves toward Islam, either directly, or indirectly through the securitization of immigration. In most of those securitizing discourses, Islam emerges as a crystallizing point of anxieties, be them military, economic, social, and identity-related. To cite but some examples, German publicist Henryk Broder invokes a new *Kulturkampf* between secularism and Islam:

(...) one does not want to start a *Kulturkampf* because of such trifles, it is not worth it. But the *Kulturkampf* has long been taking place. What have we been discussing since September 11, 2001? Which topics determine the public discourse? Whether terrorism is a weapon of the poor in the fight against the rich. Whether a teacher who works at a public school is allowed to wear a headscarf or not. Whether separate times for women, meaning Muslim women, should be introduced in swimming pools. Whether Muslim pupils have a right to their own prayer rooms in schools. Whether the burqa and other forms of full-body disguise should be banned, although the ban on disguise already contains an answer to this question (Broder, 2016(1)).

Former French LR leader, François Fillon, targets Islam as a threat to French national unity:

There is no religious problem in France. There is a problem with Islam (Fillon, 2016(2)).

British publicist Allison Pearson frames Muslims as the nation's enemy:

We should be closing those mosques and schools in the UK that have given refuge and inspiration to our enemies and opposed integration (Pearson, 2015(1)).

On the other hand, the de-securitizing side tends to counter such securitizing speeches through the de-politicization of Islam by warning on the contrary against the stigmatization of Islam and Muslim populations.

To cite but some examples, former British LibDem leader Nick Clegg warned against Islamophobia in 2011:

But I hope today to draw attention to a different Luton; Luton as the home of some of the most vibrant campaigns against racism, extremism and Islamophobia. (...) That is why the Government is currently reviewing the Prevent programme, to ensure that money to curb violent extremism is targeted in the right way, and on the right groups. By treating Muslim communities and organisations as homogenous lumps to be variously hectored, preached at, showered with praise and money, or ignored, the previous Government created negative perceptions among British Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Clegg, 2011).

German former SPD leader Thomas Oppermann warned against the conflation between Muslim practices and terrorism in the Bundestag:

I am grateful to you, Federal Interior Minister de Maizière, for having stopped another phantom debate and, above all, for having put Berlin's Senator of the Interior, Henkel, in his place in the unfortunate debate on the burqa ban. Indeed, we cannot ban everything we reject. Of course, we must have a position on this. And of course we all reject the burqa here. That is incompatible with the values of an open society and with equal rights for men and women. But even if there are good reasons to reject the burka, people still feel very clearly: God knows that it has nothing to do with inner security, but also nothing at all. And that is why one should not put it into such contexts (Oppermann, 2016)

Similarly, French former President of the *Observatoire de la laïcité* Jean-Louis Bianco also warned against such confusion claiming the compatibility between Muslim identity and French identity:

I find it dangerous that Muslims are always being blamed and must always prove themselves as not being terrorists. One can be French and Muslim at the same time. One young woman even told me that it was in public school that she learned that she had the freedom to manifest her religious beliefs in the public space (Bianco, 2018).

That does not mean that narrators standing on the right-hand side of the graph are not engaged in any securitizing moves of any kind. One narrative strategy of de-securitizing Islam and globalization is to securitize an alternative object, such as nationalism or Right-Wing extremism. An archetypal example is German publicist Daniel Bax's condemning of Thilo Sarrazin's 2010 bestseller as a right-wing extremist weapon, as a way to de-securitize Muslim immigration in Germany:

The concrete demands Sarrazin made in his book, on the other hand, were hardly discussed and not taken up by anyone. They seemed too far-fetched in their radicalism. "The only meaningful perspective for action" could only be "to prevent further immigration from the Near and Middle East as well as from Africa in general", Sarrazin (p. 372) demanded in his book. At the end of the book, he explained quite bluntly that it was best to reduce the number of Muslim migrants in Germany considerably and make them practically invisible. This is in line with the aims of right-wing populist parties in Europe such as the Front National, the Danish People's Party or the Freedom Party in Austria (Bax, 2015(3)).

However, as those narrators do not perform securitizing moves toward Islam as culture or religion, which is the principal object of the present dissertation, I considered them within the de-securitizing cluster. In

addition, let us note that some narrators standing on the upper-right hand side of the graph, mainly actors in or running for power such as British PMs, German Chancellor, French Presidents, as well as some leaders the European majority parties, perform at times securitizing moves toward radical Islamism or Islamic inspired terrorism. For example, former British PM David Cameron explained in his 2011 Security Conference in Munich that:

We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where these terrorist attacks lie. That is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism (Cameron, 2011).

Besides, in line with my previous remark on securitizing right-wing extremism as an alternative object, German Green leader Cem Özdemir put on an equal footage Islamists and right-wing radicals as enemies to the State:

On the other hand, it is indispensable for the state to be able to defend itself in all directions, whether the danger comes from right-wing radicals or from Islamists (Özdemir, 2016).

And, more recently, on a 2018 Conference on financing terrorism, French President Macron declared:

First of all, [we must] obviously continue to fight extremist ideology wherever it occurs, starting with the insidious action of groups and associations which, as has been pointed out by a group of French imams, confiscate the Muslim religion for criminal purposes, distort it and misappropriate it, and they must know that we will not give them any respite (Macron, 2018(3)).

On the other hand, axis 2 seems to discriminate between narrators in or running for power on the upper-side, such as German Chancellor, French Presidents, British PMs, as well as numerous European Parties' leaders, to narrators of the media set-up or the political opposition on the lower-side. What does it tell us? First, it counters the traditional securitization studies' assumption according to which securitizing moves are only performed by state officials and political leaders. According to my empirical study, narrators of the media set-up clearly participate in the process of securitization, as shown in the lower-left hand side, as well as de-securitization, as exemplified in the lower right-hand side. Second, it means that narratives of (de)securitization are not the same when performed by the head(s) of states and in the media-set up, as depicted by the relatively homogeneous distribution between the 4 quarters of the graph.

Hence, one can identify two parallel and corollary narrative wars to that of the (de)securitization of Islam. The first narrative struggle takes place at the head of Western European states under study and displayed in the upper side of the graph, based on the nodal point of *globalisation*. In this story, the upper left-hand side encloses a *populist* characterization defending the Westphalian model considered as threatened by tenants of a borderless ideology and, with it, (Muslim) immigration flooding to Europe. They oppose the upper right-hand side, which encloses the *liberal* characterization, defending the globalization of trade, humans, and culture, and the presence of Islam in Europe, against international isolationism embodied by the opposing side. The *populists* call for the return or preservation of national sovereignty through border and immigration

controls²²⁴, while the *liberals* call for strong multilateralism, be it regarding political or economical matters²²⁵. Such narrative conflict is best illustrated in the clash between the right-wing populist parties leaders such as German Frauke Petry, British Nigel Farage, or French Marine Le Pen, accusing Europe of destroying nations through uncontrolled immigration...

We know that only by leaving the union can we regain control of our borders, our parliament, democracy and our ability to trade freely with the fastest-growing economies in the world (Farage, 2013).

In addition to all the reasons that call for a drastic reduction of immigration, there are now imperatives that touch the very foundations of French civilization: the security of all, and the rights of women. I do not believe for a second in the EU to reverse the trend. On the other hand, I firmly believe that France, if it recovers its sovereignty and its borders, can completely curb this migratory submersion and its various consequences. I am convinced that it is the will of the Nation (Le Pen, 2016(1)).

This applies to the end of the ideological project EURO as well as to an overdue change of course in Europe back to a Europe of sovereign nation states whose economic, social and population policies are decided not in Brussels and Strasbourg but in Berlin, Paris, London and the other European parliaments. As an alternative for Germany we are the political latecomer among the numerous European parties, some of which for decades have been the urgently needed democratic corrective to the borderless, multicultural and socially destructive ideology of the left, the Greens and increasingly also the so-called people's parties (*Volksparteien*) (Petry, 2017).

...and the liberal leaders such as German Christian Lindner, British Nick Clegg, and French Emmanuel Macron, calling for more European integration:

The real lesson of the last 5 years has been the remarkable resilience of open societies and the acute need for international cooperation in today's world. Liberal democracies in Europe and across the Atlantic have weathered profound economic difficulty; the Eurozone did not fall over – as many said it would. By working together disaster was averted and the sovereign debt crisis is being managed.

In Europe we have maintained stability at a time of great upheaval because, for the most part, our citizens have expressed their frustration peacefully and through the ballot box. And where there has been unrest, mature democracies have managed it with relative success. (Clegg, 2013)

France can succeed. To do so, it must first revive Europe. I hear so many speeches of hatred on this subject, of renunciation or of withdrawal. Europe is our opportunity in the globalisation process, and our responsibility here is immense (Macron, 2016).

Dear friends, there is no easy, quick answer to all these crises. But we do know one thing: every possible answer begins with one word and that word is called Europe. (Lindner, 2018(2))

Conversely, the second narrative war, displayed in the lower part of the graph, takes place within the Western European media spheres and articulates around the nodal point of *identity*. In this story, the lower left-hand side encloses the Islam-critics, self-identified as such or as secularists, defending an enlightened or secular

²²⁴ Kavanagh, 2017(1), (2), (3); Batten, 2014, 2018(1), (2), (3); Farage, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019; Johnson, 2016(1), 2017, 2019(1), (2); Hitchen, 2015(2); Gauland, 2017(1), 2018(3), 2019; Petry, 2016, 2017, 2018, Wagenknecht, 2018(1); Le Pen, 2012, 2016(1); Dupont-Aignan, 2017, 2019; Fillon, 2016(1); Wauquiez, 2018; Sarkozy, 2010.

²²⁵ Welby, 2015(2), 2016(1), 2018; Clegg, 2013, 2017; Cameron, 2015(2), (3), 2016(1); May, 2015, 2017(1); Lindner, 2018(2), 2019, Özdemir, 2016, 2017(1), Oppermann, 2017(1), (2), 2019; Westerwelle, 2010(1), 2012(1), (2), 2013; Maas, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2), 2018(1), Merkel, 2012, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2), (3), 2018; Gysi, 2013, 2018(1), (2); Hamon, 2017(2); Macron, 2017(2), 2018(1), (2), 2019; Hollande, 2015(3); Dufloth, 2015(1); Aubry, 2009, 2015(1), 2016.

European identity deemed threatened by Islam as culture, religion and/or ideology, against the so-called political correctness of their opponents, the *cosmopolitans*, standing on the lower right-hand side, who defend a multicultural Europe, and with it, the recognition of Islam and Muslim identity as part of European contemporary identity. The Islam-critic cluster urges the community to resist the national and societal threat of Islam through assimilation or deportation²²⁶, while the cosmopolitans urge the public opinion to resist the political threat of xenophobia and Islamophobia through the de-problematization and recognition of Muslim presence in Europe²²⁷. To cite but some examples, such opposition is illustrated in the narrative battle between European intellectual and publicists German Alice Schwarzer, British Allison Pearson, and French Elisabeth Badinter, who, most of the time in the name of feminism, call for the fight against the societal ambitions of Islam...

For virtually all struggles for the “right to the headscarf”, or the “right to the chador” (which still leaves the face free) or even the “right to the burqa or niqab” (which fully covers the face) were initiated and fought by Islamist groups or organizations, in the background. The insistence of individual women on their allegedly individual right to veil has repeatedly been exposed as a pretext with which organised theocracy wants to advance Islamization in the middle of Europe, both legally and morally (Schwarzer, 2014).

It’s no good pretending that all “faith schools” are equal; how many “British Catholic” primaries do you know that are incubating extremists? There is no place in a liberal, equal society for sharia courts. Oh, and ban the wretched burka, please (Pearson, 2016).

I consider that most French people share this point of view but that they are petrified by the accusation of Islamophobia. To be called Islamophobic is a stigma, a weapon that the islamo-leftists have offered to extremists. To label as Islamophobic those who have the courage to say: “We want the laws of the Republic to apply to all and first to all” is an infamy (Badinter, 2016).

... and publicists such as Mithu Sanyal in Germany, Edwy Plenel in France, and Nesrine Malik in Britain, most of the time also in the name of feminism or anti-racism and/or anti-imperialism, call for the fight against Islamophobia:

This is the alarm that we would like to raise again, in defence of Muslims, in the human diversity of what this word covers. In defence of all those whom the dominant vulgate assimilates and assigns to a religion, itself identified with an obscurantist fundamentalism, just as, yesterday, the Jews were essentialized, caricatured and slandered, in an ideological brew of ignorance and mistrust that provided the bedrock for persecution (Plenel, 2013).

Of course there are people who come from countries or milieus with different social codes. We have to talk about that too, but in a more differentiated way than has been the case so far. There is no point in lumping together people from completely different countries of origin such as Tunisia, Syria, Egypt or Morocco. In relation to Islam, this means that we must not consider the most conservative form of Islam to be the only or only “genuine” Islam. The IS is already doing that. And we must stop thinking of ourselves as the pinnacle of

²²⁶ Kelle, 2016(2); Schwarzer, 2016; Wizorek, 2016(2); Hitchen, 2012; Bruckner, 2015; Thréard, 2016; Fourest, 2015, 2017; Badinter, 2016.

²²⁷ Saleh, 2015(1), 2017; Sanyal, 2017(1), 2018; Bax, 2015, 2018; Wizorek, 2014; Plenel, 2009, 2013, 2015; Diallo, 2013, 2018(1); Bianco, 2013, 2016(1); 2018.

emancipation. In the ultra-conservative Pakistan and even in Saudi Arabia there are more women in parliament than in the US. In India a woman was elected president fifty years ago. The Muslim man as the terror of the Christian West, that is simply not true (Sanyal, 2017(1)).

It is clear that prejudice against Muslims is only a problem for the Tories insofar as it may damage their prospects at the ballot box – and at the moment, they aren't very worried about that. What Hancock and the Conservatives see when confronted with reports of anti-Muslim hate is not Muslims themselves. They see personal hysteria, or political correctness – exaggeration, or “humbug”, in Johnson's own words. Their inner eyes, as Ellison put it, look right past the reality. Warsi, a Conservative peer who has worked in race relations for three decades, is Tory Islamophobia's invisible woman (Malik, 2019).

One can note some national variations within those two (de)securitizing wars. Despite my observation regarding axis 2 distributing official state leaders on the upper side and media actors on the lower side, nuances can be made. First, British narrators standing on the securitizing side never explicitly call for assimilation, except for Peter Hitchen (2012). Second, French narrators standing on the de-securitizing side never explicitly mobilise the term “Islamophobia”. Besides, regarding types of narratives, French politicians standing on the upper left-hand side of the graph are the only politicians to use civilizational rather than national narratives²²⁸. On the contrary, while generally speaking the lower side of the graph encloses mostly narrators from the media set up, numerous British political leaders, such as Green leaders Jonathan Bartley and Amalia Womack, as well as Mayor of London Sadiq Khan and Conservative Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, and LibDem leader Vince Cable, stand on the lower right-hand side, characterized by the multicultural defence of Islam.

What do such observations suggest? First, assimilation is still alien to the British political discursive field, even within the most vehemently anti-immigration discourses, and despite the recent questioning of British multiculturalism. Conversely, the multicultural stance within identity politics is explicitly supported in British political discourses of some party leaders, while they remain confined to the media sphere in the French and the German cases. Second, civilizational rhetorics together with the call for assimilation, are wider spread in the French political fields than in its European counterparts, as instanced in the number of French narrators standing on the securitizing side of the graph. Finally, it seems that the use of the term Islamophobia is not consensual in the European panel and is politically recognized almost exclusively in the British field. Such variations might indicate an implicit cross-European struggle on the meaning of liberalism, which results in opposite tendencies regarding the integration of Islam.


²²⁸ Sarkozy, 2009(1), (2), 2015(1), (2); Fillon, 2010, 2016(1); Dupont-Aignan, 2012, 2016, 2019; Le Pen, 2016(2), 2017, 2018.

2.2. European struggles on liberalism: multicultural vs assimilationist integration of Islam?

The stories of de-securitization exposed in the previous section unravelled cross-European tensions on the framing of liberalism along axis 1 (fig. 5). The left-hand side tends to embrace liberalism as a Christian and/or Western “way of living” to which newcomers shall assimilate, contrasting with the right-hand side of the graph that embraces liberalism as “way of managing” de facto multicultural societies, recalling to a certain extent John Gray’s (2000) observation on the two faces of liberalism. According to him, liberalism *as a way of life* is not a liberal *modus vivendi* but promotes liberalism as “common values”, giving to the State the power to emancipate individuals. On the other hand, liberalism *à la* Rawls (1993) is understood in terms of “common rules of game”. Despite common struggles in the European panel, the conception of liberalism also implies some national specific responses. Although internal narrative struggles exist in each European context, as showed in the empirical chapters, one could position each European case on an ideal-typical map illustrated in the question of integrating Islam: France, whose republicanism is the French modality of liberalism (Joppke, 2009), seems to witness narrative attempts to push the French model one step further in an assimilationist direction. On the other hand, Britain and Germany stand closer to the ideal type of multicultural integration (see fig. 5), although heading toward reverse tendencies.

On the one hand, as the graph of figure 6 shows, 60% of French narrators stand on the left-hand side of the graph, which embodies the defence of liberalism as a way of life, which represents 43% of all European narrators standing there. Conversely, the graph shows an under representation of French narrators standing on the right-hand side of the graph, which embodies the multicultural reading of liberalism, with only 24% of French narrators. In other words, most French narrators support a conception of liberalism as common values, while the majority of British and German narrators stand on the opposite side, where liberalism is framed as common rules. Besides, it is worth mentioning that the word “liberalism” itself is not particularly positively charged in the French discursive field, as illustrated in the absence of identification to liberalism or multiculturalism in the French codebook. First, very few French narrators defend the right to difference and the opposition to assimilation, except for Edwy Plenel and Rokhaya Diallo explicitly, and Jean-Louis Bianco and Benoît Hamon more implicitly (see chapter 6). Second, when they do, they define themselves either as anti-racist or as democrat, but never as liberal or multiculturalist.

Figure 5. Repartition of European narrators along the narrative struggle on liberalism (2009-2019)



Third, both the words “multiculturalism” and “liberalism” are almost absent from the French discursive codebook, and when they appear, they are most often negatively charged. “Liberalism” in the French political field is mostly mobilised and opposed as economical neoliberalism:

I want to fight the deadly mirages of the liberal ideology of *laissez faire, laissez passer*, I want Europe to stop being the idiot of the global village! (Dupont-Aignan, 2012).


Multiculturalism, on the other hand, is condemned as an Anglo-Saxon model incompatible with the Republican ideal of universalism and indivisibility:

Is republican, secular, one and indivisible France about to renounce its principles? Is its value base doomed to be swept away by the vortex of globalisation and multiculturalism? (Thréard, 2009)

You understand then very well that the negation of national identities, massive immigration, multiculturalism as a doctrine, communitarianism, all these contemporary plagues, are part of the globalist project. (...) It is clear that they (globalists) all lean towards Anglo-Saxon-style multiculturalism, sometimes to the point of absurdity, such as the preposterous idea of granting a holiday to Jews for Yom Kippur and to Muslims for Eid-el-Kebir (Le Pen, 2012).

It is not the multiculturalist United Kingdom or Germany that will win against the Islamists, only France is capable of standing up to them in Europe. We do not have the right to fail (Bruckner, 2019).

Figure 6. Focus on the repartition of French narrators along the narrative struggle on liberalism (2009-2019)



Such opposition unravels through the cross-political condemning of *communautarisme* as self-separatism:

This need to belong can be satisfied through the tribe or through the nation, by communitarianism or by the Republic (Sarkozy, 2009).

The Right wing has always refused to give in to communitarianism, but we have probably not shown it enough in the framework of a global policy (Dati, 2013).

But let us be lucid: we are witnessing a rise in religious and communitarian demands everywhere: at the university, or in early childhood care services (Valls, 2015(2)).

To all this we must add the adherence of a part of the left to a communitarian society contrary to a universalist philosophy (Badinter, 2015).

The scandal provoked by the "Burkini day" in Marseilles has brutally reminded us of the threat posed by communitarianism, which challenges the fundamental values of the Republic and of France by making the bed of Islamism (Dupont-Aignan, 2016).

I'll tell you sir, the real problems do not come from religions but from communautarisms (Mélenchon, 2016(1)).

Because the Republic is not a dead idea (...). Its foundations are solid, but its face is today disfigured by the rise of the spirit of secession, by divisions, by stifling communitarianisms (Duflot, 2016(1)).

To hold a naïve discourse on immigration would simply be suicidal, especially coming from a camp that is sometimes rightly suspected of having flattered communitarian clientelism at the cost of great complacency towards fundamentalism (Fourest, 2018).

Hence, following Gray's (2000) and Joppke's (2009) distinction between the two faces of liberalism, French narrators promote Republicanism as a variant of liberalism understood as a way of life to which newcomers

must assimilate. As Cecile Laborde put it, “French Republicanism is a tough-minded version of egalitarian, difference-blind liberalism” (Laborde, 2005: 315) promoting what Hayek called a “Gallican liberty” (Hayek, 1960: 55). In policy terms, assimilation is on the opposite spectrum of multiculturalism and means refusal to admit or recognize distinct communities. Such a French assimilationist ideal type is best expressed in Laurent Wauquiez’s statement that “the republic is assimilation and it is not communitarianism” (Wauquiez, 2015(2)).

On the other hand, both 60% of British narrators and 60% of German narrators stand on the right-hand side of the graph (fig. 5), which expresses the defence of liberalism as a way of managing differences, representing together more than 75% of all European narrators. However, two nuances can be made between the British and German discursive fields regarding their multicultural stance. First, the reference to liberalism is much more explicit in the British case, as meta narrative of the British national self, while it remains on the implicit on the German discursive field, where the *Verfassungspatriotismus* (constitutional patriotism) has become a hegemonic referent of German belonging. Second, the tendency is reversed in the two cases. In Britain, while multicultural liberalism has been acknowledged in both policy and discourse since the end of the 1960s, it has been put into question since the turn of the 21st century. On the opposite, in Germany, the culturalist model of national belonging deemed exclusionary in the post-war period seems to have given way to a top-down narrative that attempts to push the German integrating model in a multicultural direction since the turn of the 21st century.

In Britain, “liberty” is the most important national narrative since it has been the paradoxical definition of the British Empire (Barker, 1951: 8), as evidenced in former British PM Gordon Brown’s 2004 statement on British roots:

“Britain’s roots are on the most solid foundation of all - a passion for liberty anchored in a sense of duty and an intrinsic commitment to tolerance and fair play”.²²⁹


British historical liberalism met racial pluralism at home at the end of its Empire, where it evolved into multiculturalism (Joppke, 2009: 82). Hence, British post-imperial multiculturalism provided the discursive and institutional frames for integrating Islam in Britain. As a matter of fact, in contrast with the French case, almost all British narrators from both sides of the political spectrum define themselves as liberals or explicitly defend liberalism as a core British value – even those narrators engaged in securitizing moves toward Islam(ism) and Muslims:

Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty (Cameron, 2011).

²²⁹“Speech by the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the British Council annual lecture, July 7 2004”; <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/jul/08/uk.labour1>

Maintaining a liberal, open nation also demands a fierce allegiance to shared values. The values of liberal citizenship. The values of responsibility, tolerance, and openness (Clegg, 2011).

Figure 7. Focus on the repartition of British narrators along the narrative struggle on liberalism (2009-2019)



He said that I had no right to vote Leave, because I was in fact a “liberal cosmopolitan”. (...) And so I want this morning to explain why the campaign to Leave the EU is attracting other liberal spirits (...). It is we in the Leave Camp – not they – who stand in the tradition of the liberal cosmopolitan European enlightenment (...); and we will win for exactly the same reason that the Greeks beat the Persians at Marathon – because they are fighting for an outdated absolutist ideology, and we are fighting for freedom (Johnson, 2016(1)).

Simply put, this judgement is not consistent with the British liberal and human rights tradition (Champion, 2017(1)).

I am a liberal and a social democrat and far from moderate in my detestation of what is happening at the extremes of British politics (Cable, 2018(2)).

How Britain responds to this new environment will determine whether we succeed in remaining a tolerant, diverse, liberal inclusive democracy, and the canaries in the coal mine are British Muslims” (Wars, 2018(2)).

But pushing back against regressive and oppressive forms of Islam means standing up for liberalism, fundamental rights and freedoms. Burqa bans feel too much like the abandonment of these values (Evans, 2018).

Such hegemonic adhesion to liberalism has been debated and questioned since the middle of the 2000s within British narrators between a more assimilationist integration, under the banner of David Cameron's famous "muscular liberalism" as a way of living, against the excesses of State multiculturalism...

Any observant person in Britain can see the same process in such cities as Bradford, where multiculturalism has created two solitudes with their backs turned on each other (Hitchen, 2012).

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. (...) Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. (Cameron, 2011).

And this is the mess multiculturalism has got us into. We have ended up with de facto ghettos like Tower Hamlets, where only 31 per cent of the residents are white British and a reactionary, misogynist version of Islam is allowed to flourish unchecked. Instead of insisting on integration, shared values and a common language, we have capitulated to the point where a senior officer in the Metropolitan police suggests that victims of crime who do not speak English should be given priority (Pearson, 2017).

I don't hate multiculturalism. We have made some real mistakes with state-sponsored multiculturalism and division within society. and that's something that's something which when I was saying it a few years ago was considered to be dreadful. Now people as Trevor Phillips say it (Farage, 2015).

... and an attachment to British multicultural model of integration:

Politicians have a huge responsibility to lead by example and engage in the often-difficult arguments around immigration, multiculturalism and liberty. (...) For me, multiculturalism has to be seen as a process by which people respect and communicate with each other, rather than build walls between each other. Welcoming diversity but resisting division: that's the kind of multiculturalism of an open, confident society (Clegg, 2011).

Yet God's creation of human society is far more than individual or bureaucratic: it is relational, and for it to be so every form of human relational institution from the base community of the family to the small and medium sized business, or the church, or anything else must be treated as possessing legitimacy and value in the rich and luxuriant mix of European human society. It is, after all, these intermediate groups that have been behind the success of our countries and societies (Welby, 2016(2)).

Our celebrated multiculturalism and diversity are under attack – not just here in London but around the world (Khan, 2018).

The multicultural acceptance of integration toward Islam is best illustrated in the success of recognizing both the phenomenon and the term "Islamophobia" in the British political field. More than a sensor for discrimination, Islamophobia has become a symbolic device of the British state to recognize its Muslim minority (Joppke, 2009):

So, it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion, whether that is through forced repatriation, favored by some fascists, or the banning of new mosques, as is suggested in some parts of Europe. These people fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument (Cameron, 2011).

But I hope today to draw attention to a different Luton; Luton as the home of some of the most vibrant campaigns against racism, extremism and Islamophobia (Clegg, 2011).

Sadly, since the Paris attacks there has been a sharp increase in Islamophobic incidents and physical attacks (Corbyn, 2015).

There lies a vision of creativity and innovation, of hope and challenge to motivate anyone: there one does not find fear and destruction, Islamophobia, mosque burning and suspicion (Welby, 2015(1)).

We are committed to ensuring that police will now record hate crime which has an Islamophobic element to it so that we can get a better understanding of exactly what is taking place (May, 2016).

This is a take-note debate on the impact of Islamophobia in the UK. So, we could take note of the breadth of Islamophobia in Britain today (...) (Warsi, 2018(2)).

Trying to talk about Islamophobia in British politics today – never mind seeking to hold anyone accountable for it – is an endeavor perpetually condemned to this state of invisibility (Malik, 2019).

Otherwise, the German multicultural stance is much more implicit and recent. Contrary to British multiculturalism being progressively called into question, the German case follows the opposite direction. Although it was, until recently, not considered a country of immigration and regarded as the ideal type of exclusionary citizenship, neither assimilationist nor multiculturalist (Brubaker, 1992), it has evolved toward implicit multiculturalism since the turn of the 21st century, both in policy and narratives (Kaya, 2009). The narrative analysis of de-securitization of Islam has showed the emergence of *Verfassungspatriotismus* as hegemonic reframing of German *Leitkultur* against the threat of right-wing culturalist definition of the German self. Such constitutional patriotism is German modality of liberalism as “common rules of the game”, and is expressed in the commitment to the Basic Law and the Constitution, as well as common liberal items such as *democracy, freedom, tolerance, and diversity*:

Only enhanced civil liberties, economic prosperity and a chance for political participation can counter the appeal of terrorism in the long run. The basis for all our actions is the rule of law and the respect for human rights (Westerwelle, 2012(1)).

The rule of law is an inalienable value in our society that makes our community so attractive to immigrants in the first place. Many people flee to us precisely because they want to escape the arbitrariness of the police and the judiciary and seek an area of justice (Saleh, 2015).

A look at the constitution does not, of course, automatically answer all moral questions. The Basic Law, however, stands for us above the Bible, the Koran or other holy books. It is the basis for our peaceful coexistence and for a better life than in the countries and regions from which people have to flee. We should give all newcomers a basic law in their own language and explain the content in a realistic way (Özdemir, 2016).

We can be proud of the humanity of our Basic Law (Merkel, 2015(2)).

The openness with which the Cologne police at the main station selected women according to skin colour is a clear violation of the German constitution (Sanyal, 2017).

Over there, as Minister of Justice, I have always relied on a compass, namely the Basic Law, on the principles of the democratic rule of law here in Germany, on the Treaties of the European Union and on the rules of international law and international institutions (Maas, 2018(1)).

The murderers want to create a feeling of powerlessness. They want to tempt the organs of the Basic Law to turn away from liberal and constitutional principles. They hope that their violence will produce a merely emotionally controlled, undifferentiated, uncontrolled counter violence ... These expectations will not be fulfilled. The rule of law remains invulnerable as long as it lives within us (Maas, 2017).

Some things are clear. They are also indisputable: We respect fundamental rights and the Basic Law. Above all stands the preservation of human dignity. We are a democratic constitutional state. We speak the same language; our official language is German. We have one word for all this: constitutional patriotism. A good word (De Maizièrre, 2017).

Clear the way for a truly cosmopolitan immigration law and an integration policy that does not play religions off against each other but focuses on the republican values of the Basic Law (Lindner, 2018(1)).

On the opposite side, promoters of a culturalist version of the German Self frame their political stance within liberalism as a way of life:

But even if that were to be in this 14-century-old book, in our constitutional state - which applies to everyone, including Muslim women! – the equality of the sexes and the human rights or human dignity of women must have priority. These are values that the West has worked hard to achieve, and which it should not simply abandon (Schwarzer, 2014).


As early as 2011, lawyers Joachim Wagner and Seyran Ates warned that Islamic parallel justice had established itself in the shadow of the German rule of law – after all, some of you even admit it - with peace judges and even with state cooperation between German authorities and imams. (...) The constitutional state has surrendered its monopoly on the use of force not only in urban areas such as Neukölln, but also secretly, quietly, and quietly in many places in our country and capitulated to Sharia law - regardless of the variant. (...) So, if you are interested in peaceful coexistence under the rule of law in Germany, let us encourage the authorities and the judiciary in the consistent application of our legal system (Petry, 2018(1)).

Hence, constitutional patriotism appears as a “top-down” hegemonic discourse that mitigates securitizing moves toward Islam, through greater securitization of right-wing extremism and German past, as I shall discuss in the final section. However, unlike in Britain, even though the phenomenon of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim hate is well recognized in German public discourses...

The world, however, is occasionally knitted in the wrong way. Even if you don't talk to Assad, he protects Christians while others in Syria hunt and persecute them. - And in Europe? In Europe there is an increasing discrediting of people of Islamic faith. This clearly contradicts the state of our democratic and cultural civilisation (Gysi, 2016).

No wonder that the Saxon NPD knocked itself on the thighs and recommended him for the office of commissioner for foreigners, although Sarrazin had rounded off his anti-Muslim brass with a pinch of philosemitism (Bax, 2009).

Figure 8. Focus on the repartition of German narrators along the narrative struggle on liberalism (2009-2019)



... the term Islamophobia timidly reaches the German political field:

No wonder that the Saxon NPD knocked itself on the thighs and recommended him for the office of commissioner for foreigners, although Sarrazin had rounded off his anti-Muslim brass with a pinch of philosemitism (Maas, 2015).

We expect them not to tolerate racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and homophobia anywhere (Özdemir, 2016).

Most narrators, even those engaged in de-securitizing Islam and Muslims, tend to prefer alternatives to the term “Islamophobia” such as “anti-Muslim hatred” (*Muslimfeindlichkeit*), which became the official term to address hatred against Muslims in since the 2010 German Islam Conference (for a critique, see: Hernández Aguilar, 2015: 254-260).

Summary

Stories of (de)securitization of Islam have worked as mirrors to each national repertoire and unravelled contemporary struggles on liberalism. Since the turn of the 21st century, an “assertive” liberalism, as Christian Joppke has called it (Joppke, 2009), has come to play the securitizing work that was done by racism and nationalism since the 19th century. However, such assertive liberalism comes with different shades according

to the national narrative context in which it is mobilized. National variations are significant in the *expressions* of securitization and de-securitization of Islam and Muslim, rather than in the *performance* of (de)securitizing moves, which tend to embrace partisan preferences²³⁰. The French ideal type of (de)securitizing Islam manifests into the debated frame of *laïcité*, underpinning liberalism – called “*républicanisme*” – as a way of life to which newcomers must assimilate. In line with a historical adherence to the idea of assimilation, dating back to the colonial *mission civilisatrice*, the last decade has witnessed narrative attempt to push the French model further in an assimilationist direction at the head of the state, expressed in the hegemonic mobilisation of ideological *laïcité*. The British ideal type of (de)securitizing Islam is discursively framed within the debated concept of multiculturalism, underpinning liberalism as a *modus vivendi* for reconciling many ways of life. British historical multiculturalism has been debated and questioned since the Labour’s narrative shift toward “community cohesion” and David Cameron’s “muscular liberalism”. Yet, such a shift in narrative has not been followed by an assimilationist alternative. Communities remain framed as the major vehicle of social cohesion and the recognition of Islamophobia as a political tool to integrate Islam shows that multicultural frames are still vivid in the British political field under study. Finally, the German case is not a third ideal-typical as it stands half-way between the assimilationist and multiculturalist ones. The stories of (de)securitizing Islam have brought to light an attempt at reframing the German self into constitutional patriotism heading toward a top-down multicultural version of integration, against the revival of a monocultural version of German *Leitkultur*.

Such struggles crossing European socio-political contexts underpin another narrative conflict on the way to (re)define a world status in a post-war international order characterised by a constant Europeanization and the loss of Empires, as I shall discuss in the next section.

²³⁰ European conservatives and populists tend to securitize globalization, immigration, and/or Islam as culture or religion, while European progressives and liberals tend to de-securitize those objects through an alternative securitization of right-wing extremism. However, relatively speaking, conservative British securitize less Islam than German and French conservatives, while leftist French securitize more Islam than German and British leftist, due to the colonial legacy as privileged repertoire of securitization.

Section 3. The endurance of national (hi)stories in post-war and Europeanized contemporary narratives

In the previous section, I offered an abundant description of how narratives of the (de)securitization of Islam and Muslim varied within and across the European corpuses under study. In the following section, I suggest a historical interpretation of such variations bridging together the historical contextualization of Chapter 3 and the narrative analysis of the empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6. To put it differently, this section explores the way historical traumatic experiences might have left enduring impressions in contemporary national repertoires. The German public discursive field unravels a hegemonic struggle between a cultural and post-cultural story of the German self, underpinned by the hunting of German “dark past” (3.1.). The British public discursive fields unravels a hegemonic war between an imperial and a post-imperial reading of the British self, sustained by the multi secular counter-identification to continental Europe (3.2.). Finally, the French public discursive field unravels a narrative struggle between a colonial and post-colonial reading of the French self, resting on the historical relations to Islam (3.3.).

3.1. The hunting ghost of Germany’s “dark past” in the definition of German (post)-cultural self

The stories of de-securitization of Islam and Muslims in German public discourse put in perspective with the British and the French cases demonstrates some tension in the expression of the German self, which reflects a double traumatic historical legacy specific to Germany: 1) National Socialism, mobilized in discourses to trigger the most negative emotions, and 2) the division of Germany during the Cold War, and more specifically the communist past of Eastern Germany. As a matter of fact, historical references are omnipresent in the German panel, either to legitimate, explain, or condemn. In particular, actors under study promoting a non-cultural version of Germanness, expressed in constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), tend to refer abundantly to historical dark memories in order to delegitimize actors promoting what is considered an ethno-cultural version of Germanness (*Leitkultur*).

As evidenced in the empirical chapter about German public discourses, the recent re-framing of Germaness as constitutional patriotism has become hegemonic in the past two decades. First, most actors holding authority and audience to diffuse it, that are actors standing in the upper-right hand side of the graph (fig 8) promote it. Second, they associate such patriotism to a constellation of positive referents such as “democracy”, “freedom”, the “welfare state”, or “economical strength”, so that it is hardly contestable without being linked to German ethnic nationalism. In addition to such positive equivalence, the hegemonic discourse relies on contrasting present democratic and constitutional Germany to the evils of its own past. As Müller

notes, constitutional patriotism is based on political achievement and on an explicitly adversarial relationship with democracy's enemies, real or presumed, in the past as much as in the present (Müller, 2006: 286). Hence, constitutional patriotism is explicitly framed in contraposition to German own history, be it National Socialism, or the division between East and West Germany. Narrators promoting constitutional patriotism refer abundantly to German negative past and appeal to self-criticism as source of social cohesion, linking "working through the past" (*Vergangenheitsbeweltung*) explicitly with a new kind of cosmopolitanism (Jaspers, 1946). In those German discourses, the backward and dangerous other appears to be German past itself (Attaman, 2018(2), 2019; Özdemir, 2011, 2017(1), (2); Lindner, 2018(2); Bax, 2009, 2010, 2018; De Maizièrè, 2017; Gysi, 2016, 2018; Westerwelle, 2010(2); Maas, 2015, 2017, 2018(1); Merkel, 2012, 2015(1), (2), 2017(1), (2), 2018; Oppermann, 2013; Saleh, 2014, 2015). References to World War II and the Holocaust trigger the most negative charged emotions:

I say this against the background of the German Israeli government consultations that have just taken place, which were a remarkable event in view of our own history. It should be remembered that this darkest and cruel chapter of our history is less than a human life ago (Westerwelle, 2010(1)).

Those who do not understand the Holocaust and the German responsibility for ensuring that something like this never happens again can hardly be Germans (Saleh, 2015)

We in Germany, we in Europe really have no reason to speak with a raised index finger, the centuries of bloodshed on our continent were too painful, up to the breach of civilization of the Shoah committed by Germany (Merkel, 2015(1))

With all due respect, I did not enter politics because of Willy Brandt. Nor did I enter politics because of the peace movement or the ecological question. I went into politics because of Auschwitz. And that is why this part of our work is particularly important to me (Maas, 2018(1)).

Cem Özdemir (*Die Grüne*) and Heiko Maas (SPD) carry a historical understanding of Germany, always referring to the importance to teach History and self-criticism, particularly regarding the Holocaust:

The family histories of Muslims in Germany are not linked to the guilt of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, all Germans, regardless of their origin or religion, bear the same historical responsibility, and that means to me: Jews should never again have to be afraid to identify themselves as Jews in Germany, not even in Neukölln or Kreuzberg (Maas, 2015).

Let me say the following about Turkey: Everyone said that these accusations from Turkey with the Nazi comparison are absurd, that they are actually so absurd that you don't have to answer at all. I think the best answer is given by our teachers in the Federal Republic of Germany, who teach our children the narrative of our country "Never again Auschwitz!" together in history lessons, but also in other subjects (Özdemir, 2017(1)).

Gregor Gysi (*Die Linke*) also uses allusion to Nazi Germany to alert against threats to religious freedom in Germany:

After the democratic revolutions in Europe, freedom of religion and belief became an important good - albeit with considerable limitations when I think of the countless pogroms against people of Jewish faith in many European countries and the murder of millions of Jews by Nazi Germany (Gysi, 2016).

Publicist Daniel Bax and Ferda Ataman also invoke Nazism and the Holocaust to warn against right-wing extremism. The former links Thilo Sarrazin's discourse to the tradition of Hitler and Goebbels (Bax, 2009, 2015(1)), comparing his book *Deutschland Schaff sich ab* to *Mein Kampf* (Bax, 2010), while the latter alerts on right-wing extremist hate crimes (Ataman, 2018(2), 2019):

An example: Only a few weeks after the anti-Semitic and racist terror attack in Halle, the big topic in all media was that many Germans feel restricted in their freedom of expression. I don't know in which parallel society these victims of freedom of expression live, but doesn't it matter how such a debate is received by Jews and other People of Colour* who have observed in recent years that the Holocaust can be relativized or people can be called parasites without any consequences? (Ataman, 2019)

In addition to repeated allusions to Nazi Germany, actors also use the Cold War as negative trigger, particularly to address political division:

We are relying on the peace dividend. Twenty years after our reunification, we are celebrating this wonderful anniversary, because this year is the time for all of us to work together politically on this peace dividend. Making the world more peaceful is also an answer to the globalisation of our time (Westerwelle, 2010(1)).

Until 1990, this conference was dominated by the Cold War and the uncompromising confrontation between two blocs, as well as by nuclear deterrence. Thanks to the western partners' cohesion and strength, we were able to experience the end of the Cold War and the achievement of the goals of values based cooperation, particularly those of transatlantic cooperation, in 1990 (Merkel, 2017(1)).

And even more so, the West and East of Europe must not drift further apart - and for this we Germans in the middle, especially with our painful experience of division, bear a special responsibility (Maas, 2018(1)).

Gregor Gysi also mentions the Cold War to warn against German and European systematic alignment on the US foreign policy agenda (Gysi, 2015(1); 2018), while Daniel Bax refers to the former division between East and West Germany to criticise Sahra Wagenknecht's accusation of Germany fetching Syrian doctors (Bax, 2018). Finally, actors also invoke the German *Kulturkampf* to warn against religious persecution of Islam (Westerwelle, 2010; Özdemir, 2011; Maas, 2018(1)), and punctually allude to imperial Germany to criticize the backwardness of German nationalism:

All I can tell you is that, with your clinging to the obligation to choose, you are still mentally at the level of nationalist thinking from the imperial era. Your point of view is from the last or penultimate century. Come out of your corner and join us in shaping a modern citizenship law for a modern Germany! (Oppermann, 2013)

In short, as noted by historians of colonialism Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer, because of the Third Reich, Germans are indeed generally not proud, if not ashamed, of their 20th century history (Perraudin and Zimmerer, 2011). Historical references can also be used positively, although more anecdotally. The reference to German historical religious pluralism, with allusions to the hosting of Huguenots or recalling of the reformation are mobilized to support religious peace, the *Willkommenskultur*, or the recognition of Islam and migrant minorities (Özdemir, 2011; Maas, 2015; De Maizièrè, 2017; Ataman, 2018(1)):

Sorry for interrupting, but we know in the Huguenots' case it took around one century, and they were privileged people because they had the same religion, most of them were officially invited, the Prussians

supported them as much as they could. And there it took one century. I don't know what the situation will look like in 30 or 50 years from now, but part of the difference is the examples you've given—and I think they are very good examples—are examples of assimilation. Because what is left from the Huguenots? Just the family name, nothing else, and some names of villages (Özdemir, 2011).

Their general suspicion that all Muslims are per se disloyal citizens is reminiscent of Bismarck's policy of exclusion from Catholics: Whoever did not recognize the Prussian king as *summus episcopus* was suspicious and was treated as such (Maas, 2015).

German “dark past”, and particularly the traumatic experience of National Socialism, works as an implicit reference point for German constitutional patriotism. As nationalist discourses (*völkisch*) have been bound up with National Socialism, its moral substance has been compromised and rejected in most political discourse. As showed by declarations of several German political leaders, “Germaness” should not be understood in cultural terms but as a continuous civic self-interrogation and historical self-criticism (Saleh, 2015, 2016; Merkel, 2015(1); Maas, 2015, 2018(1); Friedrich, 2016; Westerwelle, 2010(1); (2); Özdemir, 2017(1)):

What shapes us Germans is the - hard-won - self-critical way in which we deal with our history. (Saleh, 2015). Hence, the German constitutional and patriotic self is expressed in contraposition to the German past that embodies the figure of the absolute Other. In this story, the figure of right-wing extremism (*Rechtsextremismus*) personifies the radical other as a revival of the German hunting past, and is pivotal to German political and discursive fields. National Socialism above all historical memory works as a “constitutive outside (...) at once incommensurable with and the condition of possibility of the collectivity, at once radically external to and fundamentally constitutive of it” (Shoshan, 2016: 9).

On the opposite side, tenants of an ethnocultural reading of Germanness (*Leitkultur*) condemned by constitutional patriots, such as Henryk Broder (2017), Alexander Gauland (2017(1)), or Brigit Kelle (2017), try to rehabilitate a positive reading of German historical or cultural self. Especially AfD leader Alexander Gauland, whose party is accused of right-wing extremism, uses lots of quotations from German politicians, philosophers, historians, and sets himself particularly in line with Otto von Bismarck whom he quotes three times in seven speeches. He relates to him in supporting *Realpolitik* against German *Weltpolitik*, referring to imperial and colonial Germany to oppose interventionism in the Middle East:

Otto von Bismarcks, who once said: I have always found the word “Europe” in the mouths of those politicians who demanded something from other powers that they did not dare to demand in their own names ... (Applause to the AfD) Perhaps you could ask your colleague, President Macron, for this quote. Ladies and gentlemen, even if you see it differently: Not so much has changed in foreign policy since Bismarck's days, and that is why it is easy to remember it (Gauland, 2018(1)).

Or, to use Otto von Bismarck's words, we do not have dogmatism to do, but politics to do (Gauland, 2018(2)).

Ladies and gentlemen, Bismarck once said: If a pact, however harmless it may look, is made somewhere between two powers, one must immediately ask oneself who is to be killed here (Gauland, 2018(3)).

In doing so, he both dismisses the German hunting ghosts of the WWII mobilized in discourses of constitutional patriots and rehabilitates a positive version of German historical self, dating back to the turn of the 20th century. Furthermore, he also refers to the German communist past to oppose the German *Establishment*, or constitutional patriots for that matter, whom he compares to the SED Communist dictatorship. Birgit Kelle, on the other hand, does not refer explicitly to German history but rather rehabilitates a positive vision of a German ethnocultural core (*Kern*):

I come from Transylvania. We are of German origin, so-called “late repatriates” (*Spätaussiedler*), (...). In Romania, we were the Germans and (...) here I was again the Romanian. But what is amazing is that the culture was the same. There is a German core. It is amazing how in two regions there is the same language, same culture, same children’s books. So there is something like German culture (Kelle, 2017).

Henryk Broder, without promoting German history, dismisses fears of right-wing extremism threatening Europe and Germany:

Right-wingers taking power in Europe? A bit of kitsch and surfing may also be part of it. But to fantasise about a takeover by right-wing extremists while Martin Schulz threatens that by 2025 there will be a United States of Europe is very presumptuous. Of all the dangers threatening Europe, right-wing extremism is probably the least presently. But it is best served by pleasurable fears. That, of course, is a completely different story. It is called: Catching up on the resistance (Broder, 2018(1)).

Finally, other narrators also taking part explicitly in securitizing moves regarding Islam or immigration such as Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Frauke Petry and, to a lesser extent, Sahra Wagenknecht, never mobilize the German past as scaremonger rather they embed their stories exclusively into contemporary horizons of experience.

In short, constitutional patriotism appears as a “top-down” hegemonic discourse of (re)imagination of the German self after the reunification that mitigates securitizing moves toward Islam, through greater securitization of right-wing extremism assimilated to the hunting ghost of German National Socialist era. The promotion of a cultural Germaness appears as a counter-hegemonic discourse resting on the rehabilitation of / or the disconnection from German supposed dark memories. Traumatic legacies of National Socialism and the memory of the epoch of the GDR have both framed the emergence of a unified, democratic, liberal state, simultaneously with the resurgence of a cultural, authoritarian, and nationalist currents. The narrative study of German contemporary public discourses on Islam, identity, and security, seem to indicate that right-wing extremism is vital for domesticating the tension between these two historical horizons, more structuring than sedimented orientalist Muslim figure inherited from its imperial and colonial experiences.

Looking back at German historical interactions with Islam in the *long durée* explored in Chapter 3, the German case reveals more ruptures than continuities in its narrative construction of the self/other nexus. On the one hand, at the turn of the 20th century, Germany continuously oscillated between identification to

the East and to the West. The *Kaiserreich* and the Ottoman Empire united against the military but also the cultural hegemony of “the West”, while some of German most influential intellectuals and orientalist understood the West as a superficial and purely formal form of civilization, which they essentially associated with Britain and France. On the other hand, parts of the German bourgeoisie looked down on Muslims, sharing with other Europeans the awareness of Western cultural superiority over the Orient. Thus, while debating on the cultural inferiority and the potential threat of Islam, the German authority was willing to conduct a “cultural struggle” against European competitors, covered under the guise of “Western materialism”, in a holy war on the side with Islam. However, at the turn of the 21st century, the threat scenario for the German public had changed decisively and completely. After two world wars and the Cold war, and particularly after the experience of Nazism, Germany has firmly anchored itself in the West (Müller, 2006: 289). However, despite the “westernization” of the German self, it is not the Muslim who plays the role of the multi-secular (Eastern) Other but the German historical self. In other words, debate about Germany’s colonial and imperial history has long been overshadowed by the trauma of the Nazi era in public discourses.

As a result, the major part of the political elite and the state officials seems reluctant to explicit identity securitization of Islam, be it as culture or religion, targeting preferably right-wing extremism as the reminiscence of the Nazi other, while the securitization of Islam as a threat to German identity tends to limit itself to a part of the media arena²³¹. That said, the rise of the AfD in the political arena, and its recent entry to the Bundestag, have begun to change and (re)open narrative possibilities toward “political incorrectness” and *völkisch* discourses of national pride in Germany.

3.2. Conflicting uses of British (post)-imperial particularism in its quest of world status

The stories of (de)securitization in British public discourses put in perspective with the German and the French have evidenced a double and interlinked historical legacy at work in British identity and security contemporary narratives: a multi-secular antagonism between Britain and continental Europe and the British Empire. However, in contrast to the German case, the mobilization of British history, be it British heroism in the European world wars, the greatness of the British Empire through its continuity via the Commonwealth, or the British liberal tradition, triggers generally positive emotions in most of the British discourse under study. Whether to foster national pride against the continental other, or to defend multiculturalism and European integration against the rise of nationalism, British narrators express a rather positive reading of British history.

²³¹ Let us note that if Islam is not securitized as such in most German official discourses, that does not mean that they are exempt from xenophobic narratives. For example, German official discourses are soaked with negative rhetoric on Turkish Germans’ lack of adaptation (*Anpassung*).

On the one hand, narrators securitizing continental Europe and/or immigration tend to highlight British particularism in contra-position to the European other. On the other hand, narrators de-securitizing Europe and immigration tend to frame British particularism within a wider European tradition of humanism and liberalism. The former rests on an imperial framing steaming from historical antagonisms between continental Europe and the British Empire, while the later rests on a *post*-imperial framing, steaming from a reading of British history as fundamentally European.

British narrators standing on the upper side of the graph (fig. 7), although they differ according to their identity and security speeches, display some common imperial framing, in which the centrality of history is expressed through a cult of heroism: Britain is considered as the hero of Europe, resisting against Napoleon, German militarism in the WWI, and German expansionism in the WWII (Johnson, 2017; Cameron, 2013, 2016(1); Hitchen, 2015(1); May, 2018):

We are the product of our long history – of the decision of our forebears, of the heroism of our parents and grandparents. (...) Blenheim. Trafalgar. Waterloo. Our country's heroism in the Great War. And most of all our lone stand in 1940, when Britain stood as a bulwark against a new dark age of tyranny and oppression (Cameron, 2016(1)).

This perception of British heroism is coupled with the perception of a weakened or declining British identity (Cameron, 2011; Hitchen, 2012, 2015(1); Batten, 2018(3)), best expressed in Trevor Kavanagh's column "The New Politics of Decline":

This is not the slow, managed decline of an empire looking for a role. It is a sudden, embarrassing discovery that we don't count on the world stage anymore. Thanks to our lumbering Prime Minister, we have been given the unwelcome gift to see ourselves as others see us. And it ain't pretty (Kavanagh, 2009).

The conflation of a high level of historical pride and a perception of decline results in two opposing views of the path to restoring British Greatness: a) *Global Britain*, or the refocus on the former Empire/commonwealth by proponents of leaving the EU, b) and *British Europe*, or the creation of a Greater Britain by proponents of remaining in a British-led EU – mainly supported by PM David Cameron in the British corpus under study. Narrators of *Global Britain*, standing mostly on the upper side of the graph (fig. 7), express the wish to return to strong economic ties with countries of the Commonwealth instead of its European neighbours. The tendency to romanticize the days of the British Empire, when Britannia ruled the waves, emerges in contemporary discourses through a re-orientation toward the Commonwealth. For example, Nigel Farage expressed a preference for trade with and migrants from the Commonwealth rather than relations with Europe:

Out there trading with countries that have growth rates of six, seven, ten per cent a year. Not hemmed in by the European Union – but open to the Commonwealth. Not headed by my old pal Herman Achille van Rompuy but by the Queen. Our real friends in the Commonwealth (Farage, 2013)

I have to confess I do have a slight preference... I do think naturally that people from India or Australia are in some ways more likely to speak English, understand common law and have a connection with this country than some people that come perhaps from countries that haven't fully recovered from being behind the Iron Curtain (Farage, 2015).

These declarations interestingly link three core narratives of British contemporary nationalism: the legacy of the British Empire, the antagonism with Europe, and the hatred of communism. Similarly, in her 2017 speech on the government's plans for Brexit, Theresa May referred to the Commonwealth as a "reminder of our unique and proud global relationships" and called for the restoration of British "role as a great, global, trading nation"²³². This goes hands in hands with a designation of continental Europe as multisecular enemy, and the EU as a continuation of previous attempts at domination from the continent:

You have done what Philip of Spain, what Napoleon, what Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler couldn't do: you have brought Britain to its knees, without firing a single shot (Batten, 2019)

Such political discourse has been interpreted as a kind of "imperial nostalgia", when Britain has gradually become an equal alongside other EU Member States in European integration, while simultaneously losing her place as first among equals in the Commonwealth. This particular uninhibited reading of British history as a trigger of national pride stems from two historical particularities that discriminate Britain from its French and German counterparts. On the one hand, Britain did not address its imperial past as a "dark past" as Germany confronted national socialism, nor as a "conflicting memory" as France is uneasy with respect to the loss of Algeria. On the other, according to Sally Tomlinson, Britain has not lost a war, so the British elite never had to question themselves in the way the German elite had to. Another interpretation supported by Linda Colley, is that the British are more inclined than the Germans and the French to perceive a unified Europe as a threat because they have so often fought against continental European states, but also because of rising doubts about Britishness in the present. According to her, "the Other in the shape of militant Catholicism, or a hostile Continental European power, or an exotic overseas empire is no longer available to make Britons feel that – by contrast – they have an identity in common" (Colley, 2003: 7). Besides, as Fintan O'Toole notes in his 2018 interpretation of Brexit, "the imaginary existential struggle between the gallant English Resistance and the Euroreich was already being played out in one part of English consciousness" (O'Toole, 2018: 98-99). According to him, "war was – and remains – crucial in structuring English feelings about the European Union. In 1975 [referendum campaign], many of the leading advocates on both sides were veterans, as were many voters. But instead of this common experience creating a common emotional ideal of Britain's relationship to Europe, it fed two completely opposite stories, each very deeply felt" (O'Toole, 2018: 90). Hence, the horror

²³² "Theresa May's Speech Laying Out the U.K's Plan for Brexit", *The Time*, January 17th <https://time.com/4636141/theresa-may-brexite-speech-transcript/>

of the world wars left a contradictory legacy in British imaginary. On the one hand, the trauma led part of the British political elite, among which most narrators of the panel standing on the upper side of the graph, to refuse to bend the knee on an EU felt as a reminiscence of German expansionism. As Saunders writes, “for some, (...) the surrender of national sovereignty to the EEC was a betrayal of all those who had fought and died “to deliver Europe from Nazi dictatorship” (Saunders, 2018: 25). On the other, the catastrophic experience of the two world wars and the first half of 20th century Europe carried two traumatic lessons expressed in Cameron pro-European stands: European nationalisms led to war and Britain could not stand aside from the fate of Europe (O’Toole, 2018: 91):

For 2,000 years, our affairs have been intertwined with the affairs of Europe. For good or ill, we have written Europe’s history just as Europe has helped to write ours. From Caesar’s legions to the wars of the Spanish Succession, from the Napoleonic Wars to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Proud as we are of our global reach and our global connections, Britain has always been a European power, and we always will be (Cameron, 2016).

David Cameron defended a vision of using British imperial experience to lead Europe, against a Tory interpretation of British imperial history that would foster populism and nationalism. Put it in a nutshell, “Europe,” Anthony Barnett writes, “moved on from the Second World War and Britain didn’t” (Barnet, 2017: 278).

On the other hand, British narrators framing the British self within a European in-group also narrate their preferences according to a particular historical vision of the British self as humanist, outward-looking, and tolerant – see Grodon Brown’s 2004 declaration on British roots (*op cit* p. 309). For example, Labour MP Sarah Champion insists on “British liberal and human rights tradition” (Champion, 2017(1)) and Conservative Sayeeda Warsi evokes British “strong record of promoting human rights both domestically and internationally (and playing) a leading role in establishing the post-war international human rights framework” (Warsi, 2017). Columnist Nesrine Malik also evokes British history of multicultural tolerance, through the example of London:

All the layers that the place has accumulated over the years, all its history, its small tolerances and cheek-by-jowl living and commuting have made it at once both reserved and welcoming (Malik, 2017).

Lib Dem leaders refer repeatedly to British history and the British tradition of liberalism, understood as tolerance and openness to the world and Europe:

Because someone has to stand up for the liberal Britain in which we and millions of decent, reasonable people believe. For tolerance, compassion, openness, unity – the values this party holds so dear. (...) [Conservatives] want to scrap the universal human rights Brits have enjoyed since the days of Winston Churchill (Clegg, 2014).

But it can be done... And I am determined that our party should be at the heart of it, leading the Resistance to the forces of illiberalism. Leading a crusade to give the people the final say on our future in Europe, and looking outwards to a changing world, with confidence and determination that our values will outlast and out-class the forces ranged against them (Cable, 2018[2]).

Such construction of the British self as historically outward looking goes in pair with an integration of Britain within European history as well as the use of European historical divisions as a scaremonger. For example, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn refers to European division during the Cold War (Corbyn, 2016) while Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby reminds “the titanic [European] struggle between different ideologies which began in 1914 and ended in 1989” (Welby, 2016(1)). Finally, this post-imperial framing of Britishness focuses on the need to look toward the future rather than toward the past. For example, both the Lib Dem leaders and the Greens’ leaders present themselves as governments of the future (Cable, 2017(2); Bartley, 2018). According to Jeremy Corbyn, “Britain needs to stay in the EU as the best framework for trade, manufacturing, and cooperation in 21st century Europe” (Corbyn, 2016). According to Jonathan Bartley, “[t]hey are symbols of the past which have no place in a future in which people and the planet can thrive” (Bartley, 2017). In this scenario, continued membership of the European Union is the only way to secure British “liberal values” under the nationalist and populist threat of “imperial nostalgia”:

No wonder Boris and the Brexiteers are so frightened of the people...and the facts. They now believe in the slogan of dictators everywhere: ‘one person, one vote, once!’. I am a grandparent. I am concerned about the country my grandchildren will inherit. I am already getting a colourful correspondence from people of my own generation claiming that I have betrayed them. That I have given up too easily on reinventing the British Empire and on the dream of Britain without foreigners. (...) And while France is modernising, Britain is lurching down a nostalgic cul-de-sac of Brexit. (Cable, 2017[2])

They are symbols of the past which have no place in a future in which people and planet can thrive (Bartley, 2017)

Hence, discourses on Islam, security and identity have unravelled struggles in the British political and media set up to find a place in the sun in the post-imperial era, characterized by European integration. In these struggles, three different uses of history emerged: a) the imperial set-up, divided into *Global Britain* that wishes to restore British imperial greatness through a special relationship to the Commonwealth, the Anglosphere, and a withdrawal from the EU; and *British Europe* advocated by PM David Cameron, who offers to make Britain great again within a British-led EU; b) the post-imperial set up, advocating for a *New Britain* that abandons its position as *primo inter pares* and accepts a horizontal position within a strong and cooperative Europe.

While right-wing extremism seemed vital in the German case for domesticating the tension between traumatic legacies of National Socialism and the GDR, continental Europe seems pivotal in British political narratives to make sense of British (un)particular status in the new post-imperial and Europeanized order. The narrative study of British contemporary public discourses on Islam, identity, and security, indicates that the continental Other, from militant Catholicism and hostile power to Brussels and the “jungle of Calais”, is more

structuring than the Muslim Other in catalysing ontological insecurities. With respect to British imperial interactions with Islam in the *long durée* explored in chapter 3, it seems that the British imperial framing of the British self reveals some continuities in its narrative construction of the self/other nexus, particularly regarding its counter-identification to European powers yesterday and the EU today. Yet, British historical religious, political, economic, and military relations with Europe for good or for worst, seems to weight heavier than Islam in the narrative catalysing of ontological insecurities. Although discourses of securitization of Islamist ideology are well embedded in the British PMs' cluster, discourses of securitization of Islam as a threat to British identity are marginal compared to that of securitization of continental Europe as a threat to British societal and political securities. The shift of UKIP's leadership from Europhobic Nigel Farage to Islamophobic Gerard Batten might have been a sign of reorientation of British nationalism toward a rising securitization of Islam in the British political arena. Yet, the loss of UKIP's representativeness following such change of leadership and following the Brexit vote supports the hypothesis that the EU works as a more structuring threat than Islam in public discourses.

3.3. Colonial aphasia vs. post-colonial recognition in French national narratives

Finally, stories of (de)securitization of Islam in French public discourses put in perspective with the German and the British has unravelled a tension in French national narratives, reflecting a deeper conflicting memory opposing colonial aphasia to post-colonial recognition. On the one hand, narrators securitizing Islam and Muslims through ideological *laïcité*, standing mostly on the left-hand side of the graph, rests on what Ann Stoler conceptualized as “colonial aphasia”, while those de-securitizing Islam and Muslims through constitutional *laïcité*, standing on the right side of the graph, articulate around the recognition of French colonial past and post-colonial French Muslims. This narrative battle between colonial aphasia and post-colonial recognition at play in stories of (de)securitization is expressed in three narrative sub-battles: 1) the (historical) framing of Islam and Muslims as hostile and violent against the call for recognition of Islamophobia in France; 2) the call for assimilation against the call for integration; 3) the occlusion of French colonial past in discourses about Islam and Muslims against the call for recognition of the importance of French colonial past.

First, the counter identification of French identity to Islam crystalized during French colonization in the MENA region, and particularly in Algeria (Scott, 2007; Lorcerie, 2007; Bancel, 2005; Davidson, 2012; Shepard, 2013) and manifests in the contemporary framing of the Islamic veil as both a symbol of the Islamic

threat and an antithesis to the French Republic. In the corpus under study, starting in 2009, beginning of the 2010s, the “*burka*” or full veil is framed as a threat to national identity and cohesion:

First, the simple scarf placed on the hair has, here and there in the neighbourhoods, transformed into a full veil covering the entire face, except for the eyes. Then, its followers are no longer only foreign nationals, but, for the most part, French women, born and raised here (Thréard, 2009).

The fact that women wear it with their consent, or say they do, does not take anything away from its violence. Quite the contrary. Accepting and even defending the right to humiliation illustrates the capacity of such a sectarian mentality to proselytise nuisance. (...) No matter what they say outside, fully veiled women are not citizens like others. Some have decided to wear it out of mystical delirium, just as others believe they have to give all their savings to a sect (Fourest, 2010).

If the burqa or even the veil displeases so many of our fellow citizens, it is not only because it limits gender mixing, but because it contravenes gender equality. Behind the wearing of the veil, there is the idea that it is I, the woman, who is responsible for man's sin. This is unbearable, and not only to militant feminists (Badinter, 2013).

And, after the summer of 2016, the “*burkini*” became a subject of suspicion, considered both a sign of communitarianism and a provocation of political Islam:

While some claimed that communitarianism has developed, proselytising has taken place in mosques and elsewhere, Islamic militancy has become increasingly virulent and provocative. Even on the beaches, where the burkini port has become comfortable (Thréard, 2016). Let us add to this the laxity of the authorities towards an unbridled Islamist communitarianism financed by foreign powers. A country that (...) tolerates the forced entry of women in burkini into a swimming pool (...) (Dupont-Aignan, 2019)

Such framing was already alive during the conquest of Algeria, which General Bugeaud, the administrator of the Algerian territory in the 1840s, depicted by metaphors of unveiling:

“The Arabs elude us, because they conceal their women from our gaze” (Scott, 2007: 55).

It was not the 9/11 and the fear of Islamic terrorism that politicized the wearing of the veil, but the Algerian war, when women became objects of attention for both sides, and the veil acquired political significance. It was at that time that the veil was first associated with dangerous militancy when the FLN (National Liberation Front) was using veiled women to transport weapons and bombs past security checkpoints. On the other side, supporters of French Algeria encouraged Muslim women to get rid of their veil to become free French citizens. Unveiling women was both a way of depriving the rebels of a war weapon, and a sign of progress, freedom, and assimilation. Hence, even before the war on terror, the continuum between headscarves and terrorism was there, out of suspicion from postcolonial immigrants and of the civil war in Algeria. Such historical frames continue in French public discourses. In 2003, French President Jacques Chirac stated that: “*Like it or not, wearing a veil is a kind of aggression*”²³³. One decade later, the Socialist PM Manuel Valls followed his footsteps

²³³ Cited in Thomas Deltombe, *L'Islam imaginaire, La construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France, 1975–2005*, Paris, La Découverte, 2005, p. 347.

by stating: “*the veil that forbids women to be what they are will remain for me and must remain for the Republic an essential combat*” (Valls, 2013). The fear of Islam has coloured the perception of the Islamic headscarf in terms of the equation “headscarf = Islam = communitarianism = terrorism”.

On the other hand, narrators on the de-securitizing side tend to counter such narrative construction by calling for the recognition of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim prejudices as a colonial legacy:

In this context, one of our concerns will be the obvious rise of Islamophobia in our country. When we advocate this or that measure, possibly this or that law, we will have to ask ourselves whether it is stigmatising for certain people, whether it contributes to appeasing or hardening relations between the French (Bianco, 2013).

Secondly, because in France, for a long time under the weight of a colonial past that has never really been resolved and, more recently, under the effect of the trivialization of Islamophobia since the New York attacks of 2001, the Muslim question holds the key to our relationship with the world and with others, depending on whether it is unraveled or exacerbated, whether it is soothed by reason or agitated by passion (Plenel, 2013).

Second, stories of securitization of Islam and Muslims unravelled the colonial legacy of assimilationism.

Promoters of ideological *laïcité* frame an assimilationist interpretation of integration:

You are a French citizen because you share with the French people the values and principles of French civilization! This sharing is called assimilation and it has been the program of the Republic for 200 years (Sarkozy, 2015(1)).

It is time to return to the foundations of the republic. The republic is assimilation, not communitarianism (Wauquiez, 2015(2)).

I have demanded administrative control of the Muslim faith until its integration into the Republic is complete (Fillon, 2016(1)).

Such assimilationist claims bear resonance with France’s colonial *mission civilisatrice* that advocated the turning of colonial subjects into French citizens by the bringing of republican, secular, universalist values (see Conklin, 1997). After 1865, the civilising mission translated into the *politique d’assimilation*, which consisted in according to naturalisation to Algerians that gave up their personal status, be it mosaic or koranic²³⁴. Such assimilationist policy was based on the idea that the contact with French administration would naturally lead the population to acknowledge the superiority of the colonial system and therefore abandon their belongings based on religion. According to Bancel (2005), the *politique d’assimilation* is therefore the republican concrete application of the French civilizing mission, which was at once instrumental and ideological. A metropolitan idealism that was never implemented within the Muslim majorities, both in Algeria and the Levant, and a rhetorical tool because it endured in political discourses advocating the colonisation, long after it was abandoned on the field (Bancel, 2005)²³⁵. The legacy of assimilationism also resonates in contemporary

²³⁴ The conflict between France and Islam, enunciated at first in military terms and then in social and identity terms, was evident in a law of 1919 that extended naturalization only to those Arab men willing to abandon their “indigenous” status, i.e. Islamic law.

²³⁵ According to him, assimilationism was also an opportunist consensual ideology to reconcile strong political struggles and class conflicts at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th. It projected the patriotic and military wound caused by the loss of

discourse through the civilizational clash, which did not emerge in France with the war on terror as it did in other Western countries. The 9/11 attacks exacerbated rather than created the discourse of the “clash of civilization” that was already cemented in French political discourse (Scott, 2007: 74, 79). According to Françoise Lorcerie, Huntington’s clash of civilizations even recycled 19th century savant discourse developed by Ernest Renan, in the margin of imperial expansionism (Lorcerie, 2007: 509) (see chapter 3). Such historical precedent would explain the resonance of civilizational narratives in contemporary French public discourse:

This is the condition to ward off the perils that threaten our freedom, to protect our loved ones, to preserve our way of life, our model of civilization, everything we love (Sarkozy, 2015(2)).

The barbarian triumphs when the civilised has already surrendered, too exhausted to resist him. The question deserves to be asked in the worried and tired France of 2016 (Bruckner, 2016).

The burkini is not a Koranic prescription, but the umpteenth manifestation of a political, militant, destructive Islam that seeks to question our way of life, our culture, our civilization (Thréard, 2016).

[Islam] is a community project and a social project that competes with our own as soon as they are pushed to the end of their logic. Yet, Muslims must understand and admit that exotic and political Islam is contrary to France, to the Republic and to democracy, in short to our open civilization where the secularization of the temporal sphere, individual liberties and equality between men and women, are irreducible and non-negotiable. (Dupont-Aignan, 2016).

The breakdown of our growth and the explosion of unemployment, the fragmentation of Europe and Brexit, Islamic totalitarianism, and the threat to our civilization: in these times of gusts of wind, we should have had a Policy with a great P. But we have had Holland and its anaphors (Fillon, 2016(1)).

As a matter of fact, French commentators who tend to incriminate the founding texts of Islam make the same arguments as orientalist such as Ernest Renan (see chapter 3, section 1.3.), who claim the incompatibility of Islam with the French Republic:

Islam is the most complete negation of Europe (Renan, 1862)²³⁶.

The first taboo around the Koran is that of its origins. A text without context, say the specialists. That is to say, a text that appeared out of nowhere, which cannot be put into perspective with any other written text, as is possible with the New Testament, which stems from the Old, as well as with countless early Christian texts that swarmed around at that time. With the Koran, none of this is possible. Mystics will say that it is proof of his holiness. The rationale will be more doubtful. The answer to this question will take a long time to find, because the Koran has not benefited from as many studies as the Christian texts. Why has this been the case? A single question is enough to burn one’s fingers. Who wrote the Quran? To ask this question, which assumes that authors other than Mohammed were involved in its writing, is almost blasphemous. For, since the twelfth century, discussion of the Qur’an has been forbidden, and Islam has since locked itself up in a bubble where all Muslims are prisoners (Riss, 2015).

Not that Sharia is always the more or less mediaeval set of obligations that we often like to describe, nor that the laws that refer to it always take it at face value. But finally, in its rigorous version, such as it is practiced in several

Alsace-Lorraine onto overseas colonisation while convincing the Republicanist, advocating to continue spreading the values of the French Revolution through the civilising mission (Bancel, 2005).

²³⁶ “De la part des peuples sémitiques dans l’histoire de la civilisation”, opening speech of the Hebrew, Chaldaic and Syriac language course at the Collège de France, 21 February 1862, in: *Œuvres complètes de Ernest Renan*, definitive edition established by par Henriette Psichari, Paris, Calmann Lévy, t. II, 1948, p. 332-333.

Muslim countries, here is a doctrine that advocates the whip for homosexuals or the death penalty for apostates! (Joffrin, 2016)

On the other hand, proponents of constitutional *laïcité* call for a pluralist interpretation of integration and denounce the lack of recognition of French colonial fracture and of French Muslim's citizenship:

Assigned, in France, to a demand for assimilation, an old colonial myth in which the Other (the indigenous yesterday, the immigrant today) is summoned to forget and erase himself in order to be accepted, these populations are thus sent back to the bosom of their country, by the blindness of our own rulers, to a demand for submission, where freedom is only tolerated on the condition of conformism and follow-my-leaderism, and thus, there again, of self-forgetfulness (Plenel, 2011).

All the most anxiety-provoking theories find a favourable breeding ground to prosper in a France that is struggling to digest its colonial past. There are cries of "civil war", "internal enemies" are denounced, and the witch hunt begins (Diallo, 2015(1)).

Fifty-five years later, all the French people who left a part of their hearts in Algeria, who have a part of their history there that divided them too often and too long, are coming together. I want them to help us elaborate and tell a shared history of Algeria and colonisation and a way to remember it. The peace of arms and the independence was in 1962, fifty-five years ago with the Evian Agreements, but the peace in the hearts is not yet there. It is time, and I will do everything for it, that it happens (Hamon, 2017(2)).

Finally, the colonial legacy also emerges in public discourses on Islam and Muslim in a struggle between the occlusion of French colonial past on the one side, and repeated attempts at critically recognizing French colonial fracture on the other.

The former emerges in narratives in three different ways: 1) a deafening silence about the colonisation of Algeria, as expressed in Marine Le Pen's insistence on French "great discoveries":

There was a time when France was discovering the four corners of the globe. A time when Jacques Cartier opened the St. Lawrence River to the Old World. A time when the French explored the entire Mississippi Valley. A time when missionaries from France travelled to the kingdoms of Asia (...) A time when France was the beacon of freedom. A time when all the oppressed of the world saw in France the symbol of the struggle against tyranny. A time when France abolished slavery before any other nation. A time when, wherever the wind of independence was blowing, the French declared: "All men are born and remain free and equal in rights". France was the civilization of freedom and reason" (Le Pen, 2016(2)).

2) The denunciation of a so-called "colonial lobby", as is the case for Pascal Bruckner:

"Colonialism" has become a catchword that no longer designates a precise historical process, but the whole of what different lobbies, and notably that of the Islamists, challenge in France, the republican ideal, secularism, equality between men and women. It should be noted, moreover, that French people of Vietnamese, Cambodian or Chinese origin rarely use this argument to explain their difficulties (Bruckner, 2014).

3) The condemning of a permanent "repentance" with respect to France's colonial history, without ever explicitly referring to the colonisation of Algeria, accusing a so-called "bad conscience" of the Left:

A few years ago, it was fashionable in certain circles to denigrate our country and mock its fundamental principles and symbols (Fillon, 2009).

Why does it persist in encouraging the cult of origins, the war of memories, the unbearable repentance that sets the French against each other when the Republic must unite because it is indivisible? (Sarkozy, 2015(1)) A weak thought would be that we should pay for our interference in Muslim countries (Bruckner, 2015)²³⁷.

The latter, which is a minority in the French corpus under study, is instanced in what their opponents call the “multicultural left” or “*Islamogauchistes*”, embodied by Benoît Hamon, Edwy Plenel, and Rokhaya Diallo:

Fifty-five years later, all the French who have left a part of their hearts in Algeria, who have a part of their history there that too often and for too long divided them, are reunited. I want them to help us elaborate and tell a shared history of Algeria and colonisation and a way to remember it. The peace of arms and independence was in 1962, fifty-five years ago with the Evian Accords, but peace in hearts is not there. It is time, I will do everything I can to make it happen (Hamon, 2017(2)).

Secondly, because in France, for a long time under the weight of a colonial past that was never really resolved and, more recently, under the effect of the trivialization of Islamophobia since the New York attacks of 2001, the Muslim question holds the key to our relationship to the world and to others, depending on whether we unravel it or exacerbate it, whether we appease it with reason or stir it with passion (Plenel, 2013).

Civilizational anxieties, identity obsessions, fantasies of purification of the “French strain”? All the most anxiety-provoking theories find a fertile ground to flourish in a France that is struggling to digest its colonial past. The “civil war” is shouted, “internal enemies” are denounced, the witch hunt begins (Diallo, 2015(1)).

Hence, in contrast to with the British case, where the imperial legacy was expressed partly by a so-called “imperial nostalgia”, French colonial legacies resemble what Ann Stoler (2016) conceptualised as “colonial aphasia”. According to her, imperial/colonial nostalgia or amnesia (Noiriel, 1996; Ross, 1996; Donadey, 1999; De L’Estoile, 2007; Shepard, 2008) are misleading terms in France, since “very little of these histories has been or is actually forgotten: it may be displaced, occluded from view, or rendered inappropriate to pursue (...). But it is neither forgotten nor absent from contemporary life” (Stoler, 2016: 128). Hence, she suggested the term aphasia, which “captures not only the nature of that blockage but also the feature of loss. (...) In aphasia, an occlusion of knowledge is the issue. It is not a matter of ignorance or absence” (*ibid*). She follows Herman Lebovics’ argument according to which the foundational myths of French cultural identity disallowed genealogies of empire as part of the true France, which “political blueprint” relegated “empire to a national extension” so that “native cultures” could be incorporated in the first half of the twentieth century only if they were wrapped “within the high culture of European France” (Lebovics, 1994: 57)²³⁸. Hence, aphasia is expressed in narratives in the simultaneous presence of a thing and its absence, its presence, and the misrecognition of it (Stoler, 2016: 157).

²³⁷ In his *La Tyrannie de la pénitence: essai sur le masochisme occidental*, Pascal Bruckner considers the condemnation of French colonization as part of a “repentance epidemic” (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2008, p. 59).

²³⁸ Lebovics, *True France; The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994: 57 - cited in Stoler, 2016: 151).

Such colonial aphasia was turned once into colonial nostalgia, as indicated by the 23 February 2005 French law on colonialism, which article 4 imposed on high schools' teachers a requirement to teach the "positive values of the French colonial presence overseas, particularly with respect to North Africa". According to Joan Scott, such law "was one of those amazing moments in which an official action designed to conceal something actually reveals what it most wants to hide: in this case the fact that the colonial past, with its legacy of discrimination against, and denigration of, North Africans and Muslims, continued to trouble the nation in ways that seemed endless and insoluble" (Scott, 2007: 87).

In short, the tension on the French self, expressed in the narrative struggle on *laïcité* brought out a French colonial legacy opposing colonial aphasia, expressed in the mobilization of an assimilationist and ideological *laïcité*, to post-colonial recognition, expressed in the mobilisation of a constitutional and pluralist *laïcité*. With respect to the French colonial interactions with Islam in the *long durée* explored in chapter 3, it seems that the French case also reveals some continuities in its narrative construction of the self/other nexus, both in the French self-definition in contra-identification to Islam and the continuation of the civilizing mission through an assimilationist interpretation of integration. Hence, the colonial experience, and with it the trauma of the decolonization of Algeria, is the overarching legacy in France that still underpins French discourses on French identity. This trauma is expressed in narratives in a *displacement*, a *dismembering*, a *difficulty in speaking* about it (Stoler, 2016: 128).

Summary

The detailed analysis of stories of (de)securitization in the European corpus has revealed key convergences and divergences regarding the construction of the self/other nexus in European narratives. On the one hand, these stories have shown cross-European struggles on framing liberalism either as European way of life or as a way of managing de facto multicultural societies, struggles that tend to embrace partisan preferences across Europe. On the other hand, specific expressions of such tensions in the three different European semantic repertoires have brought out specific historical legacies in each European case. Although those historical specificities express differently a common struggle in defining Western European national selves in a post-imperial and Europeanized order, they have contrasting impacts on the (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims. In the German corpus under study, right-wing extremism appears vital for domesticating the tension between traumatic legacies of National Socialism and the GDR, which have more impact in contemporary identity narratives than sedimented interaction with Islam, therefore mitigating securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims in official discourses and confining them to the media sphere. In the British

case, continental Europe is key to make sense of British (un)particular status in the new post-imperial and Europeanized order, confining the securitizing moves to the object of Islamism and Islamic inspired terrorism. Finally, in the French case, Islam is constitutive of French national identification, allowing the continued illusion of French civilizing mission in the post-colonial and post-war eras marked by the loss of international status, which may explain the over representation of French narrators on the securitizing side of the panel.

In sum, the comparison has highlighted how specific historical legacies constituted specific repertoires of securitization: the German historical legacy of National-Socialism seems to be a privileged repertoire of securitizing right-wing extremism, while the British imperial legacy appears as a privileged repertoire of securitizing continental Europe, and French colonial legacy as a privileged repertoire of securitization of Islam.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion and future research

To conclude this long-term reflection, I would like to highlight some key points.

This thesis asked the question: *how does the construction of Islam and Muslims as threats in public discourses vary from one national context to another in an integrated region such as Western Europe?* Rather than explaining, this research aimed at offering a thick description of convergences and divergences in framing the threats and the referents of security in three Western European discursive fields, i.e., Germany, Britain, and France. To do so, I rested on the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, studying the discursive construction of threats, aiming at criticising it by suggesting a narrative, comparative, and historical investigation of securitizing processes. The first claim of this research was therefore that narratives were primordial in understanding the processes of securitization, which varied from a socio-historical context to another, through specific semantic repertoires. Secondly, I wondered the extent to which such semantic repertoires were imprinted with historical sediment steaming from specific interactions with the Orient. In sum, this dissertation questioned the way historical representations of Islam and Muslims reverberated in contemporary discourses of (de)securitization, creating a bridge between history and historical sociology, working on imperialism, colonialism, and orientalism, and political science and IR, working on the contemporary processes of securitization.

My research was a qualitative interpretative and comparative study of securitization and de-securitization of Islam, resting on the narrative analysis of public discourses. After a deep historical contextualization of the interactions of Germany, Britain, and France with the then called "Orient" at the turn of the 20th century in chapter 3, I compared the discourses on Islam and Muslims in German, British, and French public discourses between 2009 and 2019, taken first as national corpuses in the chapters 4 to 6, and then as one unique European corpus in the 7th chapter. In each of these empirical chapters, discourses were reconstructed through a narrative analysis highlighting ideal-typical settings, characterizations, and plots. Next, I assessed the extent of securitization and de-securitization moves toward Islam and Muslim among and across the three European cases, and identified convergences and divergences. Finally, I tried to interpret these variations by evaluating the weight and uses of national memories in public discourses.

In answer to the research question, I validated the first argument according to which narrative constructions of a same object varied depending on national semantic repertoires, specific meta-narratives, and proper historical analogies. In the German case, the stories of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslims revolved around narrative struggles and negotiations between a cultural (*Leitkultur*) and post-cultural

(*Verfassungspatriotismus*) vision of Germaness, and therefore on the nodal point of culture. In the British case, securitizing moves were performed through the nodal point of liberalism, displaying narrative negotiations between two conceptions of liberalism, as British way of life, which implicitly refers to a British “culture”, or as British *modus vivendi*. Finally, in the French case, such securitizing processes focused on the struggle between ideological and constitutional *laïcité*, and therefore on the nodal point of religion. However, some nuances can be made. Although variations exist between the three elements of narrations, i.e., settings, characterizations, and plots, political actors use the same rhetorical toolbox to mobilise consent of the audience, whatever the socio-cultural context – only a few exceptions aside. Besides, as shown by the comparative chapter, some ideal-typical elements of narratives are common to the European corpus. Finally, if national variations were significant in the *expressions* of securitization and de-securitization of Islam and Muslims, the *performance* of securitizing and de-securitizing tend to embrace rather partisan preferences. For example, generally speaking, European so-called conservatives and self-defined or designated “populists” tend to securitize globalization, immigration, and/or Islam as culture or religion, while European self-defined or designated liberal or socio-democrats tend to de-securitize those objects through alternative securitizations. However, relatively speaking, British conservatives perform less securitizing moves toward Islam than their European counterparts. Conversely, French socialists, self-assumed as progressives, tend to perform more securitizing moves toward Islam than their European counterparts, due to a post-colonial framing of *laïcité* as a privileged repertoire of securitization. Furthermore, so-called liberal or social democrats tend to securitize more when in power than in opposition, while conservatives and so-called “populists” perform those securitizing moves both in and out of power. Securitization seems therefore opportunistic for the former and programmatic or structural for the latter.

The second argument, according to which varying orientalisms crystallized at the turn of the 20th century would inform the way Islam and Muslim are being securitized or de-securitized in contemporary public discourses, was partly infirmed. Although some narratives are persistent throughout the century, and French colonial legacy appeared as a privilege repertoire of securitization, it became clear that other historical experiences, such as the trauma of National Socialism or the rivalry between the British Empire and continental Europe, weighted heavier than imperial relations to the East in contemporary discourses on Islam and Muslim in Germany and Britain.

My work contributed thereby to both the literature on securitization and the literature on orientalism. First, it provided a more nuanced and embedded way to study and reconstruct securitizing and de-securitizing moves. Further, it offered a less homogeneous and reifying study on European orientalisms and gave a strong

example of the way history reverberates, sediments, or fades away from national narratives and collective memories.

In the following, I recap the main research findings and answer the research question (8.1.). Next, I stress the implications of these new insights, as well as my theoretical argument for and methodological contribution to research on securitization (8.2.) and the study of orientalism and the construction of the self/other nexus in IR (8.3). In a final section, I address the main limitations of my research and suggest new avenues of development for further research (8.4).

8.1. Main findings

In the search to answer the question *how does the securitization of Islam and Muslims in public discourses vary from one national context to another*, I first found that securitization could not be reduced to a speech-act resting on the sole authority and will of the speaker. Rather, securitizing actions are speech-acts if, and only if, certain conditions are met, of which the mobilization of constraining and pre-existing narrative resources that vary according to the context in which they are performed and allow the resonance with the audience, is mandatory.

Upon detailed narrative analysis of three European discursive corpuses, I found that securitizing and de-securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims were performed through narrative wars specific to each discursive context. In the German case, narrative wars on immigration and Islam highlighted how “constitutional patriotism” had become a top-down hegemonic project of re-imagination of the German self post reunification that seems to have somehow mitigated some securitizing moves toward Islam in the political arena. The promotion of constitutional patriotism was found to have a tendency to go hand in hand with de-securitizing moves toward Islam and securitizing moves towards right-wing extremism as greater threat to Germany. In contraposition, the explicit or implicit return of culture-based narratives within some securitizing discourses on Islam appear as a counter-hegemonic discourse around the revivalism of a cultural version of German *Leitkultur* against migrants and/or Muslims. In the British case, although security and identity narratives targeting *directly* Islam were harder to find, some British discourses displayed securitizing moves that *indirectly* impacted British Muslims and Islam in Britain via the securitization of immigration, including Muslim migrants, conflated with that of European integration, and the securitization of Islamist extremism as an ideological threat to Britain’s national security. Those narrative battles have highlighted how *liberalism as a British way of life* has emerged as a top-down hegemonic discourse of (re)imagination of British particularism at the turn of the 21st century against the perception of both Islamist and continental threats, contrasting with

a *liberalism as British modus vivendi*, framed as the management of different ways of life and mobilized defensively to secure British multicultural tradition against populist and nationalist threats. In the French case, discourses on (de)securitization of Islam have highlighted how French *laïcité*, mobilized as both securitizing and de-securitizing tools vis-à-vis Islam, appeared to be the privileged framework for interpreting sociocultural, identity, and security issues regarding Islam. On the securitizing side, ideological *laïcité*, incarnating French way of life to be secured, has progressively become the socially accepted representation of French secularism and has become equated with modernity, the opening to democracy, and reason, in contraposition to Islam, conflated to tradition, superstition, and fanaticism. On the de-securitizing side, constitutional *laïcité* appears as counter-discourse defending the liberal spirit of the “1905 law”.

Further, through a comparative analysis of the European corpus taken as one and unique case, I found that such specific narrative was actually underpinned a common struggle being fought about European liberalism, either as common values or as common rules. German *Leitkultur*, British “muscular” liberalism, and French ideological *laïcité*, are three narrative versions of what Christian Joppke called “assertive” liberalism (2009), which have become the privileged narrative tools used in securitizing Islam and Muslims since the turn of the 21st century. Notably, the mobilization of this “assertive liberalism” is not exclusive to so-called or self-proclaimed liberals or social democrats in Europe. Both so-called “populists” and so-called “liberals” are involved in securitizing moves under the same banner of liberal (and/or civilizational) values. This means that the securitization of Islam underpins a hegemonic war on the metanarrative of liberalism, which takes on different shades according to the context in which it is mobilized. The French privilege repertoire of securitizing Islam manifests into the debated frame of *laïcité*, underpinning liberalism – called “*républicanisme*” – as a way of life by which newcomers must assimilate and steaming from its specific colonial legacy. The British specific repertoire of securitizing Islam is discursively framed within the debated concept of multiculturalism, underpinning liberalism as a *modus vivendi* for reconciling many ways of life, moving toward a more assimilationist acceptance through the narrative shift toward “community cohesion” and “muscular liberalism”. Finally, the revival of a monocultural reading of German *Leitkultur* to which newcomers must assimilate or be excluded, appears as the favored framework of securitizing Muslim migrants, against a top-down attempt at imposing a multicultural version of integration under the meta-narrative of constitutional patriotism and *wilkommenskultur*.

In contrast, liberalism as common rules of the game, expressed in constitutional patriotism in Germany, liberalism as *modus vivendi* or multiculturalism in Britain, and constitutional *laïcité* in France, appear as a counter discourse, or as a de-securitizing tool for that matter. In the first case, constitutional

patriotism appears as a hegemonic project as it is supported by the actors holding the most authority in the public debate, both in power and running for power. In the second case, liberalism as a multicultural model appears as a tough negotiation, stemming both from political leaders and the media, mostly against the British government. Finally, in the French case, constitutional *laïcité* seems marginal and a counter discourse against a hegemonic project of imposing ideological *laïcité*, i.e., *laïcité* as signifier of French identity itself by the majority of the political and media elites.

Overall, the first set of findings relating to the variable expressions of securitizing and de-securitizing moves towards Islam in the three European contexts implies that:

- Securitizing and de-securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims exist in all three case studies and rest on common rhetoric to obtain the consent of the audience: *emotional* and *binary* tones in case of securitizing moves, displaying a zero-sum game setting and a clash scenario; and *dialectical* and *didactical* tones in case of de-securitizing moves, displaying a win-win game setting and a counter clash scenario. Such findings concur with traditional securitization theory considering securitization as an articulation resting on a universal grammar of security.
- However, securitizing and de-securitizing moves also express through specific elements of narratives that reveal socio-cultural specificities. These findings partly overturn the traditional securitization theory's assumption mentioned above and show that 1) the "West" is not a homogenous securitizing actor and 2) securitization is also a negotiation.
- The study of the (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims in the three European cases provided a single codebook integrating the narrative toolbox of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslim in Britain, France, and Germany, as well as three country-specific codebooks that detail specific expressions, hegemonic projects, mainstream narratives, what is acceptable in a specific audience:
 - The mobilization of foreign or alien culture(s) as object(s) of securitization is more acceptable in the German and the British public fields under study than in the French one, where political actors never publicly target culture. Conversely, the mobilization of alien religion(s) as object(s) of securitization seems more acceptable in the French corpus than in the two others, where it seems of a higher political cost and never mobilized as such.
 - The call for assimilation is still alien to the British political discursive field, even within the most vehemently anti-immigration discourses, and despite the recent interrogation of British multiculturalism. Conversely, the multicultural stance is explicitly supported in British

political discourses of some party leaders, while it remains implicit or confined to the media sphere in the French and the German cases.

- Civilizational rhetoric is more widely spread in the French corpus, where it finds a historical anchor in the *mission civilisatrice*, particularly in comparison to the German and the British corpuses.
- The use of the term Islamophobia is not consensual across the European panel and is politically recognized almost exclusively in the British field.

With respect to my second assumption, that national semantic repertoires are imprinted with historical experiences, I found that narrative wars in contemporary public discourse underpin a common struggle on the way to (re)define a world status in a post-war international order characterized by a constant Europeanization and the loss of European Empires. However, this common struggle reveals once again country-specific historical trauma and overturned, in part, the orientalist hypothesis according to which the interactions with the Middle East at the turn of the 20th century were the founding historical experience that would inform contemporary expressions of securitization. In some cases, historical experiences that carry bigger traumas weight heavier than imperial relations to the East in contemporary discourses on Islam and Muslim.

In the German corpus under study, the securitization of right-wing extremism as an absolute Other was vital to the understanding of the tension between the traumatic legacies of National Socialism and the GDR, which has a greater impact in contemporary identity narratives surrounding Islam, than historical interactions with Islam and the East, thus mitigating securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims in official discourses of the political elite, and confining them to the media sphere. In the British case, the securitization of continental Europe as historical enemy seemed pivotal to make sense of British (un)particular status in the new post-imperial and Europeanized order, therefore confining the securitization of Islam to the objects of Islamism and Islamic inspired terrorism. Finally, in the French case, the Muslim other remained constitutive of French national counter-identification, allowing the continued illusion of the French civilizing mission in the post-colonial and post-war era that is otherwise marked by the loss of international status, which might explain the over representation of French narrators on the securitizing side of the European panel under study.

Overall, the second set of findings relating to the “orientalist” assumption implies that:

- Securitizing narratives should not be read a priori as ruptures but, rather, be questioned in the *long-durée* and the (re)activation of prior and sedimented dichotomies.

- Specific historical interactions with the “Orient” imply specific orientalisms – off-ground and inclined to Islam in Germany, paternalist and romanticized toward the figure of the Arab of the desert in Britain, civilizationist and hostile to Islam in France.
- Historical interactions with the East and the implied orientalisms are not the only historical experiences that inform securitizing and de-securitizing moves toward Islam and Muslims in contemporary discourse. Some historical experiences have left more marks within narratives than others, according to the level of trauma linked to it.
- Consequently, specific historical legacies constitute specific repertoires of securitization: the German historical legacy of National-Socialism seemed to be a favored repertoire of securitizing right-wing extremism, via the meta-narrative of constitutional patriotism, while the British imperial legacy appears as a privileged repertoire of securitizing continental Europe, through the referent of liberalism, and French colonial legacy as a privileged repertoire of securitization of Islam, through the referent of ideological *laïcité*.

The implications of these two sets of findings for scholarship are discussed in the two following sections.

8.2. Implications for research on securitization

These research findings have implications for scholarship on securitization. First, the results of the empirical analysis demonstrates how a narrative approach to securitization provides important insight to the variation – against homogenization – and stability – against volatility – of the securitization process in Western Europe. Second, the present dissertation suggests a methodological contribution to European Security Studies’ agenda, namely, the construction of threats (security from whom?) and the construction of referents of security (security for whom?). Finally, it offers an empirical investigation of the securitization process in the Western European field.

First, theoretically, I contend that the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory faced difficulties to explain variations in levels, degrees, and forms of securitization, as it tends to treat security as a binary notion: either an object is designated and accepted as a security issue, or it is contested and remains within the realm of “normal” politics. In doing so, it neglects contextual factors, and assumed a global and homogeneous securitization of Islam in the West. This might be due to Ole Wæver’s first “internalist” reading of securitization, focused on the *speech-act* event, grounded in the concept of performativity. According to this view, the speech-act itself creates the authority rather than any pre-existing social or cultural context, and the success of a narrative hinges on the ability and power of the narrator telling the story. Such a vision has two

misleading implications: first, securitization was thus perceived as a global and homogeneous phenomenon in the West, and second, it was considered as a clear rupture and novelty since September 11th, 2001. For example, Talal Asad argues the Secular remains the Western epistemic category for confronting and assimilating Islam. Or Luca Mavelli's hypothesis that the securitization of Muslims in Western Europe is an instrumental process of construction and reproduction of secular modes of subjectivity. Both of the above contentions tend to undermine the narrative specific expressions of securitization within their socio-historic context, and was therefore partly infirmed by the present empirical study. Within the three European case studies, France represents actually the ideal-typical expression of Asad and Mavelli's assumptions via the use of *laïcité* as a privileged securitizing tool. However, this narrative framing of *laïcité* is not equivalent to secularism, and second the use of liberalism to politicize or securitize Islamism in Britain did not hinge on secularism but rather on community participation and economic adhesion. Meanwhile the use of cultural narratives to securitize Muslim migrants in Germany did not focus on secularism as the Copenhagen school would have, but rather on economical incapacities, demographic threats, and educational deficiency.

In contrast to this stance, I have suggested a narrative approach to securitization, arguing that understanding *how* actors securitize is not only about understanding the words they use. That the success of a narrative does not rest solely on the ability and power of the narrator telling the story, as suggested by the speech act theory based on universal principles of communication. Rather, mobilizing narratology and embedding securitizing speeches into history, allows the contextualization of securitizing speeches in order to analyze the variable expressions of securitizing and de-securitizing moves, and therefore overturned the Copenhagen School's internalist reading of securitization. As a matter of fact, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Boris Johnson, while holding comparable degrees of authority, do not perform similar securitizing moves since some narratives have a higher political cost according to socio-political context than in another. Narratives cannot be freely changed or manipulated by narrators, but must conform, connect to, or overlap with previously existing ones. Moreover, the narrative must be sufficiently well known and collectively shared to be reliable in communication, as evidenced in the antagonistic mobilization of culture and religion in each context. Securitizing agents such as Nigel Farage, Alexander Gauland, or Marine Le Pen do not operate in a social vacuum and cannot exclude themselves from the narrative environment in which they tell their story of securitization. Marine Le Pen does not identify with Otto von Bismarck and non-interventionism in the Middle East, but rather with the French great colonial past. Conversely, she does not mobilize cultural narratives nor does she warn against demographic threats, as it would not resonate with her target audience where cultural or racial talks are taboo. Rather, she targets the religious identity of the object

of securitization. Conversely, Nigel Farage does not call for the assimilation of migrants in his securitizing moves, since assimilation is not a pay-off narrative strategy. Rather, he recalls the wars of the 20th century and the dangerous hegemonic attempts of European powers to securitize continental Europe, incarnated in Brussels or Berlin, as major threats to Britain's greatness. Finally, Alexander Gauland never refers to German colonial or imperial past in order to flatter the German self, nor does he refer to the religious identity of Muslim migrants. Rather, he relates to cultural incompatibilities as well as economic burdens as a means to securitize immigration in Germany.

Further, the decisionist reading of securitization theory undermines the role of media actors in securitizing processes. Yet, according to my empirical study, narrators of the media set-up clearly participate in the process of securitization, as showed by the example of Trevor Kavanagh and Allison Pearson in Britain, Alice Schwarzer and Henryk Broder in Germany, or Elisabeth Badinter and Pascal Bruckner in France, as well as de-securitization, as exemplified by Kira Cochrane and Nesrine Malik in Britain, and Edwy Plenel and Rokhaya Diallo in France. It means, however, that narratives of (de)securitization are not the same when performed by the head of states and by those actors the media-set up. In the present case studies, the media set-up tends to perform societal securitization toward Islam, revolving around identity and including moral injunctions, while state officials perform traditional securitizing moves toward economic, military, or political threats, involving State solutions.

Second, the present dissertation offers a methodological contribution to the European Security Studies' agenda on the constructions of threats and referents of security in Europe. First, the combination of a narrative approach based on qualitative categories (coded systematically via a codebook) with a structured comparison within and between national cases allows for a clear balance between accounting for collective narratives with as much depth as possible and systematically generating knowledge about collective narratives in the political and media set-ups. It means that researchers do not have to choose between depth on the one hand, or effort towards generalizability on the other. Furthermore, by resting on both operational code analysis, which has proved itself to unravel leaders' mind-sets, and narratology, which uncovers mechanisms of obtaining the audience consent, to code and then reconstruct discourses, I hope to help future researchers on securitization, but also on the construction of the self/other nexus. Finally, this mix method brought to light what content analysis and MCA alone could not, i.e., how the same word, such as liberalism or secularism, can bear different meanings and relate to different realities according to the context, while, conversely, different words or expressions could relate to comparable meanings, such as *bien pensance*, *False Toleranz*, and passive tolerance.

While narrative securitization *could* be studied in a single case, the intensity of the process is best studied in contrast. The comparative methodology, based on the complementarity between the within case narrative analysis that provided idiosyncrasy, and cross-case narrative analysis through a European case, renders explicit the implicitness of collective representations, which remained otherwise invisible to the common. Furthermore, it allows for the refinement of the hypothesis by analytically differentiating between processes of *politicization* and *securitization*. *Politicization* implies the designation of political adversaries in the out-group characterization and challenges in the plot. *Securitization*, implies the designation of enemies in the out-group characterization, and threats in the plot. The former problematizes an object as an issue to be debated in the public space, while the latter is a construction of an object as a security issue, which is not to be debated but rather fought.

In short, by suggesting a narrative theory of securitization, this dissertation offers a narrative contribution to securitization studies as well as national and regional repertoires of (de)securitization in Britain, France, and Germany, which have, so far, never been analysed in a comparative and historical perspective:

- Successful securitization is not an either/or proposition, but rather a continuum of successes and failures. The process of securitization is as much one of narrative *articulation* than one of *negotiations* with audiences, hence the need for resonance, and the existence of contestation and de-securitization moves. (De)securitization is not a zero-sum game where an object is either securitized or not. Rather, it is a constant narrative fight between different sides that constitute the negotiation and redefinition of the national and regional self at a given time.
- Securitization is not always an *event* or a *moment* of rupture, but a cumulative *process* based on the idea of *embeddedness*, that is the dependence of the phenomenon to its environment. Securitizing actors do not create a new regime of truth but reactivate, re-use or embed their securitizing moves within pre-existing repertoires composed of historical analogies.
- Each country has its repertoire of historical and contextual themes with a particular impact on the construction of the threat, and securitization occurs when securitizing discourses tend to become hegemonic, but they are always contested and challenged.

Finally, investigating the narrative of securitizations in the *long durée* provided a better understanding of continuity and stability in representations, as well as ruptures, as I shall expose in the next section.

8.3. Implications for research on orientalism and the self/other nexus in IR

The research findings also have implications for the scholarship on orientalism and the construction of the self/other nexus in International Relations. First, the historical investigation of European interactions with the “Orient” at the turn of the 20th century levelled our knowledge of the German *Weltpolitik* as part of European imperialism. Second, it provided a refined methodology to analyze and compare the different patterns of interactions between the three European countries in question and the Orient. Third, it allowed for the assessment of the actual impact of these differences on the narrative framing of contemporary challenges regarding Islam and Muslims.

First, while there are substantial works on the long-term impact of the British Empire and the French *politique d’expansion coloniale*, few have been published on the German *Weltpolitik* and the relation of Germany to the East since the Wilhelmina era, especially in France. As a matter of fact, even Said’s conceptualization of orientalism excluded Germany from the very beginning of his book. Yet, since its proclamation at Versailles in 1871 and until the First World War, the German *Reich* had become the main power competing with the United Kingdom²³⁹, superseding France. After his advent in 1888, Wilhelm II claimed a place within the concert of nations by replacing Bismarck’s *Realpolitik* with his *Weltpolitik*. In the Orient, this new policy focused on an alliance with the *Sublime Porte*, at the expense of the previous alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the United Kingdom. Even if it eventually collapsed with the First World War, chapter 3 has showed how the *Weltpolitik* “moment”, and especially the Kaiserreich’s *Orientpolitik* in the Ottoman Empire, conformed to a certain extent to the model of informal imperialism inspired by 19th century British imperialism²⁴⁰. Hence, the acknowledgement of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire allowed the qualification of Said’s exclusion of Germany from its study on *Orientalism*. Even though influential German-speaking romanticism and German scholar orientalism is not comparable to the British or the French structural orientalism, they still developed an off-ground and distant discourse on the Eastern other according to an evolving geostrategic interest in the Mediterranean.

Second, Said’s conceptualization of orientalism, Neumann’s genealogy on the “Turkish Other”, or Hansen’s “Western Enlightenment discourse” on the Balkans, appeared somehow monolithic, undifferentiated, and uncontested. Yet, the historical investigation of imperial relations between the three

²³⁹ In 1897, the *Saturday Review* featured “*Germania esse delendam*” by reference to “*Carthago delenda est*” or “Carthago must be destroyed”: https://archive.org/stream/WhoStartedWorldWarTwo/Who%20Started%20World%20War%20Two_djvu.txt, retrieved on August, 6th, 2021.

²⁴⁰ And for good reason, as Wilhelminian Germany had no colonies in the East, like its European counterparts, it could hardly have done otherwise.

Western European countries and the “Orient” showed that neither secularism nor orientalism was a homogenous Western mind-set to frame the Oriental Other. There is no such thing as a unified European – let alone “Western” – “Enlightenment” discourses. While the age of the Enlightenment was a cross-Europe movement, there were great differences, when not oppositions, between the British Enlightenment, the German *Aufklärung*, and the French *Lumières*. The French *Lumières* were based on a fiercely secularist, republican, and revolutionary “ideology of reason”, when the essence of the British Enlightenment rested on liberal and reformist “sociology of virtue”. The German Protestant Enlightenment was thus primarily a utilitarian reform movement deeply committed to the traditional social order. Relatively free from anti-clericalism and rarely opposed to tyrants, the *Aufklärer* saw the State, and by implication the Church, which was subject to it, as the prime vehicle of reform.

Moreover, both Said’s study on orientalism and Neumann’s study on the European “Turkish Other” undermine the possible national specificities that the comparison was able to uncover. Not only the representations of the “Orient” and the “Eastern Other” rest on particular socio-historical contexts, but they were also inseparable from political aims and geostrategic concerns. Inevitably, since the British, French, and Germans were competing and following antagonistic interests and strategies in the Mediterranean in the 19th and 20th centuries, they also constructed different conceptions of the region. After the expedition to Egypt in 1798, narrative productions *of* and *on* the Orient changed. It ceased to be homogeneous and became specific to each national experience with the region. First, spatially, while the Ottoman Empire slowly collapsed, the vast and blurry “Orient” started to cover variable geopolitical conceptions in British, German, and French ruling elites: the *Vorderasien* and its Turkish *Herrenvolk* for the Germans, the Arabic Middle East for the British, and the Levantine Near East and North Africa for the French. Second, ethically and emotionally, the “Eastern Other”, ceased to be homogeneously framed as the “Turkish Saracen”. Rather, for the British travellers, it also became the Romantic Arab of the Desert and the vicious Oriental Christians, allied to the French. For the German-speaking romantics, the “Eastern Other” incarnated the purity of Islam, against Western rationalism, while some German orientalist of the beginning of the 20th century claimed the alliance to Turkish Caliphate against the colonial European enemies. For some French orientalist, the Eastern Other became incarnated in the fanatic and dangerous Muslim, threatening French domination of North Africa, which needed to be taught and governed rather than cooperated with.

Conversely, the *Question d’Orient* manifested itself differently in the three countries under study. German *Orientpolitik* consisted mostly in a rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire since the 1890s and a call for *jihad* against the colonial powers during the First World War. The British Empire’s Eastern policy

largely aimed at an informal empire in the Gulf since the beginning of the 19th century that led to the Trucial States and the support of Arab nationalism during the First World War. Finally, the French Eastern policy evolved toward a nearly exclusive support of Eastern Christianity, the Maronites in particular, and a strategic “retreat” to the Levant at the turn of the 20th century. France’s Levantine-oriented policy acted in the Mediterranean world against pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, both considered as a threat to French domination in North Africa (Khoury, 2006).

Finally, historical master frames do exist and remain expressions of imagined communities and collective identities that can be empirically analysed through narrative analysis. Such empirical investigation allowed the nuance of orientalism as the sole historical legacy weighing on contemporary framings of Islam and Muslims. Although national specificities in the historical relations to the “Eastern other” had lasting effects, some historical moments left more traces in contemporary discourses on Islam and Muslims than others. The German public discourses under study were ambivalent toward Islam, in between top-down recognition and integration and a bottom-up rise of Islamophobia, particularly in East Germany. Such ambivalence has more to do with the traumatic legacy of Nazism and the division of Germany during the Cold War, than Imperial Germany’s relation to the East before WWI. In Britain, the hegemonic narrative of multiculturalism has been challenged by the New Labour’s rhetoric of “community cohesion” in the mid-2000s while, at the same time, successive governments have progressively acknowledged and sanctioned anti-religious prejudices to protect British Muslims. Such narrative tensions have both to do with British historical counter-identification to continental Europe, and its imperial multi-racial relations to religious minorities, and less to do with a romantic construction of the Middle East. Finally, the French public discourses are punctuated with regular controversy on the compatibility between Islam and the French Republic or French *laïcité*, which illustrates a certain continuity with French historical counter-identification to Islam dating back to its colonial enterprise in North Africa. However, this research presents several limitations and needs further development, as I shall expose in the next section.

8. 4. Limitations and further research

First of all, the proposed comparative methodology is still experimental and needs further refinement to overcome biases.

However relevant an interpretative methodology was to this dissertation, it is not free of bias. The researcher’s attempts at understanding also impacts knowledge production. In this dissertation, I likely highlighted stories that another researcher may have determined of lesser importance or might have interpreted

from a different perspective – and conversely. It would be presumptuous to believe that I or any single person could *wholly* and *objectively* interpret a given human behavior. I attempted and provided an interpretation that is hopefully convincing, for a time, in a given scientific discourse, while remaining conscious of and trying to limit my own bias. Besides, human coding entails a degree of subjectivity and interpretation. For example, the categories I developed or refined to reconstruct the narrative analysis of the European corpuses, following an ideal-typical characterization, are reifying, simplistic, and above all arbitrary. First, they do not render reality in an exhaustive manner. Second, they are subjective, in the sense that another researcher undertaking the same research would have in all likelihood chosen other analogies, and therefore coined those ideal-typical discourses otherwise. Such risk of bias could be further avoided through the cross reading and annotation of the same data by multiple researchers at the same time to reach a consensual coding. In addition to the bias induced by an interpretative qualitative analysis, the reduction of the MCA to a two-dimensional projection implies a loss of information that also orients the analysis. Deepening this research with three dimensional projections might reveal unexpected narrative relations and new clusters of narrators.

Moreover, an approach to securitization based on the discursive productions of political and media elites implies that I could only analyze narratively what the actors committed to paper or public speeches. It thus limited the analysis of the narrators' discursive lines to those mentioned explicitly or implicitly in written or prepared texts, which means that it may not be operational without modification on other types of data such as flyers or tweets, videos with many visual elements, photographs, and other aesthetic material. Further research is needed to test its applicability in projects with pop cultural materials for instance to analyse other representations of Islam and Muslims over time, as suggested by Stuart Croft (2012).

Another limit relates to the extension of the findings beyond the present research object. The necessary comparison within or between cases limited the range of application of the proposed methodology. The research findings draw on the analysis of two types of political actors, namely political leaders and media actors, acting in their national environment. Admittedly, the comparison analysis between German, British, and French corpuses, and over a plurality of actors, offer a robust test. Nonetheless, I cannot extrapolate the results beyond other national contexts and other actors – such as artists, researchers, experts, or citizens.

Similarly, the present dissertation based on public discourses did not allow evaluating the degree of conviction of the European narrators under study toward the narrative they produce. Whether political leaders or media actors believed what they said publicly at a given time remains a mystery to the present study. Although I find it difficult to assess the conviction of an actor, a hint would have been by conducting close interviews with the narrators at the time of production. However, as already mentioned in introduction,

leading interviews was as much a practical difficulty, given the tri-national nature of the panel and the political and institutional positions of the actors under study, as a theoretical choice, given the constructivist stance of this study contending that securitization only makes sense in discourses aimed at public audiences. Finally, the focus on the sole public discourses did not fully address the possible matching or, on the contrary, the gap between securitizing discourses and security policies, and vice versa. Further development could focus on the actual link between public speeches and law enforcement.

Finally, another limit lies in the impossibility – within this dissertation – to assess the reception of the securitizing and de-securitizing moves performed by the public actors. While the focus was laid on how these (de)securitizing moves varied according to national contexts, it would be interesting to trace how national audiences reacted to such moves. In other words, a complementary and useful research would be to investigate the reception of securitizing and de-securitizing moves within national audiences. One way would be to mobilise existing polls closely linked to the research question and follow the time frame of the empirical study. It would be difficult to find retrospectively available polls whose questions asked would perfectly fit the research question. However, it would be possible for research in the future to narrow the study of public discourses down to one particular moment and gather the corresponding data from the targeted audience.

Future research is needed to capitalize on the heuristic power of comparison and explore other variations that would qualify the significance of national and partisan preferences. Future comparative research could focus on political actors of other Western countries to highlight regional specificities in the (de)securitization of Islam and Muslims, or even in the objects of securitization. Conversely, comparative research between Eastern and Western German political actors, or between English, Scottish, and Welsh political actors, might highlight local specifics that would overweight partisan trends. Finally, further comparative research between different age groups within the political and media elite could highlight generational variations that would balance both national and partisan preferences.

Second, future research could also focus on the diffusion of Western European semantic repertoires study in an interactionist perspective, as was primarily intended but revealed too ambitious for a doctoral research. Investigating the reception of orientalist discourses and the framing of the *question d'Orient* in local Eastern elites (e.g., Turkish or Arabic) at the turn of the 20th century would have been interesting to question the perception of the German, British, and French geopolitical choices on the other side of the Mediterranean. Was Germany actually perceived as “the least imperialistic of the imperialist powers” as assumed by Max von Oppenheim? Was British domination perceived as “benevolent” and French one as “authoritarian”? as suggested by the testimony of two Muslim notables, Dr. Sameh Fakhoury, from Beirut, and Mohamed Kurd

Ali, from Damascus, published in the French *Le Temps* in 1912:

What hurts you [French] among us, they say, is the way you behave towards the Muslims of Algeria. We all know Egypt, and we cannot help but draw a comparison between the English and you which is unfavourable to you.

In Egypt, the English established the principle that the burdens would be the same for Europeans and Muslims as soon as they arrived. They equalised taxes and abolished drudgery. You have been in Algeria for 80 years and the Muslims still bear the burden of land tax alone, not to mention all sorts of chores [...].

In Egypt, [the British] created, as early as 1883, provincial councils, elected by village delegates designated by universal suffrage, a legislative council of 30 members [...] and a legislative assembly of 82 members [...] the provincial councils have been increased and invested with real power: they are the ones who are now in charge of primary education; they can vote certain taxes without control; they make known to the government the wishes of the populations.

None of this is the case in Algeria. The representation of Muslims is derisory. They do elect, with a ridiculously small vote, a few representatives in the municipal councils; but these representatives are powerless. [...].

In Egypt, most of the civil servants are Muslims; one can be a Muslim and reach the highest offices. In Algeria, you exclude from important functions those very Muslims who have managed to acquire a French education [...]. You prevent them under all pretexts from making the pilgrimage to Mecca. The English are not like you.

You do not respect individual freedom. Not only in Algeria, but even in Tunisia, a Muslim can be interned or exiled without trial. Nothing like that in Egypt. The *moudirs* (prefects) have the right to impose simple police sentences, but as soon as it is a question of a more serious sentence, no Egyptian is sentenced without having appeared before the courts.

How can there still be such a discrepancy between your actions and your principles? We consider you to be the liberal and generous nation par excellence; we seek your culture precisely because it represents for us the highest in the world. And yet, we are obliged to recognise that in Algeria you are applying a policy that is at odds with your republican ideal. So, our co-religionists, if they had to emigrate, would all prefer to live in Egypt rather than in Algeria. They know that if there is a minority of discontented people in Egypt, the vast majority of Muslims are satisfied, whereas the opposite is true in Algeria.²⁴¹

Since it is not possible to take this testimony at face value, further research on the differential perception of French, British, and German imperialisms by Eastern elites would be an exceptional improvement of my modest historical investigation.

A third avenue of research could investigate the way each semantic repertoire identified in the three corpuses under study have diffused in the European colonial and imperial areas would strengthen the hypothesis of historical endurance: have universalism and *laïcité* affected the Algerian and the North African post-colonial states identities? Has German *culturalism* soaked into the Turkish state identity? Has British multicultural liberalism somehow impregnated India and the British Middle East?

Conclusively, this research aimed at better understanding the affective background and narrative framing of each European power facing contemporary challenges relating to Islam, Muslims, and the Middle East, considered an essential precondition to conduct European common internal and external policies. While the future of the EU rests in part on the harmonization of its foreign and defence policies, none of the three key European countries that are Britain, Germany, and France seem to share a common vision on

²⁴¹ *Le Temps*, Paris, February 13th, 1913, 2.

contemporary crises relating to Islam and the Mediterranean, both outside and inside their borders. At the European level, a political shift is needed, namely the consideration of the weight of national-specific historical legacies and their continuing narrative impact in contemporary times. By “mapping” the different ways of (de)securitizing Islam and Muslim and unravelling national-specific historical legacies, I hope to have modestly contributed to opening the possibilities for (re)thinking common external and internal policies at the European level.

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Appendix 4 - German codebook of narration of Islam, security, and identity (2009-2019)

Code's name	Description
SETTING	
Horizon of experience	
East-West division	Reference to the historical division between Eastern and Western Germany during the Cold War and the reminiscence of such political division nowadays.
Africa	Reference to the African continent and topics linked to German and/or European and/or Western relations to Africa.
Brexit	Tackling the topic of Brexit and its consequences, as well as German and/or European relations to it.
Customs	Reference to German customs (such as showing face or shaking hands) in opposition to Islamic conservatism.
DIK	Reference to the <i>Deutsche Islamkonferenz</i> , i.e., a long-term dialogue between the German state and Muslims living in Germany initiated by former German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble aiming, according to him, to a better integration of the Muslim population and a better coexistence in Germany.
Eastern Europe	Reference to European countries such as Hungary or Poland and to German privileged relations to Eastern Europe.
German Past	Negative references to German “dark” past, including the First World War, the division of Germany and the GDR, or again the <i>Kulturkampf</i> .
German Turks	Tackling the topic of German Turks, either designating as Muslims or as <i>Kanaks</i> .
History	Neutral reference to historical events and History in general.
Immigration	Tackling the topic of immigration and guest workers, mostly Turkish.
Integration	Tackling the topic of integration, especially the integration of Islam, i.e. the <i>Willkommenskultur</i> and/or the <i>Annerkennungskultur</i> .
Islam	Tackling the topic of the place of Islam in Germany.
Cologne NYE's assaults	Reference to the 2015–16 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne.
<i>Leitkultur</i>	Tackling the topic of German “leading culture” and the debate it implies.
Middle East	Reference mainly to Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, and Turkey.
Otto von Bismarck	Reference to and/or quotation of Otto von Bismarck, first chancellor of unified Germany from 1871 to 1890.
Refugees crisis	Tackling the topic of the European migrant crisis, the issue of asylum in Europe and Angela Merkel's politics of “ <i>Wir schaffen das</i> ”.
Terror	Tackling the topic of terrorism, be it terror attacks in in Europe, the West, and the rest of the world, as well as terror organizations.
Thilo Sarrazin	Tackling the topic of Thilo Sarrazin's controversy and/or Thilo Sarrazin's book.
Donald Trump	Tackling the topic of Donald Trump.
Veil	Tackling the topic of the veil.
Women Victim	Reference to women as victims of patriarchal domination and violence.
Rhetoric codes	
Alarming	Lexical field of urgency and danger to foster State intervention.

Binary	Strong dichotomies and opposition between “us” and “them”, simplification of a situation in “black and white” terms, lack of understanding.
Empathetic	Lexical field of compassion and call for understanding the “other”, few dichotomies and oppositions between the self/other.
Dialectical	Opposite to binary tone, describing a situation with nuances and complexity.
Defensive	Rhetoric linked to the fear of/feeling of being attacked, ready to defend oneself, on guard to strike back.
Didactical	Pedagogical tone to help the audience understand a complicated situation.
Emotional	Argumentation is founded on emotional narratives to persuade the audience and trigger fear or hate, or on the opposite, compassion or pity (in opposition to reasonable).
Ironical	Use of irony to disregard an argument.
Optimistic	Enhancing the good side of a story and betting on a positive outcome.
Pessimistic	Enhancing the bad side of a story and betting on a negative outcome.
Reasonable	Argumentation founded on reasonable narratives to convince the audience.
Reproving	Oppositional rhetoric, mostly against the government or the state, reproving a lack of intervention/success.
Self-promoting	Promotion of oneself or one’s party’s achievements.
CHARACTERIZATION	
In-group	
<i>Self</i>	
Anti-racist	Self-definition as anti-racist or engaged in fighting racism as priority political fight.
Christian	Self-definition as Christian or Protestant or Catholic or belonging to a Christian country and/or inclusion of the Christian civilization within the in-group.
Democrat	Self definition as democrat, or reference to one’s own country and/ or party as democratic or inclusion of democrats within the in-group.
Enlightened	Self-definition as enlightened or inclusion of enlightened (“ <i>aufgeklärt</i> ”) Muslims within the in-group.
The EU	Self definition as belonging to the European Union or definition of the EU as the in-group – different from the self-definition as belonging to European culture/civilization/identity, or the inclusion of other European countries as friends and allies.
European	Self-definition as belonging to the European culture/civilization/identity but not to the European Union.
Feminist	Self-definition as feminist (be it “new” or “old feminism”).
Humanist	Self-definition as humanist or as defender of human rights.
Islam-critic	Self-definition as Islam-critic (<i>Islamkritik</i>), ie., critique of the foundations, cultural traditions and social norms of Islam, or including Islam-critics such as Necla Kelek, Alice Schwarzer, Birgit Kelle, or Henryk Broder within their in-group.
Left	Self-definition as a leftist or belonging to <i>Die Linke</i> .
Liberal	Self-definition as a socio-political - not economic - liberal, and/or as progressive
Migration background	Self-definition as having a migration background, e.g. Kanaks, Turkish, Palestinian, Romanian.
Moderate	Self-definition as moderate or endorsing/calling for moderation in politic
Multiculturalist	Endorses multiculturalism as an ideal of society and includes a pluralism of communities within the in-group.
Muslim	Self-definition as Muslim.
Opposition	Self-definition as the only real opposition to the Establishment - often going in pair with the self-definition as scapegoat.

Realist	Self-definition as pragmatic and/or clear-headed, or endorses political realism (<i>Realpolitik</i>).
Republican	Self-definition as republican or endorsing republicanism.
Scapegoat	Self-definition as victim of defamation, of negative review from the media, as the “bad guys of the story”.
The West	Self-definition as belonging to the West, as westerner or “occidental”.
<i>Friends and allies</i>	
The USA	Designation of the USA as principal ally to Germany - often despite the election of Donald Trump as President.
Eastern Europe	Designation of Eastern European countries as privileged interlocutors and friends to Germany.
European countries	Designation of European sovereign countries as allies, as opposed to the EU
German Turks	Inclusion of German Turks within the in-group/imagined community
International Left	Designation of European left parties and/or leftists as friends and allies to German left, such as Bernie Sanders, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, or Jeremy Corbyn
Islamic associations	Designation of German Islamic associations as partners and allies to the German State.
Israel	Designation of Israel as friend and ally to Germany.
<i>Kulturmuslimen</i>	Inclusion within their in-groups/imagined community of so-called cultural Muslims, as opposed to religious Muslims, considered as and also called Enlightened Muslims, secular Muslims, or again “normal believers”.
MENA	Designation of MENA countries, i.e., North African such as Tunisia and Algeria, or Middle Eastern such as Syria, as friends and/or allies to Germany.
Muslims	Inclusion of German Muslims within their in-group/imagined community.
NATO	Designation of NATO as an indefectible ally to Germany.
The UN	Inclusion of the UN within the international imagined community.
Religious communities	Designation of German religious communities as partners to the German State.
Russia	Designation of Russia as friend and ally to Germany.
Secular dictatorships	Designation of former secular dictatorships in the MENA region as better objective allies to Germany than newly elected or potential Islamic alternatives steaming from the Arab revolution.
The People	Self designation as true defender of “the people”, aka the silent majority, the hard workers or taxpayers, the voters, the German <i>Volk</i> , against the so-called establishment.
Donald Trump	Designation of Donald Trump as friend and ally to one’s party (particularly within international populism).
Turkey	Designation of Turkey as friend and ally to Germany.
Out-group	
Conservative Islam	Designation of devout and/or orthodox Muslims as adversaries.
Erdogan	Designation of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as adversary.
The EU	Designation of the EU, aka Brussels, and/or Europeanization as adversary.
The FDP	Designation of the <i>Frei Demokratische Partei</i> , the Free Democratic Party, as political opponent.
The Gulf states	Designation of the Gulf states (the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc.) as adversaries or others.
The Greens	Designation of the Green Party (<i>Die Grüne/90 Bundnis</i>) as political opponents.

<i>Die GroKo</i>	Designation of the grand coalition (<i>Die Große Koalition</i>) as political opponents.
The Government	Designation of Federal Government as political opponents.
ISIS	Designation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria as enemy.
Islam as scandals	Designation of the media that use Islam as scandal to sell as adversary.
Islam-critics	Designation of Islam critics, such as Necla Kelek, Alice Schwarzer, etc, as adversaries.
Islamic associations	Designation of the German Islamic associations and/or German Islamic authorities as adversaries.
Islamists	Designation of political Islam and/or Muslim Brotherhood as enemies or adversaries.
Laicism	Designation of a radical version of secularism, i.e., one that fights religious visibility in the public space, as a destructive ideology to be opposed, as well as its supporters.
<i>Leitkultur</i>	Designation of proponents of <i>Leitkultur</i> , <i>Heimat</i> , or the <i>Kulturnation</i> as political adversaries.
The Media	Opposition to the “mainstream” media as accomplices to the Government and the Establishment, and/or as distributor of mainstream ideology and/or political correctness.
Multiculturalists	Designation of supposed proponents of moral and cultural relativism, political correctness, also accused of <i>False Toleranz</i> or <i>Kulturelle Anpassung</i> , as adversaries and/or enemies.
Nationalists	Designation of supposed proponents of an ethno-cultural reading of German identity as adversaries and/or enemies.
NATO	Designation of the transatlantic alliance as a political annoyance and NATO as an adversary to German and/or Europe’s interests.
Neoliberalism	Designation of neoliberalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents
<i>Netzfeminismus</i>	Designation of so-called internet feminism, accused of reducing its action to hashtags and tweets rather than real actions, also accused of political correctness and complacency with Islam (the headscarf).
The New Left	Designation of a new string within the left, i.e., one that supports immigration, gender equality, and cultural relativism, also considered as supporters of passive tolerance and political correctness, as political adversary.
Putin	Designation of Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, as adversary to Germany and/or Europe and out of the international imagined community.
Religious fundamentalists	Designation of fundamentalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents.
Right-wing extremism	Designation of right-wing extremism as destructive ideology and its supporters, i.e., the <i>AFD</i> or <i>Pegida</i> , as enemy to Germany’s political security.
Terrorists	Designation of terrorist groups and organizations, i.e., Al Qaeda, Book Haram, the Taliban, or ISIS as enemies.
The Bureaucracy	Designation of German’s bureaucracy as a burden to German political and economical flourishing.
Capitalism	Designation of capitalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents.
The Establishment	Opposition to the mainstream political parties, so-called <i>Volksparteien</i> , as well as the so-called “elites”, accused of subjugating the “people”.
The SPD	Designation of the <i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> , the Social Democrat Party of Germany, as political opponent.
Trump	Designation of Donald Trump, president of the USA, as adversary to Germany and/or Europe.
Turkey	Designation of Turkey and its government as adversarie(s) and out of the international imagined community.
The USA	Designation of the USA and its government as adversarie(s), especially against the German transatlantic bias.

Plot	
Challenges and threats	
Anti-liberalism	Designation of anti-liberal forces, such as anti-individualism, authoritarianism, populism, etc., as the main challenge to Germany and/or Europe and/or the West.
Anti-Semitism	Designation of anti-Semitism as main threat to German political stability and German identity.
Arm export	Designation of arm export, arm race, as well as the building of a European army, as a threat to global peace.
Transatlantic alliance	Designation of systematic alignment of German and European interests on the USA's as a threat to German and/or European interests.
Brexit	Designation of Brexit, and with it the situation with Ireland, as a challenge or a threat to the EU.
Democracy crisis	Considering that freedom is in danger, particularly freedom of religion for minorities, especially with regards to the European migrant crisis.
Discrimination	Designation of discrimination (race, religion, gender, etc.) as main challenge for German democracy.
Division	Designation of the division between East and West Germany and/or division among German citizens following the European migrant crisis or terror attacks as threat to German political unity and stability.
Economical insecurity	Designation of economic insecurity, including global financial crisis, the Euro crisis, the threats weighing on free trade and market economy, massive unemployment, as primary insecurity.
Environmental insecurity	Designation of environmental insecurity, including global warming, climate change, over consumption, nuclear waste, energy issues, etc.
Europhobia	Designation of Europhobia, expressed for example in systematic Brussels bashing as threat to Europe and Germany.
<i>False Toleranz</i>	Designation of "false tolerance", including political correctness, censorship, denial, or political taboo, as well as passive tolerance of cultural accommodation or derogation, designated as "cultural trap" or <i>Kulturalrabatte</i> .
Forced assimilation	Designation of forced assimilation, that is an assimilation imposed by the state to the newcomers or to the people considered as non-German in Germany, as threat to German cohesion.
German - Turkey relations	Designation of privilege relations between Germany and Turkey as threat to German independence, especially with regard to German Turks and German Muslims in Germany.
German Middle Eastern policy	Designation of German policy in the Middle East that would move toward an interventionist policy as a threat to Germany's interests and its tradition of non-interventionism.
Globalisation	Designation of globalisation (economical, migration, digital, etc) as the main challenge to Germany and Europe.
Immigration	Designation of immigration as an economical and/or cultural threat to Germany.
Integration	Designation of integration of newcomers, and especially Muslims and/or Turks, as the main challenge to contemporary Germany.
Interventionism	Designation of interventionism in general, be it regime change foreign policy, interventionist war, or western imperialism, as a threat to global peace and German and/or Europe political image.
Islam	Designation of Islam, be it the Koran, the Sharia, the Sunna, public prayers, the veil, as problems and/or threats to Germany and German identity.
Islamic culture	Designation of Islamic culture, considered as imprinted by patriarchy, backwardness, sexual abuse, honour killing, forced marriages, etc., as threat to Germany and German identity.

Islamic fanaticism	Designation of Islamic fanaticism as threat to Germany.
Islamic terrorism	Designation of Islamic terrorism as threat to Germany.
Islamism	Designation of Islamism, aka Muslim brotherhood, political Islam, as threat to Germany and its political security.
Islamophobia	Designation of Islamophobia, aka “ <i>Islamfeindlichkeit</i> ”, including Muslim rejection and discrimination, as well as Muslim migrant bashing, as threat to German identity.
<i>Islampolitik</i>	Designation of German federal policy toward Islam, mainly embodied in the DIK, as a threat to German identity and security.
Left wing populism	Designation of left wing populism, including Sahra Wagenknecht, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, etc., as political threat to Germany and/or Europe and/or the West.
Migrants bashing	Designation of migrant bashing as political challenge and/or threat to German identity.
National insecurity	Designation of national insecurity, especially terrorism and wars, as primary insecurity.
<i>Ostpolitik</i>	Designation of German Eastern policy, particularly German relations to Russia and/or Ukraine, as threat to Germany's national interest, particularly its Atlantic alliance.
Parallel societies	Designation of so-called parallel societies, aka “no-go areas” implied by self-segregation, as a challenge to contemporary Germany and a threat to German citizens.
Perversion of Islam	Designation of an interpretation of Islam considered as a perversion of it, as a threat to German political and national security as well as a challenge for German Muslims.
Political Extremism	Designation of extremism in general, be them right-wing, left-wing, in opposition to moderation, as a threat to German political security.
Privatisation	Designation of privatisation of public services or industries as a threat to German economical and social securities.
Racism	Designation of racism and particularly so-called “salon” or acceptable racism as a threat to German political security and identity.
Radicalization	Designation of radicalization, mainly suspected radicalization of Muslims, considered as “ <i>Gefährder</i> ”, that are persons whose certain facts justify the suspicion that they might commit criminal acts, as threat to German national security.
Refugee crisis	Designation of the European migrant crisis, or the refugee crisis, including issues of forced migration, accommodating refugees, as the main challenge to contemporary Germany and Europe.
Religious persecution	Designation of religious persecution in the world, as well as religious stigmatization and discrimination in Germany, as challenge to global peace and German political security and identity.
Salafism	Designation of Salafism as a radical interpretation of Islam threatening German national and political securities as well as German identity.
Securitarian state	Designation of a security drift, especially in response to terror attacks or terrorist threats, as a threat to individual freedom and German constitution.
Sexism	Designation of sexism, gender/sexual discriminations, violence against women, sexual violence, etc., as challenge to contemporary Germany.
Societal insecurity	Designation of societal insecurity, including fear of (European and/or Western) civilization's decline, cultural conflicts, loss identity, etc., as primary insecurity.
Social insecurity	Designation of social insecurity, including poverty, social injustice, inequalities, poor workers, etc., as primary insecurity.
Technological revolution	Designation of new technologies, including the digital revolution, as the main challenge to Germany and/or Europe and/or the West.
Terrorism	Designation of terrorism, and with it the phenomena of home-grown terrorists, foreign fighters and returnees, as main threat to Germany's national security.

Unilateralism	Designation of unilateralism and isolationism, by opposition to multilateralism and international cooperation, as threat to global peace and/or free trade.
Utopianism	Designation of utopianism, in opposition to political realism or <i>Realpolitik</i> , as a threat to Germany's national interests.
Veil	Designation of the veil as political provocation and a sign of separatism and threat to German political security and identity.
War	Designation of war, and with it civilian casualties and the <i>Bundeswehr</i> 's mission in the Middle East, as a threat to global peace and German political stability.
Solutions	
Assimilation	Promotion of the assimilation of newcomers, among which German Turks and German Muslims, to German's <i>Leitkultur</i> .
Transatlantic alliance	Promotion of a strong alliance with the USA and the west in general.
Reform	Call for reforms and change in German politics.
Control immigration	Regulate immigration to Germany by differentiating between "real" refugees and so-called economic migrants and/or call for controlling German borders.
Cooperation	Call for international cooperation and multilateralism as modes of international relations.
Democracy	Call for a stronger democracy and defence of the legitimacy of the German Bundestag.
Deportation	Call for the repatriation of migrants and/or refugees to the German national borders.
Development policy	Fight causes of flight, invest in developing countries and/or emigration countries.
Diplomacy	Call for diplomatic actions rather than sanctions in international relations (e.g. Negotiate a political solution with Bachar al-Assad regarding the conflict in Syria).
Education	Call for education as a solution to social insecurity in general, and defence of Islamic instruction in school in particular.
Enlightenment	Call for the use of reason, science, and knowledge in general, in opposition to religious belief, and/or the call for reform Islam in particular.
European integration	Call for more institutional interaction, a fiscal integration, a European foreign policy and European defence, etc.
Fairer society	Promotion of fair trade and call for more redistribution.
Fight for women	Call for the fight against sexism and sexual violence against women.
Foreign Policy	Help neighbouring countries Fight the causes of migration <i>Weltpolitik</i> .
Frontex	Call for reinforcing the control of European external borders, rather than national ones, with regard to the European migrant crisis.
German Islam	Call for the institutionalization and de-transnationalization of Islam in Germany to foster a German Islam.
Greener economy	Call for the consideration of ecological variables in the German economy.
Humanitarian	Promotion of humanitarian foreign policy in general, and regarding the conflict in Syria in particular, to mitigate the European migrant crisis (e.g. Helping neighbouring countries to host refugees, etc.).
Immigration	Promotion of an incentive immigration policy to attract skilled workers to Germany.
Innovation	Call for or defence of public investment in research and innovation and/or promotion of a nation of entrepreneurs and start-ups.
Integration	Promotion of integration, particularly the integration of German Turks and/or German Muslims, among which the promotion of the DIK or the training of imams in order to de-transnationalization of Islam, learn German.
Intelligence	Call for public investment in intelligence services to insure national security, particularly with regard to the terrorist threat.

Intervention	Promotion of military intervention to mitigate international conflicts in general, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in order to mitigate the European migrant crisis and counter the terrorist threat.
<i>Leitkultur</i> debate	Call for a national debate on German's identity, in order to reaffirm or redefine German <i>Leitkultur</i> to the attention of newcomers and/or German Muslims.
Market economy	Promotion of economic liberalism, especially the market economy, free trade and tax relief.
Moral	Promotion of moral consideration in politics, in opposition to the sole pursuit of German national interest, aka realism or <i>Realpolitik</i> .
Peace and disarmament	Call for banning arm export and a general military restraint - implicitly referring to the particular context of post-war Germany.
Police	Call for public investment in the police forces, particularly hiring more agents in the local police.
Political consensus	Promotion of consensus between opposing political forces and parties in Germany, against radical cleavages.
Prevention	Call for preventive policy, particularly regarding the terrorist threat.
Proportion	Promotion of proportion and moderation in the State response to crisis in general, and with regard to the terror attacks in particular.
Realism	Promotion of political realism, or <i>Realpolitik</i> , in opposition to utopianism, ideologies, or moral politics.
Recognition	Call for the recognition of people with a migration background living in Germany by the host society, focusing on the appreciation of their potential agency (<i>Anerkennungskultur</i>).
Resistance	Call for the resistance of Germans with migration backgrounds to the rise of nationalists and migrant bashing in Germany.
Rule of Law	Promotion of the rule of law (and the Constitution) as only German national cement, in opposition to a so-called <i>Leitkultur</i> .
Secularism	Promotion of secularism as primary western and German value.
Self-criticism	Call for (historical) self-criticism as part of German citizenship.
Social cohesion	Call for shared understanding, social solidarity, and the importance of civil society.
Stability	Call for political and economical stability as the primary objective of the German federal state.
Strong economy	Promotion of a strong economy fostering high competitiveness, public investments, and the flexibility of the labour market.
Strong state	Promotion of a strong state providing redistribution of wealth, securing labour laws and rights, and fostering an industrial policy.
Transparency	Promotion of transparency in politics.
Turkey deal	Promotion of a deal with Turkey regarding the European migrant crisis.
<i>Vaterländer</i>	Promotion of a Europe of sovereign nations, national borders and national interest, in opposition to the EU and European integration.
<i>Willkommenskultur</i>	Promotion of a welcoming attitude towards migrants, on the basis of attractive framework conditions, and prevent them from discrimination.

Appendix 5 - British codebook of narration of Islam, security, and identity (2009-2019)

Code's name	Description
SETTING	
Horizon of experience	
Africa	Reference to the African continent and topics linked to British and/or European and/or Western relations to Africa.
Brexit	Reference to the topic of Brexit and its consequences.
BRICS	Reference to Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.
Christian Tradition	Reference to the (Judeo) Christian anchorage of the West and/or European and/or Britain.
Islam	Reference to the debate regarding the place of Islam in Britain.
Eastern Europe	Reference to European countries such as Hungary or Poland and to British relations to Eastern Europe.
Economy	Tackling the topic of economy in general.
Europe	Tackling the topic of Europe and the EU.
Family	Tackling the topic of family.
Foreign Policy	Tackling the topic of British foreign policy.
Future	Reference to the future of Britain and/or Europe, and future generations, especially in relation to environmental insecurity.
History	Neutral reference to historical events and History in general.
Identities	Tackling the topic of identities in general in Britain and/or Europe and/or the West.
Immigration	Reference to the topic of immigration and the Windrush generation.
MENA	Reference to the Middle East North Africa region, such as Israel-Palestine, Iran, Syria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
National interest	Reference to British national interest.
Northern Ireland (conflict)	Reference to Northern Ireland, as a historical event and/or in reference to the potential consequences of Brexit.
British past	Positive reference to British proud national history, particularly as crib of liberalism and democracy, and as Europe's peacemaker and peacekeeper during the two World Wars and/or British particularism (its sacred Parliament, the Magna Carta and Habeas corpus, the Crown, etc.).
Religious identities	Tackling the topic of religious identities in Britain and/or Europe and/or the West, especially in relation to that of secularisation and secularism.
Secularisation	Tackling the topic of secularisation and/or secularism.
Terror	Reference to the topic of terrorism, be it terror attacks in in Europe, the West, and the rest of the world, as well as terror organizations.
Veil	Tackling the topic of the veil, be it the headscarf, the <i>burqa</i> , etc.
Women's right	Tackling the topic of women's rights and gender or sexual discrimination.
Youth	Tackling the topic of youth, new generations, etc.
Rhetoric codes	

Alarmist	Lexical field of urgency, uncertainty, and danger to foster State intervention.
Binary	Strong dichotomies and opposition between “us” and “them”, (e.g. backward vs. civilised/enlightened) simplification of a situation in “black and white” terms, lack of understanding.
Defensive	Rhetoric linked to the fear of/feeling of being attacked, ready to defend oneself, on guard to strike back.
Dialectical	Opposite to binary tone, describing a situation with nuances and complexity.
Didactical	Pedagogical tone to help the audience understand a complicated situation, against binary or simple explanations.
Emotional	Argumentation is founded on emotional narratives to persuade the audience and trigger fear or hate, or on the opposite, compassion or pity (opposite to reasonable).
Empathetic	Lexical field of compassion and call for understanding the “other”, few dichotomies and oppositions between the self/other.
Ironical	Use of irony to disregard an argument or as self-depreciation.
Optimistic	Enhancing the good side of a story and betting on a positive outcome (e.g. lexical field of hope).
Pacifist	Lexical field of peace, in opposition to war-like rhetoric, i.e., dialogue, appeasement, disarmament, etc.
Pessimistic	Enhancing the bad side of a story and betting on a negative outcome.
Reasonable	Argumentation founded on reasonable narratives to convince the audience.
Reproving	Oppositional rhetoric, mostly against the government or the state, reproving a lack of intervention/success.
Self-promoting	Promotion of oneself, of one’s or one’s party’s achievements.
War-like	Lexical field of combat, i.e., strike, counter-strike prevailing, defeat, etc.
CHARACTERIZATION	
In-group	
<i>Self</i>	
Anti-racist	Self-defined as anti-racist or engaged in fighting racism as priority political fight.
Atheist	Self-defined (implicitly or explicitly) as atheist.
British Muslim	Self-defined as British and Muslim.
Christian	Self-defined as Christian or Protestant or Catholic or belonging to a Christian country and/or inclusion of the Christian civilization within the in-group.
Conservative	Self-defined as a conservative, in opposition to the Labours or the Liberal Democrats.
Democrat	Self-defined as democrat, or reference to one’s own country and/ or party as democratic or inclusion of democrats within the in-group.
Enlightened	Self-defined as enlightened or inclusion of enlightened Muslims within the in-group
The EU	Self-defined as belonging to the European Union or definition of the EU as the in-group - different from the self-definition as belonging to European culture/civilization/identity, or the inclusion of other European countries as friends and allies.
Feminist	Self-defined as feminist or adhesion to feminism.
Hero	Self-defined as heroic or characterization of Britain as a hero of history (Europe’s peacekeeper).
Humanist	Self-defined as humanist or as defender of human rights.
Leftist	Self-defined as a leftist or belonging to the Labour Party.
Liberal	Self-defined as a socio-political and/or economical liberal.
Londoner	Self-defined as Londoner.
Migration background	Self-defined as having a migration background.

Moderate	Self-defined as moderate or endorsing/calling for moderation in politics.
Modernist	Self-defined as modernist, embracing European modernity, i.e., secularism, democracy, etc., in opposition to traditionalist, backward or reactionary.
Multiculturalist	Endorses multiculturalism as an ideal of society and includes a pluralism of communities within the in-group.
Patriot	Self-defined as a patriot, driven by national pride.
Populist	Self-defined as populist, that is defending public policies aimed at and for the people.
Progressive	Self-defined as a political liberal, supporter of societal and social reforms.
Radical	Self-defined as a radical in politics, in opposition to a moderate.
Religious	Self-defined as a religious believer.
Republican	Self-defined as republican or endorsing republicanism.
Secularist	Self-defined as secularist or inclusion of secularist and/or enlightened within the in-group
The Union	Inclusion of members of the Union, i.e., England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, within the in-group, against a wider (e.g.. European) and/or narrower (e.g.. English) self.
The West	Self-identified with the West, or self-defined as westerner or “occidental”.
World leader	Identification of Britain as world leader.
<i>Friends and allies</i>	
The <i>AfD</i>	Designation of the German <i>AfD</i> as a political ally in Europe.
Merkel	Designation of Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, as partner in the EU.
Commonwealth	Inclusion of the Commonwealth and its members within the British imagined community.
EDL	Designation of the English Defence League as political ally.
Europe	Designation of European sovereign countries as allies, as opposed to the EU.
Extinction Rebellion	Designation of the group Extinction Rebellion as a political ally.
The Holy Sea	Designation of the Holy Sea as an ally on the international stage.
Israel	Designation of Israel as friend to Britain and/or as only democracy in the Middle East and therefore natural ally to Britain and/or the West.
Muslim communities	Designation of Muslim communities in Britain as political ally to the British State.
NATO	Designation of NATO as an essential international organisation for Britain.
North-America	Designation of the USA and Canada as principal allies to Britain.
Obama	Designation of Barack Obama as political ally.
The UN	Inclusion of the UN within the international imagined community.
The People	Self-designation as representing “the People”, aka, the workers, the “ordinary people” against the Establishment, i.e., the London’s elite, or pro-EU establishment, etc.
Trump	Designation of Donald Trump as friend and ally to one’s party (particularly within international populism).
Turkey	Designation of Turkey as friend and ally to Britain.
Out-group	
Merkel	Opposition to Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, and its presumed grip over the EU.
Assad	Opposition to Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, and to including him in the Syrian conflict resolution.

The BBC	Designation of the BBC as distributor of the Establishment's mainstream ideology.
Boris Johnson	Opposition to Boris Johnson.
Brexiteers	Designation of supporters of the leave's vote in the Brexit referendum as political opponents and enemies to British national interest.
Capitalists	Designation of capitalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents
Communists	Designation of so-called communists, including so-called "socialists", targeting either leftists in Britain, or USSR's former countries, as old enemies since the Cold War.
The Conservatives	Designation of the Conservatives' Party, aka the Tories, and particularly David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson, as political adversaries.
Cultural relativists	Designation of supposed proponents of moral and cultural relativism, accused of political correctness and cowardice, as adversaries and/or enemies.
ISIL	Designation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as enemy.
Human rights' lobby	Opposition to the influence of human rights defenders in the public matters and the State's policies accused of idealism and political correctness against pragmatism and realism.
Eastern Europeans	Designation of migrants from Eastern Europe as others, a burden to the British labour market.
The Establishment	Opposition to the mainstream political parties or the two-party system, as well as the so-called "London cosmopolitan elite" and/or the "European technocrat elite", but also the big finance and big businesses, all accused of subjugating the "people".
The EU	Designation of the EU, aka Brussels, and/or Europeanization as adversary.
Extremists	Designation of religious as well as political extremists as enemies.
The Far Left	Designation of the Far-Left as political enemies.
The Far-right	Designation of the Far-Right as political adversary, i.e., the English Defence League (EDL), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the British National Party (BNP) in Britain, but also the <i>AfD</i> in Germany or the National Front in France.
Frackers	Designation of organisations and people engaged in fracking to extract gas as enemies to British environmental security.
The Government	Designation of Government as political opponents.
Ideologues	Designation of ideologues, as opposed to common sense, reason, and practicality, be them left-wing ideologies considered dangerous utopians, or religious, considered dangerous fundamentalists, as enemies to British political stability and security.
Imperialists	Opposition to promoters and/or conveyers of western hegemony, supremacy, and interventionism, particularly in the MENA region.
Islamists	Designation of political Islam and/or Muslim Brotherhood as enemies or adversaries.
The Labour	Designation of the Labour Party, and particularly Jeremy Corbyn, as political adversary.
Laicism	Designation of a radical version of secularism, i.e., one that fights religious visibility in the public space, as a destructive ideology to be opposed, as well as its supporters.
The LibDems	Designation of the Liberal Democrats as political adversaries.
The Monarchy	Opposed to the Monarchy - as a Republican.
The UN	Opposed to the UN as supranational power.
Puritans	Designation of religious puritans or bigots as political adversaries.
Remainers	Designation of supporters of the Remain vote in the Brexit referendum as political adversaries.
Russia	Designation of Russia as an international adversary, out of the international imagined community.
Terrorists	Designation of terrorist groups and organizations, i.e., Al Qaeda, Book Haram, the Taliban, or ISIS.
Trump	Designation of Donald Trump, president of the USA, as adversary to Britain and/or Europe.

The USA	Designation of the USA and its government as adversarie(s) or other(s), especially against the transatlantic alliance.
PLOT	
Challenges	
Anti-liberalism	Designation of anti-liberal forces, such as authoritarianism, dictatorship, theocracies, Totalitarianism, reactionary, global retreat and isolationism, populism, as the main challenge to Britain and/or Europe and/or the West.
Anti-Semitism	Designation of anti-Semitism as challenge to British society.
Arm export	Designation of arm export, arm race, as well as the building of a European army, as a threat to global peace.
Asian British	Designation of migrants from Asia, mostly from Pakistan or India, and their integration as challenging contemporary Britain.
Benefit trap	Condemnation of the benefit trap or the culture of assistantship, considered a perverse incentive of the welfare state and a barrier to employment.
Austerity	Condemnation of austerity measures as a major threat to the British social system and community cohesion.
Brexit	Designation of Brexit, and with it the situation with Ireland, the risk of a no deal, as a threat to Britain and the UK.
British Empire Nostalgia	Designation of so-called "nostalgia" of the British Empire endorsed by some of the political and ruling elite as a major threat to British political stability and British national interest.
Clash narratives	Condemning the use of clash narratives, i.e., the clash of civilizations, cultural incompatibilities, the great replacement, etc., to trigger fear for political and electoral purposes.
Cyber insecurity	Designation of cyber terrorism and cyber-attacks in general as major threat to British national security.
Demonization	Condemning the demonization of Islam as folk devil, with it the obsession of the veil, and/or the conflation of social and security policies.
Discrimination	Designation of discrimination (race, religion, gender, etc.) as main challenge for British democracy.
Division	Designation of the division among British communities following the European migrant crisis or terror attacks as threat to British political unity and stability.
Economical insecurity	Designation of economic insecurity, including global financial crisis, the Euro crisis, the threats weighing on free trade and market economy, energy supply, massive unemployment, as primary insecurity.
Environmental insecurity	Designation of environmental insecurity, including global warming, climate change, over consumption, nuclear waste, energy issues, etc., as primary insecurity.
EMC	Designation of the European migrant crisis, or the refugee crisis, including issues of forced migration, accommodating refugees, or the "Calais jungle" as main challenge or threat to contemporary Britain and/or Europe.
Globalisation	Designation of globalisation (economical, migration, digital, geopolitical, etc.) as the main challenge to Britain and Europe.
Grievance narratives	Opposing Britain's bashing, especially the use of grievance narratives against British foreign and domestic policies to explain or justify criminal attitudes, including terrorism.
Hate-crimes	Designation of hate-crimes, i.e., crimes perpetrated on the basis of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity, as major challenge to contemporary Britain.

Ideological threat	Designation of ideologies, also called non-violent extremism, as threat to British national and political securities.
Immigration	Designation of immigration as an economical and/or cultural threat to Britain.
Integration	Designation of integration of newcomers, and especially Muslims and/or “Pakis”, as the main challenge to contemporary Britain.
Interventionism	Designation of interventionism in general, be it regime change foreign policy, interventionist war, or western imperialism, as a threat to global peace.
British Muslims	Designation of British Muslims, real or perceived as Muslims, as problems or threats to Britain and British identity.
Islamic culture	Designation of Islamic culture, considered as a misogynist culture, including sexual abuse, honour killing, forced marriages, excision, etc., as threat to Britain and British identity.
Islamic ideology	Designation non-violent extremism steaming from Islam as threat to British political and national securities (NB. never referred to as Islamism, political Islam, or the Muslim Brotherhood as in the German or the British case).
Islamophobia	Designation of Islamophobia as a challenge to British political stability and identity.
Migrant bashing	Designation of migrant bashing as a political challenge and creating a hostile environment in Britain.
Muslim sex crimes	Condemnation of the sexual crimes perpetrated by Muslims groups, suggesting a correlation between the nature of the crime and the religion and/or culture of the perpetrator.
National insecurity	Designation of national insecurity, especially terrorism and wars, as primary insecurity.
Nationalism	Designation of a growing retreat and isolationism of Britain on a mono-cultural version of Britishness, rejecting both migrants and the EU, as threat to contemporary Britain.
Organized crime	Designation of murderers, killers, vandals, rapists, as threats to British national security.
Political correctness	Opposing political correctness, including passive tolerance, the recognition of Islamophobia, censorship of free speech, denial, or political taboo, as well as cultural appeasement or institutional timidity.
Perversion of Islam	Designation of an interpretation of Islam considered as a perversion of it, as a threat to British community cohesion.
Politics of fear	Condemnation of State policies driven by fear, particularly following terror attacks.
Racism	Designation of racism as a challenge to contemporary Britain.
Radicalisation	Designation of radicalization, mainly suspected radicalization of Muslims, also called “preachers of hate”, as threat to British national security.
Religion	Designation of religion, considered as superstition, myth, supernatural belief, irrational, and particularly the presence of religion in the public space as well as the role of faith communities, as a threat to contemporary Britain.
Religious persecution	Designation of religious persecution in the world, as well as religious stigmatization and discrimination in Britain, as a challenge to global peace and British community cohesion.
Religious privilege	Opposing accommodations or exemptions based on religion.
RMV	Designation of religious motivated violence as threat to Britain and/or Europe and/or the West (narrative often used in order not to stigmatize a particular religion, Islam for that matter).
Securitarian state	Condemnation of a security drift, especially in response to terror attacks or terrorist threats.
Sexism	Designation of sexism, gender/sexual discriminations, violence against women, sexual violence, etc., as challenge to contemporary Britain.
Social insecurity	Designation of social insecurity, including poverty, social injustice, inequalities, housing issues, retirement pensions, the NHS, access to education, University fees, etc., as primary insecurity.

Societal insecurity	Designation of societal insecurity, including fear of (European and/or Western) civilization's decline, cultural conflicts, loss of identity within the EU or fear of the great replacement through immigration and/or "Islamization", etc., as primary insecurity.
State multiculturalism	Designation of State supported multiculturalism as responsible for British decline.
Tech revolution	Designation of new technologies, including the digital revolution, industrial changes, as the main challenge to Britain and/or Europe and/or the West.
Terrorism	Designation of terrorism, and with it the phenomena of home-grown terrorists, foreign fighters and returnees, terror funding and terror attacks, as main threat to Britain's national security.
Veil	Designation of the veil (headscarf or full-veil) as political provocation and a sign of separatism and threat to British political security and identity.
War	Designation of war, particularly the war in Iraq, and with it civilian casualties and the issue of arm export, as a threat to global peace and Britain's national interest.
Weakened British ID	Condemnation and/or or fear of the decline of British identity, British national pride, and British worldwide influence, considered as mutually fulfilling one another.
Solutions	
Liberalism	Promotion of or defence of British liberalism, understood as the promotion of individual freedom, free economy, democracy, and considered as British particularism.
Justice	Call for more social justice and/or the recourse to the law and courts instead of coercion.
Assimilation	Promotion of the assimilation of newcomers, among which "Pakis" and British Muslims, to the British way of life.
Bigger society	Call for more engagement and responsibility of the civil society, and with it the agency of communities, in the promotion of British community cohesion.
Border control	Call for controlling British borders, particularly regain control from the EU, in order to regulate immigration.
Brexit	Call for and/or defence of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU in order to regain sovereignty (fisheries, border control, immigration control, etc.).
Reform	Call for reforms in general, including electoral reform, regime change (constitutional), etc.
Community cohesion	Call for shared understanding, solidarity, and the agency of communities at the local level.
A Constitution	Call for the codification of a Constitution in the UK.
Control immigration	Regulate immigration to Britain by controlling British borders and/or implementing a point system for selecting migrants.
Cooperation	Call for international cooperation and multilateralism as modes of international relations.
Counter-extremism	Call for providing a counter-narrative to fight extremism in the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, rather than prevention and coercion alone.
Create jobs	Call for public investment to create jobs.
De-growth	Promotion of an economical model based on de-growth instead of growth.
Forfeiture nationality	Call for the forfeiture of nationality for convicted terrorists.
Defence	Call for public investment in the defence budget.
Development	Call for investing in the development of developing countries, particularly to fight causes of flight in emigration countries.
Electoral reform	Call for reforming the British electoral system.
The EU	Call for more institutional interaction, a fiscal integration, the single market, a European foreign policy and European defence, Erasmus, etc.

Fairer society	Promotion of fair trade and call for more redistribution.
Faith communities	Defence of interfaith relations and the role of faith communities in British community cohesion.
Fight Islam	Call for the resistance against the presumed political agenda of Islamic groups.
Fight Islamophobia	Call for the defence of British Muslim against religious discrimination.
Free trade	Promotion of economic liberalism, among which free trade and market economy.
Freedom of religion	Promotion and defence of the freedom of religion, i.e., the freedom of expressing one's religion in the public sphere (e.g.. wearing of the veil).
Greater Britain	Call for British leadership in the world.
Greener Society	Call for a green revolution, and the consideration of climate change, energy issues, and environmental challenges in British society.
Handle the deficit	Call for handling the British deficit and maintaining a balanced budget.
Host refugees	Call for hosting refugees in Britain, and opening the European and British asylum system.
Humanitarian help	Promotion of humanitarian foreign policy in general, and regarding the conflict in Syria in particular, to mitigate the European migrant crisis (e.g. helping neighbouring countries to host refugees, discouraging migration in the first place, pacification of a relocation scheme etc.).
Integration	Promotion of integration, particularly the integration of British Muslims and/or British Asians.
Intelligence	Call for public investment in intelligence services to insure national security, particularly with regard to the terrorist threat.
Intervention	Promotion of military intervention to mitigate international conflicts in general, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in order to mitigate the European migrant crisis and counter the terrorist threat.
Science	Promotion of the recourse of science and knowledge in the public sphere (often in opposition to the use of religion).
Less state	Call for and / or promotion of deregulation, privatisation, and the withdrawal of the state.
Localism	Promotion of decentralisation and/or direct democracy at the local level.
Multiculturalism	Promotion of cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity and the recognition of the plurality of cultural based communities as an added value for Britain.
New economy	Call for a new economy based on post-capitalist criteria, both social and environmental.
Non-military solutions	Call for non-military solutions to handle international crises, such as economic sanctions, humanitarian help, or diplomacy.
Patriotism	Promotion of and/or call for national pride.
People's vote	Call for a second referendum following the UK's Brexit vote to leave the EU in order to sanction the deal negotiated between the UK and the EU.
Police	Call for public investment in the police forces, particularly hiring more agents in the local police and security services.
Pragmatism	Promotion of political pragmatism, in opposition to utopianism, ideologies, or moral politics.
Prevention	Call for preventive policy, particularly regarding the terrorist threat, and defence of the prevent strategy within the government's counter-terrorism strategy.
Prison	Call for more repressive actions against criminality, more time in prison rather than alternative sentence or sentence adjustment.
More state	Call for more state regulation in general, from nationalisations, to protectionism, and massive public investments in education, local police, emergency services, and public services in general.
Remain	Promotion of the vote to remain in the EU during the Brexit referendum and defence of the EU after the Brexit vote.

Innovation	Call for and defence of public investment in research and innovation and/or promotion of a nation of entrepreneurs and start-ups.
Secularism	Promotion of secularism one of the primary Western and/or British values, and call for abolish what is considered religious privileges in Britain.
Sovereignty	Promotion of a Europe of sovereign nations, national borders and national interest, in opposition to the EU and European integration.
Stronger Economy	Promotion of a stronger economy fostering more competitiveness and the flexibility of the labour market.
The rule of Law	Promotion of the respect of the rule of law as the primary duty of British citizens, in opposition to any cultural-based definition of Britishness.
Trans-Atlantic alliance	Defence of a strong alliance with the USA.
Redistribution	Promotion of a redistributing state, particularly through wealth taxation.
Wellbeing	Call for taking the people's wellbeing as primary criteria of developed countries.

Appendix 6 - French codebook of narration of Islam, security, and identity (2009-2019)

Code's name	Description
SETTING	
Horizon of experience	
Africa	Reference to the African continent and topics linked to French and/or European and/or Western relations to Africa.
Civilization	Reference to the Western and/or French civilization.
Dark History	Negative reference to European and/or French historical traumas, such as the WWII and with it French collaboration and Vichy France, French Wars of Religion, Ancien Régime, the colonisation, slavery, or the Cold War.
Shool	Tackling the topic of schooling and/or education.
Ecology	Tackling the topic of ecology and the environment.
Europe	Tackling the topic of Europe and the EU.
Family	Tackling the topic of family.
Foreign policy	Tackling the topic of French foreign policy.
Future	Reference to the future of France and/or Europe, and future generations, especially in relation to the environmental insecurity and/or the way to address the new century.
Greatness	Reference to France's (historical) greatness (" <i>la grandeur de la France</i> ").
Identity	Tackling the topic of identity in general in France and/or Europe and/or the West.
Immigration	Reference to the topic of immigration in general and/or " <i>immigrés</i> " in France.
Islam	Tackling the topic of Islam.
Judeo-Christian tradition	Reference to the Judeo-Christian tradition of France and/or Europe and/or the West.
<i>Lumières</i>	Reference to the French Enlightenment and the legacy of the <i>Lumières</i> .
MENA	Reference to the Middle East North Africa region, especially, North-Africa, Libanon, Syria, and Israel-Palestine.
Proud Past	Positive reference to French national history, such as the Edit de Nantes, the French Revolution, the Great discoveries, French liberation, French resistance, as well as references to French historical figures such as Charles de Gaulle, Jean Jaurès, Jules Ferry, Victor Hugo, Clémenceau, Napoléon, etc.
<i>Laïcité</i>	Tackling the topic of secularisation and/or secularism, and particularly French <i>laïcité</i> and the place of religion in the public sphere.
Terror	Reference to the topic of terrorism, be it terror attacks in in Europe, the West, and the rest of the world, as well as terror organizations.
Work	Tackling the topic of work and/or the labour market.
Youth	Tackling the topic of youth, new generations, etc.
Rhetorical tones	
Alarmist	Lexical field of urgency and danger to foster State intervention.
Binary	Strong dichotomies and opposition between "us" and "them", simplification of a situation in "black and white" terms, lack of understanding, particularly the dichotomy between barbarism and civilization and/or between the <i>Lumières</i> and obscurantism.
Defensive	Rhetoric linked to the fear of/feeling of being attacked, ready to defend oneself, on guard to strike back.
Dialectical	Opposite to binary tone, describing a situation with nuances and complexity.

Didactical	Pedagogical tone to help the audience understand a complicated situation, against binary or simple explanations.
Emotional	Argumentation is founded on emotional narratives to persuade the audience and trigger fear or hate, or on the opposite, compassion or pity (opposite to reasonable).
Ironical	Use of irony to disregard an argument or as self-depreciation.
Optimistic	Enhancing the good side of a story and betting on a positive outcome.
Pacifist	Lexical field of peace, in opposition to war-like rhetoric (e.g.. use of diplomacy, political settlement in Syria, etc.).
Pessimistic	Enhancing the bad side of a story and betting on a negative outcome.
Self-promoting	Promotion of oneself or one's party's achievements.
Reproving	Oppositional and/or offensive rhetoric, mostly against the government or the state, reproving a lack of intervention/success, and/or use of shaming narratives.
Empathetic	Lexical field of compassion and call for understanding the "other", few dichotomies and oppositions between the self/other.
War-like	Lexical field of combat, i.e., strike, counter-strike prevailing, defeat, etc.
CHARACTERIZATION	
In-group	
<i>Self</i>	
Antiracist	Self-defined as anti-racist or engaged in fighting racism as priority political fight.
Atheist	Self-defined (implicitly or explicitly) as atheist.
Christian	Self-defined as Christian (meaning Catholic) or belonging to a Christian country and/or inclusion of the Christian civilization within the in-group.
Conservative	Self-defined as a conservative, in opposition to progressivists.
Democrat	Self defined as democrat (meaning not only Republican), or reference to one's own country and/ or party as democratic or inclusion of democrats within the in-group.
European	Self-definition as belonging to the European culture/civilization/identity - but not systematically to the European Union.
Feminist	Self-defined as feminist or adhesion to feminism.
French civilization	Self-identification with the French civilization - including the French nation and/or more rarely the French culture.
Green	Self-defined as a member of the green party and/or including the green's parties into their in-group.
Hero	Self-defined as heroic or characterization of France as a hero of history and/or hero of the Western civilization (e.g. peacekeeper).
Humanist	Self-defined as humanist or as defender of human rights.
Intellectual	Self-defined as an intellectual, i.e. who engages in the public debate to share his or her analyses or to defend values.
<i>Laique</i>	Self-defined as <i>laïque</i> (secularist) or inclusion of secularist and/or enlightened within the in-group.
Leftist	Self-defined as a leftist - " <i>de gauche</i> " - or belonging to a leftist party (LFI, PS, EELV, etc.).
Liberal	Self-defined as an economical liberal.
Migration background	Self-defined as having a migration background, being " <i>immigrés</i> " or " <i>issu de l'immigration</i> ".
Moderate	Self-defined as moderate or endorsing/calling for moderation in politics.
Muslim	Self-definition as Muslim.
Patriot	Self-defined as patriot, driven by the belonging to and/or the love of the " <i>patrie</i> ".
Progressive	Self-defined as a political liberal, supporter of societal and social reforms.
Rational	Self-defined as rational, that is driven by reason, in opposition to emotion and/or religious beliefs.

Republican	Self-defined as republican or endorsing republicanism and/pr self-identification to <i>LA République</i> .
The Right	Adhesion to the Right, more precisely the Republican right, as opposed to the Far Right.
The West	Self-identified with the West, or self-defined as westerner or “occidental”.
Universalist	Self-defined as a supporter of universalism, in opposition to relativism.
Victim	Self-identification to the victim of the story and/or as a scapegoat.
Friends and allies	
Five star movement	Designation of the Italian populist <i>Movimento 5 Stelle</i> as political ally in Europe.
Assad	Designation of Bachar el-Assad, President of Syria, as an objective ally.
Britain	Designation of Britain as friend to France and/or Europe, as opposed to the EU.
CFCM	Designation of the French Council of the Muslim Cult (<i>Conseil Français du Cultre Musulman</i>) as objective ally to the French State.
<i>Francophonie</i>	Inclusion of the countries and regions where French is a lingua franca or customary language, where a significant proportion of the population are francophones (French speakers), or where there is a notable affiliation with French culture, within their imagined community.
Germany	Designation of Germany as friend to France and/or Europe, as opposed to Germany's bashing after the handling of the EU's financial crisis.
<i>Islam des lumières</i>	Inclusion within their in-groups/imagined community of so-called Enlightened Islam or “ <i>musulmans modérés</i> ” (moderate Muslims) or “ <i>musulmans éclairés</i> ” (Enlightened Muslims), as opposed to religious Muslims.
Israël	Designation of Israel as friend to Britain and/or as only democracy in the Middle East and therefore natural ally to Britain and/or the West.
Kurds	Designation of the Kurds as international ally in the conflict in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic state and/or as a population to be protected and supported in their independence movement.
Muslims	Inclusion of French Muslims within the imagined community.
North Africa	Inclusion of North-African countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in front, within the international in-group.
Russia	Designation of Russia as friend and ally to France.
The EU	Inclusion of the EU within the in-group.
The People	Self designation as true defender of “the people”, aka the silent majority, the “working class”.
The UN	Inclusion of the UN within the international imagined community.
The US	Designation of the USA as an ally to France.
Turkey	Designation of Turkey as friend and ally to France and/or the EU - especially regarding the deal with Turkey on the refugee crisis.
Out-group	
Anti-liberals	Designation of anti-liberals, such as authoritarianism, dictators, reactionary, or populists populism, as political adversaries.
Capitalism	Designation of capitalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents.
<i>CCIF</i>	Designation of the French Council against Islamophobia in France (<i>Conseil français contre l'islamophobie en France</i>) as political adversary and/or enemy to the French Republic.
Conservatives	Designation of conservatives, as opposed to progressivists, as political opponents.
Daesh	Designation of the so-called Islamic State or “Daesh” as enemy.

Secular dictatorships	Designation of former secular dictatorships in the MENA region as adversaries to the Arab revolutions and to democracies in general.
<i>Ennemi intérieur</i>	Targeting of the enemy within, or the "5th column" that works for external enemies and undermines national cohesion.
The EU	Designation of the EU, aka Brussels, considered as a new imperialism, as political adversary.
Fanatics	Designation Muslim " <i>fanatiques</i> ", aka " <i>intégristes</i> " or " <i>fondamentalistes</i> " as enemies to the French Republic.
Finance	banques l'Argent les Puissants
Islamists	Designation of proponents of Islamism, political Islam, and/or the Muslim Brotherhood as enemies.
<i>Islamogauchistes</i>	Designation of so-called Islamo-leftists, i.e. who support Muslims and accept their political provocations in the name of political correctness, postcolonial repentance, or anti-imperialism, as accomplices of Islamists and/or terrorists.
Laicism	Designation of a radical version of secularism, i.e., one that fights religious visibility in the public space, as a destructive ideology to be opposed, as well as its supporters.
Liberals	Designation of proponents of economic liberalism, understood as neoliberalism, as political adversaries.
Merkel	Opposition to Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, and its presumed grip over the EU.
Globalists	Opposition to supporters of globalisation and the so-called ideology of borderless globalism (<i>mondialisme</i>), considered as anti-patriotic, elitist, and destructive.
Muslim authorities	Designation of the French Muslim authorities such as the <i>Mosquée de Paris</i> or the French Concil of the Muslim Cult (CFCM) as political adversaries and/or accomplices to Islamists.
NATO	Designation of the transatlantic alliance as a political annoyance and NATO as an adversary to France's and/or Europe's interests.
New feminism	Opposition to so-called new feminism, in opposition to traditional feminism from the 70s, considered as favouring cultural relativism rather than universalism (regarding the veil for example).
<i>Observatoire de la laïcité</i>	Opposition to the French consultative commission responsible for advising and assisting the Government in respecting and promoting the principle of secularism, considered as promoting a soft or accomodating reading of French <i>laïcité</i> tolerant of political and/or radicalized Islam (regarding the wearing of the veil for instance).
Putin	Designation of Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, as adversary to France and/or Europe and out of the international imagined community.
Terrorists	Designation of terrorist groups and organizations, i.e., Al Qaeda, Book Haram, the Taliban, or ISIS, often called "dijihadistes", as enemies.
The Establishment	Opposition to the mainstream political parties or the so-called " <i>système</i> ", as well as the so-called " <i>classe politique</i> ", all accused of subjugating the "people".
The Government	Designation of Government, particularly French Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, and Emmanuel Macron, or PM Manuel Valls, as political adversaries.
The Left	Designation of the Left, particularly the Socialists, as political opponents.
The FN	Designation of the National Front (now <i>Rassemblement National</i>), sometimes called the Far-Right, as a political enemy.
The Right	Designation of the Republican right as political adversary.
The USA	Designation of the USA and its government as adversarie(s), especially against the transatlantic alliance.
Islamic totalitarianism	Designation of Islamism as new fascism, mortal enemy to Western civilization and to civilization in general in the Arab world.
Trump	Designation of Donald Trump, president of the USA, as adversary to France and/or Europe.

Turkey	Designation of Turkey and its government as adversarie(s) and out of the international imagined community.
PLOT	
Challenges and threats	
Anti-Semitism	Designation of anti-Semitism as threat to French society.
Assimilation	Designation of French model of assimilation, considered as imposed by the state to the newcomers or to the people considered as non-French, as threat to contemporary France.
<i>Assistanat</i>	Condemnation of the benefit trap or the culture of assistantship, considered a perverse incentive of the welfare state and a barrier to employment.
Austerity	Condemnation of austerity measures as a major threat to the French social system and to the lower classes.
<i>Bien-pensance</i>	Opposing political correctness, including too much tolerance, hypocrisy, the recognition of Islamophobia, censorship of free speech.
Civilizational discourse	Condemning the use of clash narratives, i.e., the clash of civilizations and with it the defence or a supposed French identity or Western civilization, as well as cultural incompatibilities, the great replacement, etc., to trigger fear for political and electoral purposes.
Communitarianism	Designation of communitarianism, i.e., the toleration and/or recognition of communities as a way of emancipating the individuals, in opposition to universalism, as threatening the unitary of the French Republic.
Crisis of democracy	Considering that democracy is in danger, due to the lack of representativeness of political rulers, and/or that freedom is in danger, particularly freedom of religion for minorities, especially with regards to the European migrant crisis.
Demonization	Condemning the demonization of Islam as folk devil or scapegoat, with it the obsession of the veil, and/or the conflation of social and security policies.
Discrimination	Designation of discrimination (race, religion, gender, etc.) as main challenge for French democracy.
Decline	Designation of the perceived decline of France and the collapse of the State as an urgent matter to be addressed and/or condemning the decadence speech, that is the tendency to depict France as a declining or decaying nation.
Criminality	Designation of drug dealers, stealers, and particularly so-called " <i>délinquance</i> " as threats to French national security.
Economical insecurity	Designation of economic insecurity, including global financial crisis, the Euro crisis, the threats weighing on free trade and market economy, energy supply, massive unemployment, as primary insecurity.
EMC	Designation of the European migrant crisis, or the refugee crisis, including issues of forced migration, accommodating refugees, or " <i>la jungle de Calais</i> " as main challenge or threat to contemporary France and/or Europe.
Environmental insecurity	Designation of environmental insecurity, including global warming, climate change, over consumption, nuclear waste, energy issues, etc., as primary insecurity.
State of emergency	Condemning the establishment of the state of emergency in France in response to terror attacks, as threat to civil liberties.
<i>Fracture coloniale</i>	Designation of the difficulties to handle France's colonial past and the conflicting memories opposing members of its population steaming from this situation as a great challenge in contemporary France.
Ghettoization	Designation of the process of segregation and isolation of some populations into underprivileged urban areas as a major challenge to French cities.

Globalisation	Designation of globalisation (economical, migration, digital, geopolitical, etc.) as the main challenge to France and Europe.
Grievance narratives	Opposing France's bashing, especially the use of grievance narratives against French foreign and domestic policies to explain or justify criminal attitudes, including terrorism.
Immigration	Designation of immigration as an economical and/or civilizational threat to France.
Integration	Designation of integration, understood as assimilation of newcomers, and especially Muslims and/or " <i>maghrébins</i> " and " <i>immigrés</i> ", as the main challenge to contemporary France.
Islam	Designation of Islam, be it the Koran, the Sharia, the Sunna, public prayers, the veil, halal food, or the " <i>barbus</i> ", as problems and/or threats to French Republic and French identity.
Islamization	Condemning and fear of a Muslim intention to destroy Europe, to wipe out its culture, by way of Islamicization of European societies.
Islamism	Designation of Islamism and/or political Islam as threat to French political and national securities.
Islamophobia	Designation of Islamophobia as a challenge to French political stability and identity.
Softness	Condemning State softness, called " <i>laxisme</i> ", with respect to criminality in general, and Islamic communitarianism and "provocations" in particular.
<i>Laïcité</i> under threat	
Migrant bashing	Designation of migrant bashing as a political challenge and creating a hostile environment in France.
Interventionism	Designation of interventionism in general, be it regime change foreign policy, interventionist war, or western imperialism, as a threat to global peace and France's and/or Europe's political image.
Multiculturalism	Designation of multiculturalism as anti-model and threat to the French Republican ideal of universalism and unity.
National insecurity	Designation of national insecurity, especially terrorism and wars, as primary insecurity.
Nationalism	Designation of a growing global retreat and isolationism as a threat to Europe and the world.
Obscurantism	Condemning obscurantism, implicitly referring to Islamic obscurantism, as opposed to the French <i>Lumières</i> , reason, and knowledge, and as vehicle of violence.
Persecution of Christians	Designation of the persecution of Christians in the world, particularly the Eastern Christian (<i>Chrétiens d'Orient</i>) in the MENA region, as well as stigmatisation of Christians at home, as a challenge to France's and/or Western identity.
Politics of fear	Condemnation of State policies driven by fear, particularly following terror attacks.
Proselytism	Condemning religious, and more particularly Islamic proselytism, accused of imposing Muslim beliefs in the public sphere.
Racism	Designation of racism as a challenge to contemporary France.
Radicalization	Designation of radicalization, mainly suspected radicalization of Muslims, as a threat to French national security.
Cultural relativism	Designation of cultural relativism, i.e., the idea that meaning and value have no absolute references and should be understood from the perspective of their culture, accused of political correctness and cowardice, as a threat to French identity.
Technological revolution	Designation of new technologies, including the digital revolution, as the main challenge to France and/or Europe and/or the West.
Salafism	Designation of Salafism as a radical interpretation of Islam threatening German national and political securities as well as French identity.
Sexism	Designation of sexism, gender/sexual discriminations, violence against women, sexual violence, etc., as challenge to contemporary France and the world.

Social insecurity	Designation of social insecurity, including poverty (<i>précarité</i>), social injustice, inequalities, housing issues, etc., as primary insecurity.
Societal insecurity	Designation of societal insecurity, including fear of (European and/or Western) civilization's decline, cultural conflicts, loss identity, etc., as primary insecurity.
Terrorism	Designation of terrorism, and with it the phenomena of home-grown terrorists, foreign fighters and returnees, as main threat to France's national security.
Veil	Designation of the veil as political provocation and a sign of separatism and threat to French security and identity.
Veil obsession	Condemning the obsession of French media and politicians for the Islamic veil.
Xenophobia	Designation of the hate or fear of foreigners as a major challenge to contemporary France.
Solutions	
Assimilation	Promotion of the acculturation of newcomers and/or French people considered as non integrated, among which French Muslims, to the French Republic.
Veil ban	Call for banning the wearing of the veil in the public space (full veil in the street, hijab in the university, or for people working in daycare centres, etc.).
Border control	Call for controlling French borders, particularly regain control from the EU, and/or regulate European borders, in order to regulate immigration.
National cohesion	Call for shared understanding, social solidarity, and the uniting of the French nation around the Republican ideal.
Control immigration	Regulate immigration to France by controlling French borders and implementing a system of selection.
Cooperation	Call for international cooperation, dialogue, and multilateralism as modes of international relations.
Counterterrorism	Call for security measures to fight the threat of terrorism.
Create jobs	Call for public investment to create jobs.
Cut taxes	Call for the cut of taxes to attract investment and gain competitiveness.
Democracy	Call for more democracy, i.e, public debate, pluralism, and direct democracy.
Deportation	Call for the repatriation of migrants and/or refugees to the German national borders.
Diplomacy	Call for diplomatic actions rather than sanctions in international relations, particularly negotiating a political solution with Bachar al-Assad regarding the conflict in Syria.
Diversity	Promotion of cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity and the recognition of the diversity of French people (NB. Never call for multiculturalism where community is the base of recognition, while diversity relies on individuals).
Forfeiture of nationality	Call for the forfeiture of nationality for convicted terrorists.
Education	Call for education as a solution to social insecurity in general.
Embrace immigration	Defence of immigration as a positive phenomenon and an added value to France.
Greener policy	Call for more environment-oriented policies (energy, pollution, etc.).
State of emergency	Call for declaring and/or extending the state of emergency to give enough power to the State to fight the terrorist threat.
The EU	Call for more institutional interaction, the reinforcement of Frontex, the single market, a European foreign policy and European defence, etc.
Stronger economy	Promotion of a stronger economy fostering more competitiveness, growth, and the flexibility of the labour market.
Handle the deficit	Call for handling the British deficit and maintaining a balanced budget.
Self-criticism	Call for (historical) self-criticism, particularly with regard to colonial France.

Humanitarian policy	Promotion of humanitarian foreign policy in general, and regarding the conflict in Syria in particular, to mitigate the European migrant crisis (e.g. Helping neighbouring countries to host refugees, etc.).
<i>Idéal républicain</i>	Invocation of the triptych “liberty, equality, fraternity” and/or defence of the republican essence of France, considered as of higher value than democracy.
Institutionalize Islam	Call for the institutionalization and de-transnationalization of Islam in France to foster an <i>Islam de France</i> (creating representational institutions, training imams, etc.).
Integration	Promotion of integration, particularly the integration of Muslims and/or “ <i>immigrés</i> ”.
Intelligence	Call for public investment in intelligence services to insure national security, particularly with regard to the terrorist threat.
(Social) Justice	Call for more social justice and/or the recourse to the law and courts instead of coercion.
<i>Laïcité</i>	Promotion of French specific secularism as one of the primary Western values, and the first value of the French Republic.
<i>Droit au blasphème</i>	Defense of the right to blasphemy, i.e., the right to insult or disrespect a deity, a sacred object or something considered inviolable - exclusively invoked as the right to criticize or condemn Islam as religion without being accused of Islamophobia.
Freedom of religion	Promotion and defence of the freedom of religion, i.e., the freedom of expressing one's religion in the public sphere (e.g.. wearing of the veil).
Intervention	Promotion of military intervention to mitigate international conflicts in general, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in order to mitigate the European migrant crisis and counter the terrorist threat.
Moderation	Promotion of moderation in the State response to crisis in general, and with regard to the terror attacks in particular.
The Nation State	Promotion of a Europe of sovereign nations (“ <i>souveraineté nationale</i> ”), national borders and national interest, in opposition to the EU and European integration.
Patriotism	Promotion of and/or call for national pride.
Peace	Call for banning arm export and a general military restraint.
Police	Call for public investment in the police forces, particularly hiring more agents in the local police and security services.
Pragmatism	Promotion of political pragmatism, in opposition to utopianism, ideologies, or moral politics.
Prevention	Call for preventive policy, particularly regarding the terrorist threat, and defence of the prevent strategy within the government's counter-terrorism strategy.
Protectionism	Call for regulatory policies to protect the French economy from foreign competition.
More state	fonction publique services publics investissements publics régulation
Religious neutrality	Call for the neutrality of individuals in matters of religions and beliefs in the public sphere, implicitly targeting the visibility of Islam in the public space.
Revolution	Call for a popular revolution against the political oligarchy.
Prison	Call for more repressive actions against criminality, more time in prison rather than alternative sentence or sentence adjustment.
Innovation	Call for and defence of public investment in research and innovation and/or promotion of a nation of entrepreneurs and start-ups.
State authority	Politique sécuritaire surveillance, Strong state Muscular responses Ordre républicain Régalien
Frexit	Call for and/or defence of the withdrawal of France from the EU in order to regain sovereignty (border control, monetary and financial sovereignty, etc.).
State neutrality	Defence of the State neutrality in matters of religions and beliefs, rather than a religious neutrality imposed on the individuals.
Work more	Promotion of hard work (“ <i>travailler plus pour gagner plus</i> ”), and/or entrepreneurship, etc.
The Welfare State	Defence of the welfare state and/or call for more redistribution and social security.

Appendix 7 - European codebook of narration of Islam, security, and identity (2009-2019)

Code's name	Description
SETTING	
Horizon of experience	
Africa	Reference to the African continent and topics linked to European and/or Western relations to Africa.
Judeo-Christian Tradition	Reference to the (Judeo) Christian anchorage of the West and/or Europe and/or the country.
Islam	Reference to the debate regarding the place of Islam in Europe and/or the country.
Eastern Europe	Reference to Eastern European countries such as Hungary or Poland and to the country's and or Western Europe's relations to Eastern Europe.
Europe	Tackling the topic of Europe and the EU.
History	Neutral reference to historical events and History in general.
Identities	Tackling the topic of identities in general in the country and/or Europe and/or the West.
Immigration	Reference to the topic of immigration.
MENA region	Reference to the Middle East North Africa region.
National past	Positive or negative reference to the national past.
Secularism	Tackling the topic of secularisation and/or secularism.
Terror	Reference to the topic of terrorism, be it terror attacks in in Europe, the West, and the rest of the world, as well as terror organizations.
Rhetoric codes	
Alarming	Lexical field of urgency, uncertainty, and danger to foster State intervention.
Binary	Strong dichotomies and opposition between “us” and “them”, (e.g. backward vs. civilised/enlightened) simplification of a situation in “black and white” terms, lack of understanding.
Defensive	Rhetoric linked to the fear of/feeling of being attacked, ready to defend oneself, on guard to strike back.
Dialectical	Pedagogical tone to help the audience understand a complicated situation, against binary or simple explanations.
Emotional	Argumentation is founded on emotional narratives to persuade the audience and trigger fear or hate, or on the opposite, compassion or pity (opposite to reasonable).
Empathetic	Lexical field of compassion and call for understanding the “other”, few dichotomies and oppositions between the self/other.
Ironical	Use of irony to disregard an argument or as self-depreciation.
Optimistic	Enhancing the good side of a story and betting on a positive outcome (e.g. lexical field of hope).
Pacifist	Lexical field of peace, in opposition to war-like rhetoric, i.e., dialogue, appeasement, disarmament, etc.
Pessimistic	Enhancing the bad side of a story and betting on a negative outcome.
Reasonable	Argumentation founded on reasonable narratives to convince the audience.
Reproving	Oppositional rhetoric, mostly against the government or the state, reproving a lack of intervention/success.

Promotional	Promotion of oneself, of one's or one's party's achievements.
War-like	Lexical field of combat, i.e., strike, counter-strike prevailing, defeat, etc.
CHARACTERIZATION	
In-group	
<i>Self</i>	
Anti-racist	Self-defined as anti-racist or engaged in fighting racism as priority political fight.
Muslim	Self-defined as British and Muslim.
Christian	Self-defined as Christian or Protestant or Catholic or belonging to a Christian country and/or inclusion of the Christian civilization within the in-group
Democrat	Self defined as democrat, or reference to one's own country and/ or party as democratic or inclusion of democrats within the in-group.
The EU	Self defined as belonging to the European Union or definition of the EU as the in-group - different from the self-definition as belonging to European culture/civilization/identity, or the inclusion of other European countries as friends and allies.
Feminist	Self-defined as feminist or adhesion to feminism.
Hero	Self-defined as heroic or characterization of Britain as a hero of history (Europe's peacekeeper).
Humanist	Self-defined as humanist or as defender of human rights.
Leftist	Self-defined as a leftist or belonging to the Labour Party.
Liberal	Self-defined as a socio-political and/or economical liberal.
Migration background	Self-defined as coming from a migration background.
Moderate	Self-defined as moderate or endorsing/calling for moderation in politics.
Multiculturalist	Endorses multiculturalism as an ideal of society and includes a pluralism of communities within the in-group.
Patriot	Self-defined as a patriot, driven by national pride.
Republican	Self-defined as republican or endorsing republicanism.
The Right	Adhesion to the Right.
Secularist	Self-defined as secularist or inclusion of secularist and/or enlightened within the in-group.
The West	Self-identified with the West, or self-defined as westerner or "occidental".
<i>Friends and allies</i>	
Europe	Designation of European sovereign countries as allies, as opposed to the EU.
Israel	Designation of Israel as friend to Britain and/or as only democracy in the Middle East and therefore natural ally to Britain and/or the West.
MENA	Designation of MENA countries, i.e., North African such as Algeria, Tunisia and Algeria, or Middle Eastern such as Syria, as friends and/or allies.
Muslims	Designation of Muslim communities in Britain as political ally to the British State.
NATO	Designation of NATO as an essential international organisation for Britain.
North-America	Designation of the USA and Canada as principal allies to Britain.
Russia	Designation of Russia as friend and ally.
The UN	Inclusion of the UN in the international imagined community.
The People	Self-designation as representing "the People" against the Establishment.
Turkey	Designation of Turkey as friend and ally.
Out-group	

Merkel	Opposition to Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, and its presumed grip over the EU.
Capitalism	Designation of capitalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents.
ISIS	Designation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as enemy.
The Establishment	Opposition to the mainstream political parties and elites accused of subjugating the “people”.
The EU	Designation of the EU, aka Brussels, and/or Europeanization as adversary.
The Far-right	Designation of the Far-Right as political adversary and/or enemy.
The Government	Designation of Government as political opponents.
Islamic national authorities	Designation of the national Islamic associations and/or national Islamic authorities as adversaries and/or accomplices to Islamists.
Islamists	Designation of political Islam and/or Muslim Brotherhood as enemies or adversaries.
The Left	Designation of the Left, particularly the socialists and/or the communists, as political opponents.
Laicism	Designation of a radical version of secularism, i.e., one that fights religious visibility in the public space, as a destructive ideology to be opposed, as well as its supporters.
Religious fundamentalists	Designation of fundamentalism as a destructive ideology to be fought, as well as its proponents.
Terrorists	Designation of terrorist groups and organizations, i.e., Al Qaeda, Book Haram, the Taliban, or ISIS, as enemies.
Trump	Designation of Donald Trump, president of the USA, as adversary to Europe.
The USA	Designation of the USA and its government as adversarie(s), especially against the transatlantic alliance.
PLOT	
Challenges and threats	
Anti-liberalism	Designation of anti-liberal forces, such as authoritarianism, dictatorship, theocracies, totalitarianism, reactionary, global retreat and isolationism, populism, as the main challenge to Europe and/or the West.
Anti-Semitism	Designation of anti-Semitism as contemporary challenge.
Assimilation	Designation of assimilation, considered as imposed by the state to the newcomers or to the people excluded from the in-group, as threat to contemporary France.
Clash narratives	Condemning the use of clash narratives, i.e., the clash of civilizations, cultural incompatibilities, the great replacement, etc., to trigger fear for political and electoral purposes.
Discrimination	Designation of discrimination (race, religion, gender, etc.) as main challenge.
Economic insecurity	Designation of economic insecurity, including global financial crisis, the Euro crisis, the threats weighing on free trade and market economy, energy supply, massive unemployment, as primary insecurity.
Environmental insecurity	Designation of environmental insecurity, including global warming, climate change, over consumption, nuclear waste, energy issues, etc., as primary insecurity.
EMC	Designation of the European migrant crisis, or the refugee crisis, including issues of forced migration, accommodation of migrants, or the “Calais jungle” as main challenge or threat.
Ghettoization	Designation of the process of segregation and isolation of some populations into underprivileged urban areas as a major challenge.
Globalisation	Designation of globalisation (economical, migration, digital, geopolitical, etc.) as the main challenge.
Grievance narratives	Opposing national bashing or foreign policy explanations considered as justifying criminal attitudes, including terrorism.

Immigration	Designation of immigration as an economical and/or cultural threat to the country
Integration	Designation of integration of newcomers, and especially Muslims, as the main challenge.
Interventionism	Designation of interventionism in general, be it regime change foreign policy, interventionist war, or western imperialism, as a threat to global peace.
Islam	Designation of Islam, be it the Koran, the Sharia, the Sunna, public prayers, mosques, the veil, or so-called “Islamicization”, as problems and/or threats.
Islamic culture	Designation of Islamic culture, considered as a misogynist culture, including sexual abuse, honour killing, forced marriages, excision, etc, as threat to national identity.
Islamism	Designation of Islamism and/or political Islam as threat to political stability and national security.
Islamophobia	Designation of Islamophobia as a challenge to political stability and national identity.
Migrant bashing	Designation of migrant bashing as a political challenge and creating a hostile environment.
National insecurity	Designation of national insecurity, especially terrorism and wars, as primary insecurity.
Political correctness	Opposing political correctness, including the recognition of Islamophobia, censorship of free speech, denial, or political taboo, as well as cultural appeasement or institutional timidity.
Perversion of islam	Designation of an interpretation of Islam considered as a perversion of it, as a threat to cohesion.
Racism	Designation of racism as a challenge.
Radicalisation	Designation of radicalization, mainly suspected radicalization of Muslims as a threat to national security.
Religious persecution	Designation of religious persecution in the world, as well as religious stigmatization and discrimination in Britain, as a challenge to global peace internal cohesion.
Sexism	Designation of sexism, gender/sexual discriminations, violence against women, sexual violence, etc., as challenge.
Social insecurity	Designation of social insecurity, including poverty, social injustice, inequalities, housing issues, retirement pensions, access to education, University fees, etc., as primary insecurity.
Societal insecurity	Designation of societal insecurity, including fear of (European and/or Western) civilization's decline, cultural conflicts, loss of identity within the EU or fear of the great replacement through immigration and/or Islamization, etc., as primary insecurity.
Multiculturalism	Designation of multiculturalism as a threat to the national identity.
Tolerance	Opposing too much tolerance and/or softness with respect to immigration, integration, or security policies.
Technological revolution	Designation of new technologies, including the digital revolution, industrial changes, as the main challenge to the country and/or Europe and/or the West.
Terrorism	Designation of terrorism, and with it the phenomena of home-grown terrorists, foreign fighters and returnees, terror funding and terror attacks, as main threat to (inter)national security.
Veil	Designation of the veil (headscarf or full-veil) as political provocation and a sign of separatism and threat to national security and identity.
War	Designation of war, particularly the war in Iraq, and with it civilian casualties and the issue of arm export, as a threat to global peace and national interest.
Solutions	
Assimilation	Promotion of the assimilation of newcomers, especially Muslim populations.
Reform	Call for reforms in general, including electoral reform, or regime change (constitutional), etc.

Cohesion	Call for shared understanding, solidarity, and the unity of the imagined community.
Control immigration	Regulate immigration by controlling national borders and/or implementing a system or selection.
Cooperation	Call for international cooperation and multilateralism as modes of international relations.
Counterterrorism	Call for security measures to fight the threat of terrorism.
Create jobs	Call for public investment to create jobs.
The EU	Call for more institutional interaction, a fiscal integration, the single market, a European foreign policy and European defence, Erasmus, etc.
Fight Islamophobia	Call for the defence of British Muslim against religious discrimination.
Forfeiture of nationality	Call for the forfeiture of nationality for convicted terrorists.
Greener policy	Call for a green revolution, and the consideration of climate change, energy issues, and environmental challenges.
Host refugees	Call for hosting refugees and opening the European and national asylum system.
Humanitarian help	Promotion of humanitarian foreign policy in general, and regarding the conflict in Syria in particular, to mitigate the European migrant crisis (e.g. helping neighbouring countries to host refugees, discouraging migration in the first place, planning of a relocation scheme etc.).
Institutionalize Islam	Call for the institutionalization and de-transnationalization of Islam (creating representational institutions, training imams, etc.).
Integration	Promotion of integration, particularly the integration of Muslim populations.
Intelligence	Call for public investment in intelligence services to ensure national security, particularly with regard to the terrorist threat.
Intervention	Promotion of military intervention to mitigate international conflicts in general, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in order to mitigate the European migrant crisis and counter the terrorist threat.
Diplomacy	Call for non-military solutions to handle international crises, such as international dialogue, economic sanctions, humanitarian help.
Police	Call for public investment in the police forces, particularly hiring more agents in the local police and security services.
Pragmatism	Promotion of political pragmatism and/or realism, in opposition to utopianism, ideologies, or moral politics.
Prevention	Call for preventive policies (intelligence, surveillance) particularly regarding the terrorist threat.
More state	Call for more state regulation in general, from nationalisations, to protectionism, and massive public investments in education, local police, emergency services, and public services in general.
Secularism	Promotion of secularism one of the primary Western and/or European values and/or principles.
Sovereignty	Promotion of a Europe of sovereign nations, national borders and national interest, in opposition to the EU and European integration.
The rule of Law	Promotion of the respect of the rule of law as the primary duty of European citizens, in opposition to any cultural-based definition of national identities.
Trans-Atlantic alliance	Defence of a strong alliance with the USA.

Appendix 8 – French summary

L'émergence d'une « menace terroriste islamiste » après les attentats du 11 septembre à New York a (re)mis la question de la place de l'islam et des musulmans au cœur des politiques européennes et occidentales. Néanmoins, les différences de perception et de réactions à l'égard de l'islam dans les discours publics en Allemagne, en Grande-Bretagne, et en France interrogent, tant sur le plan politique qu'intellectuel. Politique, d'abord, car si l'avenir de l'Union européenne repose, en partie, sur une plus grande convergence des politiques étrangères et de défense, aucun de ces trois pays d'Europe occidentale ne semble s'accorder sur la manière de gérer les crises auxquelles ils sont confrontés²⁴². Intellectuelle, ensuite, car si l'analyse de la construction sécuritaire de l'islam a acquis une pertinence croissante au cours des deux dernières décennies, tant dans les études sur la sécurité, que dans celles sur le cadrage (*framing*) ou sur le démon populaire (*folk devil*), aucune n'adopte une démarche comparative permettant d'éclairer la manière dont les récits politiques varient dans les différents contextes européens. Même celles qui remettent en question la réification de l'« islam » ou de l'« Autre » musulman/oriental, peinent à déconstruire l'« Occident » comme acteur monolithique. Or, une première étude comparative menée en 2013 sur trois magazines hebdomadaires européens avait montré que même lorsque les attentats du 11 septembre avait (ré)activé la rhétorique du choc des civilisations dans les discours médiatiques et politiques, le cadrage d'une « menace islamique » exprimait des sensibilités propres à chaque contexte national²⁴³. Ce constat ne permettait pas de tirer des conclusions générales mais remettait néanmoins en cause la vision homogénéisante de l'« effet 11 septembre », selon laquelle la construction sécuritaire de l'islam est un phénomène global et unifié en Occident depuis les attentats. Il a également contribué à formuler la question de recherche suivante : comment la construction sécuritaire de l'islam et des

²⁴² A titre d'exemple, les réactions publiques aux « révolutions arabes » diffèrent diamétralement. En France, médias et officiels ont porté un jugement négatif aux révolutions populaires dès lors qu'elles ont porté au pouvoir, par les urnes, des partis islamistes, tandis que les nouveaux pouvoirs démocratiquement élus, même islamistes, ont été reconnus voire salués par les autorités allemandes et britanniques. D'autre part, concernant la crise irako-syrienne, tandis que la France a rejoint une coalition internationale aux côtés des Etats-Unis pour lutter contre l'Etat islamique, la Grande Bretagne s'est impliquée de façon secondaire et l'Allemagne est restée en retrait. Notons enfin que le Royaume-Uni et la France ont défendu un accueil prudent des réfugiés syriens en Europe tandis que l'Allemagne a tout de suite ouvert ses frontières, quoique momentanément. A l'intérieur, l'islam visible (voiles, barbe, nourriture halal, prières de rue, mosquées, etc.), provoque des réactions épidermiques dans le débat public français, et au plus haut niveau de l'Etat, allant jusqu'à des lois d'interdiction (2004, 2010). Au Royaume-Uni, au contraire, toute loi d'interdiction est exclue, malgré quelques polémiques ponctuelles. En Allemagne, enfin, le voile suscite des polémiques au niveau local mais les hautes autorités fédérales, au contraire, reconnaissent la place de l'islam en Allemagne.

²⁴³ Jeanne Prades (2013), « La perception différentielle de la « menace islamique » dans trois hebdomadaires d'Europe occidentale : une « panique morale » française ? », *Political Science*, [dumas-009887280]. Disponible ici : <https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-009887280v1>

musulmans varie-t-elle d'un contexte à l'autre dans les discours publics de trois pays d'Europe occidentale qui partagent, a priori, des défis communs liés à l'islam et aux musulmans²⁴⁴ ?

Si de nombreuses recherches, notamment structuralistes (mobilisation des ressources, idéologie politique, modèle de régulation étatique du religieux), ont abordé la question des différences de traitement et de perception des minorités musulmanes dans ces trois contextes, elles sortent toutes du cadre des études sur la sécurité. A ce jour, il n'existe donc pas d'étude comparative sur la construction des menaces dans les discours publics européens. Pour y remédier, bien que modestement, cette thèse propose de mobiliser de façon critique le concept de « *securitization* » de l'école de Copenhague – que je traduis par « sécuritisation » en français²⁴⁵. Celui-ci interroge la façon dont certains objets sont constitués en enjeux de sécurité requérant des mesures extraordinaires pour les combattre, et semble le plus à même de rendre compte de l'articulation entre islam, identité et sécurité dans le champ des relations internationales. L'une de ses forces réside dans la reconnaissance de la dimension intersubjective de la sécurité, offrant ainsi la possibilité d'analyser les idées et les représentations dans les discours sécuritaires. Cependant, les études sur le processus de sécuritisation de l'islam ont tendance à tenir pour acquis le phénomène sans jamais le démontrer empiriquement. De plus, elles mobilisent l'expression « sécuritisation de l'islam » pour désigner indifféremment la politisation et la construction sécuritaire de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de la religion et de la culture (islamiques), qui ont, pourtant, des conséquences différentes sur l'élaboration des politiques publiques ainsi que sur les minorités musulmanes. C'est pourquoi, cette thèse propose une approche narrative de la sécuritisation, permettant d'analyser concrètement les processus de sécuritisation et de dé-sécuritisation dans les discours.

Partant du postulat épistémologique de l'École de Copenhague selon lequel les discours d'(in)sécurité sont avant tout des actes narratifs, cette thèse nuance néanmoins deux de ses présupposés : (1) la sécuritisation est une articulation discursive reposant sur une grammaire universelle de la sécurité, et (2) la perception de la menace est instable et volatile. D'une part, le processus d'altérisation (*othering*) nécessaire à la sécuritisation présuppose un environnement, un cadre préexistant pour résonner dans une audience. Le « sécuritisateur » comme le « sécuritisé » sont co-dépendants des cadres narratifs nationaux dans lesquels ils évoluent. D'autre part, ces cadres narratifs et répertoires sémantiques, s'ils évoluent constamment, sont le fruit d'une

²⁴⁴ En effet, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Allemagne et la France connaissent, d'une part, une immigration de populations musulmanes d'après-guerre ainsi qu'un mode de sécularisme relativement comparable. De l'autre, ils sont tous trois confrontés à des attaques terroristes récurrentes sur leurs territoires depuis le 11 septembre, menées par des mouvements djihadistes, et ont été touchés de plein fouet par la crise migratoire qui a suivi les révolutions arabes des années 2010.

²⁴⁵ Le terme français de « sécurisation » - le fait de sécuriser, rendre sûr - serait ici un faux ami, la sécuritisation étant au contraire le fait de construire/désigner un objet comme menaçant, nécessitant des mesures de sécurisation.

sédimentation longue de certaines représentations dans les récits nationaux. Certains événements traumatiques restent ancrés dans la mémoire collective durant des siècles, même s'ils se modifient et sont contestés, tandis que d'autres ne s'implantent pas ou disparaissent. Un ancrage positif est un ancrage producteur de récit, quelle que soit la valeur attribuée à l'événement. Un ancrage négatif est un ancrage producteur d'amnésie. Par ailleurs, les cadres narratifs peuvent être mobilisés de manière active, comme le devoir de mémoire ou les commémorations, ou passive, comme les éléments de langage, les analogies ou les expressions idiomatiques.

L'ambition première de cette thèse est donc d'analyser la construction de l'islam et des musulmans dans une perspective comparative afin de mettre en évidence comment les processus de sécuritisation peuvent varier en fonction des répertoires narratifs et sémantiques nationaux. En second lieu, elle tente d'évaluer le poids des expériences historiques et leurs expressions dans ces répertoires. En somme, elle interroge la manière dont les représentations historiques de l'islam et des musulmans résonnent, ou non, dans les discours contemporains de (dé)sécuritisation de l'islam, créant un pont entre les études sur l'impérialisme, le colonialisme et l'orientalisme, et les études critiques sur la sécurité en relations internationales.

Méthodologiquement, cette recherche s'inscrit dans une démarche qualitative et interprétative, fondée sur l'analyse des expressions, plutôt que la recherche des causes, de la sécuritisation. Empiriquement, elle repose sur une analyse des discours publics. Après une contextualisation historique approfondie des interactions entre l'Allemagne, la Grande-Bretagne et la France et ce que l'on appelait alors « l'Orient » au tournant du XX^{ème} siècle (chapitre 3), elle compare les constructions narratives de l'islam et des musulmans dans les discours publics allemands, britanniques et français entre 2009 et 2019, pris d'abord comme des corpus nationaux dans les chapitres 4 à 6, puis comme un corpus européen unique dans le chapitre 7. Dans chacun des chapitres empiriques, les discours ont été reconstruits par le biais d'une analyse narrative mettant en évidence des idéaux-types de cadrage ou mise en scène (*setting*), de protagonistes (*characterization*) et d'intrigues (*plot*). Ensuite, elle identifie des points de convergence et de divergence dans les processus de sécuritisation et de désécuritisation dans les trois cas européens. Enfin, elle tente d'interpréter ces variations en évaluant le poids et les usages des récits nationaux dans les discours publics. Notons toutefois que cette thèse n'a pas pour ambition d'identifier les croyances d'un état ni de supposer qu'il existerait une culture nationale à part entière qui puisse dicter à elle seule les processus de sécuritisation. Il est en effet théoriquement et empiriquement difficile, si ce n'est impossible, de saisir un système de croyances qui serait collectivement partagé au niveau national.

En réponse à la question de recherche, cette thèse valide en partie son premier argument selon lequel les constructions narratives de la menace varient en fonction de répertoires narratifs et sémantiques nationaux.

En effet, dans chaque cas européen étudié, deux batailles narratives se déroulent simultanément impliquant des objets et des référents de sécurité différents. Dans le cas allemand, les discours de (dé)sécurisation s'articulent, dans l'arène politique, autour de l'immigration : les uns défendent une « culture » allemande (*Leitkultur*) et le retour des frontières nationales contre le danger migratoire, a fortiori musulman, les autres soutiennent la culture de l'accueil (*Willkommenskultur*) contre le spectre néonazi incarné par les mouvements d'extrême droite comme *Pegida* ou l'AFD (*Alternative für Deutschland*). Dans la sphère médiatique, un *Kulturkampf* sociétal et contemporain se joue autour de la question musulmane : les uns prônent l'assimilation contre le danger islamique, les autres plébiscitent une politique de reconnaissance (*Annerkennungskultur*) contre un revivalisme nationaliste. Ainsi, les récits de (dé)sécuritisation de l'islam et des musulmans sont autant de négociations entre une vision mono- et une vision multi- ou post-culturelle de l'identité allemande. Dans cette lutte narrative, l'extrême droite, assimilée à l'héritage traumatique de l'Allemagne nazi, fait office d'ennemi intérieur numéro 1 pour l'élite politique fédérale, qui la juge plus dangereuse pour la stabilité politique du pays que la « menace islamique ». La sécuritisation de l'islam, en tant que danger culturel pour l'Allemagne, reste quant à elle virulente mais circonscrite à la sphère médiatique.

Dans le cas britannique, d'un côté les discours de (dé)sécuritisation s'articulent autour de l'Europe continentale, avec comme corollaire, l'immigration et l'islam : les uns défendent une Grande-Bretagne tournée vers le Commonwealth contre la menace d'une Europe dirigée par l'Allemagne, et une immigration incontrôlable permise par l'UE, les autres défendent une Grande-Bretagne foncièrement européenne et multiculturelle contre la menace anti-libérale. De l'autre, les trois Premier Ministres étudiés articulent la sécuritisation de l'« idéologie islamiste », contre le relativisme des libéraux et des « gauchistes », à la désécuritisation de l'islam et des musulmans britanniques, contre les ultra-nationalistes et les laïcistes. Ces deux discours de (dé)sécuritisation expriment une lutte hégémonique entre deux conceptions du libéralisme. D'une part, le libéralisme en tant que mode de vie britannique à préserver (*way of life - living*) apparaît comme un discours hégémonique de re-définition du particularisme britannique au début du XXI^{ème} siècle, face aux menaces islamiste et continentale. De l'autre, le libéralisme en tant que *modus vivendi*, considéré comme un mode de gestion des différentes communautés hérité de la construction britannique, est mobilisé au sein de l'opposition politique et de l'arène médiatique contre les menaces populistes et nationalistes. Ces conceptions opposées du libéralisme britannique expriment moins une tension identitaire qu'une incertitude de statut international face à la perte de l'Empire et à une Union européenne de plus en plus intégrée.

Dans le cas français, enfin, les récits de (dé)sécuritisation de la mondialisation opposent les défenseurs de l'Etat national aux partisans de l'intégration européenne, tandis que les discours de (dé)sécuritisation de

l'islam opposent les partisans d'une laïcité idéologique, mobilisée de manière offensive contre la menace islamique, aux partisans d'une laïcité constitutionnelle, mobilisée de manière défensive pour inclure les Français musulmans dans la République française. Ainsi, la laïcité française, mobilisée à la fois comme instrument de sécuritisation et de dé-sécuritisation de l'islam apparaît comme le cadre privilégié d'interprétation des enjeux socioculturels, identitaires et sécuritaires liés à l'islam. La laïcité idéologique incarne le mode de vie français à sécuriser et est progressivement devenue la représentation socialement acceptée de la laïcité française, assimilée à la modernité, la démocratie et la raison, en opposition à l'islam, associé à la tradition, la superstition et le fanatisme. Par contraste, la laïcité constitutionnelle apparaît comme un contre-discours défendant l'esprit libéral de la « loi de 1905 ». Cette guerre narrative sous-tend un conflit plus implicite entre aphasie et reconnaissance du passé colonial français.

Ces premiers résultats restent à nuancer. D'une part, si les récits sécuritaires varient dans les trois corpus européens étudiés, les acteurs politiques tendent à mobiliser la même boîte à outils rhétorique pour obtenir le consentement de leur audience, quel que soit le contexte socioculturel : les discours de sécuritisation mobilisent des registres émotionnels et binaires et construisent les interactions politiques comme un jeu à somme nulle dans un scénario global conflictuel. Les discours de dé-sécuritisation mobilisent au contraire des registres didactique et empathique et construisent les interactions politiques comme un jeu gagnant-gagnant dans un scénario plus généralement collaboratif. En outre, comme le montre la comparaison du chapitre 7, certains idéaux-types de récit sécuritaire sont communs au corpus européen. Ces résultats semblent donc démontrer que la sécuritisation est à la fois une *articulation* reposant sur une grammaire universelle de la sécurité, et une *négociation* reposant sur des répertoires narratifs propres. D'autre part, si les variations nationales sont significatives dans les récits sécuritaires, les processus de sécuritisation et de dé-sécuritisation tendent également à embrasser des préférences partisans. En effet, sans surprise, les “conservateurs” et les “populistes” européens (auto-proclamés ou désignés) ont tendance à sécuriser la mondialisation, l'immigration et/ou l'islam en tant que culture/religion/idéologie, tandis que les “socio-démocrates” et “libéraux” européens (auto-proclamés ou désignés) ont tendance à dé-sécuritiser ces objets par des sécuritisations alternatives, telles que l'extrême droite ou l'insécurité environnementale. Cependant, d'un point de vue *relatif*, la comparaison a permis de montrer que les conservateurs et nationalistes britanniques sécurisent *tendanciellement moins* l'islam et les musulmans que leurs homologues européens, l'Europe continentale étant l'objet privilégié des discours de sécuritisation. A l'inverse, les socialistes et progressistes français sécurisent *tendanciellement plus* l'islam et les musulmans que leurs homologues européens, l'islam restant l'objet privilégié de contre-identification française depuis l'époque coloniale. Enfin, les gouvernants et

autorités fédérales allemandes sécuritisent *tendanciellement moins* l'islam et les musulmans que leurs homologues français et anglais, les mouvements d'extrême droite et néonazi représentant l'objet privilégié des discours de sécuritisation au plus haut niveau de l'Etat fédéral – à l'exception de l'*AFD*.

Le deuxième argument, selon lequel les différents orientalismes cristallisés au tournant du XX^{ème} siècle influencent la manière dont l'islam et les musulmans sont construits dans les discours publics contemporains, a été quant à lui partiellement infirmé. Bien que certains récits aient persisté tout au long du XX^{ème} siècle, et que l'héritage colonial français soit apparu comme un répertoire privilégié de sécuritisation de l'islam, d'autres expériences historiques, telles que le traumatisme du national-socialisme ou la rivalité entre l'Empire britannique et l'Europe continentale, pèsent plus lourd dans les corpus allemand et britannique étudiés. L'ambivalence des discours publics allemands à l'égard de l'islam est autant, si ce n'est davantage, liée à l'héritage traumatique du nazisme et à la division de l'Allemagne pendant la guerre froide qu'à la relation de l'Allemagne impériale avec l'Orient et l'Empire Ottoman avant la Première Guerre mondiale. En Grande-Bretagne, la mobilisation du libéralisme, à la fois pour remettre en question et défendre le multiculturalisme britannique, et à la fois pour contester et défendre la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans l'Union européenne, exprime un double leg : une contre-identification historique de la Grande-Bretagne à l'Europe continentale et une expérience impériale des relations multiraciales avec les minorités religieuses – qui atténue et rend politiquement couteux la sécuritisation de l'islam en tant que tel. Enfin, la lutte hégémonique autour de la laïcité française, l'une affirmant et l'autre contestant la compatibilité de l'islam avec la République française, illustre une certaine continuité avec la contre-identification historique de la France à l'islam depuis son entreprise coloniale en Afrique du Nord et valide donc l'hypothèse orientaliste pour le cas français.

Outre ces résultats empiriques, cette thèse a également des implications pour la recherche sur la sécuritisation en général. Premièrement, elle démontre que l'analyse narrative est une méthode concrète d'investigation empirique du processus de sécuritisation. Deuxièmement, la démarche comparative, fondée sur la complémentarité entre l'analyse narrative aux niveaux nationaux et l'analyse narrative au niveau européen, permet de rendre explicite l'implicite de certaines représentations collectives qui resteraient autrement invisibles au commun. Elle permet également d'affiner l'hypothèse de recherche en différenciant analytiquement les processus de politisation et celui de sécuritisation : le premier désigne des adversaires politiques et énonce des défis, le second désigne des ennemis et énonce des menaces. Une approche narrative de la sécuritisation fournit par ailleurs des informations supplémentaires tant sur les variations spatiales que sur l'(in)stabilité temporelle des processus de sécuritisation en Europe occidentale.

Enfin, les résultats de cette thèse ont des implications pour la recherche sur l'orientalisme et la

construction du rapport entre les « nous » nationaux et l'« Autre » dans les relations internationales. Premièrement, l'enquête historique sur les interactions européennes avec l'« Orient » au début du XX^{ème} siècle a permis de niveler nos connaissances sur la *Weltpolitik* allemande en tant que partie intégrante de l'impérialisme européen. Deuxièmement, elle a fourni une description fine des différentes interactions entre les trois pays européens et l'« Orient » à l'ère des empires. Enfin, elle a rendu possible l'évaluation concrète de l'impact de ces différences sur le cadrage narratif de l'islam et les musulmans dans les discours publics contemporains.

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Titre : Constructions sécuritaires de l'islam en Europe occidentale. Une analyse comparative des discours publics en Allemagne, en Grande-Bretagne, et en France

Mots clés : islam, construction sécuritaire, discours, orientalisme, analyse comparative

Résumé: Cette thèse interroge la manière dont les représentations historiques de l'islam et des musulmans résonnent, ou non, dans la construction sécuritaire de l'islam et des musulmans dans des discours publics contemporains allemands, britanniques et français. Plus précisément, en proposant une approche narrative du concept de « sécuritisation » de l'Ecole de Copenhague, elle propose de créer un pont entre les études sur l'impérialisme, le colonialisme et l'orientalisme, et les études critiques sur la sécurité en relations internationales.

Méthodologiquement, cette recherche repose sur une démarche comparative, qualitative et interprétative, fondée sur l'analyse des expressions, plutôt que la recherche des causes, de la sécuritisation. Empiriquement, elle repose sur une analyse narrative de 356 discours produits par 66 différents acteurs politiques et médiatiques, construits d'abord en trois corpus nationaux allemand, britannique et français, puis en un corpus européen global.

En réponse à la question de recherche, cette thèse valide en partie son premier argument selon lequel les constructions narratives de la menace varient en fonction de répertoires narratifs et sémantiques nationaux. Elle invalide néanmoins en partie le second, selon lequel les différents orientalismes cristallisés au tournant du XX^{ème} siècle influencent la manière dont l'islam et les musulmans sont construits dans les discours publics contemporains.

Cette thèse a des implications pour la recherche sur la sécuritisation, ainsi que pour les études sur l'orientalisme et la construction du rapport entre le « nous » national et l'« Autre » dans les relations internationales. D'une part, elle propose une méthode d'investigation empirique des processus de construction des menaces et des référents de sécurité, bien qu'encore expérimentale. De l'autre, elle démontre le pouvoir heuristique de la comparaison pour rendre explicite l'implicite de certaines représentations collectives qui resteraient autrement invisibles au commun.

Title: Narrative (de)securitizations of Islam in Western Europe. A comparative analysis of public discourse in Germany, Britain, and France

Keywords: Islam, securitization, narrative analysis, comparative analysis, orientalism

Abstract: This dissertation inquires into how historical representations of Islam and Muslims may resonate, or not, in the securitization of Islam and Muslims in contemporary German, British and French public discourses. More specifically, by suggesting a narrative approach to the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization, this research aims at bridging studies on imperialism, colonialism, and orientalism, and studies on security in international relations.

Methodologically, this research is grounded in a comparative, qualitative and interpretive approach, based on the analysis of the expressions, rather than the causes of securitization. Empirically, it is based on a narrative analysis of 356 speeches produced by 66 political and media actors, first sampled in three German, British and French corpus, and then in a global European corpus.

In response to the research question, this thesis partially validates its first argument according to which narrative constructions of threat vary according to national narrative and semantic repertoires. However, it partially invalidates the second argument according to which the different orientalismes crystallized at the turn of the 20th century influence the way Islam and Muslims are constructed in contemporary public discourses.

Finally, this research has implications for research on securitization, as well as for studies on Orientalism and the construction self/other nexus in international relations. On the one hand, it offers an effective method of empirical investigation of securitizing processes although it is still experimental. On the other hand, it demonstrates the heuristic power of comparison to make explicit the implicit of some collective representations that would otherwise remain invisible.