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Multiple host organizing committees for international major sporting events: studying factors affecting organizational learning outcomes

Karina Mukanova

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Multiple host organizing committees for international major sporting events: studying factors affecting organizational learning outcomes.

Les comités d'organisation de grands événements sportifs à plusieurs hôtes : étude des facteurs influençant les résultats de l'apprentissage organisationnel.

Thèse de doctorat de l'université Paris-Saclay

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Thèse soutenue à Paris-Saclay, le 17 novembre 2023, par

Karina MUKANOVA

Composition du Jury

Membres du jury avec voix délibérative

Holger PREUSS

Professor, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz (Allemagne)

Président & Rapporteur

Dongfeng LIU

Professor, Shanghai University of Sport (Chine)

Rapporteur & Examineur

Judith MAIR

Associate Professor, The University of Queensland (Australie)

Examinatrice

Emmanuel BAYLE

Associate Professor, Université de Lausanne (Suisse)

Examineur

Anna GERKE

Associate Professor, Audencia Business School

Examinatrice

Titre : Les comités d'organisation de grands événements sportifs à plusieurs hôtes : étude des facteurs influençant les résultats de l'apprentissage organisationnel.

Mots clés : Événement co-organisé, alliance stratégique, apprentissage organisationnel, gouvernance de l'événement, héritage, impacts sociaux

Résumé : Cette thèse analyse la collaboration entre plusieurs pays hôtes dans le cadre de la coorganisation d'événements sportifs. Nous qualifions leurs partenariats d'alliances d'accueil conjointes (AAC), car nous appuyons sur les cadres théoriques des alliances stratégiques et des relations interorganisationnelles (IOR). L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser les facteurs clés de succès des AACs. Trois questions centrales sont abordées afin de comprendre pleinement les trois phases des alliances d'accueil conjointes. La première question porte sur les moteurs et les motivations des AACs. La deuxième question concerne le modèle d'organisation d'événements qui gère les AACs. Enfin, la troisième question porte sur les résultats de la collaboration entre organisateurs et en particulier sur l'apprentissage organisationnel. L'objectif des deux premières questions de recherche est de comprendre leur influence sur les résultats de l'apprentissage organisationnel.

Cette thèse est divisée en 2 études. L'étude 1 utilise une étude de cas multiples avec une unité d'analyse intégrée pour avoir une vue panoramique des différents scénarios de collaboration en interrogeant tous les membres co-hôtes d'une même alliance. L'étude 2 utilise une étude de cas unique avec une unité d'analyse intégrée prenant en compte les deux co-organisateurs de l'événement. Pour les deux études, les données ont été collectées à partir de deux sources. Des entretiens semi-structurés avec 11 alliances hôtes conjointes pour l'étude 1 (n=28) et avec une seule alliance hôte conjointe, FIBA Eurobasket Femmes 2021 (n=12) pour l'étude 2. La deuxième source de données a été de l'information grise. L'analyse des données a suivi une approche mixte de codage déductif et inductif à l'aide du logiciel MAXQDA. Pour l'étude 1, nous avons procédé à une analyse transversale, tandis que pour l'étude 2, il s'agissait d'une analyse intra-cas, suivie d'une analyse de la fréquence des liens.

L'étude 1 révèle que les membres de l'alliance ont appris individuellement en renforçant leurs capacités, en élargissant leur réseau et en partageant des idées (apprentissage intra-organisationnel). Ils ont appris les uns des autres par mimétisme lors des phases d'appel d'offre et de préparation ou de projets conjoints (apprentissage interorganisationnel). De son côté l'alliance a pu poser un jalon et institutionnaliser certaines pratiques dans les événements (apprentissage extra-organisationnel). Les facteurs qui ont affecté l'apprentissage sont apparus lors de la formation de l'alliance, dans les aspects de gestion et dans le contexte national de chaque co-organisateur. Cependant, la majorité des résultats d'apprentissage semblent accidentels. L'étude 2 nous a appris que l'apprentissage inter- et extra-organisationnel n'est pas contrôlé par les membres de l'AAC ou les propriétaires d'événements, ce qui explique l'absence de planification stratégique au niveau d'apprentissage organisationnel.

Les études futures devraient s'attacher à comprendre le rôle du secteur public dans la planification et la gestion d'apprentissage organisationnel. Les praticiens peuvent tirer profit de cette recherche, le secteur public prendra conscience de son rôle dans le lancement et le soutien de ces initiatives d'apprentissage, de levier social ou d'héritage. La prise de conscience des organisateurs d'événements sur l'importance des outils de formalisation permettait des interactions, plus fréquentes et de meilleure qualité, propices à l'apprentissage. Pour les membres de l'alliance, nous leur proposons un cadre des facteurs culturels et organisationnels garantissant de meilleures interactions et in fine, le succès de l'apprentissage.

Title: Multiple host organizing committees for international major sporting events: studying factors affecting organizational learning outcomes

Keywords : Co-hosted event, strategic alliance, organizational learning, event governance, legacy, social impacts

Abstract: This thesis analyses the collaboration of multiple hosts in co-hosting sporting events. We will refer to their partnerships as Joint Hosting Alliances as we rely on strategic alliance theoretical and Interorganizational relationships (IOR) frameworks. The objective of this thesis is to analyse factors affecting collaboration outcomes of the joint hosting alliances. Three central questions are addressed to understand fully all three phases of joint hosting alliances (formation, management and outcomes). The first question asks what the drivers and motives of joint hosting alliances (JHA) are? The second question investigates the event delivery model that manages JHAs. The final, third question examines the outcomes of co-host collaboration, especially with regards to organizational learning. The purpose of the first two research questions is to understand their influence on organizational learning outcomes.

This thesis is divided into two studies. Study 1 employs multiple case study with embedded unit of analysis to have a panoramic view on different collaboration scenarios through inquiring all co-host members of single alliance. Study 2 employs single case study with embedded unit of analysis considering both of co-hosts of the event.

For both studies, data were collected from two sources. Semi-structured interviews from 11 joint hosting alliances for Study 1 (n=28) and from single joint hosting alliance, FIBA Eurobasket Women 2021 (n=12) for Study 2. The second source of data collection was the secondary data (event governance documents) for both studies. The data analysis followed the mix of deductive and inductive coding approach through MAXQDA software. For Study 1 we followed cross-case analysis, for Study 2, it was within-case analysis, followed-up by frequency of ties analysis.

Results of Study 1 reveal that for alliance members learned individually through capacity building, network expansion, and idea sharing (intraorganizational learning). They learned from each other by mimicking their practices and collaborating during bidding and preparation stages on particular initiatives and joint projects (interorganizational learning). As an alliance, they could reach a joint milestone and institutionalize the practices in their event (extraorganizational learning) The factors that affected the learning emerged from the alliance formation, the management aspects, and the national context of each co-host. However, most of the outcomes seemed incidental. In Study 2, we learned that inter- and extra- organizational learning, are not the areas that are financed and therefore controlled by either JHA members or event owners which explains the lack of strategic planning of such organizational learning outcomes.

Future studies should focus on understanding the role of public sector in being involved into planning and managing such organizational learning outcomes. Practitioners can benefit from this research. The public sector will realize its role in initiating and supporting such learning, social leverage or legacy initiatives. Alliance members should focus on building the match based on alliance formation and the national factor recommendations from this thesis that could facilitate learning opportunities. The event owners should be more aware of how their formalization tools affect the frequency and quality of interactions that can be conducive to learning.

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This thesis would not have been completed if I had been alone. I want to thank those who helped me get through this tough but enriching journey.

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me the same even if you preferred that I was next to you. Thank you to my late grandmother, Baba Nina (Inabat) for the unconditional love that I received from you and my late dad, Artur, for doing the best you could and being part of my life.

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To my grandmother, Inabat, and my dad, Artur

Abbreviations

ACOG	Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games
AFC	Aquatic Federation of Canada
ASOIF	Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
ATP	Association of Tennis Professionals
CEV	European Volleyball Federation
CIAMS	Complexité, innovation, activités motrices et sportives
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
EHF	European Handball Federation
FA	Functional Area
FEB	Spanish Basketball Federation
FFBB	French Federation of Basketball
FIBA	International Basketball Federation
FIBA EBM	FIBA Men's EuroBasket
FIBA EBW	FIBA Women's EuroBasket
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
FINA	International Swimming Federation
FIVB	International Volleyball Federation
HR	Human Resources
ICC	International Cricket Council
IF	International Federation
IIHF	International Ice Hockey Federation
IOR	Interorganizational Relationships
ISGB	International Sport Governing Body
IHF	International Handball Federation's
JHA	Joint Hosting Alliances
LOC	Local Organizing Committee

LSGB	Local Sport Governing Bodies
MNC	Multinational Corporations
MSE	Mega Sporting Events
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NMSE	Non-Mega Sporting events
NSGB	National Sport Governing Bodies
OCA	Olympic Coordination Authority
OCOG	Organizing Committee for Olympic Games
PPP	Public-private Partnership
R&D	Research and Development
SIM	Sport Internationals of Montreal
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOCOG	Sydney Organizing Committee for Olympic Games
SOOG	Sochi Olympic Organizing Committee
SOPA	Sydney Olympic Park Authority
TOP	The Olympic Partner
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UEFA Euro	Union of European Football Associations Men's European Championship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency

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Synthèse en français

Cette thèse analyse la collaboration entre plusieurs pays hôtes dans le cadre de la coorganisation d'événements sportifs. Nous qualifierons leurs partenariats d'alliances d'accueil conjointes (AAC), car nous nous appuyons sur les cadres théoriques des alliances stratégiques et des relations interorganisationnelles (IOR). L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser les facteurs clés de succès des AACs. Trois questions centrales sont abordées afin de comprendre pleinement les trois phases des alliances d'accueil conjointes. La première question porte sur les moteurs et les motivations des AACs. La deuxième question concerne le modèle d'organisation d'événements qui gère les AACs. Enfin, la troisième question porte sur les résultats de la collaboration entre organisateurs et en particulier sur l'apprentissage organisationnel. L'objectif des deux premières questions de recherche est de comprendre leur influence sur les résultats de l'apprentissage organisationnel.

Cette thèse est divisée en 2 études. L'étude 1 utilise une étude de cas multiples avec une unité d'analyse intégrée pour avoir une vue panoramique des différents scénarios de collaboration en interrogeant tous les membres co-hôtes d'une même alliance. L'étude 2 utilise une étude de cas unique avec une unité d'analyse intégrée prenant en compte les deux co-organisateurs de l'événement. Pour les deux études, les données ont été collectées à partir de deux sources. Des entretiens semi-structurés avec 11 alliances hôtes conjointes pour l'étude 1 (n=28) et avec une seule alliance hôte conjointe, FIBA Eurobasket Femmes 2021 (n=12) pour l'étude 2. La deuxième source de données a été de l'information grise. L'analyse des données a suivi une approche mixte de codage déductif et inductif à l'aide du logiciel MAXQDA. Pour l'étude 1, nous avons procédé à une analyse transversale, tandis que pour l'étude 2, il s'agissait d'une analyse intra-cas, suivie d'une analyse de la fréquence des liens. L'étude 1 révèle que les membres de l'alliance ont appris individuellement en renforçant leurs capacités, en élargissant leur réseau et en partageant des idées (apprentissage intra-organisationnel). Ils ont appris les uns des autres par mimétisme lors des phases d'appel d'offre et de préparation ou de projets conjoints (apprentissage interorganisationnel). De son côté l'alliance a pu poser un jalon et institutionnaliser certaines pratiques dans les événements (apprentissage extra-organisationnel). Les facteurs qui ont affecté l'apprentissage sont apparus lors de la formation de l'alliance, dans les aspects de gestion et dans le contexte national de chaque co-organisateur. Cependant, la majorité des résultats d'apprentissage semblent accidentels. L'étude 2 nous a appris que l'apprentissage inter- et extra-organisationnel n'est pas

contrôlé par les membres de l’AAC ou les propriétaires d'événements, ce qui explique l'absence de planification stratégique au niveau d'apprentissage organisationnel.

Le sens général de cette thèse est que les AAC ne sont pas nécessairement des collaborations intenses. C'est une décomposition des projets en événements plus petits qui facilite l'accueil par les pays hôtes plutôt que l'ensemble de l'événement par leurs propres moyens. Cette étude ne suggère pas que cela n'est pas possible. Elle visait à explorer si une telle collaboration pouvait être une source d'apprentissage et de résultats, mais cette recherche a démontré que ce n'était pas encore la priorité et que les parties prenantes de l'événement ne se sentaient pas pleinement autorisées et compétentes pour assumer le rôle de vision stratégique de leur partenariat avec l'organisateur. Les études futures devraient s'attacher à comprendre le rôle du secteur public dans la planification et la gestion d'apprentissage organisationnel. Le secteur public et différents organismes peuvent jouer un rôle clé dans la prise de décision. Il est donc important de les interroger à l'avenir pour savoir s'ils tirent parti de ces plateformes d'accueil conjointes pour produire des résultats positifs pour leurs communautés d'accueil. Les praticiens peuvent tirer profit de cette recherche, le secteur public prendra conscience de son rôle dans le lancement et le soutien de ces initiatives d'apprentissage, de levier social ou d'héritage. La prise de conscience des organisateurs d'évènements sur l'importance des outils de formalisation permettait des interactions, plus fréquentes et de meilleure qualité, propices à l'apprentissage. Pour les membres de l'alliance, nous leur proposons un cadre des facteurs culturels et organisationnels garantissant de meilleures interactions et in fine, le succès de l'apprentissage.

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Foreword

[...] the point of truce is one of “opening windows of opportunity for peace”. Like the Olympic festival and potentially like sport itself, truce creates a time and a place where conflicts are set aside and the culture of peace has a chance to take root. Just as xenia required ancient Hellenes to make space and bring out their best for the stranger, the Olympic Games cultivate peace by making a space where it is possible for us to give of our best as human beings.

Jacques Rogge

Just like the Olympics, all other international sporting events reunite nations and create unique occasions to interact with one another. In the last two decades the globalized sporting event context has witnessed a new phenomenon of multiple host nations bidding and organizing sporting events. As the subject of peace, solidarity and intercultural collaboration have always interested me, this phenomenon captured my attention straight away. I saw the uniqueness and beauty of these partnerships. Not only do nations learn about each other by practicing sports together, competing together, but also by organizing those events. Something about this unity grasped my attention and the desire to study this subject further never left me. I followed this spark of curiosity and turned it into my master thesis which allowed me to interact with practitioners and the representatives of international sport governing bodies (ISGBs). The results of this first academic study gave me more hunger to explore further links. This is how the idea was born to study the collaboration of co-hosts and how different factors affect the degree of frequency and intensity with which co-hosts collaborate. The most interesting link was between the event delivery model of the ISGB and the collaboration context. The University of Paris-Saclay welcomed me to study this relationship in depth at their premises. I hope you enjoy reading about this journey of four years and two studies.

Introduction

The 2018 edition of International Federation of Association Football's (FIFA) World Cup in Russia was held across 12 stadiums of the capacity ranging from 33000 to 78000 seats (FIFA, 2018). Hosting multi-sport events such as the Summer and Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games is another level of commitment, amplified by the specific weather conditions needed for certain sports. Hence, the way the major sport event hosting requirements are presented today is very discriminatory towards many host nations that naturally either do not have necessary weather conditions or cannot or do not need to have the required number of facilities. With every new edition, the Games reached more significant size milestones in the number of sporting disciplines, participants, venues, and, thus, costs. Hosting mega events is a competition of its own as it allows countries to be part of the "select club," which means that they will be "at the heart of political and media attention" for a substantial period (Brun & Gomez, 2022, p. 47). Chappelet (2014) described this phenomenon as the gigantism of the Olympic Games. There are major events that are equally high-profile spectacles for media but they generate lesser economic activity. As in the case of football globalization, various sports such as basketball, volleyball, ice hockey, rugby, handball, and cricket became more democratized with time. Therefore, their events followed the tournament growth patterns. This latest proliferation of event gigantism across major events provoked the over-formalization of hosting requirements and increased hosting costs (Byun et al., 2019; Kelly et al., 2019).

As a result, new hosting formats have emerged over the last few decades to retain the interest in hosting the events. The ISGBs started to allow host countries to go beyond the one-host country concept and to co-host the event with another nation. When it comes to the Olympics, IOC has systematically allowed the practice of hosting certain disciplines like sailing, surfing, rowing or equestrian sport and some of the winter sport disciplines outside the mainland of the host country due to various reasons ranging from national regulations to lack of weather conditions or nature sites. This demonstrates that the way the events have been hosted cannot still be confined to the vision of a single host city or country, where there have always been "bigger" events. The mono-sport ISGBs have allowed countries to be more flexible, either by letting them bid for a particular group stage, e.g. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Men's European

Championship (UEFA Euro) in 2020 or jointly bid with another country, e.g. FIFA World Cup 2026 in USA, Canada and Mexico. Today, this co-hosting phenomenon is also widely practiced within most of the latest editions of other trademark monosport events, including the International Ice Hockey Federation’s (IIHF) World Championship, International Cricket Council’s (ICC) World Cup, International Basketball Federation (FIBA)’s EuroBasket, FIBA World Cup, European Handball Federation’s (EHF) Euro, International Handball Federation’s (IHF) World Cup, International Volleyball Federation’s (FIVB) World Championship, European Volleyball Federation’s (CEV) Eurovolley among others (see Figure 1 of the logos of specific examples of co-hosted editions).



Figure 1. Co-hosted event editions

As hosting has become a burdensome affair for the hosts, co-hosting has become a solution for much smaller and less experienced countries to be able to bid for the event, to become a host and to reap the benefits of hosting. It has also enabled experienced nations to host the events responsibly and to persuade their governments to continue investing in sport events, as sport events continuously compete with other industries for public money.

These events have only started attracting attention from the academic side. A few empirical studies were conducted to grasp a generous understanding on the phenomenon. A few studies focused on the motivations and drivers of co-hosting partnerships. In the sport management literature, various sports and sport event partnerships can be described through network theory, interorganizational relationships (IORs), and strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are partnerships between two or more organizations where learning occurs (Child & Faulkner, 1998). Given this definition, co-hosted events can be regarded as strategic alliances, as multiple host organizations can influence

each other in the alliance. Byun et al. (2019), who started applying these lenses, encourage the exploration of organizational learning outcomes of joint bidding alliances. As joint bidding alliances eventually become hosting alliances in their lifecycle, we will refer to them as Joint Hosting Alliances (JHAs) throughout the rest of the thesis.

Less is known about how such events are managed and whether hosts are successful in delivering the event and in achieving their goals, and whether there are positive social outcomes of this new hosting context. The pioneer research on JHAs highlights the need to explore how alliance partners influence each other. Therefore, authors agree on the need to explore organizational learning as an outcome in such partnership. The outcomes of the IOR are usually directly affected by how the alliance was formed and managed. Therefore, what is the management context of such partnership across different events and what contribution does it play in the alliance outcomes? Are such IORs transactional or strategic? This will help us answer the following concerns of event management and geopolitical literature. Can these events can make the world better? Can they help achieve unity and interconnectedness? How do they represent current development of the world order?

This thesis aims to fill these research gaps by studying the effect of the management of the JHAs on its outcomes. For the outcomes, we will focus on organizational learning to see how alliance partners influence each other.

Central research questions

Considering above-mentioned gaps, this thesis attempted to address these three main research questions:

- a. Formation phase: What are the drivers and motives of JHA formation?
- b. Management phase: What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?
- c. Outcomes phase: What are the organizational learning outcomes of co-host collaboration?
What are the factors affecting organizational learning outcomes?

Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of an introduction, five main chapters and conclusion. **Chapter I** is the literature review chapter through which we aim to explain the birth of co-hosted events by examining the history of the globalization of sporting events. We then talk about the research implemented in the events literature. The following subsections on IOR and structure represent

current literature review within these domains but also the justification of the use of these two theoretical frameworks in building the questions for this research and understanding the issues through their prisms. **Chapter II** explains the methodological choice of this research by referring to case study notions and two study design to answer our research questions. **Chapter III** and **IV** are two separate studies that we completed to answer our research question. **Chapter III** is the first exploratory and macro level multiple case study to understand the panoramic context of JHA management, in particular structural dimensions' effect on organizational learning outcomes. Chapter IV is specific single case study that goes deeper to understand the impact of formalization on the JHAs' organizational learning outcomes. **Chapter V** is a general discussion of the two studies and their results.

Chapter I. Literature Review

This chapter is designed to scan the current gaps across different perspectives. The first section “review of sport globalization and the development of sports events” explains the developments that led to the appearance of co-hosting practice. Then, it examines the foundations of the research on events and the current state of inquiry on co-hosted events. The third section introduces research on the IORs and the formation, management and outcomes of co-host partnerships through IOR lenses. The last section on organizational structure unpacks in more detail the parameters that constitute the management of the event and therefore the alliance that delivers it.

1.1 Review of Sport globalization and the development of sports events

This sub-chapter will explore the development of sport events in the light of globalization processes and its role in sport. Sport events have been the center of these transformational processes and allowed for developments that contributed to the current sports economy. We start by looking back to the major milestones of globalization and sport. We then dive into geopolitical processes and the associated shifts in sports and the sporting events. We finalize this section by establishing current questions and gaps that are in line with this body of literature.

1.1.1. The beginning era of Globalization and role of sport

The best way to characterize the debut of globalization is via the development of early communication technologies, transportation, and the spread of the transnational movement, that dates back to the late 19th century and early 20th century (Hoberman, 2004). These transportation developments were the development of railway infrastructure and steamship lines. With this primitive form of mobility, the world was already witnessing the early form of economic integration and of the heightened mobility of “capital, information, goods, and people” (ibid, 2004, p. 177). Besides, the proliferation of transnational movement” was another highlight of the first wave of the globalization marked by the occurrence of the first transnational organizations, such as the General Postal Union (1874), the International Committee of the Red Cross (1863), the Esperanto movement (1887), the Olympic movement (1894) and the Scouting movement (1907) (Hoberman, 2004, p. 178).

On 25 November 1892, at a meeting of the Union des Sports Athlétiques in Paris, Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic movement, declared that he wanted to revive the Olympic movement (Hoberman, 2004). According to the author, the Olympic movement remains among the most long-lasting monuments in the pursuit of international reconciliation and periodic athletic encounter. Since then, international sport originated thanks to the utilitarian aspirations of the Barron de Coubertin who joined the transnational movement that opened the door to further globalization developments across the world of sport.

According to Chadwick (2022), many other sporting organizations have been founded at that period across Europe. The Codification of football, that led to the creation of FIFA, also marks this period. Tour de France’s first races and Wimbledon’s first tennis matches are also part of this movement of sport professionalization. This is what Chadwick (2022) characterizes as the development of the

utilitarian paradigm of sport management scholarship. The main aim of the international federation (IF) creation was the establishment of unified rules to coordinate the nation-to-nation competitions and supervision of calendar (ASOIF, 2019). With the codification of sporting rules, the world of event hosting emerged. Table 1 below explores the list of the Olympic ISGBs based on their year of establishment. Once the organizations were established, they started to organize their trademark events.

Table 1. The Establishment of the international federations

IF	Sport	Establishment year
FIG	Gymnastics	1881
WR	Rugby	1886
FISA	Rowing	1892
ISU	Ice Skating	1892
UCI	Cycling	1900
FIFA	Football	1904
UWW	Wrestling	1905
IWF	Weightlifting	1905
WS	Sailing	1907
ISSF	Shooting	1907
FINA	Aquatics	1908
IIHF	Ice hockey	1908
FIS	Skiing	1910
IAAF	Athletics	1912
FIE	Fencing	1913
ITF	Tennis	1913
AIBA	Boxing	1920
FEI	Equestrian	1921
IBSF	Bobsleigh and Skeleton	1923
FIH	Hockey	1924
World Skate	Skateboarding	1924
IITF	Table Tennis	1926

WA	Archery	1931
FIBA	Basketball	1932
BWF	Badminton	1934
ICF	Canoeing	1946
IHF	Handball	1946
FIVB	Volleyball	1947
UIPM	Modern Pentathlon	1948
IJF	Judo	1951
FIL	Luge	1957
IGF	Golf	1958
ISA	Surfing	1964
WCF	Curling	1966
WKF	Karate	1970
WT	Taekwondo	1973
ITU	Triathlon	1989
IBU	Biathlon	1993
IFSC	Sport Climbing	2007
WBSC	Baseball/Softball	2013

Source: own elaboration based on Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) (ASOIF, 2019)

According to Table 2, the very first planned monosport event that was organized was an International Weightlifting Senior Championship in 1881 that was then followed by the first Olympics in 1896.

Table 2. First year of the organization of various sporting events

Sports discipline	International Sporting Body (ISB)	World Sports Event (WSE)	First year of organisation
1 Weightlifting	International Weightlifting Federation (IWF)	IWF Senior World Championships	1891
2 Multi-sports	International Olympic Committee (IOC)	Olympic Summer Games	1896
3 Shooting	International Shooting Sport Federation (ISSF)	ISSF World Championships all events	1897
4 Artistic gymnastics	International Federation of Gymnastics (IFG)	Artistic Gymnastics World Championships	1903
5 Wrestling	Fédération Internationale des Lutttes Associées (FILA)	FILA World Wrestling Championships	1904
6 Table tennis	International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF)	World Table Tennis Championships	1926
7 Cycling	Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI)	UCI World Road Championships	1927
8 Soccer	Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)	FIFA World Cup Soccer	1930
9 Archery	Fédération Internationale de Tir à l' Arc (FITA)	FITA Archery World Championships	1931
10 Fencing	Fédération Internationale d'Escrime (FIE)	FIE Fencing World Championships	1937
11 Volleyball	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB)	FIVB Volleyball Men's World Cup	1949
12 Pentathlon	Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne (UIPM)	World Modern Pentathlon Championships	1949
13 Basketball	Fédération Internationale de Basketball (FIBA)	FIBA World Championships	1950
14 Equestrian (jumping)	Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI)	World Show Jumping Championships	1953
15 Judo	International Judo Federation (IJF)	World Judo Championships	1956
16 Multisports	International Paralympic Committee (IPC)	Paralympic Games	1960
17 Tennis (men)	Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)	ATP Masters Finals	1970
18 Hockey (men)	International Hockey Federation (FIH)	Hockey Men's World Cup	1971
19 Tennis (women)	Women's Tennis Association (WTA)	WTA Masters Finals	1972
20 Taekwondo	World Taekwondo Federation (WTF)	WTF World Taekwondo Championships	1973
21 Aquatic sports	Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)	World Aquatics Championships	1973
22 Hockey (women)	International Hockey Federation (FIH)	Hockey Women's World Cup	1974
23 Boxing	International Boxing Association (AIBA)	AIBA World Boxing Championships	1974
24 Badminton	Badminton World Federation (BWF)	BWF World Championships	1977
25 Athletics	International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)	IAAF World Championships in Athletics	1983
26 Rugby	International Rugby Board (IRB)	Rugby World Cup	1987
27 Triathlon	International Triathlon Union (ITU)	World Triathlon Series Grand Final	1989

Source: Borgers et al. (2013)

To reiterate, globalization has been an anchor of the development of modern sport in the way that we practice, watch and consume it. The developments of the transportation, immigration rules and extension of paid holidays facilitated recreational and labour mobility in the late decades of 19th century. Annual paid holidays allowed people to spend money on leisure activities in developed market economies (Higham & Hinch, 2009) This initiated one of the first forms of the sports consumption (Andreff, 2008). This consumption was via sports gambling, as sports events started to catch interest in the early 20th century in the press, they started to be broadcasted in the radio. Therefore, we may consider that gambling paved the way to the globalization of the sports economy.

These breakthroughs allowed for the exposure and growth of sports as well, as leisure consumption facilitated the process of professionalization of sports, which means that sportspeople started to receive money for their performance. Football was one of the first sports that was professionalized. In some European countries such as France, Germany or Italy, the professionalization of football was possible through a financial model relying on gate receipts and some subsidies of local and national governments as well as industrial patrons such as Fiat, Bayer, Philips, Peugeot that were located nearby (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). With time, corporate sponsorship and broadcasting

revenues financed the clubs, but clubs were not heavily reliant on them (ibid, 2000). However, gradually, televised broadcasting of sports content, more particularly of sports events, has skyrocketed the revenues of sports (Andreff, 2008). In the American football context, television rights have provided the needed fuel for players' salaries.

Similarly, in the American sports model, free agency was a key milestone when it comes to the players' salaries and globalization of team sports. Free agency allowed players' salaries to be determined by market conditions "rather than what a single monopsonist employer might be willing to pay" (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000, p. 269) In Europe, a few decades later, the Bosman ruling facilitated the free movement of labour among professional football players across EU borders and thus globalized European football.

Another outcome of globalization of sport shows and events through TV broadcasting is the increase of corporate sponsorship. Multinational corporations (MNCs) quickly realized the media outreach and the platforms that global sport events represented and therefore started to associate themselves with such events. Among famous MNCs involved in sports events are "Coca Cola, Pepsi, Visa, Mastercard, McDonald's, Mars, Kodak, Time-Life, Fuji, Philips, Canon, Panasonic, Xerox among other and MNCs involved in the sports goods industry such as Nike, Adidas, Puma, Asics, Mizuno" and so on (Andreff, 2008, p.17). According to the Financial times, the latest Coca-Cola deal done together with Chinese dairy brand Mengniu sealed a 3-billion-dollar deal until the Summer Olympics in 2032. It is considered to be one of the biggest sponsorships in the history of sport (Ahmed, 2019).

The media exposure that the major sport events such as European championships, World Cups and professional sport was getting, contributed to the better awareness and the development of the player transfer market. Therefore, the global professional football that we know of today owes its exposure to broadcasted events and the above-mentioned legal changes in the American and European contexts (Giulanotti, 1999; Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004; Higham & Hinch, 2009).

1.1.2. Geopolitical borders creating new politics, new identities and new processes

"Geopolitics assumes a multipolar world, as it hopes for a "better balance between dominant and subaltern groups within global capitalism".

Richard Gruneau and John Horne

1.1.2.1. Transnationalism and new identities

The new shift begins as sport and more generally tourism have become the drivers of new identities due to sport's continuous global migration and medialization (Alpan & Schwell, 2015). Transnationalism is a sociological term that tends to be applied in regard to processes of migration and medialization. It defines the processes that interconnect social groups and individuals across specific geo-political borders. According to Maguire (1993) as cited in (Higham & Hinch, 2009), the increased mobility and globalization processes led to the 'crisis of identity'. Therefore, the internationalization of professional clubs has affected the identities across the athletes who have migrated and their segment of dispersed fans around the world. Chiba et al., (2001) introduce the concept of borderless athletes to describe naturalized athletes of Japanese and non-Japanese origin in Japanese ice-hockey or rugby leagues. The framework of the types of Japanese to Non-Japanese was introduced by Fukuoka (1993) and it was applied to describe different athlete situations in Japan to label them with Japanese or Non-Japanese identity. And this is one of the manifestations through which the world has less borders or becomes "borderless".

Nationality is no longer the only identity marker in the world of sports (Alpan and Schwell, 2015). In the sport realm, if you join a club, you are no longer a stranger. The alien may become 'ours' at the very moment he wears our team's jersey (ibid, 2015). According to Alpan and Schwell (2015), football is a great example of the marketplace of fan and athlete identities, where one can choose the various aspects of his/her identity." Migrant players can bring their own culture to the club and the country they play in. The identifications of South Korean fans with Tottenham Spurs thanks to Son Heung-min is a great example of that. The club's preseason spent in Korea is their way to capitalize on this new fan market.

One of the examples of the new identities within football fan realms is what the authors called the phenomenon of Italianization, due to the growing interest of the Algerian media in European football, particularly the Italian *Serie A*, as it was heavily broadcasted through satellite television in Algerian households. However, in the case of Algeria, it was not the case of the loss of the local national identity, rather the attachment to local clubs and the association of Italian league football stars with the those from their local context.

However, not only athletes can affect the fan identities, but the athlete entourage and the coaches can too. According to Amara & Henry (2004), Algeria and other Arab socialist countries developed

a strong partnership with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) by inviting specialists from Eastern Europe to share their expertise. Rachid Mekhloufi, the Algerian national team coach, was perceived in his methods as “too French” and neo-colonial, and therefore was fired and replaced by a soviet coach from Romania. Algeria, not willing to associate themselves with French identity, replaced it with the state ideology they were more compatible with. In both examples of new identities related to sports, athletes, fans and coaches in the Algerian context, inviting a foreign coach, according to Hoberman (2004) may put under threat the national values and therefore national identity. Despite the new identities that football brought to the Algerian community, during the colonization period, football was a sport of a “colonizer” and was later used as a tool to regain independence and lost identity (Amara & Henry, 2004).

To continue the transnationalism discussion, there are a few more concepts to unravel with regards to this phenomenon: glocalization and translocality.

1.1.2.2. Glocalization and new processes

The term glocalization comes from the Japanese language, from the word “dochakuka”, (meaning ‘global localization’ or ‘localized globalization’) which was mostly used in business circles in the 1980s. The term glocalization encapsulates the localized global or globalized local processes (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007). The term itself expresses the sociological critique of the processes, the cohabitation, the codependency, mutual exclusivity of the local and the global, the universal and the particular, and homogeneity and heterogeneity (ibid, 2007).

The example of Algerian football is a good example of glocal processes in sport, as Algerian society responded in their own manner to football that came from the western modernity, from secular to non-secular ideologies (socialism, populism, pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, pan-Islamism, and western liberalism). Amara & Henry (2004) explains that modernity (or in our case “football”) is applied to non-western societies in a locally distinctive manner. They used sport as a driver of their liberation movement.

1.1.2.3. Translocality and new politics

From the International Relations’ perspective, the concept of ‘Translocalism’ encapsulates the form of politics situated across and in-between national borders (Amara & Theodoraki, 2010).

translocality is embodied through the following characteristics: the drastic growth of movement of people including labor and political migrants (refugees, asylum seekers); the rise of transnational movement with regards to social issues, e.g. Médecins sans frontières, Croix Rouge, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Les Enfants du Mékong, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), SOS International Villages etc.; the rise of supranational political forums beyond the nation state, e.g. the EU and the rise of Global City; spaces that are rich in transnational significance, such as NY, London, Paris, Tokyo or Dubai. These cities are the examples of the “trans-territorial economies” that imply capital and labour mobility, “identity formation and socio-cultural mélange” (Amara and Theodoraki, 2010).

In sport, the example of translocality will be the non-governmental specialized agencies such as Right to Play, Sport Sans Frontiers (sport for development and post-conflict agendas), and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (fight against doping in sport) and Play International among others. With relation to global cities in sport, it is usually the capitals that host the events or Lausanne (Olympic capital) or other cities in Switzerland that host other headquarters of the ISGBs. Each sport can have its own capital(s) depending on where most of the important events in that sport are hosted. In surfing, it is the city that hosts famous major professional tournament, which is for example Teahupoo in Tahiti. In tennis, they are the Grand Slam locations such as Paris, London, New York and Melbourne.

1.1.2.4. Denationalization, paradiplomacy, city diplomacy

The growing role of global cities and supranational organizations that we just described earlier emphasizes in a similar vein the rising role of sub-national territories. According to Theodoraki and Amara (2010), global cities are involved in the competition for the global capital and outreach. City governments have been aligning their activities to promote their cities to potential investors, which is an example of what is called the denationalization processes in the sociology according to above mentioned authors.

Cities have also been involved in constructing diplomatic relationships without involving their nation-states, in what is known today as decentralized cooperation, paradiplomacy or city diplomacy. An example of this is the concept of twin cities. Local government bodies in France have been involved in internationalization processes with foreign local governments in the field of

culture, climate, sustainability, urban and rural development, education, youth and economic development.

1.1.2.5. Denationalization, cities and sporting events

In the sporting context, such denationalization processes are reflected on the role cities play in the domain of major events. According to Acuto (2013), London 2012 is the number one benchmark in event hosting in terms of sustainability, as it was demonstrated that it is “the greenest event” ever (p. 297). Therefore, major events offer a unique chance to subnational authorities to have their own diplomatic capacity. Moreover, there are associations such as “Olympic city association” or the International Association of the Event Hosts that represent how subnational authorities share expertise on the event hosting among each other.

It has been demonstrated that today’s global economy is increasingly reliant on cities rather than nations. In a similar vein, the global sports economy becomes more and more concentrated in particular global hotspots for sport. The joint hosting of events by multiple host cities can also support the argument that the global sports economy is more reliant on major cities and particular sport-specific hotspots rather than countries. This is true for events where the host city is a prevailing event branding concept, not a nation. Therefore, the joint event bidding/hosting is the joint project that is supported by the sub-national authorities and even local national sport governing bodies. This phenomenon reflects the growing importance of paradiplomacy.

1.1.3. Globalization of sporting events

1.1.3.1. Instrumentalization of sport events

Why are mega events still being hosted? What is so special about them? Chappellet and Parent (2015) describe mega events as unique examples of “peaceful coexistence and international cooperation” (p. 9). Events have a special capacity of a festive nature that can leave a social value by bringing communities together. Chalip (2006) describes events’ luminoid capacity that implies social imagination and innovation because it allows everyone to see their city and its life differently in the same community, as well as the concept “*communitas*” where events allow to build new relations or foster the existing ones. They have so much more to offer rather than being merely regarded as *circus maximus* or bread and circuses. However, it is important not to neglect that it is more attractive for countries to host because of their capacity for huge attendance, media outreach,

sponsorship and image-building (Stewart, 2016). Due to the reasons mentioned above, bidding and hosting mega sport events is a competition of its own. Although western countries have a better know-how and existing Olympic parks, the shift to the Asian continent is gradually happening (Cashman, 2004). Developing countries also want to taste this opportunity of a festive ambiance and they view these events as platform to be on level playing field with developed nations, to compensate for the influence and power they historically were lacking.

Football research confirms the long-established relationship between sport and politics, where “national identities and political ideologies can be expressed” (Armstrong and Giulianotti, 1999; Dietschy, Gastaut and Mourlane, 2006; Hare, 2003). In such cases, countries instrumentalize sports events to promote national belonging among the population and national prestige to the rest of the world. The events serve to consolidate the current political regimes (Tomlinson and Young, 2006).

According to Essex and Chalkley (1998), the host city is exposed to many people which makes politicians want to showcase their territories and accelerate the development they claim their countries need by hosting such events.

1.1.3.2. The gigantism of major events and associated problems

Despite the development of global major event cities and hubs, only a few countries can meet the requirements to host mega events. The internationalization of tournaments, and the growth of participating countries in tournaments like FIFA World Cup, the commercialization and mediatization of mega events have forced ISGBs to highly formalize the event requirements to maintain the prestige or their trademark. Therefore, only a few countries in the world can meet the criteria to host these events. As the event hosting requires the involvement of taxpayers’ money, in many democratic nations today, the public referenda are against these costly events. To keep the events viability, the ISGBs have been seeing the drop in the interest of their events (Byun et al., 2019) but also growing interest from emerging nations to host the event. Therefore, we might observe a shift in the event host geography from the past few decades. In western democratic societies, the resource allocation decisions are consulted more and more with the public, as the resources the taxpayers provide are scarce and might be used for other community projects instead of staging the major events. There were a few examples of opposition to such decisions among the population (Bourbillères et al., 2021; Johnston et al., 2021). The public of cities of Krakow, St. Moritz and Munich opposed their respective bidding for 2022 Winter Olympic Games and

similarly, the public referendum in Sion, Switzerland opposed the city’s bid for the 2026 Winter Olympics with 54% of the votes (Jastrząbek, 2019; Johnston et al., 2021). See Table 3 for the reasons for withdrawal.

Table 3. Reasons from withdrawal from hosting

City	Status in bidding process	Formal reason of withdrawal
Cracow	Applicant	Negative result of local referendum
Lviv	Applicant	Ukrainian crisis caused by war and political turmoil
Stockholm	Applicant	Lack of political support and financial arguments
Oslo	Candidate	Lack of political support

Source: Jastrząbek (2019)

In a similar vein, the local opposition forced the cities of Hamburg, Rome and Budapest to withdraw their bids for 2024 Summer Olympic Games (Bourbillères et al., 2021). The drives and motives of such decisions can vary, but one of the main ones is the negative impacts associated with the hosting. Moreover, Hugo Bourbillères highlights that the vast majority of the local population has little to gain from large sporting events, compared with the political and economic elite (Sport et Citoyenneté, 2021).

1.1.3.3. Shift to developing nations through critical theory

Emerging nations are more and more keen on hosting these events because they are the ones that lack the benefits that the western democratic societies have reaped already from hosting these events, e.g. Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park urban transformation in London 2012, Sydney Olympic Park, Barcelona (Davidson & McNeill, 2012; Degen & García, 2012; Watt, 2013). Table 4 below demonstrates the distribution of events across periods and geographies to demonstrate the shift to emerging countries (Borgers et al., 2013)

Table 4. Number of events in different geographical regions across different periods of time

	Europe	North America	Latin America & Caribbean	Africa	Asia	Oceania	Total number of WSEs per period
1891-1910	37 (94.1%)	1 (2.6%)	1 (2.6%)	-	-	-	39 (100%)
1911-1930	38 (92.7%)	2 (4.9%)	1 (2.4%)	-	-	-	41 (100%)
1931-1950	65 (90.3%)	2 (2.8%)	3 (4.2%)	2 (2.8%)	-	-	72 (100%)
1951-1970	107 (69.9%)	11 (7.2%)	18 (11.8%)	1 (0.7%)	14 (9.2%)	2 (1.3%)	153 (100%)
1971-1990	137 (56.1%)	56 (23.0%)	21 (8.6%)	-	23 (9.4%)	7 (2.9%)	244 (100%)
1991-2010	161 (53.5%)	45 (15.0%)	11 (3.7%)	4 (1.3%)	60 (19.9%)	20 (6.6%)	301 (100%)

Source: Borgers et al. (2013)

Concern is sometimes raised when such events are hosted in countries that are non-democratic where the political regimes are highly militarized and repressive. Therefore, the security demands and associated costs will increase (Gruneau & Horne, 2016). As we observe a lot of hosts events shifting to non-Western countries, more specifically to the Asian continent, these countries usually use the event to legitimize themselves as they have been struggling under the colonialist regimes.

Post-soviet bloc

Azerbaijan wanted to follow pro-European narrative for their identity construction as a post-soviet republic through hosting events like European Games and the Eurovision. Kazakhstan, a country with an emerging economy coming from extraction activities, has engaged itself in international promotion via major events hosting (Jastrzabek, 2019; Nurmakov, 2016). For these countries to reclaim themselves, they must present themselves as equals. These developments can serve them to be on the level-playing field with the Global North. Table 5 below demonstrates attempts of the

unsuccessful bids of Central and Eastern European cities bidding to host the Summer and Winter Olympics and reasons for not being successful (Jastrzabek, 2019).

Table 5. Causes of unsuccessful bids

City and year	Reason for unsuccessful bid
Summer Olympics	
Belgrade 1992	Lost in third voting round to Barcelona (host), Paris, Brisbane
Belgrade 1996	Lost in first voting round to Atlanta (host), Athens, Toronto, Melbourne, Manchester
Tashkent 2000	Bid withdrawn by the city
Saint Petersburg 2004	Bid dropped by IOC in 1996
Moscow 2012	Lost in first voting round to London (host), Paris, Madrid, New York City
Prague 2016	Bid dropped by IOC after Working Group Report evaluation
Baku 2016	Bid dropped by IOC after Working Group Report evaluation
Baku 2020	Bid dropped by IOC after Working Group Report evaluation
Budapest 2024	Bid withdrawn owing to lack of political unity and local support ^a
Winter Olympics	
Sofia 1994	Lost in first round to Lillehammer (host), Östersund, Anchorage
Poprad 2006	Not selected to two 'finalist cities' (Turin – host, Sion) that were subjected to the voting
Zakopane 2006	Not selected to two 'finalist cities' that were subjected to the voting
Borjomi 2014	Bid dropped by IOC after Working Group Report evaluation
Sofia 2014	Bid dropped by IOC after Working Group Report evaluation
Lviv 2022	Unstable political situation
Almaty 2022	Lost to Beijing in final voting
Cracow 2022	Bid withdrawn owing to local referendum negative result

Source: Jastrzabek (2019)

Post-colonial countries: North Africa

Algeria

The example of Algerian aspirations to disassociate themselves with colonizer regime through hiring an Eastern bloc specialist was an example of that as well. These are examples of sportive nationalism which means using sport to promote the nationalistic ambition of countries. Therefore, this means that sport can serve for suppressed countries to pursue a level-playing field through hosting events, participating and winning at sports events (Hoberman, 2004). In this new order that we have just demonstrated, the roles are switched. For example, The Senegalese players who have professional football careers in France can now give a football lesson to their nation's former colonizer. Hoberman (2004) calls it "the utopian possibilities of a new order of things".

Morocco

Morocco's attempt to get the 2010 FIFA World Cup was also constructed around the identity and modernity discourse and their proximity to Europe but at the same time their ability to be a gateway to Africa and represent them at this competition (Cornelissen, 2004; S. T. Lopez, 2012). Egypt similarly claimed their African leadership by bidding for the World Cup by stating that there was Eurocentrism and European imperialism within hosting and that FIFA itself was founded by the imperial founders (Lopez, 2012).

Small countries in Gulf region

Small countries in Gulf region such as United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are relatively new states. They come from a British protectorate background and achieved their independence in 1971. They have been heavily investing into a sports sector for reasons such as economic diversification in a post-oil era, absence of hard power, image-making and nation branding strategies (Guégan, 2022; Olivereau, 2022). Some of these small nations such as Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been actively exercising the hosting of major sports events.

The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, in particular the cities of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah are big players of the international cricket, as the International Cricket Council is headquartered today in Dubai and there is substantial investment into stadia construction (the Zayed Cricket Stadium) and tournament sponsorships (Etisalat (telecommunication) sponsorship). The region is also promoting itself through hosting the following major events: Omega Dubai Desert Classic, Standard Chartered Dubai Marathon, Dubai Tour, Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships, Dubai World Cup, DP World Tour Championship, Emirates Airline Dubai Rugby Sevens (Deloitte, 2015)

Qatar

Qatar's ambition to become a major actor within the sport business industry lies around the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, owning PSG football club and leading the sports and entertainment media market in the face of BeIN Group Media. The latter one, previously called Al-Jazeera Sport, is the example of the successful sports media and entertainment holding that is started and owned by Qatari government that is now broadcasting sports content on major sports events across 5

continents, in 43 countries and in 7 languages. Qatar's tries through these developments to build its own distinct identity from the other Gulf countries, following the Qatar's blockade and also promote itself as a modern nation.(Amara & Bouandel, 2022) Guégan, (2022) calls this pursuit a sport power or sportive soft power (p.111). As Saudi Arabia prospered on oil reserves, Bahrein on finance and Dubai on commerce, Qatar had to find itself a niche within sports (ibid, 2022). Their sport strategy is comprehensive and what Guégan, (2022) refers to as 360-degree approach by broadcasting, event hosting, supplying, innovating, winning, financing, and participating in sports.

1.1.4. Geopolitics of sports events and the ambitions of the new world order

Given the current geography of events and discussed motives and drivers of hosting among subaltern hosting groups is the new world power shift in the context of major events. Therefore, we can now understand the role major events play in such societies and what it means to host such events. It can lead to multipolar economic system and therefore world order. (Gruneau & Horne, 2016; Tinaz & Knott, 2021). Geopolitics assumes a multipolar world, as it hopes for a “better balance between dominant and subaltern groups within global capitalism. “The involvement of these nations in sport was described in academic literature as the examples the use of sports as an instrument to pursue foreign policy goals and project soft power. They aim to gain soft empowerment or “attraction” through the hosting of mega-sporting events or through investing in the sports sector. However, the father of the term “soft power”, Joseph Nye, says that if the three constituents of soft power such as culture, values and policies are not attractive, public policy cannot produce soft power, but it produces completely opposite phenomenon, which is on the other side of the spectrum, the soft disempowerment.

The staging of sport mega-events can be risky and can produce soft disempowerment for host nations who do not realize the level of media attention from international media and different international movement actors. As an example, hosting Beijing 2008 and 2022 Olympics shed the light on China's occupation of Tibet, human right violations and the mistreatment of minorities such as the Uyghur people. In the similar vein, Qatar's ownership of PSG and acquisition of FIFA World Cup hosting rights had spread more awareness on violations of human rights and mistreatment of migrant workers and controversial laws that brought some reputational damages for this country (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015). Therefore, hosting of events can cause more losses than gains for the countries (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015).

The modernity race that is now pursued by non-West implies that its cities can only win if they “adhere” to western values. If democratic countries are so against non-democratic regimes, why would accepting middle eastern capital would be possible in the first place? Why do event owners continue allocating events to the countries with such regimes? For the countries that do get a leeway with hosting in such regimes, this race can be positive if it garners positive benefits to the community but not normalizing the regimes that perpetuate violation of human rights and more inequalities (Myambo, 2018). What is the role that the ISGBs play in this perpetuation of politics of attraction? The violation of human rights did not prevent IOC to allocate hosting rights to Beijing by making it first city to host Summer and Winter Olympics (Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2016). FIFA did the same by allocating hosting rights to Russia, Qatar and then to USA, Canada and Mexico under “United as one” to pursue capital accumulation and consolidation of FIFA’s global football empire (Beissel & Ternes, 2022). With the symbolism, we risk sport becoming a commodity for these actors.

1.1.5. Research gaps: geopolitics of joint bids

With the continental bid getting the green light from FIFA to host the event under the united spirit, the subject of multiple hosts alliances and joint bids is one of the most recent developments that is the result of rapid growth of events that has commercial potential. Major sport events including the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup have been criticized for their gigantism in terms of their cost and size (Chappelet, 2014). As an example, the 2026 FIFA World Cup will host 48 teams compared to 32 teams hosted in the previous 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia (FIFA, 2018). Co-hosting is indeed a last resort for small nations to host the event and it also allows small hosting nations to bid and possibly host what they think they are capable and willing of hosting. Although as demonstrated above, joint bids have the potential to create more equitable distribution of host countries, including smaller and emerging nations (Swart & Mammadov, 2022), The United Bid celebrated a symbolic politics of unity as an attempt to gain support for the bid from FIFA member associations (Beissel & Andrews, 2020).

These unified partnership narratives are now omnipresent in the hosting of different major tournaments coming from various cultural backgrounds under such slogans as “Candidatura Iberica” (unsuccessful UEFA Euro and FIFA World Cup joint bidders), “Celtic Bid” (UEFA Euro unsuccessful joint bidders), “Balkan Bid” (FIFA World Cup unsuccessful joint bidders), “Trans-

Tasman Bid” (past ICC World Cup co-hosts) or “United Bid” (future World Cup co-hosts). More on co-hosted events are in section **1.2.3** of this chapter.

If the unity narrative of joint bids does its trick to secure the hosting rights, is unity really being achieved? Can such contexts, despite the opportunistic behavior of the certain event owners and symbolic politics of the bidding regimes, still achieve the good and become another platform for those who will be at the heart of putting such events together? Do all unity narratives hide symbolism at all according to the claim of Beissel et al., (2022); Beissel & Andrews (2020); Beissel & Ternes (2022). This research is a modest attempt to find these answers.

Therefore, studying multiple host alliances will contribute to the understanding of the latest developments of the world order. The geopolitical scholarship advises us to critically look at such relationships and to take into consideration historical context implying dominant and subaltern background of actors. This scholarship also accepts such contexts and gives valid research implications. The future hosting of events can still be a good tool if used accordingly. The very idea of rebirth of Olympic Games was to allow sport to do its magic for the international peace.

1.2. Review of Events Research

Having understood the globalization processes within sporting events, the need to understand the field of events is the objective of this following sub-chapter. It will uncover all important definitions and historical development of research within the sport event management field. It will provide all the “top-level” information about the co-hosting and its current state of research. We finish this section by identifying relevant research gaps within the field to address further through our and future research undertakings.

1.2.1. Definitions and typologies

The development of Event Studies goes hand in hand with the terminology of events that has been built over years by the colleagues. It generated a lot of comparisons and terms sometimes competing to describe the phenomenon (Page & Connell, 2011). For this reason, the definitions and typologies are one of the major pillars of the establishment of the domain of the Events, with which we start the discussion of the Events in this thesis.

The word “sport event” is comprised of two words, sport and event. The word “events” comes from Latin and Middle French languages that mean “something that will happen or occur”. The other meaning that a dictionary also gives is “noteworthy occasion” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Apart from its reference to just a happenstance or noteworthy occasion, events can be categorized according to the notion of plan: unplanned and planned. Unplanned events are events that happened or occurred by accident, like an unplanned visit of parents, a natural disaster, a call that you received etc. Getz (2015) refers to them as events belonging to the realm of free expression. Planned events are organized events, such as birthday party celebrations with a particular date and place in mind or a family vacation.

As for the word sport, one of the current definitions on sport classifies it as “a game, competition, or activity needing physical effort and skill that is played or done according to rules, for enjoyment and/or as a job” (Cambridge dictionary, n.d.). Nonetheless, Huizinga (1970) names sport as a form of play, which demonstrates that it belongs to the realm of free expression.

Getz and Page (2016) highlight the switch of events from the realm of free expression to professionalization (Getz & Page, 2016). As the relationship between sport and the economy started to develop dating back to the 20th century when individuals started to have annual paid

holidays which led to their expenditure on leisure activities (Andreff, 2008) and sporting events started being broadcasted on the radio and later became an object of lucrative TV broadcasting deals, the sporting events became a professionalized domain and one of the major pillars of the global sports economy today (Andreff, 2008; Mair & Whitford, 2013).

Getz (2012) defined planned events as the occurrence within certain timeframes at a certain place which is fixed and decided in advance and which is “created to achieve specific outcomes, including those related to the economy, culture, society and environment” (p. 28). The author has accomplished a lot of pioneering research on planned events looking at them from the tourism perspective. Planned events in tourism are created for a purpose, and what was once the realm of individual and community initiatives has largely become the realm of professionals and entrepreneurs (Getz & Page, 2016).

1.2.1.1. Event typologies

Getz and Page (2016) designed the typology of the planned events that classified them into four categories: business (Meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE) sector), entertainment, sport and festivals/culture events (see Figure 2 below).




Figure 2. The typology of planned events.

Source: Getz & Page (2015, p. 594)

This typology highlights events from small to big caliber in each category. Among these events, there is a hierarchy that exists from a touristic perspective that Getz and Page (2015, p. 596) had developed under portfolio approach depicting events from low to high tourist demand and value (See Figure 3).




Figure 3. Hierarchy of events from touristic perspective.

Source: Getz & Page (2015, p. 596)

For example, local events are located at the bottom of the pyramid and are referred to as low tourist demand, while hallmark and occasional mega events are at the top of the pyramid, meaning that they generate higher influx of tourists and higher value. Local concerts will attract only local residents but not incoming tourists compared to annual summer music and dance festivals, which attract international visitors. The same logic is applied to sport events: a recreational basketball district tournament will not be high in touristic value compared to European or World Championships held in the city. Having understood the umbrella event typologies and different touristic value among them, the next section will explore different research done on typologies of events in sporting context.

In one of their latest works, Chappelet and Parent (2015) came up with the overarching typology of events based on "three dichotomies": for-profit or non-profit, mono-sport or multi-sport, one-off or recurring (p.3) (see Figure 4 below).




Figure 4. Classification of sporting events based on three event dichotomies.

Source: Chappelet and Parent (2015)

To distinguish if the event is staged for profit or not, we must see who organizes it. The events organized by ISGBs are non-profit (e.g. FIFA World Cup, organized by FIFA), while events organized by a company or corporation are for profit (e.g., Tour de France, organized by Amaury Sport Organization). The second dimension is regarding the number of events: single sport event or multi-sport event (e.g. FIFA World Cup or Summer Olympics (33 sports in Tokyo 2020 edition)). The third dimension is whether the event is one-off for a host city (where they only get to host a particular event once) or recurring, also known as heritage event. For example, host cities are always chosen for FIFA World Cup and therefore unique and one-off for the host cities, while for Grand Slam tennis tournaments such as Wimbledon or Rolland Garros, they are always hosted in the same host cities.

Size logic

Ones of the most dominant typologies present in the literature are based on a size logic. The size is usually determined by the mediated reach of the global audience and sponsorship revenue that it generated. Mega sports events are called differently in different typologies. Formerly Mega Sporting Events (MSEs) were also called “special” or “hallmark events” or “marquee” (Gammon, 2011; Gruneau & Horne, 2016; Horne, 2007). Gammon (2011) compiled “special event” characteristics from the literature referring to the attributes such as “attracting tourism, of limited

duration, being a one-off or infrequent duration, raising awareness, image or regional profile, attracting media attention, having an economic impact, being out of ordinary or unique. However, Roche's definition of mega events is one of the frequently referred definitions. He refers to them as 'large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance' (Roche, 2000: p. 1). Getz (2012) defined 'Mega' as largest and most significant events, which by way of their size generate "very high levels of tourism, media coverage, prestige or economic impact for their host community" (Getz et al., 2012, p. 45). Gratton & Taylor (2000)'s typology of events and consider MSEs as "Type A" events defined as "irregular, one-off, major international spectator events generating significant economic activity and media interest" (p. 190). Any other type of event that is not of this magnitude could potentially be labeled a "non-mega" sport "Type B and C" events, namely, "irregular, one-off major international spectator/competitor events, generating moderate or limited economic activity" respectively (ibid, 2000). Roberts (2004) confirms these claims by saying how they such events are capable of transmitting messages to the billions of people while broadcasted. Müller (2015) developed a "multi-dimensional, point-based classification scheme" based on four dimensions such as visitor attractiveness, mediated reach, cost and transformational cost (p.1), which categorizes large events into giga, mega and major (see Table 6 for the examples).

Table 6. Size classification of selected events

<i>Event</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Visitor attractiveness</i>	<i>Mediated reach</i>	<i>Cost</i>	<i>Transformation</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>Class</i>
Olympic Summer Games	London 2012	3	3	3	2	11	Giga
Euro	Ukraine/Poland 2012	2	2	3	3	10	Mega
Football World Cup	South Africa 2010	3	3	2	2	10	Mega
Expo	Shanghai 2010	3	0	3	3	9	Mega
Asian Games	Guangzhou 2010	2	0	3	3	8	Mega
Olympic Winter Games	Vancouver 2010	2	2	2	1	7	Mega
Commonwealth Games	Delhi 2010	2	0	2	2	6	Major
Universiade	Kazan 2013	1	0	2	2	5	Major
Pan American Games	Guadalajara 2011	1	0	0	0	1	Major
APEC Summit	Vladivostok 2012	0	0	3	3	6	Major
European Capital of Culture	Liverpool 2008	3	0	0	2	5	Major
Rugby World Cup	New Zealand 2011	2	2e	0	0	4	Major
Super Bowl	New Orleans 2013	0	1	0	0	1	Major

(APEC: Forbes; ECoC: García *et al.*; Rugby: *Economist*; Super Bowl: Gardner & Guthrie)

e = estimation

Source: Borrowed from Müller (2015, p. 19)

Taks (2013) has compared MSEs to Non-Mega Sporting events (NMSEs). It is the international audience and the infrastructure requirements that separate the two. Major events seem to be a more commonly accepted term for both MSEs and NMSEs that are high profile. Gruneau and Horne (2016) refer to NMSEs as second and third tier events, giving examples of Commonwealth, Pan American and Asian Games, Youth Olympic Games, other World Cups across different sports and Formula 1 car races. Gammon (2011) refers to them as small scale/community events. Getz (2007) offers a broad categorization based on the following attributes: professional/amateur; indoor/outdoor; regularly scheduled; local, regional, national or international in scope; for participants, for spectators or both, single or multi sports.

The most commonly accepted terms that are used by the researchers seem to be mega vs. non-mega, major, medium and small size events. The factors that were mentioned by most of the authors to classify the events from mega to non-mega are: mediated outreach, the international audience (types of attendees) and cost (infrastructure). The tier, alphabetical or size model are used interchangeably to classify them from their highest mediated and attendance value to the lowest.

1.2.1.2.Event life cycle

Events can be studied either according to their full lifecycle or focusing on one of the aspects of the event lifecycle. The lifecycle of the event usually includes the three main phases: pre-event (bidding) stage, event stage and post-event stage.

For the planned one-off mega events, we may assume that event planning takes a great deal of time and preparation. The mega event lifecycle lasts about nine to ten years in the example of Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup and is normally divided into three stages: the bidding (or candidature), the event implementation and post-event phases. For smaller size one-off MSEs and NMSEs, the process is identical, it can just vary in terms of the whole timeline. Firstly, the interested nation tries to assess the feasibility of the event, then if feasibility study meets the budget, needs, wants and the rest of the concerns, the nation proceeds to the preparation and later submission of the bid book for the right to host the event. The successful bidder becomes the organizer. Here, the implementation phase begins and normally lasts around 7 years. The most important part of the implementation phase is staging the event. Once the event is finished, the organizing committee ceases its functioning, the reports are prepared and the management and measurement of legacies are implemented. See Figure 5 for the summary of the mentioned life-cycle steps.




Figure 5. One-off event life cycle

Source: author's own elaboration of one-off event life cycle

Alternatively, in recurring context, the lifecycle is slightly different. The only difference lies in the final stage, that is followed by event planning again by the same organizer, at the same location. See Figure 6 for the visualization of the life cycle, excluding event bidding phase.




Figure 6. Recurring event life cycle

Source: author elaboration of recurring event life cycle

To conclude this section, it was necessary to align with existing typologies and terms to understand further the differences and peculiarities of different event contexts. The following section will discuss the development of research itself and its tendencies and how we further place our research within the existing fields.

1.2.2. The development of the sport events research

1.2.2.1. Back to tourism roots

Event studies were introduced by Getz and Page (2016), as the domain encompassing event tourism and event management. According to Figure 7 below, event studies encompass within themselves the major blocks such as event management and event tourism. Leisure is more overarching studies within which tourism is located, the focus of which is “entertainment, consumption and the desire to attend events”. (Getz and Page, 2016). The development of the domain of the event studies is closely associated with the professionalization of events as for the academic field to be established a core phenomenon needs to be happening to study it.” (Getz & Page, 2020). It aims to create knowledge about planned events, festive individual events to collective occasions including sport, business and leisure.




Figure 7. Major blocks of event studies

Source: Getz & Page (2015, p. 595)

Goldblatt (2011) cited in Getz and Page (2016) argued that “Eventology is the study of planned events to promote positive societal benefits.” According to Getz and Page (2016), organizing planned events has the potential to contribute to the improvement of societies by promoting health, intelligence, wealth, fairness, sustainability, safety, and resilience, making it a valuable and policy-driven agenda.

As sport events are part of the overall event studies, they have been a part of the existent research paradigm on events, that originated from tourism research. They remain an object of different social sciences and humanities studies beyond leisure, including management, leisure, sports, arts, theatre, cultural studies, politics, economy etc.

The event and tourism specialist journals are: Leisure Studies, International Journal of Event and Festival Management, Event Management/Festival Management & Event Tourism, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Administration, Journal of Convention & Event Tourism, Journal of Hospitality Marketing & Management, Journal of Human Resources in Hospitality & Tourism, Journal of Quality Assurance in Hospitality & Tourism, Visitor Studies and World Leisure Journal among others.

The sport specialist journals where events research have been published are: Journal of Sport Management, Sport Management Review, European Sport Management Quarterly, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, Journal of Global Sport Management, International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing, Sport, Business and Management, Managing sport and leisure, Sport in Society, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, International journal of sport policy and politics, European Journal for Sport and Society and Journal of Sport and Tourism among others.

1.2.2.2.From economic impact analysis to social impacts

Australia was one of the first countries to develop research agenda for the events (Getz & Page, 2015). The driver for this research was its economic appeal. Therefore, for some time, the economic impact research was dominating the event management research agenda. The economic issues researched were forecasting, assessments and evaluation of economic impacts and the management aspects (Lienhard & Preuss, 2014; Preuss, 2007, 2019).

There were a few papers that have summarized the event trends and forecasted future themes for the academic community. One of the first analysis of event research was done by Formica (1998), where the author emphasized the focus on economic research related to festivals and special events from 1970s to 1990s and there was a clear gap on social characteristics of the events. Mair & Whitford (2013) had also concluded that future research on events and festivals. Future research themes provided by Mair and Whitford (2013) included the topics such as event impacts and outcomes, event policy and planning, event operations, event legacy, event/culture/identity, event and human resources (HR), event marketing and event typologies. The directions for future events and festivals research identified by this study appear clear – more research on the socio-cultural and environmental impacts of events is needed, along with a better understanding of the relationship between events and the policy agendas in different countries and regions.

Getz & Page (2020), in the latest edition of their book on event studies, discussed various forces and associated trends and issues in events research, including political and legal, society and culture, environment, technology, population and economics. Some of the trends and issues within this topic are regarding shifting values, migration, multiculturalism and exclusion, wealth and disparity, exploitation of events for propaganda, sustainable events, live and virtual event experiences, gigantism of sport events. This is completely in line with the developments we have started discussing at the end of sub-section **1.1.5**. Therefore, the research should be moving forward to explore what is happening today.

Social impacts of MSEs

In the early 2000s, the researchers started focusing the importance of positive and negative outcomes of events beyond the economic dimensions. The focus of event research has gradually developed and the potential of events as tools for social development and social leverage was unveiled in the research. The social impact started to gain importance as economic impacts should not be considered in isolation and they were not always convincing. Therefore, the need to study other effects of the events across different typologies (e.g. smaller size events) was obvious (Taks, 2013). Social impact is the way in which events “effect changes in the collective and individual value systems, behavior patterns, community structures, lifestyle and quality of life” (Balduck, Maes & Buelens, 2011 cited in Taks, 2013). The positive social impacts are diverse in nature and regroup the following types among others: feel-good factor, well-being, happiness, psychological

benefits, sport participation, health benefits, urban regeneration, infrastructure development, increased employment and business development. Among the negative impacts of sports events: restrictions of accessibility to certain zones, sound nuisances, hooliganism and lack of security, vandalism, prostitution et other antisocial behaviors, social devastation, population displacement, transformation of territories to giant amusement parks (disneyfication), crowding-out effect etc. Some events contribute to eliminating the local culture and promoting globalization sentiment what damages the sense of belonging and wakes up the nationalistic sentiments towards ethnic minorities. According to Gruneau and Horne (2016), mega events, being "out of the ordinary" occasions with high urgency, often lead to a relaxation of democratic governance principles. This relaxation is linked to cost overruns, as mega projects such as events tend to underestimate investments and timeframes. The fast-paced environment and pressure on public authorities can create a space where democratic values and human rights may be compromised. This pressure can even affect legal documents and public policies, as seen in the changes made to Rio's legislature on public procurements. An extreme example of this is Qatar, where the violation of human rights and labor standards has been perpetuated to meet the deadlines of projects, such as the World Cup. The state sponsored Kafala system, which gives sponsors control over migrant workers, has contributed to the loss of lives and poor working conditions. Ter Haar (2018) suggests that hosting the World Cup may prompt Qatar to reconsider its labor laws and abolish the Kafala system to mitigate human rights criticisms. The scrutiny and media attention that come with hosting such events can also serve as a catalyst for addressing these problems in non-democratic regimes. Therefore, MSE impacts can be colossal if leveraged but also devastating if not governed well.

Impacts of NMSEs

There is growing research interest around event impacts of NMSEs. If mega-events are more vertically oriented and benefit only the political elites and the organizers, the non-mega sporting events can have a positive outcome potentially for the community (Djaballah et al., 2015; Taks et al., 2015).

To refresh the scope of NMSEs, they range from second-tier events such as Commonwealth, Pan American and Asian Games, Youth Olympic Games, other World Cups than football and Formula 1 car races to small scale/community events of local, regional, national or international in scope (Gammon, 2011; Getz, 2007 and Gruneau and Horne, 2016). Based on this definition, it is evident

that smaller events require fewer resources, making them more likely to produce positive economic results compared to mega sports events (Taks et al., 2015). MSEs commonly face cost underestimation or overruns, where the actual cost surpasses the initial budgeted or estimated amount. These overruns often result in the development of "white elephants," particularly in developing nations where the funds could have been better utilized for healthcare, social services, and infrastructure needs. White elephants emerge due to inadequate cost management and a lack of planning for the future use of the infrastructure, leading to premature and unplanned obsolescence (Amara & Theodoraki, 2010; Preuss et al., 2019 and Davis, 2020). However, for NMSEs, overruns can still happen if we talk about second tier events or poor planning by host countries that do not see the future use of infrastructure and/or miscalculate their budget. As MSEs generate high streams of income due to big broadcasting deals, sponsorship packages and sale of tickets, NMSEs depending on its tier, are also able to earn through the following types of incomes. However, for the economic impact potential of NMSEs, Taks et al. (2015) stresses the importance of local businesses' involvement in those events. Their engagement is crucial for the economic impact on the community, the event's ongoing success, and the satisfaction of event attendees.

Taks (2013) conducted a comparison between the social impacts and outcomes of mega sport events and non-mega sport events from various perspectives, including power relations, urban regeneration, socialization, and human capital. The research suggests that non-mega sport events generally offer more positive social impacts and outcomes for host communities compared to mega sport events. This is primarily attributed to the ability of non-mega events to foster tighter social networks and a greater sense of connectedness among the local population. According to Misener & Mason (2006), non-mega events are more likely to create outcomes that best serve the community's needs and aspirations. However, to achieve that, it is crucial to develop and implement appropriate strategies and tactics efforts to achieve specific goals in economic, touristic, social, or environmental domains. This should be done by various entities such as politicians, local sport organizations, local businesses, and marketing destination organizations who can associate themselves with the event and incorporate it into their marketing. This leveraging requires human, financial, physical and time resources, which can be an issue in the NMSEs' context.

Djaballah et al (2015) compiled research on social capital potential of NMSEs. Regarding social capital, Lee et al. (2012) define it as social relationships and conditions that foster trust, diverse

networks, social proactivity, and participation in the community for mutual success. Misener and Mason (2006) argue that sporting events can be an important source of social capital as they facilitate the building of community networks through multiple partnership opportunities. While mega events tend to foster vertical social capital, which can lead to inequalities between local elites and the community, non-mega events promote horizontal social capital and stronger networks within the community (Djaballah et al., 2015).

Finally, another important social impact to consider for NMSEs is human capital. It refers to the attributes of individuals that contribute to personal development and societal well-being, including knowledge, skills, competencies, and attitudes. Sporting events, particularly through volunteer opportunities, encourage social interactions, knowledge exchange, leadership skills, mutual assistance, and capacity building. Taks (2013) suggests that mega events' volunteer programs may not be well-suited for fostering human capital as they often involve volunteers from outside the local community and offer unfulfilling tasks that do not develop marketable skills. On the contrary, non-mega events have the advantage of primarily engaging with local volunteer community and entrusting them with higher responsibilities, thereby promoting human capital development within the community. However, we can also discuss human capital when we talk about employees of the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from that local community. Here lies the gap in the literature on human capital of these groups at NMSEs. Moreover, current research on social impacts of NMSEs lack consideration of co-hosted events and specific impacts that can be possible in such context. Although for those events, these social impacts can still be relevant as they concern every single host's community.

1.2.2.3. Measurement of event impacts

Charrier et al. (2019) was one of the first research team who designed a visual social impact measurement tool, that they have utilized for UEFA Euro 2016 in France. This social impact perimeter included 6 different categories that represent the grouped categorization of different possible social impacts. Figure 8 below was translated from the original French version.




Figure 8. Social impact perimeter

Source: Charrier et al. (2019, p. 16)

However, the use of the word “impact” in event discourse has to be more conceptualized. It is a short-term outcome but not planned long-term outcomes. Therefore, these impacts are not legacy. Legacy creates changes in the host cities’ (e.g., post-event tourism due to increased interest in the event city). The first studies on long-term changes were done by Cashman (2005) who classified them in six fields: sport, economics, infrastructure, information and education, public life, politics and culture and symbols, memory and history and later by Chappelet (2006), who distinguished sporting, economic, infrastructural, urban and social legacy. With the qualitative critic and lack of measurability, Preuss (2007) was the first to propose a legacy measurement cube based on which the author created legacy’s definition: “Irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself” (p. 211). Figure 9 below is Preuss’ legacy cube.




Figure 9. Legacy measurement cube

Source: Preuss (2007)

A similar perspective to legacy came from Chalip (2004). Chalip (2004) introduces the word “liminality” to describe its luminoid capacity of events if certain measures are applied by the organizers. Some of the research that used this model tried to generate the leverage model to be applied for different types of leverage, including economic/business land social leverage (Chalip, 2004; Kelly et al., 2019; Kirby et al., 2018; Schulenkorf et al., 2017).

The leverage demands the event consideration at the destination’s tourism and event portfolio so the relevant agencies can take in charge of strategically planning the outcomes of the event that they see fit to achieve. Legacy is criticized in the sense that it is additional foci for the organizers that they are not always capable of achieving as the event hosting is already costly activity for the organizers. After the event is over and the organizing committee disbanded, the event legacy projects can easily be abandoned if not transferred or taken care of by other organisms. Similarly, the findings from Preuss (2013) demonstrate how the organizing committee failed to take care of environmental issues given the urgency of different issues in the event-planning. The environmental issue should be taken care of by the actors that are responsible for post-event phase, governments or other agencies. The idea to look at the event outcomes through leverage lenses came from Australian practice. Economic leverage was introduced by Australian businesses,

governments, and not-for-profit organizations who came together to formulate strategies and tactics to capitalize on the Sydney Olympics and which was then formulated by Chalip (2004). Later Melbourne Commonwealth Games led to a model for social leverage (Chalip, 2006). These two elements led to the integrated model of economic and social leverage that was published by O'Brien & Chalip (2008).

1.2.3. Review on co-hosted events

Different notions on one-off event co-hosting that you may encounter in the literature or the media are: "Polycentric event" (Kaspar, 2018, p.239), "co-hosted" (Kristiansen, Strittmatter & Skirstad 2016, Pavitt 2018), "dual host" (Kristiansen et al., 2016), "combined bid" (Butler, 2018), "joint bid" ("World Cup 2026: Canada, US & Mexico joint bid wins right to host tournament", 2018). Kaspar (2018) refers to polycentric events as those expanding their geography outside of single host city or country venue cluster. Mukanova (2019) defined co-hosting as "an optional undertaking between two or more countries, either on planned, arranged or imposed basis, to deliver the event" (p. 35). According to Byun et al. (2020), co-hosting refers to a proactive strategic partnership between multiple hosts who share a co-branded identity. The co-hosts willingly pool together their resources, expertise, and skills to collaboratively organize a sports event.

In major recurring single sport events like Tour de France or La Vuelta, the polycentric approach has also been applied from 1950's and onwards, where the start and the finish of the race can be held outside of the host's mainland. In major one-off multisport events, the polycentric approach has been employed before as in the case of Sydney Summer Olympics in 1956 where equestrian sport was held in Stockholm due to quarantine laws in Australia (Kristiansen et al., 2016). This approach is still encouraged and welcomed by IOC Olympic Agenda 2020 and its New Norm in order to avoid forcing host countries to build infrastructure they do not foresee any future use of such infrastructure and to make the games more attainable for countries (Kaspar 2018, Kristensen 2016 and Walzel 2018). The actual co-hosting between two or more nations has not been employed yet at Olympics. However, it was taking form in multiple host city context and going "cross-border" context like in the upcoming Paris 2024 Summer Olympic Games where surfing will be hosted in Teahupoo, Tahiti or the last Winter Youth Olympics in Lausanne 2020, which had a competition cluster in neighboring France. The IOC has now made it possible in the Agenda 2020+5 to go beyond the host city concept if necessary. Besides, South and North Korea, had

expressed earlier their willing to bid for the Winter Olympics “to change the fate of Korean peninsula” (McCurry, 2019). With regards to other multi-sport events, the European Championships in 2018 were organized by Glasgow and Berlin. Among the upcoming bidders for the next edition of 2022 European Champions are joint bids among two or more nations as well.

However, co-hosting has been predominantly and more frequently occurring in major one-off monosport events. Based on the first editions of co-hosted events in major monosport events, one can generalize that starting from 2000, we enter the co-hosting era. UEFA was among first ISGBs that encouraged this practice by allocating the right to host UEFA Euro to Belgium and Netherlands in 2000. The following editions of 2008 and 2012 were respectively co-hosted by Austria and Switzerland and Poland and Ukraine. The UEFA Euro 2020 was one of the historical events in football and also in co-hosting practice with 12 host nations, explained by the 60th anniversary of European championship. FIFA’s first co-hosted World Cup was in 2002 co-hosted by Korea and Japan, where FIFA could not to choose between two bidders and allocated the event to two countries simultaneously, aiming to improve the relations between the two nations. The next co-hosted edition is going to happen in 2026, where for the first time the joint bid won the right to host the event. In the basketball world, FIBA EuroBasket’s first co-hosted edition was in 2015, co-hosted by four countries: France, Croatia, Germany and Latvia. For the ice-hockey, IIHF World Men’s World Championship was first co-hosted in 2012 by Finland and Sweden.

To understand the motivations of co-hosts, we should look also on unsuccessful joint bid attempts. Among unsuccessful bidders for UEFA Euro were for Greece and Turkey for 2008, Hungary Croatia for 2012 and Spain Portugal for 2016 editions. The latter one also bid for FIFA World Cup 2018 under “Candidatura Iberica”. We can therefore notice that most of the planned co-hosted event bidders have one thing in common is the neighboring situation. One can see the regional unity slogans such as “Candidatura Iberica” (unsuccessful UEFA Euro and FIFA World Cup joint bidders), “Celtic Bid” (UEFA Euro unsuccessful joint bidders), “Balkan Bid” (FIFA World Cup potential joint bidders), “Trans-Tasman Bid” (past ICC World Cup co-hosts) or “United Bid” (future World Cup co-hosts). This represents the multilateral development of sport that we mentioned in the section **1.1**.

Another tendency within co-hosting is its cross-border context. For example, the co-hosts of 2022 FIVB Women’s World Championship were Netherlands and Poland. The countries are not

neighboring. Therefore, there is a gap in understanding the motivations of co-hosting between countries that are not sharing the border. Since, Poland and Netherlands are two countries that are competent in volleyball, we may make a hypothesis that one of the motives thanks to which their alliance came into life is from their common sport achievements in volleyball.

1.2.3.1.Challenges and opportunities of co-hosting

The current research on co-hosted events is still at its early stage since the practice itself has just been pioneered. There are a few research papers that have done empirical research on these events. Some authors approached it by conducting explorative, macro-level studies to explore challenges, opportunities and Impacts. Kristiansen et al. (2016) investigated challenges and issues of a multi-sport event - European Youth Olympic Festival co-hosted by Austria and Lichtenstein. Stura et al. (2017) conducted expert interviews with stakeholders of UEFA Euro 2008 event co-hosted by Austria and Switzerland, mostly on positive and negative effects of the event. Mukanova (2019) has completed a master thesis study on challenges and opportunities of major single sport events. Walzel (2018) interviewed key people from sport organization of 6 co-hosted events (three in the past and three in the future) on motivations, opportunities and threats, impacts and legacies of such kind of events.

Through careful analysis of these pioneer research, one can break down major co-hosted event challenges into the following. One major challenge is the cultural differences between co-hosts, which can impact payment methods and create logistical complications. Distribution of responsibilities and effective communication between co-hosts can be time-consuming and may lead to divergent messages if not properly managed. Customs, visa, and currency differences between host countries can also pose challenges, requiring negotiations and potentially compromising national laws and security measures. The athlete and fan experience are also important factors to consider in co-hosted events, ensuring that schedules, venues, transportation, and accommodations are organized to provide the best possible experience. Power dynamics between co-hosts, potential post-event membership distribution decrease, unequal treatment, and the issue of automatic qualification for hosts are additional considerations that arise in co-hosting scenarios. In terms of opportunities, co-hosting events can offer external benefits such as larger event sizes and the opportunity for individual nations to pursue their ambitions. LOCs can accrue benefits from being part of a globally televised event, including economic gains, legacy creation,

sustainability practices, and increased governmental support. The ISGBs can benefit from better quality bids, economic advantages, and the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to equality and sustainability. However, co-hosting also comes with the potential for extra costs, power dynamics, event delivery imbalances, and unequal treatment among co-hosts. The rules for automatic qualification of hosts may need to be adjusted, balancing the fair competition while also considering the advantages of home support and increased unpredictability in sport.

Other authors explored a particular aspect, issue or application of theoretical concept to these events. Lienhard and Preuss (2014) explored the sustainability and legacy of Euro 2008 in Switzerland. Kelly et al. (2019) studied the effect of formalization of event requirements on economic leverage in the context of ICC Cricket World Cup in 2007 in West Indies. Byun et al. (2019, 2020) research covered the formation part of the alliances, looking at the motivations of joint bidders and environmental/organizational factors that led to the formation of these alliances (Byun et al., 2019) and legitimation strategies used by joint bidders (Byun et al. 2020). Ludvigsen (2019) studied ‘continent-wide’ spectacles and the aspects related to concerns raised by event attendees, reduced financial risk associated with new stadiums or infrastructure, and difficulties in security planning.

1.2.4. Research gaps

1.2.4.1. Research gap within events

To summarize, the authors of current research papers have expressed concerns about the future of events in the life of current transformations and processes. Getz & Page (2020) have synthesized the current issues and the need for the research to address them. For the sub-theme of population, we need to understand if events can bring together diverse groups of people and how they can adapt to next generations. For political and legal issues, the exploitation of events for political propaganda and their safety are on top of the agenda (p. 33). For economics, how authentic or commodified are current events? Are events following a capitalistic agenda? How inclusive are they? Environmentally speaking, will event tourism exist? Can we use events as social marketing platforms to educate on sustainability? For societal and cultural issues, can events solve the world’s problems? And lastly, technology-speaking, what can be long term consequences of current practices of technological use in sport events? Do current technological benefits justify its use?

1.2.4.2. Research gaps on NMSEs

Studying NMSEs seems to be a dominating theme within this section. With well-established research on MSEs, NMSEs are as important, very frequent and diverse events that need further understanding and contextualization. Therefore, the research gaps in this section will highlight future directions for the NMSEs. With the need for the research paradigm to focus more on social impacts, future research should focus on social impacts of NMSEs in particular its social and human capital. When it comes to co-hosted events, what specific social capital can be produced when hosting NMSEs? Is social capital leveraged from the current editions and forms of NMSEs? As for human capital, a gap lies in studying stakeholders beyond volunteers, to understand the capacity building of event staff such as LOC staff, community, public sector employees. Co-hosted event context provides an interesting ground to explore those outcomes. With regards to Djaballah et al. (2015) framework, it could also be further applied to understand local government's attitudes and considerations of social impacts of co-hosted events.

1.3. Review of IOR literature

The study of IORs in the realm of sport and sport event partnerships has garnered growing attention from researchers. These collaborative endeavors have become increasingly prevalent in the sport industry and taking new shapes considering industry changes. While a substantial body of research exists on IORs in the sport context, there are notable gaps in sport event delivery partnerships that warrant further exploration. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the current state of research on IORs in sport and sport event partnerships, while highlighting the identified gaps in the literature.

1.3.1. Introduction

The previous sub-chapter on Globalization has demonstrated the current state of the world that implied interconnectivity and interdependence of transnational or transcontinental networks (See **1.1**). The various economic, military, environmental and social processes affect these networks by either strengthening or weakening them (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In a similar vein, the networks in sport are affected by such processes. The environmental processes lead to collaborative projects or actions that are undertaken jointly worldwide by sports actors. Similarly, economic regimes facilitate the movement of labor or expertise in sport. In the sports event world, contracting an event agency from one country to deliver the event in the other can also be the example of the sports network. Hillman et al. (2009) highlights the resource interdependence as form of interorganizational and intercorporate relations through the Resource Dependence Theory which explains why we have the proliferation of interorganizational forms of relations between organizations. Therefore, the theoretical consideration of various concepts of interorganizational linkages is vital for this research.

In the previous two subsections, we also discussed gigantism of MSEs (**1.1** and **1.2**). This phenomenon led to the overformalisation of hosting requirements and the increase in costs for these events (Byun et al., 2019; Kelly et al., 2019). As a result, in the last decade, the new forms of hosting emerged as we discussed earlier (see **1.2.3**). ISGBs started to systematically allow host countries go beyond one host country concept. This forms hosting partnership between multiple hosts in many major monosport events that are usually comprised of several networks of actors in each host location: host member associations, the associated hosting governments and in some cases contracted private event agencies.

1.3.2. Theorizing JHAs as IORs

In the management literature, organization linkages can be described through network theory, IORs and strategic alliances, which all refer to the same perspective according to Parent (2006). Therefore, the literature review will gather the existing knowledge from the above-mentioned perspectives.

There are several definitions that are provided in the literature to describe partnerships and linkages. In the IOR context, Oliver, (1990) defined IORs as “relatively enduring transactions, flows, and linkages that occur among or between an organization and one or more organizations in its environment” (p. 214). Child & Faulkner (1998) defined strategic alliances as partnerships between two or more organizations where learning occurs, therefore, organizing committees could be seen as strategic alliances given that the event owners continuously implement knowledge transfer processes (Parent, 2015). Byun et al. (2019) argued that the event joint bids can qualify as strategic alliances as they meet all the central pillars of strategic alliances such as “achieving the goals of organizations,” “cooperative efforts with partners” and “the pooling of resources.” and therefore they allow each alliance member (i.e. each bid entity) to have a strategic advantage over their competitors to win the rights to host the event.

The definition of network was also provided by the colleagues as “a skill-based partnership involving more than two partners”. The network is characterized by nodes (actors) which are connected through formal or informal mechanisms (where it is from?). A network is a group of at least three organizations that are connected in ways that facilitate the achievement of a common goal (Provan et al., 2007). Parent (2015) referred to the event as a network, where the LOC is a leading organization within that network. Gerke et al. (2021) studied sports clusters as networks of organizations. Earlier, Gerke et al., (2018) researched Interorganizational networks (IONs) as such networks develop when IORs merge, meaning that there are at least three or more organizations.

Relying on IOR definition, Babiak & Willem (2017) then defined sport-specific partnerships as “voluntary, close, long-term, planned strategic action between two or more organizations with the objective of serving mutually beneficial purposes in a problem domain” (p. 273). Sport-related linkages are formed across different sport organizational contexts. Some of them are formalized

sponsor-sponsee relations, sport-venues-local governments, National Sport Governing Bodies (NSGBs)-local governments and NGOs – ISGBs among others.

One of the examples of the sponsor-sponsee relations is the example of relationships between The Olympic Partner (TOP) program of the IOC with the global corporations. IOC provides them a media platform, while brands provide IOC with revenue stream and their products and services that could be used for the Games (Babiak & Willem, 2017). As for the example within NSGBs-local governments, Lopez et al. (2022) studied collaboration between the French Golf Federation and Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines agglomeration community, an inter-municipal territory located in the Ile-de-France region, 20 km west of Paris. Sport venues/teams-local governments is an example of public–private partnerships (PPP) in which local governments collaborate with private sector to reach a public goal (e.g. the construction of sport infrastructure) (Babiak & Willem, 2017). For the partnership between Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – ISGBs, that usually pursue a sport for development objective (Babiak & Willem, 2017). An example of that would be UEFA working with Homeless World Cup Foundation, whose mission is to use football to support and inspire homeless people to change their lives and to change perceptions and attitudes towards people who experience homelessness. UEFA is one of the key contributors to this project.

To cite a few examples in the event context, IORs were studied between Organizing Committee for Olympic Games (OCOG) and satellite LOCs; NSGBs and Local Sport Governing Bodies (LSGBs); NSGBs and tour operators; between multiple bidding entities; between multi-level and multi-sector stakeholders; LOCs and event operators to deliver the event. Hoff et al. (2020) qualified event partnerships between OCOG and LOCs as IOR because they “form relationships to increase the potential for success and to maximize mutual benefits (e.g. legacies) as a result” (p. 2). The authors studied the relationship between the OCOG and satellite host organizing committees at 1996 Atlanta OG as the cross-sector IORs (see table 7 below). In the monosport context, Gao (2018) studied the relationships between NSGB and LSGBs in the context of FIBA 2019 World Cup in China.

Table 7. Satellite host organizing committees.

Satellite host location	Local organizing committee name	Stakeholder members	Event(s) hosted
Athens	Athens '96	Local government, University of Georgia, and the local Chamber of Commerce.	Rhythmic gymnastics, soccer, and volleyball
Columbus	Columbus '96	Local government, business leaders, and residents.	Softball
Conyers	Conyers-Rockdale Equestrian Task Force	Local government, local Chamber of Commerce, business leaders, and various city associates.	Equestrian and mountain biking
Savannah	Savannah Olympic Support Council	Local government, business leaders, numerous community organizations, and residents.	Sailing

Source : Hoff et al. (2020)

Byun et al. (2019) view multiple joint event bidding committees of monosport major events as strategic alliances. Parent et al. (2017) studied multi-sector multi-level ties of Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games through network lenses. As for the NSGBs and tour operators, Kennelly & Toohey (2014) studied the partnership of a national sport organization hosting a major rugby union event and sport tour operators to enhance sport tourism. There are a few research papers describing the relationship of the main LOC with other delivery partners: such as satellite LOC, multiple event partners and subcontracted partners. Zhou et al. (2021) explored partnerships in the US context between regional or local sport commissions with its event delivery partners such as sport facilities, hotels, local governments, and sport clubs. Finally Bradbury & Bhattacharya (2022) has done the research on contracting multiple external partners to deliver the event in the case of the World Masters Games 2017 in Auckland, New Zealand.

The type that is under researched within the literature is event owner and event organizer relationships that resembles theoretically to the franchisor-franchisee relations. Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos (2011) define franchising as a form of an IOR, as in a franchising agreement, franchisor its brand name and franchisor gives the access to its local market knowledge. Current research does not officially regard this relationship though IOR perspective but more form

stakeholder theory, agency theory perspective. As part of this research, a few papers study event management aspects of event owners and its effect on outcomes for the event organizers, that will be discussed more in depth in the “Management of the IOR” section of this chapter.


The number of partners in the linkages are two or more in the IORs and strategic alliances, whereas networks assume the presence of more than two actors. The partnership interactions can be within sector, cross-sector, multi-sector (Babiak et al., 2018). In the events most of the partnerships are either cross sector or multi sector as the stakeholders within those IORs are heterogeneous, and rarely within the sector unless it is studied at a particular level. In the examples of the OCOG and satellite host organizing committees at Atlanta 1996 Summer Olympic Games and network ties of Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games, the partnerships studied are cross/multi sector (Hoff et al., 2020; Parent et al., 2019). Within the network research, the units of analysis can be individual actors, dyads or the whole network (Parent, 2006). The strategic alliances are also studied from intraorganizational, interorganizational or extraorganizational perspective (Malo & Elkouzi, 2001).

A number of studies discuss linkages through their main lifecycle. In the IOR research applied to local organizing committee, Hoff et al. (2020) referred to the formation, management and outcomes of such IORs and emphasized the interdependence of these 3 phases when it comes to the outcomes. Gerke et al., (2021) discussed sport cluster stages through network structure, governance and outcomes, highlighting their interconnectedness as well. (p.2). In the literature of strategic alliances, the lifecycle is referred as motives, process and outcomes (Byun et al., 2019). In our research of Joint Hosting Alliances, the classic IOR terms such as formation, management and outcomes will be used to refer to their lifecycle.

1.3.3. IOR phases of event related IORs


As of today, researches on event IORs have studied them either focusing on one phase (Byun et al., 2019, 2020a; Drewniak, 2016) or on the full phases (Hoff et al., 2020; Kozak, 2014; Kristiansen et al., 2016) or the effect of one on the other (Barišić et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2020; Heere et al., 2012a; Kelly et al., 2019; Lienhard & Preuss, 2014; Walzel & Eickhoff, 2021). Figure 10 below illustrates the overall findings and discussion points of the study on IOR of the Atlanta 1996 OCOG and satellite hosts considering all three phases. Figure 11 below represents research findings and conceptual model of joint bid as alliances by Byun et al. (2019).

Figure 10. Formation, management and outcomes of ACOG 1996 and satellite host city IOR



Source: Hoff et al. (2020)

Figure 11. Conceptual model of the processes of Joint Bidding Alliances



Source: Byun et al. (2019)

1.3.3.1 Formation of the IOR

The formation of the event IOR in the non-profit one-off context comes when the event owner (ISGB) opens the bid procedure for the next edition of their trademark event. It is there, where different country members of the ISGB – NSGBs make the decision to host or not the event. These decisions come from different motives and drivers. In the event hosting literature, Johnston (2013) applied DiMaggio & Powell (1983)'s three forms of institutional pressures: coercive, mimetic and normative, to explore why a big number of NSGBs bid to host the major events. Coercive pressure refers to a situation in which an organization is compelled to conform to a certain behavior or structure due to institutionalized pressure from another organization or entity on which it depends. When faced with ambiguous situations where the correct course of action is uncertain, organizations may imitate the actions of other organizations they perceive as legitimate, which is mimetic pressure (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Normative pressures arise as a result of professionalism within specific organizational fields. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), professionalism is defined as the collective interpretation by members of a particular occupation, determining the appropriate ways to behave.

In the strategic alliance literature applied to joint bids, Byun et al., (2019) explored the preconditions for the formation of joint bids through reviewing the literature of motives and drivers of strategic alliances. The motives chosen by the author were gaining access to partner's resources, differentiating the bid, joint bids for leverage and reducing the potential threat of future competition, while notions on drivers referred to resource-related, characteristics of bidders and environmental drivers. Table 8 below represents the results from the motive of gaining access to partner's resources.

Table 8. Motives of gaining access to partner's resources

Resource type	Resource	Event	Alliance partners	Representative quotes
Property-based resources	Infrastructure	UEFA EURO 2008	Austria–Switzerland	“The bid from Austria and Switzerland impressed Uefa because of the high standard of hotels, communications, rail links and police facilities” (BBC, 2002)
	Stadiums		Scotland–Ireland	“In economic terms, Scotland simply could not sustain eight major stadiums of the size required. That’s why we joined forces with our friends in Ireland to put forward a bid that combined the best of both our nations” (Roberts, 2002)
	Sponsorship market	2023 FIBA Basketball World Cup	Indonesia–Japan–the Philippines	“Obviously, there is the opportunity to take world basketball’s flagship event into three vibrant, powerful and growing markets for the game, something all of us are excited about given the potential it creates to build more momentum for the sport in these countries” (FIBA, 2017)
		2026 FIFA World Cup	Canada–Mexico–USA	Gulati said. “The economic power of the American market – we’ve got 500 million people in these three countries – this will be an extraordinarily successful World Cup on financial and economic grounds” (Galarcep, 2017)
Knowledge-based resources	Reputation in sports	UEFA EURO 2012	Croatia–Hungary	“Croatia and Hungary had also mounted a joint bid, combining Hungary’s great history in the game and Croatia’s remarkable rise from a nation at war to third place in the 1998 World Cup” (Hughes, 2007)
	Knowledge and experience of hosting sport events	2019 IHF World Men’s Handball Championship	Denmark–Germany	“Both Denmark and Germany have strong handball cultures and have plenty of experience in hosting major, international sports events” (Mackay, 2013)

Source: Byun et al. (2019)

Other authors opted for Oliver’s (1990)’s framework of IOR formation (Babiak, 2007; Gerke et al., 2018; Hoff et al., 2020). See Table 9 below for the framework.

Table 9. Key determinants of IORs

Determinant	Definition
Asymmetry	An organization’s desire or ability to exercise power or control over another organization for its resources.
Reciprocity	When organizations pursue common or mutually beneficial goals through cooperation.
Necessity	Present when organizations form relationships to meet necessary legal or regulatory requirements.
Legitimacy	When an organization tries to comply with norms, rules, beliefs, or expectations.
Efficiency	Occurs when organizations try to improve their internal input/output ratio.
Stability	An adaptive response to environmental uncertainty such as resource scarcity.

Note: Table based on Oliver’s (1990) study titled “Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and Future Directions.”

Source: Hoff et al. (2020)

Those factors of linkage formation were asymmetry (power-dominated approach), reciprocity (the pursuit of collaborative advantage), necessity (responding to the legal requirements), legitimacy (demonstrating its correspondence with the environment), efficiency (maximizing the use of resources), and stability (resource scarcity). Hoff et al. (2020) found that stability, asymmetry, and legitimacy were three major motives pursued by the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) to join forces with the satellite LOCs. Gerke et al., 2018 identified reciprocity, necessity and stability as major motives to enter the formal and informal IORs within sailing sport cluster context. Byun et al. (2019) findings on motives and drivers, also in line with Oliver's (1990) determinants: reciprocity (joint bids for leverage), necessity/legitimacy (Differentiating and adding value to the bid, reducing competition), stability/efficiency (gaining access to partner's access to resources). However, some of these determinants miss more explanation that Byun et al. (2019) were considering, which gives us additional explanation why some nations join forces: specific characteristics of bidders, pre-existing ties.

Once the successful bidder(s) is(are) chosen, the IOR is finalized between the event owner and its chosen bidder(s). IORs are established through interactions or transactions between two organizations with the common aim of serving mutually beneficial purposes (Babiak, 2007; Oliver, 1990). The motives and drivers also determine whether the partnership is transactional/short-term or trust-based and mid- and long term (Gerke et al., 2018). Some partnerships are short-term, transaction-based, while others are long-term, trust-based. The transactional IORs are referred as "first-level" relationships, while the latter ones are more collaborative and strategical and considered as "higher level" relationships (Zhou et al., 2021).

Alliance Goals and Objectives

Although motives and drivers define well the objective of each alliance member, it is important to understand the goals and objective of the alliance as a whole for its successful management and outcomes. Gao et al. (2019) studied whether the event stakeholders planned any social initiatives at the early stage at the FIBA 2019 World Cup locations to reach any social leverage outcomes. Kelly et al., (2019) have mentioned separate strategic planning of 2007 ICC Cricket World Cup co-hosts, discussing how Barbados was pursuing long-term goals and the others – short term

objectives. As shared goals are more observed in mid and long terms linkages, in the transactional IORs, the goals and objectives are more individual.

The effect of formation of the alliance on the other phases

Authors of IOR literature observed the interconnectedness of IOR phases. In both research works of Hoff et al. (2020) and Gerke et al. (2018), the motives affected the management of the event, in a way whether the partnership would be formalized or not. Therefore, in the formation phases, the nature of the partnerships is being configured. Also, at the formation/early management phase of the event IOR, the goals are formulated. According to Chalip (2004), the strategic planning approach is an important factor that affects the implementation of the desired outcomes of the IOR whether on individual or partnership level. In the trust based and long-term partnerships, IORs are more strategic and collaborative, therefore, they would lead to the IOR outcomes such as knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Zhou et al., 2021). In the alliances, where the mutual goals are formed (reciprocity), the associated outcomes are more likely to happen (Gerke et al., 2018). Finally, Kelly et al., (2019) observed that during management phase of the IOR, that the hosts' capacity to respond or "push-back" to the event regulations (formalized not in the favor of hosts) effects directly whether the hosts will get the desired outcomes or not.

1.3.3.2. Management of the IOR

In their studies, researchers (Hoff et al.,2020; Huxham & Vangen, 2000; Seabright et al., 1992) commonly classify the managerial factors influencing partnerships as either formal control mechanisms or informal factors .According to Hoff et al., (2020) formal control mechanisms encompass contractual obligations and structured organizational mechanisms aimed at fostering cooperation. These mechanisms can take the form of guidelines, rules, and detailed contracts. Geeraert (2017) attempted to theorize the governance of sport mega-events by relying on insights from the principle-agent perspective and described how the use of control mechanisms such as bidding, the contract design and the various checks by ISGBs are in place to minimize the conflicts of interest and information asymmetries (Geeraert, 2017; Leopkey & Parent, 2019). These mechanisms bring order, stability, and effectiveness to the organization by determining how organization workers are supervised, how the different departments or teams' tasks are allocated, and how decisions are made (Hoff et al., 2020).

On the other hand, informal processes refer to the influence of informal cultures and systems on members, encouraging self-regulation. These processes are characterized by elements such as trust, commitment, and communication. In both studies, researchers emphasized the vital role of the combination of formal and informal control methods for effective partnership management. In a study conducted by Babiak and Thibault (2008) involving managers overseeing partnerships between various nonprofit sport organizations in Canada, while Hoff et al. (2020) studies the management of partnership between the host city and satellite host cities in Atlanta 1976. In the conceptual model designed by Byun et al. (2019), the joint bidding alliance management included both formal control mechanisms and informal factors (See Figure 10).

The effect of the IOR management of the alliance on its outcomes

Babiak and Thibault (2008) observed that formal controls imposed constraints on certain organizations, thereby impeding interorganizational relationships in the Canadian sport system, while highlighting that effective interaction between organizations was facilitated by informal processes; however, in the context of the Atlanta case (Hoff et al., 2020), formal controls yielded favorable outcomes, as exemplified by the timely construction of facilities, adherence to Olympic hosting standards, and subsequent long-term utilization of the venues.

Formalized rules and regulations, as highlighted impedes experimentation, innovation, creativity and autonomy. By attempting to pre-program behavior, formalization restricts decision-making power (Kelly et al., 2019). The following examples describe the effect of control methods such as rules and regulations on the host leveraging ability from the event. Rogerson (2009) described how during 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, small local businesses, specifically tourism businesses, were disadvantaged by FIFA regulations and as a result did not benefit from the event. Strict International Olympic Committee (IOC) rules regarding copyright also hindered leveraging activities related to the London 2012 Games. As a result, the expected benefits of showcasing the local culture failed to materialize, thus limiting the benefits to the host community. According to Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), what limited the success of the inclusion of the small creative business initiative at the 2012 London Olympic Games is the inadequate community consultation, hyper-securitization, barriers to leveraging, and a lessened priority of local interests. In the co-hosted event context Kelly et al. (2019) study examines how formalized policies and procedures

on the part of event rights holders can in fact constrain host communities from achieving positive outcomes (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. The impact of formalized regulations on the host destination's ability to leverage the event




Fig. 1. The impact of formalised regulations on the host destinations' ability to leverage events.

Source: Kelly et al. (2019)

The formal control methods that can facilitate collaboration can yield positive outcomes for the alliance and the host community. The coordination and cooperation between stakeholders are of the utmost importance for social outcomes leveraging (Chalip & Heere, 2014; O'Brien, 2006). Therefore, formal and informal factors stimulating coordination and cooperation might be conducive to positive social outcomes. Likewise, for the co-hosted events, Walzel (2018) observed that the increase of social capital happens when there is inclusive management and collaboration between co-hosts.

When talking about informal factors, Kristiansen et al. (2016) examined the challenges and issues associated with the co-hosted European Youth Olympic Festival (by Austria and Liechtenstein), pinpointing internal communication difficulties that hindered the management process. Similarly, building trust among partners is critical for the success of alliances because strategic alliances create mutual dependence among partners (Child et al., 2005). The presence of strong connections

and effective communication among key members from ACOG and the LOCs fostered trust and cooperation, leading to a greater willingness to collaborate and achieve the intended legacies, aligning with Hardy et al., (2003) proposition that well-connected organizational relationships yield desired outcomes.

1.3.3.3. Outcomes of the IOR

The evaluation stage holds great importance for stakeholders as it allows them to assess whether they are reaping benefits from the established relationships (Hoff et al., 2020; Sotiriadou et al., 2017). As a rule, the evaluation of IOR should be aligned with the intended objectives and goals of the alliance (Babiak & Willem, 2017). However, current research shows that sometimes there is lack of clear goal formulation of the alliances, and lack of alignment. Here it is important to refer back to the formation of the alliance and its motives as well as drivers. Moreover, has there been any strategic goal setting to achieve specific outcomes (leveraging strategy).

Byun et al. (2019) recommended for the future research three types of outcomes: organizational learning, achieving goals of each alliance member and result of joint bidding alliance. It is not known if alliances are successful or not, how alliance members affect each other and if their individual goals are met (See Figure 10). In the partnership between Atlanta and its satellite host cities for Atlanta 1996 Games, Hoff et al. (2020) has found that there were different specific legacy outcomes for different destinations and that there was unequal distribution of legacies across the satellite locations. There was no mention on joint goal formulation and its achievement, apart from delivering the event and meeting each alliance member goals. Zhou et al., (2021); In their study on sport event delivery partnership, concluded that there were positive outcomes on three levels: relationship, organizational, and community benefits. The partnership stimulated personal interactions, fostered mutual organizational learning between sport commissioners and sport experts, and generated economic, social, and environmental advantages in the local community.

1.3.4. Research gaps

While significant research has been conducted on event partnerships, there are still notable gaps in the existing literature that require further investigation on sport event partnerships and notably in

the joint hosting partnerships. There is a necessity to verify which institutional pressures of Oliver (1990) are dominant to form co-host alliances to confirm the seminal research findings of our colleagues. There is a need to understand whether these partnerships are first level or higher level and what implications it might have on the alliance management and outcomes (Gerke et al. 2018).

As for the management of alliances, what is the effect of formal and informal mechanisms in co-hosted sport event delivery contexts and how are they affecting collaboration. Is there a hierarchy in mechanisms that lead to positive social outcomes? Can we confirm the findings of Kelly et al. (2019) that more outcomes can be observed if co-host are able to “push-back” to the requirements?

As per Hoff et al. (2020), what are intangible legacies of sport event partnership. No research is done on JHAs, what are intangible legacies of these partnerships? To address (Chalip & Heere, 2014)’s gap, can social leverage be only possible if initiated at early stages of the partnership (formation and early phase of management)?

What are the outcomes of JHAs? Are these alliances successful? Does each alliance member meet their goal? How do alliance members influence each other (what is the organizational learning between the members?) As per this literature review, organizational learning seems to be a common outcome in the case of sport event delivery partnerships and there is non-existing research on organizational learning in the context of JHAs.

1.4. Review of Organization Structure Literature

This subchapter explores the relevance of organizational structure literature in formal control mechanisms and informal factors governing the alliance. We start by unpacking the pioneer research of Mintzberg, followed by its applications in event management research, a simplified explanation of key structural dimensions and current research gaps, connecting it to the other subchapters.

1.4.1. Application of Mintzberg's research in studying sport event organizing committees

Now that we have covered strategic alliance literature and we have explored the related gaps, Byun et al. (2019) encouraged to study further the management and outcomes phase. As we have determined in the previous chapter on what outcomes we would want to focus, this sub-chapter will allow us to explore in more detail the effect of formal control mechanisms and informal factors that manage the alliance. To quickly recap, there are formal and informal managerial factors that determine event governance (Hoff et al., 2021). These formal and informal interactions that make up organizational life derive from the structure (Amis & Slack, 2016). Therefore, the theoretical body of knowledge on organizational structure will help us dig into these mechanisms and factors in more detail. Parent, (2015) is a pioneer in studying all forms of organizational structure and efficiency for different contexts.

Theodoraki (2001) is a pioneer in applying Mintzberg's Structural Configurations in studying the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG)'s lifecycle. Table 10 below represents the changes in configuration according to the OCOG lifecycle. Theodoraki (2001) found that each OCOG exhibits a simple structure at the very beginning when it first forms a bid committee and at the first stage of the preparation. Overtime the organization turns to professional bureaucracy in the preparation of the Games phases until it becomes a venue-based division just before the games. Once it enters the games it corresponds to divided structure, an adhocracy and/or a missionary organization as the decision-making is decentralized across the venues and to the volunteers. In the post event phase, the OCOG structure can exhibit the forms of missionary organization that is preparing to finish its operations and close up.

Table 10. Mintzberg's configurations and OCOG lifecycle

Configuration	Main co-ordinating mechanism	Key part of the organisation	Type of decentralisation	OCOG's Life-cycle
Simple structure	Direct Supervision	Strategic Apex	Vertical and horizontal centralisation	Start up year 1
Machine Bureaucracy	Standardisation of work processes	Technostructure	Limited horizontal decentralisation	N/A
Professional Bureaucracy	Standardisation of skills	Operating core	Horizontal decentralisation	Build-up years 2-6
Divisionalised Structure	Standardisation of outputs	Middle line	Limited vertical decentralisation	Build-up year 7 & Games Time
Adhocracy	Mutual adjustment	Support Staff	Selected decentralisation	Games Time
Missionary Organisation	Standardisation of norms	Ideology	Decentralisation	Games time & Post-event yr. 8

Source: Theodoraki (2001)

Malfas (2003) built up on Theodoraki's research and applied a modified approach to study the lifecycle structural configurations of the OCOGs, considering the uniqueness of OCOG as organization. This uniqueness was manifested in a way that, first, OCOG's operations are co-produced by the efforts of multiple stakeholders. Secondly, OCOGs operate in a non-competitive environment once they are allocated hosting rights. Thirdly is that OCOG's organizational status continuously changes depending on the event lifecycle, compared to conventional organizational whose status changes only based on size. Malfas operationalized the theory of Mintzberg to study Sydney Organizing Committee for Olympic Games (SOCOG)'s organizational structure. The author did not apply fully the theoretical framework of Mintzberg to study the structure of OCOGs as it was not clear as well how to measure each variable.

Table 11 below represents Malfas' findings across different SOCOG's design parameters according to SOCOG lifecycle phases: start-up period, build-up period, games period and close-down period.

Table 11. SOCOG's organizational characteristics over its lifecycle

<i>Age</i>	<i>Start-up period</i>	<i>Build-up period</i>	<i>Games-time period</i>	<i>Close-down period</i>
Size	Medium	Medium	Large	Small
Environment	Simple/dynamic	Complex/relatively stable	Complex/relatively stable	Simple/stable
Resource dependence	High	High	High	Moderate
Power	High external control	High external control	High external control	High external control
Strategic capacity	Low	Low	Low	Low
Specialisation	Little specialisation	Much specialisation	Much specialisation	Little specialisation
Unit grouping	Functional-based	Functional and place-based	Place-based	Functional-based
Liaison devices	Few liaison devices	Many liaison devices	Few liaison devices	Few liaison devices
Formalisation	Little formalisation	Much formalisation	Some formalisation	Little formalisation
Centralisation	Centralisation	Limited decentralisation	Decentralisation	Selective decentralisation
Training	Little training	Some training	Much training	Little training
Basic part	Strategic apex	Technostructure/ operating core	Operating core	Technostructure/ operating core
Basic co-ordination mechanism	Mutual adjustment	Standardisation of work processes	Mutual adjustment	Standardisation of outputs

Source: Theodoraki (2007, p. 147)

According to Malfas (2003), justification of the structural changes across the SOCOG's lifecycle might be the result of the observation of the previous games, appointment of the leader, the shift from functional area to venue-based teams and eventually to MOC operations and the end of the games (Theodoraki, 2007).

The following paragraphs will describe in more detail each lifecycle stage and the associated changes across design parameters.

Start-up period

Theodoraki described how the Sydney 2000 Bid Committee structure starts forming around the central bid committee members, who were leading the bid. As the bid committee started getting in contact with the IOC and followed the bid requirements to build their candidature files, it evolves into a functional structure to correspond to the major functions of the organization. This structure exhibits little technostructure, a few support staff members, a flexible and broader division of labor, a few major divisions and one level of hierarchy. This is the simplest form of a structure that is usually witnessed at the early stages of the bidding stage (See Figure 13).




Figure 13. Sydney 2000 Bid Committee's simple structure

Source: Borrowed from Theodoraki (2007, p. 122)

The coordinating mechanism that is disposed to strategic apex is direct supervision. Malfas (2003) found that the structure of SOCOG during the early bidding period was more prone to adhocracy's type of coordinating mechanism which is mutual adjustment. It implied that the work co-ordination in SOCOG was primarily achieved through informal interactions of its members.

One can start observing market formations or stakeholder relationship formations once the bid committee builds its relationship with the internal (local and national governments) and external (IOC and IFs) stakeholders. These relationships are antecedents of the divisionalized form of the structure. As the work is more coordinated by the IOC's required outputs such as bidbook and bid presentation, task specialization and decentralization increase to the specialist staff and outside consultants work with the bid nations. IOC's future commission in particular works with the bidding nations, that constantly monitors, analyzes and assesses the bidding nation's state of affairs and reports to the IOC Executive board that later will also put forward the preferred host to the IOC session (see the figure 14)

FUTURE HOST ELECTIONS OF OLYMPIC GAMES AND YOUTH OLYMPIC GAMES



Figure 14. IOC future host election process
 Source: Future Host Election (2023)

At the IOC session, on the day of host city election, the structure evolves back to a more centralized form with direct supervision, where strategic apex is the key part of the organization, which are IOC members. We can see these relationships at the example of Sochi 2014 Bid Committee structure (See Figure 15).




Figure 15. Illustration of relationship between Sochi Olympic Organizing Committee (SOOG) and other relevant organizations

Source: Theodoraki (2007, p. 134)

Build-up period

The buildup stage is characterized by the mixture of Mintzberg’s Machine and Professional bureaucracy configurations (Malfas, 2003). In the build-up phase, organizations get transferred knowledge from the previous edition on the event hosting as well as the leadership is identified which pushes the further growth of the organization into the divisionalized structured based on functional areas and later gradually shifting to the venue-based team structure. Functional areas derive from the Host City Contrasts that relate to the roles and responsibilities of the hosts. The

following table represents the functional areas of the Athens Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (See Table 12).

Table 12. Athens Organizing Committee FAs

- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| ■ Health services | ■ Generic Competition Venue |
| ■ Catering | ■ Energy supply |
| ■ Overlay and site management | ■ Merchandising |
| ■ Telecommunications | ■ Ceremonies |
| ■ Sport division | ■ Torch relay |
| ■ Sport competition | ■ Press operations |
| ■ Information technology | ■ Security |
| ■ Sport entries | ■ Ticketing |
| ■ Risk management | ■ OAKA Complex |
| ■ Accommodation | ■ Hellinikon Complex |
| ■ Image and Identity (look) | ■ Faliron Coastal Zone |
| ■ Broadcasting | ■ Doping control |
| ■ Accreditation | ■ Main press centre |
| ■ IOC relations and protocol | ■ Airports |
| ■ Greeks abroad | ■ Sponsor hospitality centre |
| ■ NOC relations and services | ■ Olympic Village |
| ■ Pre-games training | ■ Village overlays |
| ■ Environment | ■ International Broadcasting Centre |
| ■ Olympic youth camp | ■ Media Villages |
| ■ Supply chain (procurement and logistics) | ■ Olympic Family Hotels |
| ■ Rate card | ■ Olympic Logistics Centre |
| ■ Human resources | ■ Technical Officials Village |
| ■ Test events | ■ City (look) |
| ■ Paralympic Games | ■ Spectator services |
| ■ Transport (generic venue) | ■ Brand protection |
| ■ Cleaning and waste management | ■ Uniforms |
| ■ Language services | |

Source: Theodoraki (2007, p. 130)

During this period, an organization's work processes are highly standardized, as functional areas need mechanism to coordinate work between these areas. And this work is accomplished by different by the expert staff. Therefore, the basic part of organization in built-up period or implementation/planning period is operating core/techno structure and the main coordinating mechanism is partly the standardization of work processes in the form of different deliverables across the build-up stage. These deliverables start from the master schedules and global strategic plan to the functional area concept of operations and venue-specific operational plans along with tests events and finalized operational plans for function areas and venues (Theodoraki, 2007). Technostructure is event consultants, helping the event to be built up. The operating core is the functional area teams or venue teams. As the build-up period is also characterized by the

standardization of skills, where positions are formalized and the volunteers are trained, the other main coordinating mechanism is standardization of skills. Therefore, given the mixture of the two configurations, build-up period exhibits high specialization function or venue-based, many liaison devices, much formalization, little or medium decentralization to venue teams towards the end of build-up stage. The figure 16 below demonstrates the organizational structure at the time of Build-up of the Torino OC.

Source: Theodoraki (2007, p. 150)

Games-period

As the venue teams are the highlight of this phase, the operating core is the basic organizational part. There are series of mechanisms used to coordinate and liaison activities between the divisions. Therefore, the main operating mechanism is considered to be mutual adjustment. The decision-




Figure 16. Torino Organizing Committee Structure

making is decentralized as the venue teams are autonomous during the games period to make decisions to prevent waiting for the top management and decide on the venue the most suitable solution. Theodoraki designed a figure of decisional power in OCOGs and how it changes from functional to venue structure and from functional manager to venue manager (See Figure 17).




Figure 17. Decisional power in OCOG

Source: Theodoraki (2007, p. 167)

Even though this period exhibits divisionalized form structure given the just mentioned characteristics, “headquarters” still practice their power by standardizing the outputs of each of the venue in terms of reporting of daily activities and the results to the Main Operations Center. Therefore, each division or venue is a machine bureaucracy with low decision-making power and highly standardized procedures. In effect, the organization required to be divisionalized to serve the venue needs, while retaining a certain degree of professionalism deal with the complexity of its task.

Close-down period

The venues get disbanded and the functional areas find themselves again at the close-down period finalizing the games by writing reports, counting necessary statistics. Decision-making is centralized back to the top management on when each function finish to perform, but within the function there is still a degree of autonomy on decision-making. Therefore, decentralization is selective. Due to the decline of operations, there is little degree of formalization and specialization. The close down period is a mixture of machine bureaucracy and simple structure, as it corresponds to some characteristics. However, Malfas (2003) has claimed that close-down period corresponds to none of the configurations of Mintzberg (1979). The wrap-up mode in mega events is characterized with legacy planning (Parent, 2015; Parent & Naraine, 2019), so there might be some experts involved (technostructure) involved to help to put that in place. Therefore, the structural configurations of uniqueness of OCOGS post-game transformations to legacy/endowment funds is not considered by such configurations. Leopkey and Parent (2016) found that for the successful legacy governance there are four phases compared to the event lifecycle phases which only has

three. These four phases are legacy conceptualization, legacy planning, legacy transfer and post-games governance (p.6). Figure 18 below represents Leopkey (2013)'s elaboration of the four phases.




Figure 18. Olympic legacy governance phases

Source: Borrowed from Leopkey (2013)

The post-games governance in SOCOG's case was the establishment of the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) by the New South Wales government to continue managing the sports development of the district, which was previously the role of Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) during the SOCOG period. SOPA is comprised of a seven Board of Directors, who come from private and public stakeholder groups and who are appointed by the NSW Government and who previously worked for the OCA (Leopkey & Parent, 2016). The National Lottery Community Fund founded Spirit fund in 2013 with a £47m endowment to continue spread the impact of London 2012 Games to the community. (*London 2012*, n.d.). Paris 2024 OCOG has been put in place an endowment fund in their planning stage to finance the social innovation through sport projects that could benefit the French community. Every year they make call for candidates to allocate funding for the project and it is renewable under conditions (*Fonds de dotation Paris 2024*, n.d.).

Furthermore, if one-off events then cease to exist or stich to other organizations, usually within a year of the end of the event, recurring events such as French Open Roland Garros, reenter the planning mode for the next event (Parent, 2015). It refers to the cyclical nature of structural configurations of the recurring events, which has not been yet the subject of the research. Another research gap would be legacy governance in NMSEs. As mega events started to establish separate bodies to govern legacies and research done on legacy recommends integrating it from the very

early stage of the bidding process, how are legacy objectives governed in smaller events? Is there a need for similar structures?

1.4.2. Design parameters applied in sport management literature: Slack (1997)'s structural dimensions

The critique that Mintzberg approach received across sport event management researchers is that it fails to accommodate the unique features of the event lifecycle, especially with regards to Close-down phase of the event (Malfas, 2003). Therefore, Malfas (2003) does not recommend utilizing Mintzberg's approach for projects that may have declines such as major events. Theodoraki (2001) noticed that Mintzberg's approach does not take into consideration the cultural aspect that are important in consideration of the study of OCOGs as they exhibit different cultural contexts with every edition which can affect the structural configurations as well. Malfas (2003) suggests that when comparing SOCOG with a future OCOG, political and legal systems of the host country, the levels of public administration involved in the Games' Organization, the organizational culture of the host country should be considered.

Therefore, we had to look for something more simplified to understand major determinants of structural design. Slack (1997) summarized three major structural dimensions of sporting organizations: complexity, formalization and centralization deriving from Mintzberg (1979)'s taxonomy of structural configurations, that includes the consideration of design parameters discussed earlier.

1.4.2.1. Complexity

Amis and Slack (2016) defined the complexity of an organization as “the degree to which the work that is carried out is broken down and assigned to different sub-units or individual specialists”. This degree is also known as differentiation. The complexity refers to the horizontal, vertical and spatial differentiations. Horizontal one encompasses the task specialization and departmentalization, while vertical one refers to the number of levels “a matter should pass to be acted upon in the organization” (Slack, 1997) and we may reach “administrative efficiency” when we have minimum levels of such passage (ibid, 1997). Finally, spatial differentiation can occur as a form of vertical or horizontal differentiation, where tasks and powers can be separated geographically. Complexity usually occurs when the organizations grow. It is usually addressed through creating appropriate

additional structures, systems and rules and procedures (Theodoraki, 2001; Trevor, 1997). Therefore, there is an obvious correlation between complexity and formalization.

Slack (1997) cited how task specialization affected the increase in standardization. Therefore, the greater the level of differentiation is, the more complex organization is. Complexity at the solo event context is embodied through the presence of various functional areas of the LOCs (horizontal) as well as different specificities around ownership of the event (vertical). Spatial characteristics can occur when the event facilities are spread geographically across the city, region and the country.

1.4.2.2. Formalization

Slack (1997) referred to formalization as “the extent to which mechanisms such as rules and regulations, job descriptions, and policies and procedures govern the operation of a sport organization. In a highly formalized organization, employees have little discretion over how and when they do their work. In an opposite situation, employees have freedom to exercise discretion about their work and how and when it is carried out.

The formalization in event context is embodied in the form of hosting agreements and contracts that a host city sign. The contracts guarantee the control that the event owner practices over the host cities (Kelly et al., 2019). This control is justified in a way that event owners need to ensure timely and budgeted organization of the event to protect the event brand (ibid, 2019). These highly formalized documents prescribe the hosts to form the LOC and focus on operational delivery of the event, which identifies their role in the whole event delivery process. The organizing committee in its event planning stage is headquarter-centered and therefore, at this stage the degree of the formalization is high, as “it is during this period that strategic plans, rules, policies, and procedures are developed and anticipated changes can be planned”. A few research papers agree that in the NMSEs context, the degree of formalization is not that elaborated. (Bradbury & Bhattacharya, 2022; Middleditch & Bradbury, 2014; Parent, 2008)

Some of the few advantages of formalization are the following: employee commitment and identification and therefore ethical culture, as there are tangible rules to abide by. Despite these advantages, the management literature discusses some important disadvantages related to

formalization such as loss of employee's autonomy, constraint on the employee capacity to experiment, innovate or explore or to solve unexpected issues, and in its excessive form, minimal adherence to the rules or bureaucratic behavior, resistance to change and misperception of organizational goal among others (Kelly et al., 2019 and Slack, 1997). The current research confirms the limited engagement of the LOC with its population and concludes that formalized requirements exclude the strategic thinking behind the mere hosting and do not include anything on broader functions to make their events more beneficial to the hosting communities (Kelly et al., 2019). To the date, no research has been found on how event owners prescribe behavior in the multiple host context and whether they include any engagement with the local community in their formalized requirements.

1.4.2.3. Centralization

The last element of structure, centralization refers to the "locus" of decision making (Amis & Slack, 2016). The organization is centralized if the decisions are made at the top, the organization is decentralized when they are delegated to the lower levels of management. The locus of decision-making in single host event context is usually the event board appointed by the event owner and comprised of the representatives of the main stakeholders: event owner and event organizer. Parent and Séguin (2007) referred to the composition of the Organizing Committee Board of the 2005 FINA World Championships in Montréal, comprising of governments, Aquatic Federation of Canada and community members. In a multiple host environment, the event board Kristiansen et al. (2016) refer to the top management of the co-hosted Olympic Youth Festival as General Assembly that is comprised of the stakeholders of the two countries (their National Olympic Committees, sport ministries and regional administrative and sport authorities, city authorities and some private stakeholders).

Some factors that affect whether the decision-making is centralized or not are the following: the presence of the informal authority that discourages decentralization, management information systems as control mechanism of centralization, professionals and expert's positive effect on decentralization (individuals who best understand the situation are given power to make decisions). These factors can be used within the analysis of co-host decision-making.

Parent (2010) was one of the first who theorized decision-making processes in LOC environment according to the event velocity. Findings show how decision-making is non-linear or not consistent

over the event lifecycle because of the environment velocity that is characteristic to each cycle. Velocity is moderate at the planning and wrap-up stages, and it is at its peak during implementation stage. Therefore, the event stakeholders are more likely to make more-informed and weighted decisions at moderate or low velocity levels as opposed to immediate decision-making or even inability to make decisions on non-pressing matters during high velocity. Strategies used by organizing committee can be in place to ensure effective decision-making during the implementation stage by decentralizing decision-making to additional levels and by introducing more formalization to clarify the decision-makers and the deadlines.

1.4.3. Research gaps

More research is needed in understanding the organizational delivery models in NMSE context. (Bradbury & Bhattacharya, 2022; Middleditch & Bradbury, 2014; Parent, 2008). The application of Mintzberg research by Theodoraki and Malfas is focused only on the Olympic Games that is a mega event. Their findings can be applicable for the events of the same size, where it is highly formalized such as other mega events (FIFA World Cup or UEFA Euro championship), but the huge gaps lie in the understanding of the structural configurations or dimensions in lower-tier one-off events or non-Olympic events such as international or continental major tournaments across different sports (Parent, 2015). The question is how the event owner from their perspective designs the structure for each edition. There is a need to understand a configuration at the start-up/build-up stage to see how it affects the outcomes, the unit grouping to see who works with whom and where in a multiple host context. the liaison devices the event owner use to coordinate the event hosting across multiple countries, the degree to which they decentralize based on the lifecycle, the degree to which processes are formalized and the organizers adhere and factors affecting *that*. Adding to this research gaps, there is no research data on if and how the collaboration of multiple hosts is coordinated in the context of linkages and whether the social leverage is coordinated by each alliance partner and/or by the alliance.

1.5. Chapter conclusion and overall research gaps

This literature review was developed taking into consideration different perspectives. These perspectives were chosen not by accident. JHAs are an interesting case for everybody of this literature. To link all the perspectives and connect similar concepts under various names.

There is a need to study more events in non-mega event context and the social and intangible impacts of these events such as human and social capital. Similarly, the intangible legacies within the IOR and strategic alliance literature in the event context is the significant lacuna. The pioneer research applying these lenses to joint hosting partnership highlights the need to explore how alliance partners influence each other. Therefore, authors agree on the need to explore organizational learning as an outcome in such partnership. The outcomes of the IOR are usually directly affected by how alliance was formed and managed. Therefore, what is the management context of such partnership across different events and what contribution it plays in the alliance outcomes. Are such IORs transactional or strategic? This will help us answer the concerns of event management and geopolitical literature if these can make the world better and how do they represent current development of the world order? Can these events help achieve unity and interconnectedness?

This thesis aims to fill these research gaps of studying the effect of the management of the JHAs on its outcomes. For the outcomes, we will focus on organizational learning to see how alliance partners influence each other and contribute to literature by studying intangible impact such as organizational learning of these alliances.


Chapter II. Methodology and Research Design

This chapter aims to explain the rationale behind the research design as well as our theoretical and methodological choices. We first explain the steps to the formulation of our research questions. We then explain our choice for theoretical framework, that is built from the extensive literature review that we have presented in Chapter I. The final section explains the chosen case study designs and our methods.

2.1. Steps to the formulations of the research questions

Figure 19 indicates two steps that led to the formulation of the research question. The first step was the master thesis results which was an exploratory study on co-hosted events. The following second step was the careful consideration of literature review to make sure that this study fills current research gap and is justified to be studied.

Figure 19. Steps to the formulation of the research question



Source: author's own elaboration

2.1.1. Step 1 - Master thesis study results

The previous exploratory master thesis study (Mukanova, 2019) leading up to this research demonstrated some good examples of collaboration outcomes:

- a) Contracting common event partner that is owned jointly by national companies of involved co-host nations, e.g. jointly owned train company of the nations of two co-hosts transported athletes between the host cities

- b) Having one representative on behalf of two co-hosts to report to the event owner
- c) Organizing events beyond the tournament together, e.g. co-organized coach symposium

All these initiatives were in place because co-hosts shared responsibilities or occasions to collaborate granted by the event owners. Therefore, if the hosts had common areas of responsibility, they were more likely to develop joint initiatives in that area of responsibility. There was a correlation between the level of jointly coordinated initiatives with the overall co-host frequency and scope of collaboration. As an example, the transportation concerned both co-hosts, one could see joint efforts in planning a sustainable and cost-effective route.

The findings within outcomes demonstrated that there were by-products or unplanned legacies that come from hosting the event, e.g. modernization of infrastructure and employee-level skill development, which were acquired by each co-host on its own. However, it was found that there was also a joint “by-product legacy” of network ties creation with another co-host but no other planned joint long-term-benefits which can be explained by the lack of requirements from the side of event owners and the lack of joint areas of responsibility that could engender more joint long-term legacy opportunities. Furthermore, it was also concluded that more frequent instances of collaboration were found when the co-hosting was initiated (e.g. joint bid) by co-hosts themselves before the candidature period before the intervention of the event owner in the relationship. This means that once the event owner enters the relationship (after allocating event rights), it dictates the rules of communication and responsibilities. Thus, some international federations impede co-hosts from collaborating or to share specific responsibilities that would facilitate collaborative projects.

Therefore, instances of rare and limited collaboration are found in the co-host scenarios that are not initiated or planned by the co-hosts themselves (e.g. bidding separately for event packages, etc.), where the event ownership models are not well adapted for joint event hosting and thus countries share a minimal set of shared responsibilities (e.g. only logo designing) or these models contain highly formalized communication protocols and strict chain of command (i.e. communicating with co-host through the event owner only).

These findings sparked the interest to explore further polycentric major sports events as platforms for joint leverage and the role the event ownership models play in hindering or facilitating this leverage.

These are the observations that were taken to lead to the formulation of the particular focus for this study.

O1: These initiatives were possible thanks to shared responsibilities

O2: If the co-hosts have common areas of responsibility, they are more likely to come up with the joint initiative in that area of responsibility (e.g. transport)

O3: Lack of joint legacy initiatives = lack of requirements from event owners

O4: Once event owner enters the relationship, it dictates

These observations led to the formulation of the research hypothesis:

Formalized event governance models affect how co-hosts communicate, their roles and responsibilities, their joint areas of collaboration and therefore their ability to reap joint benefits from the event.

To be able to proceed further with this research hypothesis, we had to cross-check in the literature for the current research gaps and similar concerns raised by similar research works within the field.

2.1.2. Step 2 - Research gaps from the IOR, structure and event outcomes literature

We have conducted a literature review to see whether the existing gaps meet the hypothesis. As per the gaps of our **Chapter I**, we learned that there is a need to study more events in non-mega event context and the social and intangible impacts of these events such as human and social capital. Similarly, the intangible legacies within the IOR and strategic alliance literature in the event context is the significant lacuna. The pioneer research applying these lenses to joint hosting partnership highlights the need to explore how alliance partners influence each other. Therefore, authors agree on the need to explore organizational learning as an outcome in such partnership. The outcomes of the IOR are usually directly affected by how alliance was formed and managed. Therefore, what is the management context of such partnership across different events and what contribution it plays in the alliance outcomes. Are such IORs transactional or strategic?

These summarized gaps among others from **Chapter I** confirm that our hypothesis can then move further to the stage of research question formulation.


2.1.3. The Ph.D Research Design

Combining the preceding two steps, there is an evident need to study the effect of the management of the JHAs on its outcomes. For the outcomes, we will focus on organizational learning to see how alliance partners influence each other and contribute to literature by studying intangible impact such as organizational learning of these alliances.

2.2. Theoretical framework

To build on this research gap, a multi-theoretical approach was used to guide this research (See Figure 20). Given the interconnectedness of the IOR phases (Hoff et al., 2020), the choice to also include formation stage in addition was obvious in order to better understand how it could affect the management and the outcomes phases. Therefore, for each phase, the relevant concepts were identified. The overarching lens of this research is the IOR framework and its phases. For the formation phases, we rely on previous research framework on the formation of joint bid strategic alliances by Byun and colleagues (2019). For the management phases, the research on branch on structure in sport event sector was studied and the concept of Slack's simplified structural dimensions (1997) was applied to guide the findings on formal control methods and informal factors. For the outcomes stage, to frame the results, the organizational learning outcomes (Malo and Elkouzi, 2001) were used to understand the alliance influence on one another on different levels, which is inclusive concept of several intangible outcomes such as human and social capital among others. Legacy and leverage concepts are mentioned at the end to understand whether the findings on the outcomes could be explained through these concepts. Whether the outcomes were strategically leveraged (Chalip, 2004) and/or if structural change was evident (Preuss, 2018) for example.

Figure 20. Theoretical framework linking event outcomes, IOR and structure research.



Source: author's own elaboration

2.2.1. The epistemological positioning

To understand how reality is viewed and how knowledge is constructed is the purpose of this section. The study of the philosophy of knowledge is referred to as ontology, and the philosophical study of how such knowledge is acquired is referred to as epistemology (Gratton & Jones, 2010).

Since this study explores both the collaboration of co-hosts and the design of the formal control methods and presence of informal factors, it means that studying the experience itself of those individuals is needed. Epistemology explains how this knowledge will be better constructed. There are three major approaches within epistemology: post-positivism, interpretivism or constructivism. The JHAs are unique experiences lived by different individuals working in their respective organizations. They also represent two or more different cultures and the culture of the event owner organization who all have their own interests and experiences. Knowledge is then fluid, multiple and dependent on how it is experienced and made meaningful to each one of them. For this quest, the interpretivist approach will help the research to accomplish that, as it allows for appreciation

of differences between people’s experiences. We leaned on the Figure 21 to build our methodological process further.

Source: Hudson (2018)




Figure 21: Research paradigms and associated designs

2.2.2. Abductive reasoning approach

Just to recap our formulated questions derived deductively from the theoretical concepts under each phase:

1. Formation phase: What are the drivers and motives of JHA formation?
2. Management phase: What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?
3. Outcomes phase: What are the organizational learning outcomes of co-host collaboration?
What are the factors affecting organizational learning outcomes?

The way the answers are sought to these questions relies on abductive reasoning which implies the mix of deductive and inductive approach. This means that pre-determined theoretical assumptions guide the data interpretation, but also the room is left for the newly emerged data that could not

necessarily belong to one deduced assumption or the other. Moreover, abductive reasoning is applied within the case-studies to constantly go back and forth from theory to the data collection/analysis to produce the most relevant results that correspond the best to the experiences of the interviewees as well as the theoretical underpinnings (Dubois & Gadde, 2002 cited in Gerke, 2014).

2.2.3. Case study design

This section presents the case study design approach that is used all over this thesis. According to Yin's classification in his 2014 book (p. 50), case studies can be categorized into four fundamental design types. These include a holistic approach that focuses on a single case with a single unit of analysis (Type 1), an embedded design that examines a single case with multiple units of analysis (Type 2), a holistic design that encompasses multiple cases (Type 3), and an embedded design that involves multiple cases (Type 4).

The whole research project was divided into two studies: Study 1 and Study 2. Both studies have embedded design, meaning that the unit of inquiry is multiple alliance members, not a single co-host which would be a holistic design. **Study 1** employs *Type 4* multiple case study with embedded unit of analysis to have a panoramic view on different collaboration scenarios through inquiring all co-host members of single alliance. **Study 2** employs *Type 2* design which is single case study with embedded unit of analysis considering both of co-hosts of the event (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The combination of the two analyses will unveil the answers to the research questions across two governance levels: on macro level (institutional level) to have a panoramic view on different collaboration outcomes as well as on micro level to identify the Study 1 hypotheses as well as the intensity of ties through bigger sample (refer to figure 22 below for illustrating the context).





Figure 22. Thesis design with two levels of case studies

Source: author's own elaboration

2.2.3.1. Study 1 Multiple case study design



As co-host collaboration is a relatively new phenomenon within the field and therefore new academic research area, there is not enough theory generated on it. Organizational structure with regards to event hosting and its implications on collaboration of co-hosts was not

previously the area of the study either. According to Yin (1994), to develop a theory in early development stages and in such new real-life contexts is relevant through within-case and cross-case analysis using replication design. Therefore, in this thesis, there is a need to understand the way the organizational structure affects collaboration between the co-hosts across multiple events, the exploratory multiple case study design was chosen to be a relevant design approach to have a panoramic view of the way co-host collaboration is governed and configured in terms of structure and different outcomes that result from it. It is therefore able to test the existing theoretical

concepts in a new context and also generate the theory of its own (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The existing theoretical concept of Slack's (1997) on three structural dimensions needs to be consolidated through the theory building research and see whether they adapt to the current real-life contexts. Multiple case study is used to gain understanding of the relationships between the event owner and co-hosts and between the co-host themselves. The **embedded cross-case analysis** is applied (Stake, 2013) to look at multiple sub-units (co-hosts and event owner) situated within the larger case (each event).

The embedded multiple case study design allows theory development through either literal replication or theoretical replication logics (Yin, 2009). In the case of literal replication, the same results come out of each case which will allow to consolidate the theory. In the case of theoretical replication, different results will come out in each case which will allow to develop the theory further. Yin (2009)'s replication model to identify literal or theoretical types follows the steps as illustrated in Figure 23 below. It consists of the three main stages: 'define and design', 'prepare, collect, and analyze', and 'analyze and conclude'. In the first stage 'define and design', the identification of theoretical framework and the formulation of research questions are done. Also, the case selection criteria are established, and the cases are selected for the study. The following step is 'prepare, collect and analyze' involves the data collection for each case study and the generalization of the findings within the case. At this stage, the research design of the first case study is checked against the formulated theoretical framework for any adjustment before passing to the next case study. This should be done carefully so that further cross-case analysis can be

possible. The final step involves ‘analyze and conclude’ where the cross-comparison between all case is conducted. The conclusions and implication then follow the analysis.





Figure 23. Process model for case study method

Source: Borrowed from Yin (2009, p.57)

2.2.3.2. Study 2 Single case study approach



Yin (2009) among rationales for the case-study research names an extreme or unique case, representative case, critical case in testing a well-formulated theory, revelatory case or longitudinal study. Although the chosen single case study was not revelatory or extreme, it was quite representative and, in a way, longitudinal as the interviews were conducted in event preparation and post-event phase. **This single case study is also embedded** as the major sub-units of it are the co-hosts and the event owner that are studied within the one particular co-hosted sport event as a case. The choice for the single case study was also affected by

the access to participants and the access to archives, as well as the geographical proximity for one of the sub-units of the embedded single case study.

Multiple case study selection

The study investigates sports events that are co-hosted by two or several nations. The subject of this thesis are JHAs. The inclusion criteria for the events were designed to meet the purpose of a comparative case study analysis across different organizational structure backgrounds. To select relevant cases, the typology on centrality of events was created to place all possible events co-hosted by cities, regions and countries. Figure 24 below represents the logic behind the typology of events to monocentric and polycentric and sub-categories between them.




Figure 24. Event typology depending on its centrality.

Source: author’s own elaboration

Monocentric events are events that are held in a single host city. Such events are normally recurring for-profit events like Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) Masters or Formula 1 and non-profit like Grand Slams and Marathons. Such events in the past were held among one-off

non-profit monosport (World, Continental, national, local championships) and multisport events (Olympics). Due to the gigantism of the events the latter events acquire polycentric nature.

Polycentric events are all events held beyond the border of one host city. It could be events that are held within the borders of the same host nation or beyond. Today it is mostly observed in among one-off non-profit monosport (World, Continental, national, local championships) and multisport events (Olympics). Also, such context has always been relevant at the recurring for profit events like major cycling races that take places within the borders of one host nation: Tour de France and La Vuelta and now such events are going beyond the host nation context, i.e. Tour de France starts in Belgium and Germany. The polycentric events held within the border of one host country are denoted as (P1) and events expanding its borders outside are denoted as (P2). P2 type also has two subtypes which is events officially held in one host city or nation, but unofficially held elsewhere as well (P2a) and events which are officially held beyond one host country, by two or more host countries (P2b).

The focus of this research are therefore the events where the polycentric approach has been more relevant and rational due to the event requirements, which is monosport one-off non-profit event context, with the collaboration context between two or more countries (P2), which are highlighted in red in the figure 24 above. The choice was therefore made to create a table that includes all co-hosted events editions across polycentric (P2) context across P2a and P2b types in the last 2 decades, as this is when the phenomenon started to occur. The co-hosted event editions that met the inclusion criteria are from the following event owners: FIFA, UEFA, IHF, EHF, FIVB, CEV, FIBA, FIBA Europe, IIHF and ICC. Appendix A summarizes the qualified events from these event owners that we will be used as a point of reference to choose the cases. We took into consideration different factors such as diverse event owner, diverse sports, event type, host country representation and the access to the event to select our cases. We used qualified events as a basis to contact all these different events. We let those events that we would reach form this list to determine our final sample. In the timeframe of this research and feasibility, we could reach to participants from 11 co-hosted events that formed our 11 cases for Study 1 (see Table 13 below).

Table 13. Study 1 selected cases

Event owner	Type	Co-hosted event editions	Co-host countries
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UEFA	Continental	UEFA Euro Men – 2012	Ukraine and Poland
IHF	International	IHF Men World Championship – 2019	Denmark and Germany
EHF	Continental	EHF EURO Men – 2020	Sweden, Norway and Austria
		EHF EURO Men – 2022	Hungary and Slovakia
FIBA	International	FIBA World Cup Men – 2023	Indonesia, Japan and Philippines
FIBA Europe	Continental	FIBA Eurobasket Men – 2015	France, Croatia, Germany and Latvia
		FIBA Eurobasket Women – 2021	Spain and France
CEV	Continental	CEV Eurovolley Men – 2019	France, Netherlands, Belgium and Slovenia
IIHF	International	IIHF Men's World Championship Men – 2021	Latvia and Belarus
ICC	International	ICC Cricket World Cup Men – 2015	Australia and New Zealand
		ICC Cricket World Cup Men – 2019	England and Wales

Source: Author's own elaboration

Single case study selection

The choice for Study 2 fell on FIBA Eurobasket Women 2021. This study was designed to consider the future research suggestions and the limitations of Study 1. Although the chosen single case study was not revelatory or extreme, it was quite representative and, in a way, longitudinal as the interviews were conducted in event preparation and post-event phase. The choice for the single case study was also affected by the access to participants and the access to archives, as well as the geographical proximity for one of the sub-units of the embedded single case study. Figure 25 represents the chosen case for Study 2 from Study 1.

Study 1

Event owner	Type	Co-hosted event editions	Co-host countries
UEFA	Continental	UEFA EURO Men – 2012	Ukraine and Poland
IHF	International	IHF Men World Championship – 2019	Denmark and Germany
EHF	Continental	EHF EURO Men – 2020	Sweden, Norway and Austria
		EHF EURO Men – 2022	Hungary and Slovakia
FIBA	International	FIBA World Cup Men – 2023	Indonesia, Japan and Philippines
FIBA Europe	Continental	FIBA Eurobasket Men – 2015	France, Croatia, Germany and Latvia
		FIBA Eurobasket Women – 2021	Spain and France
CEV	Continental	CEV Eurovolley Men – 2019	France, Netherlands, Belgium and Slovenia
IHF	International	IHF Men's World Championship Men – 2021	Latvia and Belarus
ICC	International	ICC Cricket World Cup Men – 2015	Australia and New Zealand
		ICC Cricket World Cup Men – 2019	England and Wales

Study 2

FIBA Europe	Continental	FIBA Eurobasket Women – 2021	Spain and France
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


Figure 25. Study 2 case selection

Source: Author's own elaboration

The following chapters, Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 5 (Study 2), will introduce each study's design, methodology and findings respectively.

Chapter III. Organizational Learning Outcomes of Joint Hosting Alliances: A Comparative Case Study of 11 Co-Hosted Events

This chapter presents Study 1's full elements including introduction, theoretical framework, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion which will be then synchronized in **Chapter V - General Discussion and Conclusion** with the results of Study 2.

3.1. Introduction

Legacy is important for the hosts [...] In the case of an event that is co-hosted by 2 hosts or more, joint legacy is challenging, since this is a topic that each Host Association develops with its own resources and according to its own environment and priorities (I₁, Chief Executive Officer, UEFA Events)¹

Organizing mega multisport events such as the Summer and Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games has always been a burden for the host cities. With every new edition, the Games reached more significant size milestones in the number of sports disciplines, participants, venues, and, thus, costs. Chappelet (2014) described this phenomenon as the gigantism of the Olympic Games. The next-in-line mega-events are the FIFA World Cup and UEFA European Championship. Although they represent a single sport, they are considered the most popular monosport competitions as they attract many international audiences and generate significant economic activity (Taks, 2013b). Hosting mega events is a competition of its own as it allows countries to be part of the "select club," which means that they will be "at the heart of political and media attention" for a substantial period (Brun & Gomez, 2022, p. 47). Major events are equally high-profile spectacles for media on the lower ladder of mega-events, but they generate lesser economic activity. As in the case of football globalization, various sports such as basketball, volleyball, ice hockey, rugby, handball, and cricket became more democratized with time. Therefore, their events followed the tournament growth patterns. This latest proliferation of event gigantism across major events provoked the over-formalization of hosting requirements and increased hosting costs (Byun et al., 2019; Kelly et al., 2019). As a result, new hosting formats have emerged over the last few decades to retain the interest in hosting the events. The ISGBs started allowing host countries to go beyond the one-host country concept and to co-host the event with another nation.

Some ISGBs officially invited potential host countries to bid jointly for their events (e.g., FIFA World Cup 2026 by USA, Canada, and Mexico), and others opted to propose countries bid for separate event packages, ranging from the group stage to the finals (e.g., UEFA Euro 2020 by 13 European host cities), which results in joint hosting alliances (JHAs). Today, the co-hosting phenomenon is also widely practiced within most of the latest editions of trademark non-mega events (NMSEs), including the IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship, ICC Cricket World Cup,

¹ See Table 14 for the full list of interview participants

FIBA Europe EuroBasket, FIBA World Cup, EHF Handball Euro, IHF Handball World Cup, FIVB Volleyball World Championships, CEV Volleyball Eurovolley among others.

Child & Faulkner (1998) defined strategic alliances as partnerships between two or more organizations where learning occurs. Given this definition, co-hosted events can be regarded as strategic alliances, as multiple host organizations can influence each other in the alliance. Byun et al. (2019) encourage the exploration of organizational learning outcomes of joint bidding alliances. As joint bidding alliances eventually become hosting alliances in their lifecycle, we will refer to them as such throughout the rest of the thesis. While there have been studies on organizational learning in the hosting alliances between the organizations in the single-host event context (Malfas et al., 2004; Parent & Séguin, 2007), research needs to be done on whether the learning occurs for joint hosting partnerships, but also in NMSE context. Therefore, this study will fill in this research gap. Given the interconnectedness of IOR phases, we must understand all three phases of the alliance to see which factors from which phase affect the alliance outcomes. We restate our thesis research question here:

1. Formation phase: What are the drivers and motives of JHA formation?
2. Management phase: What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?
3. Outcomes phase: What are the organizational learning outcomes of co-host collaboration?

The following sections of this paper will cover the consideration of joint hosting partnerships as strategic alliances, organizational learning as main theoretical framework, qualitative methodology, results, discussion and conclusion of the study.

3.2. Theoretical framework

Theoretical framework of this study is based on the overarching theory on IOR and strategic alliance to place our JHAs within (see 4.2.1). As we are studying a particular aspect – management and outcomes, we will rely on specific concepts for management and outcomes. For the management we will apply Slack (1997)'s structural dimensions (see 4.2.2) and for the outcomes - organizational learning framework provided by Malo and Elkouzi (2001) (see 4.2.3).

3.2.1. Overarching theoretical framework: JHAs as strategic alliances

In the sport management literature, various sports and sport event partnerships can be described through network theory, IORs, and strategic alliances. Babiak and Willem (2017) define such partnership as “voluntary, close, long-term, planned strategic action between two or more organizations with the objective of serving mutually beneficial purposes in a problem domain” (p. 273). They also defined a network as “a skill-based partnership involving more than two partners.” The network is characterized by nodes (actors) that are connected through formal or informal mechanisms. Child and Faulkner (1998) defined strategic alliances as partnerships between two or more organizations where learning occurs. Following this definition, JHAs are considered strategic, given that the event owners continuously implement knowledge transfer processes (Parent, 2015). Moreover, Byun et al. (2019, 2020) research covered the formation part of the alliances, looking at the motivations of joint bidders and environmental/organizational factors that led to the formation of these alliances (Byun et al., 2019) and legitimation strategies used by joint bidders (Byun et al. 2020). The motivations discussed were accessing the partner's resources (such as financial, infrastructural, and knowledge), getting a competitive advantage through differentiation and reducing the potential threat of future competition. As for the drivers, there are two types of them, organizational and environmental (general and specific). The organizational drivers are related to the resource constraints, specific characteristics of the potential alliance members, their cultural and political fit, and their previous alliance experience (if any). The general environmental drivers include general environmental factors such as economic, political, sociocultural, demographic, legal, and technological. To provide an example, Kristiansen et al. (2016) explain that one of the significant reasons for the alliance formation between Austria and Lichtenstein to host the European Olympic Festival was their geographical proximity and existing political and economic bonds. The specific environmental factors include

customers/members/fans, suppliers, regulatory agencies, athletes' groups/staff and competitors. In the case of the alliance of Japan and Korea, co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, it was the decision of the regulatory agency to allocate the rights of the event to the two countries out of the inability to choose between the two (Heere et al., 2012b).

The literature suggests a research agenda to study such alliances' management and outcomes phases. For their management, the authors mentioned that factors that might affect it negatively include the lack of trust, incompatible goals, disagreements regarding resource allocation, and opportunistic behavior. The alliance literature says that these factors also then affect the outcomes.

In alliances where mutual goals are formed (reciprocity), the associated outcomes are more likely to happen (Gerke et al., 2018). In the case of the alliance between the Aquatic Federation of Canada (AFC) and an event delivery company Sport Internationals of Montreal (SIM), the lack of success was due to their divergent goals and false promises (Parent & Séguin, 2007). These goals are formed at the partnership's early stages, where the partners formulate the strategic plan. In trust-based and long-term partnerships, alliances are more strategic and collaborative, leading to outcomes such as knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Zhou et al., 2021).

Furthermore, in the study of Walzel and Eickhoff (2021) on social outcomes of co-hosted events, the authors concluded that the outcomes were more of the "side effects" rather than strategically leveraged outcomes such as 1) improvement of bilateral relationships between the hosts and the building of social capital, 2) increased social cohesion and 3) enhanced cultural awareness (p.5). This leaves a question as to whether the strategic planning stage is present at JHAs. According to Chalip (2004), the strategic planning approach at the early stages of the partnership is an essential factor that affects the implementation of the desired outcomes of the alliance, whether at the individual or alliance level. At this early stage, the goals are formulated, and "reciprocity" can be built. Therefore, one can see the apparent interconnectedness of alliance phases to achieve strategic social outcomes. This link is discussed in the study on the alliance between the OCOG and the satellite host cities to co-host the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 (Hoff et al., 2020).

Finally, in the frameworks of Byun et al. (2019) on joint bids as strategic alliances, studying organizational learning outcomes is encouraged to evaluate each partner's influence on one another. Organizational learning is also a part of the definition of the strategic alliance provided by

Child and Faulkner (1998) and, according to Parent (2006), the reason why such alliances can be formed.

If JHAs have been qualified as “strategic alliances,” organizational learning is at the core. Given the slight controversy in the literature regarding the lack of strategic action in such alliances and the significant lacuna in organizational learning outcomes, this research aims to fill this uncertainty.

3.2.2. Specific theoretical concept for the management: Structural dimensions

In this section we will focus on structural dimensions of Slack (1997) to help us understand theoretical underpinnings behind event delivery model. These three dimensions will explain why there are or are not certain dispositions that govern the delivery of the event and co-host collaboration. As formation affects the management and the management directly affects the outcomes, it is important to understand what is behind management that will affect the organizational learning outcomes. The following section on organizational learning also explains the importance of formal control methods and tools and their effect. We can learn more about these tools within this section (4.2.3).

3.2.2.1. Complexity: The governance of “complex” JHAs

One of the first dimensions that we will discuss is complexity. Amis and Slack (2016) defined the complexity of an organization as “the degree to which the work that is carried out is broken down and assigned to different sub-units or individual specialists”. This degree is also known as differentiation. The complexity refers to the horizontal, vertical and spatial differentiations. Horizontal one encompasses the task specialization and departmentalization, while vertical one refers to the number of levels “a matter should pass to be acted upon in the organization” (Slack, 1997) and we may reach “administrative efficiency” when we have minimum levels of such passage (ibid, 1997). Finally, spatial differentiation can occur as a form of vertical or horizontal differentiation, where tasks and powers can be separated geographically.

Complexity usually occurs when the organizations grow. It is usually addressed through creating appropriate additional structures, systems and rules and procedures (Slack, 1997). Therefore, there is an obvious correlation between complexity and formalization. Slack (1997) cited how task specialization affected the increase in standardization. Therefore, the greater the level of differentiation is, the more complex organization is. Complexity at the solo event context is

embodied through the presence of various functional areas of the LOCs (horizontal) as well as different specificities around ownership of the event (vertical). Spatial characteristics can occur when the event facilities are spread geographically across the city, region and the country. 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar is the example vertical differentiation. They opted for a centralized governance approach to have a central planning system such as Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy to better control the preparation and the delivery of the tournament across host locations.

Applying this to multiple host context, we may hypothesize that in multiple host organizing committees, the organization is complex to manage. As the tournament's participating team number increases (*horizontal*: more new roles and the new departments (liaison office) and therefore, *vertical*: more layers of management), the event requirements become more formalized. Spatial characteristics can occur when the event facilities are spread geographically across multiple cities, regions and countries. More complex event structures may have different managerial implications, including problems related to communication between the organizations and their members caused by added complexity.

3.2.2.2. Formalization: The formalization of (co)host behavior

The next dimension is formalization. Slack (1997) referred to formalization as “the extent to which mechanisms such as rules and regulations, job descriptions, and policies and procedures govern the operation of a sport organization. In a highly formalized organization, employees have little discretion over how and when they do their work. In an opposite situation, employees have freedom to exercise discretion about their work and how and when it is carried out.

The formalization in event context is embodied in the form of hosting agreements and contracts that a host city sign. The contracts guarantee the control that the event owner practices over the host cities (Kelly et al., 2019). This control is justified in a way that event owners need to ensure timely and budgeted organization of the event to protect the event brand (ibid, 2019). These highly formalized documents prescribe the hosts to form the LOC and focus on operational delivery of the event, which identifies their role in the whole event delivery process. The organizing committee in its event planning stage is headquarter-centered and therefore, at this stage the degree of formalization is high, as “it is during this period that strategic plans, rules, policies, and procedures are developed and anticipated changes can be planned.”

Some of the few advantages of formalization are the following: employee commitment and identification and therefore ethical culture, as there are tangible rules to abide by. Despite these advantages, the management literature discusses some important disadvantages related to formalization such as loss of employee's autonomy, constraint on the employee capacity to experiment, innovate or explore or to solve unexpected issues, and in its excessive form, minimal adherence to the rules or bureaucratic behavior, resistance to change, misperception of organizational goal etc. (Kelly et al., 2019 and Slack, 1997). The current research confirms the limited engagement of the LOC with its population and concludes that formalized requirements exclude the strategic thinking behind the mere hosting and do not include anything on broader functions to make their events more beneficial to the hosting communities (Kelly et al., 2019). To the date, no research has been found on how event owners prescribe behavior in the multiple host context and whether they include any engagement with the local community in their formalized requirements.

3.2.2.3. Centralization: decision-making within JHAs

The last dimension of structure, centralization refers to the "locus" of decision making (Amis & Slack, 2016). The organization is centralized if the decisions are made at the top, the organization is decentralized when they are delegated to the lower levels of management. The locus of decision-making in single host event context is usually the event board appointed by the event owner and comprised of the representatives of the main stakeholders: event owner and event organizer. Parent and Séguin (2007) referred to the composition of the Organizing Committee Board of the 2005 International Swimming Federation's (FINA) World Championships in Montréal, comprising of governments, Aquatic Federation of Canada and community members. In a multiple host environment, the event board Kristiansen et al. (2016) refer to the top management of the co-hosted Olympic Youth Festival as General Assembly that is comprised of the stakeholders of the two countries (their National Olympic Committees, sport ministries and regional administrative and sport authorities, city authorities and some private stakeholders).

Some factors that affect whether the decision-making is centralized or not are the following: the presence of the informal authority that discourages decentralization, management information systems as control mechanism of centralization, professionals and expert's positive effect on

decentralization (individuals who best understand the situation are given power to make decisions). These factors can be used within the analysis of co-host decision-making.

Parent (2010) was one of the first who theorized decision-making processes in LOC environment according to the event velocity. Findings show how decision-making is non-linear or not consistent over the event lifecycle because of the environment velocity that is characteristic to each cycle. Velocity is moderate at the planning and wrap-up stages and it is at its peak during implementation stage. Therefore, the event stakeholders are more likely to make more-informed and weighted decisions at the moderate or low velocity levels as opposed to immediate decision-making or even inability to make decisions on non-pressing matters during high velocity. Strategies used by organizing committee can be in place to ensure effective decision-making during the implementation stage by decentralizing decision-making to additional levels and by introducing more formalization to clarify the decision-makers and the deadlines.

3.2.3. Specific theoretical framework for the outcomes: Organizational learning

In this research, we chose organizational learning framework the discussion on the outcomes, as it was suggested by the previous research on event-hosting partnerships considered through strategic alliance lenses (Byun et al., 2019; Parent et al., 2009). According to Malo and Elkouzi (2001), organizational learning is the social process of individual interactions that aims to produce new organizational knowledge or know-how. It is classified into three types: intra-organizational (internal functioning of each partner), interorganizational (an increase of collaboration between the partners), and extra-organizational (development of the capacity to negotiate with other stakeholders). This learning framework by Malo and Elkouzi (2001) clearly describes three different levels in which organizations can influence each other. It has already been applied to study event delivery strategic alliance in NMSE context between AFC and SIM to deliver FINA Championship in 2005 (Parent & Séguin, 2007). As JHAs are another type of strategic alliances in the event context between different cultural, political, and administrative contexts, applying organizational learning is relevant to see how alliance the organizations influence each other in such contexts.

Malo and Elkouzi's (2001) framework facilitated the understanding of how intra and extra-organizational learning contributed to AFC and SIM successfully winning the rights to host the FINA Championship in 2005 thanks to the AFC's knowledge of FINA's expectations and

requirements (Parent and Seguin, 2007). For interorganizational learning, the improvement of ties and network is among the most common examples. This was observed in the case of Austria and Lichtenstein in co-organizing the Olympic Youth Festival (Kristiansen et al., 2016). Another example would be adopting the joint concept for sustainable development between Austria and Switzerland, co-hosting UEFA Euro 2008 (Lienhard & Preuss, 2014). In the case of extra-organizational learning, hosting the Athens Olympics facilitated the change in Greek legal frameworks in the creation of enterprises and public corporations (Malfas et al., 2004). However, no study has yet referred to extraorganizational learning in a JHA context.

The literature has acknowledged contributive factor to organizational learning, which is complementary strengths (Ahuja et al., 2008). In the organizational linkages with dissimilar skills, there is a higher rate of effective Research and Development (R&D) or innovation outcomes. Complementary strengths can be access to the resources that one nation can provide to another that does not possess them. In the JHAs, in the partnership between experienced and unexperienced nations to co-host the ICC World Cup, the latter ones were perceived as easier to work with compared to experienced nations where the decision-making processes were more complex as more people were involved (Mukanova, 2020). Therefore, although small nations benefit from access to bigger partners' technical resources to host the event, the bigger nations, in turn, can benefit from the willingness to compromise and the smoother management practices of smaller nations. This is an example of how organizations can complement each other.

Reviews also suggest that to achieve learning, relational norms should be in place (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). According to Hoff et al. (2020), formal control mechanisms (such as legally binding documents) and informal communication and commitment mechanisms (such as phone calls, emails, meetings, existing ties, and personal contacts) are implemented to motivate the partners to achieve the desired outcomes. These mechanisms bring order, stability, and effectiveness to the organization by determining how organization workers are supervised, how the different departments or teams' tasks are allocated, and how decisions are made. The control mechanisms will therefore be considered as a factor that positively affects the organizational learning outcomes in the strategic alliances. For example, extraorganisational learning was not possible in the AFC and MIS alliance due to ineffective knowledge transfer. The stakeholders carrying the specific knowledge were not involved in the formation of the organizing committee,

thus preventing the transfer and rendering the alliance unsuccessful. A formal control mechanism, formal contract could have avoided this (Parent & Séguin, 2007).

To summarize our choice of theoretical framework, Figure 26 below presents on a macro level, the framework that is based on strategic alliance literature and on a more specific micro level, structural dimensions and organizational learning on three levels.




Figure 26. Overarching and specific theoretical frameworks used in this research

Source: author's own elaboration

3.3. Methodology

To answer our research questions, we employed Type 4 typology of case study, which is multiple case study with embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2009). This design aims to gain a panoramic view of different organizational learning outcomes across different alliance contexts to fill the identified gap (Creswell, 2013; Naraine et al., 2016; Yin, 2009). Purposive (based on the events of interest) and convenience (timing and access) sampling strategies were utilized (Creswell, 2013; Naraine et al., 2016).

3.3.1. Case Study Settings

Non-profit, one-off, and monosport events on an international and continental scale

For this study, we obtained data from 11 co-hosted event editions of eight non-profit, one-off monosport events (Ferrand & Chappelet, 2015; Parent & Chappelet, 2015) on an international or continental scale. These 11 sports event editions are from four international and four continental championships. The international championships are IIHF Men's World Championship (1), ICC Men's World Cup (2), The FIBA Men's Basketball World Cup (1), and IHF Men's World Men's Championship (1). The continental championships are the UEFA Men's European Football Championship (1), the FIBA Men's and Women's European Basketball Championship (2), and The CEV Men's European Volleyball Championship (1), EHF Men's European Handball Championship (2).

3.3.2. Data Collection

Data collection stemmed from interviews and archival material, two sources of information for case studies (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2013). The inclusion criteria for participants were JHA members (the co-hosts) and the event owners as they are directly involved in organizational learning processes.

Before the data collection of this thesis the informed consent of interview participants was obtained. Therefore, the interview process was explained to them. At first a selection of potential interview participants was contacted from the typology of polycentric events (see Appendix A for P2 events). If participants were interested in participating, in a follow-up email potential interview partners were asked for a meeting or telephone call to conduct the interviews. If the interview

partner agreed to participate in the study, a video call meeting or telephone call was agreed upon. The interviewee received an information pack about the research project beforehand. The interview information pack contained two pieces of information: a participant information sheet and a consent form (Appendix B and C). The participant information sheet contains information concerning the subject and nature of the research as well as details about the data collection and analysis. It emphasized the voluntary nature of participation in the study. The interview guide was also provided by request or to make sure that the participant can provide the information on the topic. The interview guides were designed for event owners and Organizing Committees of co-hosted events (JHA members) in English, with the later one being reproduced in French. (See Appendix D, E and F respectively). The major questions discussed during the interviews were around these themes: role within the organization, individual and multiple host responsibilities, event owner responsibilities, frequency and types of collaboration with the co-host, challenges working with another co-host, joint legacy, etc.).

The final count of participants represented 24 different host nations, of which 82 % are from Europe and the rest from Asia and Oceania. As the data collection was conducted during the Coronavirus disease in 2019 (COVID-19) crisis, the semi-structured interviews (n=29) with the two main stakeholder groups were organized using Microsoft teams, Zoom, telephone, and email. An online version of the question guide was provided to some of the participants on request. Interviews lasted 37 minutes on average and were transcribed verbatim. An overview of the interviewees from each alliance is provided in Table 14 below.

Table 14. The list of co-hosted events and interview participants

Co-hosted event edition	JHA members	Interviewees
UEFA Euro 2012	Ukraine and Poland	Interviewee 1 (I ₁), Chief Executive Officer (CEO), UEFA Events I ₂ , Senior Manager (SM), LOC Poland
FIBA World Cup 2023	Indonesia, Japan and Philippines	I ₃ , EM, FIBA Basketball World Cup 2023 I ₄ , EM, LOC Indonesia I ₅ , EM, LOC Philippines I ₆ , SM, Philippines

FIBA Men's Eurobasket 2015	France, Croatia, Germany and Latvia	I ₇ , Managing Director (MD), FIBA Europe Properties I ₈ , SM, French Basketball Federation I ₉ , SM, LOC Croatia
FIBA Women Eurobasket 2021	Spain and France	I ₁₀ , Managing Director (MD), FIBA Europe Properties I ₁₁ , SM, French Basketball Federation I ₁₂ , Manager, Spanish Basketball Federation
CEV Men's Eurovolley 2019	France, Netherlands, Belgium and Slovenia	I ₁₃ , President, French Volleyball Federation I ₁₄ , SM, LOC France I ₁₅ , SM, Dutch Volleyball Federation I ₁₆ , EM, Flemish Volleyball Federation I ₁₇ , SM, LOC Slovenia I ₁₈ , EM, Slovenian Volleyball Federation
IIHF Men's World Championship 2021	Latvia and Belarus	I ₁₉ , SM, International Ice-Hockey Federation I ₂₀ , SM, International Ice-Hockey Federation I ₂₁ , SM, Latvian Ice-Hockey Federation
IHF Men's World Championship 2019	Denmark and Germany	I ₂₂ , EM, Danish Handball Federation I ₂₃ , SM, Sport Event Denmark I ₂₄ , EM, German Handball Federation
EHF Men's Euro 2022	Hungary and Slovakia	I ₂₅ , SM, Hungarian Handball Federation
EHF Men's Euro 2020	Sweden, Norway and Austria	I ₂₆ , EM, Swedish Handball Federation I ₂₇ , SM, Norwegian Handball Federation
ICC World Cup 2015	Australia and New Zealand	I ₂₈ , SM, LOC Australia
ICC World Cup 2019	England and Wales	I ₂₉ , MD, Cricket World Cup 2019

Source: Author's own elaboration

Archival data were used to triangulate with the interview data and to complement interview data if we did not have enough participants and did not reach saturation during interviews. We have collected and reviewed some of the governance documents of these events (e.g., event bidding requirements, bid evaluation reports, tournament requirements, post-event reports, official press

releases, event organizational structure schemes, and event websites). Eighteen documents, totaling 1142 pages, were analyzed. These documents ranged from one page to a 251-page document, depending on whether it was a single website page or the whole championship regulation document. For some of the events, the interview participants provided secondary data (such as bidding and tournament requirements and organizational structures). For the events where the data was not provided, the research team obtained them where possible. The average number of documents per event is two, and the average number of pages is 63. Overall, the archival material represents a limitation of the research because of the inconsistent access to documents, considering the different open access and confidentiality policies of event owners.

3.3.3. Data Analysis

Interview transcriptions were done either manually or through the Word transcribe feature in the online version by uploading the interview recording. See examples of transcript for I₂₅ for the alliance member perspective and I₃ for the event owner – Appendix G and H respectively).

The MAXQDA software facilitated the qualitative data analysis regarding coding and the retrieval of data. The research team followed the top-down approach to analyzing data and conducted what is called “deductive thematic analysis” or “theory-driven data analysis” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 83). The transcribed interviews and documents were analyzed against the codes derived from the theoretical framework. First-order themes are IOR major phases (formation, management, outcomes) to structure all the other sub-codes under and to be able to easily answer our research questions across all three phases. Second order themes are Structural dimensions of Slack (1997) and Malo and Elkouzi’s (2001) organizational learning typology), as well as the codes from the literature review on different factors that positively affected organizational learning (e.g., complementary strengths, dissimilar skills, relational norms, etc.) or those that affected negatively the organizational learning (e.g., competing alliance members, lack of relational norms, etc.), that we included within those themes. Creswell (2013) encourages inductive coding to accompany the deductive process. Through this coding, the primary researcher identified new emergent codes within factors that could affect organizational learning (managerial and national context factors). (See Appendix I for the number of codes under each IOR phase and each major sub-codes of each phase)

3.4. Results

For the results section, the best way to organize them was to present this section starting from outcomes which will answer our third research question “What are the organizational learning outcomes of co-host collaboration?”. The rest of the results will be presented in the forms of factors affecting collaboration and the learning deriving from alliance formation and management. This will answer our first and second research questions, which are “What are the drivers and motives of JHA formation?” and “What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?” respectively.

3.4.1. Outcomes

3.4.1.1. Cross-case intraorganizational learning results

The intraorganizational learning level is the first individual host level. As for the learning here, the participants referred to all the improved aspects on the individual level of each co-host. The dominant forms were capacity building, network expansion, individual milestone achievement, and event leverage.

a) *Capacity building*

For capacity building, the learning about cross-country management and cultures and the idea exchange that could or could not result in the actual implementation of shared ideas were found. For their cross-country management learning, I₂₇ (Norway) shared that “it's very interesting [...] to get to know other nations and how they function”. Idea exchange was highlighted by I₂₄ (Germany):

They have a so-called agency for international events which [...] helps the federations organize the events [...]. We are planning to have that in the future in Germany. That would be the opportunity to organize the events on a little bit higher level.

b) *Expansion of personal network*

These findings represent how co-hosts built a strong relationship with their co-host that lasted beyond the event organization. I₂₄ (Germany) said, “So if there are some questions considering the International Federation, some new rules, [...], the last World Championship in Egypt [...] about the coronavirus [...] I call (*sic*) my colleague from Denmark more often than others.”

I₂₇ (Norway) expressed that:

I feel like we've gotten closer [...] if I need something or I want to [...] have someone's opinion, I now have a lot of persons I can call and ask for opinions in both Austria and Sweden [...] and also in the EHF.

c) Learning about cultures/changes in attitudes

I₂₇ (Norway) found similarities with a country they did not expect to be culturally similar, “we were kind of more culturally [...] similar with the Austrians than the Swedes [...]”. While I₂ (Poland) found more differences working with their co-host, “there were more differences and divergences than links and bonds [...] but [...] this is reality. This is the history between the two countries. So, it had an impact.”

d) Reaching individual milestones

I₁₃ (France) answered that they had managed to reach their own goal as a national sports governing body (NSGB) “Our legacy objective was that volleyball is better than before, and we succeeded.”

3.4.1.2.. Cross-case interorganizational results

When it comes to interorganizational learning, the findings demonstrate the following elements: as a more meaningful interaction, true collaboration, and a joint effort. The results demonstrate two categories of interorganizational learning: mimicking behavior and collaboration in the framework of bidding, event preparation, and the organization of auxiliary events.

a) Mimicking each other's practices

The mirrored/mimicked practices appear as a dominant form of that learning. Usually, the practices are mimicked by one co-host when the other co-host is experienced in that practice or area or when the co-host does not have the required resources to develop those practices. Due to their experience, knowledge, and current practice, I₁₅ (Netherlands) advised Slovenia and France to organize the event by involving a promoter agency. I₂₇ (Norway) adopted its strategy from Sweden, which had the main responsibility for the event (e.g., marketing and communication strategy). I₁₆ (Belgium) explained their mimicking practice to the lack of HRs at their Local Organizing Committee (LOC), “we didn't have a full time in charge for communication, so we were building on the communication planning of the Netherlands.”

b) Event bidding and preparation collaboration

The collaboration as part of bid preparation and after the allocation of rights was the major joint efforts between co-hosts that came out of the results. For the I₁₃ (France), one of the most memorable joint efforts of the alliance was the joint bid, “we built the candidature file together [...] it is the work of many years”. For the I₁₆ (Belgium), it was the activity that they did as part of the event preparation that was the strongest joint effort, “the sports presentation has been developed together with four countries [...], so it was really a very strong cooperation between the co-hosts.” Similarly, for I₂₁ (Latvia), the only activity where two countries exchanged the most was the mascot “I would say the biggest or the main or maybe [...] the only common activity were (*sic*) competition for the mascot.” For I₁₂ (Spain), the collaboration went beyond tournament preparation, and it was sports-related auxiliary event:

We have been collaborating in the sport way because we automatically classified to [...] the EuroBasket. So, we played two friendly matches [...] So it's you help me, I help you. You come to Spain to play. I go to France to play.

3.4.1.3.. Cross-case extraorganizational learning results

As for the extraorganizational level, the findings rely on the success of the co-host alliance to reach milestones for the sport (e.g., increasing spectatorship and popularity of women’s sport, winning awards for the events) and institutionalize certain practices for the event.

a) Reaching milestones for the sport/for the event

According to I₈ (France), their alliance reached the highest number of spectators in this event, “FIBA told us that we did extraordinary work and there had never been as many spectators.” In the CEV Eurovolley event, I₁₄ (France) shared that they had “the award of the CEV Event of the year.”

b) Institutionalizing practices

According to I₂₆ (Sweden), their event’s sustainability initiative is institutionalized for the next editions of the event: “they have received from the EHF a document describing the requirements of how to operate their event with a focus on sustainability.” Similarly, the same alliance between Sweden, Austria and Norway, has persuaded the event owners to change their requirements “we also succeeded in receiving the responsibility of the merchandise sales in all countries and in all venues,” said I₂₆. Moreover, for the ICC World Cup 2015, “an innovative joint tourism visa for Australia and New Zealand was implemented for the first time as a direct result of the event” (PWC, 2015, p.7).

3.4.2. Factors affecting collaboration and organizational learning outcomes

Findings under the following sub-sections will help us answer our first and second research questions, which are “What are the drivers and motives of JHA?” and “What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?” respectively.

3.4.2.1. Alliance formation factors

Alliance formation factors answer research question 1 of this thesis on how these various alliances were formed. They were found to have a big impact on whether there will be further interaction and collaboration between the alliance members in the management stage, affecting their organizational learning outcomes.

a. Access to resources

Access to resources is one of the key sub-factors that facilitated organizational learning on the intra-organizational level. The resources the alliance members had access to were tangible (financial, infrastructure) and intangible (knowledge, votes). Most respondents agreed that it allowed them to share the hosting costs, making the event affordable for their country. According to I₁₁ (France). “It costs a lot to organize the event. We are obliged to pay a big bill for the organization. If we divide it by two, it is okay ». For I₂₈ (Australia), the lack of the availability of venues, due to them being booked for other events, made them consider working with New Zealand for the ICC World Cup 2015: “The number of venues [...] required to deliver the event along with [...] conflicting bookings for venues [...] dictated the fact that there needed to be two countries [...] to host this event.” I₂₄ expressed how Germany lacked know-how in organizing international handball events, so their motive was to have access to such resources from their alliance partner, “Denmark was a lot more experienced in organizing major handball events, women's handball and men's, both for euros and World Championships. So, we learned a lot from them.” The participant also mentioned indirectly another resource that Denmark provided them access to (the votes to win the event rights):

The chance to get the event is a lot higher if you make it jointly because then you have the vote of the other country and [...] of [...] the friends of the other country. And this was the clever idea from our side to make it together with Denmark, because if we would have gone on our own way, I think we would not have organized the event at all.

b. Pre-existing ties

Some of the alliances were formed based on their pre-existing ties (political, sporting, geographical) which may underline trust in another member. I₁₂ (Spain) explained their ties with France on the sports performance level, “I think we couldn't have bid with another country because you need trust in the other partner and France is the only one. The only federation in European women’s basketball that can match up in (*sic*) our level.” For the I₂₉ (England and Wales), their sport ties are already formalized by being the members of the same cricket board, “actually it wasn't a Wales or Glamorgan, Cardiff form part of the England and Wales Cricket Board so they play cricket in the England domestic setup. So effectively it wasn't a joint bid between the two countries to secure the World Cup. They've always been part of the England and Wales Cricket Board.” Hungary and Slovakia were part of the political union according to I₂₅, “we have a historical and sports event organization history together with Slovakia [...] the Visegrad four, which means that Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have many, many cultural, sports related joint activities.”

c. Reducing competition

At least three alliances admitted their formation on the grounds of reducing the bidding competition. I₄ (Indonesia) explained that the alliance between them, Japan and Philippines for the FIBA World Cup was born out of the single bid proposals, “at first, we have our own proposal, and then at the very last stage we combine the proposal and we move as one.” It was a similar context for the alliance between Sweden, Austria and Norway for EHF Euro 2020 “the collaboration was a project of politics, really. We applied for championships separately, but then realized that it would be better for all of us if we joined together” according to I₂₆ (Sweden). I₂₁ (Latvia) also expressed on this subject:

We realized that only Latvia wouldn't take enough votes in the IIHF Congress. Belarus participated as one of the possible hosts and my colleagues did a big research and realized that Belarus will not get enough votes, so we offered them to be their co-hosts [...].

d. Regulatory agency’s agendas

Regulatory agencies, also known as event owners, are driving joint bid alliances with their favorable attitude to such an approach or due to their tournament/sport growth agendas. I₂₅ (Hungary) has explained that “the European Handball Federation is really supporting joint bids to

be able to spread the handball euro event all around the continent. They want to make [...] top level handball available for as many people as possible.” In the European volleyball context, I₁₈ (Slovenia) also forged their alliance with three other nations after CEV’s tournament expansion, “[...] after CEV changed the format of the European Championships and gave the possibility to organize an event in four countries, we started to talk with some potential co-organizers to join forces and organize Eurovolley 2019.”

3.4.2.2. Managerial factors

Most of the findings on the managerial factors are described through formalization, centralization and complexity dimensions, describing to which degree they affect co-host collaboration and learning. We will learn the complexity of event delivery in the JHA who is behind formalization of joint host alliance relations and what areas specifically are formalized and finally how centralized are the alliance matters.

a. Complexity

The organizational structures of the organizing committees of co-hosted events are complex as the degree to which event delivery is broken down and assigned to two or more co-hosts. All three types of differentiation evoked under Slack’s complexity (1997) are intertwined as it involves growth in terms of unit of organization that has different geographical delimitation. As the event delivery is realized at different locations, the discussion will be led through spatial differentiation lenses. The events have spatial differentiation horizontally, which means the organization tasks are in different locations. Each of the LOC’s tasks are to host their part of the matches. However, the major event functions are mirrored at each LOC, so they are not lacking essential functions for which they depend spatially on another LOC.

Such horizontal differentiation requires identically skilled event personnel on different levels at each location. In certain circumstances, the alliances depend on HRs of each other, when the HR calendars or resources are not the same at each location, but the tasks need to be performed:

We didn't have a full-time in charge for communication. We had the full time starting one month before the event, so it's too late to really organize very well [...]. So, we were building on the communication planning of the Netherlands. (I₁₆, Belgium).

Spatial differentiation was also manifested vertically, which means that different levels of organization are dispersed geographically. This is the case for alliances, when their hierarchy (i.e. ISGB) is located elsewhere than their host city or country. Such vertical spatial differentiation is usually manifested when the main LOC or head office supervises the activities of other LOCs in one host country. In the JHAs, it is either ISGB who supervises the activities being headquartered somewhere else or there is a leading co-host that supervises from its headquarters.

The presence of the additional layer in the structure that supervises the activities of all host cities (e.g. Steering/Management Committee) that is comprised of all the JHAs members at most of the events. For I₂₄ (Germany) “We had the top organizing committee [...]. There was the President of the two federations, the Secretary Generals and the project manager of the World Championships from both sides. And one person from the ISGB.” For the FIBA World Cup, I₃ (FIBA) explained:

Additional level of HR is sometimes recruited to coordinate each host and the activities between the ISGB and the alliance members (e.g. Liaison office, host country manager etc.). For the event with four co-hosts, I₁₀ (FIBA Europe) implemented the following “We [...] assign in our organization one event manager who is responsible for each host. So we have four event managers [...].”

Sometimes, the additional layer of hierarchy can be the leading co-host partner who is usually hosting the major part of the event, who is an experienced host or one of the top-ranking host in that sport. It was the case for ICC World Cup 2015: “marketing and public relations was run out of the Australian office. They still had a counterpart at New Zealand, but the strategy, the delivery was all run out of Australian office.” (I₂₈, Australia)

The balanced decision-making is found at those events, where the number of their matches hosted is balanced:

I think what ISGB did was really interesting because all four countries had a group stage and then each country had two games of eight final [...] The organizer really got more feeling that you really co-host the event, not only one small stage. (I₁₇, Slovenia).

b. Formalization

The formalized policies and procedures that govern the operation of a joint hosting organizing committee can be divided into two main types: the ones deriving from the ISGB and the others

deriving from the alliance members. One of the main documents prepared by the ISGB to govern the event delivery is bidding requirements (to qualify for hosting) and hosting agreements (to deliver the event) that are usually either signed with each co-host or signed by multiple parties simultaneously. Some co-hosts also sign their own agreements after allocation of rights that discusses what is not included in the main agreement, in particular the distribution of roles and budget-related matters. For (I₂₂, Denmark), they had additional inter-partes agreement to distribute the money coming from IHF and assign responsibilities among co-hosts:

[...] we do have this inter partes agreement between Germany and Denmark[...] Because you have some money coming from the International Federation to support the championship, who is going to have this money? Is it Germany or is it Denmark and how are we going to split this? [...]what kind of expenses and costs are related to the cooperation [...].

In the occasion where such contracts do not exist, simply the common budget is established that identifies the financial contribution of each co-host and their common expenditures. The importance of such contract is highlighted by some cultures as the result of regular joint hosting. For certain cultures, such contract is not always necessary if you trust your partner:

[...] because of the historical background and the good cooperation with the Slovakian Federation and in the Slovakian federation, there are some Hungarian people as well in the leadership [...] we have a mutual understanding of each other and that's why it was not necessary to have a contract. (I₂₅, Hungary).

Formalized areas of collaboration

Common event responsibilities then lead to the elaboration of the common budget that is usually proportionate to each co-hosts' event participation. This budget is used only for activities related to the delivery of those areas such as marketing, sports presentation, ticketing, communication, scheduling and logistics. The examples of common costs are as follows: developing presentation and video for the bidding, developing the event identity, the mascot, logo and anthem, organizing side events (draw, officials conference or clinics for the referees), booking the charter flights between the host cities or the flight tickets for the event owner staff.

I₂₇ (Norway) has collaborated with their co-host as stipulated in the contract “we did the official conference and the draw for the preliminary rounds and [...] for the qualification rounds. They are all part of part of the contract with the EHF.” For I₂₅ (Hungary), the event owners “were really keeping it on the organizational level.” I₁₇ (Slovenia) highlights the role of the event owner in giving those collaboration initiatives, “CEV didn't give us any initiative from their side.” I₃ (FIBA) reassured that the learning may be prescribed or recommended as part of the formal programs at their federation, “It will be driven by FIBA, by our foundation. And it's something that all three host nations will relate to.”

These joint responsibilities sometimes are shared jointly with the event owner. In different event delivery models, where event owner has more control, event owners take the responsibility on branding of the event, event scheduling, ticketing as these areas sometimes need central coordination or they are bound to partnership contracts of the event owner. Consequently, in such events, the decision-making is more centralized.

c. Centralization

The decision-making within the event delivery is centralized by default as ISGBs control many activities and the co-hosts abide to formalized rules and procedure just like in the solo hosting scenario. However, there are decentralization factors that allow co-hosts to be delegated certain decisions depending on the event delivery model. The decisions that are more likely to be decentralized are local matter related as the hosts are the most competent to decide what is best for them. Therefore, certain decisions like legacy planning are a decentralized task not a joint or not a centralized task. The leading co-host, as mentioned in the paragraph on vertical differentiation in Complexity, can have certain stakeholder salience among the co-hosts and the event owner that could allow the alliance to deviate from the formalized requirements or affect the joint decision-making.

Findings disclose that the locus of joint decision-making varies in JHAs based on two factors: political-administrative context and LOC setup, configured by the hosting National Federations (NFs). As JHAs involve different governmental systems, the highest decision-making authority can vary within the alliance members. In the highly centralized contexts and non-democratic regimes, the decisions that could affect the country's image, the government's approval are extreme: the approval would be more likely to be sought even for lower management decisions that

would slow the process or on the contrary, decisions would not go through the full circle and be quick. When the alliance is comprised of the countries with opposite regimes, joint decision-making can be affected where one party must wait for another. When alliance is comprised of the identical regimes, the collaboration is smoother:

The second factor, the LOC setup is affected by the size of the federation and political-administrative system and hosting capacity as well. The LOC setups identified within various alliances are the following: events department within NSGB, a subsidiary of the hosting NSGB in charge of the event, an event agency contracted to organize the event. On the top management level, the representation within alliance is usually identical, however on the lower management level, the staff at each hosting LOC may be heterogeneous given the chosen LOC setup. Therefore, in the alliances that are comprised of the LOCs configured differently within their host country, the decision-making is affected and therefore the ties between the people.

3.4.2.3. Other factors that have affected collaboration and organizational learning: national context factors

National context factors, although could be attributed to alliance formation section, it deserved a separate group of its own, because there were quite a few illustrations ways in which national context could limit collaboration and therefore potential learning opportunities for the alliance members. Additionally, we could not fully attribute it to formation factors, as these experiences were observed while collaborating with co-hosts. These sub-factors could have both positive and negative effects under different circumstances. Examples will be demonstrated under quotations below.

a. Culture

For some co-hosts, it was easy to work with culturally similar countries. For I₂₆ (Sweden) it was the case, “It was three countries with almost the same cultures [...] the standard of the countries is almost the same [...] the financial situation, the national economic situation [...]. For others, it was the opposite: “although we are bordering countries, what we found was there were more differences and divergences between us than links and bonds [...] so it had an impact [...] sometimes you know it clashed”, according to I₂ (Poland).

b. Internationalization attitudes

Socio-economic differences at national level can lead to the lack of legacy-related collaboration. I₁₅ (Netherlands) explained “we (sic) extremely internationally oriented, so we don't need those kinds of events for this. For Slovenia, it would really be a thing [...] France is a big economy and they don't care so much [...]”.

c. Decision-making styles

National/cultural differences in public administration and decision-making highlighted this section of factors. I₂ (Poland) has testified that “in Ukraine, a decision took several seconds and in Poland several weeks. This was the divergence[...].” Similarly, I₂₁ (Latvia) shared their decision-making differences with Belarus: “the example like such a small thing as a mascot for the event and the name of the mascot needed to be approved by the President of the country [...] A lot of processes went slower than it could be [...] We could make decisions in Riga like within few minutes, between a few people. At their side, they needed to go through a lot of cabinets [...].”

d. The level of government support

Finally, how different co-hosts and their LOCs are financially supported differs depending on national current agenda and priorities. This played a role in their level of event preparation, collaboration and willingness to collaborate and go beyond the event “rule book”. For I₂₅ (Hungary), their counterpart the Slovakian federation was on different level of support “they are supported by the local government, which means that we have different opportunities, and it would be not wise to combine it and force them to be involved in any kind of activity where they don't have the financial background.”

For I₅ (Philippines), it was the question of national priorities and changes in government. “It would be bad timing for us to request our government for money when we should be more concerned on how to address the health issues of the country because of the pandemic [...]” Besides, the Philippines were not sure how the situation would have turned out after the election “we'll know more once the newly elected government officials are known to us”.

Finally, France had to do all the initiatives targeting their population. “Legacy is something to do individually by each country [...]. In France when we have government's funding [...] there is an obligation do the legacy projects related to the general public of our state” said I₁₃.

e. Changing staff in the co-host LOC

Changing staff in the LOC can be political as these projects are funded by the government and people are appointed. This can affect the continuous changes of staff in the LOC. For example, for I₂₁ (Latvia) what made it complicated was the staff from the federation in Belarus “some of the employees in the federation changed four times. So, we did some job with one team, then it changed. Then you started [...] almost from the beginning [...].

3.5. Discussion

Our results reveal significant data on how alliance members engage into organizational learning activities and under which factors. This study contributed to research by providing specific examples of types of organizational learning under different conditions.

We learned that organizational learning varies from alliance to alliance, however some common tendencies were observed. Overall, all the organizational learning results correspond to the formalized areas of collaboration between co-hosts, highlighting the importance of formal tools in establishing collaboration framework (common functional areas (FAs)).

This study has confirmed some of the factors previously discussed in the literature review with some new emerging contextualization. Trust, for example, remains an important factor that affects collaboration between the co-hosts and without which certain types of learning might not be possible. However, not all types of learning are dependent on this factor and might still be achieved thanks to the activities within the hosting (e.g. mimicking practices). This reality weakens the full correlation argument between organizational learning and trust, evoked by Zhou et al. (2021) and Byun et al. (2019). Their argument is that trust is crucial when there is mutual dependence of resources in alliances. Our study shows that there is no mutual dependence as such on such resources in JHAs, although they depend on the other host to organize their part of the tournament. This can explain why trust is not crucial for achieving learning outcomes, thus adding new data on trust and organizational learning relation (Byun et al., 2019, 2020). Trust also affects the formalization of the relationship between co-hosts. Some co-hosts simply collaborate by trusting each other due to established ties, others formalize their actions, regardless established ties, as there is money distribution and responsibilities involved. This can be attributed to culture and to event delivery model of each ISGB (if they contribute to the event organization financially or not).

Cultural differences can affect the overall collaboration experience of co-hosts, but learning outcomes are still possible. In the alliance between Poland and Ukraine to co-host UEFA 2012 Euro, the two heads of the tournament at each location experienced cultural clash working together. Nevertheless, they still collaborated daily, mimicked each other's practices and worked on joint initiatives, which resulted in interorganizational learning outcomes between them. However, we learned that different cultural or political-administrative approaches would be an obstacle to the learning. The differences in political administration between Belarus and Latvia affected the HR practices of the LOCs (e.g. constant change of staff) and the decision-making differences within the government which hindered the knowledge transfer. However, it did not prevent Latvia from achieving intraorganizational learning when gaining the rights to host the event by joining forces

with Belarus. Therefore, with such differences, intraorganizational learning is most of the time possible.

Additionally, the literature mentioned that incompatible goals may negatively affect the alliance (Parent & Séguin, 2007). Our study showed that alliance members can still achieve learning regardless of pursuing non reciprocal goals. Nonetheless, this can affect the degree of learning and the typologies of learning between the members. For example, at the co-hosted edition of the CEV Eurovolley 2019 (France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Slovenia), each alliance member had its own objective. France aimed to legitimize volleyball in the country, whereas the Netherlands organized this tournament to enrich their event portfolio further. However, this alliance managed to achieve extraorganizational learning (win the CEV award for the Event of the year).

This example represents non-strategic organizational learning outcomes. Nevertheless, the closer the goal alignment is, the more likely outcome of more strategic interorganizational and/or extraorganizational learning opportunities. Therefore, our findings align with those of Walzel and Eickhoff (2021) which confirm the lack of strategic formulation of goals in co-hosting alliances and the presence of more “side-effect” outcomes.

Most of the results confirmed the importance of having dissimilar skills to obtain intra and interorganizational learning. In the vertical structure between co-hosts, where members include more experienced and unexperienced co-hosts, the learning is likely to happen in the form of sharing of experience and benchmarking the strategies. Some alliances like Poland and Ukraine did not provide each other with complementary strengths, so both lacked experience in major event hosting, which could have affected their capacity to transfer different types of knowledge to each other. For the EuroBasket’s duo, Spain and France are two nations both equally good in their sport and experienced in organizing such events. Therefore, whilst not having dissimilar skills in this matter, this affected their capacity to transfer knowledge to each other. However, they had a mutual goal to make women’s basketball more visible. In the flatter structure between co-hosts, where members exhibit similar characteristics or equal participation, the cumulative stakeholder salience of alliance leads to more extraorganizational learning which can be advantageous to advocate the alliance rights before the event owner requirements. In the alliance of opposing co-host characteristics, intraorganizational learning in the form of intercultural awareness is possible.

Finally, in the EHF Euro alliance between Sweden, Austria and Norway, the level of experience between co-hosts was heterogeneous, Austria and Norway mirrored practices (e.g. communication, marketing and sustainability) of the most experienced host in the alliance, Sweden, which resulted in interorganizational learning for Austria and Sweden. Moreover, this interorganizational learning has facilitated extraorganizational learning (further institutionalization of the sustainability strategy for future editions of this event).

Formalization due to its “obliging” or “recommending” power can have dual effect on collaboration and learning. The example of positive effect was formalized FIBA’s Foundation social development projects as suggested legacy project for the co-hosts of FIBA World Cup. However, just as formalized tools can facilitate the learning by prescribing it (like in the example above), it may prevent innovative behavior of the alliance members. For example, FIBA Europe formalized meetings for the two co-hosts of Women’s Eurobasket 2021. This might have prevented informal, improvised, more regular cross-team meetings where more of the organizational learning could have occurred. Lastly, the co-hosts can also develop themselves these formalized tools, which can prescribe the learning on all three levels. Norway and Denmark co-hosting IHF World Championship 2019 developed the first of its kind bilateral contract (inter-partes agreement) to establish a collaboration framework. This enabled them to have trust. By formalizing collaboration, either event owners or alliance members create more platforms for interorganizational learning.

The current findings confirm the negative effects of complexity on communication suggested in the theoretical framework, however, they demonstrate that ISGBs take measures such as additional hierarchical levels, additional specialized HR to accommodate this complexity.

As for centralization, the results confirmed the presence of the decentralization factors such as the delegation of decision-making to professional and experts. Co-hosts are indeed experts when it comes to their own community, that is why decisions concerning event operations or legacy planning are decentralized.

3.6. Conclusion

3.6.1. Contributions and managerial implications

This study contributes theoretically and practically to the subjects of management and outcomes of JHAs. It allowed us to answer all research questions on formation, management and outcomes, comparing different cases. More globally, this study contributes to the research body of event management, organizational theory and IORs, in particular to the link between organizational structure and organizational learning. It allowed us to see the gaps of this approach.

It confirmed certain theoretical underpinnings and brought more illustration through JHA examples to the concepts of organizational structure and organizational learning. It is one of the first studies that empirically tests eleven co-hosted event editions across eight different sport events. What this study contributes to the research body of IOR management and outcomes it is not just event owners that have discretion to design organizational structure for CBMHOCs. The event organizers designing the joint management scheme and their own LOC locally lead equally to organizational learning outcomes. The degree to which each actor is responsible is an important contribution of this research. Practical managerial implications for both event owners and alliance members (co-hosts) aim to bring awareness of different factors that affect learning outcomes as well as recommendations to follow to maximize positive outcomes.

3.6.1.1. Managerial implications for the event owners

a. The effect of event size on co-host collaboration

The size of the tournament (the number of participating teams) affects the potential number of co-hosts that can co-deliver the event and therefore potential packages that the event owner will propose to the organizers. The bigger the event, the more packages are available. In the event of packages with unequal distribution of match hosting, it affects the co-host stakeholder salience in the partnership which can affect the collaboration dynamics and therefore organizational learning typologies.

b. The effect of separate event packages on co-host collaboration

Already formed joint bids have a higher probability of alignment as due diligence is already done with regards to choosing the hosting partner. Separate package bidders have less chance of

alignment with other allocated co-hosts. If separate package bidding is still in place, there are ways that event owners can mitigate co-hosting partnership risks.

c. Structural tools effect on co-host collaboration

Different structural solutions can take place to mitigate the power mismatches within joint roles and decision-making such as specialized HR coordination mechanisms (e.g. liaison office/specialist) and tools such as formalized rules and regulations that would include procedures with regards to co-hosting (good practices, tips, ethical code etc.) and other tools like CSR platform or other collaborative tools. We learned that structural design is not a matter that is solely realized by event owners. Alliance members have full discretion when it comes to choosing their joint management scheme and the setup of their own LOC, which can equally affect the organizational learning outcomes. The event owners, given their hierarchical position, can always introduce additional organizational mechanisms to foster collaboration through their organizational control tools.

d. Formalization and legacy

Moreover, if the event rights owners are interested to ensure continuous interest in bidding and hosting of their events, they must consider the benefits to community and therefore formalization of legacy as they formalize and standardize the event delivery processes, that could induce more types of organizational learning (interorganizational and/or extraorganizational).

3.6.1.2. Managerial implications for the event organizers

a. Co-host match-up

If bidding jointly, choosing the right co-host is essential taken into consideration geographical, cultural, administrative, financial, sporting and even hosting context in consideration.

b. Goal alignment

Once the co-host is chosen, goal alignment is important that could help to define collaboration vision, mission and goals to achieve. This will help in perception (performance evaluation) of alliance success. Being aware of the hosting objective is important, which will help to be transparent in the collaboration with another co-host.

c. Strategic thinking behind co-host collaboration

Leveraging unique context of co-hosting can be noteworthy for co-hosts looking for ways to maximize their event benefits together for their sport, organization and host communities (interorganizational and extraorganizational learning), as multiple host context may present a unique opportunity for hosts to collaborate and create potential for social capital (Walzel & Eickhoff, 2021).

d. LOC setup effect on co-host collaboration

LOC setup can also set the tone of the collaboration experience and therefore interorganizational learning between the alliance members. Adapting similar LOC setups locally can smoothen the communication and decision-making processes. If the setups are different, being able to align the LOCs through alternative mechanisms could be considered.

e. Devote bidding and post-event stage for leveraging your co-host partnerships

Making decisions in high velocity environment can be with regards burning matters only. The same for thinking of joint projects (interorganizational and extraorganizational learning). Therefore, this explains why issues beyond the operational questions may be beyond the scope of the co-hosts and why there is no formalizing of such initiatives, as this implies costs and responsibility.

3.6.2. Study limitations and future study suggestions

There are a few limitations to consider. As for the theoretical limitations, the structural dimensions of Slack (1997) were too overarching to frame this research. The dimensions allowed for understanding of why JHAs were designed in a certain way, but the future research should focus on a particular aspect of organizational structure such as complexity, centralization or formalization or even more detailed concepts within them such as locus of decision-making, differentiation or discretion to do things, to explore the issues mentioned in a more structured manner. To conclude, future studies should examine individual factors affecting a particular typology. This will give practitioners and researchers clear prerequisites for pursuing a desired organizational learning outcome. Focusing on type(s) of organizational learning or different outcomes with particular focus on diplomatic, political, environmental outcomes could be also enriching.

Methodologically, the lack of organizational learning examples across some events can be explained by the inconsistent access we had to participants (e.g., ICC World Cup 2015 and 2019, IIHF 2021 World Championship, EHF Euro 2022) and the archival data. studying organizational

structure design of JHAs during the event planning could bring interesting insights of what drives the design options in different joint and national contexts, as well as whether this could incentivize the co-host to integrate current findings to their case. Secondly, although panoramic view was at first an advantage of this research, using one case study will help avoiding the problems that this study faced such as inconsistent access to archives or not always comparable sample. This can be done by officially associating with the event as the researcher. Future research needs to ensure choosing only completed events for the “outcomes” studies and consider the views of all alliance members for their case(s) for a full picture. Finally, the majority of participants coming from European events, which was determined by the availability of the completed co-hosted events at the time of the research that singled out the perspective of other host cultures. The research on underrepresented geographical context (e.g. North America, Africa, Asia and Oceania) is encouraged to bring diverse and new perspectives to JHA research.

Chapter IV. The study of FIBA Women’s Eurobasket 2021 alliance: the effect of formalization on organizational learning outcomes

This chapter presents Study 2's full elements including introduction, theoretical framework, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion which will be then synchronized in **Chapter V - General Discussion and Conclusion** with the results of Study 1.

4.1. Introduction

“Female basketball is a real product with high potential. That’s why we told to FIBA to give us the organization and we will make the arenas full with Spain.” (Marketing Director, French Federation of Basketball (FFBB))²

² Interviewee 7 of Study 2. See table 15 for the list of participants.

The co-hosting phenomenon in mega and non-mega event context has become a regular form of hosting for the recent editions. FIBA Women's Eurobasket (FIBA EBW) event is not an exception. It is top women basketball event in Europe that is organized bi-annually in different host locations. The last four editions of these events were co-organized by two co-hosts. The event is becoming attractive with every new edition, however unfortunately, it is not experiencing the same attractively and attendance levels compared to its male counterpart. If the event does not bring enough gate receipts, attracting hosts might be an issue. Co-hosting the event is a format that allows for cost sharing and therefore the latest editions were all co-organized. The FIBA EBW 2021 was co-hosted by Spain and France, in the pursuit to do something great for the sport by experienced host nations. This alliance was formed by countries that are located cross-border geographically and are united to bring a better awareness to the event and sport.

As in previous studies we have considered JHAs through strategic alliance lenses, we will continue doing so in this study by understanding the effect of the organizational structure on alliance member collaboration and organizational learning. However, considering the limitations of Study 1, for the management part of our inquiry, we will focus mainly on formalization as a structural dimension to specifically see how formal control methods affect organizational learning outcomes. Additionally, it is important that for the single case study we have more data sources, such as access to more participants from each LOC and access to governance documents because it would be essential for understanding formalization, without which we can only speculate about the organizational structure of a given event. It is also imperative to test our hypothesis through additional tools (calculating the intensity of ties) to understand the frequency of alliance stakeholder relations. Considering the changes above, this study will help us to answer the main thesis questions, by considering the gaps of Study 2. This Study's questions are adapted as follows:

1. Formation phase: What are the drivers and motives of FIBA EBW 2021 alliance formation?
2. Management phase: How did formalization affect the collaboration and organizational learning between alliance members?

4.2. Theoretical framework

This study is the continuation of Study 1 and uses the same theoretical framework, however the only difference that for the management of the alliance, we applied one of the structural dimensions of Slack (1997) which is formalization as it is the main dimensions that is overarching and inclusive of the other two and through which we can understand the best collaboration and organizational learning outcomes.

4.2.1. Overarching theoretical framework: joint hosting alliances as strategic alliances

In the sport management literature, various sports and sport event partnerships can be described through network theory, interorganizational relationships (IORs), and strategic alliances. Babiak and Willem (2017) define such partnership as “voluntary, close, long-term, planned strategic action between two or more organizations with the objective of serving mutually beneficial purposes in a problem domain” (p. 273). They also defined a network as “a skill-based partnership involving more than two partners.” The network is characterized by nodes (actors) that are connected through formal or informal mechanisms. Child and Faulkner (1998) defined strategic alliances as partnerships between two or more organizations where learning occurs. Following this definition, JHAs are considered strategic, given that the event owners continuously implement knowledge transfer processes (Parent, 2015). Moreover, Byun et al. (2019, 2020) research covered the formation part of the alliances, looking at the motivations of joint bidders and environmental/organizational factors that led to the formation of these alliances (Byun et al., 2019) and legitimation strategies used by joint bidders (Byun et al. 2020). The motivations discussed were accessing the partner’s resources (such as financial, infrastructural, and knowledge), getting a competitive advantage through differentiation and reducing the potential threat of future competition. As for the drivers, there are two types of them, organizational and environmental (general and specific). The organizational drivers are related to the resource constraints, specific characteristics of the potential alliance members, their cultural and political fit, and their previous alliance experience (if any). The general environmental drivers include general environmental factors such as economic, political, sociocultural, demographic, legal, and technological. To provide an example, Kristiansen et al. (2016) explain that one of the significant reasons for the alliance formation between Austria and Lichtenstein to host the European Olympic Festival was their geographical proximity and existing political and economic bonds. The specific environmental factors include customers/members/fans, suppliers, regulatory agencies, athletes’ groups/staff and competitors. In the case of the alliance of Japan and Korea, co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, it was the decision of the regulatory agency to allocate the rights of the event to the two countries out of the inability to choose between the two (Heere et al., 2012b).

The literature suggests a research agenda to study such alliances’ management and outcomes phases. For their management, the authors mentioned that factors that might affect it negatively include the lack of trust, incompatible goals, disagreements regarding resource allocation, and opportunistic behavior. The alliance literature says that these factors also then affect the outcomes.

In alliances where mutual goals are formed (reciprocity), the associated outcomes are more likely to happen (Gerke et al., 2018). In the case of the alliance between the AFC and an event delivery company SIM, the lack of success was due to their divergent goals and false promises (Parent & Séguin, 2007). These goals are formed at the partnership's early stages, where the partners formulate the strategic plan. In trust-based and long-term partnerships, alliances are more strategic and collaborative, leading to outcomes such as knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Zhou et al., 2021).

Furthermore, in the study of Walzel and Eickhoff (2021) on social outcomes of co-hosted events, the authors concluded that the outcomes were more of the “side effects” rather than strategically leveraged outcomes such as 1) improvement of bilateral relationships between the hosts and the building of social capital, 2) increased social cohesion and 3) enhanced cultural awareness (p.5). This leaves a question as to whether the strategic planning stage is present at JHAs. According to Chalip (2004), the strategic planning approach at the early stages of the partnership is an essential factor that affects the implementation of the desired outcomes of the alliance, whether at the individual or alliance level. At this early stage, the goals are formulated, and “reciprocity” can be built. Therefore, one can see the apparent interconnectedness of alliance phases to achieve strategic social outcomes. This link is discussed in the study on the alliance between the OCOG and the satellite host cities to co-host the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 (Hoff et al., 2020).

Finally, in the frameworks of Byun et al. (2019) on joint bids as strategic alliances, studying organizational learning outcomes is encouraged to evaluate each partner’s influence on one another. Organizational learning is also a part of the definition of the strategic alliance provided by Child and Faulkner (1998) and, according to Parent (2006), the reason why such alliances can be formed.

If JHAs have been qualified as “strategic alliances,” organizational learning is at the core. Given the slight controversy in the literature regarding the lack of strategic action in such alliances and the significant lacuna in organizational learning outcomes, this research aims to fill this uncertainty.

4.2.2. Specific theoretical framework for the management: Formalization

The three adapted organizational structural dimensions by Slack’s (1997) are formalization, along with centralization and complexity. Slack (1997) referred to formalization as “the extent to which

mechanisms such as rules and regulations, job descriptions, and policies and procedures govern the operation of a sport organization. In a highly formalized organization, employees have little discretion over how and when they do their work. In an opposite situation, employees have freedom to exercise discretion about their work and how and when it is carried out.

The formalization in event context is embodied in the form of hosting agreements and contracts that a host city sign. The contracts guarantee the control that the event owner practices over the host cities (Kelly et al., 2019). This control is justified in a way that event owners need to ensure timely and budgeted organization of the event to protect the event brand (ibid, 2019). These highly formalized documents prescribe the hosts to form the LOC and focus on operational delivery of the event, which identifies their role in the whole event delivery process. The organizing committee in its event planning stage is headquarter-centered and therefore, at this stage the degree of formalization is high, as “it is during this period that strategic plans, rules, policies, and procedures are developed and anticipated changes can be planned.”

Some of the few advantages of formalization are the following: employee commitment and identification and therefore ethical culture, as there are tangible rules to abide by. Despite these advantages, the management literature discusses some important disadvantages related to formalization such as loss of employee’s autonomy, constraint on the employee capacity to experiment, innovate or explore or to solve unexpected issues, and in its excessive form, minimal adherence to the rules or bureaucratic behavior, resistance to change, misperception of organizational goal etc. (Kelly et al., 2019 and Slack, 1997). The current research confirms the limited engagement of the LOC with its population and concludes that formalized requirements exclude the strategic thinking behind the mere hosting and do not include anything on broader functions to make their events more beneficial to the hosting communities (Kelly et al., 2019). To the date, no research has been found on how event owners prescribe behavior in the multiple host context and whether they include any engagement with the local community in their formalized requirements.

4.2.3. Specific theoretical framework for the outcomes: Organizational learning

In this research, we chose organizational learning framework the discussion on the outcomes, as it was suggested by the previous research on event-hosting partnerships considered through strategic alliance lenses (Byun et al., 2019; Parent et al., 2009). According to Malo and Elkouzi (2001),

organizational learning is the social process of individual interactions that aims to produce new organizational knowledge or know-how. It is classified into three types: intra-organizational (internal functioning of each partner), interorganizational (an increase of collaboration between the partners), and extra-organizational (development of the capacity to negotiate with other stakeholders). This learning framework by Malo and Elkouzi (2001) clearly describes three different levels in which organizations can influence each other. It has already been applied to study event delivery strategic alliance in NMSE context between AFC and SIM to deliver FINA Championship in 2005 (Parent & Séguin, 2007). As JHAs are another type of strategic alliances in the event context between different cultural, political, and administrative contexts, applying organizational learning is relevant to see how alliance the organizations influence each other in such contexts.

Malo and Elkouzi's (2001) framework facilitated the understanding of how intra and extra-organizational learning contributed to AFC and SIM successfully winning the rights to host the FINA Championship in 2005 thanks to the AFC's knowledge of FINA's expectations and requirements (Parent and Seguin, 2007). For interorganizational learning, the improvement of ties and network is among the most common examples. This was observed in the case of Austria and Lichtenstein in co-organizing the Olympic Youth Festival (Kristiansen et al., 2016). Another example would be adopting the joint concept for sustainable development between Austria and Switzerland, co-hosting UEFA Euro 2008 (Lienhard & Preuss, 2014). In the case of extra-organizational learning, hosting the Athens Olympics facilitated the change in Greek legal frameworks in the creation of enterprises and public corporations (Malfas et al., 2004). However, no study has yet referred to extraorganizational learning in a JHA context.

The literature has acknowledged contributive factor to organizational learning, which is complementary strengths (Ahuja et al., 2008). In the organizational linkages with dissimilar skills, there is a higher rate of effective R&D or innovation outcomes. Complementary strengths can be access to the resources that one nation can provide to another that does not possess them. In the JHA, in the partnership between experienced and unexperienced nations to co-host the ICC World Cup, the latter ones were perceived as easier to work with compared to experienced nations where the decision-making processes were more complex as more people were involved (Mukanova, 2020). Therefore, although small nations benefit from access to bigger partners' technical resources

to host the event, the bigger nations, in turn, can benefit from the willingness to compromise and the smoother management practices of smaller nations. This is an example of how organizations can complement each other.

Reviews also suggest that to achieve learning, relational norms should be in place (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). According to Hoff et al. (2020), formal control mechanisms (such as legally binding documents) and informal communication and commitment mechanisms (such as phone calls, emails, meetings, existing ties, and personal contacts) are implemented to motivate the partners to achieve the desired outcomes. These mechanisms bring order, stability, and effectiveness to the organization by determining how organization workers are supervised, how the different departments or teams' tasks are allocated, and how decisions are made. The control mechanisms will therefore be considered as a factor that positively affects the organizational learning outcomes in the strategic alliances. For example, extraorganisational learning was not possible in the AFC and MIS alliance due to ineffective knowledge transfer. The stakeholders carrying the specific knowledge were not involved in the formation of the organizing committee, thus preventing the transfer and rendering the alliance unsuccessful. A formal control mechanism, formal contract could have avoided this (Parent & Séguin, 2007).

4.3. Methodology

As we are building up a single case that was selected from 11 JHAs. This design aims to gain a micro-level view of organizational learning outcomes across different alliance contexts to fill the identified gap (Creswell, 2013; Naraine et al., 2016; Yin, 2009). Methodological suggestions of Study 1 were completed event, the consideration of all relevant stakeholder parties, the access to governance documents. Theoretical suggestions were to study one particular outcome and one structural dimension. Therefore, we attempted to do that. Therefore, this study 2 employs Type 2 typology of case study design which is single case study with embedded unit of analysis considering all event co-hosts' perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Purposive (based on

the event of interest) and convenience (timing and access) sampling strategies were utilized (Creswell, 2013; Naraine et al., 2016).

4.3.1. Case study setting

The phenomenon of interest is the co-hosted event alliance of FIBA 2021 Women's Eurobasket co-host alliance and its major sub-units are the alliance members (co-hosts, Spain - Spanish Basketball Federation and France - French Basketball Federation) and the event owner (FIBA – FIBA Europe) and more specifically, their structure that affects the relationships between members and their outcomes. The alliance is time and place specific. It has formal dimensions such as its formation (preconditions, motives and drivers), its management (formal and informal management or control mechanisms during the event preparation and the event phase), and the outcomes (inter-organizational learning and extra-organizational learning outcomes). This approach helps to understand *why* co-hosts joined forces and organized jointly this event, *how* the alliance relationships are managed, *what* their relationships were between each other, and *what* are the outcomes of alliance.

4.3.2. Data collection

For the single case study, two sources of information are simultaneously used to collect the data: interviews and documents (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009). The inclusion criteria for participants were the multiple host alliance members, the co-hosts, as they are directly involved in organizational learning processes.

Before the data collection of this thesis the informed consent of interview participants was obtained. Therefore, the interview process was explained to them. At first a selection of potential interview participants was contacted from the typology of polycentric events (see Annex A for P2 events). If participants were interested in participating, in a follow-up email potential interview partners were asked for a meeting or telephone call to conduct the interviews. If the interview partner agreed to participate in the study, a video call meeting (Zoom or Microsoft Teams) or telephone call was agreed upon. The interviewee received information about the research project beforehand: a participant consent form (Appendix J and K). The participant consent form contains information concerning the subject and nature of the research as well as details about the data

collection and analysis. It emphasized the voluntary nature of participation in the study. The interview guide was also provided by request or to make sure that the participant can provide the information on the topic (Appendix L).

We organized semi-structured interviews (n=11) with three main organizations of the co-hosted event IOR: a) event owner - to understand the rationale behind the event governance structure design and b) alliance members (co-hosts) - to learn their experience of collaboration under such event governance structures. The latter participants represented two countries in Europe (France and Spain). The interview with the alliance members, and co-hosts were semi-structured (n=11). The major questions discussed during the interviews with alliance members (co-hosts) (n=8), were more targeted to understand in more depth the frequency, the intensity and types of ties that each participant had with various actors in the opposite alliance member. As for the event owner, the interviews were semi-structured (n=3) to understand the structural design of the event governance and the approach towards managing the alliance relationships between them and co-hosts and between co-hosts themselves. The participants were all from Europe. Most of the participants were acquired through snowball effect from the participants of Study 1. As data collection was conducted during COVID-19 crisis, 9 out of 11 interviews were conducted via videocall platform online (Zoom and Microsoft Teams), except for one interview in person at the premises of the FFBB and one interview by email. Interviews were conducted in English (6) and French (5). Interviews lasted 37 minutes on average and transcribed verbatim (See Appendix M, N and O). An overview of the interviews is presented in Table 15 below.

Table 15. Overview of Study 2 interview participants

JHA members	Interviewees	Duration
FIBA Europe	I ₁ , Managing Director (MD), FIBA Europe Properties	35 mins
	I ₂ , Project Manager LOC France	30 mins
	I ₃ , Project Manager LOC Spain	30 mins
LOC Spain	I ₄ , Entertainment manager, Spanish Basketball Federation (FEB) (1 st interview)	32 mins 47 mins
	I ₅ , Entertainment manager, FEB (2 nd interview)	email
	I ₆ , Venue manager, FEB	47 mins
LOC France	I ₇ , Marketing director, FFBB	44 mins
	I ₈ , Event director, FFBB	40 mins
	I ₉ , Event manager, FFBB	35 mins
	I ₁₀ , Event coordinator, FFBB	30 mins
	I ₁₁ , Event officer, FFBB	

Source: author's own elaboration

For the second source of information, we used archival data. Compared to the multiple case study, in Study 2 we had requested the access to all the related governance documents of FIBA EBW 2021 event (e.g. bidding requirements, bid evaluation reports, post-event reports, any contracts signed with event owner and co-host, media sources, official website of the event etc.) to collect the preliminary information on event governance structure design (See Table 16). These documents were in English and Spanish. The use of more than one data source ensured the trustworthiness of data. The table below presents the total number of documents considered and provided by different stakeholders, as well as the number of pages. Some of the documents were identical that were provided by LOC Spain and the event owner, FIBA Europe. See Appendix P for the file that we sent to the stakeholders to request the documents.

Table 16. Number of documents provided by each stakeholder and their examples

Provided by	Total number of documents	Number of pages	Examples of provided documents
FIBA Europe	6	375	FIBA EBW 2021 Bid book FIBA EBW 2021 Event Manual

			Accompanying letter of the joint bid
			Event organizational structure
LOC France	1	31	Post event report
LOC Spain	47	271	Port event report
			Workshop reports
			Post-workshop reports
			Follow-up Meeting Agendas
			Follow-up Meeting Summaries
			Promotional plan
			LOC Activities program
			Marketing committee structure
			Milestones EBW 2021
			Official photos
Total:	54	671	

Source: Author's own elaboration

These two methods complement each other. As we were located physically in France contacting the LOC France was easier, however the access was only provided to post event report. Although we only interviewed two stakeholders of LOC Spain, the participants have provided a generous access to their archives which can gives us a satisfied understanding of the event hosting experience of LOC Spain.

4.3.3. Data Analysis

The MAXQDA software facilitated the qualitative data analysis with regards to coding and the retrieval of data. The research team followed the top-down approach to analyzing data and conducted what is called “deductive thematic analysis” or “theory-driven data analysis” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 83). The transcribed interviews and documents were analyzed against the codes derived from the theoretical framework on IOR, organizational structural element, formalization” (Amis & Slack, 2016; Fredrickson, 1986; Mintzberg, 1979; Slack, 1997) to understand all formal and informal methods governing the event as well as the codes from the literature review on different advantages (e.g. employee commitment, ethical culture) and disadvantages of formalization (loss of employee’s autonomy, constraint on the employee capacity to experiment,

innovate or explore or to solve unexpected issues). See Appendix Q for the number of codes. We looked for the themes on inter and extra organizational outcomes derived from the previous study to see if there was any relation with the formalization. As Creswell (2013) encouraged conducting inductive coding to accompany the deductive process, we were open to emerging themes.

The coded data will also be analyzed against the number of interactions mentioned by the interviewed stakeholder to understand the frequency and the intensity of ties and frequency of ties to produce a network or sociogram of collaboration of FIBA EBW 2021 alliance. This will serve as an additional tool to visualize the major interactions and therefore associate the frequency of ties with the collaboration/organizational learning outcomes and/or explain better what caused the interactions to be as such. This sociogram was cross-checked with two participants for validity.

4.4. Results

The results section is divided into two main sections “Formation” and “Management” of the alliance. In the first sub-section, the alliance formation will be explained to understand to what degree it affected the management and the outcomes of the alliances. The second section is focused on findings from Formalization dimension, which is everything about formal control methods that prescribe behavior of co-hosts, especially with a focus on their collaboration and organizational learning matters. There are also some references of formalization within formation stage as the bidders will follow these guidelines to form their future alliance. We used event-related documents and interviews to construct these both sections.

Lastly, the end of “Management” section is accompanied by the results of quantitative analysis of the frequency and intensity of ties between the stakeholders.

4.4.1. Formation of the alliance

4.4.1.1. *Understanding FIBA Eurobasket event or Bidding for FIBA Eurobasket event as a JHA*

According to the FIBA Women’s Eurobasket Event Manual, the definition of the FIBA Women’s Eurobasket is the following “*FIBA Women’s EuroBasket is one of the most important FIBA tournaments and one of the largest female sporting events in Europe* (FIBA, 2019, p.4)

The event officially belongs to FIBA, the world governing body of basketball “*FIBA including its subsidiaries, successors or affiliates) is the world governing body of basketball. It is organized as an independent association formed by 213 National Federations of basketball throughout the world.*” (FIBA, 2018). However, the governance of their continental European championships for the female basketball is delegated to FIBA Europe “*FIBA Europe e.V. (including its subsidiaries, successors or affiliates) is a legal entity with delegated authority by FIBA to develop, supervise and organize basketball in Europe*” (FIBA, 2018).

FIBA Women’s Eurobasket single or multiple host alliance can be formed thanks to the call for candidates that was launched by the event owner FIBA for their bi-annual feminine European Championship:

With this Bid Book, we are now inviting you to join this celebration of women’s basketball, either as the host of the entire tournament, or as a co-host. In the past, FIBA Women’s

EuroBasket has been successfully executed, within both the framework of a single host option and with co-host option. We welcome you to put together your Bid, for both or either, with no necessary preference from our perspective. (FIBA, 2018, p.3).

The FIBA EBW's frequency is different compared to the frequency of FIBA Men's Eurobasket (FIBA EBM) that is organized every four years. The difference between the frequency is not the only one. The second difference is the tournament size. Unlike the Men's tournament, the women's event size is smaller and there will be only 16 teams. This difference will affect the hosting options that will be proposed to the bidders and therefore different options for the alliance formation:

According to I₁ (FIBA Europe) “[...]For the women [...] we only have two hosts because you have only 16 teams [...]. If you have 4 hosts[...] they are already qualified. So, from 16 teams [...] it's not really [...] practical because then only 12 places are free for other countries. Well, for the men there are still 20 places to be filled.”

More precisely the following hosting options are available for the bidders in chapter 1, Art. 3 (FIBA, 2018):

*“(a) The whole Event is held in the geographical territory of one country only (**“One-Country Event”**).*

*(a) The Event is held in two countries (not necessarily neighboring countries) simultaneously, with the Final Phase being staged in one of these two countries (**“Two-Country Event”**). If the Event is staged as a two-country Event, the following hosting system is available: (a) The Group Phase is staged by two hosts in two different countries (**“Group Phase Host”**). Each Group Phase host would host two groups with four teams each group. (a) The Final Phase is staged by one host only. This host shall also be one of the Group Phase hosts (**“Group and Final Host”**) to host two groups with four teams each group.”*

Once the hosting option is chosen, there are several bidding options too:

*“(a) A Bid to host the whole Event within the geographical territory of one country (**“One-Country Bid”**). (a) A Bid to host one Group Phase and the Final Phase of the Event (**“Group and Final Phase Bid”**)*

*(a) Bid to host one Group Phase (**“Group Phase Bid”**).”*

A bidder can apply for multiple options to be selected and they can be selected for multiple options as well. However, if chosen for Group and Final phase and Group phase bid, “the latter shall only be considered if the Bidder is not successful with his Group and Final Phase Bid” (FIBA, 2018).

FIBA communicates associated benefits and available income sources for the future hosts as a way to reassure and attract the potential hosts (FIBA, 2018, 2019). Moreover, they conduct ex-post impact analysis that is contracted by the independent agency as a reliable source for governments to see the potential impacts of the event (I₁, FIBA Europe):

[...]Economic impact study, now we also do it for the Women. We did it for the Men [...] with Price Waterhouse in Zurich together and we do then also a report and try to give the hosts a book or something to go to their government and see[...] “if we host this, we get so much in return” because the figures are quite impressive, but this is under normal times when people are travelling and coming.

The major bid evaluation criteria are around the following 4 factors: athlete welfare, state of the art infrastructure, stakeholder experience and organizational factors (FIBA, 2018). The process for the bidding according to I₁ (FIBA Europe) is the following:

We send out a bid manual, where it is (sic) written all the conditions, how the bid works [...] a template of the hosting contract [...] and then also the event manual already that they see the full details. The event manual [...] it's really that detailed thing from [...] how many cars we need to how many rooms we need [...].

4.4.1.2. Bidding and Hosting Alliance formation preconditions of FIBA Women's Eurobasket 2021 (motives and drivers)

Now that we understand the formal preconditions for the alliance formation, this section will enable us to understand how in particular, the alliance of FIBA Women's Eurobasket 2021 was formed. To explain the formation of the alliance, we will refer to Byun et al. (2019) motives and drivers applied to joint bids, that we also used to analyze our Study 1 results. Figure 27 below summarizes the objectives of each alliance member.




Figure 27. Individual alliance member and JHA objectives

Source: author's own elaboration

a. Individual alliance member objectives

Individually each host had its own objectives when it comes to wanting to host the event.

FEB

FEB is an experienced host with a proven track of past hosting experiences and sporting success (I₄, FEB). According to the post-event report, their objectives were to transform the supporter experience, engage basketball fans with women's basketball, create economic and social impact for Valencia, to improve image of players and to promote FEB as an organization nationally and internationally (Local organizing committee - Spain, 2021)

FFBB

According to the post-event report of Local organizing committee - France (2021), France's motivations were to promote women's basketball in France; make people want to live a FIBA Women's EuroBasket 2021 experience in the light of Tokyo Olympics in 2021; reach a large audience; increase ticketing sales; and ensuring French team's position at the highest level

internationally. maintaining the position of the French team in French women's sport and at the highest international level.

a. Joint objectives

– *Sport Promotion*

One of the joint objectives of the alliance members was to bring the women's basketball to the highest level, as both federations are one of the leading federations in terms of sporting success in female basketball and in terms of sports participation in Europe. According to the I₇ (FFBB):

We said to ourselves that we will do something big for the women [...]. We invest a lot of money to women's sport and women's basketball. The last championship that happened [...] there was no one in the gym. [...]The third of the gym was empty. When such a spectacle is broadcasted on television, [...] it is so bad for the promotion of women's sport. [...] But female basketball is a real product with high potential. That's why we told to FIBA [...] give us the organization and we will make the arenas full with Spain [...]

– *Existing experience/matching level*

Another reason why Spain and France merged for this event is the fact that they both have experience in organizing such kinds of events. Spain wanted a partner that would have the same amount of knowledge as them, so look for accessing similar hosting resources in the co-host partner (I₄, FEB):

I think we couldn't have bid with another country because you need trust in the other partner and France is the only one. The only federation in European woman basketball that can match up in our level. And also because [...] we hosted the Woman's World Cup in Tenerife.

France also demonstrated their hosting experience by referring to the organization of FIBA EBM with other co-hosts “Give us the organization and we will make the arenas full with Spain. Perfect as what we have done in 2015.” (I₇, FFBB)

– *Sharing the costs and Leveraging ticketing revenue*

Another reason why this alliance happened is by sharing organization costs as the organizational fees are expensive even for countries such as Spain and France. Both sides agreed on this financial point of the organization.

I₇ (FFBB) highlighted that “*Obviously, it costs us a lot, if you divide it by two, it is okay*”. (I₄, FEB) develops this point by explaining the differences that exist when you organize Eurobasket event and when you organize it as one country compared to two and how co-hosting was the result of this logic:

[...]because we are basketball, we are not football. Then there are not so many people who come to the country [...] to see the events. So you are not gonna (sic) sell tickets on, imagine, a morning game at 12:00 o'clock with two teams that had not (sic) the local country [...] on a Wednesday.

Therefore, a host country is more likely to fill up their arena if the local team plays at the group stage they host, “[...] it allows to separate the budget, balance it out between the countries and to have a group stage with the host country playing by trying to fill it up” (I₈, FFBB).

4.4.1.3. Historical development related to COVID (change of host cities and main hosts)

The alliance member roles underwent a few changes due to COVID context. At the beginning, the initial plan was that the FFBB would be the Group Phase and the Finals host (GPF host).

[...] Yes, indeed, we were candidates for the group phase in Lyon. The other group phase was in Valencia and then the finals in Paris, and we put together the dossier with these cities Lyon and Valencia and then we had to finish in Paris [...]. (I₈, FFBB)

As the COVID arrived, the FFBB realized that they were no longer capable of delivering the group phase in Lyon due to the incertitude with the funds as well as the Finals in Paris.

[...]And when we applied for the bid, we weren't yet sure we'd get the funding and subsidies from Lyon's local authorities. Nonetheless, we made progress on the bid. [...] Then came COVID and the municipal elections. [...] And in fact the commitment we had from the municipal team was not renewed, since the ecologists took over in Lyon, and we were no longer sure of getting the subsidy. [...] (I₈, FFBB)

The solution needed to be found. The two federations presidents discussed the issue and FEB agreed to take the role of the Group and Finals Host, as the way their event was financed was different to FFBB situation.

[...] We had to find another city for the group phase [...] so our 2 federations discussed it, our president, Jean-Pierre Siutat, with the president of the Spanish federation and came to the conclusion that Spain would take the final [...] (I₈, FFBB)


[...] Financially, they were less dependent on government subsidies than we were. I know they [...] were privately funded, so it was less of a hassle for them.

(I₉, FFBB)

After the agreement, France found new hosts for their Group Phase in Strasbourg.

And then Strasbourg came along [...] quite naturally, because Strasbourg is a European capital, so for a European championship, it made sense to develop women's basketball there [...] The Strasbourg authorities supported us in this project. The gym was the right size for this women's basketball event. It's a 5-6,000 capacity gym [...]. (I₈, FFBB)

The figure 28 below summarizes the changes in the alliance member status:



*GPF (group phase and final host) and GP host (group phase host)

Figure 28. Changes in JHA member status

Source: author's own elaboration

4.4.2. Management of the alliance (Event governance model)

4.4.2.1. Formal tools and informal tools of governance

– Formalized documents

According to I₁ (FIBA Europe), the management of the alliance was based on the event management model formalized in the major three documents signed between FIBA and the co-hosts (bid book, event manual and host country agreement).

The Event Manual stipulates more extended list of documents as the ones governing the event (FIBA, 2019, p.5):

a) Competitions Regulations of FIBA Europe; b) Official Basketball Rules; c) FIBA Internal Regulations; d) Hosting Agreement; e) Event Manual; f) Bid Book; g) Various guidelines provided by FIBA (in special cases guidelines may overrule the event manual. FIBA shall inform in written form accordingly); h) Other related documents produced in due time.

The goal of the Bid book is the following:

The Bid Book strives to include all key aspects of organization of the Event that shall be considered by a responsible Bidder while planning a preliminary budget; however, successful Bidder(s) will be provided with a document containing a more detailed description of the Event organization requirements (“Event Manual”)(FIBA, 2018. p.6)

The goal of the Event Manual is the following:

The event manual is intended to provide clear descriptions and requirements for the Host(s). However, each Host acknowledges that FIBA may reasonably (i.e. without essentially changing the material covenants of the Hosting Agreement) amend, change or correct any part of the event manual, any adjoining documents, guidelines and/or requirements, in particular if deemed necessary by FIBA at its sole discretion, for the benefit of clarity of the event manual and/or the success of the event (FIBA, 2019, p.2)

The Hosting Agreement:

The Bidder has agreed to sign the FIBA hosting agreement template(s) prior to his nomination as a host (templates to be sent to the Bidders following the deadline for filing the bids to FIBA). The Bidder signs the hosting agreement on the day of the award of the Event following the award ceremony. (FIBA, 2018 p. 18)

The hosting agreement is sent to the bidders and must be approved by the bidders before the FIBA Board meeting.

The two interviewees also mentioned a sanitary protocol as another formalized document that was mandatory for hosts to follow “[...] the Fiba sanitary protocol was very strict and very extensive. There were 75 pages of specifications [...]” (I₁₀, FFBB).

- ***Co-host governance***

- *Additional HR*

“We assigning in our organization, one event manager, who is responsible for each host, so we have four event manager but we try to combine it because at the end it should be one event, one CI.” (I₁, FIBA Europe)

- *Workshops*

Normally we have workshop in each of the country to keep them together on separate topics. [...] one is for doping control [...] the other one is fans or on our hospitality [...] Normally in each country at least one workshop. Now we do everything online [...] (I₁, FIBA Europe)

- *Individual approach*

[...] it's also very individual, because every country is really different [...] Now we have from Georgia to Germany[...] they are so different. Last time, we had even Finland Turkey [...] really completely different hosts. So also the arenas are different and all these things. (I₁, FIBA Europe)

- *FIBA Europe visits*

FIBA may decide to send one to three representatives to the offices of each Host for a short time to consult or support the Host(s) on daily organizational issues as it is proven that on-site co-operation is much more productive than electronic correspondence (“Working Sessions) (FIBA, 2019)

- *Communication*

FIBA Europe provides the following platforms for communications for the event:

No, we use our teamwork platform in FIBA. So, this is being used for sharing documents or we upload certain files and also the meeting protocols [...] then [...] we regularly have these workshops and online meetings[...]beside this we use email. (I₁, FIBA Europe)

As per language of communication, FIBA also has a clause on this, “all written communication shall be conducted in English. Native languages can be used (wherever possible) during a verbal communication for clarification purposes only if needed” (FIBA, 2019, p.9).

As FIBA has an event manager responsible for each host country, the communication between co-hosts is centralized which causes also less interactions between co-hosts:

[...] And in fact FIBA sends all the directives and tries to set up the identical organization between the 2 countries [...] we almost do not have relations with our contacts in Spain because every time it goes up to FIBA and [...] FIBA then goes directly to them (I₁₀, FFBB)

– *Decision-making*

In all organization matters, it is FIBA that is a locus of decision-making of any decisions. According to the bidbook:

FIBA retains the right at its sole discretion to make all final decisions, in particular regarding which host country, host cities, venues and hotels shall be used to stage the Event. Such decisions shall be stipulated in detailed agreements with the successful Bidder (“Hosting Agreement”) and will have to be fully implemented by the successful Bidder through a dedicated separate legal entity (“Local Organizing Committee” or “LOC”) (FIBA, 2018, p. 6)

However, it seems like in this alliance members did have autonomy in certain areas of decision-making, as we can see with regards to the change of host cities. This was decided by the alliance members themselves. However, this might be exceptional as these alliance members are leaders in sport and they may have different powers. I₃ (FEB) expressed that they could be considered as special case as they have a habit in hosting of events and FIBA has “trust” towards them:

[...] it's a special case because, you know we are Spain and France with top one and two in Europe. We have a lot of experience organizing events. We have the World Cup in 2018 in Tenerife two years ago, Men's World Cup here in Spain in 2014. [...] so we are an exception, let's say because we are really used to organize at least one FIBA tournament every two years (I₃, FEB)

The same sentiment is observed when I₇ (FFBB) described their motivation to host the FIBA Women's Eurobasket, as they consider themselves a considerable player and they have confidence in delivering a good tournament for women's basketball:

We said to ourselves that we will do something big for the women [...]. We invest a lot of money to women's sport and women's basketball [...] That's why we told to FIBA [...] give us the organization and we will make the arenas full with Spain [...]

Additionally, any decisions taken during preparation stage are only binding if they are “formalized” and approved by FIBA. They highlight that the final decision by the respective FIBA management representatives prevails at all times (FIBA, 2019). This demonstrates also that the agreement between Spain and France on status change and host city change can only be binding or valid if approved by FIBA.

The answer of I₁ (FIBA Europe) explains that they can only control areas that they finance themselves. “[...] we tried to control with the branding and everything. But if you want to control these things, you also must pay for these things so”. So, the fact that host countries pay the majority of the organization, they still might have certain not formalized control over decision-making on certain areas not financed by FIBA Europe.

I₁ (FIBA Europe) provides an example that the decision-making for the mascot was done via email, and they have provided their preferences, usually ranking them from one to three. If there is a tie, FIBA might be the final authority to make decisions or grant this decision to a country that hosts the final, but they explained that they did not have to face such issue yet. This demonstrates the flexible approach of the event owner.

- Responsabilités of stakeholders

The role of all stakeholders

FIBA highlights that success is joint effort between various stakeholders “*The success of FIBA Women's EBW 2021 shall be a result of very close co-operation amongst various stake-holders: a) FIBA b) Hosting federation(s) c) Local organizing committees d) Hosting venues e) Host cities f) Host countries* (FIBA, 2019, p. 5) *FIBA in cooperation with the host, host country and host cities are continually making their best efforts to raise the level of FIBA Women's EuroBasket from Event to Event.* (FIBA, 2018)

FIBA also highlights their joint responsibility in coordinating sponsorships in the framework of joint marketing committee.

“The Host(s) and FIBA shall work together to coordinate the sponsorship sales efforts, optimize the sponsorship revenues and plan the delivery of the contractual rights for all the Partners amongst other responsibilities through a Marketing Committee (the “MC”), which shall be set up no later than two (2) months after the awarding of the Event (FIBA, 2018, p. 60)

Responsibilities of FIBA

FIBA is the locus of decision-making *de facto* for all final decisions, “*FIBA retains the right at its sole discretion to make all final decisions, in particular regarding which host country, host cities, venues and hotels shall be used to stage the Event*” (FIBA, 2018, p. 6). However, I₁ (FIBA Europe) acknowledges the need for financial contribution to exert control over these aspects. FIBA bears several costs, including media operations management, event coordination and management support, economic impact study, transfer of knowledge management, and the development and implementation of the Event's corporate identity and branding policies. (FIBA, 2018; FIBA, 2019) FIBA requires the involvement of third-party service providers to assist with various responsibilities, including event corporate identity development, IT services planning, television production, marketing, ticketing, and sport presentation. A third-party agency ensures a consistent visual identity for the event across all host countries and venues. The agency also produces all the necessary artworks for branding materials at the event venues and hotels (FIBA, 2019).

Responsibilities of Each Host

Hosts have five major areas of responsibility, as outlined by FIBA (2018). These areas include marketing, transportation, accommodation, games and practice venues, and financial obligations. Speaking of financial obligations, hosts are required to cover 16 specific costs, such as hosting fees, accommodation, transportation, and more. FIBA's Bidbook explicitly states that additional costs may arise, which future hosts must agree to (FIBA, 2018). It is worth mentioning here the potential impact of additional COVID-related expenses on the alliance members of FIBA EBW 2021. Additionally, each host is expected to appoint a ticketing agency capable of providing

comprehensive services in sales, management, and reporting, as specified in Annex 2 of the Event Manual.

- Collaboration/Joint efforts

Once we now understand host responsibilities, it is easier to visualize in which areas they will interact with each other. Jointly, co-hosts organize clinics for the referees, charter flights for the delegations between the host countries and promotional costs. These activities are done jointly because the costs are shared (FEB, 2019 and I1, FIBA Europe)

- Types of ties/interactions

The full analysis of interviews and documents has showed that there were other interactions around *bidding, city branding, promotion, clinics, friendly match organization, sponsor, ticket provider, slogan, mascot, transfer and political interactions*, where the mutual exchange of information or discussion has happened. There are some examples below to demonstrate in more detail these interactions.

For the *team transfers*, as teams had to go from France to Spain, I₁₀ (FFBB) oversaw finding the flight and the exchanges were at least twice per month for this part. The interviewee would pass the essential information from French LOC to Spanish with regards to accommodation and food preferences of the teams.

For the *bidding interaction*, France compiled and finalized their joint bid book with Spain (I₁₀, FFBB).

Co-hosts have also been collaborating in the sportive way as they both qualified automatically for the tournament, they organized friendly matches between the teams (I_{3,4}, FEB). In the workshop summary notes, we can see that they discuss the differences in sponsorship matters and the value of the sponsorships as well as in slogan formulation or mascot release postponement. both host cities would like to work with local ticketing agencies, despite the proposed agency suggested by FIBA. Apart from these different thematic interactions, co-hosts do formally meet at the preparation workshops.

Workshops (official encounters). These are thematic workshops that are organized by FIBA. However not all the staff from the LOC participate in these workshops. There is the first workshop organized before bidding procedures, where FIBA explains their Bid book requirements in more

details (I₄ and 9, FFBB) I₄ (FEB) for example did not have to attend security and media operation as it didn't affect him. Therefore, not all the staff members of both LOCs are involved in these interactions. Most of the workshops, especially during and post COVID era were online. I₁ (FIBA Europe) highlights that this might have created more occasions to meet rather than a constraint not to meet physically.

Finally, there was a *political* interaction between the Presidents of both federations when it came to deciding to bid together or on the change of status of the hosts and change of host city in France.

– Reasons for minimal interactions

Event issue centralization of FIBA

It was highlighted by all the participants that the interactions were minimal. Interactions with French LOC was minimum as everything was centralized by FIBA and there were not many common areas of work (I_{4,6,8, 9, 10} and 11, FEB)

Language and culture

Interactions can become less frequent when language barriers exist. Although English served as a common language, collaborating on a meaningful promotional campaign is easier when both parties speak the same language and can find common points connecting their respective countries. (I₃, FEB). The name for the mascot also took some time to be decided as the name can have different meanings in different languages “They say “but in our language this name...”. So, it was quite difficult surprisingly, first time.” I₁, (FIBA Europe). Also, the Spanish LOC felt like the color of the mascot should represent well Spanish culture as they were the final and group phase host now “When we voted, the final phase was still supposed to be in France but now that is in Spain, as Curly is blue, we think it seems more French than Spanish.” (FEB, 2020)

COVID

COVID prevented physical meetings between alliance members for the FIBA workshops I₃ (FEB) “You know, before COVID we were supposed to have meetings workshop in France and in Spain [...] we had one [...] in Palencia before COVID, another one in Munich and then all of them were online.”

Local people-oriented

The Spanish LOC was skeptical that this tournament is about working closely with your co-host. It is much smaller tournament that is aimed at doing things locally:

In the end these are like two different tournaments. They have their strategy for their partners and [...] women's basketball is not that global. So this tournament is more for your local people in your country [...] local government so [...] it doesn't matter if there is a co-host [...]

Financing body and structural differences

Something that was mentioned by numerous interview participants was that the two LOCs had different financial backgrounds. LOC Spain was financed mostly by private foundation, while France has state institution's money. These differences played out in the change of roles between co-hosts during the COVID crisis. LOC in Spain had more roles to support financially for the event, while in France an event officer or event coordinator could execute a few of the functional areas. This can also affect the interactions and their intensity depending on the functional areas. The example of Event Coordinator (I₁₀) in FFBB demonstrates that:

[...] Us, compared to the Spanish committee, we had a slightly smaller organizing committee in terms of people. So people had several tasks, several roles, several subjects to deal with [...]. In the position I was assigned, there were four of them in Spain, so there was one person managing the teams, one person managing the referees, one person managing transport, one person managing accommodation. [...] so I interacted with just about everyone.


Event velocity and related issues

The people with whom the most collaboration was those who were directly involved in the related functional areas and within the same LOC. For example, for the Event Coordinator in FFBB, it was with those who worked on sanitary issues (due to the novelty of the issues and its timely importance in post COVID game planning), volunteering (delegating the tasks within the same function) and venue management (executing functions of one of his main FAs). (I₁₀, FFBB). The same was observed for I₁₁ (FFBB) having more interactions with the people from the same LOC, FIBA and function-related stakeholders (e.g. subcontractors).

4.4.2.2. *The Results of the quantitative analysis of ties and interactions*

We have tried to undertake a quantitative addition to our ties and interactions. Alongside qualitative analysis, we have calculated the degree centrality measure to understand which the interactions between the alliance members and the frequency of ties. It was done quantifying the interactions mentioned above. We have created an adjacency matrix for the stakeholders that we interviewed and that were mentioned in the document analysis. We assigned one to those actors that had interactions with each other and zero if there were no interactions. The sum of each actor's interactions determined the actors that had the highest and the lowest number of interactions with others. We visualized those actors with bigger circles and thicker lines of interactions on our scheme. both LOCs.

Figure 29 below represents the visual interactions between all mentioned stakeholders. The two first actors that had the most interactions were the Event Managers of both host countries (FIBAEUREMFR; FIBAEUREMSP); highlighted in thick black circles, which confirms our results of Centralized Interactions of FIBA with co-hosts rather than between co-hosts. The following actors were the Event Manager of the LOC in France (LOCFREM), highlighted in thick blue circle and the Venue Manager in Spain (LOCSPVM), highlighted in thick red circle, which were both homologues in each of the LOC which similar functions and similar employment duration. They were one of the central keys in communications with the alliance members from another LOC. This analytical addition has its limitations that will be discussed further in Conclusion.



FIBA and FIBA Europe

- FIBAEURMD – Managing Director
- FIBAEUREMFR- Event Manager France
- FIBAEUREMSP- Event Manager Spain
- FIBAEURC – Competition department
- FIBAEURICT – ICT
- FIBAEURSECU - Security

LOC Spain

- FEBPRES – FEB President
- LOCSVPM – LOC Spain Venue Manager
- LOCSPEM – LOC Spain Entertainment Manager

LOC France

- LOCFRED - LOC France Event Director
- LOCFREM - LOC France Event Manager
- LOCFREO - LOC France Event Officer
- LOCFRACCOMTRM - LOC France Accomodation and transport
- LOCFRMCM - LOC France Media and Communications manager
- FFBBPRES - FFBB President
- FFBBMCD - FFBB Marketing and Communications Director
- FFBBMCR - FFBB Marketing and Communciation Responsable
- FFBBIRM - FFBB International Relations Manager

Figure 29. Network of collation between JHA members of FIBA EBW 2021

Source: author’s own elaboration

4.5. Discussion

To discuss the findings of the FIBA Eurobasket alliance results, we will rely on the schema that was designed earlier in the theoretical framework, considering the interconnectedness of the phases. The goal is to understand the effect of each phase on each other and eventually outcomes.

4.5.1. Formation and its effect on collaboration

As for the formation of the alliance, there are a few noteworthy discussion points. Firstly, considering individual objectives, both federations had similar objectives (for example, sportive objective). Therefore, alliance members had competing objectives. At the end, the French women basketball team did achieve their objective by finishing second, but it was not the case for not the Spanish women's team. Therefore, competing objectives within the alliance may have affected the collaboration context, its frequency and therefore co-host's organizational learning capacity. Nonetheless, the alliance members also leveraged each other's teams to prepare for the match which was one of their collaborations.

Secondly, both hosts have an equal amount of experience, which may have also prevented knowledge exchange and interorganizational learning. However, having the same level of experience meant that they had trust between the alliance members and one of the major reasons why such an alliance was formed.

Thirdly, there was a change in the alliance formation halfway through the event with the change of roles and power dynamics of alliance members, due to COVID, which might have also changed the initial objectives of each federation which were initially written at the bidding stage. This may also have affected the relations. For example, with the status change, the Spanish LOC was feeling more legitimate to ask for reconsideration of the mascot colours for example in favor of Spanish colours. On the other hand, this status change was not necessarily something negative. French LOC could still be part of the event because their counterpart could take on GPF host role on themselves by keeping the event happening for both alliance members. If not, French LOC would have to withdraw as a host. Since this was something discussed on a political level, the agreement was reached thanks to this trust.

Finally, the alliance had joint objective that also drove them to form the alliance which is to bring women basketball event to a new level combining the know-how of both countries. This might not

have been fully possible because of the extraordinary circumstances of sanitary context. Despite, the event was delivered, which demonstrates the accomplishment of the project and therefore success of the alliance.

4.5.2. Management of the alliance and its effect on collaboration

The results of this part of the study answer well the research question on “How did formalization affect the collaboration and organizational learning between alliance members?”

First of all, we clearly see the kind of governance model that FIBA Europe employs and how it has responded to the multiple host country context. The model is highly centralized, with locus of decision-making with FIBA Europe and FIBA top management, with decentralization factors possible because the hosts had informal authority as they were experienced and demonstrated good record of women’s basketball development. Therefore, decisions such as change of status of hosts were taken between them. As per answers of the LOC employees they were confident in their expertise and relationship with FIBA, and they feel like FIBA can consider their needs.

Formalization

Despite that, high centralization also meant high levels of task specialization (complexity) and therefore standardization (formalization). FIBA Europe standardized the delivery across the two countries by having specific requirements on the LOC structure and FAs. The two event managers were assigned internally to align the two hosts. Internally, the co-hosts were still free to have their own structure depending on their financial context and hosting responsibilities under condition of having all the necessary FAs in each LOC.

FIBA Europe clearly has a high degree of formalization of their event regulations, which confirms its utility for the effective decision-making strategy in high velocity environment during preparation and tournament period. Despite these advantages of high formalization, this study confirms the presence of a few negative outcomes. The literature mentioned that among such disadvantages: there can be loss of employee’s autonomy, constraint on the employee capacity to experiment, innovate or explore or to solve unexpected issues, and in its excessive form, minimal adherence to the rules or bureaupathic behavior, resistance to change, misperception of organizational goal etc. (Kelly et al., 2019 and Slack, 1997). In the case of FIBA EBW 2021, the capacity to experiment and innovate was affected as there were not many interactions between co-

hosts and as they simply followed the regulations and deliver their part of the event. However, given the entrusted informal authority, alliance members could solve unexpected issues. This means that in the alliances where hosts have different levels of experience, this informal authority may not be observed and autonomy to solve unexpected issues and make decisions will be reduced or non-existent. These formalized requirements indeed might have prevented employees from innovating and experiment, as well as collaborate, as they simply want to follow the regulations and deliver their part of the event.

The emerging results were that the collaboration of co-hosts was more intense with the event owners and with the personnel of the LOC under the same FAs, rather than between themselves. According to the sociogram findings, stakeholders that had most of the interactions and learning in this study are the Event Management Personnel at FIBA Europe that were responsible for each of the co-host, as there were a lot of interactions between them, them and co-hosts and them and FIBA top management. This was cross confirmed with the participants.

We may consider the event owners in this case as “co-hosts” and “alliance members” and co-producers of the event together with co-hosts. Especially when considering collaboration and interactions, there can be social outcomes when daily interacting with FIBA personnel and other stakeholders within each FA. It is something that was found also in Phase 1 study as well as in the previous research for single host scenarios.

When reflecting on the nature of the organizational learning outcomes that were produced, there were no structural changes or strategically planned legacy thanks to this event in terms of co-host collaboration outcomes. JHA to organize FIBA Eurobasket 2021 was not really a collaboration, but the delivery of the parts of the tournaments across different territories.

4.6. Conclusion

4.6.1. Theoretical contributions

This study was unique as we had interviewed the event both during the event preparation and outcomes, so we could access it in the perspective of longitudinal study. Moreover, we had unique access to archives of the co-hosted event, which has not been done before. It gave us unique insights on how such events are organized and daily managed. We interviewed participants from different management levels from both alliance member countries. We have implemented an additional analytical tool to cross-check our results. Thanks to this sociogram, we had new emerging findings with regards to the most intensive ties within this alliance and organizational learning outcomes between the individual alliance member and the event owner.

It contributes to the understanding of collaboration between co-hosts and builds up on previous research by bringing the insights on management and the outcomes of the JHAs. More globally, we have added to the literature of IOR and structure and intangible event outcomes application to the context of NMSEs. We have explored the effect of formalization on collaboration and organizational learning outcomes. We have identified one typology of collaboration and associated it with related organizational learning outcomes.

4.6.2. Practical contributions and recommendations

This research can also help practitioners improve their practices based on empirical research findings. Potential JHA members can understand what they can learn from different partners depending on their profile. Therefore, they can be more aware and selective in the partner seeking process. Event owners can also benefit from these findings, by knowing how to adapt to different alliances depending on the profile of the alliance members, at which point to intervene and to formalize additional collaborative opportunities, shared functional areas and workshops to transfer knowledge to each other among others.

For both event owners and event organizers, more interactions between co-hosts can be thought and foreseen during the low velocity event periods - the bidding and early event preparation periods, as they are more available and involved in joint candidature bidding and aligning as alliance at this stage. Equally post-event stage is a low velocity period and good opportunity to debrief and reunite, where different learning and legacy outcomes can be born or followed-up, to

understand at which areas the tournament has affected the alliance members and their following projects.

FIBA event managers, *additional HR* working to align co-hosts, may prevent collaboration between the alliance members. These HRs were useful from the side of FIBA to align the activities between the alliance members. However, they did not facilitate the exchange as all the requests, questions and issues were centralized. The sociogram showed that these stakeholders were the ones who had the most intense interactions with all the stakeholders.

We learned that FIBA cannot formalize areas that they do not finance and do not control. *Legacy or social leverage* are not one of those areas. As legacy is unique to each host country and it is financed by each alliance member, it is completely decentralized matter and therefore this can explain why event outcomes or legacy are all done individually by the alliance member country and for their community. Therefore, this is not their area of control. The findings suggest that for the implementation of alliance organizational learning outcomes beyond the knowledge transfer is the matter of host governments.

4.6.3. Limitations and future studies perspectives

This study also had its limitations. Because of the time constraints, we could not collect data from all involved stakeholders in the event, because we also did not have full understanding of the ties, until we have executed the quantitative analysis. Therefore, future studies should access all event stakeholders to identify and cross-check ties and interactions between event stakeholders. We did not have equal number of interviews with Spanish LOC, but the amount of provided documents by them allowed us to understand in depth the governance of LOC in Spain. However, it was important to triangulate the found data through more interviews with Spanish LOC. We also did not have a chance to interview both Presidents of the host federations. They were key figures behind alliance formation. Therefore, it is important for future studies to interview stakeholders who initiated formation and who made major decisions within the alliance. We had more participants in France due to easier access and language advantage being in France as a research group. Therefore, future studies on collaboration between host countries should regroup researchers from those countries and speaking co-hosts' languages. The quantitatively analyzed sociogram has not been done by a software program, but rather manually, due to lack of access to the quality software. So, better Social Network Analysis tools should be applied for such purposes. Finally, the case itself was

unique as it has been affected by COVID. There is a need to cross-check this study's findings with a similar event in non-COVID context.

In this case, the two co-hosts were experienced. Therefore, to understand better the organizational learning outcomes, the best sample would be to study a co-hosted alliance with complementary skills to confirm this study's hypothesis.

Chapter V. General Discussion and Conclusion

Although we have already discussed each Study's findings regarding their unique research questions, the aim of this section is to link the results and discussion of both studies and aim to answer our global research questions by comparing the findings of the two studies and attempting to see whether we were successful in filling up the existing research gaps.

This thesis aimed at understanding JHAs through overarching partnership lenses such as IOR that is widely applied in sport management literature to study any form of collaborative projects. Current literature gaps lied in exploring management and outcome phases of co-hosted major events (Byun et al., 2019, 2020a; Stura et al., 2017). We followed the hypothesis made by the authors that at the co-hosted events with inclusive management styles, there is a room for specific social legacy (Walzel & Eickhoff, 2021). Therefore, one of our research objectives was to see what these management styles are and how do they affect collaboration. The more precise suggestion by Byun et al., (2019) was to explore JHA's management and outcomes and in particular through organizational learning perspective to understand how each co-host organization affect each other. Therefore, we have combined these different previous study results and decided to see how event delivery models affect collaboration outcomes or more particularly organizational learning outcomes of co-hosts. To understand the event delivery model, we relied on structural characteristics of Slack (1997) (formalization, centralization and complexity) to see how the event delivery model was designed. This helped us address the management phase gap. To understand the outcomes phase of the alliance, the organizational learning typology of Malo and Elkouzi, (2001) is applied along with social impact literature to discuss the outcomes. As Hoff et al. (2020) highlight the interconnectedness of the IOR stages when conducting research on phase, it was important for us to preserve this logic to make sure we can draw the most relevant conclusion of the outcomes of the JHAs. Therefore, our research questions followed the structure of three phases, while the gap we are trying to fill up lies within the management and outcomes phases. By answering the first two questions, we will understand what factors from formation and management affect the outcomes at the end.

The research question of this thesis was formulated as follows:

1. Formation phase: What are the drivers and motives of JHA formation?
2. Management phase: What is the event delivery model that manages JHAs?

3. Outcomes phase: What are the outcomes of the co-host collaboration? What are the organizational learning outcomes of co-host collaboration? What are the factors affecting the co-host collaboration?

The combination of the two studies helped us to gain the answers to the research questions across two governance levels: on macro level (institutional level) to have a panoramic view on different collaboration outcomes as well as on micro level to explore further the effect of one particular structural dimension (formalization) on the organizational learning outcomes as well as to validate the results through additional analysis on the frequency and intensity of ties through much bigger sample.

The following sections will discuss how successful we were in answering our main research questions combining the results of two studies.

5.1. What are the organizational learning outcomes of the joint hosting alliances?

For making the scope of collaboration outcomes more feasible and narrowed down, we chose organizational learning outcomes, as in fact multiple hosts that join forces together are organizations. As they have been previously considered through strategic alliances in the literature, organizational learning is one of the key constituents of strategic alliances. Moreover, there was a gap established in studying joint bids and/or JHAs through organizational learning lenses. The theoretical framework that we chose to study organizational learning is a multi-level framework to be able to explore learning at three levels: intra-, inter- and extraorganizational learning. This helped us to understand what each co-host learned internally from co-hosting/hosting the event, what they learned together from co-hosting and how their environment benefited from their alliance (their sport, event, federation, community etc.). We could simply study alliance collaboration results through event impacts, legacy or leverage lenses. However, the need for one typology of outcomes made the study more oriented and rigorous as well as in line with strategic alliance literature. This organizational learning theoretical framework is in line with social impact perimeter and its major constituents that was designed to evaluate the impact of MSEs (Charrier et al., 2019) For example, intraorganizational learning outcomes represent capacity building outcomes mentioned in the literature, social cohesion could be within inter- and extraorganizational learning outcomes. Organizational restructuring dimension from this perimeter can also be found within intra-, inter- or even extraorganizational learning outcomes. Development of territories can be intra- or extraorganisational learning outcome identified within our framework.

In **Study 1**, we learned about different organizational learning outcomes of 11 JHAs. As for **intraorganizational learning** results, they referred to all the improved aspects on the individual level of each co-host. The dominant forms were capacity building, network expansion, individual milestone achievement, and event leverage. When it came to **interorganizational learning**, it could be described as a more meaningful interaction, true collaboration, and a joint effort. The results demonstrated two categories of interorganizational learning: mimicking behavior and collaboration in the framework of bidding, event preparation, and the organization of auxiliary events. As for the **extraorganizational level**, the findings were on the success of the co-host

alliance to reach milestones for the sport (e.g., increasing spectatorship and popularity of women’s sport, winning awards for the events) and institutionalize certain practices for the event.

We will now contextualize our findings to one case, that we studied in depth in Study 2. The findings on *FIBA 2021 EBW* from Study 1 indicated that there were no intraorganizational learning outcomes. There was one interorganizational learning outcome on sporting level, as two teams played against each other in preparation for the event. As for extraorganizational outcomes, increasing visibility of women basketball was the initial strategic goal. However, it is not clear yet if this goal can be a learning outcome as the organizers were hit with COVID restrictions. Even for the matches between Spain and France not all of them happened due to the restrictions. As we can see in Table 17 this event did not have a lot of organizational learning outcomes. The factors below may unravel in more detail why.

Table 17. Organizational learning outcomes of FIBA EBW 2021

Codes Event	Intraorganizational	Interorganizational	Extraorganizational
FIBA Women Eurobasket 2021	N/A	Common activity: friendly matches to prepare for the tournament (Spain)	Increasing visibility of women basketball

Source: author’s own elaboration

E 2 What are the factors affecting organizational learning outcomes?

In Study 2 we explored in more detail the factors affecting the outcomes, below the discussion on the factors is presented that answers our research sub-question.

Study 1 has demonstrated that the factors that affect organizational learning outcomes derive from three different contexts: **the formation, management and national context**, so we did not just study the influence of management of the alliance in complete isolation in this study, although this was the objective of the study. Alliance formation factors were found to have a big impact on whether there would be further interaction and collaboration between the alliance members in the management stage, affecting their organizational learning outcomes. Most of the findings on the managerial factors are formal and informal event owner tools that can facilitate or hinder learning. For example, formalized areas of collaboration which the event owner prescribes can hinder learning if they only prescribe collaboration on subjects limiting the learning and innovation capacities of the members. Conversely, they can facilitate learning if they prescribe learning between the partners, e.g. knowledge transfers programs, joint projects, joint legacy programs etc. Dedicated HRs can facilitate the co-host interaction or be a “third-party” between the alliance members. Additional management layer is a meeting platform where co-hosts interact, collaborate and may transfer knowledge. Finally, high event velocity is high the intensity of event preparation and delivery that affected the frequency of collaboration. National context factors, although a group of emerging codes that deserved a separate group of its own, because it represented different ways in which such context could limit collaboration and therefore potential learning opportunities for the alliance members. These sub-factors are culture, internationalization attitudes, decision-making, government support and staff change in the LOC. They could have both positive and negative effects under different circumstances. However, it was difficult to appropriate the outcomes to factors due to a lack of evidence at certain events.

Therefore, Study 2 was designed to fill in that gap and Study 1 was implemented to study event and see how different factors affect the collaboration and associated outcomes (in our case collaborate organizational learning outcomes). See Figure 30 below that summarizes how the findings of Study 1 helped framing Study 2 and how they can help frame future studies.




Figure 30. Comparison between two studies' findings

Source: author's own elaboration

Further discussion will be applied to discussing single case study on FIBA EBW 2021 in depth comparing its findings from both studies.

5.2.1. Formation factors

The Study 1 gave us a first level understanding that there were ties between the two co-host federation presidents' as two federations are experienced hosts, they have good women basketball record and therefore the associated mutual trust that comes with it. Study 1 also revealed that lack of organizational learning could be due to lack of dissimilar skills between the NSGBs as they were both experienced in hosting. We learned that their goals were competing after conducting Study 2 and analyzing the archives of the event for the objective of each host federation. Their individual objectives were that both the federations had similar sportive objective, which were in a competing objective. The French women's basketball team did achieve their objective by finishing second, but it was not the case for not the Spanish team, in terms of sporting result. Therefore, having competing objectives within the alliance may also affect the collaboration context, its frequency and therefore co-host's organizational learning capacity. However, we also learned that they also had a mutual goal to make women's basketball more visible. It is yet to explore if this objective

was achieved due to COVID and if yes it can be considered as an extraorganizational learning outcome that was planned and written in the accompanying letter for their bid proposal, which we also learned through Study 2. However, despite competing objectives and the same experience level, the federations trust each other in the delivery. Therefore, for the alliances' objectives which is delivering the event, this quality was crucial because both sides delivered the event, despite change of context, power relations and differences in the structure. However, for organizational learning and its various typologies, presence of dissimilar skills, heterogeneity of experience level and adapted relational norms are important.

Second, there was a change in the alliance formation halfway through the event with the change of roles and power dynamics of alliance members, due to COVID, which might have also changed the initial objectives of each federation which were initially written at the bidding stage. This might also have affected the management of the alliance. With the status change, the Spanish LOC was feeling more legitimate to ask for reconsideration of the mascot colors in their favor for example. However, this status change was not something necessarily negative. French LOC were able to save their status as hosts of the event. Since this was something discussed on a political level, the agreement was reached thanks to this trust.

5.2.2. Management factors (structural dimensions)

5.2.2.1. *Formalization*

Study 1 gave examples of areas in those regulations where joint collaborations can be encouraged, recommended or formalized so that co-hosts work together. It also suggested that formalization can hinder learning and innovation capacities of co-hosts. Study 2 confirmed this finding by studying one case. The formalized requirements indeed might have prevented employees from innovating and experiment, as well as collaborate, as they simply want to follow the regulations and deliver their part of the event.

5.2.2.2. *Centralization*

Study 1 highlighted the fact that having dedicated HRs might help in the liaison of co-hosts more frequent interactions. Study 2 results showed the opposite. The event managers in charge of hosts were the stakeholders that had the most interactions as their job were to centralize information from each of the co-host. Therefore, it is important to explore further the job specifications of liaison

officers of event managers of co-hosts that are hired by the event owners to coordinate the event delivery across multiple nations and understand where lies their mission to coordinate relations between co-host are interacting with co-hosts, to align, to centralize etc.

Despite of having additional HR tool to manage relations, which we considered a positive dispositive to have in Study 1, it did not help alliance members collaborate more, as the functions of the event managers were more centralization of information, which prevent sin certain way interactions between co-hosts. This finding was possible thanks to Study 2, to which we had access to more participants: event managers themselves as well as the LOC representatives from both countries.

Linking back to literature, this alliance did have informal authority that allowed certain degree of decentralization as being top federations in women basketball, therefore there might have been less intervention to certain areas of organization and more flexibility, which allowed hosts to be more autonomous and maybe less cooperative.

5.2.2.3. *Event velocity*

Event velocity appeared in both studies as well as a dominant factor that affects collaboration. It explained why there were only “by-product” outcomes in Study 1 and a lack of organizational learning outcomes between co-hosts in Study 2. High event velocity also means lack of the need for the regular interaction and rather focus on local delivery of the event, therefore there is less probability for inter and extraorganizational learning. A few of the interviewees agreed that the event workload did not allow for collaboration. This leads to the discussion of the frequency of collaboration and the importance of norms and regulations prescribed by the event owners, which was also given attention in our theoretical framework. In study 2, the people with whom the most collaboration was those who were directly involved in the related functional areas and within the same LOC. For example, for the Event Coordinator in FFBB (I₁₀, FFBB), it was with those who worked on sanitary issues (due to the novelty of the issues and its timely importance in post COVID game planning), volunteering (delegating the tasks within the same function) and venue management (executing functions of one of his main FAs). The same was observed for I₁₁ (FFBB) having more interactions with people from the same LOC, FIBA, and function-related stakeholders (e.g. subcontractors). The implication of this is that since there is a lot of alignment and coordination to be done, the bidding, and event preparation could be longer so it will allow the co-

hosts to benefit from this collaborative stage as interactions have organizational learning social legacy outcomes. This is in line with Chalip (2006) argument on pre-event strategic planning as a necessity for leveraging event for specific benefits. Leverage can also be successful if planned, especially in the event context, as tournament and event periods are the busiest where issues like co-host collaboration can be the least important.

5.2.3. National context factors

Study 1 results revealed national context factors as emerging theme factors among alliance formation and management factors. We could attribute these factors to alliance formation factors, such as characteristics of bidders to describe that this was a factor in forming the alliance. National context factors, although a group of emerging codes that deserved a separate group of its own, because it represented different ways in which such context could limit collaboration and therefore potential learning opportunities for the alliance members. These sub-factors are culture, internationalization attitudes, decision-making, government support and staff change in the LOC. They could have both positive and negative effects under different circumstances. These factors were crucial in the perception of one another and collaboration. The government support was one of the dominant results, as many co-hosts felt like doing something together would cost additional money and each co-host's budget differs as the money comes from different sources in each LOC. Similarly, the constant staff change at one LOC makes co-host LOC unable to coordinate with an opposite LOC and build a lasting tie. Study 2 confirmed the government support argument, as both federations were not financed in the same way by government, which affected their LOC structure as well and number of employees at each location. However, at the same time Language could be the barrier for leveraging the collaboration to create a more meaningful promotional campaign for example. Also, there were power dynamics played out depending on the status of the host, whether they host the final or not, which means they would want their culture to be represented on the joint mascot for example.

Therefore, political, administrative and cultural context did demonstrate a significant role in coordination, event decision-making and potential outcomes of the collaboration. It gave us some insights into how organizational learning and other social outcomes can happen between the countries that are culturally proximate regardless geographical location.

5.3. Connecting thesis results and literature review gaps

5.3.1. Globalization research gaps

As was demonstrated in the results, co-hosted events can be the examples of denationalization processes as national federations collaborate and establish diplomatic relations without the state involvement. However, they do need state authorities to support them financially. However, in the example of FIBA EBW 2021 it was local authorities, cities supporting the event. Therefore, they are examples of continuous development of paradiplomacy. The fact that the branding of the event was on host cities - Valencia and Strasbourg is to highlight the efforts of these cities rather than Spain or France. The branding of these cities was crucial due to their involvement in the organization of the event.

The sample of Study 1 and 2 did not include as many countries from subaltern groups, but there were a few participants that gave us insights into the issues associated when co-hosting events between subaltern and western countries (Latvia and Belarus, Poland and Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia, Japan, Indonesia and Philippines).

Our findings did go in line with the research of colleagues (Beissel & Ternes, 2022; Beissel & Andrews, 2020; Beissel & Kohe, 2020) that shows that the symbolic politics of unity was present in co-hosted alliances that we interviewed. The lack of social outcomes, legacy or leverage in diplomatic relations or other areas shows that the events themselves were not used to achieve these goals. Although non-state actors are involved in organizing the events, the governments did not demonstrate further interest in leveraging these relationships.

5.3.2. Event research gaps

We have studied predominantly NMSEs and their social outcomes in our research. We have been studying co-hosted specific social impacts, organizational learning outcomes that can be attributed to social and human capital body of knowledge. We have applied also appropriate methodology to study NMSEs through making social network analysis, as it is as at NMSEs that these ties might be conducive to more social outcomes. Indeed, Study 1 results demonstrated a plethora of the results but proved the lack of strategic use of the events. Study 2 shows that there was a small degree of leveraging social outcomes in co-hosted events. It was interorganizational learning findings that both federations wanted to benefit from each other's sporting resources and to prepare

themselves for the tournament by playing friendly matches. At the end this was not done fully because of COVID context.

Our findings are in line with Preuss (2013) findings that social legacy outcomes absences can be due to the issue that LOCs or event organizers cannot take on themselves. It is an additional focus for the organizers and it is up to relevant stakeholders to see the value in these events. It confirms the research on NMSEs that these events usually do not have additional resources to support social impact leverage initiatives and they do not see themselves as the right stakeholders to do so. This is in line with Djaballah et al. (2015) approach on sensemaking that local governments yet do not see these events as leverageable sources and they do not realize yet their role into social outcome implementation in the context of co-hosted specific social outcomes like organizational learning. Organizational learning could be directly involved with government, as they are the ones who supervise the professionalization of event management employees within their national contexts. They have the capacity to build bridges and facilitate exchange. They have financial power to support these initiatives. Therefore, more research should be done to explore the role of local government in supporting social outcomes in a co-hosted event context towards co-host specific outcomes, as this is also leverageable resource for them.

5.3.3. IOR research gaps

Our research is logical continuation of the existing research in the field of sport event partnerships by applying IOR and strategic alliance literature. We followed the conceptual model of Byun et al. (2019, 2020) who started the research on joint bidding alliance, by studying such partnerships in their following management and outcomes stage. We relied on Gerke et al.(2021) and Hoff et al. (2020) to form our understanding around partnership phases. We formulated our research questions based on the need identified by Byun et al. (2019) to study organizational learning outcomes of joint bids in the later phases of their alliance. This study aimed to fill this gap.

When it comes to formation phases of the JHAs that we studied in Study 1, we relied on the motives and drivers of Byun et al. (2019) research as it was more contextualized and inclusive. Hoff et al. (2020) results in applying Oliver's framework demonstrated the need for additional determinants such as shared motives and individual-level factors, which was present in Byun et al. (2019). Our findings confirm the motives and drivers of Byun et al. (2019) by testing more events. Our findings, however, had an additional motive: access to political resources (votes), which was mentioned by

a third of our sample, which contributes to the existing literature. To link these findings with Oliver's determinants. The alliance members across different events looked for legitimacy, necessity, reciprocity, efficiency and stability. The determinant that did not appear in our findings is Asymmetry. The partnerships that were formed through bidding procedures were formed based on legitimacy and necessity grounds (e.g. FIBA World Cup 2023, IIHF Men's World Championship 2021, EHF Men's Euro 2020). The partnerships that formed their alliances before the bidding procedures looked for Stability, Efficiency and Reciprocity (e.g. FIBA Women's Eurobasket 2021, UEFA Men's Euro 2012, EHF Men's Euro 2022, IHF Men's World Championship 2019 and CEV Men's Eurovolley 2019)

In the Study 2 of FIBA 2021 EBW, it was the case of the partnership formed way before the bidding procedures. Our findings showed that the formation of this alliance was based on Reciprocity, Efficiency and Stability based on Oliver's (1990) determinants of the IOR. FFBB and FEB looked for mutual goal to make a women's basketball tournament better, which indicates Reciprocity. Both federations, despite their experience in hosting tournaments, cannot deliver an event on their own if they want to leverage economically from the event (Efficiency) and therefore forming alliance would be a solution to a resource scarcity. Since partners have changed their roles over the course of COVID crisis over event funds, demonstrated their search for Stability in the relationship and mutual understanding.

The findings show that due to timeline and nature of the NMSEs, these partnerships cannot be more than first-level partnerships (Gerke et al. 2018) which may explain why there is not a lot of strategic leverage and therefore inter and extraorganisational learning. Our findings show that organizational learning is possible but most of it is accidental and therefore the stakeholders of alliance are not the right actors to build long-term partnerships. The case of FIBA EBW 2021, it was a first level partnership in way that each actor knew its role and part in the partnership and there was no need for more coordination between actors. The event hosting though can be part of higher-level partnership between the federations, Presidents of the federations, state actors, but does not necessarily translate into the LOC / operational level. More research could be done to explore the nature of co-hosted event partnerships with regards to higher-level or first-level.

The literature also mentioned that for the knowledge transfer within the partnerships, they must be strategic and collaborative. Our research has shown that even in collaborative partnerships, there

was one common characteristic – presence of dissimilar skills. In partnership with equal skill dynamic, partners tend to work independently. They do not leverage their knowledge for the creation of new knowledge, for example.

To conclude, we contributed to current research by verifying some of the previous findings of our colleagues, adding new examples by testing new events and new dimensions to the ones discussed. We continued the research by studying the outcomes of the alliances and the effect of the management on the outcomes. We reaffirmed the interconnectedness between the phases and their effect on outcomes.

To answer specific research gaps on the Outcomes phase of the JHAs: What are the outcomes of JHAs? Are these alliances successful? Does each alliance member meet their goal? How do alliance members influence each other? (What is the organizational learning between the members?)

Does each alliance member achieve their goal? Not always because some of their goals are independent of the alliance, for example in single case study 2 of FIBA EBW 2021, Spain had sportive ambitions, which they did not achieve. As an alliance, Spain and France wanted to achieve better tournament experience for fans, this was not possible fully due to COVID and its consequences on attendance. However, the tournament did happen, and it generated an enthusiasm from fans, according to post-event report of FEB (2021). In Study, the example of the co-host of IIHF World Championship 2021 – Belarus was relevant to illustrate alliance member achievement of goals. They did achieve their goal to be win the bid but not to host of the tournament, as due to unstable political situation, the event had to withdraw from Belarus.

Intangible outcomes: organizational learning

More globally, multiple case studies helped to fill the gap on studying intangible social outcomes of NMSEs, in the co-hosted context. We narrowed down our focus to organizational learning on different levels which was an inclusive concept of different positive and negative intangible outcomes of the event. For intraorganizational learning results, participants referred to all the improved aspects on their individual level. The dominant forms were capacity building, network expansion, individual milestone achievement, and event leverage. The findings in this form of organizational learning can help to fill up the gap on the success of strategic alliances and each alliance member's goal achievement (Byun et al. 2019). When it comes to interorganizational

learning, it can be described as a more meaningful interaction, true collaboration, and a joint effort. The results demonstrate two categories of interorganizational learning: mimicking behavior and collaboration in the framework of bidding/event preparation, and the organization of auxiliary events. This category of interorganizational learning fills the gap on how alliance members influence each other (organizational learning of strategic alliances) (Byun et al. 2019). As for the extraorganizational level, the findings rely on the success of the co-host alliance to reach milestones for the sport (e.g., increasing spectatorship and popularity of women's sport, winning awards for the events) and institutionalize certain practices for the event. This fills up the gap between the results/success of strategic alliances (Byun et al. 2019) and co-host ability to push-back the formal requirements to leverage the event's benefits Kelly et al. (2019).

In the single case study 2, we concluded that some goals were achieved for one co-host but not for the other. Spain and France had sportive ambitions, however only France succeeded to meet this objective. As an alliance, Spain and France wanted to achieve better tournament experience for fans and overall improve the quality of female basketball tournaments, this was not possible fully due to COVID crisis and its consequences on attendance. However, the delivery of the event was successful especially in the sanitary context, so the alliance was successful in this regard. When talking about inter- and extraorganizational learning outcomes, they were not really achieved because of the presence of these specific factors: competing objectives, lack of dissimilar skills and formalized event delivery model that affected interactions.

5.3.4. Organizational structure gaps

This research responds to the current gaps in the research of organizational structure in the context of NMSEs. We understood the role of the event owner in designing the event delivery model and what drives the formalization of areas in their rules and regulations. We also contributed to the current literature by understanding the role of JHA members in designing the part of organizational delivery model in co-hosted events (by creating their own contracts or by organization on their side additional platforms formal or informal to collaborate).

We provided different examples of *unit grouping* in JHAs with a deeper focus on it in Study 2 by analyzing the ties in more detail. We have seen what *liaison devices* event owners use to communicate, coordinate with co-hosts and align the co-hosts. We could see whether some areas can be decentralized to co-hosts and what factors affect this decentralization. Finally, we could

understand that social leverage or social outcomes are not part of the organizational delivery model provided by the event owners as they do not finance or control these initiatives. To conclude, our thesis has contributed to the literature on structure by using structural dimensions and especially formalization to guide us in understanding the event delivery models of NMSEs, co-hosted events.

5.4. Conclusion

The overall meaning of this thesis is that JHAs are not necessarily intense collaborative efforts. It is a breakdown of projects to smaller events that makes it easier for host countries to host, rather than the whole event on their event. Due to the high event velocity and differences in legal, administrative and financial background, Study 1 and Study 2 especially proved that such events cannot be platforms of intense collaboration that can lead to specific social legacy outcomes or planned interorganizational and extraorganizational learning outcomes. This study does not suggest that it is not possible. It aimed to explore whether such collaboration could be a source of such learning and outcomes, however, this research demonstrated that it is not yet the priority and the event stakeholders do not feel fully entitled and competent to take on role to strategically view their co-host partnership. Event owners do not see that it should be their role to make the host countries collaborate. The low degree or the lack of collaboration formalization is explained by the lack of control and accountability over these areas which interest less ISGB because they are aligned with their own strategic goals and mission which is to deliver the event. For the alliance members, this is also rarely a priority due to lack of involvement of the public sector. Such partnerships however are viewed strategically at the bidding stage to win the bid as demonstrated by the results of the study of Byun et al. (2019 and 2020), but not once the alliance is formed.

Social impacts unfortunately stay an area that is not yet regarded as important at the co-hosted NMSEs. There is a willing to produce legacy even by the actors, but there are no resources to implement them. Strategic planning could be implemented while looking for a co-host partner, when forming the partnership and its goals, when designing specific management tools, and when following and responding to the formalized regulations. Even if there is one positive example of a co-host federation that gains organizational learning outcomes can be legitimate in the whole federative world to encourage mimicking of practices within the same national context or within the federative environment.

Finally, I hope this work was a small and modest contribution to understanding how sporting events can be harnessed for international ideologue, understanding and peace, to connect it to the very first quote that we started this thesis with. Even if we learned that these events are not yet strategically used to produce such specific outcomes, we identified the starting points and relevant stakeholders to reflect on the potential of JHAs to become such platforms.

Among the major limitations of this research was in defining the right sample, in accessing key individuals during the peak of their professional commitments, in accessing the event related material, in focusing on one main theoretical framework and on the overall volume of the 2 studies that makes it harder to generalize. Despite these important limitations, we believe that we produced a significant contribution in the field of sports event management and alliance management.

This thesis was successful in filling up the gap on the impacts of JHAs and the factors that affected it deriving from formation and management phases. We highlighted and established the link specifically between organizational structural dimensions and their organizational learning outcomes. We can see clearly that there is a link between how the event was governed and what outcomes it would produce. However, alliance formation factors equally affect the organizational learning outcomes. The organizational structure is designed by the event owner but also determined by the JHA members depending on their practices. Some of their practices can facilitate organizational learning outcomes. However, we could establish a different link on the absence of strategic planning and strong collaboration in such alliances. The stakeholders we interviewed are not key stakeholders to develop high level partnership and produce intangible outcomes. The public sector and different organisms can be key in that decision-making, so therefore it is important to inquire them in the future on whether they leverage such joint hosting platforms to produce positive outcomes for their host communities. Applying given theoretical frameworks such as structural dimensions (formalization) and organizational learning gave us all other possibilities to explore such questions in the future.

Studying each event's model in-depth would be the most relevant way to study the event delivery's model effect on co-host collaboration. We should exclude the events that were formed through emergency reasons or that were prepared during COVID as it is not a representative sample. Organizational learning outcomes enables us to understand social and human capital outcomes of NMSEs and these findings could be explored further by studying one outcome (e.g., bilateral ties improvement, diplomatic, political ties etc.)

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Appendix A: Table of examples of monosport event editions based on centrality

MONOSPORT												
		Football		Basketball		Volleyball		handball		cricket	ice hockey	rugby
		FIFA	UEFA	FIBA Europe	FIBA	CEV	FIVB	EHF	IHF	ICC	IIHF	Rugby Union
		WC	Euro	EB	WC	EV	WCh	Euro	WCh	WC	WCh	WC
P1	M	2018 - RUS	2004 – POR	2013 - SVN	2014 - ESP	2009 - TUR	2022 –RUS	2018 - HRV	2017 - FRA	2023 - IND	2016 - RUS	2011 - NZL
		2022 - QAT	2016 – FRA		2019 - CHN	2017 - POL	2014 – POL	2024 - DEU	2021 - EGY		2019 - SVK	2019 - JPN
											2022 - FIN	2023 - FRA
	W	2019 - FRA	N/A	2013 - CZE	N/A	2009 - POL	2014 – ITA	2018 - FRA	2019 -JPN	2013 - IND	2021 - CAN	2021 - NZL
				2017 - FRA			2018 – JPN		2021 - ESP	2022 - NZL		
P2a	M	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2007 - FRA + (WAL)
	W	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2015 - ENG + (WAL)
P2b	M	2002 - JPN, KOR	2008 - AUT, CHE	2015 - FRA, HRV, DEU, LVA	2023 - PHL, JPN, IDN	2011 - AUT, CZE	2018 - ITA, BGR	2020 - AUT,NOR, SWE	2019 - DEU, DNK	2007 - West Indies (8	2013 - SWE, FIN	N/A

									host nations)		
		2012 - UKR,POL	2017 -FIN, ISR, ROU, TUR		2013 - DNK, POL			2023 - POL, SWE	2011 - IND, SKA, BGD	2017 - DEU, FRA	
					2015 - ITA, BGR			2025 - HRV, DNK, NOR	2015 - AUS, NZL	2021 - BLR, LVA	
		2026 - USA, CAN, MEX	2020 - 12 host nations	2022 - CZE, GEO, ITA, DEU	2019 - BEL, FRA, NLD, SVN		2022 -HUN, SVK		2019 - ENG, WAL	2025 - SWE, DNK	
W	2023 - AUS, NZL	N/A	2015 - HUN, ROU	N/A	2007 - BEL, LUX	2022 - POL, NLD	2020 - NOR, DNK	N/A	2017 - ENG, WAL	N/A	N/A
			2019 - LVA, SRB		2011 - ITA, SRB						
			2021 - FRA, ESP		2013 -DEU, CHE						
					2015 - ITA, BGR						
					2017 AZE, GEO						

						2019 - HUN, POL, SVK, TUR						
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Appendix B: Study 1 - Interview Guide for Event Owners

I. Event governance model

1. What is the organization model of the co-hosted event(s) at your sports organization?
2. What type of contract(s) do you sign with the co-hosts? (e.g., staging, hosting, stadium, etc.)?
3. How did you arrive to this practice?
4. Do you view co-hosts as individual hosts of your event or a hosting alliance?

II. Elements of event governance model

Communication

5. How is the communication happening between you and co-hosts and between co-hosts? (before and during the event)

Roles and responsibilities, joint functions, and collaboration

6. What are your responsibilities in the event governance?
7. What are the responsibilities of hosts in the event governance?
8. What are the joint responsibilities of co-hosts?

Decision-making

9. How were event-related decisions made between you and co-hosts and between co-hosts?
10. Can host nations suggest the modifications to the contracts? Has it happened before?

Leverage

11. Do you encourage legacy/joint legacy? If yes, how and in what areas? If no, why?
12. Do you encourage social joint legacy? If yes, how and in what areas? if no, why?

Prompt: Social impact perimeter (Charrier et al., 2019):

- a. social cohesion
- b. capacity building
- c. sport practice development
- d. organizational structuring
- e. development of territories
- f. bridging sport and other sectors

Final

13. Would you like to add anything?
14. Do you know anyone who could contribute on this subject?

Appendix C: Study 1 - Interview Guide for Event Organizers

Formation of alliance

1. How was your co-hosting alliance formed? How did your country (federation) join the hosting alliance?

Event governance model

2. What type(s) of contract(s) have you signed with the event owner?
3. Have you signed any contract with your co-host? (e.g. inter-partes agreement)
 - a. If yes, what was the purpose of it?

Elements of event governance model

Roles and Responsibilities

4. What were the areas of responsibilities of each co-host?
5. What were the areas of joint responsibility with your co-host?
6. Was there a clarity between individual and joint responsibilities for each co-host?
7. What were the areas of responsibility of the event owner (federation)?
8. Was it up to you to decide to work on any area with your co-host? (without asking for permission of event owner)
 - If yes, in what areas and to what extent?
 - If not, why not?

Communication, Collaboration, Decision-making

9. How was communication with your co-host and event owner arranged?
10. How close did you work with your hosting partner?
11. Which information and sources were shared between you and co-host?
12. Could you question or suggest anything regarding regulations of the event owner?
13. Could you question any ideas or decisions of your hosting partner?
14. Has there been collaboration with your co-host beyond the tournament organization and after the event? If yes, what kind?
15. Has there been collaboration with your co-host with regards to joint legacy initiatives? If yes, what kind?

Joint event leverage

16. What were the barriers/challenges to leveraging the event with your co-host?
17. What could you do differently to leverage better the event's benefits?

Final

18. Would you like to add anything?
19. Do you know anyone who could contribute on this subject?

Appendix D: Study 1 - Interview Guide for Event Organizers (french version)

I. Modèle de gouvernance de l'événement

1. Quel(s) type(s) de contrat(s) avez-vous signé avec le propriétaire de l'événement ?
2. Avez-vous signé un contrat avec votre(s) co-hôte(s) ? (Par exemple, un accord inter-partenaires)

II. Éléments du modèle de gouvernance de l'événement

Rôles et responsabilités

1. Quels étaient les domaines de responsabilité de chaque co-hôte ?
2. Quels étaient les domaines de responsabilité conjointe avec votre(vos) co-hôte(s) ?
3. Les responsabilités individuelles et conjointes de chaque co-organisateur étaient-elles claires ?
4. Quels étaient les domaines de responsabilité de la fédération internationale ?
5. Pourriez-vous décider de travailler sur n'importe quel domaine avec votre co-organisateur ? (Sans demander la permission du propriétaire de l'événement)

Communication, Collaboration, Prise de décision

6. Comment la communication avec votre(vos) co-hôte(s) et le propriétaire de l'événement a-t-elle été organisée ?
7. Dans quelle mesure avez-vous travaillé en étroite collaboration avec votre partenaire d'accueil ?
8. Quelles informations et sources ont été partagées entre vous et le(s) co-hôte(s) ?
9. Pourriez-vous poser des questions ou suggérer quelque chose concernant les règlements de la fédération internationale ?
10. Pourriez-vous remettre en question certaines idées ou décisions de votre(vos) co-hôte(s) ?
11. Y a-t-il eu une collaboration avec votre co-hôte au-delà de l'organisation du tournoi et après l'événement ? Si oui, de quelle nature ?
12. Y a-t-il eu une collaboration avec votre(vos) co-hôte(s) en ce qui concerne les initiatives conjointes d'héritage ? Si oui, de quelle nature ?

Organisation de l'événement conjoint (Effet de levier)

13. Quels ont été les obstacles/défis pour organiser l'événement avec votre co-organisateur ?
 - a. Pour exploiter les avantages de l'événement avec votre co-organisateur ?
14. Que pourriez-vous faire différemment pour mieux organiser l'événement ?
 - a. Pour mieux exploiter les avantages de l'événement avec votre co-organisateur ?

Final

15. Souhaitez-vous ajouter quelque chose ?
16. Connaissez-vous quelqu'un qui pourrait apporter sa contribution sur ce sujet ?

Appendix E: Study 1 - MAXQDA Screenshots of analyzed codes

- *Screenshot A on total number of codes for Study 1 and Study 2*

A screenshot of the MAXQDA software interface showing a hierarchical tree view of the code system. The root node is 'Code System' with a count of 529. It branches into 'Study 1 Multiple case study' (363), 'Study 2 - FIBA EBW 2021 IOR' (166), and 'Sets' (0). The interface includes a toolbar with icons for search, print, and other functions.

Code System	Count
Code System	529
Study 1 Multiple case study	363
Study 2 - FIBA EBW 2021 IOR	166
Sets	0

- *Screenshot B on number breakdown across major codes which are IOR phases*

A screenshot of the MAXQDA software interface showing a hierarchical tree view of the code system. The root node is 'Code System' with a count of 529. It branches into 'Study 1 Multiple case study' (0), 'IOR formation' (31), 'IOR management' (179), and 'IOR outcomes' (153).

Code System	Count
Code System	529
Study 1 Multiple case study	0
IOR formation	31
IOR management	179
IOR outcomes	153

- *Screenshot C on number of major sub-codes within each phase*

A screenshot of the MAXQDA software interface showing a hierarchical tree view of the code system. The root node is 'Code System' with a count of 529. It branches into 'Study 1 Multiple case study' (0), 'IOR formation' (0), 'IOR management' (0), and 'IOR outcomes' (0). Under 'IOR formation', there are sub-codes: 'IOR member individual strategic goal' (2), 'drivers' (10), and 'motives' (19). Under 'IOR management', there are sub-codes: 'Structure' (1), 'Centralization' (11), 'Complexity' (74), and 'Formalization' (93). Under 'IOR outcomes', there is a sub-code: 'organizational learning' (153).

Code System	Count
Code System	529
Study 1 Multiple case study	0
IOR formation	0
IOR member individual strategic goal	2
drivers	10
motives	19
IOR management	0
Structure	1
Centralization	11
Complexity	74
Formalization	93
IOR outcomes	0
organizational learning	153

Appendix F: Study 2 - Interview Guide for JHA members

Questions in English

1. Can you introduce yourself and talk to me about your role at the organization of the event?
2. How long did you work for the event?
3. What were the people you worked the most at the event?
4. What were the people you worked the least at the event?
5. Did you have interactions with the staff from Spanish LOC ? If yes, what kind? What frequency?
6. Did you have interactions with the staff from FIBA Europe and FIBA International? If yes, what kind? What frequency?
7. Did you have interactions with the other organizations of the event? If yes, what kind? What frequency?
8. Other questions depending on answers

Questions en français

1. Pouvez-vous vous présenter et me parler de votre rôle dans l'organisation de l'événement ?
2. Combien de temps avez-vous travaillé pour l'événement ?
3. Quelles sont les personnes avec lesquelles vous avez le plus travaillé pour l'événement ?
4. Quelles sont les personnes avec lesquelles vous avez le moins travaillé lors de l'événement ?
5. Avez-vous eu des interactions avec le personnel du COL Espagne ? Si oui, quel type ? A quelle fréquence ?
6. Avez-vous eu des interactions avec le personnel de FIBA Europe et/ou FIBA International ? Si oui, quel type ? A quelle fréquence ?
7. Avez-vous eu des interactions avec les autres organisations de l'événement ? Si oui, quel type ? A quelle fréquence ?
8. Autres questions en fonction de vos réponses

Appendix G: Study 2 - MAXQDA Screenshots of data coding

▼ ●📄 Study 2 - FIBA EBW 2021 IOR	0
> ●📄 management of the IOR	46
●📄 outcomes of the IOR	0
> ●📄 formation of the IOR	120