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Social Norms and Trust Levels among Refugees and Swiss Natives: A Behavioral Economics Approach

Stefanie Baumgartner

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**Social norms and trust among refugees
and Swiss natives.**

A behavioral economics approach.

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Université de Fribourg - Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales et du Management
Université Lumière Lyon 2 - Ecole Doctorale Sciences Economiques et Gestion
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique

**SOCIAL NORMS AND TRUST AMONG REFUGEES AND
SWISS NATIVES - A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
APPROACH**

Thèse de Doctorat

Présentée et soutenue publiquement par

Stefanie Simone Baumgartner

le 1er juillet 2024

en vue de l'obtention du grade de
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et
Docteur en sciences économiques
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The Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg and the University Lumière Lyon 2 neither approve nor disapprove of the opinions expressed in a doctoral thesis. They are to be considered those of the author.

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Résumé de la thèse

Un nombre sans précédent et en constante augmentation de personnes dans le monde entier ont été contraintes de quitter leur domicile ces dernières années. La guerre, les conflits ou la persécution ne leur ont laissé d'autre choix que d'entreprendre un processus de migration contraint et souvent traumatisant. À la fin 2022, 108 millions de personnes étaient déplacées de force dans le monde, parmi lesquelles 12,4 millions de réfugiés et de personnes en situation similaire à celle de réfugiés ont trouvé protection en Europe (UNHCR, 2022). Le plus grand nombre de demandes d'asiles en Europe en 2022 a été soumis par des personnes en provenance de Syrie, d'Afghanistan et de Turquie.¹ Selon la convention des réfugiés de 1951 à Genève, un "réfugié"² est une personne "*qui est incapable ou refuse de retourner dans son pays d'origine en raison d'une crainte fondée d'être persécutée pour des raisons de race, de religion, de nationalité, d'appartenance à un groupe social particulier ou d'opinion politique.*" (UNHCR (2010), p.3)

Une fois arrivés dans le pays d'accueil et ayant obtenu le droit d'y séjourner légalement, les réfugiés doivent se créer une nouvelle vie dans le pays d'accueil, ce qui est loin d'être évident. L'intégration est considérée comme un processus allant dans les deux sens entre la société d'accueil et les nouveaux arrivants (Klarenbeek, 2021). Ce processus d'intégration passe par l'accès à l'emploi, à la santé, au logement, à l'éducation, mais aussi par l'acquisition de compétences linguistiques et culturelles et par des droits de citoyenneté et d'égalité (Ager and Strang, 2008).

Dans cette perspective, la participation au marché du travail est considérée comme l'un des aspects les plus fondamentaux du processus d'intégration des réfugiés dans la société d'accueil. En plus d'assurer l'indépendance financière, l'emploi est également un canal crucial pour établir des réseaux et acquérir des compétences linguistiques, et donc favoriser l'inclusion sociale (Ager and Strang, 2008; Cheung and Phillimore, 2013; Ortlieb and Knappert, 2023; Verdier and Zenou, 2017). Cependant, l'intégration professionnelle des réfugiés est devenue un sujet de débat politique brûlant dans la plupart des pays occidentaux. Un constat bien documenté dans les pays riches de l'OCDE est que les taux d'emploi des réfugiés hors Union Européenne sont inférieurs à ceux de la population autochtone et d'autres groupes de migrants (Bedaso, 2021; Bevelander, 2016; Salikutluk et al., 2016a; Fasani et al., 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017, 2018; Salikutluk et al., 2016b). Une étude menée dans 20 pays européens estime que la probabilité de chômage était de 22 pour cent (3.1 points de pourcentage) plus élevée chez les réfugiés que chez les autres immigrants ayant un profil individuel comparable (Fasani et al., 2022).

Alors qu'il existe une vaste littérature portant sur l'intégration sur le marché du travail des immigrants

¹Extrait de <https://euaa.europa.eu/asylum-europe-2022-year-review> au 27.04.2024

²Pour des raisons de simplicité, la forme masculine est utilisée. Cependant, il convient de noter que cela englobe tous les genres.

économiques (par exemple Causa and Jean (2006), Ho and Turk (2018), Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx (2016)), la recherche sur les facteurs de chômage des réfugiés dans les pays occidentaux à haute revenu par tête est encore relativement limitée. Plus que ces derniers, les réfugiés sont susceptibles de faire face à des défis spécifiques pouvant compromettre leur insertion sur le marché du travail. Il en est ainsi des expériences traumatiques et des problèmes de santé (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Schick et al., 2016), des conditions de vie précaires dans le pays d'accueil Salis Gross (2004), des barrières linguistiques (Arendt, 2022; Cheng et al., 2021; Foged and Van der Werf, 2023), des restrictions légales d'accès au marché du travail et de reconnaissance des qualifications (Bucken-Knapp et al., 2019; Fasani et al., 2022). A cela s'ajoute des perspectives incertaines compte tenu de leur statut particulier (Brell et al., 2020).

Il convient de noter que la question de l'insertion professionnelle des réfugiés a jusqu'à présent négligé les rôles des normes sociales et de la confiance généralisée. Qu'entendons-nous par ces concepts et pourquoi sont-ils importants ?

La théorie des normes sociales postule que le comportement humain est motivé par la préférence des individus pour la conformité avec un groupe de référence, généralement le groupe majoritaire ou un réseau de personnes pertinent pour eux. Les normes sociales sont des règles informelles de conduite d'une société basées sur les perceptions collectives de ce qui est considéré comme un comportement (in)approprié dans le cadre d'une interaction sociale donnée (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989). Dans ce travail, nous suivons la définition plus précise des normes sociales de Christina Bicchieri (2006, 2016) décrivant les normes sociales (injonctives) comme des règles comportementales auxquelles les individus préfèrent adhérer lorsqu'ils ont deux types d'attentes - empiriques et normatives. Les attentes empiriques sont fondées sur le comportement réel observé parmi la majorité des personnes dans un réseau de référence. Les attentes normatives décrivent les croyances (de second ordre) des individus sur ce que la plupart des gens dans ce réseau de référence s'attendent à être un comportement (in)approprié. En d'autres termes, les attentes normatives reflètent les croyances des individus sur la conviction de la plupart des autres quant à ce qui devrait être fait ou non. Ce n'est que si les individus ont à la fois des attentes empiriques et normatives que des normes sociales peuvent exister et être stables dans le temps.

Pourtant, il convient de distinguer les normes sociales d'autres types de normes telles que les normes descriptives et personnelles (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989; Schwartz, 1977). Les normes descriptives reposent uniquement sur des attentes empiriques, ces dernières incitant les individus à reproduire un comportement parce qu'ils croient que d'autres le font généralement. La différence cruciale entre les normes sociales (injonctives) et les normes descriptives est que les premières ne peuvent exister que lorsque les individus conditionnent leur comportement à ce qu'ils attendent de la plupart des autres par rapport à ce qui devrait être (ou ne pas être) fait. Pour qu'une norme descriptive guide le comportement d'un individu, l'observation du comportement réel des autres est une condition suffisante (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009).

Les normes personnelles correspondent à une perception personnelle de ce qui est un comportement (in)approprié dans un contexte donné. Comme les normes descriptives et sociales, elles peuvent jouer un rôle significatif dans les choix individuels, par exemple quand un individu n'a pas de certitude sur la norme sociale dominante (Bai and Bai, 2020; Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bertoldo and Castro, 2016; Dimant et al., 2023; Piliavin and Libby, 1986; Schwartz, 1977). Contrairement aux normes sociales et descriptives, elles sont purement privées et ne sont pas influencées par l'approbation ou la désapprobation des autres.

Une norme personnelle n'est pas nécessairement partagée collectivement. Par conséquent, les individus peuvent se conformer aux normes sociales établies même s'ils ne les apprécient pas particulièrement ou n'y adhèrent pas personnellement.

Les normes sociales peuvent être soutenues par divers mécanismes tels que la culpabilité, la honte ou l'embarras. Ces derniers dissuadent les individus de s'écarter des normes sociales établies (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989). Cependant, la conformité aux normes sociales peut également servir de dispositif de coordination facilitant les interactions de groupe (Young, 2015), de signal d'appartenance au groupe, ou même constituer une expression d'identification avec un groupe (Bicchieri et al., 2022; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Gomila and Paluck, 2020). De plus, le respect d'une norme sociale peut également être lié au souhait de transmettre une image de soi favorable aux membres du groupe et d'améliorer l'acceptation sociale (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Bursztyrn and Jensen, 2017).

Bien que les normes sociales puissent persister dans le temps (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015; Gruneau, 2022; Lessing, 1995; Mackie, 1996), dans certaines conditions, elles sont néanmoins susceptibles d'évoluer, voire de changer profondément (voir les synthèses sur le sujet de Gelfand et al. (2023) et Gross and Vostroknutov (2022)). Un exemple marquant est l'érosion de la conformité aux normes sociales si on observe une violation des normes par d'autres membres du groupe de référence. Ainsi, Bicchieri et al. (2022) montrent que le fait d'observer d'autres violer des normes sociales établies incite les individus à les transgresser également. Les membres influents du groupe, la sensibilité des individus aux normes et la taille du réseau de référence jouent aussi un rôle crucial dans le changement des attentes normatives des individus et des perceptions qu'ils ont des autres (Bicchieri and Funcke, 2018; Blair et al., 2021; Paluck and Shepherd, 2012).³

Un autre canal dissuadant les gens de respecter les normes sociales est la révision des croyances portant sur les attentes normatives des autres. Cette révision des croyances peut résulter de la diffusion d'informations par les médias, des résultats des élections ou simplement d'informations diffusées sur les opinions personnelles d'autres personnes. Ainsi, Paluck (2009) a montré que l'écoute d'un programme de feuillets radiophoniques fictifs avait modifié les perceptions des Rwandais sur les normes sociales injonctives. De même, les résultats des élections exprimant la popularité de Donald Trump aux États-Unis ont augmenté la tendance des citoyens américains à exprimer des opinions xénophobes en public, en fonction de ce qu'ils pensaient être la norme sociale de la majorité (Bursztyrn et al., 2020a). De même, dans une expérience menée par Bursztyrn et al. (2020b), les maris saoudiens, qui avaient sous-estimé le fait que les autres hommes saoudiens acceptaient que les femmes puissent travailler à l'extérieur du foyer, étaient plus enclins à permettre à leurs épouses de s'inscrire sur un site Web de placement professionnel une fois que leurs fausses croyances avaient été corrigées.

Signalons, en outre, que l'ampleur avec laquelle les sociétés adhèrent aux normes sociales ou punissent les comportements déviants est un trait culturel mais en même temps une source importante de

³Une expérience menée par Paluck and Shepherd (2012) a montré que la manipulation du comportement public d'un groupe d'étudiants de référence a induit un changement dans la perception normative du comportement de harcèlement des pairs à l'école. Bicchieri and Funcke (2018) ont étudié le rôle des précurseurs dans la violation des normes. Ils ont constaté que ce n'est pas la position du transgresseur de normes dans le réseau qui est le facteur décisif pour que d'autres personnes du réseau suivent la violation de la norme. Ce qui est plus important pour abandonner une norme, c'est la mesure dans laquelle ils sont sensibles à la norme et s'ils s'orientent vers un réseau de référence plus large ou plus étroit. Cependant, orienter son comportement vers le comportement d'un réseau de référence plus large et être moins sensible à une norme a augmenté l'influence du précurseur de la violation de la norme sur l'inclination des autres individus à transgresser.

changement normatif (Gelfand et al., 2011, 2023). Si cette ampleur est très élevée, ou selon les termes de Gelfand et al. (2011), si les sociétés maintiennent des normes strictes, le changement est moins susceptible de se produire. En revanche, les cultures moins contraignantes, c'est-à-dire celles qui ont des normes moins strictes, peuvent être plus rapides à acquérir de nouvelles normes, par exemple en ce qui concerne les normes de comportement introduites en réponse au changement climatique ou à une crise sanitaire.

Enfin, de façon plus étroitement liée au contexte de la migration, se trouve l'influence de la majorité numérique sur le comportement normatif des minorités. En général, les individus continuent à adhérer aux normes sociales tant qu'elles sont soutenues par un nombre suffisamment élevé de membres dans une société (Young, 2015). Cependant, les migrants quittent leur société d'origine où ils faisaient partie de la majorité pour un nouvel environnement social où ils appartiennent à un groupe minoritaire ayant potentiellement des normes et des valeurs différentes de la population du pays d'accueil. Cette infériorité numérique relative peut exposer les membres de la minorité à des pressions sociales pour se conformer aux normes de la société majoritaire (Latané, 1996). Ainsi, les résultats d'une étude expérimentale menée par Winter and Zhang (2018) montrent, en effet, que les membres des minorités ethniques en Allemagne étaient davantage susceptibles d'être sanctionnés pour des violations des normes que les citoyens autochtones.

Outre les normes sociales, un autre aspect essentiel abordé dans cette thèse est la confiance généralisée. Le concept de confiance généralisée décrit la croyance des individus "que la plupart des gens peuvent être dignes de confiance même si on n'a aucune information particulière à leur sujet" (Dinesen (2012), p.495). En d'autres termes, cela peut être compris comme la croyance de chacun que les autres adopteront un principe de réciprocité même si l'identité n'est pas ou seulement imparfaitement connue. Alors que la confiance généralisée ne peut émerger que si elle est accordée à un individu que l'on ne connaît pas, des formes de confiance particulières émergent dans les interactions avec des individus dont on connaît la réputation (Bjornskov, 2007). La littérature explorant la confiance généralisée, ses conséquences et ses ressorts est vaste. Ces travaux montrent que les différences de confiance généralisée entre pays contribuent à expliquer les écarts de taux de croissance économique (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fukuyama, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), la diversité des institutions prises dans leur acception générale (Knack, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997) ou encore les différences de corruption entre chaque pays (Uslaner, 2002). Les principaux moteurs entravant la confiance sont les événements traumatisants récents, l'appartenance à un groupe historiquement discriminé tel que les minorités ethniques, la pauvreté monétaire, un faible niveau scolaire ou encore le fait de vivre dans une société fortement diversifiée sur le plan culturel et inégalitaire en termes de revenu et de patrimoine (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).

L'argument au fondement de cette thèse de doctorat est que les normes sociales et l'inclination des individus à faire confiance pourraient être d'une importance essentielle pour l'intégration sur le marché du travail des immigrants forcés. Les paragraphes suivants développent pourquoi cela pourrait être le cas.

Tout d'abord, les normes sociales et la confiance influencent les comportements individuels et les performances sur le marché du travail. Les normes sociales concernant l'équité salariale et la réciprocité, le comportement sur le lieu de travail, les réglementations et politiques en milieu de travail ou les normes de genre ont un impact sur le comportement des individus au travail et les choix de carrière (voir la revue

de Gorges and Nosenzo (2020b)). De même, il a été montré que la confiance généralisée individuelle est positivement corrélée avec à une meilleure coopération entre individus appartenant à des cultures différentes, avec le développement du travail en équipe, avec une plus grande satisfaction au travail ou encore avec de meilleures performances et un revenu monétaire plus élevé (Butler et al., 2016; Garrison et al., 2010; Helliwell and Huang, 2011; Xie and Li, 2021).

Deuxièmement, la recherche empirique a à maintes reprises signalé des différences considérables dans les normes sociales et les niveaux de confiance entre les pays (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bjornskov, 2007; Bursztyjn et al., 2020b; Cavapozzi et al., 2021; Dinesen, 2012, 2013; Falk et al., 2018; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Gächter et al., 2008, 2010; Gelfand et al., 2011; Henrich et al., 2001; Jayachandran, 2021; Kocher et al., 2008). Les origines de telles différences mondiales remontent probablement à un passé lointain (Becker et al., 2020; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). À leur arrivée dans le pays hôte, les immigrants apportent avec eux le niveau de confiance et l'ensemble des normes avec lesquels ils ont été socialisés et élevés dans leurs pays d'origine (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bazzi et al., 2023; Blau, 2015; Dinesen, 2012, 2013). Cependant, les normes et le degré de confiance auxquels les immigrants sont confrontés dans la société d'accueil leur sont souvent peu familières et, en raison de leur nature subtile, potentiellement difficiles à comprendre (Sakamoto et al., 2010). Cela s'applique également aux normes sociales spécifiques au milieu de travail. Des travaux en sociologie des migrations ont montré que la méconnaissance des normes socioculturelles de conduite au travail peut constituer un défi sérieux pour les employés immigrants non occidentaux pour s'intégrer sur le marché du travail des pays d'accueil (Friesen, 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014).

Troisièmement, les réfugiés sont un groupe particulier caractérisé par des incitations qui seraient distinctes des autres groupes d'immigrants. Contrairement à ces derniers, une recherche hâtive de protection les rend plus susceptibles de se retrouver dans un pays où leur capital social ne répond pas aux exigences du marché du travail local (Brell et al., 2020). Étant donné que les normes et la confiance sont couramment désignées comme des composantes essentielles du capital social (Putnam, 1993), ceci peut également s'appliquer aux normes sociales et à la confiance. La menace pesant sur leur vie force les gens à quitter leur pays indépendamment de leurs aspirations professionnelles ou de leurs diplômes. Par conséquent, les caractéristiques intrinsèques des réfugiés pourraient également être plus diversifiées que celles des autres groupes d'immigrants (Brell et al., 2020; Bedaso, 2021; Dustmann et al., 2017). Enfin, les expériences de violence qui ont poussé les réfugiés à fuir leur pays comme le voyage lui-même pour arriver dans le pays d'accueil peuvent être profondément traumatisants (Hall and Werner, 2022; Salis Gross, 2004). On sait aussi que l'exposition à la violence et au traumatisme est fortement associée à des niveaux de confiance nettement plus bas et à une inclination moindre à s'engager dans des interactions sociales (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, 2013).

Dans ce contexte, on peut spéculer que les normes sociales sur le lieu de travail et les niveaux de confiance entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les sociétés occidentales sont nettement distincts. Si tel est le cas, le fait de devoir composer avec un nouvel environnement où les normes sont différentes des leurs peut entraîner une incertitude pour les réfugiés par rapport à quelle norme prévaut dans la société d'accueil et même conduire à des conflits normatifs. L'incertitude normative renvoie à un état dans lequel les individus ne peuvent pas être sûrs de savoir quelle décision est appropriée ou non dans des circonstances données (voir, par exemple, Dimant et al. (2023), Hedden (2016), Smith et al. (2007)).

Étant donné que les réfugiés peuvent ne pas être familiers avec les normes sociales prédominantes et les niveaux de confiance dans le pays d'accueil, on peut raisonnablement avancer que leurs choix peuvent être régulièrement soumis à une incertitude normative conduisant à des malentendus normatifs. Burks and Krupka (2011) décrivent les malentendus normatifs comme une fausse croyance concernant les attentes normatives des autres ou les normes sociales. Dans un tel cas, les points de vue normatifs des autres sont mal interprétés.

A l'opposé, en suivant Rauhut and Winter (2017), un conflit normatif décrit un "échec de transaction résultant du fait que les acteurs ont des attentes normatives au moins partiellement exclusives" (p.3). Ils classifient les conflits normatifs en deux types qu'ils appellent "conflits normatifs liés au contenu" et "conflits normatifs liés à l'engagement". Les conflits normatifs liés au contenu portent sur un désaccord sur la norme qui devrait être appliquée dans un contexte donné. Si un conflit normatif est lié à l'engagement, les parties sont d'accord sur la norme sociale qui doit être appliquée mais ne sont pas d'accord sur la mesure ou la rigueur avec laquelle la norme doit être respectée. Particulièrement les conflits normatifs liés au contenu sont d'une importance cruciale car ils sont associés à un effondrement de la coopération entre les individus, ce qui est plus difficile à rétablir que dans le cas des conflits normatifs liés à l'engagement (Rauhut and Winter, 2017; Matsuo et al., 2014). Par conséquent, si les normes sociales entre les groupes divergent ou ne sont pas alignées, il peut en résulter un risque de conflit normatif, qu'il soit lié au contenu ou à l'engagement, le premier entraînant des conséquences plus graves (voir également Burks and Krupka (2011) et Winter et al. (2012)).

Pourtant, même si passer d'un code normatif à un autre en fonction de l'identité du partenaire avec lequel on interagit est une réalité pour de nombreux immigrants, être confronté à des normes sociales distinctes n'est pas nécessairement un sujet de préoccupation (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Giguère et al., 2010; Molinsky, 2007). Cependant, faire face à des attentes normatives conflictuelles de la part de membres de groupes sociaux distincts peut exposer un individu à un dilemme social angoissant puisqu'il ne peut adhérer qu'à une norme au détriment de l'autre (Giguère et al., 2010; Stouffer, 1949). De telles situations peuvent être une réalité dans de nombreux lieux de travail multiculturels où la collaboration des employés immigrants se fait à la fois avec des collègues du pays d'origine et du pays d'accueil.

Sur la base de ces arguments, l'hypothèse centrale sous-tendant cette thèse est qu'il pourrait exister des différences socio-culturelles de normes sociales dans le milieu du travail et de confiance entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les populations autochtones des pays occidentaux dans lesquels ils se sont installés. D'une part, cela pourrait entraîner une incertitude (normative) et donc apporter des malentendus (normatifs). D'autre part, des normes distinctes de conduite au travail et de niveaux de confiance pourrait conduire à des conflits (normatifs) pouvant éventuellement entraîner des dilemmes sociaux difficiles et des niveaux de coopération plus faibles. Ces deux mécanismes pourraient compliquer le travail d'équipe et affecter le bien-être des individus dans le milieu du travail. De ce point de vue, on pourrait spéculer que cela pourrait constituer un défi pour l'intégration professionnelle des réfugiés dans leur société d'accueil.

Cependant, en réalité, on sait peu de choses sur l'existence des différences normatives entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les sociétés occidentales en ce qui concerne la conduite au travail et la confiance. De même que si tel est le cas, on ne sait pas dans quelle mesure et comment les réfugiés peuvent y faire face. Par conséquent, l'objectif principal de cette thèse est de contribuer à combler cette lacune. En un mot, elle vise à éclairer trois questions fondamentales. (1) Les normes dans le milieu du travail diffèrent-elles

entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les autochtones occidentaux ? Si oui, ces différences sont-elles importantes ? Quels facteurs expliquent ces différences ? (2) Comment les normes sociales en collision entre le pays d'origine et le pays d'accueil affectent-elles les propres normes (personnelles) des réfugiés ? La présence de compatriotes change-t-elle les perceptions et les comportements des réfugiés en matière de norme ? (3) En apprenant l'existence de niveaux de confiance distincts entre leurs compatriotes et les personnes du pays d'accueil, sur quel groupe de référence les réfugiés s'appuient-ils dans leur propre décision de (ne pas) faire confiance à une personne anonyme ? Cela dépend-il du fait que leurs compatriotes peuvent observer ou non leurs décisions ?

Les questions abordées dans cette thèse pourraient avoir d'importantes implications politiques pour promouvoir l'insertion professionnelle des réfugiés. D'une part, cela peut, espérons-le, fournir des informations utiles aux pouvoirs publics chargés d'élaborer les programmes d'insertion professionnelle sur le processus d'apprentissage des réfugiés concernant des normes inhabituelles pour eux. Savoir si les normes dans le milieu du travail entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les populations autochtones sont spécifiques à la culture, et le cas échéant dans quels domaines de la vie en sociétés, fournit des informations importantes sur les apprentissages qui peuvent être particulièrement adaptés pour les réfugiés nouvellement arrivés. En outre, savoir si les réfugiés comprennent ou non les normes sociales du pays d'accueil, et si leurs propres normes sociales sont différentes de celles-ci, peut avoir des implications politiques cruciales. Alors qu'un malentendu peut impliquer de fournir des informations approfondies sur les normes sociales prévalant dans le pays d'accueil, des différences dans les normes personnelles et sociales (sans malentendu) peut être abordé de manière plus efficace par un discours ouvert sur les différentes normes. La raison en est que les gens pourraient ne pas être d'accord avec les normes du pays d'accueil. En outre, comprendre quels groupes de personnes, en fonction de leur parcours personnel, rencontrent plus ou moins de difficultés pour comprendre et faire face à des normes inhabituelles pourrait avoir des implications sur la conception de programmes d'insertion.

D'autre part, en considérant la nature à double sens de tout processus d'intégration (Klarenbeek, 2021), nous espérons que nos résultats pourront également sensibiliser les employeurs et les gestionnaires de ressources humaines dans leur collaboration avec les réfugiés. Rassembler des informations approfondies sur les schémas de comportement et d'expression normatifs peut généralement faciliter la compréhension mutuelle et la communication entre les groupes, favorisant ainsi une collaboration fructueuse et la cohésion sociale. De plus, explorer les réactions des réfugiés lorsqu'ils sont exposés à des normes et des niveaux de confiance différents selon qu'il s'agit de leurs compatriotes ou de personnes du pays d'accueil pourrait être essentiel pour comprendre la dynamique de leur comportement normatif. Autrement dit, savoir dans quelles circonstances, comme par exemple le fait d'être observés par leurs compatriotes, les réfugiés suivent les normes de leur pays d'origine ou au contraire du pays d'accueil, pourrait aider à mieux comprendre les motifs derrière leur comportement, éviter les malentendus et prévenir les préjugés. Cela permettrait en retour aux employeurs d'adopter des comportements plus adéquats par rapport à une main-d'œuvre culturellement différente et vulnérable ; ce qui est également considéré comme un facteur-clé de leur processus d'insertion professionnelle réussi (Aksoy et al., 2023; Szudarlek et al., 2021).

Malgré l'importance de ces questions pour l'intégration des migrants, et plus spécifiquement des réfugiés, dans le milieu du travail, la recherche en économie est encore très rare. Les études de Jaschke et al. (2022) sur le processus de convergence culturelle des réfugiés en Allemagne et d'El-Bialy et al. (2023) sur la confiance des réfugiés syriens, également en Allemagne, sont des exceptions. Jaschke et al. (2022) ont mesuré la convergence des attitudes des réfugiés et leur performance sur le marché du travail (par rapport aux comportements et performances par la population du pays d'accueil) au fil du temps et étudié comment le niveau d'hostilité de la société d'accueil à leur égard peut affecter le processus d'apprentissage normatif des réfugiés. Ils ont constaté que le fait pour les réfugiés de vivre dans un environnement local hostile faisait que les préférences culturelles des réfugiés concernant l'attitude face au risque, la réciprocité et l'équité convergèrent plus rapidement vers celles de la société autochtone. Cependant, contrairement à notre travail de thèse, ces auteurs n'analysent pas les normes et attitudes particulières à un environnement de travail. El-Bialy et al. (2023) ont apporté de leur côté des preuves expérimentales selon lesquelles le niveau de confiance des réfugiés dépendait du type de liens sociaux qu'ils entretiennent - liens avec des compatriotes, des personnes du pays d'accueil ou encore avec les deux. Cependant, les auteurs ne fournissent pas de réponse sur la manière dont les réfugiés peuvent réagir quand ils sont exposés à des informations contradictoires sur les normes et les niveaux de confiance de leurs compatriotes et de ceux de la population d'accueil.

Pour répondre à ces questions de recherche, nous avons conduit des expériences en laboratoire menées sur le terrain (lab-in-the-field experiments) et en ligne avec des réfugiés⁴ turcs et afghans vivant en Suisse d'une part et des citoyens suisses d'autre part. La Suisse joue un rôle prédominant en tant que pays d'accueil de réfugiés sur le continent européen. En 2021, après la Suède, l'Autriche et l'Allemagne, elle a reçu la plus forte proportion de réfugiés par rapport à sa population totale, soit 1.37 pour cent (Müller et al., 2023). Pour la période allant de 2020 et 2022, les Afghans et les Turcs constituaient les groupes de réfugiés les plus importants en Suisse, en dehors des Ukrainiens.⁵ Au cours des dernières années, la Suisse a mis en œuvre des mesures d'ordre institutionnel et structurel, au niveau fédéral comme cantonal, pour améliorer l'accès des réfugiés au marché du travail suisse. Ces mesures comprennent la mise en œuvre de l'Agenda Intégration Suisse (AIS), un programme d'actions élaboré ensemble par la Confédération et les cantons, avec le but d'intégrer plus rapidement les réfugiés sur le marché de travail et dans la société en général. Ce programme inclut, par exemple, l'information approfondie des nouveaux arrivants, la promotion systématique des compétences linguistiques et des mesures spécifiques en termes d'entraînement par rapport au marché de travail.⁶ Toutefois, la conception et la mise en œuvre concrètes de ces mesures relèvent de la compétence des cantons, ce qui fait que les mesures d'intégration peuvent varier considérablement d'un canton à l'autre. Cependant, des entretiens menés avec des réfugiés et des demandeurs d'asile arrivés en Suisse entre 2014 et 2019 révèlent qu'ils ne se sentent pas bien intégrés sur le plan professionnel (Mexi, 2023). En même temps, le discours politique en Suisse sur l'insertion

⁴Il convient de préciser que ce qu'on entend par réfugié dans cette thèse concerne toutes les personnes relevant du domaine de l'asile. Contrairement à l'usage du terme dans cette thèse, en tant que terme légal en Suisse, il est réservé aux personnes remplissant les conditions requises pour bénéficier du statut de réfugié au sens de la convention de Genève de 1951.

⁵Extrait de <https://migration.swiss/en/migration-report-2022/asylum-and-protection-status-s/a-few-figures?lang=true> au 05.05.2024

⁶En vertu de la loi fédérale sur les étrangers et l'inégration (LEI) du 16 décembre 2005 (État le 15 octobre 2023) extrait de <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2007/758/frau05.05.2024> et de l'ordonnance sur l'intégration des étrangers (OIE) du 15 août 2018 (État le 1er mars 2023), extrait de <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2018/511/fr> au 05.05.2024

professionnelle des réfugiés est fortement polarisé. Certains discours populistes reposent sur des préjugés sur les comportements et les valeurs des immigrants non occidentaux, surtout lorsqu'ils sont d'origine musulmane (Direnberger et al., 2022; Dolezal et al., 2010; Ettinger, 2008; Ossipow et al., 2019). Cela pose deux types de problèmes. D'une part, cela contraste de manière disproportionnée avec le faible nombre de travaux scientifiques disponibles sur le sujet. D'autre part, cela peut rendre le processus d'insertion professionnelle des réfugiés non occidentaux en Suisse plus difficile.

Outre l'actualité du sujet dans le contexte suisse, la répartition aléatoire des réfugiés dans différents cantons suisses offre des conditions particulièrement adaptées à la mise en œuvre de notre étude.

Alors que les citoyens suisses ont été recrutés et interrogés en ligne, le recrutement et la collecte de données auprès des réfugiés se sont basés sur une collaboration avec cinq cantons suisses germanophones et francophones.⁷ Avec l'aide de diverses institutions partenaires, les réfugiés ont été contactés directement, par lettre ou par courrier électronique et invités à participer à notre étude en mode présentiel. Toutefois, les institutions qui les prennent en charge des réfugiés varient d'un canton à l'autre. C'est pourquoi les réfugiés ont dû être contactés de différentes manières. Selon le canton, nous avons contacté nos sujets par le biais des représentants des services d'intégration, des services d'assistance sociale ou encore par le biais des centres d'asile. Dans tous les cantons, nos partenaires ont contacté et informé les sujets potentiels au moyen d'une fiche d'information qui leur a été remise, soit en personne, soit par courrier postal, ou encore par courrier électronique. Cette fiche d'information avait été créée par les chercheurs et a été distribuée à toutes les personnes contactées dans tous les cantons.

Ont été invités les réfugiés séjournant depuis au plus 5 ans en Suisse. Équipés d'un laboratoire mobile, nous avons pu voyager et mener nos sessions expérimentales dans divers endroits en Suisse. Le processus complet de collecte de données a pris environ un an. Les trois chapitres de cette thèse utilisent des données qui ont été recueillies lors de cette même collecte de données. À notre connaissance, les données collectées sont uniques et n'existaient pas auparavant.

L'originalité de notre approche méthodologique est de trois ordres. Premièrement, nous combinons l'utilisation de vignettes avec la méthode d'élicitation des normes de Krupka and Weber (2013) pour mesurer les normes spécifiques en milieu professionnel des participants suisses et des réfugiés. En outre, un jeu de confiance de type Berg et al. (1995) sert de mesure de l'inclination des participants à accorder leur confiance à autrui. Deuxièmement, au-delà des simples comparaisons des perceptions normatives et des niveaux de confiance entre les Suisses autochtones et les réfugiés, nous calculons les distances euclidiennes au sein d'un groupe et entre les différents groupes de participants. Le concept de distance euclidienne fait référence à la distance moyenne des perceptions normatives et de confiance d'un individu à tous les autres individus dans un groupe de référence donné (Cha, 2007; Jaschke et al., 2022; Rapoport et al., 2021). Comparer les distances euclidiennes intra et inter-groupes des perceptions normatives et des niveaux de confiance nous permet de mesurer des différences relatives entre les réfugiés et les Suisses. En d'autres termes, ce sont des distances normatives et de confiance entre les réfugiés et les Suisses par rapport aux distances au sein du groupe des Suisses. Troisièmement, dans le cadre d'essais randomisés, nous explorons l'effet causal sur les normes individuelles et sur le comportement de confiance de fournir aux participants des informations sur les normes et les niveaux de confiance de leurs compatriotes, d'une

⁷Pour des raisons de confidentialité et de protection des données de nos groupes cibles vulnérables, nous ne mentionnons pas les noms des cantons avec lesquels nous avons collaboré.

part et des natifs du pays d'accueil, d'autre part. Nous analysons aussi l'effet causal sur les normes individuelles et le comportement de confiance résultant du fait que les normes personnelles indiquées et les niveaux de confiance des participants réfugiés peuvent être observés par leurs compatriotes (sans que les identités ne soient révélées).

Les hypothèses et l'analyse des trois études de cette thèse ont été pré-enregistrées. Elles ont également été évaluées et validées par le *Institutional Review Board for research ethics* de la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management de l'université de Fribourg. Les services de protection des données du CNRS en France ont autorisé nos procédures et confirmé leur conformité au GDPR.⁸

Bien que ce projet de recherche ait été une expérience fascinante et unique, sa mise en œuvre a entraîné de nombreux défis majeurs. Tout d'abord, l'accès à nos groupes cibles de réfugiés a nécessité un investissement très important en termes de temps, de personnel, d'organisation et de ressources financières. Contacter et trouver suffisamment de cantons prêts à soutenir notre projet et à s'engager dans le processus organisationnel qu'il impliquait a été une tâche longue et difficile. L'épidémie de Covid et les conséquences de la guerre en Ukraine ont interrompu à un moment notre projet et reporté l'accès à nos groupes cibles de réfugiés. Notre collecte de données a bénéficié de la collaboration fructueuse avec nos partenaires des diverses institutions cantonales de soutien aux réfugiés. Le succès des sessions expérimentales a exigé également des efforts d'organisation considérables de leur part. Cela concernait par exemple la prise de contact avec les participants potentiels, le chemin à ouvrir pour nous en tant que chercheurs pour informer les participants potentiels de l'étude et faciliter autant que possible le déplacement du groupe très hétérogène de participants vers les lieux d'étude. Cependant, la préoccupation majeure et omniprésente a été de trouver suffisamment de participants pour mener une analyse scientifique. En outre, les contraintes financières rendaient impossible l'embauche de traducteurs professionnels pour toutes les sessions. Nous avons donc dû organiser une équipe de locuteurs natifs turcs et dari (farsi) qui étaient suffisamment flexibles pour voyager à travers la Suisse pendant plusieurs jours d'affilée.

Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres:

Le premier chapitre traite des différences et des incompréhensions potentielles de normes socio-culturelles spécifiques au milieu du travail entre réfugiés et Suisses. La méconnaissance de ces normes est considérée comme un défi majeur pour l'intégration professionnelle des immigrants non occidentaux dans les pays occidentaux à revenu élevé (Friesen, 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014). Étant donné que les normes sociales sont souvent de nature implicite et subtile, reconnaître et comprendre les normes d'un nouvel environnement social peut être difficile pour n'importe quel individu (Sakamoto et al., 2010). On peut spéculer que cela peut comporter des risques pour la collaboration entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les natifs du pays d'accueil sur le lieu de travail. Cependant, en réalité, on sait très peu de choses sur les normes spécifiques au travail des réfugiés turcs et afghans. Nous avons tenté de mesurer empiriquement les normes personnelles et sociales sur le lieu de travail parmi les réfugiés turcs et afghans et les natifs suisses, pour vérifier s'ils diffèrent les uns des autres, et dans quelle mesure. Allant au-delà

⁸En vertu de la réglementation - 2016/679 - EN - gdpr - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).

des simples comparaisons entre groupes, l'utilisation des distances euclidiennes nous permet d'étudier si les normes personnelles et sociales diffèrent davantage entre les réfugiés et les Suisses que parmi les Suisses eux-mêmes. Dans le même ordre d'idées, nous examinons si les réfugiés méconnaissent les normes sociales de leur pays d'accueil et, le cas échéant, s'il leur est plus difficile de prédire ces normes que pour les autochtones eux-mêmes de prédire leurs propres normes. De manière cruciale, comparer les normes sociales entre les réfugiés et les Suisses nous a permis de savoir s'il existait des différences normatives entre les groupes. En confrontant les croyances des réfugiés sur les normes suisses avec les normes suisses réelles, nous avons pu tirer des conclusions sur la question de savoir si les réfugiés comprennent ou pas les normes de leur pays d'accueil. De plus, nous avons cherché à savoir quels facteurs - âge, genre, niveau d'éducation ou durée du séjour en Suisse - expliquent la distance normative entre les réfugiés et le pays d'accueil. Enfin, nous nous sommes interrogés sur les facteurs qui amène les prédictions faites par les réfugiés sur les normes en vigueur en Suisse à converger vers celles des Suisses eux-mêmes.

Pour ce faire, nous avons identifié vingt-deux vignettes (scénarios) se déroulant sur un lieu de travail et décrivant, soit une interaction entre collègues (relation horizontale), soit entre un employé et un chef d'équipe ou son employeur (relation verticale). Dans chaque vignette, l'un des partenaires de l'interaction est un employé hypothétique agissant en réponse à une situation donnée. En se fondant sur la méthode d'élicitation de Krupka and Weber (2013), les participants réfugiés et suisses ont été invités à évaluer à trois reprises l'adéquation du comportement de cet employé dans chaque vignette. Dans un premier temps, on leur a demandé pour chaque vignette de donner leur opinion personnelle sur le comportement de l'employé. Ensuite, on leur a demandé de deviner pour toutes les vignettes la réponse la plus fréquemment donnée par les autres participants réfugiés du même pays. Enfin, on leur a demandé d'indiquer la réponse la plus fréquemment donnée par les participants suisses natifs.

Nos résultats suggèrent que des différences de normes entre les réfugiés et les autochtones existent, mais qu'elles ne concernent qu'un nombre limité de situations et qu'elles sont le plus souvent de faible ampleur. Les différences avec les Suisses sont plus marquées et concernent un nombre de situations plus important pour les Afghans que pour les Turcs. Ces résultats nous apprennent que les normes personnelles et sociales des réfugiés turcs et afghans sur le lieu de travail ne sont pas si différentes de celles des Suisses quand on prend en compte la diversité de normes au sein de la population suisse elle-même. Cela contraste avec un résultat que l'on trouve souvent dans la littérature selon lequel le capital social des réfugiés est nettement différent de celui des sociétés d'accueil occidentales (Brell et al., 2020; Bedaso, 2021; Dustmann et al., 2017).

Un autre message clé de ce chapitre est que les deux groupes de réfugiés intériorisent les normes du pays d'accueil d'autant mieux qu'ils sont depuis longtemps en Suisse. On observe également que la conformité normative est motivée par le souhait des réfugiés d'être acceptés par la société d'accueil car leurs normes personnelles (du moins celles qu'ils déclarent) comme leurs croyances concernant les normes suisses ont été influencées par leur intention de donner une réponse qu'ils pensent être socialement souhaitable. Cela permet de conclure que les réfugiés se soucient de se conformer aux normes du pays d'accueil et d'appartenir à la société d'accueil, ce qui contraste fortement avec les récits populistes.

En ce qui concerne les différences les plus marquantes dans les normes sociales, nous observons que les participants afghans ont collectivement évalué le contact visuel entre un employé et un supérieur hiérarchique comme étant moins approprié que les Suisses. Étant donné que la question du travail en équipe mixte n'avait pas montré de décalage entre les Afghans et les Suisses, nous en déduisons que non

seulement le sexe, mais aussi la relation d'autorité joue un rôle crucial dans cette dernière constatation. Les participants turcs ont collectivement estimé de leur côté que critiquer un collègue devant les autres était moins approprié que les Suisses, ce qui peut être lié au fait que perdre la face est sans doute plus problématique pour les Turcs (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993). Les deux groupes de réfugiés ont collectivement jugé moins acceptable que les Suisses de prétendre avoir compris une tâche si tel n'était pas le cas.

En outre, nous avons appris que les réfugiés turcs et afghans comprennent assez bien les normes sociales du pays d'accueil (en général, pas moins bien que les Suisses). Les normes sociales du pays d'accueil qu'ils comprennent mal ne sont pas les mêmes que celles pour lesquelles nous avons observé une différence normative avec les Suisses. Cela signifie qu'il existe à la fois des malentendus normatifs et des différences normatives. Fait important, cela signifie également qu'en cas de différences normatives avec les Suisses, les réfugiés comprennent néanmoins les normes du pays d'accueil. Dans le même temps, les réfugiés comprennent parfois mal les normes suisses dans le sens où ils pensent que les Suisses sont différents d'eux alors qu'ils ne le sont pas.

Le deuxième chapitre part du constat que les normes personnelles sont cruciales dans la prise de décision lorsque les individus éprouvent de l'incertitude quant à la norme sociale prédominante (Dimant et al., 2023). Cela peut être particulièrement le cas pour les réfugiés arrivant dans un pays hôte inconnu, plus que pour tout autre groupe d'immigrants. En utilisant l'exemple du travail d'équipe avec des hommes et des femmes, cette étude examine d'abord si les normes personnelles des participants entrent en collision. Pour ce faire, nous comparons les opinions personnelles des réfugiés turcs et afghans d'une part, et celles des Suisses d'autre part. Nous étudions ensuite si la différence de normes sociales entre le groupe ayant la même origine que les réfugiés et les Suisses influence les normes personnelles des réfugiés (et de quelle manière). Nous émettons l'hypothèse que les réfugiés peuvent se sentir déchirés entre deux forces opposées : (1) le désir d'être cohérent avec les normes sociales de leur pays d'origine étroitement liées à leur identité sociale, et (2) l'inclination à se conformer aux normes sociales locales prédominantes au sein de la société majoritaire du pays hôte.

Pourtant, alors que la recherche en économie sur les normes sociales prédit que les individus ont tendance à se conformer aux normes d'une majorité numérique (dans notre contexte, la société hôte) (Young, 2015), la littérature sur l'identité de groupe suggère plutôt que les individus se conforment aux normes sociales de groupes d'individus qui leur sont similaires (Akerlof and Kranton (2000); Bicchieri et al. (2022)). Cependant, malgré l'actualité de l'immigration forcée, la recherche portant sur l'importance relative des normes du groupe majoritaire et de l'identité de groupe est encore rare. Comme dans le premier chapitre, les normes personnelles ont été élucidées par la méthode de Krupka and Weber (2013). Les participants ont été invités à lire une vignette sur des employés de sexe masculin et féminin travaillant ensemble dans une équipe et à donner leur opinion personnelle sur le caractère approprié ou pas de la composition de cette équipe. Dans un essai randomisé, les participants ont été affectés à un groupe de base et deux traitements. Les participants au groupe de base ont donné leur opinion personnelle sans recevoir aucune information. Les participants dans le premier traitement ont pu observer les distributions des normes personnelles portant sur une composition d'équipe mixte d'un groupe de participants du même pays d'origine et d'un groupe de participants du pays hôte. Après avoir reçu ces informations, on a demandé aux participants de fournir leur norme personnelle. Les participants dans un deuxième

traitement ont reçu les mêmes informations que ceux du premier traitement, mais on leur a en outre dit que leurs propres normes personnelles seraient visibles par leurs compatriotes à la fin du projet de recherche (sans que leur identité soient révélée). Le but de cette expérience est d'illustrer l'influence des normes sociales de la société majoritaire (hôte) et de celles du groupe des compatriotes dans la formation des normes personnelles déclarées par les réfugiés.

Nous avons constaté que les normes personnelles des participants turcs soutenaient davantage le travail en équipe mixte que les Suisses et les réfugiés afghans. Aucune différence dans les normes personnelles n'a été observée entre les participants afghans et suisses. Pour aucun des groupes de réfugiés, nous n'avons constaté d'effets significatifs sur les normes personnelles après qu'ils aient pris connaissance des différentes normes sociales des membres du pays d'origine et du pays d'accueil (mais sans être observés par leurs compatriotes). Conformément à la littérature sur l'identité de groupe, le fait d'être mis au courant de l'existence de normes sociales contradictoires dans le pays d'origine et le pays d'accueil et d'être conscients que leur norme serait observée par un groupe de compatriotes a conduit les participants turcs à rapporter une norme personnelle plus proche de la norme sociale de leur groupe national que de celle des Suisses. Étonnamment, les réfugiés afghans informés des normes sociales du pays d'origine et du pays d'accueil ont déclaré une norme personnelle plus proche de la norme sociale suisse, une fois qu'ils ont été informés que leur opinion serait révélée à leurs compatriotes. Nous déduisons de ces résultats que le contexte social joue un rôle essentiel pour l'expression des normes personnelles. Pourtant, nos résultats suggèrent également que des groupes distincts peuvent répondre de manière très hétérogène aux interventions en matière d'information et d'observabilité, ce qui plaide pour des politiques au cas par cas plutôt que trop générales.

Le troisième chapitre étudie la confiance généralisée individuelle, qui s'avère être importante pour expliquer le succès du travail dans des équipes multiculturelles, le degré de coopération, la performance au travail et même le niveau de revenu individuel (Butler et al., 2016; Garrison et al., 2010; Xie and Li, 2021). Malgré les débats houleux sur l'insertion professionnelle des réfugiés, la confiance est un sujet peu étudié dans le contexte de l'immigration forcée. En raison de différences culturelles et d'expériences sources de traumatisme, le niveau moyen de confiance généralisée des réfugiés du Moyen-Orient pourrait se situer en dessous de celui des sociétés d'accueil occidentales, en particulier européennes (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Haerpfer et al., 2022). L'hypothèse sous-jacente de ce chapitre est que l'augmentation des niveaux de confiance (potentiellement) plus bas des réfugiés pourrait aider à améliorer leur accès au marché du travail dans le pays d'accueil. Ainsi, un premier objectif est d'évaluer si le prétendu différentiel de confiance entre les réfugiés et les Suisses existe réellement. Si c'est le cas, nous cherchons à étudier si les informations fournies sur le niveau de confiance de leurs compatriotes et le fait de savoir que leur comportement en matière de confiance est observé par leurs compatriotes (sans que leur identité soient révélée) influencent l'inclination des réfugiés à faire confiance à autrui. Dans le même temps, les réactions des individus aux informations qui leur sont communiquées et au fait qu'ils sont observés ou non pourrait révéler si le comportement de confiance des réfugiés est guidé par des normes sociales ou par d'autres considérations. La pertinence de cette question réside dans le fait que si la confiance a une composante normative, être confronté à des niveaux de confiance différents pourrait conduire à des conflits normatifs et potentiellement à des niveaux de coopération plus faibles. De plus, si les niveaux moyens de confiance des réfugiés devaient effectivement être nettement plus bas que ceux de la société

du pays d'accueil, essayer d'améliorer leurs niveaux de confiance reviendrait à induire un changement de comportement normatif. Cependant, produire un changement de norme chez des individus est complexe (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022).

En utilisant un jeu de confiance de Berg et al. (1995), nous avons élicité les niveaux de confiance des Suisses et des réfugiés du Moyen-Orient et les croyances qu'ils ont sur le comportement de réciprocité d'un receveur anonyme. De manière analogue au chapitre deux, nous avons mené un essai randomisé dans lequel nous avons manipulé les informations fournies aux réfugiés qui accordent leur confiance (trustor) avant qu'ils ne prennent leur décision de faire confiance. Un groupe de base servant de groupe témoin n'a reçu aucune information. Les participants assignés au premier traitement ont reçu les distributions des montants envoyés au receveur (trustee) par des participants précédents du pays d'origine mais aussi du pays d'accueil qui avaient agi dans le même rôle qu'eux-mêmes. Les participants d'un deuxième groupe de traitement ont reçu les mêmes informations que ceux du premier traitement mais ont en outre été informés que leurs propres choix de confiance seraient (anonymement) partagés avec les autres participants du même pays d'origine qu'eux.

Nous ne trouvons aucune preuve de différences significatives de confiance généralisée entre les différents groupes de participants. Alors que les croyances sur la réciprocité des receveurs (trustees) ne diffèrent pas de manière significative entre les participants suisses et afghans, les réfugiés turcs ont des croyances significativement plus optimistes que les Suisses. Le fait de fournir des informations sur le comportement de confiance des participants du pays d'origine et du pays d'accueil a amené les réfugiés turcs à envoyer des montants aux receveurs plus conformes aux montants envoyés par les Suisses. Le fait d'être observés par leurs compatriotes a affaibli cet effet d'ajustement sur leur comportement de confiance. Les informations fournies n'ayant pas modifié les croyances des participants turcs sur la réciprocité des receveurs, une explication derrière nos résultats pourrait être que les participants turcs perçoivent le comportement de confiance comme une norme sociale en Suisse. Ainsi, ils pourraient se sentir enclins à se conformer à la norme sociale perçue de leur pays d'accueil, bien que cela soit dans une moindre mesure lorsque leur propre action est observable par des participants appartenant au même groupe national qu'eux.

En revanche, le fait d'être informés des niveaux de confiance de leurs compatriotes et du pays d'accueil n'a pas affecté de manière significative les choix de confiance des participants afghans. Pourtant, de manière surprenante, fournir cette information conjointement avec l'annonce que leurs propres choix de confiance seront (anonymement) révélés à tous les autres participants afghans a rendu le comportement de confiance des participants afghans plus conforme au comportement parmi les Suisses. Cependant, recevoir des informations et être observés par des compatriotes a non seulement affecté le comportement de confiance des participants afghans, mais aussi leurs croyances en la fiabilité des receveurs. Ce résultat pourrait impliquer que les Afghans ont peut-être pris les informations fournies sur le comportement de confiance parmi les Suisses comme un signal de la fiabilité du receveur, et non pas nécessairement comme une indication d'une norme sociale.

Les conclusions finales que nous pouvons tirer de tous les chapitres sont les suivantes. Premièrement, nos résultats ne soutiennent pas fortement l'hypothèse d'un capital social nettement distinct entre les réfugiés non occidentaux et les sociétés d'accueil occidentales, ni en termes de normes, ni en termes de confiance. On peut cependant se demander si les réfugiés ne constituent pas un groupe présentant un biais de sélection du fait même de la raison pour laquelle ils ont dû fuir leur pays. Par exemple,

dans le cas des réfugiés turcs, beaucoup d'entre eux sont des critiques du régime turc et ont un niveau d'éducation élevé. Cela peut aller de pair avec des normes et des attitudes progressistes et égalitaires, ce qui est conforme à nos conclusions. Ce résultat est crucial car il contraste avec les préjugés largement répandus dans le discours public en Suisse au sujet des réfugiés non occidentaux et de leurs valeurs (Direnberger et al., 2022; Mexi, 2023).

Les réfugiés turcs et afghans expriment souvent des perceptions normatives différentes et réagissent différemment à l'information qu'on met à leur disposition et au fait d'être observés par des compatriotes, ce qui souligne l'hétérogénéité de leurs normes et de leurs modèles de comportement. Pour en revenir aux différences normatives entre les réfugiés et les Suisses, rappelons la classification des conflits normatifs comme étant liés au contenu ou à l'engagement. Le premier exprime un désaccord sur la norme qui devait être appliquée dans une situation donnée et le second sur la force avec laquelle une norme devrait s'appliquer. Rappelons également que les différences de normes entre les réfugiés et les Suisses dans les deux premiers chapitres ont été observées comme étant faibles et que celles concernant la confiance étaient inexistantes. Dans l'ensemble, on peut affirmer que les différences normatives constatées dans cette thèse peuvent donner lieu à des conflits normatifs liés à l'engagement, mais pas au contenu, entre les deux groupes de réfugiés et les Suisses. Il s'agit là d'un point de vue crucial car il met en perspective la gravité des différences normatives. La résolution des conflits liés à l'engagement est possible lorsque les parties sont ouvertes au discours et à la coopération. Nos conclusions du premier chapitre, à savoir que les réfugiés intériorisent les normes du pays d'accueil au fil du temps et se soucient de s'y conformer, donnent à penser que les réfugiés sont intéressés par cette coopération. Cependant, étant donné que promouvoir un processus de coopération suppose la participation de toutes les parties impliquées, l'engagement et la coopération des réfugiés ne sont pas toujours faciles à mettre en œuvre.

Les implications politiques résultant des trois chapitres pourraient être les suivantes : Sensibiliser les employeurs et les institutions d'accueil et d'insertion des réfugiés aux nombreux points communs entre les réfugiés turcs et afghans et les Suisses pour ce qui concerne les normes sur le lieu de travail et la confiance pourrait s'avérer crucial pour réduire les préjugés et les perceptions erronées à l'égard des groupes de réfugiés. En retour, cela pourrait encourager la propension des employeurs à embaucher des réfugiés turcs et afghans et donc faciliter l'accès de ces derniers au marché du travail. De plus, sensibiliser les employeurs et les réfugiés à certaines différences normatives peut contribuer à favoriser la compréhension mutuelle. Entre les Turcs et les Suisses, perdre la face peut être un aspect plus sensible selon les normes sociales turques que suisses. Contrairement aux normes suisses, les normes sociales afghanes peuvent impliquer une perception plus prononcée des différences entre les sexes et un contact visuel plus discret comme l'expression du respect dû à un supérieur. De tels comportements peuvent être facilement mal compris en Suisse. Éviter le contact visuel peut par exemple être interprété comme un manque d'intérêt et d'attention (Akechi et al., 2013; Argyle and Cook, 2015). Ou encore, une réaction de retenue lors d'un retour d'information critique en présence de collègues peut être interprétée à tort comme une incapacité à faire face à la critique, alors que c'est simplement le fait d'avoir l'impression de perdre la face devant les autres qui l'a provoquée (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993).

L'apparition de différences normatives liées à l'engagement et l'incompréhension des normes du pays d'accueil par les réfugiés soulignent l'importance de deux stratégies. Premièrement, promouvoir un discours ouvert sur les différentes perspectives normatives et, deuxièmement, fournir des informations sur les normes du pays d'accueil. Cela pourrait par exemple se faire par le biais d'un soutien aux

réfugiés par le biais d'un coaching professionnel, qui s'est avéré être un outil efficace pour améliorer leur compréhension des normes sociales du pays d'accueil. L'instauration d'un échange interpersonnel entre les réfugiés et les collègues et employeurs autochtones directement sur le lieu de travail serait un outil important pour promouvoir un processus d'apprentissage et de coopération bilatéral. Cela pourrait être essentiel pour résoudre les différences normatives liées à l'engagement que nous avons constatées entre les réfugiés turcs et afghans et les autochtones suisses (Rauhut and Winter, 2017).

Nos expériences sur la fourniture d'informations et l'observabilité par des compatriotes impliquent que le contexte social et la pression des pairs de même nationalité doivent être pris en compte lors de l'interprétation du comportement normatif. Tandis que la présence de compatriotes rend l'acculturation des réfugiés turcs plus difficile, elle conduit les réfugiés afghans à exprimer encore plus leur conformité avec le pays d'accueil. D'une manière générale, l'hétérogénéité des normes et des modèles de comportement entre les réfugiés turcs et afghans indique que des interventions spécifiques adaptées au groupe peuvent être plus efficaces que des politiques "universelles".

Cependant, nous reconnaissons que ce travail et l'interprétation de ses résultats comportent des limites. Tout d'abord, le nombre de participants réfugiés était relativement faible, ce qui peut nuire à la puissance de notre analyse. Deuxièmement, il a été impossible de procéder à un échantillonnage aléatoire. Nous ne pouvons donc pas savoir si les caractéristiques individuelles des participants turcs et afghans sont représentatives des caractéristiques de ces groupes de réfugiés en Suisse ou si les réfugiés se sont eux-mêmes sélectionnés pour participer à l'expérience. Par exemple, des personnes particulièrement motivées ou très instruites peuvent avoir eu plus d'intérêt à soutenir un projet de recherche. En outre, la variation de certains facteurs influençant les perceptions normatives et la confiance, tels que la durée du séjour en Suisse, est limitée. Les données dont nous disposons proviennent de personnes qui, en moyenne, sont en Suisse depuis un an et demi à deux ans. Or, nous ne pouvons pas savoir comment leurs perceptions normatives ou leur confiance évolueraient sur une plus longue période dans le pays d'accueil. En outre, il y a trop peu d'observations pour distinguer, par exemple, les effets du coaching professionnel reçu dans les différents cantons. Enfin, nous n'avons pu mener ce projet qu'avec les deux nationalités sélectionnées.

D'ailleurs, bien que nous comparons les perceptions normatives et les comportements de confiance entre les groupes, nous devons reconnaître que cette thèse ne permet pas d'étudier l'effet causal du déplacement forcé des réfugiés sur leurs normes et leur comportement de confiance par rapport aux autres immigrants non-réfugiés de la même origine. En raison de la taille limitée des deux échantillons de réfugiés, nous ne pouvons pas non plus approfondir notre analyse de l'effet de la nationalité elle-même sur les perceptions normatives et la confiance. De plus, cette thèse n'aborde pas l'effet des différences de normes et de niveaux de confiance entre les réfugiés et les sociétés d'accueil sur l'insertion sur le marché du travail des réfugiés, mesurée par exemple par leur taux d'emploi.

En tant que piste de recherche future, il y a plusieurs aspects qu'il serait intéressant et important d'approfondir. Tout d'abord, compléter notre analyse avec un plus grand nombre d'observations ou au moyen d'une autre approche statistique (par exemple en utilisant les techniques de l'appariement) permettrait d'étudier un effet causal de la nationalité. En d'autres termes, il serait possible d'examiner si la nationalité ou l'origine culturelle d'une personne est un moteur important des différences normatives, ou si celles-ci sont plutôt déterminées par des différences dans les caractéristiques d'origine telles que

l'âge et l'éducation.

Deuxièmement, il serait intéressant de pouvoir relier nos données à des informations sur les résultats des mêmes participants sur le marché du travail, par exemple la rapidité avec laquelle ils ont trouvé un emploi par la suite. Cela permettrait de conclure si les différences normatives ont un impact significatif sur le processus d'intégration professionnelle des réfugiés. En outre, la réalisation de cette analyse dans différents cantons pourrait montrer dans quelle mesure les différents systèmes cantonaux sont efficaces en ce qui concerne l'intégration professionnelle des réfugiés.

Troisièmement, la collecte de données sur les perceptions normatives et les niveaux de confiance auprès des réfugiés nouvellement arrivés et la reproduction de la même collecte de données à différents moments avec les mêmes personnes fourniraient des données très intéressantes sur l'évolution temporelle des perceptions normatives des réfugiés. Une dernière voie pourrait consister à comparer les perceptions normatives et la confiance entre les migrants réfugiés et non-réfugiés de la même origine (et vivant dans le même pays d'accueil) et leurs compatriotes restés au pays. Cela permettrait de savoir si et comment les perceptions normatives et les niveaux de confiance au sein de ces groupes peuvent différer les uns des autres.

General introduction

An unprecedented and steadily rising number of people worldwide have been forced to leave their homes in recent years. War, conflict, or persecution left them no other choice than to embark on a life-changing and often traumatic relocation. By the end of 2022, 108 million people were globally forcibly displaced among which 12.4 million refugees and people in refugee-like situations found protection in Europe (UNHCR, 2022). The largest number of asylum applications in Europe in 2022 was submitted by people from Syria, Afghanistan, and Turkey.⁹ According to the refugee convention of 1951 in Geneva, a “refugee” is any person “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” (UNHCR (2010), p.3)

Once arrived in the host country, and granted the legal right to stay, establishing a new life in the host country is a challenging process for refugees. Integration is argued to be a two-way process between a receiving society and the newcomers occurring at various levels (Klarenbeek, 2021). Its key realms span from access to employment, health, accommodation, and education to social connections with co-nationals and the local society, language skills, cultural knowledge, and to rights of citizenship and equality (Ager and Strang, 2008).

Yet, participation in the labor market is considered as one of the most fundamental aspects in refugees’ integration process into the host society. Apart from assuring financial independence, employment is also a crucial channel to build up networks and language proficiency and hence, to foster social inclusion (Ager and Strang, 2008; Cheung and Phillimore, 2013; Ortlieb and Knappert, 2023; Lee et al., 2022; Verdier and Zenou, 2017). However, refugees’ professional integration has become a hotly debated issue on the policy agenda of many Western governments. A prominent finding documented across Western high-income countries is that non-EU refugees’ employment rates lag behind those of the native population and other groups of immigrants (Bedaso, 2021; Bevelander, 2016; Salikutluk et al., 2016a; Fasani et al., 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017, 2018; Salikutluk et al., 2016b). Across 20 European countries the probability of unemployment was estimated to be 22 percent (3.1 percentage points) higher among refugees than among other immigrants with a comparable individual background (Fasani et al., 2022). While there is extensive literature on labor market integration of economic immigrants (e.g. Causa and Jean (2006), Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016) or Ho and Turk (2018)), research on the drivers of (un)employment of refugees in Western high-income countries is yet relatively limited. By contrast to the former, refugees are highly likely to face specific challenges in their professional establishment such

⁹Retrieved from <https://euaa.europa.eu/asylum-europe-2022-year-review> on 28.04.2024

as traumatic experiences and (mental) health issues (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Schick et al., 2016), precarious life conditions in the host country (Salis Gross, 2004), the language barrier (Arendt, 2022; Cheng et al., 2021; Foged and Van der Werf, 2023), restrictions in labor market access and qualification recognition (Bucken-Knapp et al., 2019; Fasani et al., 2022) and uncertain prospects (Brell et al., 2020).

However, what has yet received little attention in this debate are the roles of social norms and generalized trust. What do we understand by these concepts and why do they matter?

The theory of social norms posits that human behavior is driven by individuals' preference for conformity with a reference group, usually the majority of a society or a network of people relevant to them. Social norms are informal rules of conduct of a society based on collective perceptions of what is considered as (in)appropriate behavior in a given social interaction (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989). In this work, we follow the more precise definition of social norms by Christina Bicchieri (2006, 2016) describing (injunctive) social norms as behavioral rules individuals prefer to adhere to when they hold two types of expectations - empirical and normative ones. Empirical expectations are based on actual behavior individuals observe among a majority of people in a reference network. Normative expectations describe their (second order) belief about what most people in this reference network expect to be (in)appropriate behavior. Put differently, normative expectations reflect individuals' beliefs about most others' conviction of what should be done or not. Only if individuals hold both, empirical and the normative expectations, social norms will exist and be maintained.

Yet, social norms need to be distinguished from other types of norms such as descriptive and personal norms (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989; Schwartz, 1977). Descriptive norms solely rely on empirical expectations, inducing individuals to reproduce a behavior because they believe that others usually do so. The crucial difference between (injunctive) social norms and descriptive norms is that the former can only be at work when individuals condition their behavior on what they expect most others to believe should (not) be done. For a descriptive norm to guide behavior, observing the actual behavior of others is a sufficient condition (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009).

Personal norms are privately held perceptions of (in)appropriate behavior in a given context. As descriptive and social norms, they can play a significant role in individual choices, for instance, if one is uncertain about the prevailing social norm (Bai and Bai, 2020; Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bertoldo and Castro, 2016; Dimant et al., 2023; Piliavin and Libby, 1986; Schwartz, 1977). By contrast to social and descriptive norms, they are purely private and do not refer to the behavior or the (dis)approval of others. Neither is a personal norm necessarily collectively shared. Consequently, individuals may comply with established social norms even if they do not particularly like them or personally agree to them. Social norms can be sustained by various mechanisms. Fear of negative consequences or social sanctions such as guilt, shame, or embarrassment when acting against them deters individuals from deviating from established social norms (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1989). Yet, compliance with social norms can also serve as a coordination device facilitating group interactions (Young, 2015), as a signal for (desired) group membership, or as an expression of identification with a group (Bicchieri et al., 2022; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Gomila and Paluck, 2020). Further, following a social norm may also be related to social image concerns and hence, the intention to transmit a favorable self-image to group members and to enhance social acceptance (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Bursztyrn and Jensen, 2017).

While social norms can be strongly persistent (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015; Gruneau, 2022; Lessing, 1995; Mackie, 1996), under certain conditions they are nonetheless subject to change (see Gelfand et al. (2023) and Gross and Vostroknutov (2022) for overviews). A prominent example is the erosion of compliance with social norms if norm violation is observed. Bicchieri et al. (2022) show that observing others violating established social norms induces individuals to transgress as well. Thereby, influential group members, people’s sensitivity to norms, and the size of the reference network they consider play crucial roles in changing individuals’ normative expectations and perceptions about others (Bicchieri and Funcke, 2018; Blair et al., 2021; Paluck and Shepherd, 2012).¹⁰

Another channel dissuading people from adhering to social norms is updated beliefs about others’ normative expectations as brought about by the Media, by voting outcomes, or by simply providing social information about other people’s personal opinions. Paluck (2009) found listening to a fictional soap opera radio program changed Rwandan people’s perceptions of injunctive social norms. Election outcomes expressing Donald Trump’s popularity in the U.S. increased U.S. citizens’ tendency to express xenophobic personal opinions in public conditional on their belief about the majority’s social norm (Bursztyjn et al., 2020a). In an experiment by Bursztyjn et al. (2020b), Saudi husbands who had underestimated other Saudi men’s affirmative attitude toward women working outside the home were more inclined to allow their wives to register at a job placement website once their misbeliefs were corrected.

Further, the extent to which societies hold on to social norms or punish deviant behavior is argued to be a cultural trait, yet at the same time an important source of normative change (Gelfand et al., 2011, 2023). If this extent is very high, or in the words of Gelfand et al. (2011), if societies maintain tight norms, change is less likely to occur. In the contrary, loose cultures which are less strict in enforcing their norms may be quicker in acquiring new norms for instance when it comes to behavioral standards introduced in response to climate change or a sanitary crisis.

Finally, and notably strongly related to the context of migration, is the influence of a numerical majority on the normative behavior of minorities. Typically, individuals keep on adhering to social norms as long as they are sustained by a sufficiently large number of members in a society (Young, 2015). However, immigrants move from their home society where they were part of the majority to a new social environment where they belong to a minority group maybe holding a different set of norms and values than the local population in their destination. This relative numerical inferiority may expose minority members to social pressure to conform to the norms of the majority society (Latané, 1996). Results from an experimental study by Winter and Zhang (2018) indeed demonstrate that ethnic minority members in Germany were more likely to be sanctioned for norm violations than native citizens.

Apart from social norms, another essential aspect elaborated on in this thesis is generalized trust. Generalized trust describes individuals’ belief “that most people we have no prior information about can be trusted” (Dinesen (2012), p.495). In other words, it can be understood as one’s beliefs about

¹⁰An experiment conducted by Paluck and Shepherd (2012) showed that the manipulation of public behavior of a group of referent students induced change in the normative perception of behavior of harassment of peers at school. Bicchieri and Funcke (2018) investigated the role of trendsetters in violating norms. They found that not the position of the norm violator in the network is the decisive factor for other people in the network to follow the norm violation. More important for abandoning a norm was the extent to which they are sensitive to the norm and whether they orient themselves towards a wider or narrower neighborhood. Yet, orienting one’s behavior towards the behavior of a larger reference network and being less sensitive to a norm increased the influence of the norm-violating trendsetter on other individuals’ inclination to transgress.

others' reciprocity whose identity is not or just imprecisely known. While generalized trust can only emerge if the counterpart is a stranger, particularized forms of trust arise in interactions with individuals about whom reputational knowledge is available (Bjornskov, 2007). The amount of literature exploring generalized trust, its consequences, and drivers is vast. Some prominent findings are its role as a contributor to cross-national divergence of economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fukuyama, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001, 2003), diversity of institutions and their development (Knack, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997) and country-specific corruption levels (Uslaner, 2002). Major drivers impeding trust are traumatic events in the recent past, membership in a historically discriminated group such as ethnic minorities, suffering from financial or educational misfortunes, and living in a society that is diverse in terms of cultural backgrounds and income (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).

The crucial argument building the foundation of this thesis is that social norms and individuals' inclination to trust might be of essential relevance to the professional establishment of forced immigrants. The following paragraphs elaborate on why this could be the case.

First, social norms and trust affect individual behavior and labor market outcomes. Social norms of wage fairness and reciprocity, workplace conduct, workplace regulations, and policies or gender norms impact on-the-job behavior, employment, and career choices (see the review by Görge and Nosenzo (2020b)). Individual generalized trust has been shown to be directly related to fruitful cross-cultural cooperation and teamwork, job satisfaction and performance as well as individual income (Butler et al., 2016; Garrison et al., 2010; Helliwell and Huang, 2011; Xie and Li, 2021).

Second, empirical research repeatedly reported considerable differences in social norms and trust levels across countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bjornskov, 2007; Bursztyn et al., 2020b; Cavapozzi et al., 2021; Dinesen, 2012, 2013; Falk et al., 2018; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Gächter et al., 2008, 2010; Gelfand et al., 2011; Görge and Nosenzo, 2020a; Henrich et al., 2001; Jayachandran, 2021; Kocher et al., 2008). The origins of such global variations in human preferences probably even trace back to historical movements in the distant past (Becker et al., 2020; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Upon arrival in their destination, immigrants bring with them the level of trust and the set of norms with which they were socialized and brought up in their home countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bazzi et al., 2023; Blau, 2015; Dinesen, 2012, 2013). However, the norms and the inclination to trust which immigrants face in their hosting society are often unfamiliar to them and due to their subtle nature potentially hard to understand (Sakamoto et al., 2010). This applies also to social norms specific to the workplace. Work from sociology and migration studies reported that unfamiliarity with socio-cultural standards of work conduct can pose a serious challenge for non-Western immigrant employees to establish themselves in Western workplaces (Friesen, 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014).

Third, refugees might be a particular group characterized by traits and incentives which are said to be distinct from other immigrant groups. By contrast to the latter, the sudden flight makes refugees less likely to self-select into a suitable destination. Instead, a hasty search for protection may make them prone to end up in a country where their social capital may not meet the requirements of the local labor market (Brell et al., 2020). Since norms and trust are commonly referred to as essential components of social capital (Putnam, 1993), this proposition may also apply to social norms and trust. Further, the threat to life forces people to leave their homes independently of career aspirations or educational degrees. Hence, also their background characteristics might be more diverse than those among other immigrant

groups (Brell et al., 2020; Bedaso, 2021; Dustmann et al., 2017). Finally, not only the life-threatening and often violent experiences that led refugees to flee their countries but also the journey of flight itself can be deeply traumatic (Hall and Werner, 2022; Salis Gross, 2004). However, exposure to violence and trauma is strongly associated with markedly lower levels of trust and one's inclination to engage in social interaction (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, 2013).

Against this background, one may speculate that social norms in the workplace and trust levels between non-Western refugees and Western societies are markedly distinct. If so, dealing with a new normative environment may bring normative uncertainty and perceived normative conflicts. Normative uncertainty refers to a state in which individuals cannot be sure about what decision is appropriate or not under given circumstances (e.g. Dimant et al. (2023), Hedden (2016), Smith et al. (2007)). Given refugees' potential unfamiliarity with prevailing social norms and trust levels in the host country, it may be plausible to argue that their choices and decisions may be regularly affected by normative uncertainty leading to normative misunderstandings. Burks and Krupka (2011) describe normative misunderstandings as a misbelief about others' normative expectations or social norms. In such a case, the normative views of others are misinterpreted.

By contrast, following Rauhut and Winter (2017), a normative conflict describes a "transaction failure resulting from actors holding at least partially exclusive normative expectations" (p.3). They classify normative conflicts into two types which they call "content-related" and "commitment-related" normative conflicts. Content-related normative conflicts refer to a disagreement about what norm should be applied in a given context. If a normative conflict is commitment-related, there is agreement about the applied social norm but disagreement about the extent to which it should be followed. However, especially "content-related" normative conflicts are of crucial relevance since they are associated with a collapse of cooperation between individuals which is harder to restore than in the case of "commitment-related" normative conflicts (Rauhut and Winter, 2017; Matsuo et al., 2014). Hence, if social norms between groups are found to be different or misaligned, this may bear the risk of a normative conflict, either content- or commitment related with the former bringing more serious consequences (also see Burks and Krupka (2011) and Winter et al. (2012)).

Yet, since switching between normative codes depending on the identity of the interaction partner is a reality of many immigrants, being confronted with distinct social norms does not necessarily need to be an issue of concern (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Giguère et al., 2010; Molinsky, 2007). However facing different normative expectations by members of distinct social groups at the same time may expose an individual to a distressing social dilemma since it can only adhere to one norm at the expense of the other (Giguère et al., 2010; Stouffer, 1949). Yet, such situations may be a reality in many multicultural workplaces where collaboration in the presence of both, co-workers from the home and host country, occurs on a regular basis.

Based on these arguments, the core hypothesis underlying this thesis is that there might be socio-cultural differences in social norms in the workplace and trust between non-Western refugees living in Western host societies and the native populations. On the one hand, this may result in (normative) uncertainty and thus, bring the potential for (normative) misunderstandings. On the other hand, distinct norms of work conduct and levels of trust may lead to (normative) conflicts possibly leading to difficult social dilemmas and a lower level of cooperation. Both mechanisms may complicate teamwork and affect

individuals' well-being in the workplace. From this perspective, one may speculate that this in turn could be a challenge for refugees' occupational integration in their host society.

However, in fact, little is known about whether normative differences between non-Western refugees and Western societies in terms of workplace conduct and trust actually exist, and if so, to what extent and how refugees may deal with them. Hence, the main objective of this thesis is to contribute to filling this gap. In a nutshell, it aims to shed light on three core questions. (1) Do personal and social norms in the workplace between non-Western refugees and Western natives differ; if so, to what extent, and what factors may drive these differences? (2) How do colliding home and host country's social norms affect refugees' own (personal) norms and does this change in the presence of co-national peers? And (3) when learning about distinct trust levels among home and host country peers, which of these reference groups do refugees rely on more in their own decision of whether to (mis)trust an anonymous person? And does this depend on whether co-national peers know about their decision?

The questions addressed in this thesis may have important policy implications promoting refugees' professional integration. On the one hand, it may hopefully provide useful insights for providers of occupational integration programs on refugees' learning process of unfamiliar norms. Knowing whether norms in the workplace between non-Western refugees and native populations are culture-specific, and if so regarding what topical domains, provides important guidance about the learnings that may be of particular importance for newly arriving refugees. Further, finding out whether refugees (mis)understand the social norms of the host country, and whether their own social norms are different from the latter may have crucial policy implications. While a misunderstanding may imply delivering refugees with profound information about the social norms prevailing in the host country, personal and social normative differences (without a misunderstanding) might be most efficiently addressed by an open discourse about different normative perspectives since people may disagree with the new norms. Further, gaining insight into which groups of people with what types of personal backgrounds have more or less difficulties in understanding and coping with unfamiliar norms may have implications on the design of integration programs.

On the other hand, considering the two-sided nature of any integration process (Klarenbeek, 2021), we hope that our findings may also raise awareness among employers and human resource management in collaboration with refugees. Gathering in-depth information about normative patterns of behavior and expression may generally facilitate mutual understanding and communication across groups and thus, promote fruitful collaboration and social cohesion. Further, exploring refugees' reactions when exposed to distinct norms and trust levels held by home and host country peers might be essential to understanding the dynamics of their normative behavior. That is, knowing under which circumstances such as in the presence or absence of co-nationals refugees follow home or host country norms might help to better understand the motifs behind their behavior, avoid misinterpretations, and prevent prejudice. This in turn may contribute to fostering impartial attitudes and appropriate dealing with this culturally diverse and vulnerable workforce which are also claimed to be key driver for their successful occupational integration process (Aksoy et al., 2023; Szudarlek et al., 2021).

Despite the potentially crucial relevance of social norms in the workplace and their level of trust for their professional integration process, scientific work on these issues in the field of economics is yet very scarce.

Exceptions are the studies by Jaschke et al. (2022) on the cultural convergence of refugees in Germany and by El-Bialy et al. (2023) who investigated trust among Syrian refugees, also living in Germany. Jaschke et al. (2022) measure refugees' convergence of attitudes and labor market performance towards their host population over time and how the host society's level of hostility affects it. Residence in hostile local environments was found to make refugees' cultural preferences about risk attitudes, reciprocity, and fairness converge faster to those of the native society. However, in contrast to the approach of this thesis, they do not analyze norms and attitudes particular to a workplace setting. El-Bialy et al. (2023) present experimental evidence that refugees' level of trust depends on the type of social ties they hold - bonds to co-national peers, to locals or to both. Yet, they do not provide an answer on how refugees may deal with being torn between information from co-national and native peers and how their trusting behavior may be affected by the simultaneous exposure to such information.

To elaborate on our research questions, we conduct lab-in-the-field and online experiments with Swiss citizens and Turkish and Afghan refugees living in Switzerland. Switzerland has a prominent role as a hosting nation of refugees in the European context. In 2021, after Sweden, Austria, and Germany, it received the highest proportion of refugees relative to its total population size, namely 1.37 percent (Müller et al., 2023). Between the years 2020 and 2022, Afghan and Turkish people were the largest refugee groups in Switzerland apart from Ukrainians.¹¹

In recent years, Switzerland implemented various institutional and structural changes at federal and cantonal levels to improve refugees' access to the Swiss labor market. Part of these measures was the implementation of the Swiss Integration Agenda (AIS), an action program jointly developed by the Swiss Confederation and the cantons aiming at integrating refugees more rapidly into the job market and society in general. This program includes, for example, in-depth information for newly arrived refugees, the systematic promotion of language skills, and specific measures in terms of job market training.¹² However, interviews conducted with refugees and asylum-seekers who arrived in Switzerland between 2014 and 2019 reveal that they do not feel well integrated in professional terms (Mexi, 2023). At the same time, Switzerland's public discourse is characterized by ever-present populist views and prejudices about non-Western immigrants' attitudes and values, especially when they are of Muslim origin (Direnberger et al., 2022; Dolezal et al., 2010; Ettinger, 2008; Ossipow et al., 2019). On the one hand, this stands in disproportionate contrast to the scant amount of scientific evidence available on this matter. On the other hand, it may make Switzerland a difficult terrain for the non-Western refugees' professional integration process.

Apart from the actuality of the subject matter in the Swiss context, the random allocation of refugees across different cantons in Switzerland offered particularly well-suited conditions for the implementation of our study. The reason is that this may prevent major structural differences in the background characteristics of refugees across cantons. While Swiss natives were recruited and inquired online, recruitment and data collection from refugees was based on the collaboration with five German and

¹¹retrieved from <https://migration.swiss/en/migration-report-2022/asylum-and-protection-status-s/a-few-figures?lang=true> on 25.04.2024

¹²See the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA) of 16 December 2005 (status of 15 October 2023) retrieved from <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2007/758/fr> on the 05.05.2024 and Regulation on the integration of foreign nationals (Verordnung über die Integration von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern, VIntA) of 15 August 2018 (status of 1st of March 2023), retrieved from <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2018/511/fr> on the 05.05.2024

French-speaking Swiss cantons.¹³ With the help of various partner institutions, refugees were contacted in person, by letter, or by email and invited to take part in our study taking place in presence. Invited were refugees who have stayed for at most 5 years in Switzerland. Equipped with a mobile lab, we were able to travel and to conduct our experimental sessions across various locations in Switzerland. The whole data collection process took approximately one year to complete. All three chapters of this thesis use data which was gathered in this same data collection. To the best of our knowledge, the collected data is unique and previously non-existent.

In short, the originality of our methodological approach is built on three cornerstones. First, we combine the use of vignettes with the norm elicitation method by Krupka and Weber (2013) to measure specific on-the-job norms of Swiss and refugee participants. A trust game by Berg et al. (1995) serves as a measure of one's inclination to trust. Second, beyond simple comparisons of normative perceptions and trusting choices across Swiss natives and refugees, we compute Euclidean distances thereof within and across groups. The concept of Euclidean distance refers to the mean distance of an individual's value to all other individuals in a certain reference group (Cha, 2007; Jaschke et al., 2022; Rapoport et al., 2021). Comparing intra- and inter-group Euclidean distances of normative perceptions and trusting decisions allows us to gain insight into relative normative differences between Swiss and refugees. Third, in randomized trials, we causally explore the effect of providing social information about norms and trust levels held by home and host country peers and the effect of (anonymous) observability by co-nationals on refugee participants' own norms and trusting behavior.

Even though we compare normative perceptions and trusting behavior across groups, we must acknowledge that this thesis cannot make any statement about the causal effect of refugees' forced displacement on their norms and trusting behavior (as compared to non-refugee immigrants from the same origin). Due to the limited size of both refugee samples, we can neither delve into an analysis of the effect of nationality itself on normative perceptions and trust.

The hypotheses and analysis of all three studies in this thesis have been pre-registered. It has also been evaluated and validated by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences of the University of Fribourg. The data protection services of the CNRS in France permitted our procedures and confirmed their conformity to the GDPR.¹⁴

While this research project was a fascinating and unique experience, its implementation has brought about numerous major challenges. First and foremost, accessing our refugee target groups required an enormous investment of time, personnel, organizational, technical, and financial resources. Contacting and finding enough cantons which were willing to support our project and to engage in the organizational process it involved was a long and difficult task. At some point, the Covid outbreak and the consequences of the war in Ukraine interrupted the progress of our project and postponed the access to our refugee target groups. Once the timing was right, our data collection depended on the fruitful collaboration with our partners in various cantonal institutions since the success of the experimental sessions often also involved considerable organizational efforts on their side. This concerned for instance contacting potential

¹³For reasons of confidentiality and data protection of our vulnerable target groups, we do not mention the names of the cantons we partnered with.

¹⁴Regulation - 2016/679 - EN - gdpr - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)

participants, paving the way for us as researchers to inform potential participants about the study and making it as easy as possible for the very heterogeneous group of participants to make their way into our study location. However, the major and omnipresent concern was to find enough participants to conduct a scientific analysis.

Further, financial constraints made it impossible to hire professional translators for all the sessions. Hence, we had to organize a team of Turkish and Dari (Farsi) native speakers who were personally flexible enough to travel across Switzerland for several days in a row.

This thesis consists of three chapters:

The first chapter elaborates on potential misalignments and misunderstandings of specific socio-cultural norms of workplace conduct between refugees and Swiss locals. Unfamiliarity with such norms is considered as a great challenge for non-Western immigrants' professional establishment in Western high-income countries (Lai et al., 2017). Since social norms are often of implicit and subtle nature, recognizing and understanding the norms of a new social environment can be hard for any individual (Sakamoto et al., 2010). One may speculate that this may bear risks for to the collaboration of non-Western refugees and locals in the workplace. However, in fact, very little is known about specific on-the-job norms among Turkish and Afghan refugees. We attempted to empirically measure personal and social norms in the workplace among Turkish and Afghan refugees and Swiss natives, to check whether they differ from each other, and to what extent. Going beyond simple comparisons across groups, we study whether personal and social norms differ more between refugees and Swiss locals than they do among locals themselves. In the same vein, we investigate whether refugees misperceive the social standards of their host country and if so, whether it is harder for them to anticipate these norms than for natives to predict their own norms. Crucially, comparing social norms between refugees and the Swiss allowed us to infer whether there were normative differences or misalignments across groups. Contrasting refugees' beliefs about the Swiss norms with the actual Swiss norms enabled us to draw a conclusion about whether refugees (mis)understand the norms of their host country. Further, we are interested in what factors such as age, gender, level of education, or duration of stay in Switzerland affect refugees' normative distance to the hosting nation and what makes their predictions of the local norms converge to those among the locals themselves.

To do so we identified twenty-two vignettes occurring in a Swiss workplace that either portray an interaction between colleagues (horizontal relationship) or between an employee and a team leader or the boss (vertical relationship). In each vignette, one of the interaction partners is a hypothetical employee acting in response to the context of the situation. Based on the elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013), refugee and Swiss participants were asked to evaluate the appropriateness of the behaviour of this employee in each vignette for three times. In the first pass, they were asked to give their personal opinion about the employee's behavior in each vignette. In a second pass, they were asked to guess the most frequently given appropriateness evaluation by other co-national refugee participants for all vignettes. In a third pass, they were asked to indicate the appropriateness rating most frequently given by Swiss native participants.

Our findings suggest that apart from a few misalignments, there is a lot of common ground in personal and social norms in the workplace between the two refugee groups and Swiss locals. Most of

the differences we found are of small magnitude. In general, we found Turkish norms in the workplace to be more similar to the Swiss norms than Afghan ones. Among the latter, gender norms were observed to play a salient role. To the largest part, refugees were mostly not any less able to predict the Swiss social norms than the Swiss themselves. Our results suggest that both refugee groups internalize the host country's norms over time and that conformity with the local norms is also driven by a wish for social acceptance.

Chapter 2 argues that personal norms are crucial for decision-making when individuals experience uncertainty about the prevailing social norm (Dimant et al., 2023). More than for any other immigrant group, this may be the case for refugees arriving in an unfamiliar host country. Using the example of mixed gender teamwork, this study first investigates whether personal norms collide, comparing the personal opinions of Turkish and Afghan refugees on the one hand, and those among Swiss natives on the other hand. Second, we examine whether and how conflicting social norms held among home and host country peers influence refugees' personal norms. We hypothesize that refugees may feel torn between two opposing forces: (1) the desire to be consistent with their home country's social norms closely linked to their social identity, and (2) the inclination to conform to local social norms prevailing among the majority society of the host country. Yet, while research and economic theories on social norms predict conformity to the norms of a numerical majority (in our context the host society) (Young, 2015), literature on group identity suggests the adherence to the norms of socially similar peers (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bicchieri et al., 2022). However, despite the actuality of forced immigration, research shedding light on the intersection of majority group norms and group identity is yet scant.

As in the first chapter, personal norms were elicited by the method of Krupka and Weber (2013). Participants were asked to read a vignette about male and female employees working together in a team and to give their personal opinion about the extent of (in)appropriateness of this team composition. In a randomized trial, participants were assigned to three experimental conditions. Participants in the Baseline provided their personal opinions without being provided any information. Participants in the first treatment condition were provided with the distributions of personal norms about a mixed gender team composition by a group of previous participants from the home country and by a group of former participants from the host country. After having received this information, they were asked to provide their personal norm. Participants in a second treatment condition received the same information as those in the first condition but were additionally told that their own, reported personal norms would be (anonymously) made visible to co-national participants at the end of the research project. The aim of this experiment is to illuminate the influence of social norms held by the majority (host) society and those among the co-national in-group in shaping refugees' stated personal norms.

In sharp contrast to populist narratives, we found Turkish participants' personal norms to be more supportive of mixed gender teamwork than those of the Swiss and Afghan refugees. No difference in personal norms was observed between Afghan and Swiss participants. For none of the refugee groups, we found significant effects on personal norms after they had learned about home and host country members' different social norms. Yet, knowing these norms and being observed by co-national peers led Turkish participants to (downward) adjust their personal norms towards the social norm of co-nationals. Surprisingly, Afghan refugees who were informed of home and host country social norms were more likely to report a personal norm conforming with the Swiss social norm, once they were aware that their

reported opinion would be revealed to co-nationals. Yet, without being observed by their co-nationals, no significant effect was observed on reported personal norms by Afghan participants. We derive from these results that the social context plays an essential role when stating personal norms. Our findings also suggest that distinct groups may respond very heterogeneously to information and observability interventions, making it advisable to exercise caution with “one-size-fits-all” policies.

Chapter 3 studies individual generalized trust which was found to be an important driver for individual labor market outcomes such as successful cross-cultural teamwork and cooperation, job performance, and individual income (Butler et al., 2016; Garrison et al., 2010; Xie and Li, 2021). Despite the heated debates about the professional integration of refugees, trust is an understudied topic in the context of forced immigration. Due to cultural differences and traumatic experiences, Middle and Southeastern refugees’ average level of general trust may be way below that among Western receiving societies in Europe (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Haerpfer et al., 2022). The underlying assumption of this chapter is that increasing refugees’ (potentially) lower trust levels may help improve their labor market access in the host country. Hence, the first objective is to assess whether the alleged trust differential between refugees and Western locals indeed exists. If so, we are interested in whether social information about the trust levels of home and host country peers and observability of one’s own trusting behavior by co-national peers affects refugees’ inclination to trust. At the same time, individuals’ reactions to social information and observability reveal whether their trusting behavior may be guided by social norms. The relevance of this question arises because if trust has a normative component, facing distinct trust levels may lead to normative conflict and potentially to lower levels of cooperation. Further, if refugees’ average trust levels should indeed be markedly lower as compared to the native society, trying to improve their levels of trust would be equal to inducing change in normative behavior. Yet, successfully inducing normative change is a complex matter and follows specific rules (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022).

Using a trust game by Berg et al. (1995), we elicited Swiss and Middle Eastern refugees’ levels of trust and beliefs about an anonymous trustee’s reciprocity. Analogously to chapter two, we conducted a between-subject randomized trial in which we manipulated the information provided to refugee trustors before they made their trusting decision. A Baseline serving as the control group did not receive any information. Participants assigned to the first treatment were provided with the distribution of amounts sent to the trustee by previous participants from the home and the host country who had acted in the same role as themselves. Participants in a second treatment group received the same information as those in the first treatment but were additionally made aware that their own trusting choices would be (anonymously) shared with all other co-national participants.

We found no evidence for significant differences in generalized trust across national groups. While beliefs about the trustees’ reciprocity did not significantly differ between Swiss and Afghan respondents, Turkish refugees held significantly more optimistic beliefs than the Swiss. Providing knowledge about the trusting behavior of home and host country peers led Turkish refugees to send amounts which were more in line with the Swiss. Being observed by their compatriots mitigated this adjustment effect. Since social information did not change Turkish refugees’ beliefs about the trustees’ reciprocity, an explanation behind our results may be that Turkish participants perceive trusting behavior as a social norm in Switzerland. Thus, they may feel inclined to conform to their hosting nation’s perceived social norm, though to a less pronounced extent when their own action is observable by co-nationals.

By contrast, learning about trust levels among home and host country peers did not significantly affect Afghan respondents' trusting choices. Yet, surprisingly, providing this information together with the announcement that their own trusting choices will be (anonymously) revealed to all other Afghan participants made Afghan respondents' trusting behavior more compliant with the behavior among the Swiss. However, receiving social information and being observed by co-nationals not only affected Afghan respondents' trusting behavior but also their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee. This result might imply that Afghan respondents may have taken the social information about the trusting behavior among the Swiss as a signal for the trustworthiness of the trustee, and not necessarily as an indication of a social norm.

Chapter 1

Diversity of norms in the workplace ¹

1.1 Introduction

Refugees' professional integration has become a hotly debated issue on the policy agenda of many Western governments. Across many Western high-income countries, non-EU refugees' employment rates lag behind those of the native population and other non-persecuted groups of immigrants (Bedaso, 2021; Fasani et al., 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017, 2018). While lacking language proficiency (Foged and Van der Werf, 2023), restricted qualification recognition (Bucken-Knapp et al., 2019) or discrimination (Aksoy et al., 2023) can impair refugees' professional integration, unfamiliarity with social norms can pose another challenge when entering the labor market of their host country. Since many social norms are of implicit and tacit nature, understanding the norms of a new social environment can be very hard (Molinsky, 2007; Sakamoto et al., 2010). Management science indeed reports that non-Western immigrants face unfamiliar sociocultural norms of work conduct when entering the local labor market in their host country, complicating their professional establishment (Friesen, 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014; van Riemsdijk and Basford, 2021; Wallinder, 2022).

But also in economics, social norms have been repeatedly shown to vary across nationalities and cultures and to affect behavior and labor market outcomes (Bursztyn et al., 2020b; Cavapozzi et al., 2021; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Gächter et al., 2008, 2010; Gelfand et al., 2011; Gorges and Nosenzo, 2020b; Henrich et al., 2001; Jayachandran, 2021; Kocher et al., 2008; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Yet, not only *social* norms, but also *personal* norms guide individual behavior - even more so if one is uncertain about the prevalent social norms (Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022; Burks and Krupka, 2011; Calabuig et al., 2017; Dimant et al., 2023). Whereas *social* norms describe a set of collectively shared perceptions or rules of behavior by a society about what constitutes (in)appropriate behavior, *personal* norms refer to personal opinions about what should (not) be done in a given situation (Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bicchieri, 2006).

In light of these arguments, one could speculate that differences in personal and social norms between non-Western refugees and Western natives may lead to mutual misunderstandings during recruitment processes and in the workplace. And that this in turn may impede refugees' professional integration in

¹This is joint work with Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France) and Fabio Galeotti (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France)

the receiving country. However, these are pure preconceptions because in fact, very little is known about workplace-specific personal and social norms held by non-Western refugees or their perceptions thereof.²

Therefore, the first objective of this chapter is to assess whether salient personal and social norms in the workplace exist among non-Western refugees and a Western native population. Second, if this is the case, we want to measure whether these norms differ across refugees and locals, to what extent, and what factors such as age, gender, level of education, or one's duration of stay in the host country may influence refugees' potential normative distance to the native population. Finally, we seek to learn whether refugees (mis)understand the host country's social norms and which determinants might facilitate or impede their understanding of these norms. Of particular interest thereby are the effects of the duration of time spent in the host country. While this work does not aim to investigate the impact of cross-national normative differences on the professional integration process of refugees in the host country, it might nonetheless initiate important groundwork for research on this matter.

At the core of this work, we argue that refugees are a special group for whom these questions are of particular relevance compared to non-persecuted immigrant groups. Forced migration is often a dramatic and life-changing experience that shapes the characteristics and mental well-being of the refugee population in the receiving countries (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Brell et al., 2020). By contrast to non-persecuted immigrants, the sudden flight might make refugees unlikely to self-select into a suitable destination. Instead, a hasty search for protection may make them prone to end up in a country where their human capital, such as professional skills and norms, may not meet the requirements of the local labor market (Borjas, 1999; Brell et al., 2020; Dustmann et al., 2017; Keefer and Knack, 2005; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). Furthermore, since the threat to life forces refugees to leave home, independently of education or career aspirations, their background characteristics might be more diverse than those among economic immigrants (Brell et al., 2020). Finally, evidence from psychology has shown that refugees often suffer from traumatic experiences which are claimed to impede one's capacity to recognize unfamiliar cultural environments and to acquire new competencies (Bakker et al., 2014; Schick et al., 2016; Steel et al., 2004).

To address our research questions, we employed a pre-registered, incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment with a sample of 156 Turkish and 85 Afghan refugees from five Swiss cantons. The same experiment was conducted online with a quasi-representative sample of 197 Swiss natives living in Switzerland.³ Switzerland is a prominent player in hosting refugees. After Sweden, Austria, and Germany, it received the highest share of refugees (relative to its population size) in Europe in 2021 (EU-15) (Müller et al., 2023). Between the years 2020 and 2022 apart from Ukrainian refugees, people from Turkey and Afghanistan represented the two largest groups applying for asylum in Switzerland.⁴ Furthermore, Switzerland was particularly well-suited for the implementation of our study because the allocation of refugees to different

²While the investigation of specific workplace norms of non-persecuted immigrants is the subject of several studies in migration and management sciences (Hofstede et al., 2010; Friesen, 2011; Friesen and Ingram, 2013; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014; van Riemsdijk and Basford, 2021; Wallinder, 2022), in economics, there are only very few papers touching this topic (see for instance Jaschke et al. (2022) on work-relevant preferences of refugees, or Zisler et al. (2023) dealing with workplace norms of non-refugee immigrants).

³The experiment with the Swiss was the same in its design but adapted to the Swiss.

⁴<https://migration.swiss/en/migration-report-2022/asylum-and-protection-status-s/a-few-figures?lang=true>

cantons is random.⁵ Applying the coordination method of Krupka and Weber (2013), we elicited personal and injunctive social norms among each nationality regarding specific interpersonal interaction scenarios that may hypothetically occur in a Swiss workplace (vignettes). These vignettes either portray the vertical relationship between a boss or a superior co-worker and an employee or the horizontal relationship among employees. Additionally, we measured refugees' beliefs about the injunctive social norms of the Swiss native population regarding the same vignettes. Following Burks and Krupka (2011), we compared personal and social norms between each refugee group and the Swiss to assess whether they hold similar or distinct norms. Contrasting refugees' beliefs about the Swiss social norms with the actual Swiss social norms (elicited from the Swiss sample) allowed us to evaluate whether refugees misperceived the Swiss norms or not. Following Gächter et al. (2010), cultural difference can be defined as a state in which variation *between* groups is greater than variation *within* a group. A common tool in cultural economics suitable to capture this idea is the concept of Euclidean distance (Cha, 2007; Jaschke et al., 2022; Rapoport et al., 2021). Combining this approach with Gächter's (2010) definition, we identified a personal or social normative difference between groups only if the inter-group mean Euclidean distance in appropriateness ratings (refugees vs. Swiss) was larger than the intra-group mean Euclidean distance of these ratings among the Swiss (Swiss vs. Swiss). In the same vein, we only identified a normative misunderstanding if refugees' average Euclidean distance between their beliefs about a Swiss social norm and the actual norm was greater than the mean Euclidean distance of Swiss participants' beliefs about their own social norm. In a final step, we aggregated the salient personal and (perceived) social norms we had identified for individual vignettes to check two aspects: First, whether potential *relative* normative differences between refugees and the Swiss were (also) found at the aggregate level (refugees-Swiss vs. Swiss-Swiss). Second, what (refugee-specific) factors were correlated with the distance in personal and social norms between refugees and the Swiss (refugees vs. Swiss) and with refugees' beliefs about the Swiss social norms.

Our results suggest that there are indeed salient personal and social norms in the workplace among each national group. *Relative* normative differences and misperceptions between Turkish, respectively Afghan, refugees, and Swiss locals are occasionally observed but not to the extent as commonly portrayed by populist narratives (Direnberger et al., 2022). Generally, evidence for differences in personal and social norms between Turkish and Swiss participants is weak, but somewhat more pronounced when comparing Afghan and Swiss norms. Turkish refugees are observed to report personal norms that are more supportive of equality among individuals of varying genders, ages, and hierarchical positions than Swiss participants. Misalignments between Turkish and Swiss social norms are rare and only occur for social norms identified among Turkish participants, such as the inappropriateness of giving critical feedback in front of others. However, regarding social norms identified among the Swiss, Turkish and Swiss norms are observed to be aligned. Between Afghan and Swiss respondents, we observe that most and strongest misalignments in personal and social norms are related to direct visual contact in a hierarchy relationship. Our results indicate that for an employee to maintain direct visual contact with the boss is generally perceived as less appropriate according to Afghan than to Swiss personal and social norms. Yet, this is especially the case when interaction partners are of opposite genders.

⁵Refugees are distributed proportionally to the number of permanent residents in each canton (Ahrens et al., 2023; Couttenier et al., 2019). There are reasons for exceptions to exogenous allocation to the cantons, for instance in case of family reunification. However, exceptions are relatively rare (Ahrens et al., 2023; Martén et al., 2019).

Further, we found that refugees are mostly not any less able to predict the Swiss social norms than the Swiss themselves. When they misperceived the local social norms, the Turkish overestimated them by believing that the Swiss social norms were more strongly (in)appropriate than they really were. By contrast, Afghans underestimated the local norm in the sense that they expected the Swiss to collectively hold weaker appropriateness perceptions than was actually the case.

Correlating refugees' mean Euclidean distances in aggregated personal and (perceived) social norms to the Swiss on various factors yields four important messages contradicting right-wing threat narratives about non-Western refugees (Direnberger et al., 2022). First, the wish for social acceptance matters. In both refugee groups, reported personal norms are related to what they believed to be socially desirable from a Swiss perspective.⁶ Yet, while striving to conform goes along with Afghan participants' convergence to the Swiss personal norms, it is related to Turkish personal norms moving away from the latter. Also, Turkish refugees' stated beliefs about the Swiss social norms reflect their intention to signal their positive view of the Swiss (social norms), or a view, they believed to be perceived favorably in the host country.

Second, both refugee groups may have internalized the values of their host country, or what they believed about them. Their personal and perceived in-group social norms evolved the longer they stayed in Switzerland, notably in the same direction as their beliefs about what is socially desirable in the host society.⁷ Since job experience in Afghanistan was found to amplify the distance in perceived in-group social norms between Afghan and Swiss respondents, Afghans' convergence in personal and perceived in-group social norms to those among the Swiss the longer they stayed in Switzerland supports this argument. Among Turkish refugees, not only their personal norms and perceived in-group social norms but also their beliefs about the Swiss social norms changed over time.⁸ They also diverged from the Swiss' perceptions of the Swiss social norms. Yet, specific learnings about the local norms acquired by job training induced Turkish refugees' perceptions of in-group social norms to converge towards the Swiss' perceptions of their own social norms. According to recent literature, changes in in-group evaluation can result from acculturation processes (Kämmer and Albert, 2023; Nesdale and Mak, 2000; Starck et al., 2020). Therefore, we also interpret the findings from Turkish respondents as an internalization process of what they believed about the local norms.

Third, attending job training in Switzerland was observed to help Turkish refugees predict the Swiss social norms more similarly to how the Swiss themselves did which stresses the efficiency of attending such training.

Fourth, the opposite effects of job experience in the home country on refugees' distance in personal or social norms to the Swiss corroborate our previous findings that Turkish and Swiss workplace norms may be more similar than Swiss and Afghan norms.

To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide incentive-compatible empirical evidence on (mis)perceptions of personal and social norms regarding specific on-the-job behavior of non-Western refugees in a Western high-income country. Our findings are based on a novel data set that stands out for its uniqueness due to the challenges and significant time investment in accessing this hard-to-reach and

⁶We interpret our findings as social desirability towards the Swiss since refugees were responding to (partly) Swiss researchers for a study conducted in Switzerland.

⁷Note that this analysis is solely based on correlations and does not allow any statement about causality.

⁸We cannot report any significant results from regressing Afghan participants' beliefs about the Swiss social norms.

vulnerable target group. Whereas diversity of sociocultural workplace norms between non-Western and Western employees is the subject of research in management sciences (e.g. Lai et al. (2017); Friesen and Ingram (2013); Friesen (2011)), though focusing on non-refugees, it seems barely existent in economics. The originality of this work comes from going beyond simple comparisons of norms by focusing on relative normative (mis)alignments between refugees and locals and taking into account the extent of normative variation among locals themselves. Our findings may also be of vital importance for public policy. Whether refugees simply misunderstand the local norms or whether their own norms diverge or disagree with prevailing norms in the host country could make a crucial difference to policy recommendations. While dealing with a disagreement may require a process of open discourse, a misperception by refugees might be addressed more efficiently by providing specific knowledge to correct beliefs (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022). Finally, identifying (refugee-specific) factors driving normative differences between locals and refugees may help to refine existing support strategies and training programs aiming at the professional integration of refugees.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 outlines related literature, section 1.3 describes our theoretical framework, and section 1.4 lays out our experimental design and procedures. Section 1.5 states our main conjectures. The measurement of our variables of interests and covariates is presented in section 1.6. Section 1.7 presents the main results, section 1.8 shows robustness tests and section 1.9 concludes.

1.2 Related literature

We believe that the contribution of our work to the existent literature is twofold. First, our work speaks to a growing body of economic literature on personal and social norms linked to the labor market (see G6rges and Nosenzo (2020b) for an overview) and normative misperceptions (see Bursztyn and Yang (2022) for a review). It builds on the methodological framework by Burks and Krupka (2011) which provides a useful tool to identify normative differences and misunderstandings. These authors ran an experimental, incentivized vignette study to analyze (mis)alignments of ethical workplace conduct across two levels of hierarchy in a financial services company. Their results indicate that while employees from two different hierarchy levels can predict the social norms of the respective other level, these social norms vary across the two levels of hierarchy. Another paper based on the framework by Burks and Krupka (2011) is Choi et al. (2017). In their study about norms on the safety behavior of construction workers, they demonstrate that the social norms of a certain workgroup can influence the personal standards of individual workers. This impact was found to depend on the extent to which a worker identifies with that workgroup. However, while Burks and Krupka (2011) and Choi et al. (2017) examine norms and normative (mis)alignments between members of distinct hierarchy levels, their target groups are not characterized by salient differences in social identity such as a distinct cultural background. Our paper has in common with Bursztyn et al. (2020b) that it studies incentivized data on personal and social norms and (mis)perceptions of the latter about labor market relevant behavior held by a non-Western target group. They found Saudi men to systematically underestimate the true share of other Saudi men personally being in favor of female labor market participation outside of the home. But in contrast to our work, Bursztyn et al. (2020b) do not elicit individuals' beliefs across (culturally) different groups but

only within their group of social peers.

Second, this chapter also complements the literature related to the employment of forced immigrants in Western high-income countries, which has rapidly gained interest in recent years. For general overviews see for instance Becker and Ferrara (2019) reviewing previous literature about the consequences of forced migration on economic and political outcomes for receiving and home populations and for refugees themselves. Brell et al. (2020) summarize the current literature about refugees' professional integration in high-income host countries and provide evidence for the heterogeneity of labor market outcomes of refugees depending on the host country. However, despite its relevance for professional integration, economic empirical evidence about refugees facing potentially unfamiliar norms in workplaces of their host country is yet very scarce. Using survey data from refugees and their German host population, Jaschke et al. (2022) measure the impact of a host society's hostility on refugees' convergence of attitudes and labor market performance towards their host population over time. They find that living in hostile local environments makes cultural preferences (such as risk attitudes, reciprocity, and fairness) of refugees converge faster to the preferences of the native society. Yet, in contrast to our work, their analysis does not consider norms and attitudes particular to on-the-job behavior. A study dedicated to the role of specific workplace-related sociocultural knowledge for employment chances was conducted by Zisler et al. (2023). From a combination of survey and administrative data, they find that vocational education programs which offer training of workplace-based cultural skills have a positive causal effect on employment probabilities of young immigrants in Switzerland. However, they do not target refugees. Contrary to the work of Jaschke et al. (2022) and Zisler et al. (2023), our work cannot provide a link between normative perceptions and labor market outcomes. But unlike them, we can identify relative normative differences between refugees and the host country population, going beyond simple comparisons between these groups. Finally, our work complements these studies by providing incentive-compatible evidence instead of relying on survey data which is expected to increase the robustness of all elicited measures of norms.

1.3 Theoretical framework

The two cornerstones building the theoretical framework of this first chapter are personal and injunctive social norms. There is a growing strand of economic evidence suggesting that social norms have a strong influence on individuals' behavior (Barr et al., 2018; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014; Bicchieri et al., 2022; Burks and Krupka, 2011; Gächter et al., 2017; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka and Weber, 2013). The theory of social norms suggests that a preference for conformity leads people to adjust their behaviors to be in line with what they believe is empirically and normatively expected by their reference group, usually the majority of a society. Put differently, social norms are rules of behavior of a society governing social interactions by a shared perception of (in)appropriate behavior (Elster, 1989; Young, 2015). Individuals prefer to adopt these rules for two reasons: First, because they believe that most others in their reference network do comply with these rules (empirical element). Second, because they expect the majority of others in their reference network to believe that one should behave accordingly (normative element and second-order belief). For a social norm to exist and to be maintained, both elements, the empirical and the normative one, have to be present in peoples' perception (Bicchieri,

2006).⁹ Importantly, conformity with established social norms is independent of one’s personal opinion or preference. Social norms are often claimed to be strongly persistent. However, individuals only keep on adhering to them as long as they are sustained by a sufficiently large number of members of a society (Collier, 2016; Young, 2015).

Whereas previous literature on norms predominantly addresses the behavioral impact of social norms, a growing body of research also emphasizes the importance of personal norms in predicting behavior (Ababio-Donkor et al., 2020; Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bai and Bai, 2020; Bicchieri, 2010; Capraro et al., 2019; Dimant et al., 2023; Piliavin and Libby, 1986). Personal norms are defined as own, privately held perceptions or opinions about the appropriateness of behavior (also see Schwartz (1973, 1977)). In the words of Bicchieri (2006), personal norms are a “personal normative belief about what should happen”. We adopt the idea of Bašić and Verrina (2023) that both, social and personal norms, influence individuals’ utility. Considering the reality of life of refugees, we slightly extend their theoretical framework. When recalling the definition of a social norm according to Bicchieri (2006), an individual’s reference network plays a crucial role when it comes to adopting social norms. Behavioral change occurs once a crucial majority in this network starts adhering to another norm (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022; Collier, 2016; Young, 2015). When non-Western refugees arrive in a Western destination country, a large majority of the population around them has another cultural background than in their home country. According to Barr and Serra (2010) (citing Greif (1994)), culture can be defined as a “coordination device, i.e. a set of social norms and beliefs that lead a society to a specific equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist.” Hence, with culture, normative behavioral patterns of the majority society might have changed as well. Nonetheless, refugees may engage in a network of co-nationals living in the same host country. These interactions might naturally be shaped by the familiar social norms common in their home country. Hence, being in touch with two culturally distinct social reference networks may expose refugee immigrants to different social norms. Consequently, we would expect that (non-)conformity with personal norms and, depending on the interaction partner(s), home and host country social norms affect refugee individuals’ utility. When these norms coexist, such as in a multicultural workplace in Switzerland where Swiss natives and co-nationals collaborate, non-Western refugees might find themselves navigating situations of normative conflict or misunderstanding (Olcina et al., 2024). Drawing utility from conformity to norms held by co-national peers while simultaneously sacrificing utility by deviating from the norms of the majority society, or the other way round, may confront refugee employees with a distressing behavioral dilemma.

⁹In contrast, descriptive norms solely rely on the empirical element, driving individuals to reproduce a certain behavior just because they expect most others to perform that behavior. The crucial difference is that injunctive (social) norms can only be at work when individuals condition their behavior on their expectation about what most others believe ought to be done. For a descriptive norm to steer behavior, it suffices to observe and follow most others’ behavior (Bicchieri, 2006). Even though both types of norms affect human behavior (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009), the focus in this work is on injunctive social norms.

1.4 The experiment

In this section, we will first describe the experimental design. Then, we present our samples, the recruitment of participants, and the experimental procedures we followed.

1.4.1 The experimental design

Previous work about social norms in the workplace held by non-Western refugees is scarce. Therefore, developing the vignettes to be studied required us to collect in-depth information about our target groups in the first place. In the second stage, we ran lab in the field and online experiments.

Stage 1 - Identifying vignettes. Our method builds upon prior literature applying vignettes, or hypothetical interaction scenarios, to measure social norms (Burks and Krupka, 2011; Gorges and Nosenzo, 2020a; Rauhut and Winter, 2010). The specific scenarios we identified as our vignettes are based on interviews with different actors (interculturally trained translators with a refugee background themselves, job coaches, social workers, and Swiss employers) and previous literature from social sciences.¹⁰ Our interview partners were asked about interpersonal situations in the workplace which they would expect to be perceived as (in)appropriate by Turkish and Afghan employees or which may provoke confusion or misunderstandings in their collaboration with Swiss co-workers. We selected those situations as vignettes that were consistently mentioned by several interview partners and for which we found support in the literature. As a result, displayed in Table 1.1, we identified twenty-two vignettes occurring in a Swiss workplace that either portray an interaction between colleagues (horizontal relationship) or between an employee and a team leader or the boss (vertical relationship). Our research interest in whether there are normative differences between our target groups builds on the existence of salient personal and social norms in the workplace among these groups. Since empirical research on this matter is yet very scarce, we aimed at obtaining a big picture of interactions where norms may indeed occur instead of exploring a few aspects in detail. Hence, the number of vignettes was relatively large. Topically, our vignettes focused on age, same and mixed gender interactions (teamwork and direct visual contact), hierarchy, giving and receiving (critical) feedback, dealing with insult, doing each other favors, and running late. Yet, some vignettes touch on several of these topics.

Vignettes 1 and 7 in Table 1.1 address interactions between age-diverse colleagues or super- and subordinates. While it is commonly argued that Western cultures tend to devalue elder workers, Eastern, particularly Muslim, traditions are said to place special emphasis on respectful behavior towards older interaction partners (Kameh Khosh et al., 2020; North and Fiske, 2015; Yang and Matz, 2017). Whereas distinct norms about one's superior or subordinate position due to age may expose elder Easterners or young Westerners to the risk of feeling, young Easterners in a Western workplace might not dare to question an older co-workers opinion even if maybe necessary.

Vignettes 18-22 covered interaction scenarios between men and women, more in particular, mixed gender teamwork and direct visual contact. Turkey, Afghanistan, and Switzerland were traditionally ruled by patriarchal social norms contributing to gender-segregated work domains or even discouraging women from participating in the labor market at all (Bornatici et al., 2020; Gedikli, 2020; Hedayat and Harpviken,

¹⁰All interviews were conducted in online meetings or in person. Swiss employers from various domains filled out an online survey.

2014; Ince Yenilmez, 2014; Kakar and Hasan, 2024; Özsoy et al., 2023). However, previous literature attests Middle Eastern and Southeastern regions of the world to maintain stronger gender-segregating societal norms than Western ones Bugay et al. (2021); D'Enbeau (2015); Metcalfe (2008). Part of it may also have been the idea of physical separation of women and men who are unrelated by blood or marriage (Cairolì, 1998; Kawar, 2000; Salem and Yount, 2019). Hence, if these norms were still in place, employees from Western and Eastern cultural backgrounds may experience varying levels of comfort when working in mixed gender teams, thereby complicating collaboration in a Western work environment. Visual contact is argued to be an essential aspect of nonverbal communication. Yet, its interpretation can be culturally very distinct (Jongerius et al., 2020; Uono and Hietanen, 2015). While mutual visual contact expresses interest and attentiveness in Western cultures (Argyle and Cook, 2015), in East Asian regions it is considered a sign of respect to avoid it (Akechi et al., 2013; Argyle and Cook, 2015; Elzinga, 1978; Sue and Sue, 1999). Depending on its frequency and intensity, direct eye contact may also be read as an expression of intimacy, or even dominance (Grammer et al., 1999; Tang and Schmeichel, 2015).

Vignettes 6, 8, and 9 (but also 1 and 12) deal with interactions between colleagues on different hierarchical layers. “Power Distance” or the degree of accepting unevenly distributed power has been shown to be a crucial component impacting interactions and perceptions in the workplace (Alper, 2019; Aycan, 2006; Gelfand et al., 2007; Hofstede et al., 2010). While Northern European countries are associated with a low level of “Power Distance” (participative leadership), for countries like Turkey or Pakistan (sharing its border with Afghanistan), inequalities may be perceived as more acceptable (Türker and Lajunen, 2011; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993). However, when these norms clash, individuals from “power distant” countries working in Western workplaces might find themselves missing out on participation opportunities or even being vulnerable to exploitation.

Perceiving feedback and the style of how it is communicated is covered by vignettes 2-5 and 12. Work from management science has stressed cultural diversity in interpreting feedback (Earley et al., 1999; Gabelica and Popov, 2020; Molinsky, 2007). While European regions such as Scandinavia, Germany, or Switzerland are described as relying on an explicit communication style rich in words, Eastern cultures are typically classified as transmitters of implicit and indirect messages (Adair and Brett, 2004; Hall, 1979; Würz, 2004). Thus, while individuals used to explicit statements may not properly understand implicit messages, addressing direct feedback to an individual familiar with indirect communication might miss its target and result in hurt feelings.

Vignettes 13-15 deal with an employee who is inclined to refuse a colleague’s request for a favor. Ways of declining a request can also be very much culturally determined and lacking awareness of it is another source of cross-cultural misunderstandings (Chang, 2012, 2009). Vignettes 10, 11, and 5 represent scenarios of conflict resolution or offense which might be handled distinctively in different cultures. Whereas in individualistic nations such as Western Europe conflicts are resolved by assertive and confrontational interaction strategies, in collectivist regions such as the Middle East or South Asia, compromising, smoothing approaches may be preferred (Holt and DeVore, 2005; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1988; Kozan and Ilter, 1994).

Finally, vignettes 16 and 17 outline one’s relation to being on time. While punctuality is a particularly strong norm in Switzerland, the understanding of being on time can vary considerably across countries and cultures (Brislin and Kim, 2003; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993; White et al., 2011). Yet, misinterpretations of this norm in terms of the workplace may have very negative consequences.

Table 1.1: Vignettes

Vignettes			
Short description	Situation	Behavior	Relationship
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction mistake by colleague: - no criticism - cautious criticism - direct criticism - criticism in presence of others	Employee A works in a team. The team leader is ten years younger than Employee A. The team leader instructs Employee A how to do the job. Employee A has noticed that his/her colleague has not properly read the written instruction of the boss. Therefore, the colleague is making mistakes in doing his/her job.	1) Employee A follows the instructions of the young team leader with reluctance because the boss is younger than the employee. 2) Employee A does not tell anything to his/her colleague. 3) Employee A approaches the colleague when no one is around and tells him/her that (s)he may have not seen the part of the instructions where the job is explained. 4) Employee A approaches the colleague when no one is around and tells him/her that (s)he has not properly read the instructions and is therefore making mistakes in doing his/her job. 5) Employee A approaches the colleague when other colleagues are around, and tells him/her that (s)he has not properly read the instructions and is therefore making mistakes in doing his/her job.	vertical horizontal
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept advice by older colleague: disagree but follow task unclear: - act as if it was clear - ask the boss to explain again	Employee A is having a discussion with his/her boss, and feels that his/her boss is treating him/her unfairly. A ten years older colleague, who is not the boss, tells Employee A the (s)he should do the job differently. Employee A disagrees. The boss explains a new task to Employee A. However, Employee A does not fully understand.	6) Employee A does not oppose the boss, and accepts what the boss says. 7) Employee A does not oppose his/her older colleague, and follows the advice of the older colleague. 8) Employee A nods and acts as if everything was clear. 9) Employee A asks the boss to explain again the task until everything is clear.	vertical horizontal vertical
insulted by colleague: - inform boss - resolve issue in private	Employee A feels insulted by a colleague who is neither the boss nor a close friend.	10) Employee A informs the boss about this conflict and that (s)he feels insulted by the colleague. 11) Employee A asks the colleague whether the two of them could have a private discussion in order to resolve the conflict.	horizontal
mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss colleague asks to take over shift: - not take shift - take shift - take shift if returned	Employee A has made a mistake at work. The boss directly confronts the Employee with it and tells him/her how to do better the next time. A colleague asks Employee A to take over his/her work shift. Employee feels too tired to do an additional shift.	12) After this discussion, Employee A avoids dealing with the boss in the coming time because (s)he feels insulted by the boss pointing at his/her mistake 13) Employee A apologizes to the colleague and explains that (s)he cannot take over this shift and why. 14) Employee A accepts to take over the colleague's shift. 15) Employee A accepts to take over the colleague's shift but only under the condition that the colleague returns the favor by taking over one of the Employee A's shifts next week.	vertical horizontal
appointment at work: - 5 minutes late - 15 minutes late	Employee A has an appointment at work.	16) Employee A arrives 5 minutes late to the appointment.	vertical
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	18) Employee A is a male. He is discussing with his female boss. The boss is looking Employee A straight in the eyes while talking. 19) Employee A is a female. She is discussing with her female boss. The boss is looking Employee A straight in the eyes while talking. 20) Employee A is a female. She is discussing with her male boss. The boss is looking Employee A straight in the eyes while talking. 21) Employee A is a male. He is discussing with his male boss. The boss is looking Employee A straight in the eyes while talking. 22) The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.	17) Employee A arrives 15 minutes late to the appointment. Employee A maintains direct eye contact with the boss during the discussion.	vertical vertical
mixed gender teamwork			horizontal

Note: Vignettes 1 – 17 consist of a given situation and a hypothetical reaction by the employee. While for vignettes 18 – 21 the situation varies but the reaction stays the same, the very last vignette 22 just concerns a situation.

Stage 2 - Lab-in-the-field and online experiments. In the second step, we conducted lab-in-the-field experiments with Turkish and Afghan refugees and online experiments with a Swiss native control group. Experiments with the Swiss participants took place online because we aimed to elicit the Swiss norms from a sample that closely represented the individual characteristics of the Swiss population. This required a pre-selection process which was only feasible online (also see section 1.4.3 on recruitment procedures). Following Burks and Krupka (2011) we elicited different normative components regarding the behavior of the hypothetical employee in each vignette presented in Table 1.1. That is, for each behavior described in a vignette we measured participants’ personal norms, expected (injunctive) social norms of one’s own national group and, for refugees only, their beliefs about the Swiss social norm. Correspondingly, the questionnaire for our refugee sample was built in three parts. Since we elicited only personal and social norms for the Swiss, their questionnaire had just two parts.¹¹ In each part, participants were asked to assess each of the 22 vignettes with respect to its appropriateness. While the vignettes remained the same across parts, the assessment question slightly differed from part to part depending on what norm or belief was measured. The questions asked to Afghan and Turkish participants were equal in all three parts. Apart from the refugee-specific part of the questionnaire, Swiss participants also answered the same questions as refugees.

The first part of the questionnaire was always dedicated to the unincentivized elicitation of personal norms. Regarding each behavior, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they personally find that behavior appropriate regardless of the opinion of others (“*According to your personal opinion, how do you find this behavior?*”). In our instructions, we defined “appropriate behavior” as a behavior that one personally considers to be “correct” or “ethical”. By contrast to Krupka and Weber (2013), our participants could choose from six instead of four response options: “Very appropriate”, “Appropriate”, “Somewhat appropriate”, “Somewhat inappropriate”, “Inappropriate” and “Very inappropriate”. This aimed at capturing the nature of the norm in a more differentiated way. For analysis (not shown to participants) we assigned each response option with a score ranging from 1 (corresponding to “very appropriate”) to -1 (corresponding to “very inappropriate”). “Appropriate” is assigned 0.6, “Inappropriate” -0.6 , “Somewhat appropriate” 0.2, and “Somewhat inappropriate” -0.2 .¹²

In part two, we measured injunctive social norms. By contrast to the first part, this second part was dedicated to the measurement of **social** (in)appropriateness of behavior referring to actions that are commonly acknowledged as (in)appropriate by a certain group or society of individuals. While participants were shown the same vignettes as in part one, the question being asked about each vignette changed at this stage. Following the elicitation method of social norms by Krupka and Weber (2013), participants were now asked to guess the most frequent response given by **other** co-national participants

¹¹Elicitation of Swiss participants’ beliefs about the appropriateness rating of Turkish and Afghans was not the focus of this work. A particularity of the Swiss questionnaire is that participants were asked to coordinate with other Swiss participants living in the same language region as themselves. The purpose was to check for cultural differences between German- and French-speaking respondents in our pilot data. As these differences could be ruled out, we did not introduce any change in the questionnaire. For refugees, we did not include this specification when coordinating with co-nationals or Swiss participants. 80 percent of all refugee participants have spent at most 3 years in Switzerland and 60 percent have stayed for at most 1.5 years. Many refugees spend their first year in a reception center where they live rather isolated from the host country’s population. Hence, it does not seem likely that they could take into account regional normative differences in Switzerland. It seems more natural for newly arrived immigrants to rely on own or others’ experiences with host country locals during that relatively short time of stay. Finally, the quasi-representative sampling of Swiss participants required a pre-selection questionnaire (see the instructions in the Appendix) which was not applied to refugees. There were also slight differences between Swiss and refugee participants regarding the demographic questionnaire.

¹²Following the same principle as in Krupka and Weber (2013), the scores are chosen such that the difference in score is the same between all neighboring response options.

(who had so far taken part in the study) when assessing the social appropriateness of the behaviors by the hypothetical employee. Hence, their personal perceptions did not play a role in this part of the questionnaire. As participants were asked to coordinate their answers with most other co-national study participants, this boiled down to an economic coordination game in which social norms are assumed to serve participants as a focal point. In the instructions, we described “socially appropriate behavior” as a behavior that is considered “correct” and “ethical” by the majority of people. Hence, this time, the phrasing of the question (to elicit the Afghan social norm for example) was *“Please evaluate this behavior by choosing the answer that was chosen most frequently by the other Afghan participants. If you give the same response as the majority of the other Afghan participants, you may earn 1.50 CHF.”* The number of response options was the same as in part one. But as we investigated social norms, the wording was different here, namely “very **socially** appropriate”, “**socially** appropriate”, “somewhat **socially** appropriate”, “somewhat **socially** inappropriate”, “**socially** inappropriate” and “very **socially** inappropriate”.¹³ By contrast to the elicitation of personal opinions, measuring social norms involved financially incentivizing participants’ responses. From all twenty-two behaviors in this second part, the program randomly selected four behaviors. Participants earned an additional amount of 1.50 CHF for each behavior that was chosen by the computer and for which they had correctly guessed the most frequent response given by other co-national participants.¹⁴

The third part of the questionnaire was only presented to refugees and aimed at finding out their beliefs about the Swiss social norms. This part was identical to the second one with the only difference being that refugees’ reference group was the Swiss participants. Here, Turkish and Afghan refugees were asked to guess the most frequently given answer by Swiss participants when evaluating the appropriateness of each behavior of the employee (*“Please evaluate this behavior by choosing the answer that was chosen most frequently by the Swiss participants. If you give the same response as the majority of the Swiss participants, you may earn 1.50 CHF.”*). The response options and the financial incentivization were the same as in part two.

For all participants and all nationalities, the elicitation of personal norms was always first. Given that the questionnaire for refugee participants had three parts, the second and third part appeared in random order. For each participant and all nationalities, the order in which the scenarios appeared was random but for each participant, the order remained constant across parts.

Comparing personal and social norms across national groups allows us to assess whether there are normative differences or misalignments. By a normative misalignment, we understand a situation in which social (or personal) norms significantly deviate between two nationalities. Contrasting refugees’ beliefs about the Swiss social norms with the actual Swiss social norms indicates whether they can

¹³In contrast to our design, Krupka and Weber (2013) use four response categories (“very socially appropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate” and “very socially inappropriate”) for participants to evaluate appropriateness of behavior. We used six instead of only four response options because it allowed us to differentiate participants’ responses more accurately. However, this brought the risk that it might have been harder for individuals to coordinate on the social norms. In line with Krupka and Weber (2013) and Burks and Krupka (2011), we did not provide a neutral response category. This would have introduced another focal point for participants to coordinate on rather than the social norm which could have biased participants’ responses.

¹⁴To evaluate whether participants had correctly guessed their reference group’s modal response, we compared their response to the responses of other co-ethnic participants who had already taken part in the study and who were taking part at the same time as the individual itself. That is, the modal reference value to which we compared one’s response was steadily adjusted with the increasing number of participants. Note that by the notion of “modal response” we refer to the most frequently chosen answer by a group of participants, or in other words, the answer which was chosen by the largest proportion of participants in a group.

predict or misperceive the Swiss social norms.

Finally, all participants were asked a series of optional background questions about their age, gender, number of kids, marital status, level of education, current employment status, and monthly (social assistance) income. Refugees were asked some additional questions about their employment status and socio-economic background in the home country, their approximate time of arrival (semester and year) and residence permit in Switzerland, whether they had ever been supported by job training or job coaching in Switzerland and about the approximate number of dinners with Swiss, and a co-national, people in the last three months as a rough measure of their social network. Further, we asked them about the city or region where they had lived before fleeing their country. By pairing this information with publicly available data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project), we made an attempt to capture the extent of violence to which our participants had been exposed back home (also see section 1.6.5). This relies on the idea that trauma may affect refugees' perceptions of norms or their ability to recognize unfamiliar norms of a new social environment (Schick et al., 2016). After the background questions, we included the Social Desirability Scale by Stöber (1999) and Stöber (2001) which is a questionnaire composed of sixteen short yes or no questions (henceforth referred to as "social desirability score", also see section 1.6.5). The objective behind this measure was to control for distorted answers due to socially biased response behavior in our analysis. Details on the background questionnaire are found in the instructions in the Appendix.

1.4.2 Samples

Refugees. 156 Turkish (TR) and 85 Afghan (AFG) individuals took part in the study. Eligible for participation were literate adults who arrived in Switzerland between Spring or Summer 2017 and Summer 2023. Table 1.2 below illustrates some summary statistics about the characteristics of our samples. On average, refugees had stayed in Switzerland for about 20-25 months, and about 10 percent had a job in Switzerland at the time of participation. However, we recognize that our samples are not balanced in terms of certain characteristics such as age or the level of education. For instance, refugees' mean age is considerably lower than that among Swiss participants. Whereas education levels are quite balanced among Afghan participants, in the Turkish sample highly educated respondents are over-represented. By contrast to the Swiss, in both groups of refugees, there are about 15 percent more men than women.¹⁵

Swiss natives. Our Swiss (CH) sample consists of 197 Swiss natives with a mean age of about 48 years and an equal gender distribution (see Table 1.2). About 50 percent of the sample hold a high and about 40 percent an intermediate education level. 66 percent had a job at the time of participation.

¹⁵We acknowledge that sample selection (probably due to non-random sampling of refugee participants) is a limitation of our study.

Table 1.2: Summary statistics

	Swiss		Turkish		Afghan	
Male	0.51	(0.50)	0.63	(0.49)	0.68	(0.47)
Age in years	47.87	(16.19)	35.67	(7.75)	28.65	(7.78)
High education	0.53	(0.50)	0.81	(0.40)	0.31	(0.46)
Intermediate education	0.38	(0.49)	0.12	(0.33)	0.31	(0.46)
Low education	0.08	(0.28)	0.07	(0.26)	0.39	(0.49)
Job in Switzerland	0.66	(0.47)	0.08	(0.28)	0.13	(0.34)
Desirability score	10.76	(2.85)	12.80	(2.40)	13.16	(2.19)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	.	(.)	25.14	(26.38)	20.27	(22.39)
Had job in the home country	.	(.)	0.78	(0.42)	0.51	(0.50)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland	.	(.)	0.34	(0.48)	0.38	(0.49)
Observations	196		154		83	

Note: For each national group, the first column reports means. Standard deviations are noted in parentheses. Also note that the differences in characteristics observed between refugees and the Swiss are (mostly highly) significant (t- and rank-sum tests). Exceptions are the low level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Turkish respondents and the intermediate level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Afghan participants.

1.4.3 Recruitment procedures

Refugees. Participants were recruited through the cooperation with five German and French speaking Swiss cantons which had accepted to take part in our study.¹⁶ Since in Switzerland the number of refugees assigned to cantons is proportional to their total number of inhabitants, we had initially invited the 20 largest cantons (out of all 26 cantons in Switzerland) to participate in our study. In each of the five participating cantons, we partnered with responsible institutions in charge of refugees or of their integration process. Since Switzerland’s institutional structure varies across cantons, individuals had to be contacted in different ways. Depending on the canton, we accessed our subjects with the help of representatives of integration services, social assistance services or asylum centers.¹⁷ Common to recruitment in all cantons was that our partners contacted and informed the potential subjects by an information sheet which was delivered to them either in person, by postal letter or by email (see Appendix 3.6). This sheet was created by the researchers and contained all relevant information about the study as prescribed by the standards of the data protection directives of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), such as anonymity and confidentiality.¹⁸ The sheets were translated into the respective mother tongue.¹⁹

Social assistance and integration services contacted potential participants by distributing our information sheet by email or postal letter. In one asylum center and an integration service, our partners organized information events where they informed potential participants in person based on the information on our sheet. In others, our contact persons just contacted those groups of refugees they were in charge of at the time of recruitment. In one canton, we were able to spread our information sheet to refugee communities via private contacts. There might have been certain selection mechanisms at work

¹⁶To not put at risk participants’ anonymity, neither do not publish participants’ cantons of residence, nor do we reveal the five participating cantons.

¹⁷Due to reasons of data protection (see section 1.4.4) we did not collect information on the facility where refugees lived at the time of the interview (whether in an asylum center, in a community, or elsewhere).

¹⁸See <https://gdpr-info.eu/>

¹⁹The information sheets were translated by a professional translation company (applying the four-eye’s principle). Additionally, the sheets were proofread again by at least one further native speaker.

during our recruitment process: First, most of our partner institutions deal with refugees who are yet financially dependent on social assistance. Hence, professionally established and financially independent refugees were not (no longer) available in their pool of contacted people and thus, less likely to be selected for our sample. Second, in some cantonal systems, the mandate of integration services for refugees is determined by the latter’s type of residence permit. Hence, in this case, refugees were selected for our sample by their permit. Third, the fact that most refugees were not being personally informed about the study might have selected participants with a middle or high level of education. People with a low(er) education level may not have been accessible by email and letter. Some may not have had an email account, and others who received the information sheet may not have properly understood and thus maybe not have trusted the invitation enough to follow it. Finally, there were a few participants who filled our questionnaire but had to be excluded from the data set because of a lack of understanding.

Participants’ registration process was anonymous and completely independent from the research team.²⁰

We have to acknowledge that we cannot comment on the rate of participants among the contacted refugees since we had no control and no information about the exact number people who were invited to our study.

Swiss natives. Participants were anonymously recruited by Bilendi, a European online survey platform. Selected were people living in the German and French-speaking language regions of Switzerland.²¹ Hence, the questionnaire was provided in German and French. To elicit norms of the Swiss population as accurately as possible, participants were selected in a quasi-representative manner with a distribution of background characteristics (such as age, sex, income, education, and rural/urban residence) as close as possible to the quotas of the Swiss native population. The idea was to elicit norms which may be typically present in a Swiss workplace and to compare them with those among refugees.²² This is why we chose to conduct the experiments online with Swiss participants, rather than in person in a lab setting like with refugees. We define “Swiss native” as a person who was born and currently living in Switzerland. The quotas of age and sex were calculated separately for major geographical regions of Switzerland. Income, education, and rural/urban residence quotas were set separately for German and French speaking language regions. To guarantee that participants match our criteria, they were asked to fill a pre-questionnaire before starting the study. In case of a rejection, immediately after the pre-questionnaire participants were informed that they would not fit our target group, but not about the reason for rejection.

²⁰Whenever time and personal resources allowed, the registration process was handled by our cantonal partners. Otherwise, participants registered through the administrative services of the Economics Department of the University of Fribourg. Participants had to provide their name, nationality, email, or telephone number. This was necessary for the organization of the sessions and to remind participants of their date and time of participation some days in advance. Once the data collection was completed, participants’ inscription lists and details were destroyed.

²¹We did not select Swiss people from the Italian language region because only 15 percent of the Swiss population are Italian-speaking. Furthermore, refugee participants exclusively come from German and French-speaking cantons.

²²For this reason we did not consider choosing a Swiss sample with comparable individual characteristics as those prevalent among Turkish and Afghan refugee populations in Switzerland.

1.4.4 Experimental procedures

Refugees. A session of data collection (including the payment procedure) lasted on average about 1.5 hours for Turkish and about 2 hours for Afghan participants.²³ The data collection was conducted by computer using the mobile lab from the GATE-LAB group in Lyon. To enter the responses, participants were provided with tablets which were connected to a central computer controlling the course of the study. Each place was protected by sight protection walls to prevent anyone from seeing participants' screens (see photo below, showing one of our location sites). The questionnaires were translated into Dari for people from Afghanistan and into Turkish for participants from Turkey.²⁴ Both languages use gender-neutral expressions as in English. During each session, there was a translator assisting the research team in person to translate oral instructions and to ensure participants' understanding of the questionnaire. Upon their arrival at the experiment location, participants were welcomed and introduced to the procedure of the study by the researchers. The researchers read aloud a summary of the most important information on the information sheet. Then, each participant was assigned a place with a tablet and a numbered tag. On the very first screens before giving consent, participants had to read again the same information which they had already learned in advance from the information sheet. Participants' questions during the study were answered in private.²⁵ Despite conducting our data collection in various locations and environments, we believe that the conditions in each room were comparable, ensuring the comparability of our data across locations. All rooms were quiet, luminous, and regularly ventilated by opening the windows. Moreover, the sight protection walls contributed to maintaining an unchanged direct environment for each participant, regardless of their location.

After the last person had finished, the researchers calculated each participant's earnings and put them into an envelope. Refugee participants received 15 CHF (14.79 EUR²⁶) show-up fee and 5 CHF (4.93 EUR) for each completed part of the study. For completing each of the four parts of the study²⁷, one would earn 20 CHF (19.72 EUR) regardless of the answers. In parts two and three, participants could earn an additional amount of at most $8 * 1.50 \text{ CHF} = 12 \text{ CHF}$ (11.83 EUR). On average, Turkish participants earned 4.25 CHF (4.19 EUR) and Afghan participants 4.35 CHF (4.29 EUR) in these parts (participation fee excluded). In part four, one could earn at most an additional amount of 16.50 CHF (16.72 EUR) (also see chapter 3 of this thesis). All in all, by taking part in our study a participant could earn at least 35 CHF (34.52 EUR) and at most 63.50 CHF (62.62 EUR). Due to social assistance

²³Since the same data collection provided the data for all three chapters of this thesis, this period includes the time during which the refugees completed the entire questionnaire (and not just those questions relating to this first chapter).

²⁴According to information from our partner institutions, we expected a majority of refugees from Turkey to have the Turkish language as their mother tongue or be very familiar with it. The same applies to refugees from Afghanistan where the largest part of people speak Dari as their native language. At the end of the questionnaire, we asked participants explicitly about their mother tongue, giving us an idea about the cultural diversity within each country. The translation procedures for the questionnaire were the same as for the information sheets. Yet, the fact that our questionnaire was only available in Turkish but not in the Kurdish language also revealed the complexity underlying this project. Due to financial and temporal constraints and the information that the largest part of Turkish refugees living in our study locations had a non-Kurdish background, this was the only feasible way to include Turkish participants in our study. Yet, this procedure triggered a sensitive issue for some Kurdish people since the suppression of their identity and their language was the very reason for their flight. Re-experiencing the prioritization of the Turkish language opened up old wounds, resulting in their refusal to participate.

²⁵Our procedures were designed to ensure proper understanding of the relevant information by the target group. Questions by participants about the information sheet were asked to our partners who were in direct contact with the target group and the researchers.

²⁶Exchange rate of the 25.04.2024

²⁷Note that chapter 1 of this thesis is based on the data of the first, second and third part of the questionnaire. Chapter 2 is based on the first part and chapter 3 on the fourth part.

regulations, participants were not allowed to be paid in cash but only in the form of vouchers from “Migros”, one of the largest supermarket chains in Switzerland. Since the minimum value of such vouchers is 5 CHF, amounts below 5 CHF were paid in kind such as chocolates, snacks, or teas valuing 1 CHF each.

Swiss natives. Bilendi provided participants with a link redirecting them to the server of the research team where they could access the questionnaire. Before starting the actual questionnaire, Swiss participants were provided the same information about the study as the refugee samples. They received 4 CHF (3.94 EUR) as a participation fee. The additional amount they could earn was at most $4 * 1.50$ CHF = 6 CHF (5.92 CHF). Hence, each participant earned at least 4 and at most 10 CHF (9.86 EUR). On average, it took our Swiss participants about 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Upon completion of the data collection, the researchers transferred all participants’ total earnings to Bilendi. Bilendi transferred the money in cash to the participants. Additional average earnings were 1.6 CHF (1.58 EUR) (participation fee excluded).

Ethics and data protection. Our study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences of the University of Fribourg. Our data protection procedures and their conformity to the GDPR²⁸ were registered by the data protection authority of the CNRS in France. For reasons of anonymity and vulnerability, refugees’ canton of residence, number of children and place of residence when fleeing their country will not be published. Neither did we ask refugees about their date of arrival in Switzerland, but only about the season and the year. Heightened precaution when handling refugee data is required for several reasons. First, refugees fled from a country where they were threatened by persecution, violence, and death. For safety reasons, personal information such as their location of stay should therefore by no means be accessible to malicious actors. Second, ensuring the anonymity of refugees’ data is crucial to protect them from discrimination and stigmatization in the host country and to prevent any additional hardships in their social and professional integration process. Third, as a vulnerable group with probably less access to resources in the host country (for instance the knowledge about the legal system and its enforcement), they may have harder times to file a complaint in case of the violation of the anonymity of their data as compared to locals.

²⁸see <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679>



Source: One of our study location site where we collected data from refugees.

1.5 Conjectures

In this section, we present three conjectures about participants’ personal and social norms as well as about refugees’ prediction of social norms held by Swiss participants. Conjectures two and three have explicitly been preregistered.²⁹ The first conjecture is a precondition derived from the second. According to Krupka and Weber (2013), social norms are collectively held agreements of a group about the (in)appropriateness of some action. Applying their elicitation method, the presence of a social norm should produce a salient modal response indicating that respondents were guided by the same collectively approved appropriateness perception. The underlying assumption here is that social norms serve individuals as coordination device in their attempt to correctly guess others’ responses. Further, Bašić and Verrina (2023) find a strong correlation between personal and social norms. Hence, we expect to detect salient modal responses in participants’ appropriateness ratings about their personal and expected social norms in each nationality for at least some of the vignettes.

***Conjecture 1 - Existence of salient personal and social norms.** In each national group, there are commonly shared norms and social norms in the form of salient modal responses for at least some of the workplace behaviors performed by the hypothetical employee (vignettes).*

Economic empirical evidence has shown that social norms differ across countries and cultures (Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Gächter et al., 2008, 2010; Henrich et al., 2001). Research from management sciences corroborate these findings (Friesen, 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Mahmud et al., 2014). Again, due to the correlation of personal and social norms, we hypothesize that there will be misalignments in personal and social norms across the distinct nationalities (Bašić and Verrina, 2023). In other words, we expect for at least some of the vignettes that Turkish and Afghan refugees will hold personal and social norms that differ significantly from those prevalent among Swiss natives.

***Conjecture 2 - Cross-national normative misalignments.** Given that salient personal norms and social norms of workplace behavior exist within each national group, at least some of these norms differ across national groups.*

Evidence presented by Bursztyn et al. (2020b) demonstrates that social norms can be misperceived. They showed that a vast majority of young men in Saudi Arabia underestimated the true share of other Saudi men to support female labor force participation outside the home. In their meta-analysis on literature about misperceptions, Bursztyn and Yang (2022) detected a pattern of negative correlations between one’s own beliefs and perceptions about out-group members. This suggests individuals’ general tendency to expect that out-group members were different from themselves in terms of beliefs, or behaviors. However, such (mis)perceptions might change over time. The contact hypothesis by Allport (1954/79) and more recent research underlines the beneficial effects of inter-group contact such as a reduction of prejudices or inter-group anxiety (also see Zhou et al. (2019)). Supporting a rather opposite channel, Jaschke et al. (2022) found that refugees’ cultural preferences and normative attitudes converge faster

²⁹Our work has been preregistered on AsPredicted (<https://aspredicted.org>) under the number 112073 and the title “Diversity of social norms and trust levels in refugees and Swiss natives”. Also the “Protocols and instructions” in the Appendix.

to those of the native population when living in more hostile environments. Results by Rapoport et al. (2021) indicate that immigration induces cultural convergence mostly due to immigrants bringing the host country’s culture back home. All this evidence makes us hypothesize that refugees update their beliefs about Swiss social norms over time, making them converge towards the beliefs among Swiss about Swiss social norms, the longer they stay in Switzerland.³⁰

Conjecture 3 - Temporal convergence of beliefs about Swiss social norms to the beliefs of the Swiss about their own social norms. Given that there are social norms regarding the workplace among the Swiss and misunderstandings thereof among refugees, the perception of Turkish and Afghan refugees of the Swiss social norms converges to the perception among the Swiss about the Swiss social norm the longer they stay in Switzerland.

1.6 Measures

This section introduces the different outcomes we seek to compare across national groups and the explanatory variables we control for. The existing literature on norms is not entirely consistent in the way of how salient norms and differences thereof are determined. Hence, in the three coming subsections, we present our technique of identifying salient personal and social norms and normative misalignments for each vignette which serve as our individual outcomes. Subsection 1.6.4 outlines how we aggregate the identified, salient personal and social norms (of individual vignettes) to obtain an aggregate outcome which we can regress on (refugee-specific) factors. The last subsection 1.6.5 provides an overview of the independent variables we include in OLS regressions on the aggregate outcomes. Notably, we explain how we constructed measures capturing participants’ inclination to give socially desirable answers, refugees’ duration of time spent in Switzerland, and a rough measure of refugees’ extent of experienced violence in the home country.

1.6.1 Identifying salient personal and social norms within a group

To identify salient personal norms and the presence of social norms within each nationality, we consider two parameters: 1) the modal response and 2) the share of participants who selected the modal response.³¹ In this work, we rely on the modal response as the defining characteristic of a social norm (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Burks and Krupka, 2011). A statement by Burks and Krupka (2011)(p.19) provides some guidance about the strength of the mode for social norms to exist: “We see that subjects from

³⁰We preregistered the following hypothesis: “We check whether refugees who have spent more time in Switzerland are better at guessing the Swiss’ social norms.” However, we realized after the pre-registration that this hypothesis is not testable by OLS regression. Conducting a regression, we can only check for a correlation of refugees’ duration of time spent in Switzerland with the distance between their own guess and the guess among Swiss participants about the Swiss social norms. Yet, Swiss respondents’ average beliefs about their own social norms do not necessarily correspond to their actual social norm according to our definition (see the subsection 1.6.1 in the following section on our measures). Whether refugees are able to predict the actual Swiss social norm will be tested by a sign rank test. Yet, in this analysis, we cannot test for a correlation with the duration of time in Switzerland.

³¹Gelfand et al. (2011) and Dimant et al. (2023) also use the degree of behavioral variance or ambiguity to describe the strength of norms among a group of individuals (with a high behavioral variance describing norms as “tight” (“loose”) and associating low variance with “loose” norms). According to Gelfand et al. (2011), the extent of tightness of norms varies across cultures and might bear a source of cultural conflict.

both groups are able to anticipate ratings by their peers - the modal response for any action always receives over 40% of the responses.” Following this rationale, we consider a share of at least 40 percent of participants indicating the modal response as a threshold determining the existence of a social norm within a group.³² For personal norms, 40 percent of participants answering with the modal response may be interpreted as an intra-group consensus on personal norms, what we refer to as “strong” personal norms. A disadvantage of identifying norms by setting a threshold on the modal response is that it does not account for so called “loose” norms exhibiting more variation (Gelfand et al., 2011; Dimant et al., 2023).

1.6.2 Identifying normative (mis)alignments across groups

By normative misalignments, we refer to differences in personal norms and in social norms between nationalities. In line with Gächter et al. (2010), we identify such a misalignment not simply if there is a significant normative difference between groups, but only if the variation between nationalities is larger than the variation within the group of Swiss. For social norms, cross-national comparisons are only drawn for vignettes in which a social norm has been identified in at least one group of comparison. As noted above, a drawback thereby is that potentially salient normative differences in vignettes where (in)appropriateness ratings exhibit more variation are disregarded.

To check for misalignments, we consider two methodological approaches complementing each other: 1) We check for inter-group differences in appropriateness ratings (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH) by applying a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This is a nonparametric test based on the ranks of values (not the actual values) in the two groups of comparison which tests whether a random value of one group is significantly larger than a random value of the other group. 2) A common approach to measuring cultural distance between groups in cultural economics is the Euclidean distance (henceforth EucD) (Jaschke et al., 2022; Rapoport et al., 2021). The EucD is a geometric concept capturing the shortest, unweighted distance between two points in space defined by $D(X, Y) = \sqrt[p]{\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i - y_i|^p}$ with $p = 2$ (Cha, 2007). While investigating raw data sheds light on how distributions of personal and social norms differ across nationalities, we apply the EucD such that it allows us to assess whether these cross-national differences matter relatively to intra-group variations among the Swiss themselves. On the one hand, we apply the above formula to compute an individual measure of the mean EucD *between* each refugee group and the Swiss participants (following Jaschke et al. (2022)). On the other hand, we use it to get the same individual measure *within* the group of Swiss. Computing the mean EucD between each refugee group and the Swiss participants, x_i can be interpreted as the appropriateness rating of refugee participant i and y_i as the rating of any other Swiss participant j . That is, for every refugee we compute the EucD to each Swiss participant which results in as many distances per refugee as there are Swiss participants. Averaging over all these distances per refugee yields an individual measure of the mean EucD of each refugee to the group of Swiss participants. To calculate the mean EucD within the group of Swiss, x_i indicates the appropriateness rating of some Swiss participant i and y_i the rating of any other Swiss participant j . In the same way as for refugees, we compute each Swiss participant’s EucD with every other Swiss and average over all other Swiss.

³²Note that the strength of the mode does not provide any information about what the social norm is. It is a measure to assess whether individuals’ appropriateness ratings are sufficiently homogeneous in order to assume the existence of a social norm. We discuss the threshold of 40 percent in section 1.8 by providing robustness checks with alternative thresholds.

Conducting a two-sided t-test accounting for unequal variances reveals whether there are significant differences between each inter-group mean EucD (TR vs. CH, AFG vs. CH) and the Swiss intra-group mean EucD (CH-CH). This procedure not only measures cross-national differences between each refugee group and the Swiss but tells whether they are important relatively to the within-group heterogeneity among the Swiss. However, as a measure of *mean* distances, a disadvantage of the EucD is its sensitivity to a large spread in the data or outliers. The rank-sum test counterbalances this weakness by testing whether the average sum of *ranks* differs significantly between the appropriateness ratings of two groups. Therefore, the rank-sum test is more robust to dispersion in the data. Hence, we identify a misalignment in a personal or a social norm if there is a statistically significant rank-sum difference ($p_{rs} < 0.05$) in norms across groups and a statistically significant difference ($p_{tEucD} < 0.05$) between inter- and intra-group mean EucD of the relevant norms. By contrast, an alignment would be identified if none or only one of these tests is significant.

Since we evaluate a large number of hypotheses, we account for multiple hypothesis testing by a Benjamini-Hochberg (henceforth B.-H.) correction. The B.-H. correction corrects the *rate* of false positives making multiple hypothesis testing less conservative than a Bonferroni correction which implies dividing the significance level by the number of hypotheses. The disadvantage of the latter is that strictly controlling the type I error (making at least one type I error or the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis) increases the chances for false negatives (type II error) quite strongly. For the B.-H. correction, the critical value with a significance level of 0.05 is computed as follows: B.-H. crit = (rank of p-value*0.05)/(number of hypotheses). Any p-value smaller than the critical p-value is considered significant.

For each of these two measures we report a measure of their effect size. For the rank-sum test we use the ranks-sum statistic delivering the probability that a random individual in one group will have a larger value than a random individual of the other group (henceforth ES_{rs}) (Conroy, 2012). In our case, this is $P(\text{value}(\text{CH}) > \text{value}(\text{TR}))$, and $P(\text{value}(\text{CH}) > \text{value}(\text{AFG}))$ respectively. A probability equal to 50 percent would indicate that there is no difference in the distribution of values between the two groups.

With regards to the t-test, we use Cohen’s d (henceforth d) which is (for independent samples) equal to the difference in means of both groups divided by their pooled standard deviation (Cohen, 1988; Rosenthal, 1991). Hence, it expresses the difference in means as a percentage of the standard deviation. To facilitate the interpretation of Cohen’s d we rely on a commonly used classification³³ and specify effect sizes which fall into an interval of $d = 0 - 0.19$ as no or a very small effect, $d = 0.2 - 0.49$ as a small effect, $d = 0.5 - 0.79$ as a medium, and $d \geq 0.8$ as a large effect (Cohen, 1988; Lakens, 2013).

1.6.3 Identifying normative (mis)understandings of social norms

To analyze whether refugees’ beliefs about a Swiss social norm match the actual Swiss social norm, we check whether their guesses are significantly different from the Swiss modal response indicated by the Swiss when asked about the most frequent appropriateness rating by most other Swiss. Analogously to our definition of a normative (mis)alignment, we are interested in whether and how accurately refugees

³³The suggestion in the indicated literature is to specify $d = 0.2$ as a small effect, $d = 0.5$ as a medium and $d = 0.8$ as a large effect.

match the Swiss modal response as compared to the extent to which the Swiss anticipate their own social norm. Subject of this analysis are all vignettes for which we have previously identified a social norm among the Swiss. Hence, as in the previous section 1.6.2, we combine investigating raw data with EucD measures. However, when examining the raw data we now check for significant deviations from specific values (the guessed Swiss modal responses) and hence, use a sign-rank test to do so. Applying EucDs requires a comparison of the inter-group mean EucD between each refugee’s belief about the Swiss social norm (Turkish/Afghan guess of the Swiss social norm vs. actual Swiss social norm) with the mean EucD of expected (intra-group) social norms among the Swiss (Swiss guess of Swiss social norm vs. actual Swiss social norm). For this purpose, we use again a two-sample t-test as before. Refugees’ misunderstanding of a Swiss social norm is identified if both tests, the sign-rank, and the EucD t-test indicate a significant difference at a 5 percent level. Conversely, an understanding of the Swiss social norm is defined if there are no such significant differences in none or only one of these tests.

Analogously to the identification of normative (mis)alignments, we also apply a Bonferroni and B.-H. correction to correct for multi-hypothesis testing.

Consistently with the previous subsection, we report Cohen’s *d* as an effect size for the EucD t-test. Yet, since to the best of our knowledge, there is no established method to indicate effect sizes for sign-rank tests, we only report Cohen’s *d*.

1.6.4 Aggregate outcomes

In this section, we describe how we construct aggregate EucD measures for salient personal and identified social norms. There are two purposes behind aggregating EucDs. The first is to check whether we observe similar results as obtained in non-parametric tests at an aggregate level. To achieve this, we pool the aggregate mean EucDs of refugees to the Swiss and aggregate mean EucDs of the Swiss with other Swiss and regress this outcome on nationality (without controlling for any other factors and interaction terms with nationality).³⁴ This provides an assessment of the aggregate relative mean EucD between each refugee group and the Swiss (TR-CH vs. CH-CH; AFG-CH vs. CH-CH) corresponding to our analysis at the level of individual vignettes.

The second and main purpose behind this aggregation approach is to assess, at an aggregate level and for each refugee group separately, what factors may be correlated with their mean EucDs in personal and perceived in-group social norms to personal and perceived in-group social norms among the Swiss. Also, we want to assess what factors may be related to refugees’ mean EucDs of their beliefs about the Swiss social norms to the beliefs of the Swiss about their own social norms. Note that for these regressions, the outcomes are non-relative, capturing the mean EucDs between refugees and Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH), but not relative to the normative distances among the Swiss.

To the above ends, we construct three aggregate measures, one encompassing mean EucDs of all

³⁴Of course, a potential relative difference between our target groups cannot be interpreted as a difference due to nationality. They could well be due to differences in characteristics between our samples. Yet, since Swiss and Turkish, respectively Afghan, refugees’ individual background characteristics may have a different effect on the outcome variable, an analysis of factors associated with the relative normative distance between Swiss and refugees would require to control for interaction terms between individual characteristics with nationality. However, since the sample sizes of refugee groups are not sufficiently large, introducing such interaction terms massively increases the standard error leading to a loss of precision. Hence, we did not pursue this analysis.

identified salient personal norms, one which includes mean EucDs of all identified social norms, and one which embodies mean EucDs regarding the Swiss social norms. For personal and social norms, these aggregate measures add at an individual level each participant’s mean EucDs of only those vignettes for which we had previously identified a salient personal, or social, norm among at least one nationality of comparison. For instance, to create the aggregate EucD measure of Turkish and Swiss personal norms, we add each individual’s mean EucDs regarding all vignettes for which we had either identified a personal norm among the Turkish, or among the Swiss participants, or in both samples. The same procedure is applied to build aggregate EucD measures for social norms. For the aggregate measure of refugees’ guesses about the Swiss social norms, we aggregated refugees’ mean EucDs of their guesses regarding all vignettes in which we had previously found a Swiss social norm. Since the sets of salient personal and social norms found among each refugee group are not entirely the same, we construct aggregate EucD measures separately for Swiss and Turkish participants, and for Swiss and Afghan participants.

Applying EucDs for aggregation is convenient because an additive approach of aggregating raw data values creates the problem that negative and positive values of participants’ appropriateness ratings cancel each other out. Since distances are always positive using mean EucDs circumvents this issue.

1.6.5 Covariates

As explained in the previous paragraph, in regressions conducted for each refugee group separately, we investigate the factors correlated with their mean EucDs in norms to the Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH). In a first specification, we include a set of individual characteristics, namely a dummy for being male, age in years, a dummy for holding a high level of education, and one’s social desirability score (in log) according to Stöber (1999) and Stöber (2001). In a second specification we add a second set of covariates encompassing the number of months spent in Switzerland, a dummy indicating whether one has had a (paid) job in the home country and a dummy for whether one has ever been supported by a job coach or job training in Switzerland. By contrast to the first set, this second set of covariates reflects the exposure to social interaction in the host and the home country. The choice of these covariates is also in line with previous economic studies on refugees in Western countries (El-Bialy et al., 2023; Jaschke et al., 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017; Zisler et al., 2023). When regressing refugees’ guesses of the Swiss social norms on covariates, as an exploratory analysis we also include a rough measure of experienced violence in their home country using ACLED³⁵ data. Recall that we do so because trauma may relate to one’s capacity to recognize and understand an unfamiliar social environment (Schick et al., 2016). In the following sub-paragraphs, we present the construction of the desirability score, the duration of time spent in Switzerland, and the violence index.

Desirability Score. Recall from the end of section 1.4.1 that social desirability refers to individuals’ inclination to give socially desirable answers. Since this bears the risk of biased response behavior, we include this measure in our regressions, particularly when it comes to regressing unincentivized personal norms. We adopted the social desirability scale by Stöber (1999) and Stöber (2001) which includes 16 short, socially desirable, and undesirable statements. In this questionnaire, participants were instructed to indicate whether each statement described them by selecting “true” if it did and “false” if it did not.

³⁵See <https://acleddata.com/about-acledd/>. ACLED, or the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, is a non-profit organization based in the United States. From ACLED we retrieved data about protests, violent incidences, and the number of fatalities per incidence that had occurred from 2018 - 2022 in Afghanistan and Turkey.

The procedure to build an individual score for each participant was as follows: For each socially desirable action in which a participant chose “true”, (s)he got a score of 1, if (s)he selected “false” (s)he scored 0. In case a participant chose “true” for a socially undesirable action, (s)he got a score of -1, and choosing “false” resulted in a score of 0. The individual social desirability score is a participant’s average score from answering all the statements. Hence, the higher the score, the more socially desirable actions were rated with “true” and vice versa. This questionnaire has been validated for participants from Turkey and is based on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale which has also been applied in a study with Afghan respondents (Elliot et al., 2019; Tatar and Özdemir, 2018).

Duration of stay in Switzerland. For reasons of data protection, we did not inquire refugees exact date of arrival in Switzerland. Instead, we asked them about the year and the season (“spring/summer” or “autumn/winter”). To build a variable for their duration of stay, we figured a hypothetical arrival date for each season with a gap of 6 months in between. Building the difference between this approximate arrival date and the date of the questionnaire allowed us to obtain a variable indicating the number of months spent in Switzerland.

Violence Index. From the background questionnaire we obtained information about refugees’ location or region of residence in the home country where they had lived before the flight. Pairing this information with detailed ACLED data on violent protests and conflicts in Afghanistan and Turkey allowed to build two rough measures of the approximate exposure to violence or potentially traumatic events for each refugee participant. The idea is to use this measure as a proxy for trauma which may impede refugees’ capacity to familiarize themselves with the norms of the new social environment (Schick et al., 2016). A first measure captures the average yearly number of casualties per location between 2018 and 2022 (including 2018 and 2022). The second measure is the average yearly number of total incidences (such as battles, protests, riots, explosions, violence against civilians or arrests) in each location during the same period. Each refugee was then assigned these two average measures for the indicated past home locality. The period of 5 years was chosen because most refugees in our sample had arrived in Switzerland in the years 2021 and 2022, and quite a few also between 2018 and 2020. A refugee journey can last between a few days and years but when stuck in a transit country for more than 3 years, refugees usually stay (Kuschminder, 2017). Yet, violent events may have started sometime before the flight. Hence, we use a rough average over 5 years. Since refugees may not only have experienced violence in their immediate residential area, each measure was calculated on the level of one’s residence location but also on a larger province level.

1.7 Results

In this section we address our research questions one after another. Subsection 1.7.1 describes salient personal and social norms among each nationality. Subsection 1.7.2 examines at the level of individual vignettes whether there are (relative) differences in personal and social norms across national groups and whether refugees (mis)understand the Swiss social norms. Section 1.7.3 elaborates on whether we observe (relative) normative differences between refugees and the Swiss when aggregating individual vignettes where salient personal and social norms were identified. Further, in section 1.7.3, we check what (refugee-specific) factors may be related to potential non-relative normative differences between refugees and Swiss. A discussion of these findings is provided in the final section 1.9 of this chapter.

1.7.1 Personal and social norms in each national group

This subsection addresses the question of whether Turkish and Afghan refugees and Swiss natives hold salient personal norms and social norms of workplace conduct. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 display identified salient personal and social norms and their strength.

Personal norms. A learning from Table 1.3 is that many strong personal norms (modal responses given by at least 40 percent of participants) occur in the same vignettes across cultural groups (see the (dark) blue shaded fields). In 73 percent of the vignettes where we find a strong Turkish personal norm, there is also a strong personal norm among the Swiss. In turn, whenever the Swiss hold a strong personal norm, there is a Turkish personal norm in the same vignette. Hence, where or in what vignettes the Turkish and the Swiss respondents hold strong personal norms is largely shared. For Afghans, we find the fewest (strong) personal norms.³⁶ In 75 percent of cases where there is a personal norm among Afghans, we also find a personal norm among the Swiss. Though, in only about half of the Swiss personal norms, there is also an Afghan personal norm occurring. Personal norms which commonly occur among all cultural groups concern an employee asking the boss to reexplain a task which was not clear, resolving issues in private after having felt insulted by a colleague, not taking over a colleague's work shift because of tiredness, running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work, maintaining direct eye contact if the employee and the boss are females, and working in mixed gender teams.³⁷

While the place of occurrence of personal norms (in which vignettes they exist) is not that culturally distinct, the strength of personal norms varies between cultural groups. We recognize that strong personal norms are most numerous among the Turkish. Nearly 70 percent of all vignettes are found to be strong personal norms. For the Swiss, this share is about 50 percent and for Afghans about 36 percent (8 out of 22 vignettes). Among the Turkish, about 45 percent of their strong personal norms (7 out of 15) were indicated by at least 50 percent of respondents. For Afghans, this is the case in about 40 percent (3 out of 8) and for the Swiss, in only about 20 percent (2 out of 11). Hence, we can say that the Turkish hold

³⁶Note that the Afghan sample has the smallest size. That may probably influence our ability to measure the occurrence of their norms.

³⁷Vignettes where we have not observed salient personal norms in none of the national groups concern criticizing a colleague in presence of others (yet, with close to 40 percent of Afghans choosing the modal response), disagreeing with the advice of an older colleague but nonetheless following it, informing the boss about having been insulted by a colleague (with close to 40 percent of Turkish participants choosing the modal response), avoiding the boss when feeling criticized and insulted by him/her (with close to 40 percent of Turkish and Afghan participants choosing the modal response) and being 5 minutes late for an appointment at work (with close to 40 percent of Turkish and Swiss participants choosing the respective modal response).

most and the strongest personal norms and that Afghan personal norms are most ambiguous (also see footnote 36). However, the share of personal norms selected by at least 50 percent of respondents among the strong personal norms is much lower among the Swiss than among Turkish and Afghan participants.³⁸

Social norms. Results in Table 1.4 relate to participants' guesses of the most frequently selected appropriateness rating by other, co-national participants.³⁹ Recall that we identified a social norm if there are at least 40 percent of respondents who selected the modal response. We observe that the cultural groups share social norms in basically the same vignettes in which they shared strong personal norms. Similar as for personal norms, in about 65 percent of the vignettes where we find a Turkish social norm, we also find a Swiss social norm. In 80 percent of vignettes where there is a Swiss social norm, there is also a Turkish social norm. Whereas about 80 percent of Afghan social norms are found in the same vignettes as the Swiss social norms, in only 50 percent of the Swiss social norms there is also an Afghan social norm. Thus, especially among Turkish and Swiss participants, most social norms occur in the same vignettes. To a weaker extent, this is also true for Swiss and Afghan participants. Looking at the strength of social norms across groups, we observe a similar pattern as for personal norms. In 54 percent of the 22 vignettes, we identified social norms among the Turkish. In only 27 percent of the cases, there is a social norm among Afghans. 45 percent of the vignettes were identified as a Swiss social norm. The proportion of modal responses selected by at least 50 percent of participants among the social norms identified is 40 percent among the Turkish, 50 percent among Afghans and only 20 percent among the Swiss. This latter result is in line with the findings by Gelfand et al. (2011) who found stronger social norms for Turkey and Pakistan (sharing a large part of the border with Afghanistan) than for neighboring countries of Switzerland (Germany, Austria, France, and Italy).⁴⁰

According to these results, we cannot reject our first hypothesis, stating the existence of salient personal and social norms in each of our target groups.

Result 1 - Existence of salient personal and social norms. *There are salient workplace-related personal and social norms among each nationality. Many of them are present in the same vignettes across national groups. The strength of these norms is distinct between national groups. Turkish and Afghan refugees are more likely to hold stronger personal and social norms than the Swiss.*

³⁸Reporting personal norms raises the question of social desirability bias in participants' response behavior. See section 1.7.3 where we control for a measure of one's inclination of giving socially desirable answers by (Stöber, 2001) (also see the measurement section 1.6).

³⁹Refugees' reference group of whom they were asked to guess the most frequently given response are other Turkish, respectively Afghan, refugees in Switzerland. Note that this might have made this task harder for them as compared to making a guess about Turkish people living in Turkey, or respectively, Afghan people living in Afghanistan.

⁴⁰Gelfand et al. (2011) measured the strength of social norms of 33 nations by letting subjects assess the following questions on a six-item Likert scale: "There are many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in this country", "In this country, if someone acts in an inappropriate way, others will strongly disapprove" and "People in this country almost always comply with social norms". Part of these nations is only Turkey and neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Switzerland, but not Afghanistan and Switzerland themselves. Assuming that cultures from the same geographical regions may be similar in their tightness score, we refer to the neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Switzerland.

Table 1.3: Personal norms

Vignette	TR personal norms			AFG personal norms			CH personal norms		
	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-.695	-1	53.85	-.511	-.6	37.65	-.302	-.2	31.47
Mistake by colleague: no criticism	-.613	-.6	46.79	-.402	-.6	35.29	-.471	-.6	32.99
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	.739	1	59.62	.4776471	.6	37.65	.661	1	46.19
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism	.510	1	40.38	.544	1	41.18	.510	.6	35.53
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	-.390	-1	32.69	-.271	-.6	37.65	-.180	-.2	31.47
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-.556	-.6	48.08	-.002	-.6	28.24	-.084	-.2	44.16
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-.292	-.6	34.62	.205	.2	24.71	.082	.2	34.01
Task unclear: act as if it was clear	-.718	-1	49.36	-.544	-1	41.18	-.439	-.6	37.56
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	.862	1	77.56	.826	1	78.82	.741	1	53.30
Insulted by colleague: inform boss	.356	.6	38.46	.271	.6	29.41	.161	.2	27.41
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	.728	1	53.21	.689	1	58.82	.702	1	47.72
Mistake: criticised by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-.574	-.6	39.10	-.177	-.6	38.82	-.388	-.6	32.49
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	.854	1	73.08	.68	1	50.59	.647	.6	42.13
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	-.115	-.6	25.00	.148	-0.2; 0.2; 0.6	20	.037	-.2	31.98
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	.023	.6	23.08	.177	-.6; .6	25.88	.333	.2	31.47
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-.454	-.6	39.10	-.412	-.6; -.2	28.24	-.463	-.6	39.59
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-.746	-1	50.64	-.68	-1	49.41	-.757	-1	66.50
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.664	.6	43.59	.322	.6	30.59	.682	1	46.19
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.682	1	45.51	.511	.6	40.00	.688	1	47.21
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.664	1	43.59	.4211765	.6; 1	29.41	.688	1	46.19
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.690	1	46.79	.497	.6; 1	35.29	.684	1	45.18
Mixed gender teamwork	.819	1	58.49	.669	0.6	41.38	.704	1	45.18

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate" (1), "Appropriate" (0.6), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.2), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.2), "Inappropriate" (-0.6) and "Very inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), and reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Dark red marks values ranging from (-1) to (-0.61), medium dark red values from (-0.6) to (-0.21) and light red from (-0.2) to 0. Light green (0-0.2), medium dark green (0.21-0.6), dark green (0.61-1). Blue shaded fields represent salient or "strong" personal norms indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who indicated the modal response. The darker the blue colour, the larger the share of participants choosing the modal response. Very light blue (49-49%), light blue (50-59%), medium dark blue (60-69%), dark blue (70-79%). Grey fields in the column for Afghans indicate multi-modal responses.

Table 1.4: Social norms

Vignette	TR social norms			AFG social norms			CH social norms		
	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-.388	-1	32.26	-.362	-.6	29.76	-.182	-.2	29.95
Mistake by colleague: no criticism	-.613	-1	41.94	-.295	-.6	33.33	-.378	-.6	27.92
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	.768	1	61.29	.681	1	48.81	.694	1	51.78
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism	.603	1	41.29	.562	1	39.29	.467	.6	39.09
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	-.479	-1	45.16	-.252	-1	28.57	-.320	-.6	26.90
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-.324	-.6	30.97	.062	-.6	23.81	.084	-.2	28.93
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-.063	-.6	27.10	.261	.6	30.59	.171	.2	36.55
Task unclear: act as if it was clear	-.574	-1	40.65	-.544	-1	41.18	-.288	-.6	30.46
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	.770	1	63.23	.7929412	1	64.71	.674	1	45.69
Insulted by colleague: inform boss	.262	.6	30.97	.238	.6	33.33	.031	-.2	24.87
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	.747	1	54.19	.719	1	52.38	.665	1	46.70
Mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-.453	-1	34.19	-.271	-.6	34.12	-.267	-.6	30.46
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	.776	1	56.77	.652	1	51.19	.516	.6	41.12
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	.105	.6	27.74	.224	.6	33.33	.239	.2	30.46
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	.128	.6	25.16	.2	.6	28.57	.355	.6	35.03
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-.197	-.6	29.68	-.247	-.2	37.65	-.388	-.2	36.04
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-.595	-1	43.23	-.6	-1	43.53	-.735	-1	62.94
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.466	.6	37.42	.262	.6	33.33	.576	.6	40.10
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.690	1	50.32	.471	.6	36.90	.639	1	43.15
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.445	.6	35.48	.262	.6	34.52	.580	.6	41.62
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.670	1	45.16	.457	.6	38.10	.627	1	41.62
Mixed gender teamwork	.676	1	45.28	.531	.6; 1	34.48	.706	1	48.22

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate" (1), "Appropriate" (0.6), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.2), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.2), "Inappropriate" (-0.6) and "Very inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), and reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Dark red marks values ranging from (-1) to (-0.61), medium dark red values from (-0.6) to (-0.21), and light red from (-0.2) to 0. Light green (0-0.2), medium dark green (0.21-0.6), dark green (0.61-1). Blue shaded fields represent identified social norms indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who indicated the modal response. The darker the blue color, the larger the share of participants choosing the modal response. Very light blue (49-49%), light blue (50-59%), medium dark blue (60-69%), dark blue (70-79%). Grey fields in the column for Afghans indicate multi-modal responses.

Individual differences between personal and expected social norms. In this paragraph, we present an exploratory analysis on how personal norms compare to what participants expected the social norms (by other co-national participants) to be in their own national group. Since the existing literature considers gender norms as markedly different between Western and Middle (South) Eastern regions (e.g. Moghadam, 2003), we thus focus on the vignettes concerning mixed gender eye contact and mixed gender teamwork. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.5 show that mainly Turkish (paired t-test: $p_t < 0.0001$; paired sign-rank test: $p_{sr} < 0.000$) and Swiss ($p_t < 0.001$; $p_{sr} < 0.001$) respondents' social norm ratings about mixed gender eye contact are significantly lower than personal norm ratings. The magnitude of these deviations between personal and social norms on mixed gender eye contact is significantly larger among Turkish and Afghan participants than among the Swiss (see Appendix Tables A.3 and A.6, two-sample t- and rank-sum tests for all: $p_t < 0.001$, $p_{rs} < 0.01$).⁴¹

However, OLS regression indicates that among both refugee groups individual differences between personal and social norms regarding mixed gender eye contact and mixed gender teamwork are gender-driven (Appendix Tables A.9 and A.12). Remarkably, this comes from Turkish and Afghan women expecting most other co-national respondents to perceive (intra-group) social norms on mixed gender eye contact and mixed gender teamwork as less appropriate than Turkish, respectively Afghan, men. While refugees' perceived social norms on mixed gender eye contact vary by gender, this is not the case for their personal norms on mixed gender eye contact (for Turkish personal norms see Appendix Table A.10 and for Turkish perceived social norms Table A.11; for Afghan personal and social norms see Tables A.13 and A.14; summary statistics and (non)parametric tests by gender can be found in Appendix Tables A.7 and A.18). One sample t- and sign-rank tests in Appendix Table A.19 and Appendix Table A.7 also reveal that Turkish women significantly underestimate the Turkish social norms on mixed gender eye contact (when guessing the Turkish modal responses) expecting them to be more gender-segregating than they really are ($p_t < 0.001$). Among Afghan respondents, women and men underestimate Afghan social norms (Afghan females: $p_t < 0.001$, $p_{sr} < 0.001$; Afghan males: $p_t < 0.01$).⁴²

Among the Swiss, we observe that Swiss females personally find mixed but also same gender eye contact significantly more appropriate than men (see Appendix Tables A.16 and A.7). Yet, social norms about same and mixed gender eye contact do not significantly differ between Swiss women and men (see Appendix Tables A.17 and A.18). But Swiss women also overestimate the Swiss social norm on mixed gender eye contact, believing them to be collectively perceived as more appropriate than is actually the case (see Appendix Tables A.7 and A.19, one-sample sign-rank test: $p_{sr} < 0.001$).

Differences between personal norms and what people expect to be their in-group social norm might be an indication of pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance refers to a psychological phenomenon where people's misperceived beliefs about others' attitudes and behaviors deviate from their own personal beliefs (Bjerring et al., 2014; Katz et al., 1931; Miller, 2023; Prentice and Miller, 1993). A discussion of results can be found in section 1.9.

⁴¹These results hold even after accounting for multiple hypothesis testing. For same gender eye contact (male employee - male boss), we also observe a significant difference in the distance between personal and social norms between Swiss and Afghan participants ($p_{rs} < 0.01$).

⁴²Note that the intra-group social norm modal responses about mixed gender eye contact are the same among all nationalities and among men and females of each nationality, namely 0.6 which stands for "Appropriate".

Result 2 (exploratory) - Individual differences between personal and social norms. Among both refugee groups, there are individual differences between personal norms and beliefs about social norms in some of the vignettes. For mixed gender eye contact, these differences are gender driven. This comes from refugee women who underestimate their own national group’s social norms by expecting them to be more gender-segregating than they really are. Among the Swiss, we observe that it is also women who misperceive the Swiss social norms of mixed gender eye contact. By contrast to refugee women, they slightly overestimate the Swiss social norms believing they are less gender-segregating than they truly are.

1.7.2 Normative (mis)alignments and (mis)understandings at the level of individual vignettes

In the Tables 1.5 and 1.6 below, we compare identified salient personal and social norms across national groups. Both tables are to be read in a similar way. A very first sub-column depicts which personal and social norms had been identified and among what national group. The dark blue shaded fields in this first subcolumn indicate the vignettes regarding which we identified a significant personal or social normative misalignment. For each cross-national comparison of norms (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH), we list p-values of a rank-sum test (p_{rs}) with the corresponding effect size (EF_{rs}) and p-values of a t-test of mean EucDs (p_{tEucD}) with Cohen’s d (d). Recall that we account for multiple hypothesis testing by a B.-H. correction.⁴³

Similarly, in Table 1.7 dark blue shaded fields display in what vignettes we identified a misunderstanding by refugees when predicting the Swiss social norms. We report p-values from a sign-rank test (p_{sr}) instead of a rank-sum test since we test whether refugees’ prediction of the Swiss social norms deviate from a specific value, namely the most frequently given response by the Swiss when predicting the Swiss social norm. Recalling section 1.6, we only identify a misalignment (or a misunderstanding) if both p-values, p_{rs}/p_{sr} and p_{tEucD} , indicate a significant difference on a 5 percent level after a B.-H. correction. Note that identified misalignments between refugees and the Swiss might be a potential indicator for a normative difference between the concerned refugee population and the Swiss society. However, since our refugee and Swiss samples are distinct in their background characteristics (e.g. age or level of education), the identification of a misalignment does not provide any information on the specific factors driving such a normative difference. That is, we cannot know whether normative discrepancies are due to a difference in nationality or other background characteristics between refugees and the Swiss. For an analysis of factors correlated with aggregated normative distances between each refugee group and the Swiss, see section 1.7.3.

Also note that we only draw comparisons between Turkish refugees and the Swiss as well as between Afghan refugees and the Swiss. Yet, we do not compare normative perceptions of the entire, pooled sample of Turkish and Afghan refugees with those of the Swiss. The reason thereof is that the norms we identified among Turkish and Afghan refugees are heterogeneous since salient personal and social norms occur with respect to different vignettes in each of these groups. Pooling their data and comparing it to

⁴³Since we test differences in 22 vignettes regarding personal norms, social norms, and (mis)understandings of the local social norms between Swiss and two groups of refugees using two statistical tests, we have a total number of $22*3*2*2 = 264$ hypotheses in total. According to a Bonferroni correction and using a significance level of 0.05 the critical value would in this case be computed by $\alpha = 0.05/264 = 0.000189$. For the B.-H. correction, the critical value is computed as B.-H. crit = (rank of p-value*0.05)/264.

the Swiss may thus yield biased results.

(Mis)alignments in personal norms

As displayed by Table 1.5, we first present (mis)alignments when comparing personal norms between Turkish and Swiss respondents, and second, between Afghans and Swiss. Third, we briefly comment on (mis)alignments in personal norms about eye contact by gender.

Out of fifteen (strong) personal norms either reported by **Turkish** or by **Swiss** participants (or both), in only four we detected a misalignment. Hence, personal norms between Swiss and Turkish participants are largely aligned (to about 75 percent). Only one of these significant misalignments is strong. It concerns the inappropriateness of an employee accepting unfair behavior by the boss ($p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.000$, $ES_{rs} = 0.798$, $d = 0.83$). Regarding this vignette, not only do responses in the raw data significantly differ between Turkish and Swiss respondents but also, the mean EucD between Turkish and Swiss responses is significantly stronger (mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.735$) than that between responses among the Swiss themselves (mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.577$). ES_{rs} shows that the probability that Swiss respondents indicated accepting unfair behavior as more appropriate than Turkish respondents is nearly 80 percent. Cross-checking with Table 1.3 reveals that nearly half of the Turkish sample stated that accepting unfair treatment by a boss was “Inappropriate”, while only about 18 percent of Swiss share this answer. A majority of 44 percent of Swiss declared this behavior only to be “Somewhat inappropriate”. The other significant differences in stated personal norms between Turkish and Swiss participants are observed in the vignettes about running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work, working in mixed gender teams, and reluctantly following a younger leader’s instructions.⁴⁴ All of them are only of (very) small magnitude ($ES_{rs} < 0.74$, $d < 0.5$). We observe, however, that Turkish participants are more likely than the Swiss to report personal norms that support equality irrespective of one’s age, gender or hierarchical position (see Table 1.3).⁴⁵

Turning to **Afghan and Swiss** participants’ personal norms, Table 1.5 displays that among thirteen strong personal norms, nearly half of them are significantly misaligned between the two groups. Most and the strongest misalignments occur in the vignettes about an employee maintaining direct visual contact with the boss during a discussion. Differences between Swiss and Afghans in personal norms on mixed gender direct eye contact are highly significant and of medium effect size (m-f: $p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.000$, $ES_{rs} = 0.677$, $d = 0.73$; f-m: $p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.000$, $ES_{rs} = 0.641$, $d = 0.61$).

⁴⁴When it comes to running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work ($p_{rs} = 0.020$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.006$; mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.519$; mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.572$), a majority of 50.64 percent of Turkish indicated this behavior to be “Very inappropriate”. This personal norm is also stated by a majority of Swiss which is by about 16 percentage points larger. While a majority of nearly 60 percent of Turkish participants reported personally perceiving working in mixed gender teams as “Very appropriate”, only 45 percent of Swiss indicated the same answer ($p_{rs} = 0.026$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.024$; mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.412$; mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.443$). This relatively low percentage of Swiss indicating the modal response of “Very appropriate” may be explained by two aspects: First, as shown in Appendix Table A.16, a high level of education increases the personally perceived appropriate perception of mixed gender teamwork among the Swiss by nearly 0.2 which corresponds to one step in our scaling of responses. Yet, in the Swiss sample, there are just about 53 percent who hold a high level of education. But even among the highly educated, the response “Very appropriate” was given by just 50 percent. A last significant misalignment between Turkish and Swiss participants occurs in the vignette about leadership which is a strong personal norm among Turkish only. Nearly 54 percent of Turkish reported it to be “very inappropriate” to reluctantly follow a younger leader’s instructions, but only about 19 percent of Swiss stated the same opinion. By contrast, the most frequently given response by 31.5 percent of Swiss is “somewhat inappropriate” ($p_{rs} = 0.000$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.001$; mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.777$; mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.709$).

⁴⁵For instance, as mentioned above, Turkish participants state it to be significantly less appropriate than the Swiss when an employee accepts unfair behavior by a boss or just unwillingly follows an instruction of a team leader due to his young age.

That stands in contrast to small cross-national differences in the case of direct eye contact between an employee and a boss with the same gender (f-f: $p_{rs} = 0.010$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.024$, $ES_{rs} = 0.59$, $d = 0.37$; m-m: $p_{rs} = 0.023$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.005$, $ES_{rs} = 0.58$, $d = 0.49$). Checking modal responses in Table 1.3 shows that Afghan respondents reported maintaining direct eye contact with a boss to be generally less appropriate than the Swiss, no matter the gender of the employee and the boss. While Afghan participants are less likely to personally evaluate *mixed* gender eye contact as “Appropriate” or “Very appropriate” than the Swiss, Afghan, and Swiss chose these answers in more equal proportions when it comes to *same* gender eye contact.⁴⁶ Other significant differences between Afghan and Swiss participants’ stated personal norms are of small magnitude and occur in the vignettes about acting as if an instruction was clear when it was actually unclear and cautiously criticizing a colleague who is making mistakes. Behavior in both vignettes is indicated to be less appropriate among Afghans than the Swiss.⁴⁷

(Mis)alignments in personal norms on eye contact. Taking into account that the Swiss personal norms on eye contact are gender-driven (see the exploratory analysis in section 1.7.1 and Appendix Tables A.16, A.18 and A.7), we re-estimate personal norm differences on eye contact between nationalities separately by participants’ gender. Whereas this does not yield a significant result between the Turkish and the Swiss, it reinforces the differences between Swiss and Afghan participants in terms of mixed gender eye contact. Deviations in reported personal norms between Swiss and Afghan women become large and highly significant (for personal norms on both mixed gender eye contact vignettes: $p_{tEucD} < 0.001$, $p_{rs} < 0.001$; $d > 1$). Between Swiss women and Afghan men, differences are medium to large ($p_{tEucD} < 0.001$, $p_{rs} < 0.001$; $d > 0.5$). No significant misalignment was detected neither between Swiss men and Afghan women nor between Swiss and Afghan men (see Appendix Table A.20).

⁴⁶Whilst both of these answers were indicated by about 30 percent of Afghan respondents, among the Swiss these shares were 36 and 45 percent.

⁴⁷Acting as if an instruction was clear when it was in fact unclear is a strongly stated personal norm among Afghans only. It is found to be evaluated as significantly less appropriate among Afghans than among Swiss ($p_{rs} = 0.001$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.008$) but the effect is only of small magnitude ($ES_{rs} = 0.615$, $d = 0.399$). Cautiously criticizing a colleague when making a mistake is a strong personal norm among Swiss and is personally found to be indicated as more appropriate by the Swiss than by Afghan participants ($p_{rs} = 0.017$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.017$) but the effect size is also small ($ES_{rs} = 0.585$, $d = 0.38$).

Table 1.5: (Mis)alignments in personal norms

Personal Norms	TR vs CH					AFG vs CH				
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH rank-sum pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EuclD t-test pval	P{val(CH) > val(TR)}	Cohen's d EuclD	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH rank-sum pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EuclD t-test pval	P{val(CH) > val(AFG)}	Cohen's d EuclD
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	TR	0.000000	0.001091	0.737	0.347		0.000245	0.035514	0.633	0.261
Mistake by colleague: no criticism	TR	0.001003	0.364931	0.597	0.096		0.362298	0.377836	0.467	0.122
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	TR, CH	0.005200	0.571270	0.421	0.063	CH	0.016599	0.017149	0.585	0.387
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism	TR	0.215960	0.004609	0.463	0.316	AFG	0.104751	0.048401	0.442	0.286
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others		0.000028	0.000018	0.626	0.468		0.091412	0.025660	0.562	0.289
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	TR, CH	0.000000	0.000000	0.798	0.826	CH	0.388659	0.001839	0.469	0.439
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow		0.000000	0.000000	0.701	0.832		0.032990	0.000019	0.422	0.639
Task unclear: act as if it was clear	TR	0.000000	0.148289	0.704	0.154	AFG	0.001244	0.007509	0.615	0.400
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	TR, CH	0.000001	0.916711	0.374	0.012	AFG, CH	0.000199	0.226695	0.382	0.190
Insulted by colleague: inform boss		0.000184	0.011494	0.387	0.270		0.060824	0.010439	0.431	0.348
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	TR, CH	0.172551	0.659540	0.462	0.049	AFG, CH	0.358105	0.062590	0.468	0.288
Mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss		0.000016	0.384871	0.627	0.093		0.063822	0.001293	0.433	0.493
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	TR, CH	0.000000	0.383853	0.311	0.094	AFG, CH	0.072905	0.129971	0.438	0.235
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift		0.011354	0.033468	0.577	0.232		0.098899	0.003079	0.439	0.427
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned		0.000006	0.000000	0.636	0.637		0.129702	0.000501	0.555	0.518
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late		0.623587	0.434059	0.485	0.083		0.323550	0.519173	0.464	0.082
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	TR, CH	0.020976	0.006001	0.437	0.276	AFG, CH	0.015358	0.827119	0.420	0.028
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.667160	0.935719	0.512	0.009	AFG, CH	0.000001	0.000022	0.677	0.733
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.822240	0.799281	0.494	0.028	AFG, CH	0.010336	0.024118	0.590	0.371
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.745394	0.577242	0.509	0.062	AFG, CH	0.000062	0.000374	0.641	0.611
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.490333	0.616193	0.480	0.056	AFG, CH	0.022624	0.004606	0.580	0.493
Mixed gender teamwork	TR, CH	0.026979	0.024850	0.410	0.225	AFG, CH	0.439976	0.727969	0.542	0.051

Note: The first column compares Turkish (TR) and Swiss (CH) participants' appropriateness ratings according to their personal norms. The second column contrasts these ratings between Afghans (AFG) and Swiss. For each cross-national comparison, the first sub-column indicates among which nationality a salient personal norm has been identified. The second sub-column shows p-values from a rank-sum test (p_{rs}). In the third sub-column, we display p-values from a two-sided EuclD t-test (p_{tEuclD} : TR-CH vs. CH-CH; AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Bold p-values mark a significant difference after a Bonferroni correction (0.05/264 = 0.000189) and light blue shaded fields after a Benjamini-Hochberg correction. Dark blue fields indicate for which vignettes and between what groups we identified a cross-national misalignment in personal norms. The three shades of yellow (red) stand for the effect size of Cohen's d: Bright yellow fields indicate no or a very small effect (0 – 0.19), medium-dark yellow indicates a small effect (0.2 – 0.49), dark yellow a medium effect (0.5 – 0.79) and red represents a large effect (≥ 0.8).

(Mis)alignments in social norms

Table 1.6 refers to participants' expected appropriateness ratings held by most other co-nationals. Again, we first present our findings when contrasting Turkish and Swiss participants, and second, when comparing Afghans and Swiss. Finally, we shortly elaborate on (mis)alignments in social norms on eye contact, separately for men and women.

Out of fourteen identified social norms among **Turkish and Swiss** participants, in only two we observe normative misalignments corresponding to about 14 percent. In terms of effect size, both are weak ($ES_{rs} \leq 0.68$, $d < 0.29$ for both). Note that both of these misalignments occur in vignettes which were identified as social norms among the Turkish only. Misalignments concern criticizing a colleague when others are around ($p_{rs} = 0.000$; $p_{tEuclD} = 0.007$; mean $EuclD_{TR-CH} = 0.758$, mean $EuclD_{CH-CH} = 0.701$) and acting as if an instruction by the boss was clear even though it is not ($p_{rs} = 0.000$; $p_{tEuclD} = 0.007$; mean $EuclD_{TR-CH} = 0.758$, mean $EuclD_{CH-CH} = 0.701$). Whereas Turkish participants expected most other co-nationals to evaluate these behaviors as "Very inappropriate", Swiss only expected most other Swiss to rate them as "Inappropriate".⁴⁸ Regarding mixed gender eye contact, Swiss participants were slightly more likely to expect other Swiss to indicate "Appropriate" than Turkish participants in their belief about other Turkish respondents.

⁴⁸45 percent of Turkish participants expect most other co-nationals to rate criticizing a colleague when others are around with "Very inappropriate", whereas only 24.6 percent of Swiss expect most other Swiss to indicate this rating. The Swiss modal response given by 26.9 percent of participants is "Inappropriate". 40.6 percent of Turkish respondents expected most other Turkish participants to rate acting as if an instruction by the boss was clear even though it is not with "Very inappropriate". Only 15.8 percent of Swiss shared this expectation. A majority of 30.5 percent of Swiss expect most other Swiss to evaluate this behavior only as "Inappropriate".

Among **Afghan and Swiss**, eleven social norms were identified. Only three of them (27 percent) are found to be misaligned to an intermediate or weak extent. Two of these misalignments occur in vignettes about mixed gender eye contact between an employee and a boss during a discussion (m-f: $p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.002$, $ES_{rs} = 0.655$, $d = 0.47$, mean $EucD_{AFG-CH} = 0.744$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.619$; f-m: $p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.001$, $ES_{rs} = 0.658$, $d = 0.53$; mean $EucD_{AFG-CH} = 0.719$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.585$). Whereas Afghans and Swiss expect most co-nationals to evaluate mixed gender direct visual contact as “Appropriate”, the majority of Swiss who collectively indicated this response is considerably larger than among Afghans.⁴⁹ According to Cohen’s d , the social norm about acting as if a task was clear although it is not, is only weakly misaligned ($d = 0.3$) and collectively perceived as more inappropriate among Afghans than the Swiss ($p_{rs} = 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.013$, mean $EucD_{AFG-CH} = 0.764$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.701$).⁵⁰ The probability that Swiss respondents collectively rated this behavior as more appropriate than Afghan respondents is about 66 percent ($ES_{rs} = 0.658$).

(Mis)alignments in social norms on mixed gender eye contact. From section 1.7.1 we know that male and female refugee participants expect different social norms about mixed gender eye contact. Replicating cross-national investigation of eye contact vignettes separately by gender yields a significant and moderate-sized difference in perceived (intra-group) social norms about mixed gender eye contact between Turkish and Swiss females (see Appendix Tables A.20 and A.7, $p_{rs} < 0.000$, $p_{tEucD} < 0.01$; $d = 0.75$). However, no significant differences are observed between Swiss and Turkish men or Swiss women (men) and Turkish men (women). Distinguishing cross-national differences by gender results in very large differences in social norms about mixed gender eye contact between Afghans and Swiss. We observe strong inter-group differences between Afghan and Swiss women (for p_{rs} and p_{tEucD} : $p \leq 0.000$ and $d > 1$) and across gender (Swiss men vs. AFG women: $p_{tEucD} < 0.001$ and $p_{rs} < 0.000$, $d > 0.5$; Swiss women vs. AFG men: $p_{rs} < 0.01$, $d > 0.5$), but not between Afghan and Swiss men.⁵¹

Result 3 - (Mis)alignments in personal and social norms (TR vs. CH). *Between Turkish and Swiss participants, personal and social norms are to the largest part aligned. The few misalignments we observe are of weak magnitude. Turkish participants are generally more likely to report personal norms supporting equality irrespective of one’s age, gender, or hierarchical position than the Swiss. Remarkably, misalignments in social norms between Turkish and Swiss participants only occur in social norms identified among the Turkish respondents but not in social norms prevalent among the Swiss.*

⁴⁹While about 40-41.6 percent of Swiss expected most other Swiss to rate mixed gender eye contact as “Appropriate”, only 33-34 percent of Afghans expected this rating to be indicated by most other Afghans. Note that concerning the cross-national difference in social norms about mixed gender eye contact between a female employee and a male boss, significance is stronger, and the effect size is larger as compared to the difference about mixed gender eye contact between a male employee and a female boss.

⁵⁰“Very inappropriate” was indicated by 41.2 percent of Afghan participants, but only 15.8 percent of Swiss believed most other Swiss chose this evaluation. By contrast, a majority of 30.5 percent of Swiss indicated only “Inappropriate”.

⁵¹Note that among Afghan refugees (reporting this information), 53 percent of men and 45 percent of women had a job in Afghanistan.

Result 4 - (Mis)alignments in personal and social norms (AFG vs. CH). Between Afghan and Swiss participants, roughly half of all personal norms and a quarter of all social norms are misaligned. Most and strongest misalignments occur in terms of personal and social norms about direct eye contact between an employee and a boss which is generally perceived as less appropriate among Afghan than among Swiss participants. However, this is particularly the case if interaction partners are of the opposite gender.

Result 5 (exploratory) - (Mis)alignments in personal and social norms on mixed gender eye contact, by gender. Comparing personal and social norms about mixed gender eye contact between Turkish and Swiss participants but separately by gender mainly yields no significant differences. Doing so for Afghan and Swiss participants, cross-national differences in personal and social norms become stronger as compared to average differences (independently of the gender). No differences in personal and social norms are observed between Afghan and Swiss men.

These results are in line with our second hypothesis, stating the presence of at least some misalignments in personal and social norms between each refugee group and Swiss natives.

Table 1.6: (Mis)alignments in social norms

Social Norms Vignette	TR vs CH					AFG vs CH				
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH rank-sum pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EuclD t-test pval	P{val(CH) > val(TR)}	Cohen's d EuclD	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH rank-sum pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EuclD t-test pval	P{val(CH) > val(AFG)}	Cohen's d EuclD
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction		0.000051	0.000063	0.622	0.434		0.003465	0.010317	0.607	0.338
Mistake by colleague: no criticism	TR	0.000013	0.387409	0.629	0.089		0.469474	0.141891	0.473	0.202
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	TR, CH	0.018855	0.784585	0.435	0.031	AFG, CH	0.878456	0.917776	0.505	0.015
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism	TR	0.002271	0.879890	0.410	0.016		0.026165	0.327651	0.420	0.135
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	TR	0.001248	0.018167	0.597	0.252		0.720338	0.019297	0.487	0.325
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept		0.000000	0.000000	0.703	0.733		0.805020	0.012103	0.509	0.344
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow		0.000418	0.000000	0.607	0.656		0.073780	0.004489	0.435	0.388
Task unclear: act as if it was clear	TR	0.000000	0.006509	0.677	0.290	AFG	0.000011	0.012722	0.658	0.313
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	TR, CH	0.000681	0.638775	0.405	0.052	AFG, CH	0.001782	0.944334	0.395	0.009
Insulted by colleague: inform boss		0.000118	0.002742	0.383	0.326		0.004302	0.003198	0.395	0.396
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	TR, CH	0.035681	0.300750	0.440	0.111	AFG, CH	0.239505	0.651334	0.459	0.058
Mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss		0.000070	0.007521	0.619	0.285		0.508522	0.111350	0.524	0.226
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	TR, CH	0.000000	0.496433	0.323	0.069	AFG, CH	0.001922	0.237478	0.390	0.152
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift		0.093244	0.001581	0.551	0.352		0.848356	0.039930	0.493	0.275
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned		0.002643	0.000003	0.591	0.538		0.145462	0.001483	0.553	0.492
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late		0.000891	0.002021	0.401	0.349		0.006394	0.115797	0.402	0.207
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	TR, CH	0.000279	0.311347	0.398	0.110	AFG, CH	0.004436	0.432505	0.404	0.113
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH	0.033962	0.208302	0.563	0.137	CH	0.000015	0.002241	0.655	0.478
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.124254	0.978100	0.456	0.003	CH	0.014397	0.051296	0.587	0.295
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH	0.017029	0.032186	0.570	0.237	CH	0.000009	0.000939	0.658	0.535
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.287662	0.666000	0.469	0.046	CH	0.004129	0.136560	0.602	0.212
Mixed gender teamwork	TR, CH	0.654096	0.685001	0.518	0.069	CH	0.064275	0.155438	0.599	0.436

Note: This Table can be read the same way as Table 1.5, it just applies to the findings for social norms. Recall that dark blue fields indicate for which vignettes and between what groups we identified a cross-national misalignment in social norms. For Cohen's d: Bright yellow fields indicate no or a very small effect (0 – 0.19), medium-dark yellow indicates a small effect (0.2 – 0.49), dark yellow a medium effect (0.5 – 0.79) and red represents a large effect (≥ 0.8).

(Mis)understandings of Swiss Social Norms

A major finding displayed by Table 1.7 is that out of ten social norms identified among the Swiss (see “CH SN”), Turkish refugees misunderstand two and Afghans only one. What we can infer from these results is that refugees are mostly able to anticipate the Swiss social norms as well as the Swiss themselves. Those few misunderstandings we observe are weak ($d < 0.4$ for all).

A closer look at **Turkish** refugees’ misunderstandings shows that they tend to overestimate the Swiss social norms. In other words, they believe that most Swiss participants collectively evaluate the behaviors in question as more (in)appropriate than is the case. For instance, a significant misunderstanding is found in the vignette about an employee who rejects taking over a colleague’s work shift because the employee feels too tired ($p_{sr} = 0.000$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.020$; mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.652$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.61$). When looking at the Table A.31 in the appendix, we see that about 85 percent of Turkish participants expected most Swiss to evaluate not taking over this shift as “Very appropriate” while only about 28 percent of Swiss expected most other Swiss to indicate this rating. The modal response given by 41 percent of Swiss respondents was “Appropriate”. A similar pattern is observed for the vignette about a 15-minute delay to a work appointment. A vast majority of Turkish participants (close to 80 percent) believe that most Swiss rated this behavior as “Very inappropriate”. Although this guess matches the actual Swiss modal response, it was only indicated by 63 percent of Swiss participants assuming most other Swiss would give this answer ($p_{sr} = 0.000$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.000$; mean $EucD_{TR-CH} = 0.519$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.589$).⁵²

By contrast to Turkish respondents, the result found among **Afghan** participants demonstrate that they underestimated the Swiss social norm on same gender eye contact. They believed that the Swiss collectively considered it to be less appropriate for a male employee to keep direct eye contact with his male boss during a discussion than the Swiss actually did. Afghan participants gave the modal responses of “Very appropriate” expressing the belief of about 34 - 38 percent of participants about the appropriateness evaluation on same gender eye contact given by most Swiss.⁵³ However, “Very appropriate” was indicated by a majority of 41.6 percent of the Swiss respondents ($p_{sr} = 0.000$; $p_{tEucD} = 0.022$; mean $EucD_{AFG-CH} = 0.677$, mean $EucD_{CH-CH} = 0.585$).⁵⁴

Interestingly, in both refugee groups, misunderstandings do not occur in the same vignettes where we have identified misalignments in social norms. In other words, Turkish and Afghan refugees only misunderstood Swiss social norms which were not significantly different from the social norms of their own in-group. In turn, this means that whenever social norms between refugees and the Swiss differed, refugees did nonetheless understand the Swiss social norms. At the same time, this also means refugees sometimes misunderstand the Swiss norms in the sense that they believe the Swiss are different from them even though they are not.

Finally, for Turkish (but not for Afghan) participants we found that their misbeliefs about the Swiss

⁵²Among those Turkish participants who could not anticipate the Swiss social norm (Swiss modal response) about rejecting a colleague’s work shift, 61.6 percent correctly anticipated the social norm of their own group (modal response among co-nationals). By contrast, 91.67 percent of Turkish who misunderstand the Swiss social norm about running 15 minutes late, also misunderstand their own social norm.

⁵³Note that the modal response for same gender eye contact between a male employee and a male boss was bimodal with “Appropriate” as the second modal response.

⁵⁴Among Afghan participants who could not anticipate the Swiss social norm on this vignette about same gender eye contact, 43.6 percent guessed their own group’s social norm correctly and 56.4 percent did not.

social norms also significantly differed from their personal norms, suggesting the presence of pluralistic ignorance.⁵⁵

Result 6 – Refugees’ (mis)understandings of the Swiss social norms. Both refugee groups were mostly able to anticipate the social norms of their host country. When they misperceived the local social norms, the Turkish overestimated them. That is, they expected the social norm ratings of most Swiss to be more strongly (in)appropriate than they really were. By contrast, Afghans underestimated the local norm in the sense that they expected most Swiss to collectively hold weaker appropriateness perceptions than was actually the case.

Table 1.7: (Mis)understandings of Swiss social norms

Guessing CH Social Norms	TR vs CH				AFG vs CH			
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH sign-rank pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EucD t-test pval	Cohen's d EucD	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH sign-rank pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EucD t-test pval	Cohen's d EucD
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction		0.000000	0.000000	0.667		0.000098	0.000691	0.444
Mistake by colleague: no criticism		0.000003	0.862664	0.018		0.452842	0.420096	0.109
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	CH SN	0.000000	0.458374	0.083	CH SN	0.000000	0.499058	0.108
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism		0.003482	0.341200	0.104		0.000486	0.216170	0.173
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others		0.774589	0.002577	0.323		0.118689	0.086926	0.233
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept		0.000000	0.000000	1.339		0.003077	0.006652	0.378
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow		0.000000	0.000000	1.153		0.255077	0.000675	0.505
Task unclear: act as if it was clear		0.000000	0.000000	0.584		0.000014	0.003831	0.372
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	CH SN	0.000000	0.626238	0.053	CH SN	0.000000	0.992024	0.001
Insulted by colleague: inform boss		0.000000	0.000013	0.480		0.000001	0.048402	0.270
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	CH SN	0.000000	0.247204	0.128	CH SN	0.000000	0.629977	0.067
Mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss		0.000000	0.001978	0.329		0.121057	0.029152	0.297
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	CH SN	0.000000	0.020166	0.238	CH SN	0.000006	0.056928	0.264
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift		0.000000	0.000000	0.855		0.544022	0.193247	0.184
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned		0.000000	0.000000	0.767		0.002237	0.006967	0.416
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late		0.000000	0.176881	0.143		0.000137	0.211043	0.171
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	CH SN	0.000000	0.000090	0.385	CH SN	0.000000	0.832447	0.030
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.432857	0.080	CH SN	0.371514	0.134292	0.223
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.920097	0.011	CH SN	0.000000	0.050932	0.309
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.799969	0.027	CH SN	0.629822	0.016265	0.384
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.816227	0.025	CH SN	0.000000	0.021561	0.356
Mixed gender teamwork	CH SN	0.015625	0.383852	0.092	CH SN	0.000008	0.077133	0.230

Note: This Table illustrates refugees’ misunderstandings of the Swiss social norms. But it can be read the same way as the Tables 1.5 and 1.6 displaying (mis)alignments in personal and social norms. Note that in this Table only, the first subcolumns of each comparison (TR vs. CH and AFG vs. CH) mark for each vignette whether there was a Swiss social norm identified or not. Dark blue shaded fields indicate regarding which vignettes we have identified a misunderstanding among Turkish or Afghan refugees about the Swiss social norm. In the second columns, we report the results of sign-rank tests. Since we are not aware of any established method capturing the effect size of a sign-rank test, we cannot indicate effect sizes in this Table.

⁵⁵Paired t- and sign rank tests, checking for differences in subjects’ means in personal norms and beliefs about the Swiss norms, indicated a significant difference among Turkish participants for the vignette about running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work ($p_t < 0.001$, $p_{sr} < 0.001$) and for the vignette about not taking over a colleague’s work shift ($p_t < 0.05$, $p_{sr} < 0.05$).

1.7.3 Normative (mis)alignments and (mis)understandings at the level of aggregate vignettes and associated factors

In this section, we apply OLS regression to investigate what factors might be associated with cross-national differences in personal norms, social norms, and one's guesses of the Swiss social norms at an aggregate level. To do so, we correlate our aggregated mean EucD measurements of these three outcomes with covariates (also see section 1.6). Remember that the first of these outcomes captures salient personal norms among Turkish and Swiss, and among Afghans and Swiss respectively. The second one aggregates all identified social norms among Turkish and Swiss, and among Afghans and Swiss. A third measure encompasses guesses of the Swiss social norms by refugees and Swiss in all the vignettes where we had identified social norms among the Swiss. These aggregated variables are the outcomes of interest in this section. But recall that they capture different things for refugees and Swiss. While for refugees, these outcomes designate the mean EucD of *inter-group* differences between each refugee and every Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH), for Swiss participants, they are equal to the mean EucD of *intra-group* differences among the Swiss (CH vs. CH). The analysis of this section pursues two approaches. First, we pool refugee and Swiss respondents' mean EucDs to every Swiss and regress each of the outcomes on nationality. This allows us to check at an aggregate level whether we can identify *relative* normative differences between refugees and the Swiss as compared to the intra-group differences among the Swiss themselves (TR-CH vs. CH-CH; AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Yet, the results of these regressions do not provide any information on whether relative normative differences between refugees and the Swiss are due to distinct nationalities or variations in other characteristics.⁵⁶ Second, in separate regressions for each refugee group, we analyze which (refugee-specific) factors are associated with mean EucD in the three outcomes between refugees and the Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH). For better interpretability of the regression coefficients we apply a log transformation to our outcome variables and the desirability score.

(Mis)alignments in personal norms across groups at an aggregate level

Table 1.8 reveals two commonalities in the results observed for both refugee groups. Their inter-group average EucDs of stated personal norms to the Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH) highly significantly differ from intra-group mean EucDs in personal norms among the Swiss themselves (CH vs. CH) (see specifications "TR-CH(rel.)" and "AFG-CH(rel.)"). While the deviation to the Swiss is about 7.4 percent larger among Turkish than among Swiss respondents themselves ($p < 0.001$), among Afghans it is about 17 percent larger as compared to the Swiss ($p < 0.001$).

Second, in both refugee groups mean EucD of reported personal norms to the Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH) are significantly and positively associated with their inclination to respond in a socially desirable way and their duration of stay spent in Switzerland. Yet, the effects go in opposite directions for the two refugee groups.

Running separate OLS regressions for the Turkish sample (see specifications "TR-CH(1)" and "TR-

⁵⁶Since Swiss and Turkish, respectively Afghan, refugees' background characteristics may differently affect the relative normative distance between Swiss and refugees, a causal analysis of nationality would require to control for interaction terms between individual characteristics and nationality. However, the sizes of our refugee samples are not sufficiently large for such an analysis. Introducing interaction terms strongly increases the standard error and thus, results in a loss of precision.

CH(2)”) reveals that an elevated **inclination of giving socially desirable answers** goes along with a significant increase in Turkish respondents’ mean EucD in personal norms to the Swiss (TR vs. CH). More specifically, a 1 percent increase in one’s social desirability score is significantly associated with an increase of their mean EucD by about 0.1 percent (specification ”TR-CH(2)”, $\beta_{\text{Desirability score (in log)}} = 0.097, p < 0.05$). In other terms, a 10 percent increase in their desirability score would be related to a 1 percent increase in their mean EucD in personal norms to the Swiss. We further observe that each additional **month of stay in Switzerland** corresponds to a highly significant growth in their mean EucD to the Swiss by about 0.10 percent (specification ”TR-CH(2)”, $\beta_{\text{Number of months stayed in Switzerland}} = 0.001, p < 0.001$). This equals a yearly increase of about 1.2 percent (as $1.001^{12} - 1 = 0.012$). Yet, both of these effects are very weak.⁵⁷ Finally, another result observed among Turkish refugees is that having had a **job in the home country** is linked to a significant decrease in their mean EucD of personal norms to the Swiss by about 10 percent ($\beta_{\text{Had paid job in the home country}} = -0.09, p < 0.05$).

Although these findings may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, recalling Table 1.3 on personal norms and section 1.7.2 on misalignments in personal norms between Turkish and Swiss respondents puts them into perspective. When looking at how Turkish and Swiss participants deviated in reporting their personal norms, we learned that they were actually very similar. But occasionally, the personal (in)appropriateness ratings among Turkish participants were on average stronger (more strongly (in)appropriate) than those among the Swiss. See section 1.9 for a discussion of results.

Conducting separate regressions of mean EucDs in personal norms of Afghan respondents to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH) reveals the following (see specifications ”AFG-CH(1)” and ”AFG-CH(2)”). A higher inclination to give socially desirable answers and a longer duration of stay in Switzerland are both negatively associated with their average EucD in personal norms to the Swiss. A 1 percent increase in Afghan participants’ **inclination to respond in a socially desirable manner** is related to a 0.5 percent decrease of their mean EucD in reported personal norms to the Swiss (specification ”AFG-CH(2)”, $\beta_{\text{Desirability score (in log)}} = -0.5, p < 0.05$). Put differently, a 10 percent increase in their social desirability score would go along with an approximate 5 percent decrease in this distance. Moreover, each additional **month spent in Switzerland** goes along with a significant decrease in Afghan respondents’ mean EucD in personal norms to the Swiss by approximately 0.24 percent, corresponding to an annual drop by nearly 3 percent (specification ”AFG-CH(2)”, $\beta_{\text{Number of months stayed in Switzerland}} = -0.002, p < 0.05$).

⁵⁷Regarding the duration of stay in Switzerland of Turkish respondents, the median duration is about 19 months and the longest duration of stay among the first 75 percent of the distribution is 36 months. For Afghan participants, the median is about 13 months, and the longest duration among the first 75 percent is 19.4 months. Hence, in both groups, the number of observations who have stayed longer is very large.

Table 1.8: OLS - Mean Euclidean distances of personal norms at the level of aggregated vignettes (in log), refugees vs. Swiss

	TR-CH(rel.)	TR-CH(1)	TR-CH(2)	AFG-CH(rel.)	AFG-CH(1)	AFG-CH(2)
Turkish nationality (d)	0.074*** (0.018)					
Male (d)		0.014 (0.029)	0.053 (0.032)		-0.030 (0.065)	-0.083 (0.073)
Age in years		-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
High level of education (d)		-0.069 (0.035)	-0.044 (0.041)		-0.053 (0.058)	-0.115 (0.063)
Desirability score (in log)		0.057 (0.049)	0.097* (0.044)		-0.341 (0.190)	-0.507* (0.205)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.001*** (0.000)			-0.002* (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.090* (0.042)			0.127 (0.068)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.050 (0.030)			-0.077 (0.063)
Afghan nationality (d)				0.169*** (0.030)		
Constant	-0.604*** (0.013)	-0.610*** (0.125)	-0.651*** (0.121)	-0.646*** (0.013)	0.441 (0.577)	1.053 (0.628)
F	17.9	1.24	6.65	32	2.08	2.96
r ² .a	.0441	.0121	.107	.12	.0524	.162
rmse	.166	.146	.138	.208	.224	.201
N	352	137	113	281	61	49

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Specifications TR-CH(rel.) and AFG-CH(rel.) regress the log of the mean EucD in personal norms of Turkish (Afghan) and Swiss (CH) participants (as compared to the Swiss intra-group mean EucD of personal norms) on the Turkish (Afghan) nationality (TR-CH/AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Note that the significance level of the coefficients "Turkish (Afghan) nationality" is the same when regressing mean EucDs which were not log-transformed. Specifications TR-CH(1) and AFG-CH(1) regress the mean Euclidean distance in personal norms of Turkish (Afghan) respondents to the Swiss (TR/AFG vs. CH) on a set of individual characteristics. Specifications TR-CH(2) and AFG-CH(2) are equal to specifications TR-CH(1) and AFG-CH(1) but add a set of covariates capturing the exposure to social interaction in Switzerland and the home country. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in brackets. R-squared adjusted (r².a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

(Mis)alignments in social norms across groups at an aggregate level

Table 1.9 below (specifications "TR-CH(rel.)" and "AFG-CH(rel.)") documents aggregate relative mean EucDs of Turkish and Afghan participants to the Swiss in their perception of social norms among co-nationals as compared to the Swiss intra-group perception of Swiss social norms (TR-CH vs CH-CH; AFG-TR vs. CH-CH). As for personal norms, we observe that both refugee groups exhibit a significant relative distance in perceived social norms to the Swiss. Turkish respondents deviate by about 4.5 percent more from the Swiss as compared to the Swiss themselves ($p < 0.05$), and Afghan respondents by 11.5 percent ($p < 0.001$).

Regressing Turkish respondents' mean EucDs in social norms (to the Swiss) on covariates separately yields a similar outcome as for their personal norms. Again, we observe a positive but weak correlation of **duration of stay in Switzerland** with their mean EucD in social norms to the Swiss (specification "TR-CH(2)", $\beta_{\text{Number of months stayed in Switzerland}} = 0.002, p < 0.001$). This suggests that each additional month spent in Switzerland amplifies Turkish respondents' average EucD of the perceived Turkish social norms to how the Swiss perceived the Swiss social norms by 0.2 percent. This equals an approximate yearly growth of about 2.4 percent. Finally, being supported by **job training in Switzerland** is associated with a decrease in Turkish participants' mean EucD in perceived intra-group social norms from the Swiss by about 8.4 percent (specification "TR-CH(2)", $\beta_{\text{Ever supported by job training}} = -0.084, p < 0.01$). This indicates a convergence of Turkish respondents' perception of the Turkish social norms to how the Swiss perceived the Swiss social norms.

Regressing mean EucDs of Afghan participants between their perception of Afghan social norms and the Swiss' perceptions of the Swiss social norms (AFG vs. CH) on covariates reveals two results. First, a longer **duration of stay in Switzerland** is highly significantly and negatively correlated with the outcome. That is, each additional month stayed in Switzerland is related to a decline in the distance between Afghan and Swiss respondents' perceived intra-group social norms by about 0.28 percent (specification "AFG-CH(2)", $\beta_{\text{Number of months stayed in Switzerland}} = -0.003, p < 0.01$). Further, we observe that having had a **job in the country of origin** corresponds to an increase in this distance by about 14.6 percent ($\beta_{\text{Had paid job in the home country}} = 0.146, p < 0.05$).

Result 7 – (Mis)alignments in aggregate personal and social norms (TR vs. CH). *At an aggregate level, we find differences in personal (social) norms between Turkish and Swiss participants to be by 4.5 percent (1.8 percent) larger than intra-group variation in personal (social) norms among the Swiss themselves (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). While a high inclination to give socially desirable answers and a longer duration of stay in Switzerland are associated with a very weak increase in Turkish respondents' distance in **personal** norms to the Swiss (TR vs. CH), having had a job in the home country goes along with an approximate decline of this deviation by 10 percent.*

*Similarly, to a very small extent a longer duration of stay in the host country is observed to be related to an increasing deviation between Turkish and Swiss participants' perceptions of their own in-group **social** norms. Having ever been supported by job training corresponds to a decrease in this distance by about 9 percent.*

Result 8 – (Mis)alignments in aggregate personal and social norms (AFG vs. CH). At an aggregate level, we find differences in personal (social) norms between Turkish and Swiss participants to be by 17 percent (11.5 percent) larger than intra-group variation in personal (social) norms among the Swiss themselves (AFG-CH vs CH-CH). To a weak extent, a stronger inclination to give socially desirable responses and a longer time spent in Switzerland both go along with a reduction of Afghan refugees’ distance in **personal** norms to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH).

Increasing time spent in the host country is also weakly related to a declining distance in perceived in-group **social** norms between Afghan and Swiss respondents. Yet, having had a job in the country of origin is associated with an increase of this distance by approximately 15 percent.

Table 1.9: OLS - Mean Euclidean distances of social norms at the level of aggregated vignettes (in log), refugees vs. Swiss

	TR-CH(rel.)	TR-CH(1)	TR-CH(2)	AFG-CH(rel.)	AFG-CH(1)	AFG-CH(2)
Turkish nationality (d)	0.045*					
	(0.017)					
Male (d)		-0.026	0.020		-0.082	-0.080
		(0.027)	(0.029)		(0.063)	(0.061)
Age in years		0.002	-0.000		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.005)	(0.005)
High level of education (d)		0.007	0.010		0.053	-0.027
		(0.033)	(0.041)		(0.068)	(0.062)
Desirability score (in log)		0.001	0.059		-0.054	-0.318
		(0.057)	(0.061)		(0.228)	(0.226)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.002***			-0.003**
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.044			0.146*
			(0.034)			(0.054)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.084**			-0.108
			(0.026)			(0.065)
Afghan nationality (d)				0.115***		
				(0.028)		
Constant	-0.477***	-0.505***	-0.585***	-0.545***	-0.182	0.499
	(0.013)	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.014)	(0.682)	(0.687)
F	6.68	.567	8.26	17	.521	3.62
r2.a	.0151	-.00977	.0868	.0586	-.0319	.123
rmse	.165	.142	.133	.206	.222	.192
N	351	137	113	280	61	49

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Specifications TR-CH(rel.) and AFG-CH(rel.) regress the log of the mean Euclidean distance in perceived social norms of Turkish (Afghan) and Swiss (CH) participants (as compared to the Swiss intra-group mean EucD of social norms) on the Turkish (Afghan) nationality (TR-CH/AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Note that the significance level of the coefficients "Turkish (Afghan) nationality" are the same when regressing mean EucDs which were not log-transformed. Specifications TR-CH(1) and AFG-CH(1) regress the mean Euclidean distance in perceived social norms of Turkish (Afghan) respondents to the Swiss (TR/AFG vs. CH) on a set of individual characteristics. Specifications TR-CH(2) and AFG-CH(2) are equal to specifications TR/AFG-CH(2) but add a set of covariates capturing the exposure to social interaction in Switzerland and the home country. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in brackets. R-squared adjusted (r2.a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

Refugees' (mis)understandings of Swiss social norms at an aggregate level

Table 1.10 below displays the analysis of refugees' aggregated mean EucDs of their beliefs about Swiss social norms as compared to Swiss participants' perceptions of the Swiss social norms (see specifications "TR-CH(rel.)" and "AFG-CH(rel.)"). We do not find any evidence that Turkish refugees' predictions of the Swiss social norms would significantly deviate from the predictions of the Swiss (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). However, when investigating the relative predictions between Afghan and Swiss respondents, we observe that Afghans' guesses are by 10.6 percent significantly further away from those among the Swiss than when the Swiss predict their own in-group social norms ($p < 0.001$) (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). This suggests that, at an aggregate level, especially Turkish refugees assess the social norms of their host country in much the same way as the locals do.

Regressing Turkish participants' mean EucDs between their beliefs about the Swiss social norms and the Swiss' perceptions of their own social norms (TR vs. CH) on covariates for the Turkish separately yields several results. Turkish respondents' **inclination to give socially desirable answers** is significantly positively but weakly related to their stated beliefs about the Swiss social norms (specification "TR-CH(2)", $\beta_{\text{Desirability score (in log)}} = 0.107, p < 0.01$). This implies that an increasing inclination to give socially desirable responses by 1 percent corresponds to an increasing deviation between Turkish and Swiss respondents' guesses about the Swiss social norms by 0.1 percent. Or, a 10 percent increase in desirability score would go along with a growth of this distance by about 1 percent. Further, each additional **month spent in Switzerland** is related to a rising divergence between Turkish guesses from those among the Swiss by about 0.2 percent (specification "TR-CH(2)", $\beta_{\text{Number of months stayed in Switzerland}} = 0.002, p < 0.001$). However, both effects are very small.

Moreover, factors related to the convergence of Turkish participants' guesses of the Swiss social norms to those among the Swiss are **job training in Switzerland** ($\beta_{\text{Ever supported by job training in Switzerland}} = -0.086, p < 0.001$) and job experience in the home country ($\beta_{\text{Had paid job in the home country}} = -0.099, p < 0.05$) (specification "TR-CH(2)"). Both are linked to a significant decrease in the deviation of Turkish participants' guesses from those among the Swiss by approximately 10 percent. In our exploratory analysis, we found no evidence of an effect of past exposure to violence on Turkish refugees' guesses of the Swiss social norms.⁵⁸ Conducting the same analysis separately for our Afghan sample (AFG vs. CH) does not yield any significant results.

From this perspective, we must reject our third conjecture which assumed a convergence of refugees' predictions about Swiss social norms to the predictions of the Swiss about their own social norms over time.

Result 9 - Refugees' (mis)understandings of Swiss social norms at an aggregate level. *At an aggregate level, only among Afghan (but not Turkish) refugees we observed a significant relative difference between their predictions of the Swiss social norms as compared to the predictions by the Swiss themselves. Yet, a higher inclination to give socially desirable answers and a longer duration of stay in Switzerland are both weakly associated with a divergence of Turkish from Swiss respondents' predictions of the Swiss social norms. By contrast, job experience in the home country and job training in Switzerland both made their predictions converge to those among the Swiss by about 10 percent. Among Afghan participants, no*

⁵⁸The null result on our two violence indices might be related to a lack of variance in these variables. Contributed to this may have the fact that among both refugee samples, larger proportions of people had their residence in the same location.

significant correlations could be observed.

Table 1.10: OLS - Mean Euclidean distances of participants' guesses of the Swiss social norms at the level of aggregated vignettes (in log), refugees vs. Swiss

	TR-CH(rel.)	TR-CH(1)	TR-CH(2)	AFG-CH(rel.)	AFG-CH(1)	AFG-CH(2)
Turkish nationality (d)	0.018 (0.020)					
Male (d)		-0.023 (0.028)	0.014 (0.030)		-0.018 (0.069)	-0.081 (0.094)
Age in years		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)		-0.006 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.005)
High level of education (d)		-0.012 (0.041)	0.005 (0.040)		-0.032 (0.069)	-0.111 (0.072)
Desirability score (in log)		0.089* (0.042)	0.107** (0.041)		-0.151 (0.201)	-0.228 (0.233)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.002*** (0.000)			-0.002 (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.099* (0.039)			0.126 (0.071)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.086*** (0.025)			-0.005 (0.075)
Afghan nationality (d)				0.106*** (0.031)		
Constant	-0.572*** (0.015)	-0.698*** (0.096)	-0.687*** (0.080)	-0.572*** (0.015)	0.105 (0.580)	0.458 (0.662)
F	.825	1.25	9.36	11.7	.723	1.21
r ² _a	-.000641	-.000654	.178	.0427	-.0191	.0513
rmse	.188	.152	.136	.22	.23	.226
N	351	137	113	279	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Specifications TR-CH(rel.) and AFG-CH(rel.) regress the log-transformed mean EucD between Turkish (Afghan) respondents' guesses of the Swiss social norms and Swiss (CH) participants (as compared to the mean EucD among the Swiss themselves when guessing their own social norms) on the Turkish (Afghan) nationality (TR-CH/AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Note that when conducting the same regression with EucDs which were not log-transformed, we observe that the coefficient "Afghan nationality" is only significant on a 1% level ($p < 0.01$). The significance of "Turkish nationality" did not change. Specifications TR-CH(1) and AFG-CH(1) regress the log mean EucD in perceived Swiss social norms of Turkish (Afghan) respondents to the Swiss (TR/AFG vs. CH) on individual characteristics. Specifications TR-CH(2) and AFG-CH(2) are equal to specifications TR/AFG-CH(1) but add a set of covariates capturing the exposure to social interaction related to the workplace in Switzerland and in the home country. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in brackets. R-squared adjusted (r^2_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

1.8 Robustness checks

The identification of (strong) personal norms and social norms in our analysis (see section 1.6.1) is based on the requirement that a modal response had to be selected by at least 40 percent of participants. The choice of this threshold is justified by the previous literature. However, it can be relaxed. Consider again the Tables 1.3 and 1.4 and let us imagine the cutoff to be at 50 percent of participants choosing a modal response. Consequently, there would be considerably less personal and social norms identified among the Swiss since the proportions of Swiss choosing a modal response are not that large. For instance, out of 11 Swiss personal norms (identified with a threshold of 40 percent), only two of them would remain by using a threshold of 50 percent. Yet, Turkish and Afghan refugees reported stronger norms of which a larger proportion was chosen by at least 50 percent of participants. Hence, the number of identified norms among refugees would not greatly change. Recall that we only test for differences in personal and social norms if there was a (salient) norm identified in at least one group of comparison. Since the

number of norms identified among refugees would remain very similar with the 50 percent threshold, the number of tests conducted and hence, also the number of identified (mis)alignments between refugees and Swiss would remain similar. However, the strongest misalignments in personal and social norms identified across nationalities would not be present anymore because they were based on norms most frequently chosen by less than 50 percent.⁵⁹

A threshold of 60 percent would change the picture more dramatically: Among the Turkish, only two personal and two social norms could be identified, among Afghans and the Swiss even only one personal and one social norm. This would strongly restrict the range of vignettes for which we could test for normative differences. Hence, the number of tests and consequently also the number of differences identified would be lower. How about setting this cutoff at 30 percent? Recalling the definition of a social norm (modal response) as a commonly shared focal point, it seems hard to believe that a modal response really serves as a focal point if 70 percent of individuals chose another response than the modal one. Note, however, that this threshold only affects the number of norms identified but not the p-values when comparing norms across nationalities.

Another robustness test is to merge the response options “Very (in)appropriate” and “(In)appropriate” into one category leading us to replicate our analysis with only four response options (Appendix Tables A.32-A.37).⁶⁰ Our results are not quite robust to merging response categories. In the comparison of Turkish and Swiss norms, this is mostly because by using this alternative classification, more salient personal and social norms were identified and therefore also more (mis)alignments.⁶¹ Comparing Swiss and Afghan norms, about half of the initial social norm misalignments remain the same in the merged scaling. In this comparison, the merged scaling often yields different results because of changes in the p-values.⁶² For (mis)understandings of the Swiss social norms we see that our initial results are robust, but that the merged scaling produces a few additional misunderstandings. However, since the differences we observe are mostly of small magnitude and often occur due to one group choosing “(In)appropriate” and another group selecting “Very (in)appropriate”, we argue that the scaling with six responses is more appropriate than that with only four responses. Apart from this, participants answered based on a choice of six responses. So, we cannot be sure whether their answers would have been the same if they would have had a choice of four response options as found when merging response categories.

⁵⁹For the Turkish, the strongest misalignment occurs in the personal norm concerning the vignette about the employee accepting unfair treatment by a boss, and for the Afghans personal and social norms about mixed gender eye contact.

⁶⁰This new scaling leaves us with four instead of six response categories with an assignment of scores in the style of Krupka and Weber (2013), namely “(Very) appropriate” (1), “Somewhat appropriate” (0.3), “Somewhat inappropriate” (-0.3), and “(Very) inappropriate” (-1).

⁶¹Turkish participants’ personal norms on reluctantly following a younger boss’ instructions and running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work are misaligned in the 6-response scaling but aligned in the 4-response scaling. Apart from one exception, rescaling response options also makes misalignments in social norms occurring in different vignettes.

⁶²For Afghans only the personal norm misalignments in the direct eye contact vignettes remain in the 4-response scaling.

1.9 Discussion and conclusion

Unfamiliar sociocultural norms have been considered a challenge for non-Western immigrants when professionally establishing themselves in Western high-income countries. In many Western high-income countries, rates of unemployment are reported to be higher among refugees than non-persecuted immigrants. As argued by Brell et al. (2020), their involuntary relocation motive and lower probability for self-selection, refugees' human capital, such as professional skills and norms, may not correspond to the requirements of Western labor markets. However, to the best of our knowledge empirical evidence about the personal and social norms of non-Western refugees is yet very scarce and even inexistent in terms of specific workplace behavior. This work is an attempt to contribute to closing this gap. Its objective was to study whether we can measure salient personal and social norms in the workplace among Turkish and Afghan refugees and the Swiss society and if so, whether they are culture specific. Further, we were interested in the extent to which refugees can anticipate the local social norms of their host country as compared to the Swiss themselves. Finally, we asked what factors might be associated with potential normative distances between refugees and Swiss natives.

In line with our first conjecture, our findings suggest that there are indeed salient personal and social norms in the workplace among each national group. Remarkably, many of them occur in the same vignettes across countries pointing to a common ground in terms of the interaction scenarios in which norms occur. Our results are also consistent with our second conjecture. While we observed only a few *relative* cross-national differences in personal and social norms between Turkish and Swiss respondents, there are somewhat more when comparing these norms across Afghans and Swiss.⁶³ Recall that by *relative* normative difference we mean a normative difference between a refugee group and the Swiss as compared to normative differences within the group of Swiss themselves (TR-CH vs. CH-CH; AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Apart from a few exceptions, they are of small magnitude. At an aggregate level, relative distances in personal and social norms are larger between Afghans and Swiss than between Turkish and Swiss norms. All in all, our findings do not provide strong support for the argumentation by Brell et al. (2020) predicting pronounced differences in human social capital between non-Western refugees and Western natives.

Between each refugee group and the Swiss, differences in personal norms were slightly more numerous and stronger than differences in social norms. Turkish refugees were observed to report personal norms supporting more egalitarian values in terms of individuals of different ages, genders, and hierarchical positions than Swiss participants. Misalignments of social norms between Turkish and Swiss participants were rare and only occurred in norms identified among Turkish participants such as the inappropriateness of giving critical feedback in front of others. However, regarding social norms prevalent in Switzerland such as punctuality, we do not find any misalignments between Turkish and Swiss participants. Neither do our results on Turkish norms corroborate the well-documented gender divide among Middle Eastern societies (D'Enbeau, 2015; Metcalfe, 2008).

Conversely, normative discrepancies between Swiss and Afghan participants are of a different nature.

⁶³Note that these findings do not present evidence for relative normative differences between the refugee groups and the Swiss due to a difference in nationality. Normative misalignments may also occur due to differences in other background characteristics that are distinct between our refugee samples and the Swiss. Yet, since such an analysis would have required including interaction terms, the limited sample size of our refugee samples made it impossible to investigate further the factors associated with the relative differences between the Swiss and each refugee group.

Between Afghan refugees and the Swiss, we observe most and strongest normative misalignments to be related to a gender divide, but only regarding visual contact in a hierarchy relationship. No normative misalignment was found regarding the gender composition of a work team. Our results indicate that according to Afghan personal and social norms, direct visual contact between a boss and a subordinate is generally perceived as less appropriate than according to Swiss norms. This is especially the case when interaction partners are of opposite genders. Interestingly, this latter result is driven by Afghan women who expect most co-nationals to collectively perceive mixed gender eye contact as much less appropriate than Afghan men, although Afghan men and women report the same personal norms. No differences in personal and social norms on mixed gender eye contact were observed between Afghan and Swiss men.

Among refugees and Swiss natives, we found some disparities between personal norms and beliefs about in- and out-group social norms which could be indicative for pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance refers to a psychological phenomenon where individuals mistakenly believe others' attitudes were different from their own, personal beliefs (Bjerring et al., 2014; Katz et al., 1931; Miller, 2023; Prentice and Miller, 1993). For refugees, the relevance of this matter might be that they may feel exposed to social peer pressure that, among peers in the host country, might not exist. This would be in line with a study by Buber-Ennser et al. (2016) who found refugee populations to hold more liberal values than their compatriots back home. Refugees might also feel under normative pressure by the Swiss which may not be as strong as they expected. Given that our findings suggest that norms among the refugee groups are more similar to Swiss natives than probably widely expected (Direnberger et al., 2022), pluralistic ignorance might also play a role in host societies' perception of non-Western refugees.

Further, we found that refugees are mostly not any less able to predict the Swiss social norms than the Swiss themselves. When they misperceived the local social norms, Turkish respondents overestimated them by believing that the Swiss social norms were more strongly (in)appropriate than they really were. By contrast, Afghans underestimated the local norm in the sense that they expected the Swiss to collectively hold weaker appropriateness perceptions than was actually the case. We also observed that the few misunderstandings among refugees occurred only with respect to social norms which did not significantly differ between refugees and Swiss. This suggests that in those few cases in which social norms between refugees and the Swiss differ, refugees nonetheless understand the Swiss social norms. Yet, for Turkish respondents only we found their misbeliefs about the Swiss social norms to significantly differ from their own personal norms which may again be an indicator of pluralistic ignorance.

Exploring the factors associated with personal and social normative differences between each refugee group and the Swiss at the level of aggregated vignettes yields a consistent pattern in each refugee group.⁶⁴ In line with previous literature on the acculturation processes of immigrants and refugees (Kämmer and Albert, 2023; Nesdale and Mak, 2000; Starck et al., 2020), the first two key messages our results suggest are as follows. The longer one's duration of stay in Switzerland and with an increasing wish for social acceptance by the hosting society, refugees may internalize the host country's norms or what they believe them to be.

We observe that Afghan respondents' distance in their reported personal norms to those among the Swiss declined, the longer they stayed in Switzerland, and the stronger their inclination to give a

⁶⁴Recall that for this analysis we investigated normative differences between each refugee group and the Swiss (TR vs. CH; AFG vs. CH), but not relatively to the Swiss intra-group variation of norms.

socially desirable response. The detected temporal convergence of their in-group social norm perceptions towards those of the Swiss corroborates the interpretation that an increasing duration of stay may induce an internalization process of the local norms which even manifested in Afghan refugees' perception of in-group social norms. The observation that job experience in the home country made Afghans' in-group social norm perceptions diverge from those of the Swiss about their own social norms, underlines this argument. A change of in-group evaluation among ethnic minority groups is in line with prior research showing that it can be influenced by the type of acculturation ideology to which minorities feel exposed or that they personally adhere to (e.g. Badea et al. (2015) or Verkuyten (2005)).

Also for Turkish participants, our results indicate that their reported personal norms are associated with what they believed to be favorable in the view of the Swiss. Yet, by contrast to Afghans, doing so is related to Turkish personal norms moving away from the Swiss norms.⁶⁵ A similar divergence in Turkish refugees' personal norms (from the Swiss norms) is observed the longer they stay in Switzerland. Analogously, with an increasing time of stay also Turkish refugees' perception of in-group social norms moved away from the Swiss' perception of their own social norms. This is consistent with earlier research on the close connection between personal and social norms (Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bursztyn and Yang, 2022; Piliavin and Libby, 1986). Yet, we also observe that job training in Switzerland goes along with a convergence of Turkish respondents' perceived in-group social norms to the Swiss' perception of their own norms. This suggests that attending this training may have enabled Turkish refugees to develop a more profound understanding of Swiss workplace norms, and hence, to update their beliefs about the local norms. The observation that their perception of in-group social norms approached the Swiss perception of the Swiss norms may thus also mirror an internalization process of these more accurate perceptions. In light of this finding, it might be plausible to argue that the temporal divergence of Turkish refugees' personal and perceived in-group social norms away from the Swiss perceptions reflected an internalization process of what Turkish respondents believed to be the local norms. Along these lines, this divergence may also imply that they developed a slight misunderstanding of the local norms over time.⁶⁶ This would be in line with our finding that also their predictions of the Swiss social norms moved away from the Swiss' predictions of their own norms, the longer they stayed in Switzerland. At the same time, this latter result contradicts our third conjecture.⁶⁷

However, remember that refugees' average duration of time in Switzerland is about 1.5 - 2 years. At this early stage, refugees in Switzerland are likely to primarily interact with the host society through various cantonal institutions and integration programs. Given that these institutions and programs are

⁶⁵An explanation for why we find the inclination for socially desirable answers to be related to divergence in personal norms from the Swiss among Turkish, but related to convergence among Afghan respondents might be the following. At an aggregate level, we observed that the distance in personal norms was smaller between Turkish and Swiss respondents than between Afghan and Swiss participants. Thus, one could interpret that while wanting to socially conform "only" led to a convergence of Afghan participants' personal norms to those of the Swiss, for Turkish respondents, it resulted in "over-conformism" with the Swiss norms resulting in a divergence from the actual average Swiss personal norms.

⁶⁶Alternatively, one may also argue that Turkish refugees may start to over-identify with the host country's values over time, instead of misunderstanding them. Yet, neither would this be in line with our previous results on misunderstandings, nor with the observation that attending job training makes their perceptions about co-nationals converge to the perceptions among the Swiss. Another yet opposing, interpretation could be that Turkish participants hold similar but genuinely stronger personal norms and hence, increasingly deviate from the Swiss norms. However, again, observing their perceptions of in-group social norms to converge to those among the Swiss when attending job training would not be consistent with this interpretation.

⁶⁷Recall, that our third conjecture assumed a convergence of refugees' beliefs about the Swiss social norms towards the Swiss beliefs about their own norms, the longer their stay in Switzerland.

often designed to (intensively) inform newly arrived refugees about the local norms, it may not come as a surprise that Turkish refugees over time may have increasingly overestimated the weight placed on some of these norms as compared to the Swiss society as a whole.⁶⁸ From this angle, the divergence of their normative perceptions from those among the Swiss could also be understood as a successful learning process.

Moreover, we also saw that Turkish refugees' beliefs about the Swiss social norms significantly moved away from the Swiss perception of their own norms, the stronger the former's inclination to respond in a socially desirable way.⁶⁹ On the one hand, this suggests that Turkish refugees may have intended to state a guess to please the host society. On the other hand, combining this result with our findings about misunderstandings confirms Turkish refugees' belief that more pronounced (in)appropriateness ratings would be socially desirable from a Swiss perspective.

Since the inclination to give socially desirable answers was not observed to be significantly related to refugees' distance to the Swiss in terms of perceived in-group social norms, refugees' concern for a positive in-group image may not be a likely scenario.

A third key message is that benefitting from job training and having had a job in Turkey has been shown to be positively associated with Turkish refugees' capacity to predict the Swiss social norms more closely to how the Swiss did. This also implies that specific learnings about local workplace norms may be more efficient for refugees' understanding process of norms than just spending a longer time in the host country. By contrast to Turkish respondents, having had a job in Afghanistan was found to be associated with a stronger deviation between Afghans' and Swiss perceptions of in-group social norms. This may allow for the conclusion that Turkish and Swiss workplace norms may be closer than Afghan and Swiss norms.

We acknowledge that this work has its limitations. First, the challenging circumstances of the data collection and the concern for a sufficient number of refugee participants made random sampling of refugees impossible. Thus, we may encounter sample selection bias among our refugee samples resulting in a limited variation in certain background characteristics. For instance, among the Turkish, highly educated people might be over-represented. Generally, the requirement to be able to read and write in order to participate in our study induced the selection of individuals with at least basic education. Further, we cannot know whether refugees' relatively high social desirability score as compared to the Swiss holds for the average Turkish and Afghan refugee in Switzerland or whether voluntary study participation and self-selection just attracted particularly engaged individuals.

Second, our samples are unbalanced regarding the number of participants. The relatively small number of Afghan participants may make the results about them less reliable than those of Turkish or

⁶⁸For instance, individual vignettes regarding which we found misunderstandings of the Swiss social norms with markedly larger average (in)appropriateness ratings among Turkish than Swiss participants (when guessing the Swiss social norm) are for instance the inappropriateness of being 15 minutes late for an appointment at work, the appropriateness to ask questions to the boss and the appropriateness of mixed gender teamwork. Interestingly, these norms are taught to newly arrived refugees at a very early stage from the side of (cantonal) authorities. As an example, see the official information website by the canton of Graubünden designed for newly arrived refugees: https://fluechtlinge.gr.ch/en/fluechtlinge/bildung_arbeit/gut_zu_wissen/seiten/default.aspx (see punctuality and asking questions); or a website by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) at <https://asylum-info.ch/en/life-in-switzerland> (see gender equality); retrieved on the 11.04.2024

⁶⁹Note that for Afghan participants we did not find any significant correlations of covariates with the distance between their guesses and the Swiss guesses about the Swiss social norms.

Swiss respondents. Finally, our results might be sensitive to how normative misalignments are identified and may vary accordingly (see section 1.8).

Nevertheless, we believe that this study provides novel insights into normative perceptions in the workplace among non-Western refugees and Western locals that may have important policy implications. Although Turkish and Afghan refugees and the Swiss have a lot of common ground in terms of workplace norms, there might be nonetheless certain cultural peculiarities which may render “one-fits-all” approaches in terms of job training inappropriate. For instance, while we found gender norms to be more traditional among Afghans than the Swiss, we did not observe any significant differences in gender norms between Turkish and Swiss respondents. Or, opposing widespread stereotypes, it is mainly Afghan women, not Afghan men, who hold more traditional gender norms than the Swiss. Generally, our results indicate that workplace norms in Turkey may be more similar to those in Switzerland than Afghan norms. Hence, information about workplace norms may nonetheless need to be adapted according to one’s country of origin.

Existing training programs were found to be successful in helping refugees to better understand the local social norms, even more than an increasing duration of time spent in the host country. Since normative misunderstandings were found to occur with respect to social norms in which we did not find a normative misalignment between refugees and the Swiss, information provision to correct these (slight) misbeliefs might be an appropriate tool to support their understanding.

Finally, misalignments in social norms between Turkish and Swiss respondents were only observed regarding social norms prevailing among Turkish participants, but not concerning Swiss social norms. This may imply that norm violations in the workplace are more likely to occur on the side of Turkish refugees than of Swiss natives, possibly bearing the risk of diminishing the formers’ motivation in the workplace. In line with previous work from Management sciences such as Wallinder (2022) and Szudarlek et al. (2021), it may be recommended to also raise the awareness of employers and to help them foster a work environment of open discourse about different normative perspectives among their multicultural workforces.

As an avenue for further research, it could be valuable to investigate more in-depth what factors determine the relative normative distance between refugees and host societies. We observed background characteristics such as average age and the level of education to vary across our refugee and Swiss samples. Yet, an in-depth analysis of the impact of these factors on relative normative distances between Swiss and refugees was not possible due to the limited size of our refugee samples.

Furthermore, the varied results we observe for Turkish and Afghan refugees raise the question about the role of selection mechanisms of refugees for their normative perceptions. While a range of authors found a positive selection of refugees on education and expected earnings (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2021; Guichard, 2020), others stressed the role of characteristics such as age, financial resources, or family status (Kogan et al., 2023). By contrast, Brell et al. (2020) describe (war) refugees as a heterogeneous group fleeing to another country under little influence of selection mechanisms. While this may be more likely for people from Afghanistan fleeing from war, in the case of Turkey, persecution affects specific groups such as Kurdish people or critics of the Turkish regime (often intellectuals). But also in Afghanistan, the discriminating situation for women under the Taliban regime is precarious which recently led the

Swiss government to relax the admission of Afghan women as accepted refugees.⁷⁰ Therefore, besides other factors, the reason of flight might be an important driver selecting refugee populations on specific characteristics which may play an essential role for refugees' normative perceptions.

⁷⁰See the document "Praxisänderung weibliche afghanische Asylsuchende" under <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/asyl/afghanistan.html>, retrieved at the 04.04.2024

Chapter 2

In-between social norms and social identity¹

2.1 Introduction

Social norms, collectively acknowledged behavioral guidelines of a society, have been shown to affect individual behavior and to vary across the globe (Barr and Serra, 2010; Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010; Cox et al., 1991; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Gächter et al., 2008, 2010; Gelfand et al., 2011; Henrich et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2015). Yet, not only *social* but also *personal* norms, *privately* held perceptions of (in)appropriate behavior, play a significant role in guiding human actions (Bai and Bai, 2020; Bašić and Verrina, 2023; Bertoldo and Castro, 2016; Piliavin and Libby, 1986; Schwartz, 1977).² Recent research shows that personal norms play a particularly important role for individuals experiencing normative uncertainty (Dimant et al., 2023). If people are unsure about the prevailing social norms in a given environment, they rely more on their personal norms. Refugees arriving in an unfamiliar host country might be particularly susceptible to perceiving normative uncertainty. Moreover, as argued by Brell et al. (2020), refugees' social capital, which according to common definitions encompasses social norms (Keefer and Knack, 2005; Putnam, 1993), may be less locally applicable in Western host countries as compared to that of non-persecuted immigrants.³ This may even further intensify perceptions of uncertainty.

Settling in the host country may lead refugees to engage in joint activities with both co-nationals and locals, such as in teamwork in multicultural workplaces. However, we hypothesize that in such settings, cultural differences might give rise to perceived conflicts in behavioral social norms (Friesen, 2011; Giguère et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2017; Olcina et al., 2024). We, therefore, build this work on the premise that refugees may experience a dilemma between two competing forces: On the one hand, the

¹This is joint work with Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France) and Fabio Galeotti (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France)

²Personal norms are also claimed to mediate the influence of social norms on human actions (de Groot et al., 2023).

³Brell et al. (2020) argue that by contrast to non-persecuted immigrants, refugees are forced to make quick and pressured decisions without the time to self-select or to choose a suitable destination country. This makes them more prone to end up in a hosting nation with a more distinct cultural background, resulting in diminished applicability of refugees' social capital (Brell et al., 2020). Following previous literature (Keefer and Knack, 2005; Putnam, 1993), we understand social norms as an important component of social capital. Therefore, refugees may hold social norms that are more distant from those prevailing in the host country than non-persecuted immigrants.

inclination to conform to the social norms familiar from the home country as a part of their social identity. On the other hand, a pull to adapt to the new social norms of the hosting nation. Theory and empirical evidence on social norms predict individuals' adherence to social norms of a numerical majority (Bicchieri, 2006; Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014; Gächter et al., 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Young, 2015). By contrast, research on group identity suggests that individuals prefer to align with their in-groups with whom they share social commonalities⁴ (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bicchieri et al., 2022; Chen and Xin Li, 2009; Kato and Shu, 2016; Taifel and Turner, 1985; Tsutsui and Zizzo, 2014). However, the question which these prominent concepts leave unanswered is the following. When refugees encounter conflicting social norms between their home and the host country, which reference network are they orienting themselves towards when forming and updating their personal norms - co-national or native peers? In other terms, do the social norms tied to one's social identity (in-group) or those among the hosting society (out-group) have a stronger influence on personal norms of refugees, given that they constitute a minority living in a majority society? And how do colliding in- and out-group social norms affect refugees' personal norms when they are observed by co-national peers? Even though these questions could be pivotal to understanding the behavioral drivers of forced immigrants in their host countries, they have yet received only limited attention.

We are not aware of any economic study examining how conflicting social norms between groups of distinct social identities in a minority-majority relationship influence the personal norms of the societal minority. This study aims to contribute to bridge this gap.

To address our research question, we conducted an experiment with 156 refugees from Turkey, 86 refugees from Afghanistan, and 197 Swiss natives living in Switzerland. Switzerland was an interesting terrain for the implementation of our work for two reasons. First, it had one of the highest intake rates of refugees relative to its total population in Europe (EU-15) in recent years (Müller et al., 2023). Second, random allocation of refugees to Swiss cantons helps prevent major systematic differences in participants' characteristics arising from cantonal variations.⁵ We elicited personal norms regarding mixed gender teamwork from all three target groups. The choice of a gender norm is based on an extensive literature agreeing on the gender divide as a key contributor to normative divergence between Middle (and South) Eastern and Western countries (D'Enbeau, 2015; Metcalfe, 2008; Moghadam, 2003). Employing the elicitation method of Burks and Krupka (2011), participants were shown a hypothetical scenario (vignette) occurring in a Swiss workplace. It portrayed teams consisting of male and female team members who had to perform a task requiring communication and the exchange of ideas. After having read the vignette, participants were asked to respond to the question "*According to your personal opinion, how do you find this [mixed gender] team composition?*"

First, we intended to check whether personal norms on mixed gender teamwork differed across national groups. Second, we aimed at causally measuring whether and how refugees adapt their personal

⁴Social identity also refers to specific social categories with which the individual identifies itself such as gender or nationality (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). It has been reported that social identity provokes in-favoritism when it comes to exerting reward and punishment, wage setting, competition, or donations towards an (ethnic) in- or out-group, respectively (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Chen and Xin Li, 2009; Kato and Shu, 2016; Luttmer and Fong, 2009; Mobius et al., 2016). Also see section 2.2.

⁵Random allocation to the cantons is only violated in exceptional circumstances such as to unite families and relatives. However, these cases are rather scarce (Ahrens et al., 2023; Martén et al., 2019).

norms when exposed to conflicting injunctive social norms between home and host country, we conducted a randomized trial with information provision. We adopted this idea from literature on norm nudging where giving social information is often used to manipulate individuals' expectations of injunctive social norms, or their beliefs about what others (dis)approve of doing (Bicchieri, 2023).

In our experiment, refugee participants were randomly assigned to three treatment conditions. The first is the Baseline condition serving as a control group. Participants in this condition simply respond to the above question on their personal opinions without being provided any additional information. Refugee participants in the second condition were informed about social norms among co-national peers (in-group) and among Swiss locals (out-group) who had previously taken part in this study. More precisely, participants in this treatment were shown the *distributions* of personal norms revealing to which extent in- and out-group members found mixed gender teamwork (in)appropriate. Just after the receipt of this information, refugee participants in this treatment were asked to indicate their own personal norms on mixed gender teamwork. The third condition intended to causally elicit how normative conflict influences refugee participants' personal norms once their own personal stance was revealed to co-national peers. Before being asked to declare their personal norms, participants in this treatment were additionally told that their reported personal norm would be (anonymously) shared with all other co-national participants in the end of the study. By contrast to refugees, Swiss participants were all assigned to the Baseline condition.

Based on the literature on social norms and their effect on societal minorities, we hypothesize that providing social information (without observability) may lead refugee participants to align their personal norms with the most frequently stated personal norm (social norm) by former Swiss participants (Azar, 2004; Bicchieri et al., 2018; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Masson and Fritsche, 2014; Young, 2015).⁶ Conversely, when providing social information together with the exposure of refugees' reported personal norms to the visibility of their co-national peers, we expect to observe an alignment of their responses with the most frequently stated personal norm among previous compatriots. This latter conjecture relies on former research suggesting that if a social norm is present, observability may trigger social image concerns and thus participants' compliance with the norm (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bolton et al., 2021; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017).

In contrast to common stereotypes about non-Western refugees in Western countries (Direnberger et al., 2022; Cowling et al., 2019), our results suggest that personal norms of Turkish participants are on average significantly *more* supportive of mixed gender teamwork than those of the Swiss and of Afghan participants. Interestingly, heterogeneity in personal norms between Turkish and Afghan participants is even greater than between any of these refugee groups and the Swiss. Further, for none of the refugee groups, we found significant effects on personal norms when learning about home and host country members' different social norms. Yet, knowing these norms and being observed by co-nationals led Turkish participants to significantly (downward) adjust their personal norms towards the social norm of

⁶Our understanding of a social norm is similar to Bursztyn et al. (2020b) in the sense that an injunctive social norm is measured based on a group of people expressing their personally held (dis)approval of some interpersonal interaction. Bursztyn et al. (2020b) describe a social norm as participants' average judgment of a normative personal statement ("In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside the home.", p. 2998). By contrast, Krupka and Weber (2013) elicited social norms using a coordination game and think of the norm as the modal response of participants indicating their second order beliefs about others' appropriateness perception. In line with their definition of a social norm, we also identify norms as a modal or most frequently indicated response among a group of people.

former co-national participants. Surprisingly, Afghan participants who knew the distinct social norms among in- and out-group members were significantly more likely to align their personal norm with the social norm of the (Swiss) out-group, once they learned that their answers would be revealed to co-nationals. While the result for Turkish participants is in line with group identity theory, our findings for Afghan participants unexpectedly stand in sharp contrast to this approach. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed in the last section of this chapter (see section 2.6).

In what follows, we outline previous work in section 2.2, section 2.3 describes the experiment and procedures, and in section 2.4 we state our conjectures. Section 2.5 explains our main results which are discussed in the concluding section 2.6.

2.2 Related work

Our work is mainly related to three strands of economic literature. First, it contributes to a small number of articles elaborating on the impact of social norms on personal standards (Bursztyn et al., 2020a; Choi et al., 2017). The experimental study by Choi et al. (2017) elicited social and personal norms by applying the methods of Burks and Krupka (2011) and Krupka and Weber (2013). They demonstrated that group norms of construction workers regarding safety behavior were significantly correlated with an individual worker’s personal standards. Crucially, they observed this effect to increase in the extent to which the worker identified with that particular work team. Using a donation game, Bursztyn et al. (2020a) examined how updating U.S. citizens about Trump’s popularity in their state of residence influenced their willingness to donate to an anti-immigrant organization. Without this update, participants whose choice was completely anonymous were more likely to donate compared to participants who were informed that their donation decision would be made public to others. This result implies privately held anti-immigrant sentiments that are not expressed in public due to a fear of social stigma. In a follow-up experiment, participants learned that Trump was expected to win by 100% of citizens in their own state. In this case, participants whose donation decision was made public were as likely to donate as participants taking private choices.⁷ These results underline that social norms held by a societal majority influence people’s inclination to express their privately held convictions when they are in line with the majority norms. A study from psychology by Bamberg et al. (2007) employing factor analysis and structural equation modeling presents evidence that beliefs in social norms contributed significantly to the development of participants’ personal norms when it comes to choosing public transport over the car. Yet, as opposed to our work, these papers do not investigate the influence of *conflicting* social norms between in- and out-group members on one’s personal norms. Nor do they compare individuals with markedly distinct social identities who stand in a minority-majority relationship to each other. Our paper contributes to this literature by combining all these contexts and analyzing their effect on personal norms. At the same time, this aims to represent the highly relevant circumstances of (forced) immigrants in the receiving nation.

Second, our study speaks to a range of articles on how social identity and minority-majority contexts

⁷Note that participants’ likelihood of donating in private in this follow-up experiment did not differ from the likelihood of donating in private among participants who had not been informed that everyone in their state believed in Trump’s victory.

can influence conformity with social norms. A recent empirical study by Bicchieri et al. (2022) concludes that a shared social identity leads individuals not only to reproduce others' norm violations but also others' normative conformity halting norm erosion. By contrast, when observing dissimilar others' only norm-violating behavior was found to be replicated. Work in social psychology by Christensen et al. (2004) confirms that conformity with identity-relevant injunctive social norms positively affects emotions and self-evaluations of individuals. Hence, individuals may favor to follow injunctive social norms which are tied to their social identity. A bunch of other studies examined normative behavior of minority groups when confronted with majority social norms. Investigating administrative data, a very recent study by Deng et al. (2023) investigated drivers in a major Chinese city coming from another municipality and hence, constituting a minority. The authors found that these drivers drove their cars significantly more conformist to road regulations than when driving in their home city where they belonged to the majority population. A subsequent experimental examination revealed that this compliance only occurred when minority individuals felt being monitored and threatened with punishment. In a field experiment, Winter and Zhang (2018) elicited the propensity of German natives and immigrant individuals for social norm enforcement when observing norm violation in the form of littering on the street. Immigrants were observed to enforce norms more rigorously against other minority members than against natives of the majority society. Hoff et al. (2011) have found similar results in a third-party punishment game with groups of distinct social statuses in India. In the case of norm violation, upper-caste individuals punished peers of a lower caste more strongly than those of an upper caste. Conversely, lower caste individuals show no difference in punishment behavior, no matter the caste. Finally, a study in experimental psychology by Shapiro and Neuberg (2008) revealed that (male) American native minority individuals adopted the social norm of discriminating against minorities which they believed to prevail among the white American majority. Native Americans were observed to judge job candidate profiles of white versus native American applicants according to the social norm they attributed to the white American majority when feeling in the presence of white Americans. Yet, this was not the case when they rated the profiles privately. By contrast to our work, these studies examined *behavioral* conformity to social norms. We add to this literature by investigating conformity to social norms when individuals form their personal norms.

Third, our study is linked with research on normative conflict which can be defined as a transaction failure of actors adhering to contradictory social norms (Rauhut and Winter, 2010; Winter et al., 2012). Nikiforakis et al. (2012) and Winter et al. (2012) experimentally induce normative conflict in laboratory settings to demonstrate that conflicting norms of equality and equity have detrimental effects on cooperation.⁸ Further, Kandul and Lanz (2021) use repeated public good games played by different

⁸Nikiforakis et al. (2012) do so in a public good game in which players had the possibility to punish each other depending on their contribution levels. Additionally, some players were offered higher returns from the common account than others. The authors find that punishment and counter-punishment behavior is linked to people's adherence to opposing norms which could both be plausibly applied in the same situation. Namely, either that everyone should pay the same amount to the public account (equal contributions). Or, that individuals who receive higher returns should contribute more than others (equal earnings). For settings with conflicting norms, the authors report an increased propensity for counter-punishment in response to punishment as compared to settings without normative conflict. Similarly, Winter et al. (2012) use a prior real-effort task and a subsequent strategy method ultimatum game to demonstrate the outcome of normative conflict regarding norms of equity and equality. The real-effort task determines the subjects' earnings or effort. The earned amount will define their share of the common account which is to be distributed between a proposer and a responder in the ultimatum game. The propensity for normative conflict is measured as the frequency with which responders reject a proposer's offer. Winter et al. (2012) found that the larger the differences between proposers' and responders' contributions to the common account, the more likely is normative conflict. The reason was individuals' heterogeneity in whether they

groups to examine the effect of implicit information about within-group average contribution on an individual’s own contribution level. They found that participants who contributed less (more) than average within their own group would adjust future contribution levels upward (downward). Yet, their main contribution is the insight that informing high-level contributors that the average contribution of their own group is below the average of all groups mitigated their downward adjustment of future contributions to their own group. By contrast, learning that one’s group contribution is above average will make low-level contributors discard their upward adjustment of within-group contributions. However, unlike our study, all these papers investigate how normative conflict affects behavior, but not individuals’ personal norms. In particular, they do not address the effect of conflicting social norms between groups of different social identities and numerical size on personal norms of minority members.

2.3 The experiment

In this paragraph, we describe the setup of our experiment and the procedures for the data collection from our refugee and Swiss native samples.

2.3.1 Experimental design

Based on the methods of Burks and Krupka (2011) and Krupka and Weber (2013), we elicited personal norms about mixed gender teamwork among Turkish and Afghan refugees and Swiss locals. While Turkish and Afghan participants were interviewed in the field, Swiss locals participated in the study online. In its basic form, the experiment is structured as follows. Each participant was presented with the same hypothetical scenario, also called a vignette, occurring in a Swiss workplace. It portrayed two teams which both consisted of a male and a female employee, who had to perform a task requiring communication and the exchange of ideas. After having read the vignette, study participants were asked the question “*According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?*” (also see the Instructions of chapter 2 in the Appendix). We offered six predefined response options of which one could be chosen, namely “Very appropriate”, “Appropriate”, “Somewhat appropriate”, “Somewhat inappropriate”, “Inappropriate” or “Very inappropriate”. For purposes of calculus and analysis but invisible to participants, each of these response options was assigned a value from 1 to -1 with 1 standing for “Very appropriate”, 0.6 for “Appropriate”, 0.2 for “Somewhat appropriate”, -0.2 for “Somewhat inappropriate”, -0.6 for “Inappropriate” and -1 for “Very inappropriate”.⁹ Furthermore, to assess whether and how social information and observability by co-national peers had a significant causal impact on refugees’ personal norms, we randomly assigned refugee participants to one of three experimental conditions. Hence, in a between subject-design, each participant completed one out of three versions of the questionnaire. Hereafter, we elaborate on the details of each experimental condition:

supported an equality norm (equal earnings for both of the players, no matter the contributions) or equity norm (higher contribution (effort) levels justify higher returns). However, the results of these studies solely concern groups with no marked differences in social identity.


⁹The approach of assigning each response option a quantitative score with an equal distance between each pair of responses is based on the idea of Krupka and Weber (2013). In contrast to our work, they provided participants with only four response options (“very socially appropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate” and “very socially inappropriate”) to elicit social norms. Whereas six instead of four response options allow to get a more detailed picture of individuals’ personal norm perceptions, it carries the risk that they may find it hard to choose between the peripheral answer options of “Very (in)appropriate” and “(In)appropriate”.

Baseline - Control group. Refugee participants assigned to the Baseline were presented with the basic form of the experiment as described in the latter paragraph. They were neither given any additional social information, nor were they monitored by other participants (see the instructions to chapter 2 in the Appendix, entitled with “Baseline screens”). Swiss participants all filled the Baseline questionnaire only. The responses indicated by refugee and Swiss participants in the very first Baseline groups were later used to as treatment information provided to participants in the Social Information and the Public Condition treatment.

Treatment 1 - Social Info treatment. Participants responding to this version of the questionnaire were shown the same vignette as in the Baseline. But before indicating their own personal norm on mixed gender teamwork, they were informed that there had been two previous groups of participants (a group of other refugees from their own home country and a group of locals from the host country) who were shown the same vignette and who had also indicated their personal opinion. Further, participants were provided with the distributions of the answers given by these two former groups of participants. More precisely, they were given two graphical illustrations displaying how many co-national and how many Swiss participants out of ten had selected each possible response option (as displayed in the screenshot below). After having received this information, participants were asked to indicate their own personal norm. For further details see the instructions to chapter 2 in the Appendix, entitled “Public Condition treatment screens”.

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



For your information:

A previous group of Swiss natives living in Switzerland and a previous group of Turkish people who arrived in Switzerland within the last few years participated in this study before. The following figures indicate how many, among 10 Swiss and 10 Turkish participants, found this mixed gender team composition appropriate or inappropriate and to which extent.

Swiss participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz

Turkish participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz

Note: Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' most frequent response.

OK

Treatment 2 - Public Condition treatment. Participants in this treatment were given the same information about the personal norms indicated by former co-national and Swiss study participants as in the Social Info treatment. The first screen participants in the Public Condition treatment saw was the same as for participants in the Social Info treatment (see screenshot above). But on top of this, they were made aware that the personal norms they were going to report would be (anonymously) shared with all other co-national study participants some weeks after the study. We specified that these other co-national participants would be shown a list with the responses of some participants and that their own reported responses would also appear on this list. To make this list accessible to all co-national participants, we provided all participants with a sheet to take home after the session which provided a link to a website. On this website, we made the list of (anonymous) answers from participants in the Public Condition treatment public to all co-national participants sometime after the data collection. Hence, the answers shared with all co-national study participants corresponded exactly to the responses given by refugee participants assigned to the Public Condition treatment. We made clear that this list did not reveal participants' identity and was completely anonymous. Yet, in some further instructions, it was stressed that the personal norms participants in this treatment were going to report would be publicly expressed in front of all other co-national study participants. After having received all this information, they were asked to report their own personal norm. For more details, see the instructions to chapter 2 in the Appendix, entitled "Public Condition treatment screens".

Finally, participants of all nationalities were asked to fill a list of background questions. As personal norms cannot be elicited in an incentivized way, measuring them is susceptible to experimenter bias. As explained more in detail in chapter 1 (see section 1.6.5), we included a short questionnaire according to Stöber (2001) consisting of 16 statements to be answered with "true" or "false" at the very end of the experiment. The purpose of this measure was to quantify a potential social desirability bias. The ratings of these statements were transformed in an individual score enabling us to statistically control for participants' inclination for socially desirable response behavior (see the last part of the instructions in the Appendix, entitled with "Social Desirability Scale-17"). The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17) by Stöber (2001) is a commonly used measure to capture this aspect and was also validated in previous research involving subjects from Turkey and Afghanistan (Elliot et al., 2019; Tatar and Özdemir, 2018).

Applying (non)parametric tests (two-sample t-test with relative mean Euclidean distances and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) allowed us to analyze two main aspects: First, by comparing Baseline participants across nationalities, we checked whether personal norms of mixed gender teamwork indeed significantly differed between Turkish and Afghan refugees on the one hand, and Swiss natives on the other hand. Second, when testing for differences across experimental conditions among each refugee group, we examined how social information and observability by other co-national participants influenced their reported personal norms. Finally, we employed econometric methods (OLS regression) in order to check the robustness of our results when controlling for a range of individual characteristics.

2.3.2 Procedures

Refugees. This thesis consists of three chapters which all use data from the same refugees and from the same collection. Hence, for each chapter, the procedures of how we accessed the refugees were the same and are described in detail in section 1.4.3 of chapter 1. Since this chapter studies personal norms, participants were not financially incentivized when responding to the questions related to this chapter. Note that the elicitation of participants' personal norms regarding mixed gender teamwork is also a part of the first chapter. Yet, by contrast to chapter 1, this present chapter 2 extends on studying the vignette on mixed gender teamwork by introducing the provision of information and the exposure to observability by others. Note that this experiment was only conducted for the vignette of mixed gender teamwork. The background characteristics of refugee samples are the same as in chapter 1 (also see Appendix Table B.1). Whereas there were 63% men and 37% women in our Turkish sample, among Afghan respondents there were even 68% men and 32% women. Turkish participants are on average about 36 years old, a large majority hold a high level of education and on average, they have stayed in Switzerland for about 25 months. The mean age of Afghan participants is about 29 years, their propensity for having high, intermediate, or low education is more or less equal and their average duration of stay in Switzerland is approximately 20 months. Roughly 10 percent of Turkish and Afghan refugees have a job in Switzerland. Appendix Tables B.5 and B.6 illustrate that apart from a few exceptions, sample characteristics are balanced across treatment groups. Hence participants' random assignment was mostly successful.¹⁰

Swiss natives. The recruitment procedures and individual demographic features of Swiss native participants are the same as in chapter 1 (also see Table 1.4.3 in chapter 1 and Appendix Table B.1 for summary statistics). The proportion of men (51%) and women (49%) is balanced. On average, Swiss participants are about 48 years old, 66 percent have a job and slightly more than 50 percent hold a high level of education. About 40 percent have an intermediate and 8 percent a low education level. In this second chapter, we use Swiss participants' reported personal norms which are a part of the same data analyzed in chapter 1.

2.4 Conjectures

In this passage, we outline our pre-registered hypotheses. First, we suppose that there is a stronger normative gender divide in behavioral conduct among Turkish and Afghan societies as compared to Western ones. According to the literature on gender norms in Middle and Southeastern regions of the world, Muslim-ruled societies traditionally support prescriptions of gender segregation or physical separation of women from "unrelated men" with whom they are not married or holding a family tie (Cairolì, 1998; Kavar, 2000; Salem and Yount, 2019). Compared to Western standards, gender norms in the Middle and Southeast are said to be generally more conservative, making the application of gender-segregated workplace practices more likely (Bugay et al., 2021; D'Enbeau, 2015; Metcalfe, 2008). Despite some progressive movements calling for gender equality in the past years in Turkey, traditional patriarchal norms still maintain gender segregation in the labor market pushing working women into undervalued job domains and disadvantaged work conditions. This mechanism directly restrains gender

¹⁰We will also control for individual characteristics in OLS regression.

diversity in the workplace (Gedikli, 2020; Özsoy et al., 2023; Ince Yenilmez, 2014). In Afghanistan, even before the Taliban regime came to power, sociocultural norms of segregation strongly discouraged women from pursuing a profession at all and especially from working together with men (Kakar and Hasan, 2024; Hedayat and Harpviken, 2014). Based on this literature, we conjecture that the average Turkish and Afghan refugee participant personally evaluates teamwork between men and women as less appropriate as compared to the average Swiss participant.

Conjecture 1 - Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork across national groups. *Turkish and Afghan refugee participants report personal opinions that express on average significantly less approval for mixed gender teamwork than among Swiss participants.*

According to Young (2015), people only follow social norms if a critical number of people in their society respect these norms. Yet, when refugees arrive in their host country, the new majority holds probably quite distinct norms from those held by the majority in their home country (Brell et al., 2020). The circle of co-national peers in the host country with whom refugees may engage might be small and constitute a societal minority. Hence, the norms learned in the home country are not supported anymore by a sufficient number of people which may lead refugees to subordinate themselves to the new, prevalent set of norms in the host society (Azar, 2004; Bicchieri et al., 2018; Boyd and Richerson, 2001; Latané, 1996; Young, 2015). Conforming to majority norms could be especially relevant for minority groups that care about social approval by the majority group and which fear devaluation due to their identity (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Shapiro and Neuberg, 2008; Walton and Cohen, 2007). This might particularly apply to non-Western refugees in Western host countries who may often feel burdened with stereotypical views by host country citizens (Cowling et al., 2019; Ossipow et al., 2019). Supporting these arguments with evidence from psychology, Masson and Fritsche (2014) show that the importance of a group and its role in fulfilling social needs is a major contributor to conformism with group norms (also see Leach et al. (2008) and Mc Donald and Crandall (2015)). In the same vein, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) argue that the inclination to conform may not only arise from the fear of facing rejection by others but also from an intrinsic urge to experience a sense of belonging. Thus, we hypothesize that social pressure due to the host society's numerical majority and a desire to belong to it prompts refugees to give opinions of host country members more weight than those of co-national peers.

Conjecture 2 - Provision of social information. *Receiving information about personal (in)appropriateness perceptions of mixed gender teamwork among home and host country peers leads Turkish and Afghan refugees to report a personal norm that is closer to the most frequently stated personal norm by locals than that among co-nationals.*

Social identity, i.e. the set of social categories with which individuals identify themselves, is posited as an important driver of decision-making processes (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Taifel and Turner, 1985). Empirical evidence shows that social proximity makes individuals more likely to conform to the norms of in-group peers than to those held by out-group members. For instance, Bicchieri et al. (2022) revealed that social closeness can stop the erosion of social norms (from observed norm violation). That is, individuals respond more to observing others' norm compliance if sharing social features with these

others than if this is not the case. Another example is Choi et al. (2017) who observed that group norms on safety standards of a particular work team significantly influenced the personal norms of individual workers. Moreover, the more a worker identified with the work team, the stronger was the influence of group norms on workers' personal norms. Further, the presence of a social norm may trigger social image concerns when individuals are observed by others. According to previous research, this induces them to align with the respective norm (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bolton et al., 2021; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; Grimm, 2019). Taking all this together leads us to our third conjecture:

Conjecture 3 - Provision of social information and observability by co-nationals. *Receiving information about personal (in)appropriateness perceptions of mixed gender teamwork among home and the host country peers and, learning that one's own personal norm will be shared with all other co-national participants leads Turkish and Afghan refugees to report a personal norm which is closer to the most frequently stated personal norm by co-nationals than that among locals.*

2.5 Results

In this section, we first present our findings from a comparison of the personal norms of participants in the Baseline across nationalities. Recall that the Baseline groups received no social information at all. We then describe the outcomes of introducing the two treatments: 1) the provision of information to refugee participants in the Social Info treatment about personal norms of fellow participants from their home and the host country and, 2) the notification of refugee participants in the Public Condition treatment about the observability of their own stated personal norms by co-nationals. Methodologically, we apply the same tests as in chapter 1 (see section 1.6.2 of chapter 1 for details). A t-test on relative mean Euclidean distances (henceforth EucD) between different groups of comparison allows us to check whether the mean EucD between one and another group significantly differs from the within-group mean EucD of the reference group. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests assess whether there are statistically significant differences in terms of distribution between groups. By contrast to the t-test, the rank-sum does not evaluate the actual values but the ranks of values. Consistently to chapter 1, we also employ a Benjamini-Hochberg (henceforth B.-H.) correction to take into account multi-hypothesis testing.¹¹ To check on the magnitudes of our effects, we report the rank-sum statistic (henceforth $ES_{r,s}$) and Cohen's d (henceforth d). Recall that the former provides information on the probability of a random value in one group to be larger than a random value in another group. Cohen's d is equal to the difference in means as a percentage of the pooled standard deviation of two (independent) groups. Finally, we use OLS regression to control for a set of individual covariates and a set of covariates capturing the exposure to social interaction in the home and the host country. The choice and justification of these controls are the same as in chapter 1 (also see section 1.6.5). Appropriateness ratings with respect to personal norms as our outcome variable will be log-transformed to simplify the interpretation of the regression coefficients.

¹¹According to Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), a critical value with a significance level of 0.05 is determined by the following formula: $BH_{crit} = (\text{rank of p-value} * 0.05) / 19$ with 19 being the total number of hypotheses for which we corrected. Each test was counted as one hypothesis. Since we compare personal norm ratings between Swiss and each refugee group as well as experimental conditions within each refugee group using two different tests, this yields $3 * 3 * 2 = 18$ tests. One test is added since EucDs to compare Turkish and Afghan participants were tested in both directions. See section 1.6.2 in chapter 1 for details about the B.-H. correction.


2.5.1 Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork across national groups

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of pooled data of the appropriateness ratings from personal norms on mixed gender teamwork of participants of each national group who were assigned to the Baseline. That is, it displays for each possible response option the percentage of participants indicating that response. We observe that the modal and median answer of Swiss and Turkish participants was “Very appropriate” (1) when responding to the question “According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?”, for Afghan participants it was “Appropriate” (0.6). The mean numerical rating among Turkish participants was 0.818 (s.d. = 0.23), 0.704 (s.d. = 0.33) among the Swiss and 0.668 (s.d. = 0.30) among Afghan participants (see Appendix Tables B.2, B.3 and B.4 for details).

EucD t-tests and rank-sum tests provided in Appendix Table B.10 indicate that these differences are significant at a 5%-level between Turkish and Swiss (EucD t-test: $p_{tEucD} = 0.025$; rank-sum: $p_{rs} = 0.027$) as well as between Turkish and Afghan participants ($p_{tEucD} = 0.045$, $p_{rs} = 0.026$).¹² Whereas the effect sizes of the EucD t-test comparing personal norms between Swiss and Turkish is small ($d = 0.225$), it is of larger magnitude between Turkish and Afghans ($d = 0.579$). The rank-sum statistic indicates a probability of 0.41 for the Swiss to have larger values than Turkish respondents. In other terms, Turkish respondents are more likely to have larger appropriateness values than the Swiss, namely with a probability of 0.59. With a chance of 63.4 percent, Turkish participants have larger appropriateness ratings than Afghan respondents. Yet, we did not find evidence for significant differences between personal norms about mixed gender teamwork held by Swiss and Afghan participants assigned to the Baseline. Moreover, when comparing the proportion of participants who have chosen each individual response option (as compared to choosing any other option) across nationalities, we see that the option “Somewhat appropriate” (0.2) was significantly more frequently selected by Afghan than by Turkish participants ($p_{rs} = 0.042$) (also see Appendix Table B.13). However, correcting for multiple hypothesis bias by a B.-H. correction renders all these results statistically insignificant.

¹²Note that these results were found for the total number of participants in the Baseline. Yet, they do not correspond to what we have observed among Turkish, Afghan and Swiss participants in the very first Baseline sessions. The information we provided to participants in the treatment groups was based on our findings from these very first Baseline groups. This implies, however, that the information we communicated to the treated participants did not reflect the true distributions as observed in the entire Baseline samples.

Figure 2.1: Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork, by national group (Baseline)



Note: Participants answered the question “According to your personal opinion, how do you find this [mixed gender] team composition?”. While “CH” denotes the Swiss Baseline group of trustors (n=179), “TR” stands for the Turkish Baseline (n=53) and “AFG” for the Afghan one (n=29). Participants reported their personal opinion about mixed gender teamwork by indicating one of six response options „Very appropriate“ (1), „Appropriate“ (0.6), „Somewhat appropriate“ (0.2), „Somewhat inappropriate“(-0.2), „Inappropriate“(-0.6) or „Very inappropriate“ (-1).

Pooled regressions controlling for individual characteristics were only conducted between Turkish and Afghan participants, yet not between the Swiss and the refugee groups. This is because we assume that refugees’ individual characteristics may have more similar effects on their outcomes than this would be the case among the Swiss. Under this assumption, a pooled regression with the Swiss would require the inclusion of interaction terms of covariates with the Turkish and Afghan nationalities. However, since the Turkish and Afghan Baseline groups are very small, this would result in a strong loss of precision.

Table 2.1 displays that without controlling for individual characteristics, the pooled regression of log-transformed personal norms of all national groups corroborates the results from (non)parametric testing. Turkish participants in the Baseline rated mixed gender teamwork as about 17 percent more appropriate than the Swiss Baseline ($p < 0.01$). Yet, this allows no inference about what (background) factors that may be driving this result. When accounting for individual characteristics in the pooled regression between Turkish and Afghan participants, Turkish participants assigned to the Baseline evaluated mixed gender teamwork on average as significantly more appropriate by even 38 percent than

Afghan respondents ($p < 0.05$). Interestingly, these results oppose our first conjecture and diverge from previous literature on gender norms across Western and Eastern countries (e.g. Bugay et al. (2021), D'Enbeau (2015), Metcalfe (2008)). Furthermore, it shows that personal norms about mixed gender teamwork are even more heterogeneous between Middle (South) Eastern countries than when comparing the reported personal norms of Turkish and Afghan participants with those stated by our Swiss participants. Remarkably, since the coefficient on the desirability score is insignificant, there is no evidence that Turkish and Afghan participants' responses would be driven by a desire to give socially desirable answers. We will comment on what could explain these differences in the discussion section 2.6.

Result 1 - Personal norms across national groups without information provision. *Without receiving social information and without controlling for individual characteristics, Turkish participants personally found mixed gender teamwork significantly more appropriate than the Swiss. Controlling for individual characteristics also revealed a significantly higher appropriateness evaluation of Turkish as compared to Afghan respondents. There is no evidence of significant differences in personal norms on mixed gender teamwork between Swiss and Afghan participants. Yet, heterogeneity in personal norms about mixed gender teamwork is stronger between Turkish and Afghan refugees than between any of these refugee groups and the Swiss participants.*

Table 2.1: OLS - Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork (in log), Baseline by national group

	CH-TR/AFG	TR-AFG	TR-AFG	TR-AFG
Turkish nationality (d)	0.172** (0.063)			
Afghan nationality (d)	-0.119 (0.116)	-0.291* (0.122)	-0.390* (0.147)	-0.378* (0.169)
Male (d)			-0.046 (0.086)	-0.098 (0.109)
Age in years			-0.007 (0.008)	0.003 (0.011)
High level of education (d)			0.112 (0.139)	0.062 (0.217)
Desirability score (in log)			0.132 (0.210)	0.115 (0.191)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland				-0.004 (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)				-0.130 (0.182)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)				0.035 (0.151)
Constant	-0.425*** (0.038)	-0.253*** (0.051)	-0.337 (0.628)	-0.374 (0.665)
F	4.99	5.7	2.26	1.47
r2_a	.0187	.0736	.15	.0976
rmse	.508	.462	.417	.424
N	274	82	62	52

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Specifications 1 compares appropriateness ratings regarding personal norms of Turkish and Afghan respondents to those among the Swiss (with the Swiss as reference group) without controlling for individual background characteristics. Specifications 2-3 compare these ratings between Turkish and Afghan participants (with the former as the reference group). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r2_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

2.5.2 Refugees’ personal norms on mixed gender teamwork across experimental conditions

In this subsection, we outline our findings from assigning refugee participants to the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments. Recall that participants in the Baseline did not receive any social information. By contrast, those assigned to the Social Info treatment were shown the distribution of personal norms of other study participants from the home and the host country. Participants in the Public Condition treatment received the same social information as those in the Social Info treatment but were additionally informed that their own reported response would be (anonymously) shared with all other co-national study participants at the end of the study. Within each refugee group, we aimed to test whether and how participants in the Baseline and in the two treatment groups differ from each other with respect to their personal norms regarding mixed gender teamwork.

Turkish sample

Figure 2.3 illustrates the distribution of personal norms on mixed gender teamwork among Turkish participants across experimental conditions. Figure 2.2 displays the social information Turkish participants were shown when assigned to the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments. It shows that the most frequently chosen response by the very first group of Swiss (Baseline) participants was “Very appropriate” and “Appropriate” among previous Turkish (Baseline) participants. Appendix Tables B.3 and B.8 provide details on descriptive statistics and frequency distributions and B.11 and B.13 on p-values from (non)parametric testing.

On average, the appropriateness rating among participants in the Baseline was 0.818 (s.d. = 0.23) and decreased to 0.772 (s.d. = 0.34) in the Social Info treatment and to 0.669 (s.d. = 0.39) in the Public Condition treatment. The median rating was 1 (“Very appropriate”) among the Baseline and the Social Info treatment and 0.6 (“Appropriate”) in the Public Condition treatment.


Baseline (BL) vs. Social Info treatment (T1). Our results do not present any evidence for significant differences in personal norms between participants in the Baseline and the Social Info treatment neither in their relative mean EucDs nor with respect to their distributions. As in the Baseline, participants in the Social Info treatment are more likely to select “Very appropriate” than “Appropriate”, with the former being the modal response chosen by previous Swiss participants and the latter the most frequent answer among previous Turkish participants (as depicted in the treatment information in Figure 2.2). This implies that Turkish participants in the Social Info treatment stick to their genuinely held personal norm (as stated in the Baseline).

Social Info treatment (T1) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). Mean EucDs and the distribution of responses between Turkish participants in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments do not significantly differ from each other. Although insignificant, by contrast to the Social Info treatment, the likelihood of participants in the Public Condition treatment to choose the modal response by previous Turkish participants is slightly higher than selecting what was most frequently chosen among previous Swiss.

Baseline (BL) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). The main result in this analysis is a significant difference in appropriateness ratings between Turkish participants assigned to the Baseline and the Public Condition treatment ($p_{tEucD} = 0.043$, $p_{rs} = 0.048$, $d = 0.408$, $ES_{rs} = 0.599$). Cohen’s d indicates a small yet close to medium effect. The rank-sum statistic indicates a probability of about 60 percent for Turkish Baseline participants to have higher appropriateness ratings than Turkish participants in the Public Condition treatment. Whereas in the Turkish Baseline, 58.5 percent of participants chose the category „Very appropriate“, in the Public Condition treatment this share declined to 42.2 percent which makes a difference of about 16 percentage points. By contrast, the probability of choosing „Appropriate“ increased by 6.5 percentage points in the Public Condition treatment as compared to the Baseline. A slight increase in probability was also observed for the responses „Somewhat appropriate“, „Somewhat inappropriate“ and „Inappropriate“.


However, none of the (non)parametric results outlined in the above paragraphs is robust to a B.-H. correction. Neither did we find any significant differences across experimental groups in terms of Turkish participants’ probability to select each individual response option as compared to choosing any other response (see Appendix Table B.13).

Figure 2.2: Treatment information provided to Turkish respondents in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments



Note: Read from the left to the right, the translation of the appropriateness ratings is "Very appropriate", "Appropriate", "Somewhat appropriate", "Somewhat inappropriate", "Inappropriate" and "Very inappropriate".

Figure 2.3: Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork of Turkish participants, by experimental condition



Note: Participants answered the question “According to your personal opinion, how do you find this [mixed gender] team composition?”. They could choose between any of six response options ranging from “Very appropriate” (1), „Appropriate“ (0.6), „Somewhat appropriate“ (0.2), „Somewhat inappropriate“(-0.2), „Inappropriate“(-0.6) to „Very inappropriate“ (-1).

Table 2.2 below and Appendix Table B.14 illustrate that controlling for individual characteristics in OLS regressions confirms our results from (non)parametric testing, yet not in all specifications. The second specification in Table 2.2 demonstrates that Turkish participants in the Public Condition treatment find mixed gender teamwork by about 16.3 percent significantly less appropriate than Turkish participants in the Baseline (see the coefficient on Baseline, $p < 0.05$). As also displayed in Table 2.2 and in Appendix Table B.14 comparing the Social Info treatment with the Baseline or the Public Condition treatment yields no significant differences in mean ratings. In none of the regressions, we found evidence for the influence of specific individual or social factors on Turkish participants’ reported personal norms. Notably, we do not observe that the inclination to give socially desirable responses would influence Turkish participants when stating their personal norms. In other words, this result does not indicate that Turkish participants would declare a personal norm with the intention to please the researchers or potential readers. Another noteworthy aspect is that their personal stance did not change over time or when attending job coaching. Neither does it matter for personal norms on mixed gender teamwork whether one has had a job back in Turkey. We will further discuss these results in the discussion section

2.6.

All in all, these results suggest that we can reject conjecture two but not conjecture three for the Turkish sample. Note that result 2c only holds when controlling for individual characteristics but not when controlling for the exposure to social interaction in the home and the host country.

Result 2a - Provision of social information. *Receiving information about personal norms on mixed gender teamwork among home and host country peers did not influence Turkish participants' own reported personal norms.*

Result 2b - Observability when informed. *Adding observability by co-nationals to the provision of social information did not influence Turkish participants' personal norms.*

Result 2c - Social information and observability. *The combination of social information provision with observability by co-nationals moved Turkish participants' reported personal norms closer to the norm of previous co-nationals.*

Afghan sample

Figure 2.5 is equivalent to Figure 2.3 but depicts distributions of personal norms on mixed gender teamwork across experimental groups among Afghan participants. Figure 2.4 illustrates the graphical information we provided to Afghan participants in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments. Whereas the treatment information from former Swiss participants is the same as that provided to the treated Turkish participants (with “Very appropriate” as the most frequently chosen response), information from previous Afghans indicates “Appropriate” as their modal personal norm. For Afghan participants, we report specifics of frequencies and descriptive statistics in Appendix Tables B.9 and B.4. Appendix Tables B.11 and B.13 document the details on (non)parametric testing.

Whereas Afghan participants in the Baseline on average reported a personal norm rating of 0.67 (s.d. = 0.30), participants in the Social Info treatment 0.56 (s.d. = 0.51), and those in the Public Condition treatment 0.69 (s.d. = 0.48). Median ratings were at 0.6 (“Appropriate”) among the Baseline and the Social Info treatment and at 1 (“Very appropriate”) in the Public Condition treatment. Yet, conducting (non)parametric tests on Afghan participants' appropriateness ratings of personal norms across experimental conditions does not yield any significant differences in relative mean EucDs or in distributions.

However, recall that according to the information Afghan participants assigned to the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments were provided with, the most frequent answer among previous Swiss respondents was “Very appropriate” and “Appropriate” among former Afghan participants (see Figure 2.4). As compared to the Social Info treatment, the proportion of Afghan participants in the Public Condition treatment giving the same response as previous Afghan study participants significantly decreased by nearly 30 percentage points. In the Public Condition treatment, the proportion of Afghan participants responding in the same way as former Swiss participants increased by about 30 percentage points as compared to the Social Info treatment. Further, Afghan participants in the Social Info treatment


are more likely to respond in the same way as most previous co-nationals (and less likely to respond as most previous Swiss locals) as compared to Afghan Baseline participants. However, none of these differences are significant.

Figure 2.4: Treatment information provided to Afghan respondents in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments



Note: Read from the left to the right, the translation of the appropriateness ratings is "Very appropriate", "Appropriate", "Somewhat appropriate", "Somewhat inappropriate", "Inappropriate" and "Very inappropriate".

Figure 2.5: Personal norms on mixed gender teamwork of Afghan participants, by experimental condition



Note: Participants answered the question “According to your personal opinion, how do you find this [mixed gender] team composition?”. The six response options were „Very appropriate“ denoted by (1), „Appropriate“ (0.6), „Somewhat appropriate“ (0.2), „Somewhat inappropriate“ (-0.2), „Inappropriate“ (-0.6) or „Very inappropriate“ (-1).

In line with the above observations, conducting OLS regressions reveals two significant results across specifications. Afghan participants in the Social Info treatment declare about 38 percent lower appropriateness ratings than those in the Public Condition treatment. Afghan participants’ reported personal norms in the Baseline are even 44 percent less supportive of mixed gender teamwork than in the Public Condition treatment (see Table 2.2 below). Yet, as shown by Appendix Table B.14, solely receiving social information about the personal norms of co-national and local peers did not significantly influence Afghan respondents own declared personal norms (as compared to not receiving any information). Further, as for the Turkish participants, we do not observe any significant influence on Afghan participants’ reported personal norms from an inclination to give socially desirable answers, from job experience in the home country, or job coaching in Switzerland. Surprisingly, the appropriateness rating of mixed gender teamwork significantly decreases by 1 percent for each additional month Afghan participants stayed in Switzerland ($p < 0.01$).

To sum up, given that Afghan participants are informed about the personal norms of home and host country peers, the awareness of being observed by co-nationals on average significantly increases their appropriateness rating of mixed gender teamwork. This corresponds to a significant average shift towards reporting the most frequently stated personal norm among Swiss locals (out-group members) and away from stating the most common opinion by co-nationals (in-group members). This is a surprising result because it suggests the opposite of what a large body of research on social identity would predict (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Chen and Xin Li (2009), Bicchieri et al. (2022)). See a further discussion of the results in the below section 2.6.

These findings give reason to reject our conjectures two and three for Afghan participants. Note that the below results 3b and 3c hold even when controlling for individual characteristics and exposure to social interaction.

Result 3a - Provision of social information. *Receiving information about personal norms on mixed gender teamwork among home and host country peers did not influence Afghan participants' own reported personal norms.*

Result 3b - Observability when informed. *Adding observability by co-nationals to the provision of social information moved Afghan participants' reported personal norms closer to the norm of previous Swiss participants.*

Result 3c - Social information and observability. *The combination of social information provision with observability by co-nationals moved Afghan participants' reported personal norms closer to the norm of previous Swiss participants.*

Table 2.2: OLS - Turkish and Afghan participants' personal norms on mixed gender teamwork (in log), by experimental condition

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Baseline (d)	0.092 (0.078)	0.163* (0.076)	0.155 (0.084)	-0.304* (0.147)	-0.435** (0.150)	-0.444** (0.160)
Social Information treatment (d)	0.126 (0.070)	0.143 (0.074)	0.148 (0.085)	-0.262 (0.142)	-0.238* (0.112)	-0.381* (0.173)
Male (d)		-0.041 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.062)		0.077 (0.131)	0.068 (0.169)
Age in years		-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)		-0.004 (0.010)	0.000 (0.013)
High level of education (d)		0.020 (0.066)	0.045 (0.081)		0.175 (0.140)	0.036 (0.158)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.018 (0.108)	-0.033 (0.112)		0.237 (0.347)	-0.202 (0.440)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.010** (0.004)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.114 (0.067)			0.110 (0.235)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.043 (0.066)			0.034 (0.186)
Constant	-0.345*** (0.060)	-0.102 (0.272)	-0.127 (0.256)	-0.241* (0.096)	-0.766 (0.986)	0.487 (1.277)
F	1.633	1.420	1.128	2.677	2.923	3.850
r2_a	0.009	0.035	0.005	0.033	0.091	0.158
rmse	0.352	0.320	0.313	0.542	0.488	0.492
N	150	131	110	79	57	45

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The reference group here are Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG) participants assigned to the Public Condition treatment. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r2_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

2.5.3 Personal norms of the Swiss Baseline and refugee treatment groups

In this final analysis, we are interested in checking whether the treatments we introduced had the potential to influence the distance in personal norms between refugee and Swiss participants in the Baseline (see Appendix Table B.12). Since the average appropriateness rating of mixed gender teamwork among the entire Swiss sample is 0.7 and 0.76 among the very first Swiss Baseline group (used for treatment information), what refugees learned about the Swiss is close to the actual Swiss average.

Running EucD t-tests and rank-sum tests between Turkish participants in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments as compared to Swiss participants in the Baseline do not yield any significant differences. This implies that the gap between the Turkish participants' higher appropriateness ratings to the lower ratings among the Swiss has vanished among treated Turkish participants. In other words, even when Turkish participants aligned their personal norms with the lower ratings of previous Turkish peers when observed by co-nationals, this adjustment process just led them to hold similar personal norms as the entire Swiss sample.

Conducting the same analysis for treated Afghan participants and Swiss Baseline participants neither yields any significant differences. This suggests that Afghan participants' appropriateness ratings do not significantly deviate from those among the Swiss, neither when receiving social information, nor when upward adjusting their ratings due to observability by co-nationals.

2.6 Discussion and conclusion

In situations of uncertainty about the prevailing social norm, individuals lean on their personal norms when making decisions (Dimant et al., 2023). Refugee immigrants, more than any other immigrant group, might be particularly susceptible to experiencing such normative uncertainty when arriving in a host society where they may be confronted with unfamiliar social norms (Brell et al., 2020). Further, they are likely to constitute a cultural minority in the new majority society. Two prominent explanations of individual decision-making are social identity positing alignment with socially proximate others, and social norms predicting conformity with the numerical majority (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bicchieri, 2006). This chapter sought to clarify whether social norms of co-nationals or local peers have a stronger influence on shaping personal norms of refugees. If social information has an influence, towards what norm do refugees orient themselves when facing different social norms between home and host country, given their position as a cultural minority in a majority host society? Further, how does this unfold when they feel observed by their co-national peers? Using the working example of personal norms on mixed gender teamwork, we first investigated whether Turkish, Afghan and Swiss participants indeed held significantly different personal norms. Second, we conducted a randomized trial, providing refugee participants with social information about the different social norms of two groups of co-national and local peers. To test the impact of possible peer presence, a subset of these informed refugees was additionally told that their reported personal norms would be (anonymously) revealed to their co-national peers.

Contradicting common stereotypes and populist narratives (Direnberger et al., 2022; Ossipow et al., 2019), we observe that Turkish refugee participants evaluated mixed gender teamwork on average as significantly

more appropriate than Swiss and Afghan participants.¹³ However, the heterogeneity in personal norms between Turkish and Afghan refugees was even greater than between personal norms of any of these refugee groups with those among the Swiss. Between Afghan and Swiss participants, no significant difference in personal norms was observed. These findings underline that common classifications that categorize gender norms as typically Western or Middle, respectively Southeastern, may be misleading when it comes to refugee populations. Our results rather support previous literature documenting more progressive values and attitudes among non-Western refugees in Europe as compared to the societies in their home countries (Buber-Ennsner et al., 2016; Fuchs and Von Scheve, 2023). Moreover, since we found no evidence that the responses of any of these refugee groups would be affected by an inclination to please the researchers or potential readers, we have no reason to believe that our findings are distorted by a social desirability bias.

Providing refugees with information about social norms among peers from the home and the host country (Social Info treatment) and additionally, making their reported personal norms visible to co-nationals (Public Condition treatment) yields different results for Turkish and Afghan participants.

Learning about conflicting home and host country social norms did not make a significant difference on Turkish participants' stated personal norms about mixed gender teamwork. This result suggests that informed Turkish participants stick with their own, genuine personal norm. There is no significant change in personal norms when informed participants are additionally told that their own responses will be (anonymously) shared with all other Turkish study participants. However, for this latter group, which was fully informed and observed by co-nationals, we found average personal norms to be significantly less supportive of mixed gender teamwork as compared to the Turkish Baseline who had not received any information.¹⁴ From this finding we infer that when Turkish refugees know the social norms and are aware of being observed by their social in-group, this induces them to be more conformist with the social norms of their in-groups than with those of the out-groups or the host country. In summary, when home and host country social norms are known and deviate from each other, the presence of co-national peers may exert stronger normative pressure on Turkish refugees than the majority local norms.

As for Turkish participants, the provision of social information about personal norms of home and host country peers did not have a significant impact on Afghan respondents' own, stated personal norms. Interestingly, however, when Afghan participants had received social information, adding the observability by co-national peers significantly increased their appropriateness rating of mixed gender teamwork. Providing social information and making them aware of the visibility of their answers to co-nationals also significantly increased appropriateness ratings as compared to Afghan participants who did not have any information. This is a surprising result as it is quite contrary to what is predicted according to social identity theory. It could reflect that when Afghan refugees know that their personal views are exposed to co-national peers, they have a preference to express their compliance with the social norms of the majority host society rather than with those held by their social in-group. Nevertheless, since we do not observe the same preference for conformity with the host country norms among Afghan participants who had social information but were not observed by co-nationals, this result may even be

¹³Note that the result for Turkish and Afghan respondents holds also when controlling for background characteristics. Yet, the comparison between Swiss and Turkish respondents could not be controlled for covariates and does hence, not account for differences in background characteristics.

¹⁴This result holds when controlling for a set of individual characteristics, yet not when we add a set of controls capturing exposure to social interaction in the home and the host country.

read as a signal of Afghan refugees to their co-national peers about their willingness to identify with and belong to the majority society. This could have two reasons. Afghan refugees who transgress from the most common behavior among their in-group weakly identify with their own group (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Gomila and Paluck, 2020). Alternatively, as suggested by Packer (2008), they (strongly) identify with their in-group and believe that it would be better or in the best interest of their group to adopt another norm. In this sense, they would deviate to from the in-group norm in an attempt to ensure the well-being of the group. In the case of refugees in Switzerland, the reason behind this rationale could for instance be the wish to protect their group from discrimination and marginalisation and thus, to try to push them towards conformity with the majority society.

We acknowledge limitations when interpreting the results of this study. First, our work suffers from a limited number of participants which impairs the power of our analysis. Second, as we included any refugee who was motivated to participate into our sample, we cannot exclude a selection bias instead of representativeness for the Turkish and Afghan refugee population in Switzerland.

Full information about distinct social norms influences personal norms of refugees only if paired with observability (by one's co-national in-group). However, we also derive from our results that groups with distinct cultural background may respond very differently to information and observability nudges. Thus, from the perspective of policy making, to mitigate the risk of backfiring effects, it may be advisable to design group-specific interventions instead of adopting a “one-size-fits-all” policy approach.

Chapter 3

Trust levels among refugees in Switzerland¹

3.1 Introduction

In light of the massive inflows of forced immigrants into Europe in the past years, refugees' unemployment rates are a matter of concern in many Western high-income countries (Bedaso, 2021; Fasani et al., 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017, 2018). Individual generalized trust² has been found to be an important driver of cooperation, job performance, job satisfaction, and individual economic income (Ahern et al., 2015; Buchan et al., 2002; Butler et al., 2016; Coleman, 1988; Helliwell and Huang, 2011; Larsen, 2014; Xie and Li, 2021). Trust has further been shown to be of vital importance in enhancing successful teamwork among a culturally diverse workforce (Garrison et al., 2010), in social learning (Siddiki et al., 2017), but also for refugees' social integration process in the hosting society (Essex et al., 2022; Varheim, 2014). However, for refugees, whom to trust or not is claimed to be among the foremost challenges when building new social ties (Eide et al., 2020; Essex et al., 2022).

In the year 2021, the largest part of asylum applications in Europe was submitted by refugees of Middle Eastern origin³ – a group of forced immigrants which is prone to holding markedly lower levels of generalized trust than members of occidental societies. Not only are refugees, particularly of Middle Eastern origin, likely to suffer from traumatic experiences⁴ impeding their capacity to trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, 2013; Hall and Werner, 2022; Ratcliffe et al., 2014; Starck et al., 2020), but trust levels are also argued to be culturally shaped (Bjornskov, 2007; Guiso et al., 2006; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002, 2008; Knack, 2003). Recent data from the World Values Survey draws a striking picture: Locals of the four top receiving countries in the EU-15 are by about 20-50 percentage points more likely to confirm the statement “Most people can be trusted” than people from countries submitting the highest shares of

¹This is joint work with Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France) and Fabio Galeotti (CNRS, GATE, Lyon, France) and Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

²More precisely, generalized trust refers to a trustor's level of trust in any trustee about whom the trustor has only little or even no information (Algan and Cahuc, 2014; Coleman, 1990; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010).

³<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/asylum-applications-eu/>

⁴Studies on refugees in Germany most commonly reported traumatic experiences to come from life-threatening assaults, violent loss of family members, and constant exposure to danger (Starck et al., 2020).

asylum applications in Europe (Haerpfer et al., 2022)⁵. Nonetheless, general trust and its drivers are yet an under-studied topic in the context of forced immigration.

Building on the above arguments, the core hypothesis underpinning this article is that Middle Eastern refugees hold a lower average level of generalized trust than locals in the host country. This may impair their engagement when looking for employment or in the workplace and hence, diminish their chances in the job market.⁶ Therefore, we first address whether it is indeed the case that Middle Eastern refugees trust strangers significantly less on average than natives in the receiving society. Assuming this holds true, another question that arises naturally and might be key for policy considerations is what could improve refugees' level of generalized trust.

The provision of social information about the behavior of others but also about observability of one's own behavior by others are regarded as (cost) efficient tools in guiding individual actions (e.g. Bicchieri et al. (2022); Bicchieri and Dimant (2022, 2023); Bolton et al. (2021); Bonan et al. (2021); Bursztyn et al. (2017, 2020b); Croson and Shan (2008); Ekström (2012); Ernest-Jones et al. (2011); Grimm (2019); Huber et al. (2023); Rogers et al. (2018); see Bicchieri et al. (2021) regarding reciprocity and Wei et al. (2019) regarding trust). Moreover, a study by El-Bialy et al. (2023) reveals that refugees' level of trust depends on the type of social ties they hold - bonds to co-national peers, to locals or to both. Hence, one may plausibly argue that migrating to another cultural environment makes refugees likely to be confronted with contradictory social knowledge from distinct sources such as home and host country peers. Moreover, they probably face daily interactions where co-national peers and local natives are present (at the same time). Therefore, a second objective of this work is to understand how learning about trust levels prevailing among the majority host society (out-group) and among co-national peers (in-group) affects refugees' own trusting conduct. We ask which reference group - home or host country peers - refugees rely on in their own decision to trust and whether this changes if observed by co-nationals. In other words, whose information matters more for refugees' own trusting actions - co-national peers' or locals' - and does this depend on whether their own actions are observed by co-nationals?

Ultimately, answering these questions will also contribute to an important, yet inconsistent, discussion in the literature about whether trusting behavior is led by social norms. Social norms refer to commonly acknowledged rules of behavior in a society or a group with which individuals comply because they expect some form of (social) punishment if they do not (Bicchieri, 2006).⁷ In the presence of a social norm, individuals who know the norm typically adhere to it when being observed by others to avoid

⁵Müller et al. (2023) retrieved data from the World Development Indicators 2023 and evaluated European countries' (EU-15) share of refugees as compared to the size of the host population. According to their assessment of the year 2021, Sweden was hosting 2.31% refugees as a share of their total population, Austria 1.70%, Germany 1.50%, and Switzerland 1.37%. On the other hand, the European Council (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/asylum-applications-eu/>) published a list of countries of origin of refugees traveling to Europe in 2021. The five countries with most applications were Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. We checked the question "Most people can be trusted" in the World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017-2022) (Haerpfer et al., 2022) for the mentioned countries and detected the following percentages of people confirming this statement: Sweden (62.8%), Switzerland (57.1%), Germany (41.6%), Austria (49.8%), Pakistan (23.3%), Iraq (11%), Turkey (14%). As Syria and Afghanistan are not part of the World Values Survey, we also checked Iran, a country sharing a large part of its border with Afghanistan: Also in Iran, only 14.8% of survey participants confirmed this question.

⁶This hypothesis is also inspired by Butler et al. (2016) identified a direct, hump-shaped relationship between individual trust (belief in the trustworthiness of strangers) and individual economic income. They conjectured that whereas highly trusting individuals may be let down more often by others in negotiation, being overly suspicious compared to a society's average might lead them to miss out on beneficial opportunities, both resulting in an income reduction.

⁷Note that social norms can be of descriptive or injunctive nature. Individuals following a descriptive social norm reproduce behavior because they believe that most others in their reference network to do so. Hence, individual behavior can be guided by behavior they observe by a majority of others. By contrast, injunctive (social) norms steer behavior based on individuals' expectations about what most others believe in (in)appropriate in a given situation (Bicchieri, 2006).

negative social consequences. For this reason, if provided with social information, observing behavioral change due to being observed by peers suggests that a social norm may be at work.

Let us assume refugees hold significantly lower trust levels than natives. In this case, understanding whether trusting behavior has a normative component from refugees' perspective becomes crucial to know how to enhance their trust level. This is because successfully inducing change in normative behavior (without undesirable backfiring effects) follows specific rules (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022). Moreover, our research question would become a question of normative conflict since the decision of whose information to consider for one's own trusting behavior, and in the presence of whom, may then be guided by two opposing forces: out-group social norms of the societal majority (host country norms) and in-group social norms according to one's social identity⁸ (home country norms). Both could be powerful incentives for compliant individual behavior, either to a societal majority or to socially similar others. Identifying distinct trust levels as a normative conflict could have further specific implications, for instance, on how to address it depending on the type of normative conflicts⁹ (Rauhut and Winter, 2017).

Though, evidence presented by Bicchieri et al. (2011) shows that individuals do not punish untrusting behavior by others, suggesting that trust may not be a social norm. Conversely, results from social psychology indicate that a major driver of individuals' trusting decisions is a sense of obligation to trust. Trustors were found to report they *should* trust to not question or to insult the character or (self-)image of the trustee as an honorable, trustworthy individual (Dunning et al., 2014, 2019; Evans et al., 2021; Dunning et al., 2016). These findings indicate that trustors are inclined to trust because they nonetheless expect a negative social consequence from mistrusting. That, in turn, would suggest that trust might nevertheless have a normative component.

Despite the vast amount of literature on generalized trust, we are not aware of any economic work exploring incentive-compatible data on generalized trust among non-Western refugees in a high-income Western country using information provision and observability. Drawing from a novel data set on refugees from Turkey and Afghanistan, we are to the best of our knowledge the first investigating the effects of social information and observability on generalized trust in this type of population.

We investigate our research questions on a sample of 156 refugees from Turkey, 86 refugees from Afghanistan, and 197 Swiss locals¹⁰, all living in Switzerland at the time. In 2021, Switzerland had the fourth-highest asylum seeker intake in Europe (EU-15) relative to its population size (Müller et al., 2023). Between the years 2020 and 2022, Afghan and Turkish people were considered the largest refugee groups in Switzerland apart from Ukrainians.¹¹ Moreover, Afghanistan and Turkey ranked within the top five countries submitting asylum applications to Europe in 2021, and even within the top three in 2022.¹²

In a one-shot trust game (Berg et al., 1995) played online under the strategy method, we elicited trust

⁸Social identity describes a set of shared social characteristics of individuals and drives individuals to conform to the behavior of socially similar others (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bicchieri et al., 2022; Chen and Xin Li, 2009).

⁹Rauhut and Winter (2017) suggest two types of normative conflicts. A first deals with a difference in the extent of commitment to comply with a norm. A second addresses distinct normative contents about what behavior is appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation. Depending on what sort of normative conflict policy makers may be dealing with, the implication to induce behavioral change might be different.

¹⁰We define a Swiss local as a person being born and living in Switzerland.

¹¹<https://migration.swiss/en/migration-report-2022/asylum-and-protection-status-s/a-few-figures?lang=true>

¹²<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/asylum-applications-eu/>

and beliefs about trustworthiness from refugees and Swiss locals. In the role of the trustor, they interacted with an anonymous trustee living in Europe. Comparing the levels of trust held by Turkish, Afghan, and Swiss (Baseline) participants living in Switzerland allowed us to observe potential cross-national differences in trust. In a further step, we introduced two between-subject treatments in each refugee sample. Participants in the treatment groups were provided with different pieces of information before they made their decisions in the trust game. A first treatment group was shown the *distributions* of amounts sent by a previous Baseline group of co-nationals and a former group of Swiss participants. This aimed at revealing whether knowledge about the level of trust among in- and out-groups influences the trusting actions of refugees. Participants assigned to the second treatment received the same information as those in the first treatment. But in addition, they were made aware that the amount they chose to send would be anonymously communicated to all other co-national participants at the end of the study.

Contradicting former research (Haerpfer et al., 2022), our results do not indicate any significant differences in generalized trust between Swiss and refugee respondents. Neither was there any difference in trusting behavior between Turkish and Afghan refugees. Beliefs about the trustees' reciprocity did not differ across groups apart from Turkish refugees who held significantly more optimistic beliefs than the Swiss. Social information and observability by co-national peers had significant effects on the trusting decisions of both refugee groups, yet in another way. Knowledge of home and host country peers' trust levels significantly encouraged Turkish trustors' trusting behavior and to conform with the most frequent trusting action taken by a group of previous Swiss participants, rather than with the (less trusting) modal action by co-nationals. Yet, this was observed to a less pronounced and insignificant extent once they were aware of the (anonymous) revelation of their choices to co-nationals. Importantly, the provided social information did not lead Turkish refugees to reassess their belief about the stranger's trustworthiness, suggesting that Turkish refugees act as if trusting behavior was a social norm. Our interpretation of these results is that when Turkish refugees observe a trust differential between home and host country peers, they may feel inclined to comply with a perceived social norm of trust in the hosting society. However, being observed by co-nationals, social proximity weakens this effect which is in line with the literature on social identity.

While social information had a significant effect on Turkish participants' trusting behavior, this was not observed for Afghan respondents. Surprisingly, obtaining information about others' levels of trust and being observed by their compatriots significantly raised their inclination to trust conforming with the higher trust levels of other Swiss than with the lower levels of their compatriots. Since the same significant change was also observed in their beliefs about the trustees' trustworthiness, they may have taken the social information about others' trusting behavior as signals about the trustee, but not necessarily as an indication of social norms. However, we only observed this result when Afghan respondents were aware of the revelation of their choices to home country peers. This is an unexpected result since it stands in contrast to group identity theory (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)).

In the following, section 3.2 outlines related work, section 3.3 describes the experimental design and procedures and in section 3.4 we state the main conjectures. Section 3.5 explains our main findings and section 3.6 concludes.

3.2 Related work

This work mainly contributes to three strands of economic literature. First, it adds to the existing but scarce work on trust among non-Western refugees living in Western high-income countries. El Bialy et al. (2017) and El-Bialy et al. (2023) speak to our work by conducting trust games with mainly Syrian refugees living in Germany. El Bialy et al. (2017) are interested in how the identity of the trustee impacts a refugee trustor's decision. They find that refugees trusted more when playing with German than with other refugee trustees. Conversely, refugee trustees acted more trustworthy when interacting with a refugee trustor than with a German trustor. Similarly, El-Bialy et al. (2023) study trust and trustworthiness of Syrian refugees who live in Germany but focus on how these outcomes relate to their bonding (social ties with co-nationals) and bridging capital (social ties with locals from the hosting nation). They show that Syrian refugees engaging in bonding capital favored fellow Syrian refugees over Germans in terms of the extent of trust and (conditional) trustworthiness. Yet, this reaction was significantly less likely among Syrian refugees having bridging capital only or bridging and bonding capital. By contrast to our work, the focus of these papers is on measuring refugees' level of trust depending on the identity of the interaction partner. In our work, what matters is not the identity of the interaction partner, but rather the identity of the individuals about whom our participants receive social information. Related to the present article are also Rapoport et al. (2021) and Jaschke et al. (2022). Both create an aggregate measure capturing cultural proximity or distance between refugees and locals by using survey data. In both analyses generalized trust is a component of the aggregate outcome but not the main subject of interest. Jaschke et al. (2022) reported levels of generalized trust of (mostly) Middle Eastern refugees to be slightly lower than those among German locals. Their main result is that refugees' (aggregated) social preferences approach natives' preferences more quickly when they live in a geographic location where natives' negative attitudes against minorities are more pronounced.

Second, our paper is linked to previous research on trust among non-persecuted immigrants and its convergence to local trust levels. Various authors applying non-experimental methods report that immigrants adjust their trusting behavior to that of the hosting nation: While moving from a high-trust to a low-trust country makes individuals reduce their trust, the opposite is true when immigrating from a low-trust to a high-trust country (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dinesen, 2012; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010). A more recent study by Lim and Morshed (2019) evaluates immigrants' trust levels in the U.S. based on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the General Social Survey (GSS). Opposing the conclusion by the above-mentioned articles, they document a strong association of first- and second-generation immigrants' trust levels with the levels prevailing in their countries of origin. Our study shares with these papers the context of examining trust among immigrants who relocated from a country with a markedly different trust level compared to the destination. However, as opposed to our work, these analyses are based on unincentivized survey responses.¹³

There are also several experimental studies that compare the trust level of immigrants with that among the native population and investigate how it evolves over time. In a trust game with Chinese international students in Australia and native Australians, Cameron et al. (2015) found that an increasing duration of study in Australia has a significantly negative effect of Chinese students' trust towards other

¹³As demonstrated by Glaeser et al. (2000), survey responses about trust elicited in the GSS (by the question "Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?") were not consistent with the choices made by the same respondents in an incentivized trust game.

Chinese. But the effect on their level of trust towards Australian natives was positive. Similarly, Cox and Orman (2010) present evidence from a moonlighting game in which immigrants mistrusted other immigrants more than locals of the hosting nation. Contradicting Cameron et al. (2015), they did not detect any significant influence of the duration of stay on immigrants' trusting behavior. Guillen and Ji (2011) examined the effect of group identity on the decisions of Asian international students in Australia playing a trust game with other Asian and local students. On the one hand, they did not find evidence for in-group favoritism in trusting actions. On the other hand, they observed that Asian students coming from a high-trust country adjusted their trust level downward over time, converging to the lower levels prevailing in the Australian society. Our work adds to this literature in two ways: First, we investigate a sample of hardly accessible forced immigrants. Second, beyond controlling for the duration of time spent in the host country, we analyze the impact of learning specific information about others and being observed by others on one's own trusting actions.

Third, our work expands existing literature on the provision of social information when it comes to trust. While there is an extensive literature on repeated trust games and the effect of a trustee's reputation on trustors' choice (e.g. Charness et al. (2011); Cocharde et al. (2004); Duffy et al. (2013) or Lunawat (2013); also see Borzino et al. (2023) and Cassar and Rigdon (2011) for repeated trust games in network conditions), the effect of providing social information about other trustors' level of trust has only rarely been investigated. There is only a study in neuroscience by Wei et al. (2019) that employs a trust game and like in our work presents trustors with the full distribution of trusting decisions made by other trustors. They found that decisions of informed trustors indeed significantly complied with what most other trustors had chosen. In economics, Bicchieri et al. (2021) investigate how trustees' reciprocity evolves when they are, on the one hand, given information about what amount previous trustees had returned (empirical information) or what they were normatively expected to return (normative information). On the other hand, trustees were exposed to punishment in case of non-compliance with the previously elicited norm. They find that neither the empirical nor the normative information had any significant effect on trustees' return choices. However, Bicchieri et al. (2021) did not examine trusting actions. As far as we know, there is no economic study exploring the impact of observability by others on one's own trust level. There is some literature when it comes to the provision of social information and observability by others but only in terms of social behavior other than trust: While Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) and Bicchieri et al. (2022) demonstrate significant behavioral effects from empirical information in a dictator or a take-or-give game, Dimant et al. (2020) could not confirm these findings for truth-telling. Huber et al. (2023) conclude that manipulating empirical and normative expectations significantly influences normative perceptions of (in)appropriateness of lying. Yet, no significant effect was observed by introducing observability by others. Grimm (2019) examined risk taking but neither found any significant impact from observability of others on individual actions. By contrast, observability by others significantly influenced behavior when at the same time individuals were asked to think of most others' empirical norms (Bolton et al., 2021) or when the observed behavior was linked to a strong societal social norm (Bursztyn et al., 2017).

3.3 The experiment

In this section, we first present the design of the trust game involving refugees and Swiss trustors on the one hand, and European trustees on the other hand. Then, we provide details on the procedures for each sample.

3.3.1 The experimental design

To elicit the trust levels of refugees and Swiss natives and their beliefs about trustworthiness, we ran a trust game played under the strategy method (Berg et al., 1995; Selten, 1967). Turkish, Afghan, and Swiss participants played the game in the role of the trustor with an anonymous trustee living in Europe (France, Germany or Switzerland). Yet, trustors did not know the nationality of the trustee they are playing with, they only knew that the trustee came from one of the three mentioned European countries. European subjects were only needed as interaction partners for our Swiss and refugee participants. Choosing European subjects from France, Germany, or Switzerland aimed at making the identity of trustee interaction partners more unknown (instead of choosing Swiss interaction partners), assuming that refugees may not be well informed about German and French trustworthiness.

In the beginning, each trustor was endowed with five Swiss francs (CHF). Trustors were asked to make a decision about how many of their 5 CHF they would like to send to the trustee. They are free to send any number between zero and five, inclusive. In other terms, trustors were allowed to keep the whole endowment for themselves and send nothing at all or to send their whole endowment. The number of francs sent by the trustor was then tripled by the program and transferred to the trustee. Hence, the trustee received the triple number of francs the trustor had chosen to send. Next, the trustee was asked to decide which fraction of the received amount (s)he would like to return to the trustor. Trustees had the option to keep the whole amount of money they received for themselves. Whereas trustors only chose the amount to be sent, the strategy method required the trustee to make a choice for every possible amount potentially received from the trustor. In other words, for each amount possibly sent by the trustor, the trustee was asked to choose how many of the tripled number of francs sent (s)he wants to return to the trustor.¹⁴ After trustors had made their decision about the amount to be sent, they were further asked to indicate their belief about how many francs the trustee would return to them.¹⁵ If their expectation was correct, they received an additional earning of 1.50 CHF.

There are two outcome variables of interest in this experiment: The first is the number of francs sent by refugee and Swiss trustors serving as a measure of one's level of trust. The second one is the number of francs that trustors believe to be returned by the trustee measuring their level of expected trustworthiness. Participants' final payoffs were determined by randomly matching the decision of each trustor with the corresponding decision of a trustee. The payoff-relevant interaction involves the trustor's choice and the matched trustee's chosen amount to be returned, conditional on the amount sent by the trustor. More precisely, the trustor's final payoff is the endowment of 5 francs minus the amount sent to the anonymous trustee plus the amount returned by that same trustee plus 1.50 francs if the guess about the trustee's return was correct. The trustee's final payoff results from the tripled amount sent by

¹⁴As the trustor was free to send nothing at all, the whole endowment, or any other amount between zero and five, the number of francs the trustee received must be between zero and fifteen, including zero and fifteen.

¹⁵Given that the trustee would receive between zero and fifteen francs conditional on the trustor's choice, the number of francs a trustee can expect to get back from the trustee is also between zero and fifteen.

the trustor minus the amount (s)he returned. Swiss participants played the trust game exactly in the way described above (Baseline). To evaluate the causal effect of social information and observability on refugees' trusting actions, refugee participants were randomly assigned either to the Baseline (control) group or to one of two treatment groups that we now describe in detail.





Baseline - Control group. Individuals in the Baseline group play the trust game in the role of a trustor as explained above. Neither do they receive any information before making their decision, nor are their responses (anonymously) shared with other participants. The levels of trust among Turkish, Afghan, and Swiss participants assigned to the Baseline were later used to inform participants in the treatment conditions.

Treatment 1 - Social Info treatment. Before making their decision, Turkish and Afghan trustors assigned to this treatment were informed that a group of co-national participants and a group of Swiss participants had been previously doing the same task in the same role as themselves. Additionally, they were shown the distributions of the amounts sent by these former co-national and Swiss participants. As shown in the below illustration, their computer screen displayed how many co-nationals, and how many Swiss, out of ten had sent each possible number of francs to the anonymous trustee. After the receipt of this information, participants went on to make their decision in the trust game. The provision of this information is the only element differentiating the Social Info treatment group from the Baseline. For more details see the instructions to chapter 3 in the Appendix, entitled "Social Info treatment screens".





Part 4 – Additional information

- The previous **Swiss native** participants and the previous **Turkish** participants, who both live in Switzerland, performed this same task as you in the same role as you (they also had to decide how many CHF to send to an anonymous person living in Europe who participated on the Internet). The following figure shows how many participants, among 10 **Swiss native** and 10 **Turkish** participants, sent 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CHF to the other person:

- Swiss participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- Turkish participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- **Note:** Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' choices.

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Treatment 2 - Public Condition treatment. Turkish and Afghan respondents in this treatment receive the same information about the amounts sent by previous co-national and Swiss participants as participants assigned to the Social Info treatment. In addition, they were informed that their decision of how much they would send to the anonymous trustee would be shared with all other co-national participants in the end of the study (see the instructions to chapter 3 in the Appendix, entitled with "Public Condition treatment screens"). More specifically, we told them that their individual, anonymous answers would be put on a list, together with the responses of some other participants, and that this list would be shown to all other co-national participants at the end of the study. The principle of how we provided this information was the same as in chapter 2. After each session, all participants were provided with a link to take home. By this link, the amounts sent by participants in the Public Condition treatment were made public to all co-national participants once the data collection of the research project was over. Anonymity was preserved because only their amount sent but not their identity was revealed to other participants from the same country.

In terms of analysis, we check by (non-)parametric testing (two-sample t-test on relative Euclidean distances between groups, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) whether refugee and Swiss Baseline groups significantly differed in their amounts sent and the amounts they expected to be returned from the anonymous trustee. We also examined differences in trust and trustworthiness across the Turkish and Afghan refugee Baseline and treatment groups using the same statistical tests. Also, see section 3.5 for further details on the statistical methods applied in this chapter.

3.3.2 Procedures

Refugees. In all three studies of this thesis, the data from refugees was collected in the same data collection. Hence, procedures and sample characteristics regarding the Turkish and the Afghan samples are the same as in chapter 1 (see sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 for details on recruitment and experimental procedures and Appendix Table C.1 for details on summary statistics). Recall that Turkish participants had on average stayed in Switzerland for about 2 years, and Afghan participants for about 1.5 years. While 80 percent of Turkish respondents were highly educated, among Afghans, high, intermediate and low degrees were more balanced. In both refugee samples, there are about 15 percent more men than women. Whereas there are 63% Turkish men and 37% Turkish women, among Afghan respondents there are 68% men and 32% women. With about 36 years among Turkish and about 29 years among Afghan respondents, mean age is considerably lower than among the Swiss participants who are on average approximately 44 years old. Only about 10 percent of refugees had employment in Switzerland at the time of the participation.

In fact, we observed ex post that the treatment information we had provided to refugees in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments differed from the behavior of the whole sample of Swiss, Turkish and Afghan participants. This is due to two reasons: First, due to organizational reasons we started running the sessions with the treated refugee groups before we had finished collecting the data from the Swiss. Since the social information provided to the refugee treatment groups had to remain the same for all treated individuals, we had to stick to the same social information we had collected from a previous Swiss sub-sample. Second, the data on Turkish and Afghan refugees was collected in the course

of a whole year and in different locations (Swiss cantons). To reassure the balance of data from Baseline and treatment groups across the various locations, we avoided collecting all the Baseline data in the beginning. In turn, this prevented us from providing treated individuals with information that would have represented the true distribution of the entire (Baseline) sample of co-national participants.

At the beginning of a session, once all participants were seated, the program randomly assigned participants to the Baseline or to one of the two treatments. Tables B.5 and B.6 in the Appendix show that, apart from some exceptions, randomization worked as expected in balancing individual characteristics across experimental groups.¹⁶ If needed, we personally assisted refugee participants with further clarifications of the mechanisms in the trust game.

While Turkish participants earned on average 6.95 CHF (6.85 EUR¹⁷) from the trust game, Afghan participants' mean earnings were 6.60 CHF (6.51 EUR) (excluding the participation fee).

Swiss natives. The sample of Swiss acting in the role of the trustor is composed of 200 participants. They were on average 44 years old and approximately equally distributed in terms of gender (51% men and 49% women). About 50 percent of subjects were highly educated, 40 percent reported an intermediate and the remaining 9 percent a low level of education. Nearly 70 percent had a job. Also see Appendix Table C.1 for further details on summary statistics. Swiss trustors received a participation fee of 2 CHF (1.97 EUR) and earned on average additional earnings of 6.35 CHF (6.26 EUR) from the trust game (excluding the participation fee). Recruitment and payment procedures were identically conducted as in the first study of this thesis (see sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 of chapter 1) and again carried out by the online platform Bilendi.

Europeans. 432 trustees living in France, Germany, or Switzerland took part in our study online via the platform Prolific. For each session of Turkish, Afghan or Swiss trustors, we recruited the same number of subjects on Prolific as there were (registered) refugees or Swiss participants in advance because each trustor had to be matched with another trustee. However, the total number of Prolific subjects is somewhat lower than the total number of Swiss and refugee trustors. This is due to two reasons: First, for some refugee sessions there were more participants than expected because some of them showed up spontaneously without having registered for participation. Second, it became increasingly difficult to find participants on Prolific who were willing to participate in our study but had not yet taken part. Hence, we sometimes faced insufficient numbers of Prolific participants which forced us to match some of them twice. That is, we occasionally used the indicated amount to be returned from one and the same European trustee for more than one trustor. Nonetheless, each trustee was only paid once. For such a trustee, the interaction with the first trustor (s)he was matched with was relevant for payment. On average, European trustees spent approximately nine minutes completing the questionnaire and earned 13 GBP (14.8 CHF or 15.6 EUR). Included in this amount is the fixed participation fee of 1.5 GBP (1.7 CHF or 1.75 EUR).¹⁸

¹⁶Since the refugee participants were assigned to the same treatment group in chapter 2 and chapter 3, the randomization checks for this chapter are the same as for chapter 2.

¹⁷Exchange rate of the 25.04.24

¹⁸At the time of consultation, the exchange rate was 1 GBP = 1.17 EUR and 1 EUR = 0.98 CHF

3.4 Conjectures

In this paragraph, we present the four conjectures underlying this work. All of them were pre-registered in advance.¹⁹ Two arguments build the cornerstone for our first conjecture: First, trust levels may vary across countries due to cultural differences. Data in the World Values Survey Haerpfer et al. (2022) reveals that the percentage of Swiss people (57.1) who agreed with the statement „*Most people can be trusted*“ is substantially greater as compared, for instance, to the Turkish population among which only 14 percent confirmed this statement. For Afghanistan, this data is not available. But the proportions of people agreeing to the above statement in neighboring countries are also markedly lower as compared to Switzerland. In Iran, 14.8 percent of people agreed, 23.3 percent in Pakistan, and 20.6 percent in Tajikistan. Second, trauma is claimed to have a significant impact on generalized trust. Whereas Hall and Werner (2022) report a positive correlation between refugees’ traumatic experiences and their level of generalized trust, Bauer et al. (2016) similarly observed that war can encourage cooperation. Yet, a large range of authors (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Ratcliffe et al., 2014) found a significantly negative relationship between trauma and trust. Following the latter, we conjecture that Swiss participants’ level of trust in the trust game is significantly higher than that held by Turkish and Afghan refugee participants.

Conjecture 1 - Cross-national trust levels. *In the trust game, Swiss trustors send significantly higher amounts of money to an anonymous trustee living in Europe than Turkish and Afghan refugee trustors do.*

There is a large literature across various disciplines attributing trustors’ decision to trust to their belief in the trustworthiness of the trustee (e.g. Ashraf et al. (2006), Barr (2003), Binzel and Fehr (2013), Hardin (2002), Rotter (1980), Sapienza et al. (2013)). From this perspective, trustors holding a higher level of trust would expect the trustee to be more trustworthy than trustors with a lower inclination to trust. Hence, as we conjectured Swiss have a higher level of trust than Middle Eastern refugees, we hypothesize that this is also the case for their beliefs about trustworthiness.

Conjecture 2 - Cross-national levels of expected trustworthiness. *In a trust game, the amount that Swiss trustors expect to be returned by an anonymous trustee is significantly higher than what Turkish and Afghan trustors expect the trustee to return.*

As shown by Bicchieri et al. (2023) a substantial majority of people derive normative obligations (what they *should* do) from (empirical) observations of what others *actually do*. In the same veins, also a range of other authors demonstrate that conformity to social norms is markedly determined by *empirical* social norms (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Huber et al., 2023; te Velde and Louis, 2022). Therefore, we hypothesize that Turkish and Afghan refugees feel under normative pressure when provided with empirical social information about the amounts sent by other co-national and Swiss trustors who had previously played the trust game. Yet, this may occur through two possible but distinct channels. First, there could be a normative aspect inherent to trusting behavior because individuals

¹⁹Our work has been preregistered on AsPredicted (<https://aspredicted.org>) under the number 112073 and the title “Diversity of social norms and trust levels in refugees and Swiss natives”.

might fear that mistrusting induces feelings of offense in their partner (Evans et al., 2021; Dunning et al., 2014, 2019; Faulkner, 2010). Hence, provision of information about others' trusting actions may affect individual actions by triggering this sense of obligation to (mis)trust. Yet, empirical evidence on the question of whether trust is a norm is ambiguous. Bicchieri et al. (2011), for instance, concluded that this was not because mistrusting behavior was not observed to be punished.

Yet, consistently considered as a social norm in the recent literature is trustworthiness (Bicchieri et al., 2011; Reiersen, 2019; Putnam, 2007). Therefore, alternatively to assuming trust itself had a normative component, knowledge about others' amount sent in the trust game may make Turkish and Afghan refugees infer a social norm of trustworthiness and adjust their own trusting actions accordingly. In other words, Turkish and Afghan refugees may hold the belief that other trustors would expect the trustees to follow a social norm of trustworthiness and hence, to return a (more or less) predictable amount. In this case, Turkish and Afghan refugees could assume that the other trustors' amounts sent would mirror their perception of a norm of trustworthiness and orient their own trusting actions towards the other trustors' choices.

Given that refugees are provided with social information about members of both home and host country, one may wonder whether one of the two reference distributions matters more than the other. Middle Eastern refugees in our sample belong to a (national) minority living in a majority host society. On the one hand, generally, the pressure to conform emerges from beliefs of a reference network, typically the majority of a society, about what should be done as well as from observing the actual behavior of this reference group (Bicchieri, 2006; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014). Wei et al. (2019) confirms that conveying the trusting decision of a majority of others significantly impacts an individual's own trusting action. On the other hand, compliance with the majority's norms and values may have particular importance for refugees as a vulnerable minority. Apart from their dependency on the legal acceptance by the host country, also the fear of social rejection and exclusion may drive them to comply with what they believe about the host society's normative expectations (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Shapiro and Neuberg, 2008; Walton and Cohen, 2007). Facing stereotypical views and discrimination due to their origin or identity may even reinforce the wish for social acceptance and approval (Direnberger et al., 2022; Mexi, 2023; Ossipow et al., 2019). From this perspective, we infer that refugees might take a trusting action based on what they expect to be the social norm of trust, or trustworthiness respectively, among the majority of society in Switzerland.

Conjecture 3 - Provision of social information. *Receiving information about the distinct distributions of amounts sent by trustors from the home and the host country leads Turkish and Afghan refugee trustors to send the anonymous trustee an amount which is closer to the modal amount sent by Swiss than by co-national trustors.*

Social identity theory states that individuals have a preference to behaviorally conform to others with whom they share social characteristics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Bicchieri et al. (2022) demonstrates that observing socially similar others enacting a social norm makes individuals more likely to reproduce this norm than without perceived social closeness. Moreover, it has been observed that the observability of one's own choice by others triggers social image concerns when this choice is tied to well-established, underlying social norms (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bolton et al., 2021; Bursztyn et al., 2017). Even

more so may this be the case given that establishing themselves in the host country, refugees might oftentimes depend on the support of co-ethnic networks, for instance when it comes to finding a job (Battisti et al., 2021; Martén et al., 2019). Hence, when directly observed by co-nationals, not “trusting their behavior of trust” may be a signal of separation from the group. Especially for rather newly arrived refugees, this may feel even more threatening than not being entirely compliant with the host country norm. Contrasting conjecture 3, we derive from this literature that Turkish and Afghan refugees could be induced to base their trusting behavior on a social norm of trust or trustworthiness they might have deduced from the provided social information about participants from their home country. Hence, we hypothesize that being informed about trusting behavior among host and home country participants as well as being observed by the latter will lead Turkish and Afghan refugees to send the anonymous trustee an amount that is closer to what most co-national trustors sent than to what Swiss trustors transferred most frequently.

***Conjecture 4 - Provision of social information and observability by co-nationals.** Receiving information about the distinct distributions of amounts sent by trustors from the home and the host country and being informed that their own amounts sent will be (anonymously) communicated to all other co-national participants, leads Turkish and Afghan refugees to send the anonymous trustee an amount which is closer to the modal amount sent by co-national than by Swiss trustors.*

3.5 Results

In this section, we start with presenting our results on the cross-national comparison of trust and trustworthiness of participants assigned to the Baseline. Then, we explain our findings from refugee participants across experimental conditions. That is, we compare amounts sent by refugees in the Baseline (no information), with amounts sent by those in the Social Info treatment (social information about home and host country peers’ choices) and in the Public Condition treatment (social information about home and host country peers’ choices *and* own choice observable to co-nationals). Finally, we check whether refugees’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of trustees change depending on these treatments. Analogously to chapters 1 and 2 (see section 1.6.2 of chapter 1 for details), we test for differences in trust and beliefs across nationalities and treatments by applying a Wilcoxon rank-sum test and a two-sided t-test on relative mean Euclidean distances (henceforth EucD) between independent groups. The former serves to check for differences in distributions between two groups of comparison based on the ranks of the values but not on the values themselves. The latter investigates the difference in mean EucDs between two groups as compared to the intra-group mean EucD within the group of reference. A Benjamini-Hochberg (henceforth B.-H.) correction accounts for multiple hypothesis bias (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).²⁰ Further, we report measures on effect sizes for both tests. For the rank-sum test, we use the rank-sum statistic providing the probability for a random individual in one group of comparison

²⁰According to this method, we computed the critical value with a significance level of 0.05 by the following formula: $BH_{crit} = (\text{rank of } p\text{-value} * 0.05) / 38$ with 38 being the total number of hypotheses for which we corrected. Each test was counted as one hypothesis. Hence, comparing amounts sent and amounts expected to be returned between Swiss and each refugee group as well as across experimental conditions within each refugee group using two tests yields $3 * 3 * 2 * 2 = 36$ tests. Since EucDs between Turkish and Afghan respondents’ trust and beliefs in trustworthiness were tested in both ways, there are two additional tests.


to have a larger value than a random individual of the other group of comparison. This measure of effect size will henceforth be abbreviated by $ES_{r,s}$. For the t-test on mean EucDs between groups, we use Cohen’s d (henceforth d) to provide insight into the magnitude of these tests (also see subsection 1.6.2 of chapter 1 for more details). Additionally, we report the outcomes of OLS regressions allowing us to control for individual characteristics.²¹ To facilitate the interpretation of our results, we apply a log transformation on our outcome variables of interest, as we did in chapters 1 and 2.

3.5.1 Trust across national groups

Figure 3.1 displays the percentage of trustors in each national group who sent each possible amount to the anonymous trustee. We observe that the modal amount sent by the Swiss is 5 francs (henceforth CHF), 3 CHF by Turkish and 2 CHF by Afghan trustors. Appendix Tables C.2, C.3 and C.4 reveal that the mean amounts sent are slightly different across these groups (CH-mean = 2.79 (s.d. = 1.65), TR-mean = 3.25 (s.d. = 1.39), AFG-mean = 2.21 (s.d. = 1.57)). More details are provided in Appendix Table C.5. However, the only significant difference in the amounts sent by trustors is observed between Afghan and Turkish refugees. As demonstrated by a rank-sum test, Turkish refugees send significantly higher amounts to the anonymous trustee than refugees from Afghanistan (rank-sum: $p_{r,s} = 0.003$, see Appendix table C.8). This result is significant even after a B.-H. correction. The mean EucD in amounts sent between Afghan and Turkish respondents as compared to mean EucDs among the Swiss was not found to be significantly different. The rank-sum statistic ($ES_{r,s} = 0.69$) indicates that the probability that Turkish respondents send higher amounts than Afghan participants is nearly 70 percent. Yet, we observed no significant difference in average EucDs or distributions of amounts sent between any of the refugee groups and the Swiss sample. Finally, when checking the likelihood for each amount to be chosen (as compared to not being chosen) across Baseline groups, we recognize that Afghan participants in the Baseline are significantly more likely to send 1 CHF as compared to Turkish Baseline participants ($p_{r,s} = 0.036$, non-robust to B.-H. correction, see Appendix Table C.10).

²¹As in chapter 1, the control variables we include in the regressions in this chapter are dummies for the Baseline and treatment groups, a set of individual background characteristics (age in years, dummies for being male and for holding a high level of education and the desirability score in log) and a set of covariates indicative of refugees’ exposure to social interaction in Switzerland (duration of stay in Switzerland and a dummy for ever having been supported by job training in Switzerland). These choices are in line with the literature on trust among refugees such as El-Bialy et al. (2023). In an exploratory analysis (which had not been pre-registered), we included our measures of past experienced violence into the regressions since trauma may significantly impact one’s level of trust Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). See section 1.6.5 in chapter 1 for more details on our covariates.

Figure 3.1: Amounts sent, Baseline by national group



Note: While “CH” denotes the Swiss Baseline group of trustors (n=200), “TR” stands for the Turkish (n=53) and “AFG” for the Afghan Baseline (n=28). The x-axes in these graphs show all possible amounts trustors could choose to send to the trustee. On the y-axes we display the percentage of Swiss, Turkish or Afghan participants in the Baseline who chose each possible amount.

Table 3.1 displays regression outcomes from pooling the data of the Swiss, Turkish, and Afghan Baseline participants corroborating our findings from (non)parametric testing.²² Without controlling for background characteristics, we do not observe any significant differences in amounts sent between any of the refugee groups and the Swiss. Importantly, and unlike the result from (non)parametric testing, controlling for background characteristics renders the difference in trust between the two refugee groups insignificant. Hence, we attribute the significant difference found by (non)parametric testing to differences in background characteristics of Turkish and Afghan respondents.

These results oppose our first conjecture and previous evidence suggesting that the level of generalized trust among Swiss was higher than that among Middle Eastern countries (Haerper et al., 2022).

²²As in chapters 1 and 2, we do not conduct pooled regressions of amounts sent and amounts expected to be returned between Swiss and refugees which control for individual characteristics. Since we cannot assume that Turkish and Afghan refugees’ characteristics would influence their amounts sent in the same way as for the Swiss, controlling for these characteristics would imply the inclusion of interaction terms of the Turkish and the Afghan nationality and covariates. However, the sizes of Turkish and Afghan Baseline groups are not sufficient for such a procedure. The inclusion of interaction terms would massively increase standard errors and hence, result in a loss of precision.

Result 1 - Trust across national groups. *Neither Turkish nor Afghan refugees significantly differ from Swiss participants in their amounts sent to an anonymous trustee. Neither were there any significant differences in amounts sent between Turkish and Afghan refugee trustors.*

Table 3.1: OLS - Amounts sent (in log), Baseline by national group

	CH-TR/AFG	TR-AFG (1)	TR-AFG (2)	TR-AFG (3)
Turkish nationality (d)	0.119 (0.070)			
Afghan nationality (d)	-0.217 (0.121)	-0.336* (0.129)	-0.369* (0.172)	-0.322 (0.211)
Male (d)			0.311* (0.148)	0.373* (0.171)
Age in years			-0.010 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.012)
High level of education (d)			0.175 (0.177)	0.314 (0.185)
Desirability score (in log)			-0.317 (0.247)	-0.311 (0.242)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland				0.002 (0.003)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)				-0.192 (0.144)
Constant	1.019*** (0.040)	1.139*** (0.058)	1.916* (0.752)	1.448 (0.763)
F	3.74	6.77	2.84	3.03
r ² _a	.0194	.0905	.123	.19
rmse	.514	.469	.479	.459
N	253	75	57	51

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r²_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

3.5.2 Beliefs about trustworthiness of others across national groups

Figure 3.2 exhibits for each national group the distribution of Baseline trustors' beliefs about the number of francs returned by the anonymous trustee. Conditional on the trustors' amount sent, this can be any number between zero and fifteen. We interpret trustors' beliefs as a measure of their expected trustworthiness. From the distribution in Figure 3.2 and Appendix Tables C.14 – C.17, we know that mean and modal amounts expected to be returned are highest among the Turkish respondents (CH-mean = 3.56 (s.d. = 3.05), TR-mean = 5.30 (s.d. = 3.44), AFG-mean = 2.93 (s.d. = 3.05)). The average Swiss trustor expects the trustee to return 3.56 CHF which is equal to about 42.6 percent of the mean amount trustees received (after it had been tripled).²³ Turkish trustors in the Baseline group believe on average that the trustee will send back 5.3 CHF which is about 54.36 percent of what the trustee had received.²⁴ Given that the Baseline group of Afghan trustors had sent a mean amount of 2.21 CHF to the anonymous trustee, they expect the trustee to return 44.19 percent of the tripled number of CHF received.²⁵

Rank-sum tests in Appendix Table C.20 reveal highly significant differences in distributions of expected trustworthiness between Swiss and Turkish ($p_{rs} = 0.000$) as well as between Turkish and Afghan trustors ($p_{rs} = 0.000$). These results are robust to a B.-H. correction. Relative mean EucDs of amounts expected to be returned are not observed to be significant between the Swiss Baseline and each refugee Baseline group. $ES_{rs} = 0.344$ from the rank-sum statistic expresses the probability that a Swiss trustor believes in larger amounts returned than a Turkish trustor, or a 0.656 chance that it is the other way round.


The distributions of expected trustworthiness between Afghan and Turkish participants differ more substantially ($ES_{rs} = 0.741$). This indicates a 74 percent probability for Turkish respondents to expect a larger amount returned than Afghan participants. According to none of our tests, there are any significant differences between expected trustworthiness among Swiss and Afghan trustors.

²³The mean amount sent by Swiss trustors is equal to 2.79 CHF. Hence, trustees received from Swiss trustors on average $3 * 2.79 \text{ CHF} = 8.37 \text{ CHF}$. Recall that all Swiss participants are in the Baseline.

²⁴The mean amount sent by Turkish trustors (in the Baseline) is equal to 3.25 CHF. Thus, on average trustees received $3 * 3.25 \text{ CHF} = 9.75 \text{ CHF}$ from Turkish trustors.

²⁵Trustees received on average $2.21 * 3 = 6.63 \text{ CHF}$ from Afghan (Baseline) trustors.

Figure 3.2: Amounts expected to be returned, Baseline by national group



Note: “CH” denotes the Swiss Baseline group of trustors (n=200), “TR” stands for the Turkish (n=53) and “AFG” for the Afghan Baseline (n=28). The x-axes in these graphs show all amounts that trustors could have possibly expected to be returned by the trustee. On the y-axes, we display the percentage of Swiss, Turkish, and Afghan participants in the Baseline indicating each possible expected amount returned.

Table 3.2 shows that without controlling for any background characteristics, Turkish respondents in the Baseline expect the trustee to return an amount which is about 30 percent higher ($p < 0.01$) than the amount expected in return by the Swiss (Baseline). However, the significant difference between Turkish and Afghan refugees’ beliefs about the trustees’ reciprocity detected in (non)parametric testing disappears when controlling for the duration of stay and job coaching in Switzerland. These findings stand in contrast to conjecture two which suggested that the beliefs about the trustees’ trustworthiness would be highest among the Swiss and markedly lower among Turkish and Afghan trustors.

Result 2 - Beliefs about trustworthiness across national groups. Turkish trustors hold significantly more optimistic beliefs about the trustees’ reciprocity than the Swiss. No significant difference in these beliefs is detected between Swiss and Afghan trustors. Neither do Turkish and Afghan trustors significantly differ in their beliefs about the amount returned by the trustee.

Table 3.2: OLS - Amounts expected to be returned (in log), Baseline by national group

	CH-TR/AFG	TR-AFG (1)	TR-AFG (2)	TR-AFG (3)
Turkish nationality (d)	0.280** (0.104)			
Afghan nationality (d)	-0.153 (0.126)	-0.433** (0.149)	-0.458* (0.175)	-0.383 (0.215)
Male (d)			0.529* (0.199)	0.696** (0.230)
Age in years			-0.020 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.015)
High level of education (d)			0.198 (0.177)	0.463* (0.201)
Desirability score (in log)			-0.524 (0.360)	-0.567 (0.352)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland				0.002 (0.003)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)				-0.404 (0.228)
Constant	1.248*** (0.048)	1.529*** (0.092)	2.965* (1.155)	2.678* (1.171)
F	5.15	8.44	4.02	4.11
r2_a	.0322	.0822	.123	.192
rmse	.633	.633	.647	.627
N	249	75	57	51

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r2_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

3.5.3 Refugees' level of trust across experimental conditions

In this paragraph, we describe our findings from Turkish and Afghan refugees assigned to the treatment groups. Recall that in the Baseline, the trustors played a standard trust game without receiving any additional information. Trustors in the Social Info treatment were shown distributions of amounts sent by former participants from the home and the host country before making their own decision on the amount to be sent. The Public Condition treatment is identical to the Social Info treatment with the only difference that participants were additionally told that their own choice would be (anonymously) communicated to all other co-national study participants at the end of the research project.²⁶ Details on the instructions are provided in the Appendix to chapter 3, particularly the titles "Baseline decision screen", "Social Info treatment screens" and "Public Condition treatment screens".

Turkish trustors

Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of amounts sent by the Turkish trustors in the Baseline and in each treatment group. Figure 3.3 depicts the social information Turkish trustors were shown when assigned to the Social Info and the Public Condition treatment. Details on frequencies and descriptive statistics are documented in Tables C.3 and C.6 in the Appendix. P-values from (non)parametric testing are found in Appendix Tables C.9 and C.10.

Turkish Baseline (BL) vs. Social Info treatment (T1). Comparing Turkish trustors' choices in the Baseline and the Social Info treatment group reveals that the provision of information about amounts sent by other trustors from the home and the host country significantly increases their amounts sent (BL vs. T1: $p_{rs} = 0.003$). The statistical significance of this result even holds after a B.-H. correction. Whereas the average amount sent by the Turkish Baseline was 3.25 CHF (s.d. = 1.39), Turkish trustors in the Social Info treatment sent a mean amount of 4.04 CHF (1.11). ES_{rs} with a value of 0.339 indicates the probability that Turkish trustors in the Baseline send larger amounts than trustors in the Social Info treatment is about 34 percent. In turn, this also means that the probability for the Social Info treatment group to send larger amounts than the Baseline is 66 percent.

Another noteworthy result is that, compared to the Baseline, the information communicated in the Social Info treatment makes Turkish trustors by 21.7 percentage points significantly more likely to send 5 CHF which corresponds to the Swiss modal response ($p_{rs} = 0.039$, see Appendix Table C.10). This is equal to a probability increase by 76.67 percent for 5 CHF to be chosen. Yet, this result is not robust when accounting for multiple hypothesis testing (B.-H. correction). The proportion of Turkish trustors who selected the Turkish modal response as shown in the treatment information (3 CHF) is by about 10 percentage points or by 35.29 percent lower than in the Baseline. However, this result is not significant. Other insignificant observations which may be worth noting are that 4 CHF was selected by about 7 percentage points or by about 70 percent more often in the Social Information treatment than in the Baseline and amounts below 3 CHF were chosen less often. Zero and one were not chosen at all. These findings are in line with our third conjecture stating that refugee participants would choose to send an

²⁶Recall that Turkish trustors in the treatment groups were only shown social information of Swiss and other Turkish trustors. Amounts sent by Turkish trustors in the Public Condition treatment were only (anonymously) shown to other Turkish participants. Treated Afghan trustors were only informed about amounts sent by Swiss and other Afghan trustors. The choices of Afghan trustors in the Public Condition treatment were only communicated to other Afghan participants.

amount closer to the Swiss modal response than to that among co-national peers.

Turkish Social Info treatment (T1) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). There is no evidence of a statistically significant difference between Turkish participants assigned to the Social Information and the Public Condition treatment. Thus, when provided with information about amounts sent by other home and host country participants, the additional information that one's own choice will be observed by co-national study participants does not have any significant effect on Turkish trustors' decision.

Turkish Baseline vs. Public Condition treatment. Neither did we find evidence indicating statistically significant differences between the trusting behavior among Turkish participants in the Baseline and those in the Public Condition treatment.

Figure 3.3: Treatment information provided to Turkish respondents in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments





Figure 3.4: Amounts sent by Turkish trustors, by experimental condition



Note: Turkish Baseline group ($n = 53$), Social Information treatment ($n = 50$) and Public Condition treatment ($n = 52$). This illustration depicts the percentage of Turkish trustors choosing each possible amount to be sent to the trustee across experimental groups.

Controlling for individual characteristics by OLS regression confirms these results. As compared to Turkish trustors in the Baseline, those in the Social Info treatment sent significantly higher amounts by about 19 percent ($p < 0.05$). Since we do not observe a significant coefficient on one's inclination to give socially desirable answers (Desirability Score), there is no evidence that this result is influenced by a social desirability bias towards pleasing the Swiss researchers or Swiss readers. Interestingly, the amounts sent by Turkish men were by about 17-22 percent higher than those sent by Turkish women. As shown by Table 3.3 this is the case across all specifications (also see Appendix Table C.11). An exploratory analysis in Appendix Table C.12 also reveals that a 1 percent increase in (violent) incidences such as protests and violent attacks in one's province of residence significantly decreased Turkish respondents' amounts sent by about 0.05 percent ($p < 0.05$).²⁷

Overall, when controlling for background characteristics we cannot reject conjecture three stating that social information would lead Turkish participants' behavior to adjust to the most frequent behavior among previous Swiss participants. Yet, conjecture four positing that observability by co-nationals would lead Turkish participants to adopt the most frequent behavior of former Turkish participants can be

²⁷Note that including these measures of past violence in the regression did not change our results. However, this regression has not been pre-registered.

rejected.

Result 3a - Provision of social information. *Providing information about the trusting behavior of other participants from the home and the host country made the Turkish refugees' level of trust approach the elevated trust level of the Swiss.*

Result 3b - Observability when informed. *Adding observability by co-nationals to the provision of social information did not influence Turkish refugees' trusting behavior.*

Result 3c - Social information and observability. *The combination of social information provision and observability by co-nationals did not have any influence on Turkish refugees' trusting behavior.*

Afghan trustors

Equivalent to Figure 3.4 for Turkish participants, Figure 3.6 illustrates the distributions of amounts sent by Afghan trustors in the Baseline, the Social Information, and the Public Condition treatment. Figure 3.5 displays the social information that was shown to Afghan trustors, in both the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments. Details on frequencies and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Tables C.4 and C.7, p-values from (non)parametric tests in Appendix Tables C.9 and C.10.

Afghan Baseline (BL) vs. Social Info treatment (T1). Compared to the condition without social information (Baseline), we do not find a statistical difference in the distribution of Afghans' trusting behavior or their relative mean EucDs in trust when given information about amounts sent by previous participants from the home and the host country.

Afghan Social Info treatment (T1) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). When informed about amounts sent by other participants from the home and the host country, knowing that one's own amount sent will be communicated to co-national participants did not make any significant difference on Afghan trustors' distribution of amounts sent or on mean EucDs of amounts sent between the two groups. However, Afghan participants in the Public Condition treatment were on average significantly less likely (by about 27 percentage points) than Afghans in the Social Info treatment to select the most frequent choice among former Afghans as displayed in the treatment information (2 CHF) ($p_{rs} = 0.046$, not robust to the B.-H. correction). Even though insignificant, we also observe that Afghans in the Public Condition treatment are considerably more likely to send the same amount as most frequently sent by the Swiss (5 CHF as displayed in the treatment information) than in the Social Info treatment. All in all, once Afghan participants are made aware of being observed by co-nationals in their own choice, their behavior does not significantly change; Afghan participants tend nonetheless to choose less the amounts most frequently chosen by previous co-nationals, and to choose more the amounts sent by most members of their hosting society.

Afghan Baseline (BL) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). Comparing Afghan trustors assigned to the Baseline and those assigned to the Public Condition treatment, we find significantly higher amounts sent in the latter group according to the rank-sum but not according to the t-test on mean EucDs ($p_{rs} = 0.027$, not robust to B.-H. correction). While Afghan trustors in the Public Condition treatment on average send 3.18 CHF (s.d. = 1.72), Afghan participants assigned to the Baseline only send a mean amount of 2.21 CHF (s.d. = 1.57). According to $ES_{rs} = 0.33$ ($P(\text{value}(BL) > \text{value}(T2))$), the probability that Afghan trustors' amounts sent are higher in the Public Condition treatment than in the Baseline is about 67 percent. Along these lines, Afghan trustors were twice as likely to send the modal amount sent by previous Swiss participants (5 CHF) and about five times more likely to send 4 CHF when assigned to the Public Condition Treatment than in the Baseline. The likelihood of every amount below 4 CHF either remained the same or sharply decreased in the Public Condition treatment as compared to the Baseline. This was also the case for 2 CHF which constituted the modal choice taken by the previous group of Afghan participants as graphically shown to respondents in the Public Condition treatment by Figure 3.5. Thus, when Afghan trustors who were informed about amounts sent by previous participants from the home and the host country were additionally told that their own trusting choice would be revealed to other Afghan participants, they adjusted their trusting behavior towards the most frequent behavior observed from the Swiss.

Figure 3.5: Treatment information provided to Afghan respondents in the Social Info and the Public Condition treatments





Figure 3.6: Amounts sent by Afghan trustors, by experimental condition



Note: This Figure the equivalent to Figure 3.4 with the difference that it applies to participants from Afghanistan across treatment groups. The Afghan Baseline group has $n = 29$, the Social Information treatment group has $n=28$, and the Public Condition treatment group counts $n=28$. It shows the percentages of Afghan trustors who chose each possible amount to be sent to the trustee across experimental groups.

Regressing Afghan trustors' amounts sent on individual and social characteristics corroborates our findings from nonparametric testing. Looking at Table 3.3 below reveals that Afghan trustors in the Public Condition treatment are observed to send by about 60 percent higher amounts than those in the Baseline ($p < 0.001$). Appendix Table C.11 shows that when controlling for individual characteristics, Afghan trustors in the Public Condition treatment send also significantly higher amounts (by about 30 percent) than when in the Social Info treatment ($p < 0.05$). However, controlling for the duration of stay and the support by a job coach in Switzerland, this result becomes insignificant. Table 3.3 below also shows that the amounts sent by Afghan respondents holding a high level of education were about 34 percent higher than those with an intermediate or low degree. A higher inclination to give socially desirable answers by one percent decreases Afghan participants' amounts sent by about 0.8 percent ($p < 0.05$). Interestingly, this did not discourage Afghan participants from sending significantly higher amounts when observed by their co-national peers. According to an exploratory analysis in Appendix Table C.13, a 1 percent increase in (violent) incidences such as protests and violent attacks in one's location of residence back in Afghanistan, increased Afghan participants' amounts sent by about 0.08

percent ($p < 0.05$).²⁸ This is in line with Bauer et al. (2016) positing that exposure to war experiences can foster individuals' level of cooperation.

All in all, although unexpected, we can reject both, conjecture three since social information did not affect the trusting behavior of Afghan participants, and conjecture four because observability by co-nationals led to an adjustment effect but not in line with the most frequent behavior of previous Afghan but Swiss participants. Note that result 4b only holds if the duration of stay and the support from job coaching are not taken into account.

Result 4a - Provision of social information. *Providing information about the trusting behavior by other participants from the home and the host country did not have any influence on Afghan refugees' own trusting behavior.*

Result 4b - Observability when informed. *Adding observability by co-nationals to the provision of social information made the trust level of Afghan refugees approach the elevated trust level of the Swiss.*

Result 4c - Social information and observability. *The combination of social information provision and observability by co-nationals made the trust level of Afghan refugees approach the elevated trust level of the Swiss.*

²⁸Note that the number of observations in this regression is very small. Yet, including violence in the regression did not change our results. Also, note that this regression had not been pre-registered.

Table 3.3: OLS - Amounts sent by Turkish and Afghan trustors (in log), by experimental condition (Baseline as reference)

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Social Information treatment (d)	0.213** (0.074)	0.233** (0.084)	0.188* (0.085)	0.0794 (0.158)	0.233 (0.178)	0.337 (0.186)
Public Condition treatment (d)	0.137 (0.078)	0.148 (0.089)	0.109 (0.086)	0.442** (0.142)	0.542*** (0.149)	0.599*** (0.158)
Male (d)		0.168** (0.064)	0.229** (0.069)		0.137 (0.155)	0.0811 (0.160)
Age in years		-0.00341 (0.005)	-0.00121 (0.005)		-0.00193 (0.009)	-0.00465 (0.012)
High level of education (d)		-0.00788 (0.078)	0.00257 (0.081)		0.335* (0.131)	0.379* (0.147)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.0356 (0.104)	-0.0244 (0.110)		-0.820* (0.359)	-0.812* (0.363)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.000645 (0.002)			0.00465 (0.004)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.0426 (0.072)			0.0491 (0.154)
Constant	1.139*** (0.058)	1.244*** (0.234)	1.136*** (0.238)	0.803*** (0.116)	2.702* (1.131)	2.614* (1.205)
F	4.183	2.268	1.952	6.234	3.902	3.624
r2.a	0.0412	0.0677	0.0826	0.0981	0.208	0.249
rmse	0.372	0.369	0.337	0.517	0.472	0.457
N	152	134	117	75	55	47

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r2.a) and root mean squared error (rmse).


3.5.4 Refugees' beliefs about the trustworthiness of others across experimental conditions

In this subsection, we check on statistical differences in Turkish and Afghan refugees' beliefs about the amounts returned by the trustees across experimental groups. For details on p-values from (non)parametric testing, see Appendix Table C.21. OLS regression outcomes can be found in Table 3.4 below and in Appendix Table C.22.

Turkish trustors

Figure 3.7 shows the amounts that Turkish participants in the Baseline and each treatment group expected to be returned by the trustee. The pieces of information provided to the two treatment groups had no significant effect on Turkish participants' beliefs about the trustees' reciprocity. This result is confirmed by OLS regression and is robust across specifications. A further significant and robust result is that levels of expected trustworthiness among Turkish men are about 47 percent higher than among Turkish women ($p < 0.001$). Further, having a higher inclination to give socially desirable answers by 1 percent, significantly decreases Turkish respondents' expectations of the amount returned by approximately 0.35 percent ($p < 0.05$).

Figure 3.7: Turkish trustors' amounts expected to be returned, by experimental condition



Note: Turkish Baseline group (n = 53), Social Information treatment (n = 50) and Public Condition treatment (n = 52). This illustration depicts the percentage of Turkish trustors expecting each possible amount to be returned by the trustee across experimental groups.

Afghan trustors


Figure 3.8 illustrates Afghan trustors' amounts expected to be returned across treatment groups. While no significant difference was found between the beliefs of Afghan participants assigned to the Baseline and to the Social Info treatment, we observed the following:

Afghan Social Info (T1) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). The mean EucD between amounts expected to be returned among Afghan respondents in the Public Condition and those in the Social Info treatment is significantly larger than the mean EucD between amounts expected among participants in the Social Info treatment ($p_{tEucD} = 0.01$, $d = 0.7$, not robust to a B.-H. correction).²⁹ However, this result was not obtained from conducting rank-sum tests.

²⁹In other words, compared to within-group variation of amounts expected to be returned in the Afghan Social Info treatment, the mean EucD between amounts expected to be returned among Afghan participants in the Public Condition and those in the Social Info treatment was significantly higher.

Afghan Baseline (BL) vs. Public Condition treatment (T2). (Non)parametric testing also shows that Afghan trustors' expected amounts to be returned by the trustee are significantly higher in the Public Condition treatment than in the Baseline ($p_{rs} = 0.008$, $p_{tEucD} = 0.012$, not robust to a B.-H. correction). In other terms, Afghan trustors in the Baseline expected the trustee on average to return 2.92 CHF (s.d. = 3.05) which is 44.11 percent of what the trustee had on average received from them.³⁰ Trustors in the Public Condition treatment on average believed in a returned amount of 5.32 CHF (s.d. = 4.14) which is 55.77 percent of what the trustee had received on average. Cohen's d of the mean EucD of amounts sent in the Public Condition to the Baseline as compared to the variation of amounts within the Baseline equals 0.69. This indicates an effect of intermediate magnitude. $ES_{rs} = 0.3$ indicates that the probability for Afghan participants in the Public Condition to send higher amounts than respondents in the Baseline is 70 percent.

Figure 3.8: Afghan trustors' amounts expected to be returned, by experimental condition



Note: Afghan Baseline group (n = 29), Social Information treatment (n = 28) and Public Condition treatment (n = 28). This illustration depicts the percentage of Turkish trustors expecting each possible amount to be returned by the trustee across experimental groups.

³⁰Afghan trustors in the Baseline had sent on average 2.21 CHF to the trustee who in turn received a mean amount of 6.62 CHF. Hence 2.29 CHF is 44.11 percent of 6.62 CHF.

Controlling for other factors corroborates the results from (non)parametric testing. Afghan trustors assigned to the Public Condition treatment expect the trustee to return about 80 percent more than Afghan trustors in the Baseline ($p < 0.01$). Remarkably, this significant increase in expected amounts returned occurs between the same Afghan treatment groups as we had observed for their significant increase in amounts sent. Appendix Table C.22 shows that expected amounts returned among Afghans assigned to the Social Info treatment were significantly lower than expected amounts returned in the Public Condition treatment ($p < 0.05$), yet only if not controlling for individual and social factors. By contrast to (non)parametric testing, controlling for other factors reveals that also Afghan participants in the Social Info treatment expect significantly higher amounts to be returned by the trustee than those in the Baseline, namely by about 45 percent ($p < 0.05$).

***Result 5 - Beliefs about others' trustworthiness.** Turkish participants were not observed to hold significantly different beliefs about a stranger's trustworthiness when provided with social information and exposed to observability by co-nationals. By contrast, learning about the elevated trust level among host country peers and the lower level among co-nationals led Afghan participants to hold more optimistic beliefs about a stranger's trustworthiness. This is even more the case when they are observed by their co-nationals.*

Table 3.4: OLS - Amounts expected to be returned (in log), Afghan and Turkish trustors, by experimental condition (Baseline as reference)

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Social Information treatment (d)	0.049 (0.124)	0.138 (0.135)	0.082 (0.135)	0.176 (0.176)	0.289 (0.188)	0.448* (0.203)
Public Condition treatment (d)	0.147 (0.123)	0.213 (0.133)	0.162 (0.135)	0.654*** (0.173)	0.575** (0.211)	0.790** (0.222)
Male (d)		0.390*** (0.101)	0.469*** (0.108)		0.279 (0.159)	0.145 (0.160)
Age in years		-0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)		-0.007 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.017)
High level of education (d)		0.183 (0.106)	0.210 (0.108)		0.339* (0.160)	0.399* (0.167)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.321* (0.156)	-0.331* (0.154)		-0.480 (0.486)	-0.740 (0.492)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.001 (0.003)			0.007 (0.005)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.064 (0.120)			-0.090 (0.182)
Constant	1.529*** (0.092)	1.961*** (0.403)	1.788*** (0.380)	1.096*** (0.118)	2.211 (1.588)	3.115 (1.736)
F	.754	4.43	3.96	7.5	2.59	3.59
r2_a	-.0032	.106	.143	.143	.127	.188
rmse	.611	.582	.557	.619	.596	.574
N	152	134	117	73	54	46

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared adjusted (r2_a) and root mean squared error (rmse).

3.6 Discussion and conclusion

Non-Western refugees' employment rates have been found to fall behind those of Western natives and other immigrants (Fasani et al., 2022). Factors that have been shown to positively affect cross-national cooperation and individual professional success is the level of (generalized) trust (Ahern et al., 2015; Butler et al., 2016; Xie and Li, 2021). However, cultural differences and a probably traumatic past might make Middle Eastern refugees prone to be less trusting on average than their Western host society (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Haerpfer et al., 2022). Therefore, investigating refugees' levels of trust and expected trustworthiness and how to potentially promote it could be essential for their labor market access. As far as we are aware, incentivized data on generalized trust among non-Western refugee populations in Western high-income countries does not yet exist. By means of a trust game, this study seeks to investigate whether refugees from Turkey and Afghanistan living in Switzerland are indeed more reluctant to trust a stranger than is their Swiss host society. If so, we are interested in whether social information about trust among home and host country peers and observability of own trusting behavior by co-nationals has an impact on refugees' own trusting conduct. Answering these questions might also contribute to the ongoing debate on whether trust may have a normative component. Since successfully inducing change in normative behavior requires to consider specific aspects (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022), it matters to know whether a certain behavior is guided by social norms or not.

Contradicting earlier research (e.g. Haerpfer et al. (2022)), our results provide no evidence for statistically significant differences in trusting behavior. Whereas there was neither any difference in expected trustworthiness between Swiss locals and Afghan refugees, Turkish refugees held more optimistic beliefs about the trustees' reciprocity than the Swiss. Social information about home and host country peers' trust levels and the revelation of their own trusting actions to co-nationals yielded significant reactions among refugee respondents. Providing knowledge about the trusting behavior of home and host country peers led Turkish refugees to send significantly higher amounts to an anonymous trustee in the trust game. This corresponds to a greater willingness of Turkish participants to adjust their trusting behavior to the elevated trust levels they had previously learned about the Swiss than to the (lower) levels known of co-nationals. Yet, providing this information and making them aware of being observed by co-nationals, did not have a significant effect on Turkish trustors' choices (as compared to not receiving any information). Neither did we find a significant behavioral difference between Turkish trustors who (only) learned about trust levels of home and host country peers and Turkish trustors who learned about the same information but were additionally made aware of the revelation of their choices to co-nationals. These results are in line with previous research on social identity. While social information significantly and causally affected Turkish participants' trusting decisions, it did not significantly affect Turkish refugees' beliefs about the trustees' trustworthiness. This suggests that the social information provided on trust was not taken as a signal about the trustees' trustworthiness. If this had been the case, participants' beliefs should have shifted depending on the information received, which was not the case.

From this perspective, we argue that a reasonable explanation behind our results is that Turkish participants perceive trusting behavior as a social norm in Switzerland. They may feel inclined to conform with their hosting nation's modal trusting behavior though to a less pronounced extent when their own action is observable by co-nationals. In other words, when Turkish refugees observe a gap

between the observed trust levels among members of the host country and co-nationals, they feel inclined to conform to a perceived social norm of trust believed to prevail in the host country. Yet, when also observed by co-nationals, social proximity due to a shared social identity with home country peers weakens this acculturation effect. Bicchieri et al. (2011) state that trusting decisions could not be led by a social norm because mistrust was not observed to be punished. Nevertheless, these results show that Turkish refugees in Switzerland act as if they expect social sanctions when deviating from common behavior in the host country (such as a lower probability of integration, for example), but also from the prevailing behavior of peers in their own social in-group.

Communicating information about previous Swiss and Afghan participants' levels of trust did not significantly affect Afghan respondents' choices in the trust game. Yet, unexpectedly, providing this information together with the announcement that their own choices would be (anonymously) shared with all other Afghan participants led Afghan respondents to adjust their own trusting behavior to the higher trust levels among the Swiss. By contrast to Turkish participants, we observe that receiving social information and being observed by co-nationals not only encouraged Afghan respondents' trusting behavior but also their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee. This result suggests that Afghan respondents may have taken the social information about the elevated amounts sent among the Swiss as a signal for the trustworthiness of the trustee, yet not necessarily as an indication of a social norm. These results oppose both of our expectations, namely, to observe conformism with the most frequent behavior of locals when solely receiving information, and that observability by socially close peers would trigger compliance with the in-group. An explanation thereof might be that Afghan participants intended to signal their identification with the host country society to their own in-group, maybe with the hope of better integration chances.

We acknowledge that this work has limitations. First and foremost, the limited size of refugee samples, and notably the treatment groups, comprised the statistical power of our analysis. This might have contributed to the null results observed among treated Afghan participants. Further, difficulties in accessing our refugee target groups prevented us from randomly selecting our study participants. Thus, we cannot know whether certain background characteristics, for instance, the much higher level of education among the Turkish than among the Afghans, is a feature of the Turkish refugee population or occurred due to the self-selection in the experiment.

Concerning policy implications, this article suggests that providing empirical social information about what others do and exposure to the observability of others are powerful tools to efficiently influence refugees' trusting behavior. Yet, since no difference in trust between Swiss natives and refugees had been observed, there is no indication that refugees' trust levels would be an issue for their professional integration process.

General conclusion

In light of the unprecedented movements of forced immigrants into Europe in the past years, non-EU refugees' unemployment rates are a matter of great concern in many Western high-income countries (e.g. Fasani et al. (2022), Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2017) or Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018)). Understanding whether there are normative differences in specific workplace norms between non-Western refugees and Western host societies, of what magnitude they are, and whether refugees misunderstand the host country's social norms, might be crucial to deciding on appropriate policies. Further, knowing how refugees deal with conflicting home and host country social norms and trust levels and what reference group - home or host country peers - they rely on when co-nationals are present or not, may enhance our understanding of refugees' behavioral motifs, and thus help to prevent misinterpretations and prejudice.

The first chapter of this thesis demonstrates that relative normative differences between refugees and locals exist but are not numerous and mostly of small magnitude. Slightly more and stronger misalignments were found between Afghan and Swiss than between Turkish and Swiss respondents. From these results, we learn that with respect to a workplace context, personal and social norms among Turkish and Afghan refugees are not that markedly different from those among the Swiss as compared to intra-group normative differences among the Swiss themselves. This stands in contrast to the common proposition found in the literature that refugees' social capital was saliently different from that of Western host societies (Brell et al., 2020; Bedaso, 2021; Dustmann et al., 2017).

Another key message from this chapter is that both refugee groups internalize the norms of the host country the longer they stay in Switzerland. Normative conformity is also observed to be driven by refugees' wish for social acceptance since both their reported personal norms and their stated guesses about the Swiss social norms were influenced by their intention to give a socially desirable answer. This allows the conclusion that refugees care about complying with the host country's norms and about belonging to the host society, which stands in stark contrast to wide-spread populist narratives.

With respect to the most salient differences in social norms, we observe that Afghan participants collectively evaluated mixed gender eye contact between an employee and a superior as less appropriate than the Swiss. Since mixed gender teamwork had not been identified as a misalignment between Afghans and Swiss, we infer that not only the gender but also the authority aspect may play a crucial role in the latter finding. Turkish participants collectively assessed criticizing a co-worker in front of others as less appropriate than the Swiss which may be linked to losing face (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993). Both refugee groups collectively perceived it as less acceptable to pretend to have understood a task if they did not than the Swiss.

Further, we learned that Turkish and Afghan refugees understand fairly well the local social norms (mostly not any less than the Swiss). The host country's social norms they misunderstood were not the same as those regarding which we observed a normative difference to the Swiss. This implies that there are both normative misunderstandings and normative differences. Importantly, this also means that in case of normative differences to the Swiss, refugees nonetheless understand the norms of the host country. At the same time, refugees sometimes misunderstand the Swiss norms in the sense that they believe the Swiss are different from them even though they are not.

While in chapter 2 we did not find any evidence for differences in stated personal norms on mixed gender teamwork between Afghan and Swiss respondents, personal norms reported by Turkish participants were more supportive of mixed gender teamwork than those of Swiss and Afghan respondents. Crucially, there is no evidence that this result would be biased by Turkish refugees' attempts to please the researchers or potential readers. Heterogeneity in personal norms on mixed gender teamwork is even greater between the two refugee groups than between any of these groups and the Swiss. Unlike common ideas and reports about Middle and South Eastern norms and values (e.g. Moghadam (2003)), our results do not reflect conservative, gender-segregating attitudes about teamwork in none of the refugee groups, in the case of Turkish respondents even the contrary.

Contradicting previous research on cross-cultural trust levels (Haerpfer et al., 2022), chapter 3 does not provide any evidence for differences in trust levels, neither between Turkish and Swiss, nor between Afghan and Swiss participants. While beliefs about trustees' reciprocity do not differ between the Swiss and Afghan respondents, Turkish participants hold significantly more optimistic beliefs than the Swiss. From these findings we can take away that in the case of Turkish and Afghan refugees, the hypothesis that cultural differences or their probably traumatic journey as refugees would make them on average more suspicious than Western host populations cannot be supported. From this perspective, we conclude that there is no reason to assume that their trust levels may impede their engagement in social interaction and hence, be of particular concern for a successful professional establishment in the host country.

Remarkably, among each refugee group, the reactions to information provision and observability by co-nationals are similar in chapter 2 and chapter 3. While receiving information about home and host country peers drives Turkish refugees to be conformist with the Swiss, being additionally observed by their co-nationals weakens this adjustment process. These findings are in line with group identity theory (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). The provision of information about home and host country peers' norms and trust levels alone did not have any significant impact on Afghan respondents' personal norms or their trusting behavior. However, unexpectedly, only when they were aware of being observed by their co-nationals, Afghan participants complied with the Swiss. Interestingly, the adjustment process in favor of Swiss trusting behavior in chapter 3 is observed even though Afghan participants' inclination to give a socially desirable answer pushed them to make a trusting choice in accordance with their co-national peers. Whereas this result goes against the literature on group identity, it may be interpreted as a signal to their own in-group expressing their willingness to identify with and belong to the host society (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Gomila and Paluck, 2020). As suggested by Packer (2008), this could be due to two motifs. First, deviators from in-group norms may be weakly identified with their group. Second, deviators identify strongly with their in-group but transgress because they believe that it would be better and in the best interest of their group to adopt another norm. As a refugee in Switzerland, the reason

behind this rationale could be an urge to protect the group from discrimination and marginalization and thus, to enforce conformity with the majority society.

Moreover, the experimental conditions in chapter 3 revealed a result that stands in contrast to a part of the literature denying that trust could be a norm since mistrust was not punished (Bicchieri et al., 2011). While social information about home and host country peers' trusting choices causally led Turkish participants to adjust their own trusting decisions according to those of the Swiss, this information did not change Turkish refugees' beliefs about the trustees' reciprocity. These results suggest that Turkish refugees act as if they expect negative social consequences from transgressing from the most common trusting behavior of others, either by Swiss or their co-nationals. Thus, Turkish participants may perceive trusting behavior as a social norm in Switzerland. As a consequence, observing different trust levels of home and host country peers may have the potential to expose them to a perceived normative conflict and may, depending on the strength of the observed trust differential, bear the risk of a reduction of cooperation levels (Rauhut and Winter, 2010; Matsuo et al., 2014).

By contrast to Turkish participants, we observe that receiving social information and being observed by co-nationals not only pushed Afghan respondents' trusting behavior towards that by the Swiss but also their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee. Hence, we cannot exclude that Afghan participants may have taken the trusting behavior of the Swiss as a signal about the reciprocity of the trustee, and not as an indication of trust as a social norm.

Some final conclusions we can draw from all chapters are the following. First, our results do not provide strong support for Brell et al. (2020) positing markedly distinct social capital between non-Western refugees and Western host societies, neither in terms of norms nor regarding trust. Rather, one may wonder whether refugees are a particularly selected group for instance depending on their reason of flight. For instance in the case of Turkish refugees, many of them are critics of the Turkish regime and highly educated.³¹ This may go hand in hand with holding progressive and egalitarian norms and attitudes which is in line with our findings. This is a crucial result because it stands in contrast to the widespread prejudice in the public discourse in Switzerland about non-Western refugees and their values (Direnberger et al., 2022; Mexi, 2023). Furthermore, Turkish and Afghan refugees often express different normative perceptions and react differently to social information and observability, stressing the heterogeneity of their norms and behavioral patterns.

Coming back to normative differences between refugees and Swiss natives, let us recall the classification of normative conflicts by Rauhut and Winter (2017) as content- or commitment-related. The former expresses a disagreement about the norm itself and the latter about the extent to which a norm should apply. Also, remember that the differences in norms between refugees and the Swiss in chapters 1 and 2 were observed to be weak and that regarding trust they were not even observed. Taking this together makes it plausible to argue that the normative differences found in this thesis may give rise to commitment- but not to content-related normative conflicts between the two refugee groups and the Swiss. This is a crucial insight because it puts the severity of normative differences into perspective. As proposed by Rauhut and Winter (2017) resolving commitment-related conflicts can be possible when parties are open to discourse and cooperation. Our findings from chapter 1, namely that refugees internalize the host

³¹see <https://www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/themen/laenderinformationen/herkunftslander/tuerkei>, retrieved on 27.04.2024

country's norms over time and care about conforming to them, give reason to believe that refugees are highly interested in cooperation. Yet, since fruitful discourse and cooperation processes may require the participation of all involved parties, the engagement and openness of the hosting population might also be a crucial factor contributing to the successful resolution of commitment-related normative conflicts (Klarenbeek, 2021).

Policy implications resulting from all three chapters could be the following. Raising awareness of employers and institutions about the large common ground between Turkish and Afghan refugees and Swiss natives in terms of norms in the workplace and trust could be crucial to reducing prejudice and misperceptions about these refugee groups. In turn, this may encourage employers' propensity to hire Turkish and Afghan refugees and thus improve the latter's access to the labor market.

Nonetheless, raising awareness among actors in local work environments and refugees regarding certain normative differences may help to foster mutual understanding. For instance, between Turkish and Swiss, losing face may be a more sensitive aspect according to Turkish than to Swiss social norms. By contrast to Swiss norms, Afghan social norms may entail a more pronounced perception of gender differences and more discrete visual contact as an expression of respect towards a superior. Such behavioral patterns may be easily misunderstood in Western countries. Avoiding visual contact may for instance be taken as a lack of interest and attention (Akechi et al., 2013; Argyle and Cook, 2015). Or, a restrained reaction when getting critical feedback in the presence of co-workers may be misinterpreted as an inability to cope with criticism, although it was just the loss of face in front of others that provoked it (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993).

The occurrence of commitment-related normative differences and refugees' misunderstandings of the host country's norms underlines the importance of two strategies. First, to promote open discourse about different normative perspectives, and second, to provide information about the norms of the host country. This could for instance occur through refugees' support through job coaching which has been observed to be an effective tool in improving their understanding of the local social norms. However, initiating interpersonal exchange between refugee employees and native co-workers and employers directly in the workplace would be an additional important tool since it might promote a *two-sided* learning and cooperation process. This would be essential for the resolution of the commitment-related type of normative differences that were observed between Turkish and Afghan refugees and Swiss natives (Rauhut and Winter, 2017).

Our experiments with information provision and observability imply that the social context and the type of peer pressure to which one is exposed must be taken into account when interpreting normative behavior. While the presence of co-national peers can make acculturation for Turkish refugees more challenging, it leads Afghan refugees to emphasize their compliance with the host country.

Generally, the heterogeneity of norms and behavioral patterns between Turkish and Afghan refugees indicate that specific group-adapted interventions may be more efficient than "one-size-fits-all" policies.

However, we acknowledge that this work and the interpretation of its findings have their constraints. First and foremost, the number of refugee participants was relatively low which may impede the power of our analysis. Second, it was impossible to implement random sampling. Hence, we cannot be sure whether the individual characteristics of Turkish and Afghan participants are representative for the

characteristics of these refugee groups in Switzerland or whether refugees may have selected themselves in the experiment. For instance, particularly motivated people or highly educated ones may have had more interest in supporting a research project. Further, the variation of certain factors influencing normative perceptions and trust, such as the duration of stay in Switzerland, is limited. The data we have comes from people who on average stayed in Switzerland for about 1.5-2 years. Yet, we cannot know how their normative perceptions or trust would evolve over a longer period of time in the host country. Also, there are too few observations to disentangle for instance the effects of job coaching received in the different cantons. Finally, due to limited temporal and financial resources, we could only conduct this project with the two selected nationalities.

As an avenue for future research, there are several aspects which would be interesting and important to delve into. First, conducting our analysis with a larger number of observations or by means of another statistical approach (for instance matching) would allow to investigate a causal effect of nationality. In other words, it would be possible to explore whether nationality or one's cultural background is a major driver of normative differences, or whether they are rather determined by differences in background characteristics such as age and education.

Second, it would be interesting to be able to link our data with information about labor market outcomes of the same participants, for instance with how fast they found a job later on. This would allow a conclusion about whether normative differences significantly impact refugees' professional integration process. Additionally, conducting this analysis across different cantons could show how successful the different cantonal systems are with respect to the occupational integration of refugees.

Third, collecting data on normative perceptions and trust levels with newly arrived refugees and replicating the same data collection at different points of time with the same individuals would deliver highly interesting data on the temporal evolution of refugees' normative perceptions.

A final route could be a comparison of normative perceptions and trust between refugee and non-refugee migrants from the same origin (and living in the same host country) and their compatriots back home. This would shed light on whether and how normative perceptions and trust levels among these groups may differ from each other.

Appendices

Protocols and Instructions

Pre-registration

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY

Diversity of social norms and trust levels in refugees and Swiss natives (#112073)

Created: 11/07/2022 07:53 AM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

In the first part, we investigate whether several personal and social norms related to the workplace differ between Swiss natives and Turkish or Afghan refugees in Switzerland. In addition, we examine how social information about the predominant personal norm of other participants (Turkish/Afghan and Swiss) affect a refugee's own personal norm. Our hypothesis is that refugees tend to report a personal norm closer to that of Swiss than Turkish/Afghan individuals when social information is provided. Moreover, we check whether observability by other Turkish/Afghan participants affects the refugees' reported personal norms. Here, we expect refugees to report a personal norm closer to that of their respective cultural group. Finally, we check whether refugees who have spent more time in Switzerland are better at guessing the Swiss' social norms.

In the second part (possibly reported in a different paper), we examine whether refugees and Swiss natives differ in their level of trust towards a stranger, and whether they differ in their expectations regarding the trustworthiness of a stranger. In addition, we study how social information about the trusting behavior of other participants (Turkish/Afghan vs. Swiss) and observability affects refugees' level of trust. Our hypothesis is that refugees tend to behave more similarly to Swiss than Turkish/Afghan individuals when social information is provided. In addition, they tend to behave more similarly to other Turkish/Afghan individuals when they know their decisions will be revealed to other refugees from their same cultural group.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

The key dependent variables are:

- ☐ Personal norms regarding various hypothetical scenarios/ behaviors in a Swiss workplace.
- ☐ Social norms (elicited with the Krupka-Weber method) regarding various hypothetical scenarios/ behaviors in a Swiss workplace.
- ☐ Refugees' beliefs about the Swiss social norms regarding various hypothetical scenarios/ behaviors in a Swiss workplace.
- ☐ Amounts sent in a trust game.
- ☐ Beliefs about the amount returned in the trust game.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

The refugees will be assigned to three treatments:

- 1) Baseline: No social information provided.
- 2) Private Information Treatment: In Part 1, before reporting their personal norms, subjects are informed about the distribution of reported personal norms of (previous) Swiss participants and (previous baseline) refugee participants (from the same country of origin). In Part 2, before deciding how much to send in the trust game, subjects are informed about the distribution of amounts sent by Swiss participants and refugee participants (from the same country of origin).
- 3) Turkish/Afghan Public Condition: Like treatment (2), except that subjects are also told that their reported personal norms as well as their decision regarding how much to send in the trust game will be (anonymously) communicated to the other study participants with the same country of origin at the end of the study.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

We will conduct non-parametric tests to compare:

- ☐ Refugee vs. Swiss participants' personal norms
- ☐ Refugee participants' personal norms in the three treatments
- ☐ Refugee vs. Swiss participants' social norms
- ☐ Refugee participants' beliefs about Swiss social norms vs. actual Swiss social norms
- ☐ Refugee vs. Swiss participants' level of trust in the three treatments
- ☐ Refugee vs. Swiss participants' belief about the behavior of the trustee

We will conduct a regression analysis to analyze:

- ☐ the determinants of refugees' personal and social norms, their guess of Swiss social norms as well as their trusting behavior depending on the treatment, controlling notably for the country of origin, the duration of time spent in Switzerland and other individual characteristics such as age, gender, number of children, education level in the home country, asylum status/ permit, extent of social contact to Swiss and co-ethnic people and income.
- ☐ the determinants of Swiss' personal and social norms as well as their trusting behavior, controlling for their individual characteristics such as age, gender, number of children, education level in Switzerland and income.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

Refugees who are not Afghan or Turkish will be excluded.

Participants who do not understand the questions in part 1 or the instructions of the trust game in part 2 will be excluded (exclusion of those who still misunderstand the rules even after the experimenters gave individual explanations in private).

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

We plan to collect data from 200 Swiss people (100 French-speaking, and 100 German-speaking) who will only complete the first part of the study, and 200 Swiss people (100 French-speaking, and 100 German-speaking) who will only complete the second part of the study. We also plan to collect data from about 180 Turkish and 180 Afghan refugees. Further, we will collect data from European participants who will only play the trust game in the role of trustee. The number of these participants will be large enough to match the number of refugees and Swiss participants who played the trust game in the role of trustor. The number of participants is determined by a power analysis. Our goal is to achieve a statistical power of 80% assuming a type I-error of 5%.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

We ran a pilot session with 35 Turkish and 21 Afghan refugees (field experiment), 20 Swiss individuals (online via Prolific), and 40 European individuals (online via Prolific). We used this pilot to verify the procedures, the comprehension of the instructions and the duration of the experiment. We will also use these data to generate social information in the other treatments. With regards to our main data collection, we have collected the online data with Swiss people for part 1 (online via Bilendi).

Information sheet for potential participants

Hello and welcome!

We are a team of researchers from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and the University of Lyon in France and we would like to invite you to participate in a scientific study. In this study we examine how people from different cultures make decisions. This study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg.

The study

The goal of this research is to help people from different cultures to better understand each other's preferences and habits. It consists of simple questions and decisions **that require no special knowledge (you just need to be able to read and write)**. All in all, participating in the study takes **about 2 hours**.

At the **[date/time]**, our research team will be in **[town]** at the address **[address]** in the room **[xxxx]** in order to conduct the study with those of you who are willing to participate. Participants will enter their answers into a tablet (small computer) which we will provide. During the whole study, a person speaking your language will be present to help you and answer any questions you may have.

Who is carrying out the study?

The study is being conducted by professor Marie Claire Villeval and assistant professor Fabio Galeotti from CNRS and the University of Lyon (France), and doctoral student Stefanie Baumgartner from the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

Will the study benefit me?

For taking part in our study, you will receive a fixed amount of **gift vouchers** from “Migros” with a value of **15 CHF** (abbreviation for Swiss money). The study consists of four different parts. For each of these parts, you will receive an additional fixed amount of 5 CHF if you answer all questions (in each part). Hence, just for completing these four parts of the study, you will receive a **fixed amount of 35 CHF (in vouchers)** regardless of your answers. Sometimes you will have the **possibility to earn additional vouchers** based on your choices and the choices of other participants in the study. Thus, if you participate in the study until the end, you will **earn at least 35 CHF and at most 63.50 CHF** (in the form of vouchers). You will receive your earned vouchers right after the end of the study. For organizational reasons, amounts lower than 5 CHF will be paid in kind (such as chocolates, snacks and so forth) from which you can choose. **We have already agreed in advance with the management of [responsible institution] that you will be allowed to receive and keep these vouchers.** If you do not have a transport pass, the **cost of your journey by public transport (train and bus)** to the address **[address]** will be **reimbursed to you in cash** by our research team on the day of the survey **upon presentation of your ticket**. We do not consider there to be any foreseeable risks, inconveniences or harms associated with participating in this study.

Can I withdraw from the study?

The participation in our study is **voluntary**. You are under no obligation to take part. If you take part, you are allowed to leave the study at any time without stating any reason. If you decide to exit the study, this will not have any consequences for you and if you wish, we will erase all answers you have already given. In this case, however, you will receive only the fixed amount of 15 CHF and for each part of the study where you have answered all the questions, you will receive 5 CHF and the additional gain (all in vouchers). For the parts that you do not complete, you will not receive any vouchers. Withdrawal from the study will not affect your relationship with the people from your institution (social workers etc.) or the researchers.

Once you have submitted your questionnaire, it will not be possible anymore to delete your responses. Your participation in the study (or withdrawal) will **not** have any influence on your asylum permit in Switzerland!

Will anyone else know the results?

All answers which you give in this study are **strictly confidential and anonymous**. This means once you complete our study, nobody, not even us as researchers, will be able to match your identity to your answers. So, nobody will ever know which answers you have given to the questions. At no point in the study, you will be asked to tell your name. Some of your responses may be used by the researchers to inform other participants in this study, but nobody will ever know from which person these responses come from.

All your answers will be used only for **scientific purposes**. The results of this study may be published in international research journals. To this end, your anonymized responses may be transferred outside the European Union. In these journals, only participants' pooled responses will be published, not individual responses.

After our research is completed, the responses from all study participants will be **stored** in a public repository. However, no personal information which could identify you will be made public. Information about your canton of residence, the date and time of participation will **not** be put on this repository and will be destroyed after 4 years.

For organizational reasons you need to register at the **[responsible institution] of canton [xx]** to participate in this study. However, note that registering occurs **only** at **[responsible institution]**. The **[responsible institution]** will never communicate your name or any other details about you to our research team. As soon as the data collection in your canton is completed, the **[responsible institution]** will destroy the information that you have participated in this study.

Questions and comments?

If you have any questions or comments regarding this study, please contact us using the email address **research_uni_FRLyon@gate.cnrs.fr** or by asking a person from your institution who will transmit your questions to us. If you have any concerns about how we handle your anonymized data, you can contact us directly via the above email address or you can contact the Data Protection Officer at CNRS (France) at dpE.demandes@cnrs.fr. If you have concerns regarding your data, you may alternatively contact the Institutional Review Board for Research Ethics (IRB) of the University of Fribourg at irb-ses@unifr.ch.

Registering for the study:

If you are interested in participating in our study and are at least 18 years old, please contact Mrs./Mr. **[name] (phone; e-mail)** to register. Please provide Mrs./Mr. **[name]** (by email, SMS, WhatsApp or phone) with the following information:

- Your first name / last name:
- Your nationality:
- When would you like to participate in the study?
 - I would like to participate in the study on **[date/time]**.
 - I would like to participate in the study on **[date/time]**.
 - ...

If you wish, you can also fill in this information by hand (please check one date/time of participation!) and send a picture of it by email, SMS, or WhatsApp to Mrs./Mr. **[name]**.

Your participation would be very valuable to us, and we would be very grateful if you were willing to help us!

Instructions - Pre-selection questionnaire for Swiss participants

Before participating in our study, Swiss participants only had to fill a pre-selection questionnaire. The purpose was to select a quasi-random samples of Swiss native people reflecting the distribution of individual characteristics of the Swiss population. Potential Swiss participants answered to the following questions:

How old are you?

- 18-29 / 30-39 / 40-49 / 50-59 / 60-69 / 70-79 / 80 or older

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female

In which language region do you live?

- German-speaking part
- French-speaking part
- Rhaeto-Romanic-speaking part
- Italian-speaking part

In which geographical region do you live?

- Zürich
- Nordwestschweiz (AG, BS, BL)
- Ostschweiz (GL, SH, TG, AR, AI, SG, GR)
- Zentralschweiz (LU, OW, NW, UR, ZG, SZ)
- German-speaking parts of the cantons of Berne (incl. Biel and german-speaking Bernese Jura), Fribourg and Valais (Oberwallis)
- Neuchâtel, Jura, french-speaking part of Bernese Jura, french-speaking part of canton of Fribourg
- Geneva, Vaud, french-speaking part of canton of Valais (Unterwallis)
- Ticino

How would you describe your place of residence?

- Rural
- Urban

Please select the highest level of education which you have completed:

- Compulsory education
- Secondary education
- Tertiary education

Please indicate your monthly net income.

- Less than 4000 CHF per month
- 4001-6000 CHF per month
- 6001-9000 CHF per month
- More than 9000 CHF per month

Where were you born?

- Switzerland
- Germany
- France
- Italy
- Other country

Instructions - Chapter 1

In the first three parts of the study, we present participants with the same twenty-two behaviors as presented in table 1.1. What changes across parts are the instructions and the question we asked respondents to answer. Refugees were asked to respond to parts 1-3, Swiss natives only to part 1 and 2. In the following we present for each part the instructions and an example question for one of the vignettes. Instructions are translated to English.

Part 1 - Instructions

- You will be presented with different scenarios that could happen in the workplace in Switzerland. For each scenario we will describe one or more possible behaviors of a hypothetical employee that we will call "Employee A". Note that in all scenarios the terms "employee", "boss" and "colleague" are used neutrally to represent both genders, unless otherwise stated.
- You will be asked to indicate to what extent you find the employee's behavior appropriate. By "appropriate behavior" we mean a behavior that you personally judge to be "correct" or "moral". Hence, we would like to know your personal opinion.
- We kindly ask you to answer as precisely and sincerely as possible. There is no right or wrong answer. You will not get any additional payment for your answers in this part.
- Please click "OK".

OK

Part 1 - Example scenario

Employee A has a question about how to carry out a task. (S)he would like to ask his/her boss about it, but the boss is talking to another employee right now.

Behavior: Employee A interrupts the boss and asks the question.

- According to your personal opinion, how do you find this behavior?
- Assume that **you personally find** Employee A's reaction very inappropriate. You then answer by clicking on the circle next to the response option "Very inappropriate", as indicated below:

- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

- Please click "OK".

BACK

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 1

A ten year older colleague, who is not the boss, tells Employee A that he/she should do the job differently. Employee A disagrees.

Behavior: Employee A does not oppose his/her older colleague, and follows the advice of the older colleague.

According to your personal opinion, how do you find this behavior?

- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Part 2 – Instructions

- In this part, you will be presented with the exact same scenarios and behaviors as before. As before, employee A, the boss or the colleague can be either a woman or a man, unless explicitly stated.
- This time, we are asking you what you think the majority of the **other Turkish participants** consider as socially appropriate or inappropriate. Here, you will be asked to evaluate each behavior by choosing between the six response options ranging from “Very socially appropriate” to “Very socially inappropriate”. By “**socially appropriate behavior**” we mean a behavior that is considered **correct and ethical by the majority of people**. The objective is to **choose the most frequently given answer by other Turkish people** who participate(d) in this study (and who arrived in Switzerland in the last few years).
- At the end of the study, the computer will randomly select four of the described behaviors of Employee A. For each of these four behaviors, you will **earn 1.50 CHF if your response matches the most frequently given response by the other Turkish respondents** to the same question.
- Please click « OK ».

OK

Part 2 – How you can earn additional vouchers

- For example, if the answer given by the **majority of the other Turkish people who participate(d) in this study** is “very socially inappropriate”, you would receive 1.50 CHF if you also answered “very socially inappropriate”. If the answer given by the **majority of the other Turkish respondents** is “very socially appropriate”, you would receive 1.50 CHF if you also answered “very socially appropriate”.
- Another example: If the answer given by the **majority of the other Turkish respondents** is “somewhat socially appropriate”, and you answered “very socially inappropriate”, “socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “socially appropriate” or “very socially appropriate”, you will earn nothing in addition.

BACK

OK

Part 2 – Scenario 1

A ten year older colleague, who is not the boss, tells Employee A that he/she should do the job differently. Employee A disagrees.

Behavior: Employee A does not oppose his/her older colleague, and follows the advice of the older colleague.

Please evaluate this behavior by choosing the answer that was chosen most frequently by the other Turkish participants. If you give the **same response as the majority of the other Turkish participants**, you may earn 1.50 CHF.

- Very socially appropriate
- Socially appropriate
- Somewhat socially appropriate
- Somewhat socially inappropriate
- Socially inappropriate
- Very socially inappropriate

OK

Part 3 – Instructions

- In this part you will be presented with the exact same scenarios and behaviors as before. As before, employee A, the boss or the colleague can be either a woman or a man, unless explicitly stated.
- This time, we are asking you what you think the majority of the **Swiss native people who participated in this study** (and who are living in Switzerland) consider as socially appropriate or inappropriate. Here, you will be asked to evaluate each behavior by choosing between the six response options ranging from “Very socially appropriate” to “Very socially inappropriate”. By “**socially appropriate behavior**” we mean a behavior that is considered correct and ethical by the majority of people. The objective is to **choose the most frequently given answer by Swiss participants**.
- At the end of the study, the computer will randomly select four of the described behaviors of Employee A. For each of these four behaviors, you will **earn 1.50 CHF if your response matches the most frequently given response by the Swiss native respondents** to the same question.
- Please click « OK ».

OK

Part 3 – Instructions

- In this part 3, the way to answer the questions is exactly the same as in the previous part 2. The only difference is that now, you are asked to guess the most frequently given response by the **Swiss native people** who have participated in this study.
- Also, the way how you can earn additional vouchers is the same as in the previous part.

BACK

OK

Part 3 - Scenario 1

A ten year older colleague, who is not the boss, tells Employee A that he/she should do the job differently. Employee A disagrees.

Behavior: Employee A does not oppose his/her older colleague, and follows the advice of the older colleague.

Please evaluate this behavior by choosing the answer that was chosen most frequently by the Swiss participants. If you give the **same response as the majority of the Swiss participants**, you may earn 1.50 CHF.

- Very socially appropriate
- Socially appropriate
- Somewhat socially appropriate
- Somewhat socially inappropriate
- Socially inappropriate
- Very socially inappropriate


OK

Instructions - Chapter 2

Baseline screen:

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?


- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Turkish Social Info treatment screens:

Part 1 - Scenario 7


The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.




For your information:

A previous group of Swiss natives living in Switzerland and a previous group of Turkish people who arrived in Switzerland within the last few years participated in this study before. The following figures indicate how many, among 10 Swiss and 10 Turkish participants, found this mixed gender team composition appropriate or inappropriate and to which extent.

Swiss participants answered in the following way:



Turkish participants answered in the following way:




Note: Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' most frequent response.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



As a reminder:

Swiss participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz
5 icons	4 icons	1 icon			

Turkish participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz
5 icons	4 icons	1 icon			

According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?


- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Turkish Public Condition treatment screens:

Part 1 - Scenario 7


The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.




For your information:

A previous group of Swiss natives living in Switzerland and a previous group of Turkish people who arrived in Switzerland within the last few years participated in this study before. The following figures indicate how many, among 10 Swiss and 10 Turkish participants, found this mixed gender team composition appropriate or inappropriate and to which extent.

Swiss participants answered In the following way:



Turkish participants answered In the following way:



Note: Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' most frequent response. Their responses were not shown to any other participants.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

Some weeks after the study, all Turkish participants will be able to see the responses of some Turkish participants (including you) for this scenario. This information will be displayed as follows:


...	
Turkish participant 53	very appropriate
Turkish participant 54	somewhat appropriate
Turkish participant 55	very inappropriate
Turkish participant 56	somewhat inappropriate
...	

Assume you were participant 53. Other Turkish participants will know that participant 53 answered with “very appropriate”, but they will not know that participant 53 was you. Hence, anonymity will be preserved. Note that these answers are only examples and not the real responses of participants.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



As a reminder:

Swiss participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz

Turkish participants answered in the following way:

Çok uygun	Uygun	Biraz uygun	Biraz uygunsuz	Uygunsuz	Çok uygunsuz

Your response will be shown to all other Turkish participants in this study, as explained on the previous screen. This will constitute your public opinion in front of the Turkish participants.

According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?


- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Afghan Social Info treatment screens:

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



For your information:

A previous group of Swiss natives living in Switzerland and a previous group of Afghan people who arrived in Switzerland within the last few years participated in this study before. The following figures indicate how many, among 10 Swiss and 10 Afghan participants, found this mixed gender team composition appropriate or inappropriate and to which extent.

Swiss participants answered In the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب
👤👤👤👤👤	👤👤👤👤	👤			

Afghan participants answered In the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب
👤👤👤	👤👤👤👤👤	👤👤			

Note: Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' most frequent response.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



As a reminder:

Swiss participants answered in the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب
5 icons	4 icons	1 icon			

Afghan participants answered in the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب
3 icons	5 icons	2 icons			

According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?


- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Afghan Public Condition treatment screens:

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



For your information:

A previous group of Swiss natives living in Switzerland and a previous group of Afghan people who arrived in Switzerland within the last few years participated in this study before. The following figures indicate how many, among 10 Swiss and 10 Afghan participants, found this mixed gender team composition appropriate or inappropriate and to which extent.

Swiss participants answered In the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب

Afghan participants answered In the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب

Note: Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' most frequent response. Their responses were not shown to any other participants.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

Some weeks after the study, all Afghan participants will be able to see the responses of some Afghan participants (including you) for this scenario. This information will be displayed as follows:


...	
Afghan participant 53	very appropriate
Afghan participant 54	somewhat appropriate
Afghan participant 55	very inappropriate
Afghan participant 56	somewhat inappropriate
...	

Assume you were participant 53. Other Afghan participants will know that participant 53 answered with “very appropriate”, but they will not know that participant 53 was you. Hence, anonymity will be preserved. Note that these answers are only examples and not the real responses of participants.

OK

Part 1 - Scenario 7

The employees in the same team will have to perform a task which requires communication and exchange of ideas. The teams are mixed gender.



As a reminder:

Swiss participants answered in the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب

Afghan participants answered in the following way:

بسیار مناسب	مناسب	تا حدی مناسب	تا حدی غیر مناسب	نا مناسب	بسیار غیر مناسب

Your response will be shown to all other Afghan participants in this study, as explained on the previous screen. This will constitute your public opinion in front of the Afghan participants.

According to your personal opinion, how do you find this team composition?

- Very appropriate
- Appropriate
- Somewhat appropriate
- Somewhat inappropriate
- Inappropriate
- Very inappropriate

OK

Instructions - Chapter 3


Part 4 - Instructions

- In this part, each of you will be paired with an **anonymous person who currently lives in Europe** (France, Germany or Switzerland). This person has participated from the internet and is therefore not physically present in the room. You will not know the identity of the person you will be paired with. And the other person will know nothing about you, except that you are either a non-European person or a Swiss native who lives in Switzerland.
- Please click “OK”.

OK

Part 4 - Instructions


- Both, you and the other person, receive 5 CHF each. This is an amount of real money which is offered to you. **Only you must decide how many CHF to send to this person.** It is possible to send any amount between 0 and 5 CHF. That is, you can send 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 CHF to this person.
- The computer program will multiply this amount by 3 and then pass it on to the other person. So, if you send 5 CHF, this person will receive 15 CHF. If you send 4 CHF, this person will receive 12 CHF. If you send 3 CHF, this person will receive 9 CHF. If you send 2 CHF, this person will receive 6 CHF. If you send 1 CHF, this person will receive 3 CHF. If you do not send any money, this person will receive nothing from you.
- Please click “OK”.



BACK

OK


- If you send money, the other person will have the possibility to send something back to you. (S)he can send you back an amount between zero and the total number of CHF (s)he receives.
- For example, if you send 2 CHF, this person receives 6 CHF, and can send back to you anything between 0 and 6 CHF (including 0 and 6 CHF). If you send 5 CHF, this person receives 15 CHF, and can send back anything between 0 and 15 CHF (including 0 and 15 CHF).
- **Your earnings** in this task will be 5 CHF, minus the number of CHF you send to the person, plus the number of CHF returned to you by this person.
- We will pay you these earnings in the form of additional vouchers at the end of the study.
- **Note:** The person you will be paired with has already participated. We have asked this person to make a return decision for each possible amount that you could send to him or her. Once you will have made your decision, we will implement the return decision of this person for this amount that you sent.
- Please click “OK”.



BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 1




- Let's make an example. In the beginning, each of you receive 5 CHF.
- Please click "OK".

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 1



- Assume that you send 1 CHF to the other person. You are left with 4 CHF.
- The 1 CHF which you have sent is multiplied by 3. The other person receives 3 CHF.
- It is now up to this person to decide how much he or she wants to send back to you: 0 CHF, 1 CHF, 2 CHF or 3 CHF.
- Please click "OK".

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 1

① x3 = ①①①

You: ①①① + ①


Person living in Europe: ①①① + ①①

- Assume that the other person sends 1 CHF back to you and keeps 2 CHF (from the 3 CHF he or she received). This person earns the initial 5 CHF and the additional 2 CHF. That is, (s)he earns 7 CHF in total.
- You earn the 4 CHF that you did not send to the other person and the additional 1 CHF that the other person sent back to you. That is, you earn 5 CHF in total.
- Please click “OK”.

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 2




- Consider this second example. Each of you receive 5 CHF in the beginning.
- Please click “OK”.

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 2




- Assume that in this example, you send more CHF to the other person compared to the first example. Assume that you send 3 CHF. You are left with 2 CHF.
- The 3 CHF you have sent are multiplied by 3. The other person receives therefore 9 CHF, which is much more than in the previous case.
- It is now up to this person to decide how much to send you back between 0 CHF and 9 CHF.

- Please click “OK”.

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Example 2



- In this example the other person returns 4 CHF and keeps 5 CHF. This person earns the initial 5 CHF and the additional 5 CHF. That is, (s)he earns 10 CHF in total.
- You earn 2 CHF which you have not sent and the additional 4 CHF that the other person sent back to you. You earn 6 CHF in total.
- Please click “OK”.

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Understanding questionnaire

To make sure that you understand the task, please answer the following questions. If something is not clear, please ask one of us.

Suppose that you send 2 CHF to the other person. You keep 3 CHF.

- How many CHF does the other person receive ?

CHF

- How many CHF could the other person send back to you ?

Between 0 CHF and CHF

- Suppose that the other person sends 1 CHF back to you. How many CHF do you earn in total ?

CHF

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Understanding questionnaire

Suppose that you send 2 CHF to the other person. You keep 3 CHF.

- How many CHF does the other person receive ?

Correct, the answer is: 6 CHF

- How many CHF could the other person send back to you ?

Correct, the answer is: Any amount between 0 and 6 CHF

- Suppose that the other person sends 1 CHF back to you. How many CHF do you earn in total?

Incorrect, the answer is: $5 - 2 + 1 = 4$ CHF

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Questions?

- Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand and wait for one of our team to come to you.
- If you have no questions, please click "OK".

OK

Baseline screens:

Let's start the task!

- You have received 5 CHF. Please choose how many of your 5 CHF you wish to send to the other person.
- The program will multiply this amount by 3 and pass it on to the other person.
- The other person can send you back any amount between 0 and the amount that you sent to this person multiplied by 3.
- Please click "OK".

OK

Your choice

How many of your 5 CHF do you want to send to the other person ? Please answer by selecting one of the options below:

- I send 0 CHF (and I keep my initial 5 CHF. The other person receives nothing and will also earn 5 CHF).
- I send 1 CHF (and I keep 4 CHF. The other person receives 3 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 2 CHF (and I keep 3 CHF. The other person receives 6 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 3 CHF (and I keep 2 CHF. The other person receives 9 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 4 CHF (and I keep 1 CHF. The other person receives 12 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 5 CHF (and I keep 0 CHF. The other person receives 15 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).

BACK

OK

Turkish Social Info treatment screens:

Let's start the task!





- You have received 5 CHF. Please choose how many of your 5 CHF you wish to send to the other person.
- The program will multiply this amount by 3 and pass it on to the other person.
- The other person can send you back any amount between 0 and the amount that you sent to this person multiplied by 3.
- Please click "OK".

OK





Part 4 – Additional information

- The previous **Swiss native** participants and the previous **Turkish** participants, who both live in Switzerland, performed this same task as you in the same role as you (they also had to decide how many CHF to send to an anonymous person living in Europe who participated on the Internet). The following figure shows how many participants, among 10 **Swiss native** and 10 **Turkish** participants, sent 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CHF to the other person:

- Swiss participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- Turkish participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- **Note:** Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' choices.

BACK

OK

Your choice

How many of your 5 CHF do you want to send to the other person ? Please answer by selecting one of the options below:

- I send 0 CHF (and I keep my initial 5 CHF. The other person receives nothing and will also earn 5 CHF).
- I send 1 CHF (and I keep 4 CHF. The other person receives 3 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 2 CHF (and I keep 3 CHF. The other person receives 6 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 3 CHF (and I keep 2 CHF. The other person receives 9 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 4 CHF (and I keep 1 CHF. The other person receives 12 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 5 CHF (and I keep 0 CHF. The other person receives 15 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).

BACK

OK

Turkish Public Condition treatment screens:

Let's start the task!


- You have received 5 CHF. Please choose how many of your 5 CHF you wish to send to the other person.
- The program will multiply this amount by 3 and pass it on to the other person.
- The other person can send you back any amount between 0 and the amount that you sent to this person multiplied by 3.
- Please click "OK".

OK


Part 4 – Additional information

- The previous **Swiss native** participants and the previous **Turkish** participants, who both live in Switzerland, performed this same task as you in the same role as you (they also had to decide how many CHF to send to an anonymous person living in Europe who participated on the Internet). The following figure shows how many participants, among 10 **Swiss native** and 10 **Turkish** participants, sent 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CHF to the other person:

- Swiss participants sent the following amounts:



- Turkish participants sent the following amounts:



- Note:** Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' choices. In addition, their choices were not shown to any other participants in this study.

BACK

OK

Part 4 – Additional information

Some weeks after the study, all Turkish participants will be able to see the amounts which some Turkish participants (including you) have sent to the person living in Europe. This information will be displayed as follows:

...	
Turkish participant 53	amount sent: 4 CHF
Turkish participant 54	amount sent: 2 CHF
Turkish participant 55	amount sent: 1 CHF
Turkish participant 56	amount sent: 3 CHF
...	

Assume you were participant 56. The other Turkish participants will know that participant 56 sent 3 CHF to the other person living in Europe, but they **will not know** that participant 56 was you. Hence, anonymity will be preserved. Note that these answers are only examples and not the real amounts sent by the study participants.

BACK

OK

Your choice

How many of your 5 CHF do you want to send to the other person ? Please answer by selecting one of the options below:

- I send 0 CHF (and I keep my initial 5 CHF. The other person receives nothing and will also earn 5 CHF).
- I send 1 CHF (and I keep 4 CHF. The other person receives 3 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 2 CHF (and I keep 3 CHF. The other person receives 6 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 3 CHF (and I keep 2 CHF. The other person receives 9 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 4 CHF (and I keep 1 CHF. The other person receives 12 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 5 CHF (and I keep 0 CHF. The other person receives 15 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).

BACK

OK

Afghan Social Info treatment screens:

Let's start the task!





- You have received 5 CHF. Please choose how many of your 5 CHF you wish to send to the other person.
- The program will multiply this amount by 3 and pass it on to the other person.
- The other person can send you back any amount between 0 and the amount that you sent to this person multiplied by 3.
- Please click "OK".

OK



Part 4 – Additional information

- The previous **Swiss native** participants and the previous **Afghan** participants, who both live in Switzerland, performed this same task as you in the same role as you (they also had to decide how many CHF to send to an anonymous person living in Europe who participated on the Internet). The following figure shows how many participants, among 10 **Swiss native** and 10 **Afghan** participants, sent 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CHF to the other person:

- Swiss participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- Afghan participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- **Note:** Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' choices.

BACK

OK

Your choice

How many of your 5 CHF do you want to send to the other person ? Please answer by selecting one of the options below:

- I send 0 CHF (and I keep my initial 5 CHF. The other person receives nothing and will also earn 5 CHF).
- I send 1 CHF (and I keep 4 CHF. The other person receives 3 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 2 CHF (and I keep 3 CHF. The other person receives 6 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 3 CHF (and I keep 2 CHF. The other person receives 9 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 4 CHF (and I keep 1 CHF. The other person receives 12 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 5 CHF (and I keep 0 CHF. The other person receives 15 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).

BACK

OK

Afghan Public Condition treatment screens:

Let's start the task!





- You have received 5 CHF. Please choose how many of your 5 CHF you wish to send to the other person.
- The program will multiply this amount by 3 and pass it on to the other person.
- The other person can send you back any amount between 0 and the amount that you sent to this person multiplied by 3.
- Please click "OK".

OK






Part 4 – Additional information

- The previous **Swiss native** participants and the previous **Afghan** participants, who both live in Switzerland, performed this same task as you in the same role as you (they also had to decide how many CHF to send to an anonymous person living in Europe who participated on the Internet). The following figure shows how many participants, among 10 **Swiss native** and 10 **Afghan** participants, sent 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CHF to the other person:

- Swiss participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- Afghan participants sent the following amounts:

0 CHF	1 CHF	2 CHF	3 CHF	4 CHF	5 CHF
					

- **Note:** Unlike you, these previous participants were not given any information about other participants' choices. In addition, their choices were not shown to any other participants in this study.

BACK

OK

Part 4 - Additional information

Some weeks after the study, all Afghan participants will be able to see the amounts which some Afghan participants (including you) have sent to the person living in Europe. This information will be displayed as follows:

...	
Afghan participant 53	amount sent: 4 CHF
Afghan participant 54	amount sent: 2 CHF
Afghan participant 55	amount sent: 1 CHF
Afghan participant 56	amount sent: 3 CHF
...	

Assume you were participant 56. The other Afghan participants will know that participant 56 sent 3 CHF to the other person living in Europe, but they **will not know** that participant 56 was you. Hence, anonymity will be preserved. Note that these answers are only examples and not the real amounts sent by the study participants.

BACK

OK

Your choice

How many of your 5 CHF do you want to send to the other person ? Please answer by selecting one of the options below:

- I send 0 CHF (and I keep my initial 5 CHF. The other person receives nothing and will also earn 5 CHF).
- I send 1 CHF (and I keep 4 CHF. The other person receives 3 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 2 CHF (and I keep 3 CHF. The other person receives 6 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 3 CHF (and I keep 2 CHF. The other person receives 9 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 4 CHF (and I keep 1 CHF. The other person receives 12 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).
- I send 5 CHF (and I keep 0 CHF. The other person receives 15 CHF from which he or she has the choice to send any amount back to me).

BACK

OK

Last decision screen for Baseline and treatment groups:


Your expectation

You have sent 2 CHF to the other person. This person will receive 6 CHF .

What do you think, how many CHF will the other person send back to you? If your prediction is correct, you will earn additional 1.50 CHF.

Please enter your answer here:

CHF



OK

Individual background questions

In this subsection we list all individual background questions, which participants were free to answer or not. In parentheses after the question, we mark with "CH", "Ref" to indicate whether the question was asked to both Swiss samples, to refugees or to both.

Background Questions

This final part of the study will only take a few minutes. It consists of some short questions about your personal background. However, these questions are optional and you are free to skip them (by clicking "I prefer not to say" if you do not want to answer them.

OK

How old are you? (Ref, CH)

- I prefer not to say.

What is your sex? (Ref, CH)

- Male
- Female
- I prefer not to say.

Are you married/ living in a relationship? (Ref, CH)

- Yes
- No
- I prefer not to say.

What is your mother tongue? (Ref, CH)

- I prefer not to say.

How many children do you have? (Ref, CH)

- I prefer not to say.

Please select the highest level of education which you have completed in your home country. (Ref)

- I have learned to read and write without being schooled.
- 1-3 years of (primary) schooling
- 4-6 years of (primary) schooling

- 7-9 years of (secondary) schooling
- Upper secondary education: vocational education and training
- Upper secondary education: general education (high school diploma)
- Tertiary education: Professional education (higher professional school, professional certificate)
- Tertiary education: University degree (bachelor, master, PhD)
- I prefer not to say.

Please select the highest level of education which you have completed. (CH)

- Compulsory schooling (without post-compulsory education)
- Upper secondary education: vocational education and training
- Upper secondary education: general education (high school diploma, baccalaureate)
- Tertiary education: Professional education (higher professional school, federal diplomas and professional certificates)
- Tertiary education: Higher education (universities of applied sciences, teacher training colleges, university)
- I prefer not to say.

In which canton do you currently live? (CH) (each canton is a response option)

- Appenzell Ausser Rhodes / Appenzell Inner Rhodes / Aargau / Basel-Country / Basel City / Bern
- Fribourg / Geneva / Glarus / Grisons / Jura / Lucerne / Neuchâtel / Nidwalden / Obwalden
- St. Gallen / Schaffhausen / Schwyz / Solothurn / Ticino / Thurgau / Uri / Valais / Vaud
- Zug / Zürich
- I prefer not to say.

When did you arrive in Switzerland? (Ref)

- In autumn/winter
- In spring/summer
- I prefer not to say.

In the year:

- I prefer not to say.

In which city/region did you live before you left your home country?

Please enter the city/region here: (Ref)

- I prefer not to say.

Did you have a paid job in your home country? (Ref)

- Yes
- No
- I prefer not to say.

If yes, what did you do?

- I prefer not to say.

Which permit of stay do you have in Switzerland? (Ref)

- N permit
- F permit
- B permit
- Other
- I prefer not to say.

*How many times did you have dinner with a **Swiss** person in the last three months?*

Please enter the approximate number here:..... (Ref)

- I prefer not to say.

*How many times did you have dinner with a **Turkish** person in the last three months?*

Please enter the approximate number here:..... (Ref)

- I prefer not to say.

Have you ever taken part in a job training program in Switzerland? (Ref)

- Yes
- No
- I prefer not to say.

Have you ever been supported by a job coach in Switzerland? (Ref)

- Yes
- No

- I prefer not to say.

Do you currently have a paid job on the (first) labor market here in Switzerland? (Ref)

Do you currently have a paid job? (CH)

- Yes, I have a permanent (regular) job.
- Yes, I am doing an internship or having a temporary job.
- Yes, I am doing an apprenticeship.
- No, I am a student.
- No, but I am currently looking for a job.
- No, but I am not currently looking for a job.
- I prefer not to say.

If you have or ever had a paid job in Switzerland (including apprenticeships, internships and temporary jobs) or if you are looking for a job, what is/was this job? (Ref)

If you have or had a paid job or if you are looking for a job, what is/was this job? (CH)

- Health care services
- Social services or education
- IT or communication
- Print media or media technology
- Retail trade or sales
- Cleaning services
- Gastronomy or accommodation services
- Bakery or confectionery
- Agriculture, forestry or fishery
- Meat industry
- Building services (heating/ventilation/sanitary/plumbing)
- Construction or manufacturing services (incl. Wood works, engineering, architecture, bricklaying, painting, plastering)
- Railway construction
- Mechanics or electronics
- Logistics

- Manager
- Clerical administrative support
- Business, financial operations, real estate or insurance services
- Academics or research
- Legal services
- Public sector or security
- Other
- I have never had a paid job in Switzerland.
- I prefer not to say.

Please indicate your monthly net income in Switzerland. Please indicate your household net income if you live together with your family/husband/wife. If you live by yourself or in a shared apartment (not with family member(s)), please indicate your individual net income. (Ref)

Please indicate your monthly net income (before taxes). Please indicate your household net income if you live together with your family/husband/wife. If you live by yourself or in a shared apartment (not with family member(s)), please indicate your individual net income. (CH)

- Less than 500 CHF
- From 501 up to 1000 CHF
- From 1001 up to 2000 CHF
- From 2001 up to 3000 CHF
- From 3001 up to 4000 CHF
- From 4001 up to 5000 CHF
- From 5001 up to 6000 CHF
- From 6001 up to 7000 CHF
- From 7001 up to 8000 CHF
- From 8001 up to 9000 CHF
- Over 9000 CHF
- I prefer not to say.

What income group did you belong to in your home country? (Ref)

- High income group
- Middle income group
- Low income group
- I prefer not to say.

Please help us to improve our questionnaire! How clear did you find the instructions and the questions in this study? (Ref, CH)

- 1 (very unclear) - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (very clear)

Social desirability scale - 17

Below, we present the statements from the "Social Desirability Scale - 17" according to Stöber (2001) for which participants had to indicate true or false. Every statement was presented as in the screenshot (always together with the introductory sentence which appeared repeatedly and remained the same). This questionnaire was asked to all refugees and Swiss participants whose data we used for the first and the second chapter of this thesis. The Swiss sample whose data we used for the third chapter did not fill this questionnaire.

Background Questions

Below you will find a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and decide if that statement describes you or not. If it describes you, check the word "true"; if not, check the word "false."

I sometimes litter.

True

False

OK

I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences.

- True
- False

In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others.

- True
- False

I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my own.

- True
- False

I take out my bad moods on others now and then.

- True
- False

There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else.

- True

- False

In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences.

- True
- False

I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency.

- True
- False

When I have made a promise, I keep it – no ifs, ands or buts.

- True
- False

I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back.

- True
- False

I would never lie off other people.

- True
- False

I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed.

- True
- False

During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact.

- True
- False

There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowed.

- True
- False

I always eat a healthy diet.

- True
- False

Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return.

- True
- False

Appendix Chapter 1

Individual differences between personal and (perceived) social gender norms, by nationality

Table A.1: Summary statistics of personal and (perceived) social norms on eye contact, by national group

	CH		TR		AFG	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pn_eyecontfm	0.69	(0.36)	0.66	(0.40)	0.42	(0.53)
pn_eyecontmf	0.68	(0.38)	0.66	(0.39)	0.32	(0.59)
pn_eyecontff	0.69	(0.37)	0.68	(0.41)	0.51	(0.52)
pn_eyecontmm	0.68	(0.35)	0.69	(0.40)	0.50	(0.55)
sn_eyecontfm	0.58	(0.44)	0.45	(0.51)	0.26	(0.58)
sn_eyecontmf	0.58	(0.46)	0.47	(0.51)	0.26	(0.60)
sn_eyecontff	0.64	(0.42)	0.69	(0.42)	0.47	(0.53)
sn_eyecontmm	0.63	(0.44)	0.67	(0.43)	0.46	(0.51)
<i>N</i>	196		156		85	

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm, "sn" for social norm. The variable names indicate the vignette: eyecontmf (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactfm (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), eyecontactff (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactmm (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss).

Table A.2: Summary statistics of personal and (perceived) social norms on mixed gender teamwork, by national group

	CH		TR		AFG	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pn_hetteam	0.70	(0.33)	0.82	(0.23)	0.67	(0.30)
sn_hetteam	0.71	(0.35)	0.68	(0.38)	0.53	(0.49)
<i>N</i>	196		53		29	

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm, "sn" for social norm. The variable name hetteam indicates the vignette about a mixed gender team composition in the workplace.

Table A.3: Summary statistics of individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms on eye contact, by national group

	CH		TR		AFG	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Diff_eyecontff	0.20	(0.30)	0.24	(0.37)	0.29	(0.41)
Diff_eyecontmf	0.22	(0.35)	0.37	(0.42)	0.41	(0.48)
Diff_eyecontfm	0.23	(0.35)	0.39	(0.42)	0.40	(0.49)
Diff_eyecontmm	0.20	(0.35)	0.25	(0.36)	0.33	(0.44)
Observations	196		155		84	

Note: "Diff" stands for the difference between personal norm and (perceived) social norm at the individual level. The variable names indicate the vignette: eyecontmf (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactfm (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), eyecontactff (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactmm (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss).

Table A.4: Summary statistics of individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms on mixed gender teamwork, by national group

	CH		TR		AFG	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Diff_hetteam	0.21	(0.30)	0.22	(0.31)	0.36	(0.36)
Observations	196		53		29	

Note: "Diff" stands for the difference between personal norm and (perceived) social norm at the individual level. The variable name hetteam indicates the vignette about a mixed gender team composition in the workplace.

Table A.5: (Non)parametric testing of differences between personal and (perceived) social norms within each nationality (paired t-test and sign-rank test)

varname	pval	B.-H. 5% sig.
Paired_eyecontfm_ttTR	0.0000	*
Paired_eyecontfm_srTR	0.0000	*
Paired_eyecontmf_ttTR	0.0000	*
Paired_eyecontmf_srTR	0.0000	*
Paired_eyecontff_ttTR	0.8272	-
Paired_eyecontff_srTR	0.6310	-
Paired_eyecontmm_ttTR	0.5076	-
Paired_eyecontmm_srTR	0.4736	-
Paired_hetteam_ttTR	0.0045	*
Paired_hetteam_srTR	0.5745	-
Paired_eyecontfm_ttAFG	0.0215	-
Paired_eyecontfm_srAFG	0.0067	*
Paired_eyecontmf_ttAFG	0.3740	-
Paired_eyecontmf_srAFG	0.3370	-
Paired_eyecontff_ttAFG	0.4895	-
Paired_eyecontff_srAFG	0.3963	-
Paired_eyecontmm_ttAFG	0.5277	-
Paired_eyecontmm_srAFG	0.1562	-
Paired_hetteam_ttAFG	0.1432	-
Paired_hetteam_srAFG	0.9020	-
Paired_eyecontfm_ttCH	0.0002	*
Paired_eyecontfm_srCH	0.0003	*
Paired_eyecontmf_ttCH	0.0003	*
Paired_eyecontmf_srCH	0.0006	*
Paired_eyecontff_ttCH	0.0544	-
Paired_eyecontff_srCH	0.0779	-
Paired_eyecontmm_ttCH	0.0441	-
Paired_eyecontmm_srCH	0.0615	-
Paired_hetteam_ttCH	0.9382	-
Paired_hetteam_srCH	0.0000	*

Notes: Here, we tested by a paired t-test and a sign-rank test whether the means and distributions of personal and social norms (from the same individuals) are significantly different. Tested were five vignettes for each national group: eyecontmf (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactfm (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), eyecontactff (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactmm (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), hetteam (mixed gender teams composition in the workplace). The B.-H. correction takes into account a total number of 248 hypotheses which is the number of tests we conducted in this exploratory analysis. According to a Bonferroni correction, the p-value would have to be lower than the critical value of $0.05/248 = 0.00020$.

Table A.6: (Non)parametric testing of individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms across nationalities (two-sample rank-sum and t-tests)

varname	pval	B.-H. 5% sig.
Diff_eyecontff_rsCHAFIG	0.1269	-
Diff_eyecontff_rsCHTR	0.3845	-
Diff_eyecontff_rsTRAFG	0.4413	-
Diff_eyecontff_ttCHAFIG	0.0424	-
Diff_eyecontff_ttCHTR	0.2173	-
Diff_eyecontff_ttTRAFG	0.3826	-
Diff_eyecontmf_rsCHAFIG	0.0014	*
Diff_eyecontmf_rsCHTR	0.0001	*
Diff_eyecontmf_rsTRAFG	0.7711	-
Diff_eyecontmf_ttCHAFIG	0.0002	*
Diff_eyecontmf_ttCHTR	0.0003	*
Diff_eyecontmf_ttTRAFG	0.4495	-
Diff_eyecontfm_rsCHAFIG	0.0030	*
Diff_eyecontfm_rsCHTR	0.0000	*
Diff_eyecontfm_rsTRAFG	0.7167	-
Diff_eyecontfm_ttCHAFIG	0.0007	*
Diff_eyecontfm_ttCHTR	0.0001	*
Diff_eyecontfm_ttTRAFG	0.8698	-
Diff_eyecontmm_rsCHAFIG	0.0042	*
Diff_eyecontmm_rsCHTR	0.0621	-
Diff_eyecontmm_rsTRAFG	0.1840	-
Diff_eyecontmm_ttCHAFIG	0.0055	*
Diff_eyecontmm_ttCHTR	0.1506	-
Diff_eyecontmm_ttTRAFG	0.1148	-
Diff_hetteam_rsCHAFIG	0.0109	-
Diff_hetteam_rsCHTR	0.8283	-
Diff_hetteam_rsTRAFG	0.0302	-
Diff_hetteam_ttCHAFIG	0.0190	-
Diff_hetteam_ttCHTR	0.9218	-
Diff_hetteam_ttTRAFG	0.0689	-

Notes: Here, we tested by two-sample t- and rank-sum tests whether the individual difference between personal and social norms (subtracting the score of one's social norm rating from the score of one's personal norm rating) are significantly different across national groups. For instance, "Diff.Eyecontmf_rsCHTR" stands for the rank-sum test checking whether the individual difference between personal and social norms concerning the vignette mixed gender eye contact (between a male employee and a female boss) is significantly different between Swiss and Turkish participants. "tt" would stand for t-test. "eyecont" stands for vignettes about an employee who maintains direct eye contact with the boss in a discussion. "hetteam" stands for the vignette on the mixed gender team composition in the workplace. The B.-H. correction takes into account a total number of 248 hypotheses which is the number of tests we conducted in this exploratory analysis. According to a Bonferroni correction, the p-value would have to be lower than the critical value of $0.05/248 = 0.00020$.

Personal and (perceived) social gender norms, by nationality and by gender

Table A.7: Summary statistics of personal and (perceived) social norms on eye contact, by national group and by gender

	CH men		CH women		TR men		TR women		AFG men		AFG women	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pn_eyecontfm	0.63	(0.38)	0.75	(0.33)	0.71	(0.37)	0.60	(0.43)	0.41	(0.53)	0.34	(0.56)
pn_eyecontmf	0.62	(0.39)	0.75	(0.37)	0.70	(0.38)	0.64	(0.38)	0.32	(0.61)	0.33	(0.56)
pn_eyecontff	0.63	(0.40)	0.75	(0.33)	0.73	(0.38)	0.62	(0.46)	0.50	(0.56)	0.47	(0.47)
pn_eyecontmm	0.62	(0.37)	0.75	(0.33)	0.71	(0.39)	0.68	(0.41)	0.50	(0.59)	0.46	(0.51)
sn_eyecontfm	0.53	(0.48)	0.63	(0.39)	0.53	(0.50)	0.31	(0.52)	0.36	(0.56)	-0.01	(0.58)
sn_eyecontmf	0.54	(0.49)	0.61	(0.44)	0.53	(0.49)	0.35	(0.52)	0.36	(0.58)	-0.01	(0.59)
sn_eyecontff	0.60	(0.44)	0.68	(0.40)	0.71	(0.40)	0.66	(0.46)	0.46	(0.56)	0.49	(0.50)
sn_eyecontmm	0.57	(0.46)	0.68	(0.42)	0.70	(0.41)	0.62	(0.46)	0.45	(0.55)	0.44	(0.43)
<i>N</i>	100		95		96		57		54		25	

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm, "sn" for social norm. The variable names indicate the vignette: eyecontmf (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactfm (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), eyecontactff (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), eyecontactmm (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss).

Table A.8: Summary statistics of personal and (perceived) social norms on mixed gender teamwork, by national group and by gender

	CH men		CH women		TR men		TR women		AFG men		AFG women	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pn_hetteam	0.68	(0.34)	0.74	(0.31)	0.83	(0.23)	0.82	(0.24)	0.65	(0.31)	0.70	(0.20)
sn_hetteam	0.70	(0.35)	0.72	(0.36)	0.70	(0.38)	0.64	(0.41)	0.62	(0.42)	0.20	(0.57)
<i>N</i>	100		95		29		22		22		4	

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm, "sn" for social norm. The variable name hetteam indicates the vignette about a mixed gender team composition in the workplace.

Table A.9: OLS - Individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Turkish sample

	DifECmf	DifECfm	DifECff	DifECmm	DifHetTeam
Age in years	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.010)
Male (d)	-0.206* (0.090)	-0.248** (0.089)	-0.082 (0.085)	-0.107 (0.075)	-0.300* (0.128)
High level of education (d)	0.089 (0.108)	0.163 (0.105)	-0.075 (0.153)	0.008 (0.123)	0.076 (0.251)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.038 (0.157)	-0.316* (0.129)	-0.191 (0.287)	0.216* (0.105)	-0.063 (0.262)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	0.005 (0.114)	0.134 (0.113)	-0.130 (0.119)	-0.018 (0.124)	-0.041 (0.157)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	-0.059 (0.089)	0.030 (0.094)	-0.048 (0.090)	-0.055 (0.082)	0.102 (0.140)
Constant	0.460 (0.390)	0.910** (0.273)	1.071 (0.888)	-0.073 (0.211)	0.432 (0.811)
F	1.76	3.17	1.23	1.26	2.84
r2_a	.00733	.0479	.0228	-.0137	.00418
rmse	.428	.436	.393	.377	.328
N	113	113	113	113	34

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "Dif" stands for the individual difference between personal and social norms. "EC" indicates the eye contact vignette (employee and a boss who are having a discussion), and the following labels indicate the gender of the employee and the boss. mf (male employee, female boss), fm (female employee, male boss), ff (female employee, female boss), mm (male employee, male boss). "HetTeam" indicates the vignette on the mixed gender team composition in the workplace. Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.10: OLS - Personal norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Turkish sample

	$pn_{eyecontmf}$	$pn_{eyecontfm}$	$pn_{eyecontff}$	$pn_{eyecontmm}$	$pn_{hetteam}$
Age in years	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)
Male (d)	0.039 (0.069)	0.100 (0.076)	0.075 (0.083)	0.049 (0.068)	0.003 (0.090)
High level of education (d)	0.066 (0.122)	-0.001 (0.127)	0.231 (0.168)	0.093 (0.121)	0.123 (0.088)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.214* (0.095)	-0.152 (0.143)	0.158 (0.284)	-0.145 (0.105)	-0.027 (0.103)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	0.047 (0.114)	0.098 (0.121)	0.193 (0.126)	-0.019 (0.110)	-0.197** (0.070)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	-0.017 (0.077)	-0.016 (0.075)	-0.055 (0.085)	-0.047 (0.078)	0.106 (0.085)
Constant	1.377*** (0.263)	1.254*** (0.265)	-0.067 (0.868)	1.093*** (0.225)	1.007** (0.339)
F	2.22	2.37	1.09	1.21	10.1
r2_a	.00365	.00779	.0953	-.0237	.113
rmse	.364	.375	.387	.35	.188
N	113	113	113	113	34

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm. eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), hetteam (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.11: OLS - (Perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Turkish sample

	$sn_{eyecontmf}$	$sn_{eyecontfm}$	$sn_{eyecontff}$	$sn_{eyecontmm}$	$sn_{hetteam}$
Age in years	0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.012)
Male (d)	0.212* (0.104)	0.258* (0.107)	0.018 (0.073)	0.028 (0.079)	0.223 (0.120)
High level of education (d)	0.022 (0.112)	-0.123 (0.093)	-0.003 (0.111)	0.087 (0.138)	-0.318 (0.215)
Desirability score (in log)	0.098 (0.200)	0.241 (0.162)	-0.100 (0.129)	-0.163 (0.139)	0.215 (0.292)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	-0.054 (0.115)	-0.150 (0.114)	0.157 (0.119)	0.098 (0.118)	0.056 (0.160)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	0.137 (0.092)	0.064 (0.102)	0.168* (0.077)	0.197** (0.075)	-0.119 (0.139)
Constant	0.055 (0.505)	-0.087 (0.372)	0.782* (0.325)	0.900** (0.310)	0.767 (0.789)
F	1.38	2.04	.939	1.59	1.78
r2.a	.0175	.0244	.0076	.0275	-.0299
rmse	.475	.508	.384	.392	.375
N	113	113	113	113	34

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "sn" stands for social norm. $eyecontmf$ (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), $eyecontfm$ (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), $eyecontff$ (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), $eyecontmm$ (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), $hetteam$ (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.12: OLS - Individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Afghan sample

	DifECmf	DifECfm	DifECff	DifECmm	DifHetTeam
Age in years	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)	0.006 (0.011)	0.020 (0.018)
Male (d)	-0.304* (0.129)	-0.293* (0.134)	-0.182 (0.102)	0.014 (0.106)	0.334 (0.252)
High level of education (d)	0.040 (0.124)	0.101 (0.123)	-0.202* (0.097)	-0.118 (0.107)	0.497* (0.219)
Desirability score (in log)	0.008 (0.281)	-0.595 (0.421)	-0.231 (0.297)	0.282 (0.317)	-1.281* (0.537)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	0.151 (0.116)	0.036 (0.115)	0.191 (0.104)	0.003 (0.149)	0.196 (0.156)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	0.097 (0.130)	-0.096 (0.144)	0.177 (0.127)	0.258** (0.084)	-0.129 (0.200)
Constant	0.524 (0.765)	2.099 (1.251)	0.938 (0.835)	-0.591 (1.029)	2.704 (1.637)
F	1.42	2.01	2.48	2.07	2.36
r2_a	.0508	.0453	.151	-.0512	.306
rmse	.363	.396	.282	.359	.333
N	49	49	49	49	18

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "Dif" stands for the individual difference between personal and social norms. "EC" indicates the eye contact vignette (employee and a boss who are having a discussion), and the following labels indicate the gender of the employee and the boss who are having a discussion. mf (male employee, female boss), fm (female employee, male boss), ff (female employee, female boss), mm (male employee, male boss). "HetTeam" indicates the vignette on the mixed gender team composition in the workplace. Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.13: OLS - Personal norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Afghan sample

	$pn_{eyecontmf}$	$pn_{eyecontfm}$	$pn_{eyecontff}$	$pn_{eyecontmm}$	$pn_{hetteam}$
Age in years	0.011 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.020 (0.010)	0.016 (0.009)	0.013 (0.025)
Male (d)	0.097 (0.144)	0.152 (0.168)	0.143 (0.153)	0.286 (0.169)	-0.097 (0.142)
High level of education (d)	0.291 (0.173)	0.259 (0.161)	0.299 (0.193)	0.321 (0.168)	-0.050 (0.164)
Desirability score (in log)	0.605 (0.432)	0.716 (0.444)	0.715 (0.409)	0.692 (0.441)	0.401 (0.572)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	0.008** (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	0.071 (0.165)	-0.097 (0.155)	-0.299 (0.157)	-0.099 (0.155)	0.077 (0.182)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	0.159 (0.142)	0.287 (0.174)	0.222 (0.196)	0.100 (0.189)	-0.055 (0.186)
Constant	-1.884 (1.311)	-2.039 (1.304)	-2.093 (1.244)	-2.163 (1.318)	-0.523 (1.996)
F	3.45	2.48	2.35	2.46	2.11
r2_a	.158	.0982	.121	.158	-.0771
rmse	.492	.503	.495	.487	.326
N	49	49	49	49	18

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm. eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), hetteam (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.14: OLS - (Perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Afghan sample

	<i>sn_{eyecontmf}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontfm}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontff}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontmm}</i>	<i>sn_{hetteam}</i>
Age in years	0.010 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.036 (0.019)
Male (d)	0.451* (0.190)	0.420* (0.168)	0.023 (0.168)	0.009 (0.149)	-0.108 (0.352)
High level of education (d)	0.085 (0.212)	0.131 (0.186)	0.158 (0.190)	0.341 (0.192)	-0.391 (0.378)
Desirability score (in log)	0.855 (0.428)	0.928 (0.495)	0.393 (0.495)	0.196 (0.464)	1.091 (0.719)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	0.008* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
Had paid job in the home country (d)	-0.178 (0.169)	-0.332 (0.165)	-0.186 (0.165)	-0.050 (0.163)	-0.253 (0.266)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)	0.227 (0.224)	0.327 (0.211)	0.306 (0.156)	0.038 (0.168)	0.103 (0.317)
Constant	-2.652* (1.268)	-2.890* (1.418)	-0.978 (1.515)	-0.222 (1.460)	-0.950 (1.840)
F	3.64	2.87	1.32	1.17	1.9
r ² .a	.0841	.133	-.0181	-.025	.149
rmse	.602	.547	.551	.535	.466
N	49	49	49	49	18

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "sn" stands for social norm. *eyecontmf* (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), *eyecontfm* (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), *eyecontff* (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), *eyecontmm* (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), *hetteam* (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.15: OLS - Individual differences between personal and (perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Swiss sample

	DifECmf	DifECfm	DifECff	DifECmm	DifHetTeam
Age in years	-0.004*	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male (d)	-0.017	0.020	-0.042	0.003	0.025
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.043)
High level of education (d)	-0.006	0.004	0.008	-0.012	-0.019
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.130	-0.090	-0.095	0.024	-0.023
	(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.060)
Currently having a job in Switzerland (d)	-0.094	-0.060	-0.044	-0.118	-0.030
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.053)
Constant	0.776**	0.561	0.520*	0.517	0.298
	(0.250)	(0.316)	(0.201)	(0.274)	(0.157)
F	1.87	.794	.934	2.03	.202
r ² .a	.0192	-.0105	-.00855	.0433	-.0212
rmse	.341	.351	.3	.337	.274
N	184	184	184	184	184

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Note: "Dif" stands for the individual difference between personal and social norms. "EC" indicates the eye contact vignette (employee and a boss who are having a discussion), and the following labels indicate the gender of the employee and the boss who are having a discussion. mf (male employee, female boss), fm (female employee, male boss), ff (female employee, female boss), mm (male employee, male boss). "HetTeam" indicates the vignette on mixed gender teamwork. Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.16: OLS - Personal norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Swiss sample

	$pn_{eyecontmf}$	$pn_{eyecontfm}$	$pn_{eyecontff}$	$pn_{eyecontmm}$	$pn_{hetteam}$
Age in years	0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)
Male (d)	-0.137* (0.058)	-0.142** (0.054)	-0.133* (0.057)	-0.125* (0.052)	-0.066 (0.049)
High level of education (d)	0.019 (0.054)	0.007 (0.054)	0.012 (0.055)	0.005 (0.050)	0.116* (0.048)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.039 (0.107)	0.011 (0.090)	-0.107 (0.100)	0.045 (0.093)	-0.004 (0.080)
Currently having a job in Switzerland (d)	0.056 (0.069)	0.051 (0.065)	-0.008 (0.062)	0.091 (0.062)	0.037 (0.067)
Constant	0.624* (0.301)	0.530* (0.221)	0.876*** (0.251)	0.377 (0.249)	0.490* (0.234)
F	1.57	2.01	1.29	2.11	1.52
r2_a	.0201	.0272	.0178	.0405	.0363
rmse	.381	.36	.373	.344	.316
N	184	184	184	184	184

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "pn" stands for personal norm. eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), hetteam (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.17: OLS - (Perceived) social norms, eye contact and mixed gender teamwork - Swiss sample

	<i>sn_{eyecontmf}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontfm}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontff}</i>	<i>sn_{eyecontmm}</i>	<i>sn_{hetteam}</i>
Age in years	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)
Male (d)	-0.057 (0.070)	-0.116 (0.066)	-0.084 (0.064)	-0.095 (0.064)	-0.030 (0.052)
High level of education (d)	-0.115 (0.070)	-0.092 (0.065)	-0.083 (0.061)	-0.135* (0.063)	0.012 (0.056)
Desirability score (in log)	0.033 (0.136)	0.013 (0.144)	-0.100 (0.118)	-0.084 (0.114)	0.024 (0.083)
Currently having a job in Switzerland (d)	0.042 (0.081)	0.015 (0.073)	0.023 (0.069)	0.041 (0.082)	0.044 (0.063)
Constant	0.406 (0.345)	0.565 (0.350)	0.855** (0.290)	0.800** (0.295)	0.621** (0.220)
F	1.4	1.48	1.05	2.06	.265
r ² _a	.00365	.0093	.005	.0261	-.0218
rmse	.46	.431	.414	.423	.341
N	184	184	184	184	184

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: "sn" stands for social norm. *eyecontmf* (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), *eyecontfm* (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), *eyecontff* (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), *eyecontmm* (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), *hetteam* (employees working in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.18: (Non)parametric testing of differences in personal and (perceived) social norms across gender, within each national group (two-sample t- and rank sum tests)

varname	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	varname	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%
PNeyecontmf_rs_TR	0.1879	-	PNeyecontmm_rs_AFG	0.4652	-
PNeyecontmf_tt_TR	0.3437	-	PNeyecontmm_tt_AFG	0.7693	-
SNeyecontmf_rs_TR	0.0266	-	SNeyecontmm_rs_AFG	0.6050	-
SNeyecontmf_tt_TR	0.0389	-	SNeyecontmm_tt_AFG	0.9247	-
PNeyecontfm_rs_TR	0.0648	-	PNhetteam_rs_AFG	1.000	-
PNeyecontfm_tt_TR	0.0907	-	PNhetteam_tt_AFG	0.7816	-
SNeyecontfm_rs_TR	0.0051	*	SNhetteam_rs_AFG	0.1466	-
SNeyecontfm_tt_TR	0.0103	*	SNhetteam_tt_AFG	0.0927	-
PNeyecontff_rs_TR	0.1318	-	PNeyecontmf_rs_CH	0.0025	*
PNeyecontff_tt_TR	0.1350	-	PNeyecontmf_tt_CH	0.0131	*
SNeyecontff_rs_TR	0.5285	-	SNeyecontmf_rs_CH	0.3597	-
SNeyecontff_tt_TR	0.4233	-	SNeyecontmf_tt_CH	0.3358	-
PNeyecontmm_rs_TR	0.6508	-	PNeyecontfm_rs_CH	0.0130	*
PNeyecontmm_tt_TR	0.7165	-	PNeyecontfm_tt_CH	0.0163	-
SNeyecontmm_rs_TR	0.3560	-	SNeyecontfm_rs_CH	0.1741	-
SNeyecontmm_tt_TR	0.2689	-	SNeyecontfm_tt_CH	0.0928	-
PNhetteam_rs_TR	0.9279	-	PNeyecontmm_rs_CH	0.0048	*
PNhetteam_tt_TR	0.8048	-	PNeyecontmm_tt_CH	0.0092	*
SNhetteam_rs_TR	0.5944	-	SNeyecontmm_rs_CH	0.0655	-
SNhetteam_tt_TR	0.5898	-	SNeyecontmm_tt_CH	0.0771	-
PNeyecontmf_rs_AFG	0.9354	-	PNeyecontff_rs_CH	0.0153	-
PNeyecontmf_tt_AFG	0.9474	-	PNeyecontff_tt_CH	0.0199	-
SNeyecontmf_rs_AFG	0.0098	*	SNeyecontff_rs_CH	0.1740	-
SNeyecontmf_tt_AFG	0.0117	*	SNeyecontff_tt_CH	0.1877	-
PNeyecontfm_rs_AFG	0.6091	-	PNhetteam_rs_CH	0.2053	-
PNeyecontfm_tt_AFG	0.5904	-	PNhetteam_tt_CH	0.2073	-
SNeyecontfm_rs_AFG	0.0087	*	SNhetteam_rs_CH	0.6599	-
SNeyecontfm_tt_AFG	0.0098	*	SNhetteam_tt_CH	0.7240	-

Note: Tested was whether personal and social norms about (mixed and same gender) eye contact and the mixed gender team work vignettes significantly differ by gender within each national group. "PN" stands for personal norm, "SN" for social norm. eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), hetteam (employees working in mixed gender teams). The B.-H. correction takes into account a total number of 248 hypotheses which is the number of tests we conducted in this exploratory analysis. According to a Bonferroni correction, the p-value would have to be lower than the critical value of $0.05/248 = 0.00020$.

Table A.19: (Non)parametric testing of (mis)perception of social gender norms of own national group, by gender (one-sample t- and sign-rank tests)

varname	pval	B.H. sig. 5%
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_TRm	0.1620	-
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_TRf	0.0007	*
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_TRm	0.0595	-
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_TRf	0.1056	-
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_TRm	0.1452	-
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_TRf	0.0001	*
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_TRm	0.0964	-
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_TRf	0.0189	-
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_AFGm	0.0030	*
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_AFGf	0.0000	*
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_AFGm	0.4012	-
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_AFGf	0.0007	*
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_AFGm	0.0024	*
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_AFGf	0.0000	*
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_AFGm	0.4824	-
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_AFGf	0.0004	*
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_CHm	0.2518	-
MUsnEyecontmf_tt_CHf	0.8538	-
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_CHm	0.0155	-
MUsnEyecontmf_sr_CHf	0.0003	*
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_CHm	0.1371	-
MUsnEyecontfm_tt_CHf	0.3966	-
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_CHm	0.0672	-
MUsnEyecontfm_sr_CHf	0.0000	*

Note: "MUsn" describes a misunderstanding of one's own in-group social norm. By one-sample t-tests (tt) and sign-rank (sr) tests, we tested whether participants' guesses significantly deviate from the modal response of (perceived) social norms in their own national group. For each group, we check this by gender. TRm: Turkish males, TRf: Turkish females, AFGm: Afghan males, AFGf: Afghan females, CHm: Swiss males, CHf: Swiss females. Tested were four vignettes for each national group: Eyecontmf (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), Eyecontactfm (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss), Eyecontactff (a female employee maintaining direct eye contact with a female boss), Eyecontactmm (a male employee maintaining direct eye contact with a male boss). The B.-H. correction takes into account a total number of 248 hypotheses which is the number of tests we conducted in this exploratory analysis. According to a Bonferroni correction, the p-value would have to be lower than the critical value of $0.05/248 = 0.00020$.

Table A.20: (Non)parametric testing of differences in personal and (perceived) social gender norms across national groups, within same gender and across gender (two-sample t- and rank-sum tests)

Same gender and across national groups			Across gender and across national groups		
varname	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	varname	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%
PNevecontmf_rs_CHTRm	0.0622	-	PNevecontfm_rs_CHfTRm	0.5397	-
PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHTRm	0.9080	-	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.5642	-
SNevecontmf_rs_CHTRm	0.8506	-	SNevecontfm_rs_CHfTRm	0.2329	-
SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHTRm	0.8973	-	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.0596	-
PNevecontmf_rs_CHTRf	0.0160	-	PNevecontfm_rs_CHfAFGm	0.0001	*
PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHTRf	0.7520	-	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.0001	*
SNevecontmf_rs_CHTRf	0.0014	*	SNevecontfm_rs_CHfAFGm	0.0023	*
SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHTRf	0.0619	-	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.0051	-
PNevecontfm_rs_CHTRm	0.0597	-	PNevecontfm_rs_CHmAFGf	0.0157	-
PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHTRm	0.8368	-	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.0025	*
SNevecontfm_rs_CHTRm	0.9121	-	SNevecontfm_rs_CHmAFGf	0.0000	*
SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHTRm	0.7843	-	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.0001	*
PNevecontfm_rs_CHTRf	0.0190	-	PNevecontfm_rs_CHmTRf	0.8682	-
PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHTRf	0.3272	-	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.7226	-
SNevecontfm_rs_CHTRf	0.0000	*	SNevecontfm_rs_CHmTRf	0.0052	*
SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHTRf	0.0017	*	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.1119	-
PNevecontmf_rs_CHAFGm	0.0054	*	PNevecontmf_rs_CHfTRm	0.2217	-
PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.0001	*	PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.9733	-
SNevecontmf_rs_CHAFGm	0.0427	-	SNevecontmf_rs_CHfTRm	0.2741	-
SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.1246	-	SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.4596	-
PNevecontmf_rs_CHAFGf	0.0001	*	PNevecontmf_rs_CHfAFGm	0.0000	*
PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.0004	*	PNevecontmf_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.0000	*
SNevecontmf_rs_CHAFGf	0.0000	*	SNevecontmf_rs_CHfAFGm	0.0055	*
SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.0000	*	SNevecontmf_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.0394	-
PNevecontfm_rs_CHAFGm	0.0201	-	PNevecontfm_rs_CHmAFGf	0.0175	-
PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.0016	*	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.0016	*
SNevecontfm_rs_CHAFGm	0.0665	-	SNevecontfm_rs_CHmAFGf	0.0000	*
SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.1504	-	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.0001	*
PNevecontfm_rs_CHAFGf	0.0003	*	PNevecontfm_rs_CHmTRf	0.6662	-
PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.0001	*	PNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.6859	-
SNevecontfm_rs_CHAFGf	0.0000	*	SNevecontfm_rs_CHmTRf	0.0154	-
SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.0000	*	SNevecontfm_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.2060	-
PNhetteam_rs_CHAFGm	0.6156	-	PNhetteam_rs_CHfAFGm	0.2099	-
PNhetteam_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.8733	-	PNhetteam_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.8819	-
SNhetteam_rs_CHAFGm	0.4269	-	SNhetteam_rs_CHfAFGm	0.2798	-
SNhetteam_tEucD_CHAFGm	0.3866	-	SNhetteam_tEucD_CHfAFGm	0.3951	-
PNhetteam_rs_CHAFGf	0.7034	-	PNhetteam_rs_CHfTRm	0.1608	-
PNhetteam_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.2977	-	PNhetteam_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.3958	-
SNhetteam_rs_CHAFGf	0.0222	-	SNhetteam_rs_CHfTRm	0.8342	-
SNhetteam_tEucD_CHAFGf	0.0444	-	SNhetteam_tEucD_CHfTRm	0.7580	-
PNhetteam_rs_CHTRm	0.0235	-	PNhetteam_rs_CHmAFGf	0.9845	-
PNhetteam_tEucD_CHTRm	0.3368	-	PNhetteam_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.3701	-
SNhetteam_rs_CHTRm	0.9543	-	SNhetteam_rs_CHmAFGf	0.0333	-
SNhetteam_tEucD_CHTRm	0.8626	-	SNhetteam_tEucD_CHmAFGf	0.0155	-
PNhetteam_rs_CHTRf	0.3357	-	PNhetteam_rs_CHmTRf	0.0823	-
PNhetteam_tEucD_CHTRf	0.4560	-	PNhetteam_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.4005	-
SNhetteam_rs_CHTRf	0.3627	-	SNhetteam_rs_CHmTRf	0.5315	-
SNhetteam_tEucD_CHTRf	0.5478	-	SNhetteam_tEucD_CHmTRf	0.5760	-

Note: Personal (PN) and social norms (SN) on the vignettes of (mixed gender) eye contact and the mixed gender team composition. Two-sample EucD t-tests (tEucD) and rank-sum tests (rs) across Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG) respondents. The left-hand panel displays the cross-national comparison across the same gender. The right-hand panel shows the cross-national comparison across opposite genders (male (m), female (f)). Recall that eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), hetteam (employees working in mixed gender teams). The B.-H. correction takes into account a total number of 248 hypotheses which is the number of tests we conducted in this exploratory analysis. According to a Bonferroni correction, the p-value would have to be lower than the critical value of $0.05/248 = 0.00020$.

(Relative) cross-national differences in personal and (perceived) social norms and beliefs about the Swiss social norms for individual vignettes - Turkish vs. Swiss

The following Tables present the same analysis for each individual vignette which we conducted at an aggregate level in section 1.7.3. For each vignette mean EucDs between each refugee group and the Swiss are regressed on covariates.

Table A.21: OLS - Cross-national differences in personal norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Turkish vs. Swiss sample (1)

	LEucDPNyleadno	LEucDPNyleadno	LEucDPNyleadno	LEucDPNunfairboss	LEucDPNunfairboss	LEucDPNunfairboss
Turkish nationality (d)	0.103*** (0.026)			0.248*** (0.029)		
Male (d)		0.000 (0.040)	0.069 (0.045)		0.054 (0.047)	0.008 (0.059)
Age in years		0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
High level of education (d)		-0.010 (0.050)	0.017 (0.056)		0.058 (0.052)	0.177** (0.053)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.026 (0.064)	-0.004 (0.063)		0.198* (0.093)	0.140 (0.094)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.001* (0.001)			-0.001 (0.001)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.058 (0.055)			-0.071 (0.060)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.086* (0.043)			-0.006 (0.060)
Constant	-0.380*** (0.019)	-0.206 (0.154)	-0.147 (0.142)	-0.592*** (0.020)	-0.962*** (0.260)	-0.944*** (0.256)
F	15.9	.0667	2.81	72	1.77	2.06
r ² _a	.0393	-.0291	.0108	.168	.0224	.0192
rmse	.246	.224	.212	.273	.264	.263
N	352	137	113	352	137	113

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Turkish and Swiss participants (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Turkish participants to the Swiss (TR vs. CH). "PN" stands for personal norm, yleadno (employee reluctantly follows instructions of a younger team leader), unfairboss (employee accepts unfair treatment by the boss). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.22: OLS - Cross-national differences in personal norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Turkish vs. Swiss sample (2)

	LEucDPN15late	LEucDPN15late	LEucDPN15late	LEucDPNhetteam	LEucDPNhetteam	LEucDPNhetteam
Turkish nationality (d)	-0.063** (0.024)			-0.047 (0.026)		
Male (d)		-0.015 (0.034)	0.010 (0.034)		0.030 (0.040)	0.002 (0.055)
Age in years		-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
High level of education (d)		0.007 (0.047)	-0.009 (0.070)		0.077 (0.055)	0.076 (0.054)
Desirability score (in log)		0.048 (0.030)	0.055 (0.037)		-0.017 (0.083)	-0.017 (0.064)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.000 (0.000)			-0.001* (0.000)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.007 (0.049)			-0.121** (0.043)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.046 (0.030)			0.066 (0.052)
Constant	-0.607*** (0.020)	-0.777*** (0.099)	-0.755*** (0.115)	-0.848*** (0.017)	-0.831** (0.247)	-0.809*** (0.209)
F	7.16	.705	.516	3.29	1.79	10.1
r2_a	.0151	-.0232	-.0393	.00346	.00571	.113
rmse	.232	.166	.15	.223	.122	.116
N	352	137	113	249	41	34

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Turkish and Swiss participants (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Turkish participants to the Swiss (TR vs. CH). "PN" stands for personal norm, 15late (employee is running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work), hetteam (employees are working together in mixed gender teams). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.23: OLS - Cross-national differences in (perceived) social norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Turkish vs. Swiss sample

	LEucDSNmcritoth	LEucDSNmcritoth	LEucDSNmcritoth	LEucDSNtaskclear	LEucDSNtaskclear	LEucDSNtaskclear
Turkish nationality (d)	0.070** (0.025)			0.086** (0.026)		
Male (d)		-0.021 (0.040)	0.034 (0.049)		0.101* (0.042)	0.109* (0.051)
Age in years		-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)		-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
High level of education (d)		-0.008 (0.063)	0.002 (0.077)		0.001 (0.055)	0.030 (0.083)
Desirability score (in log)		0.029 (0.092)	-0.005 (0.106)		0.146 (0.090)	0.172 (0.099)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.001 (0.001)			0.001* (0.000)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.026 (0.062)			-0.069 (0.062)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.043 (0.042)			-0.041 (0.044)
Constant	-0.263*** (0.017)	-0.124 (0.246)	-0.065 (0.292)	-0.391*** (0.018)	-0.735*** (0.217)	-0.799*** (0.232)
F	7.94	.478	.761	10.9	2.12	2.12
r2 _a	.0189	-.0125	-.0337	.0268	.0378	.0156
rmse	.234	.217	.215	.246	.227	.236
N	351	137	113	351	137	113

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Turkish and Swiss participants (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Turkish participants to the Swiss (TR vs. CH). "SN" stands for social norm, mcritoth (an employee criticizes a colleague in front of others), taskclear (employee acts as if (s)he had understood the instructions by the boss although (s)he did not). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.24: OLS - Cross-national differences in guessing the Swiss social norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Turkish vs. Swiss sample

	LEucDCHsnNoshift	LEucDCHsnNoshift	LEucDCHsnNoshift	LEucDCHsn15late	LEucDCHsn15late	LEucDCHsn15late
Turkish nationality (d)	0.094*** (0.023)			-0.081*** (0.020)		
Male (d)		-0.023 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.026)		-0.018 (0.015)	0.002 (0.017)
Age in years		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
High level of education (d)		0.031 (0.047)	0.041 (0.055)		0.041* (0.016)	0.067** (0.020)
Desirability score (in log)		0.149* (0.059)	0.113 (0.061)		0.006 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.029)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.000* (0.000)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.036 (0.034)			-0.036 (0.028)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.007 (0.027)			-0.010 (0.012)
Constant	-0.536*** (0.019)	-0.737*** (0.147)	-0.697*** (0.145)	-0.578*** (0.019)	-0.733*** (0.070)	-0.703*** (0.064)
F	16.6	2.69	1.48	15.8	2.75	4.31
r ² _a	.0379	.0366	.0185	.0331	.0245	.0513
rmse	.227	.16	.15	.21	.0759	.0702
N	352	137	113	352	137	113

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Turkish and Swiss participants (TR-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Turkish participants to the Swiss (TR vs. CH). "CHsn" stands for the Swiss social norm, Noshift (employee feels to tired to take over the workshift of a colleague, apologizes and does not take over the shift), 15late (employee is running 15 minutes late for an appointment at work). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

(Relative) cross-national differences in personal and (perceived) social norms and beliefs about the Swiss social norms for individual vignettes - Afghan vs. Swiss

Table A.25: OLS - Cross-national differences in personal norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample (1)

	LEucDPNScrit	LEucDPNScrit	LEucDPNScrit	LEucDPNtaskclear	LEucDPNtaskclear	LEucDPNtaskclear
Afghan nationality (d)	0.095*			0.119**		
	(0.047)			(0.040)		
Male (d)		-0.078	-0.106		-0.019	-0.101
		(0.094)	(0.114)		(0.083)	(0.085)
Age in years		0.004	0.008		0.004	-0.002
		(0.007)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.006)
High level of education (d)		-0.231*	-0.313*		-0.081	-0.034
		(0.097)	(0.117)		(0.078)	(0.091)
Desirability score (in log)		0.226	-0.042		-0.023	-0.103
		(0.336)	(0.467)		(0.225)	(0.254)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.003			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.250			0.133
			(0.138)			(0.097)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.082			-0.196
			(0.145)			(0.104)
Constant	-0.663***	-1.162	-0.690	-0.551***	-0.483	-0.109
	(0.017)	(0.964)	(1.335)	(0.019)	(0.643)	(0.763)
F	4.01	2.51	2.18	8.69	.447	.892
r2 _a	.017	.0129	.0743	.032	-.0386	.0116
rmse	.303	.384	.367	.286	.309	.273
N	281	61	49	281	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "PN" stands for personal norm, Scrit (employee cautiously criticizing a colleague who is making mistakes in doing the job), taskclear (employee acts as if (s)he had understood the instructions by the boss although (s)he did not). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.26: OLS - Cross-national differences in personal norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample (2)

	LEucDPNeyecontff	LEucDPNeyecontff	LEucDPNeyecontff	LEucDPNeyecontmm	LEucDPNeyecontmm	LEucDPNeyecontmm
Afghan nationality (d)	0.090 (0.048)			0.130* (0.051)		
Male (d)		-0.097 (0.121)	-0.059 (0.141)		-0.133 (0.128)	-0.202 (0.160)
Age in years		-0.016* (0.007)	-0.025** (0.007)		-0.012 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.008)
High level of education (d)		0.062 (0.108)	-0.042 (0.136)		0.011 (0.116)	-0.146 (0.116)
Desirability score (in log)		0.079 (0.340)	-0.404 (0.361)		-0.043 (0.343)	-0.398 (0.383)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.002)			-0.003 (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.260 (0.130)			0.176 (0.130)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.207 (0.152)			-0.206 (0.148)
Constant	-0.737*** (0.018)	-0.335 (0.972)	1.120 (1.037)	-0.776*** (0.018)	-0.082 (1.015)	0.997 (1.111)
F	3.56	2.79	2.17	6.64	1.15	1.66
r2.a	.0147	.038	.11	.0314	-.0143	.0676
rmse	.306	.396	.389	.316	.427	.393
N	281	61	49	281	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "PN" stands for personal norm, eyecontff (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.27: OLS - Cross-national differences in personal norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample (3)

	LEucDPNeyecontfm	LEucDPNeyecontfm	LEucDPNeyecontfm	LEucDPNeyecontmf	LEucDPNeyecontmf	LEucDPNeyecontmf
Afghan nationality (d)	0.180*** (0.049)			0.236*** (0.053)		
Male (d)		0.017 (0.123)	-0.107 (0.144)		-0.001 (0.117)	-0.120 (0.135)
Age in years		-0.001 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.010)		-0.008 (0.009)	-0.017* (0.008)
High level of education (d)		-0.089 (0.104)	-0.046 (0.129)		-0.060 (0.131)	-0.056 (0.150)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.118 (0.375)	-0.482 (0.378)		-0.577 (0.390)	-0.681 (0.385)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.002)			-0.003 (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.143 (0.137)			0.081 (0.152)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.373* (0.143)			-0.357** (0.120)
Constant	-0.763*** (0.018)	-0.255 (1.102)	1.110 (1.123)	-0.718*** (0.018)	1.223 (1.121)	1.908 (1.094)
F	13.4	.267	1.46	19.4	.937	2.69
r2.a	.062	-.0533	.0411	.0938	.000436	.117
rmse	.314	.415	.418	.331	.452	.406
N	281	61	49	281	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "PN" stands for personal norm, eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion), eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.28: OLS - Cross-national differences in (perceived) social norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample (1)

	LEucDSNeyecontfm	LEucDSNeyecontfm	LEucDSNeyecontfm	LEucDSNeyecontmf	LEucDSNeyecontmf	LEucDSNeyecontmf
Afghan nationality (d)	0.159** (0.049)			0.145** (0.047)		
Male (d)		-0.209 (0.126)	-0.274* (0.127)		-0.247* (0.116)	-0.265* (0.124)
Age in years		-0.009 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.008)		-0.002 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
High level of education (d)		0.003 (0.136)	-0.081 (0.132)		0.113 (0.127)	-0.032 (0.123)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.366 (0.388)	-0.780* (0.384)		0.019 (0.360)	-0.511 (0.305)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.004 (0.002)			-0.005* (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.394** (0.114)			0.254* (0.110)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.295* (0.134)			-0.267* (0.123)
Constant	-0.580*** (0.020)	0.951 (1.110)	2.136* (1.056)	-0.525*** (0.020)	-0.201 (1.047)	1.334 (0.858)
F	10.5	1.38	3.83	9.31	1.24	4.22
r ² _a	.0454	.0129	.244	.0388	.0268	.218
rmse	.323	.43	.371	.317	.39	.34
N	280	61	49	280	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcomes of specifications 1 and 4 are relative mean EucDs between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2,3,5 and 6 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "SN" stands for social norm, eyecontfm (female employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion), eyecontmf (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with female boss during a discussion). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.29: OLS - Cross-national differences in (perceived) social norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample (2)

	LEucDSNtaskclear	LEucDSNtaskclear	LEucDSNtaskclear
Afghan nationality (d)	0.094** (0.031)		
Male (d)		-0.066 (0.062)	-0.021 (0.073)
Age in years		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)
High level of education (d)		0.093 (0.070)	0.048 (0.075)
Desirability score (in log)		0.166 (0.154)	0.172 (0.181)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.060 (0.080)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.081 (0.096)
Constant	-0.391*** (0.018)	-0.583 (0.449)	-0.735 (0.506)
F	8.83	1.81	.923
r2.a	.0253	.0237	-.0634
rmse	.25	.231	.242
N	281	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcome of specification 1 is the relative mean EucD between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2 and 3 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "SN" stands for social norm, taskclear (employee acts as if (s)he had understood the instructions by the boss although (s)he did not). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.30: OLS - Cross-national differences in guessing the Swiss social norms, mean EucD at the level of individual vignettes (in log) - Afghan vs. Swiss sample

	LEucDCHsnEyecontmm	LEucDCHsnEyecontmm	LEucDCHsnEyecontmm
Afghan nationality (d)	0.106*		
	(0.047)		
Male (d)		0.051	0.012
		(0.101)	(0.136)
Age in years		-0.009	-0.010
		(0.007)	(0.008)
High level of education (d)		0.019	-0.141
		(0.112)	(0.113)
Desirability score (in log)		0.066	-0.226
		(0.304)	(0.330)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.003
			(0.002)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			0.258*
			(0.110)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.039
			(0.119)
Constant	-0.582***	-0.441	0.347
	(0.020)	(0.897)	(0.992)
F	5.17	1.71	1.41
r ² .a	.0201	-.00815	.0174
rmse	.313	.351	.35
N	279	61	49

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The outcome of specification 1 is the relative mean EucD between Afghan and Swiss participants (AFG-CH vs. CH-CH). Outcomes of specifications 2 and 3 are mean EucDs of Afghan participants to the Swiss (AFG vs. CH). "CHsn" stands for Swiss social norm, Eyecontmm (male employee is maintaining direct eye contact with male boss during a discussion). Standard errors are in brackets and heteroskedasticity-robust.

Beliefs about the Swiss social norms, by nationality

Table A.31: Refugees and Swiss guesses of the Swiss social norms

Vignette	TR guessing CH SN			AFG guessing CH SN			(CH guessing) CH SN		
	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)	Mean	Mode	modal response given by (%)
Reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-.6516129	-1	55.48	-.4650602	-.6	37.35	-.1816327	-.2	29.95
Mistake by colleague: no criticism	-.6154839	-1	44.52	-.3879518	-1	30.12	-.377551	-.6	27.92
Mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	.7858065	1	70.97	.6096386	.6	40.96	.6938776	1	51.78
Mistake by colleague: direct criticism	.5303226	.6	40.00	.6	1	45.78	.4673469	.6	39.09
Mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	-.4296774	-1	44.52	-.3156627	-1	30.12	-.3204082	-.6	26.90
Unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-.5690323	-1	40.65	.060241	.6	27.71	.0836735	-.2	28.93
Advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-.3445161	-.6	34.19	.2337349	.2	25.30	.1714286	.2	36.55
Task unclear: act as if it was clear	-.8606452	-1	70.97	-.6433735	-1	48.19	-.2877551	-.6	30.46
Task unclear: ask boss to explain again	.8967742	1	85.16	.8409639	1	73.49	.6734694	1	45.69
Insulted by colleague: inform boss	.3780645	.6	34.84	.2240964	1	22.89	.0306122	-.2	24.87
Insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	.7419355	1	64.52	.7060241	1	55.42	.6653061	1	46.70
Mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-.6307692	-1	46.15	-.3253012	-1; -0.6	27.71	-.2673469	-.6	30.46
Colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	.9102564	1	85.26	.686747	1	59.04	.5163265	.6	41.12
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	-.2564103	-1	28.21	.1036145	.2	27.71	.2387755	.2	30.46
Colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	.0230769	.6	25.00	.2096386	.6	33.73	.355102	.6	35.03
Appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-.5589744	-.6	38.46	-.3493976	-.6	37.35	-.3877551	-.2	36.04
Appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-.8897436	-1	76.92	-.6915663	-1	56.63	-.7346939	-1	62.94
Discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.7780645	1	62.58	.460241	.6	37.35	.5755102	.6	40.10
Discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.7909677	1	67.74	.5180723	1	38.55	.6387755	1	43.15
Discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.7677419	1	62.58	.4361446	1	33.73	.5795918	.6	41.62
Discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.7987097	1	67.10	.4506024	1; 0.6	33.73	.6265306	1	41.62
Mixed gender teamwork	.9320755	1	86.79	.6857143	.6	50.00	.7061225	1	48.22

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate" (1), "Appropriate" (0.6), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.2), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.2), "Inappropriate" (-0.6) and "Very inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Dark red marks values ranging from (-1) to (-0.6), medium dark red values from (-0.6) to (-0.2) and light red from (-0.2) to 0. Light green (0-0.2), medium dark green (0.21-0.6), dark green (0.61-1). Blue shaded fields indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who chose the modal response when guessing the Swiss social norm. The darker the blue colour, the larger the share of participants choosing the modal response. Very light blue (49-49%), light blue (50-59%), medium dark blue (60-69%), dark blue (70-79%). Grey fields in the column for Afghans indicate multi-modal responses.

Robustness tests - 4 response categories

Table A.32: Personal norms - 4 response categories

4 response categories	TR personal norms			AFG personal norms			CH personal norms		
	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-0.8162393	-1	85.26	-0.6235294	-1	74.12	-0.4013605	-1	44.67
mistake by colleague: no criticism	-0.7991453	-1	80.77	-0.5294118	-1	57.65	-0.6190476	-1	59.39
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	0.8418803	1	89.10	0.5843137	1	70.59	0.8027211	1	77.66
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	0.6025641	1	69.87	0.6470588	1	75.29	0.6666667	1	64.97
mistake by colleague: criticise in presence of others	-0.474359	-1	62.82	-0.3647059	-1	56.47	-0.2414966	-1	35.03
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-0.7393162	-1	76.28	-0.0588235	-1	30.59	-0.1530612	-0.333	44.16
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-0.3803419	-1	53.21	0.2470588	1	42.35	0.1020408	0.333	34.01
task unclear: act as if it was clear	-0.8803419	-1	90.38	-0.6784314	-1	78.82	-0.6020408	-1	58.38
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	0.9273504	1	95.51	0.8588235	1	90.59	0.8809524	1	86.29
insulted by colleague: inform boss	0.4615385	1	60.26	0.3490196	1	51.76	0.2244898	1	35.53
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	0.8717949	1	90.38	0.772549	1	78.82	0.8571429	1	83.76
mistake: criticised by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-0.7350427	-1	76.28	-0.2784314	-1	54.12	-0.537415	-1	53.30
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	0.9401709	1	96.15	0.7960784	1	85.88	0.8265306	1	80.20
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	-0.1495726	-1	35.90	0.1764706	1	38.82	0.0361122	-0.3333333	31.98
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	0.0299145	1	35.90	0.2	1	44.71	0.4557823	1	46.70
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-0.6153846	-1	60.26	-0.5294118	-1	52.94	-0.6258503	-1	62.94
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-0.9059829	-1	87.82	-0.8117647	-1	81.18	-0.8265306	-1	85.79
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	0.8290598	1	85.26	0.3882353	1	55.29	0.8367347	1	82.23
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	0.8418803	1	87.82	0.6392157	1	72.94	0.8367347	1	81.73
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	0.8162393	1	83.97	0.5137255	1	58.82	0.8401361	1	82.74
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	0.8376068	1	87.18	0.6078431	1	70.59	0.8401361	1	81.22
mixed gender team work	0.9748428	1	96.23	0.862069	1	79.31	0.877551	1	84.77

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate or appropriate" (1), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.33), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.33), "Very inappropriate or inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Blue shaded fields represent salient or "strong" personal norms indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who indicated the modal response (the darker the blue, the larger the share). Grey fields in the column for Afghans indicate multi-modal responses.

Table A.33: (Mis)alignments in personal norms - 4 response categories

(Mis)alignments in personal norms (4 response categories)	TR vs CH			AFG vs CH		
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH rank-sum pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH rank-sum pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	TR, CH	0.000000	0.815647	AFG, CH	0.000339	0.100395
mistake by colleague: no criticism	TR	0.000040	0.394367	AFG, CH	0.476759	0.142049
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	TR, CH	0.010478	0.643795	AFG, CH	0.074051	0.003079
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	TR	0.773770	0.022106	AFG, CH	0.267766	0.096486
mistake by colleague: criticise in presence of others	TR	0.000111	0.001150	AFG	0.060797	0.004170
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	TR, CH	0.000000	0.000000	CH	0.419472	0.000199
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	TR	0.000000	0.000000	AFG	0.046433	0.000057
task unclear: act as if it was clear	TR, CH	0.000000	0.204457	AFG, CH	0.012538	0.144054
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	TR, CH	0.004634	0.644467	AFG, CH	0.415237	0.413766
insulted by colleague: inform boss	TR	0.000258	0.003778	AFG	0.096220	0.034217
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	TR, CH	0.091636	0.721788	AFG, CH	0.270316	0.153153
mistake: criticised by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	TR	0.000039	0.826032	AFG, CH	0.124199	0.000048
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	TR, CH	0.000005	0.106574	AFG, CH	0.373872	0.250781
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift		0.020293	0.039092		0.115100	0.033796
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	CH	0.000004	0.000000	AFG, CH	0.076541	0.000094
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	TR, CH	0.678282	0.701500	AFG, CH	0.116357	0.721367
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	TR, CH	0.524067	0.007173	AFG, CH	0.363454	0.815655
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.542098	0.545200	AFG, CH	0.000000	0.000004
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.163107	0.534489	AFG, CH	0.049701	0.007246
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.869669	0.378796	AFG, CH	0.000011	0.000258
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.191850	0.411645	AFG, CH	0.018878	0.002447
mixed gender team work	TR, CH	0.025630	0.001153	AFG, CH	0.615735	0.854882

Note: TR(Turkish), AFG(Afghan), CH(Swiss). Light blue shaded fields indicate significant differences after a B-H. correction, dark blue shaded fields indicate in which vignette and regarding which nationality we have identified a misalignment in personal norms across groups.

Table A.34: Social norms - 4 response categories

4 response categories Vignette	TR social norms			AFG social norms			CH social norms		
	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-4709677	-1	63.23	-4444444	-1	58.33	-255102	-1	37.06
mistake by colleague: no criticism	-7462366	-1	74.84	-3809524	-1	55.95	-4897959	-1	53.30
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	8924731	1	92.26	8095238	1	83.33	8163265	1	80.20
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	7333333	1	76.13	6984127	1	77.38	6190476	1	65.48
mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	-5182796	-1	67.10	-2857143	-1	53.57	-4013605	-1	51.27
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-3935484	-1	55.48	0634921	1	33.33	0986395	-3333333	28.93
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-0752688	-1	39.35	3333333	1	48.24	2312925	3333333	36.55
task unclear: act as if it was clear	-6989247	-1	77.42	-6470588	-1	72.94	-4013605	-1	46.19
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	8752688	1	90.32	8901961	1	91.76	8231293	1	80.71
insulted by colleague: inform boss	3419355	1	51.61	3174603	1	53.57	037415	1	29.95
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	888172	1	90.32	8492064	1	85.71	8061225	1	78.68
mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-544086	-1	66.45	-4117647	-1	52.94	-3843537	-1	45.18
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	9139785	1	91.61	7539683	1	79.76	6802721	1	70.05
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	1569892	1	40.65	2857143	1	50.00	3197279	1	40.61
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	1741935	1	41.94	2698413	1	47.62	4931973	1	52.28
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-2903226	-1	40.00	-3176471	-3333333	37.65	-5510204	-1	50.25
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-7075269	-1	74.19	-7411765	-1	77.65	-8129252	-1	84.26
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	5956989	1	66.45	3412698	1	52.38	7312925	1	76.65
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	8150538	1	85.16	5873016	1	67.86	7857143	1	79.19
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	5655914	1	63.87	3412698	1	52.38	7414966	1	76.65
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	8236559	1	86.45	5873016	1	65.48	7789116	1	80.71
mixed gender team work	8238994	1	81.13	6551724	1	68.97	8605442	1	83.76

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate or appropriate" (1), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.33), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.33), "Very inappropriate or inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Blue shaded fields represent social norms indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who indicated the modal response (the darker the blue, the larger the share). Grey fields in the column for Afghans indicate multi-modal responses.

Table A.35: (Mis)alignments in social norms - 4 response categories

(Mis)alignments in social norms (4 response categories) Vignette	TR vs CH		AFG vs CH			
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH rank-sum pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH rank-sum pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	TR	0.000413	0.006804	AFG	0.011761	0.074930
mistake by colleague: no criticism	TR, CH	0.000023	0.064278	AFG, CH	0.612466	0.029321
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	TR, CH	0.001859	0.502740	AFG, CH	0.609069	0.620092
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	TR, CH	0.031286	0.332758	AFG, CH	0.085202	0.830468
mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	TR, CH	0.027334	0.295426	AFG, CH	0.541113	0.021405
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	TR	0.000000	0.000000		0.812978	0.004746
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow		0.000939	0.000000	AFG	0.083348	0.004048
task unclear: act as if it was clear	TR, CH	0.000000	0.387555	AFG, CH	0.000333	0.443007
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	TR, CH	0.017064	0.770721	AFG, CH	0.024248	0.654120
insulted by colleague: inform boss	TR	0.000177	0.004100	AFG	0.004379	0.002098
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	TR, CH	0.004088	0.355967	AFG, CH	0.201154	0.797399
mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	TR, CH	0.001699	0.097499	AFG, CH	0.492495	0.320011
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	TR, CH	0.000000	0.001009	AFG, CH	0.125437	0.822239
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	TR, CH	0.134991	0.000511	AFG, CH	0.796446	0.007722
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	TR, CH	0.000774	0.000005	AFG, CH	0.079454	0.002763
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	TR, CH	0.001203	0.000112	CH	0.002139	0.065727
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	TR, CH	0.019389	0.200391	AFG, CH	0.180315	0.470341
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.030004	0.084560	AFG, CH	0.000022	0.000336
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.190403	0.980056	AFG, CH	0.025972	0.018083
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.006195	0.017718	AFG, CH	0.000015	0.000158
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	TR, CH	0.182379	0.669262	AFG, CH	0.007308	0.053749
mixed gender team work	TR, CH	0.625675	0.583778	AFG, CH	0.048351	0.125180

Note: TR(Turkish), AFG(Afghan), CH(Swiss). Light blue shaded fields indicate significant differences after a B-H. correction, dark blue shaded fields indicate in which vignette and regarding which nationality we have identified a misalignment in social norms across groups.

Table A.36: Refugees and Swiss guessing the Swiss social norms - 4 response categories

4 response categories	TR guessing CH SN			AFG guessing CH SN			CH guessing CH SN		
	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %	Mean	Mode	Modal response given by %
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction	-.7419355	-1	79.35	-.5823293	-1	71.08	-.255102	-1	37.06
mistake by colleague: no criticism	-.7333333	-1	75.48	-.4859438	-1	56.63	-.4897959	-1	53.30
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	.8494624	1	89.03	.7751004	1	80.72	.8163265	1	80.20
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	.6688172	1	74.84	.7269076	1	78.31	.6190476	1	65.48
mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	-.4451613	-1	63.23	-.373494	-1	57.83	-.4013605	-1	51.27
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept	-.6989247	-1	77.42	.0923695	1	36.14	.0986395	-.333	28.93
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow	-.4408602	-1	61.29	.2931727	1	44.58	.2312925	.333	36.55
task unclear: act as if it was clear	-.9655914	-1	97.42	-.7751004	-1	83.13	-.4013605	-1	46.19
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	.9354839	1	96.77	.9196787	1	93.98	.8231293	1	80.71
insulted by colleague: inform boss	.488172	1	62.58	.253012	1	44.58	.037415	1	29.95
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	.8193548	1	85.81	.815261	1	84.34	.8061225	1	78.68
mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	-.7692308	-1	82.05	-.4136546	-1	55.42	-.3843537	-1	45.18
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	.957265	1	96.79	.7751004	1	84.34	.6802721	1	70.05
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	-.2948718	-1	51.92	.1485944	1	33.73	.3197279	1	40.61
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	.0384615	1	40.38	.2931727	1	49.40	.4931973	1	52.28
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	-.7179487	-1	70.51	-.4859438	-1	53.01	-.5510204	-1	50.25
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	-.9700855	-1	95.51	-.7991968	-1	81.93	-.8129252	-1	84.26
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.883871	1	88.39	.5903614	1	68.67	.7312925	1	76.65
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	.8709677	1	89.03	.6305221	1	73.49	.7857143	1	79.19
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.8666667	1	88.39	.5421687	1	65.06	.7414966	1	76.65
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	.8924731	1	92.26	.5502008	1	67.47	.7789116	1	80.71
mixed gender team work	.9748428	1	98.11	.9047619	1	85.71	.8605442	1	83.76

Note: "TR" is the abbreviation for Turkish, "AFG" for Afghan, and "CH" for Swiss. Each response option was assigned a numerical score: "Very appropriate or appropriate" (1), "Somewhat appropriate" (0.33), "Somewhat inappropriate" (-0.33), "Very inappropriate or inappropriate" (-1). Green shaded fields indicate positive modal and mean ratings (expressing appropriateness), reddish fields stand for negative ones (expressing inappropriateness). Blue shaded fields indicating whether there was a share of at least 40 percent of participants among each nationality who indicated the modal response when guessing the Swiss social norm (the darker the blue, the larger the share).

Table A.37: (Mis)understandings of Swiss social norms - 4 response categories

(Mis)understandings Swiss social norms (4 response categories)	TR vs CH			AFG vs CH		
	40% mo: TR/CH	TR-CH rank-sum pval	TR-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval	40% mo: AFG/CH	AFG-CH rank-sum pval	AFG-CH vs CH-CH EucD pval
reluctantly follow young leader's instruction		0.000000	0.059156		0.000496	0.011281
mistake by colleague: no criticism	CH SN	0.000000	0.234267	CH SN	0.283720	0.589187
mistake by colleague: cautious criticism	CH SN	0.000015	0.810165	CH SN	0.000031	0.347088
mistake by colleague: direct criticism	CH SN	0.000001	0.612402	CH SN	0.000001	0.827843
mistake by colleague: criticize in presence of others	CH SN	0.611171	0.088567	CH SN	0.533368	0.115800
unfair treatment by boss: do not oppose, accept		0.000000	0.000000		0.001943	0.001276
advice by older colleague: disagree but follow		0.000000	0.000000		0.225765	0.008995
task unclear: act as if it was clear	CH SN	0.000000	0.361945	CH SN	0.000000	0.682280
task unclear: ask boss to explain again	CH SN	0.062500	0.180335	CH SN	0.062500	0.284656
insulted by colleague: inform boss		0.000000	0.000124		0.000002	0.167235
insulted by colleague: resolve issue in private	CH SN	0.000000	0.560600	CH SN	0.000244	0.688915
mistake: criticized by boss, feeling insulted, avoid boss	CH SN	0.000000	0.841548	CH SN	0.935083	0.183909
colleague asks to take over shift: not take shift	CH SN	0.000000	0.000243	CH SN	0.000000	0.991483
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift	CH SN	0.000000	0.000000	CH SN	0.809148	0.125142
colleague asks to take over shift: take shift if returned	CH SN	0.000000	0.000000	CH SN	0.394676	0.003978
appointment at work: 5 minutes late	CH SN	0.000000	0.934142	CH SN	0.000025	0.086082
appointment at work: 15 minutes late	CH SN	0.015625	0.000038	CH SN	0.000061	0.997904
discussion employee (m) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.004973	CH SN	0.010411	0.107958
discussion employee (f) - boss (f): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000015	0.272983	CH SN	0.000000	0.036818
discussion employee (f) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000000	0.067023	CH SN	0.036182	0.030086
discussion employee (m) - boss (m): employee maintains direct eye contact	CH SN	0.000488	0.122644	CH SN	0.000000	0.013961
mixed gender team work	CH SN	1.000.000	0.017618	CH SN	0.125000	0.139646

Notes: TR(Turkish), AFG(Afghan), CH(Swiss). Light blue shaded fields indicate significant differences after a B-H. correction, dark blue shaded fields indicate in which vignette by which refugee group we have identified a misunderstanding of the Swiss social norm.

Appendix Chapter 2

Descriptive statistics across national groups and treatments

Table B.1: Summary statistics

	Swiss		Turkish		Afghan	
Male	0.51	(0.50)	0.63	(0.49)	0.68	(0.47)
Age in years	47.87	(16.19)	35.67	(7.75)	28.65	(7.78)
High education	0.53	(0.50)	0.81	(0.40)	0.31	(0.46)
Intermediate education	0.38	(0.49)	0.12	(0.33)	0.31	(0.46)
Low education	0.08	(0.28)	0.07	(0.26)	0.39	(0.49)
Job in Switzerland	0.66	(0.47)	0.08	(0.28)	0.13	(0.34)
Desirability score	10.76	(2.85)	12.80	(2.40)	13.16	(2.19)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	.	(.)	25.14	(26.38)	20.27	(22.39)
Had job in the home country	.	(.)	0.78	(0.42)	0.51	(0.50)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland	.	(.)	0.34	(0.48)	0.38	(0.49)
Observations	196		154		83	

Note: For each national group, the first column reports means. Standard deviations are noted in parentheses. Also note that the differences in characteristics observed between refugees and the Swiss are (mostly highly) significant (t- and rank-sum tests). Exceptions are the low level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Turkish respondents and the intermediate level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Afghan participants.

Table B.2: Descriptive statistics on personal norms about mixed gender teamwork, Swiss Baseline

	Baseline (CH)	
PN appropriateness rating: Mean (sd)	0.70	(0.33)
Observations	196	

Table B.3: Descriptive statistics on personal norms about mixed gender teamwork, Turkish sample by experimental condition

	Baseline (TR)		Social Info (TR)		Public Condition (TR)	
PN appropriateness rating: Mean (sd)	0.82	(0.23)	0.77	(0.34)	0.67	(0.39)
Observations	53		51		52	

Table B.4: Descriptive statistics on personal norms about mixed gender teamwork, Afghan sample by experimental condition

	Baseline (AFG)		Social Info (AFG)		Public Condition (AFG)	
PN appropriateness rating: Mean (sd)	0.67	(0.30)	0.56	(0.51)	0.69	(0.48)
Observations	29		28		28	

Table B.5: Randomization of characteristics across experimental conditions - Turkish sample

	Baseline (TR)	Social Info (TR)	Public Condition (TR)
Male	0.57	0.64	0.67
Age in years	35.06	35.86	36.08
High education	0.82	0.80	0.80
Intermediate education	0.10	0.12	0.14
Low education	0.08	0.08	0.06
Desirability score	12.20	13.02	13.10
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	31.25	21.67	21.87
Had job in the home country	0.78	0.80	0.77
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland	0.35	0.31	0.38
Observations	52	50	52

Table B.6: Randomization of characteristics across experimental conditions - Afghan sample

	Baseline (AFG)	Social Info (AFG)	Public Condition (AFG)
Male	0.85	0.50	0.70
Age in years	29.08	28.09	28.76
High education	0.38	0.21	0.33
Intermediate education	0.29	0.42	0.21
Low education	0.33	0.38	0.46
Desirability score	12.96	12.96	13.54
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	22.08	16.62	21.89
Had job in the home country	0.48	0.48	0.58
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland	0.35	0.38	0.40
Observations	28	27	28

Table B.7: Distribution of personal norms of Swiss, Turkish and Afghan Baseline groups

	-1	-0.6	-0.2	0.2	0.6	1	Total
CHnorms	1	1	2	26	78	88	196
	0.51	0.51	1.02	13.27	39.80	44.90	100.00
TR	0	0	0	2	20	31	53
	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.77	37.74	58.49	100.00
AFG	0	0	0	6	12	11	29
	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.69	41.38	37.93	100.00
Total	1	1	2	34	110	130	278
	0.36	0.36	0.72	12.23	39.57	46.76	100.00
<i>N</i>	278						

Note: Recall that 1 stands for "Very Appropriate", 0.6 for "Appropriate", 0.2 for "Somewhat appropriate", -0.2 for "Somewhat inappropriate", -0.6 for "Inappropriate" and -1 for "Very inappropriate".

Table B.8: Distribution of personal norms across Turkish experimental conditions

	-0.6	-0.2	0.2	0.6	1	Total
Baseline	0	0	2	20	31	53
	0.00	0.00	3.77	37.74	58.49	100.00
Social Info treatment	2	0	0	21	28	51
	3.92	0.00	0.00	41.18	54.90	100.00
Public Condition treatment	2	2	3	23	22	52
	3.85	3.85	5.77	44.23	42.31	100.00
Total	4	2	5	64	81	156
	2.56	1.28	3.21	41.03	51.92	100.00
<i>N</i>	156					

Note: Recall that 1 stands for "Very Appropriate", 0.6 for "Appropriate", 0.2 for "Somewhat appropriate", -0.2 for "Somewhat inappropriate", -0.6 for "Inappropriate" and -1 for "Very inappropriate".

Table B.9: Distribution of personal norms across Afghan experimental conditions

	-1	-0.6	-0.2	0.2	0.6	1	Total
Baseline	0	0	0	6	12	11	29
	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.69	41.38	37.93	100.00
Social Info treatment	2	0	0	4	13	9	28
	7.14	0.00	0.00	14.29	46.43	32.14	100.00
Public Condition treatment	0	1	3	2	5	17	28
	0.00	3.57	10.71	7.14	17.86	60.71	100.00
Total	2	1	3	12	30	37	85
	2.35	1.18	3.53	14.12	35.29	43.53	100.00
<i>N</i>	85						

Note: Recall that 1 stands for "Very Appropriate", 0.6 for "Appropriate", 0.2 for "Somewhat appropriate", -0.2 for "Somewhat inappropriate", -0.6 for "Inappropriate" and -1 for "Very inappropriate".

(Non)parametric testing of personal norms on mixed gender teamwork

Table B.10: (Non)parametric testing of personal norms, Baseline by national group

var name	pval	B.H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
pn_hetteam_CHvsTR_rs	0.026979	-		0.410 P(val (CH) >val (TR))
pn_hetteam_CHvsAFG_rs	0.439976	-		0.542 P(val (CH) >val (AFG))
pn_hetteam_TRvsAFG_rs	0.025663	-		0.634 P(val (TR) >val (AFG))
pn_hetteam_CHvsTR_tED	0.024850	-	0.2244837	
pn_hetteam_CHvsAFG_tED	0.727969	-	0.0505731	
pn_hetteam_TRAFG_tED	0.331396	-	0.2469797	
pn_hetteam_AFGTR_tED	0.044952	-	0.5792659	

Note: pn_hetteam stands for personal norms on mixed gender teamwork. Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). Rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 19 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/19 = 0.00263158$.

Table B.11: (Non)parametric testing of personal norms of Turkish and Afghan participants, by experimental condition

var name	pval	B.H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
pn_hetteam_TRBLT1_rs	0.684014	-		0.518 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
pn_hetteam_TRBLT2_rs	0.048260	-		0.599 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
pn_hetteam_TRT1T2_rs	0.125015	-		0.580 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
pn_hetteam_TRBLT1_tED	0.380431	-	0.1761042	
pn_hetteam_TRBLT2_tED	0.042724	-	0.4078071	
pn_hetteam_TRT1T2_tED	0.447614	-	0.1500389	
pn_hetteam_AFGBLT1_rs	0.644732	-		0.533 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
pn_hetteam_AFGBLT2_rs	0.306840	-		0.427 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
pn_hetteam_AFGT1T2_rs	0.130472	-		0.390 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
pn_hetteam_AFGBLT1_tED	0.335370	-	0.2632246	
pn_hetteam_AFGBLT2_tED	0.058433	-	0.5238568	
pn_hetteam_AFGT1T2_tED	0.793003	-	0.0705891	

Note: pn_hetteam stands for personal norms on mixed gender teamwork. Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 19 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/19 = 0.00263158$.

Table B.12: (Non)parametric testing of personal norms - Swiss Baseline vs. refugee Social Info and Public Condition treatment groups

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
pn_hetteam_CHBLvAFGT1_rs	0.166557	-		0.575 P(val (CH BL) >val (AFG T1))
pn_hetteam_CHBLvAFGT2_rs	0.435735	-		0.458 P(val (CH BL) >val (AFG T2))
pn_hetteam_CHBLvTRT1_rs	0.084230	-		0.429 P(val (CH BL) >val (TR T1))
pn_hetteam_CHBLvTRT2_rs	0.805307	-		0.510 P(val (CH BL) >val (TR T2))
pn_hetteam_CHBLvAFGT1_tED	0.314193	-	0.3711509	
pn_hetteam_CHBLvAFGT2_tED	0.087433	-	0.4985314	
pn_hetteam_CHBLvTRT1_tED	0.870557	-	0.0294971	
pn_hetteam_CHBLvTRT2_tED	0.520480	-	0.1243199	

Note: pn_hetteam stands for personal norms on mixed gender teamwork. Swiss Baseline (CHBL), Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups).

Table B.13: Nonparametric testing for each response option to be chosen, across national groups and experimental conditions

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%
pn_hetteam1_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.108926	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam1_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.617375	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam1_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.120708	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam1_TRBLT1_rs	0.863971	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_TRBLT1_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam1_TRBLT2_rs	0.143112	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_TRBLT2_rs	0.485714	-
pn_hetteam1_TRT1T2_rs	0.279436	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_TRT1T2_rs	0.504854	-
pn_hetteam1_AFGBLT1_rs	0.857704	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_AFGBLT1_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam1_AFGBLT2_rs	0.145056	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_AFGBLT2_rs	0.223923	-
pn_hetteam1_AFGT1T2_rs	0.059756	-	pn_hetteam_neg02_AFGT1T2_rs	0.236364	-
pn_hetteam06_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_CHvsTR_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_CHvsAFG_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_TRvsAFG_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_TRBLT1_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_TRBLT1_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_TRBLT2_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_TRBLT2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_AFGBLT1_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_AFGBLT1_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_AFGBLT2_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_AFGBLT2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam06_AFGT1T2_rs	1.000	-	pn_hetteam_neg06_AFGT1T2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.072281	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_CHvsTR_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.421477	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_CHvsAFG_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.041614	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_TRBLT1_rs	0.514563	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_TRBLT1_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_TRBLT2_rs	0.981791	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_TRBLT2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_TRT1T2_rs	0.249928	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_AFGBLT1_rs	0.776325	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_AFGBLT1_rs	0.473684	-
pn_hetteam02_AFGBLT2_rs	0.275418	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_AFGBLT2_rs	1.000	-
pn_hetteam02_AFGT1T2_rs	0.669458	-	pn_hetteam_neg1_AFGT1T2_rs	0.490909	-

Note: pn_hetteam stands for personal norms on mixed gender teamwork. Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs). Also note that "1" stands for "Very appropriate", "06" is the abbreviation of "Appropriate", "02" for "Somewhat Appropriate", "neg02" stands for "Somewhat Inappropriate", "neg06" for "Inappropriate" and "neg1" for "Very Inappropriate". $P < 0.05$ marked in bold.

Explaining appropriateness ratings of personal norms on mixed gender teamwork

Table B.14: OLS - Turkish and Afghan personal norms on mixed gender teamwork (in log), by experimental condition (Baseline as reference)

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Social Info treatment (d)	0.035 (0.062)	-0.020 (0.056)	-0.007 (0.060)	0.041 (0.153)	0.197 (0.164)	0.063 (0.219)
Public Condition treatment (d)	-0.092 (0.078)	-0.163* (0.076)	-0.155 (0.084)	0.304* (0.147)	0.435** (0.150)	0.444** (0.160)
Male (d)		-0.041 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.062)		0.077 (0.131)	0.068 (0.169)
Age in years		-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)		-0.004 (0.010)	0.000 (0.013)
High level of education (d)		0.020 (0.066)	0.045 (0.081)		0.175 (0.140)	0.036 (0.158)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.018 (0.108)	-0.033 (0.112)		0.237 (0.347)	-0.202 (0.440)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.010** (0.004)
Had paid job in the home country (d)			-0.114 (0.067)			0.110 (0.235)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.043 (0.066)			0.034 (0.186)
Constant	-0.253*** (0.050)	0.061 (0.265)	0.029 (0.253)	-0.544*** (0.112)	-1.201 (0.962)	0.043 (1.256)
F	1.633	1.420	1.128	2.677	2.923	3.850
r ² _a	0.009	0.035	0.005	0.033	0.091	0.158
rmse	0.352	0.320	0.313	0.542	0.488	0.492
N	150	131	110	79	57	45

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Turkish (TR) and Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are noted in parentheses.

Appendix Chapter 3

Table C.1: Summary statistics

	Swiss		Turkish		Afghan	
Male	0.51	(0.50)	0.63	(0.49)	0.68	(0.47)
Age in years	44.36	(15.98)	35.67	(7.75)	28.65	(7.78)
High education	0.49	(0.50)	0.81	(0.40)	0.31	(0.46)
Intermediate education	0.41	(0.49)	0.12	(0.33)	0.31	(0.46)
Low education	0.09	(0.29)	0.07	(0.26)	0.39	(0.49)
Job in Switzerland	0.69	(0.46)	0.08	(0.28)	0.13	(0.34)
Desirability score	.	(.)	12.80	(2.40)	13.16	(2.19)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland	.	(.)	25.14	(26.38)	20.27	(22.39)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland	.	(.)	0.34	(0.48)	0.38	(0.49)
Observations	200		154		83	

Note: For each national group, the first column reports means. Standard deviations are noted in parentheses. Also note that the differences in characteristics observed between refugees and the Swiss are (mostly highly) significant (t- and rank-sum tests). Exceptions are the low level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Turkish respondents and the intermediate level of education which does not significantly differ between Swiss and Afghan participants.

Amounts sent by trustors across experimental conditions

Table C.2: Descriptive statistics about amounts sent by Swiss trustors, Baseline

Swiss Baseline		
Amount sent: mean (sd)	2.79	(1.65)
Observations	200	

Table C.3: Descriptive statistics about amounts sent by Turkish trustors, by experimental condition

	Baseline (TR)		Social Info (TR)		Public Condition (TR)	
Amount sent: mean (sd)	3.25	(1.39)	4.04	(1.11)	3.73	(1.29)
Observations	53		50		52	

Table C.4: Descriptive statistics about amounts sent by Afghan trustors, by experimental condition

	Baseline (AFG)		Social Info (AFG)		Public Condition (AFG)	
Amount sent: mean (sd)	2.21	(1.57)	2.78	(1.42)	3.18	(1.72)
Observations	28		27		28	

Table C.5: Distribution of amounts sent, Baseline by national group

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Swiss Baseline	22	25	42	41	24	46	200
	11.00	12.50	21.00	20.50	12.00	23.00	100.00
Turkish Baseline	2	2	12	17	5	15	53
	3.77	3.77	22.64	32.08	9.43	28.30	100.00
Afghan Baseline	4	6	7	6	1	4	28
	14.29	21.43	25.00	21.43	3.57	14.29	100.00
Total	28	33	61	64	30	65	281
	9.96	11.74	21.71	22.78	10.68	23.13	100.00
<i>N</i>	281						

Table C.6: Distribution of amounts sent by Turkish trustors, by experimental condition

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Baseline (TR)	2	2	12	17	5	15	53
	3.77	3.77	22.64	32.08	9.43	28.30	100.00
Social Info treatment (TR)	0	0	6	11	8	25	50
	0.00	0.00	12.00	22.00	16.00	50.00	100.00
Public Condition treatment (TR)	1	1	8	11	11	20	52
	1.92	1.92	15.38	21.15	21.15	38.46	100.00
Total	3	3	26	39	24	60	155
	1.94	1.94	16.77	25.16	15.48	38.71	100.00
<i>N</i>	155						

Table C.7: Distribution of amounts sent by Afghan trustors, by experimental condition

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Baseline (AFG)	4	6	7	6	1	4	28
	14.29	21.43	25.00	21.43	3.57	14.29	100.00
Social Info treatment (AFG)	0	5	10	3	4	5	27
	0.00	18.52	37.04	11.11	14.81	18.52	100.00
Public Condition treatment (AFG)	4	1	3	6	6	8	28
	14.29	3.57	10.71	21.43	21.43	28.57	100.00
Total	8	12	20	15	11	17	83
	9.64	14.46	24.10	18.07	13.25	20.48	100.00
<i>N</i>	83						

(Non)parametric testing of amounts sent across national groups and across experimental conditions

Table C.8: (Non)parametric testing of amounts sent, Baseline by national groups

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
tga_sent_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.072417	-		0.421 P(val (CH) >val (TR))
tga_sent_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.078403	-		0.601 P(val (CH) >val (AFG))
tga_sent_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.003289	*		0.692 P(val (TR) >val (AFG))
tga_sent_CHBLvsTRBL_tED	0.089996	-	0.2567223	
tga_sent_CHBLvsAFGBL_tED	0.536437	-	0.150156	
tga_sent_TRBLvsAFGBL_tED	0.397320	-	0.1993737	
tga_sent_AFGBLvsTRBL_tED	0.164151	-	0.3727605	

Note: tga_sent stands for the amount sent by trustors in the trust game. Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 38 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/38 = 0.00132$.

Table C.9: (Non)parametric testing of amounts sent by Turkish and Afghan trustors, by experimental condition

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
tga_sent_TRBLT1_rs	0.003073	*		0.339 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_sent_TRBLT2_rs	0.067516	-		0.400 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_sent_TRT1T2_rs	0.236274	-		0.565 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
tga_sent_TRBLT1_tED	0.677145	-	0.0817179	
tga_sent_TRBLT2_tED	0.923847	-	0.0186764	
tga_sent_TRT1T2_tED	0.252718	-	0.2260587	
tga_sent_AFGBLT1_rs	0.185503	-		0.399 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_sent_AFGBLT2_rs	0.026920	-		0.331 P(val (BL) >val (T2))
tga_sent_AFGT1T2_rs	0.235657	-		0.408 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
tga_sent_AFGBLT1_tED	0.701657	-	0.1020451	
tga_sent_AFGBLT2_tED	0.059042	-	0.5096645	
tga_sent_AFGT1T2_tED	0.118304	-	0.4242364	

Note: tga_sent stands for the amount sent by trustors in the trust game. Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 38 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/38 = 0.00132$.

Table C.10: Nonparametric testing of each possible amount being sent (as compared to not being sent), by national group and by experimental condition

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%
tga_sent0_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.168012	-	tga_sent3_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.115328	-
tga_sent0_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.798727	-	tga_sent3_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-
tga_sent0_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.208295	-	tga_sent3_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.456113	-
tga_sent0_TRBLT1_rs	0.524653	-	tga_sent3_TRBLT1_rs	0.354125	-
tga_sent0_TRBLT2_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent3_TRBLT2_rs	0.296177	-
tga_sent0_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent3_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-
tga_sent0_AFGBLT1_rs	0.120069	-	tga_sent3_AFGBLT1_rs	0.505910	-
tga_sent0_AFGBLT2_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent3_AFGBLT2_rs	1.000	-
tga_sent0_AFGT1T2_rs	0.120069	-	tga_sent3_AFGT1T2_rs	0.505910	-
tga_sent1_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.096328	-	tga_sent4_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.807722	-
tga_sent1_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.316718	-	tga_sent4_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.308094	-
tga_sent1_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.036376	-	tga_sent4_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.636646	-
tga_sent1_TRBLT1_rs	0.524653	-	tga_sent4_TRBLT1_rs	0.480797	-
tga_sent1_TRBLT2_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent4_TRBLT2_rs	0.160550	-
tga_sent1_TRT1T2_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent4_TRT1T2_rs	0.680375	-
tga_sent1_AFGBLT1_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent4_AFGBLT1_rs	0.328927	-
tga_sent1_AFGBLT2_rs	0.101181	-	tga_sent4_AFGBLT2_rs	0.101181	-
tga_sent1_AFGT1T2_rs	0.176370	-	tga_sent4_AFGT1T2_rs	0.777175	-
tga_sent2_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.926878	-	tga_sent5_CHBLvsTRBL_rs	0.527098	-
tga_sent2_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.787063	-	tga_sent5_CHBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.431894	-
tga_sent2_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	1.000	-	tga_sent5_TRBLvsAFGBL_rs	0.251923	-
tga_sent2_TRBLT1_rs	0.244713	-	tga_sent5_TRBLT1_rs	0.039305	-
tga_sent2_TRBLT2_rs	0.485912	-	tga_sent5_TRBLT2_rs	0.369780	-
tga_sent2_TRT1T2_rs	0.836451	-	tga_sent5_TRT1T2_rs	0.330203	-
tga_sent2_AFGBLT1_rs	0.500896	-	tga_sent5_AFGBLT1_rs	0.951560	-
tga_sent2_AFGBLT2_rs	0.295464	-	tga_sent5_AFGBLT2_rs	0.329013	-
tga_sent2_AFGT1T2_rs	0.045580	-	tga_sent5_AFGT1T2_rs	0.577342	-

Note: tga_sent stands for the amount sent by trustors in the trust game (the number behind the variable indicates the amount sent). Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold.

Explaining amounts sent across national groups and across experimental condition

Table C.11: OLS - Amounts sent by Turkish and Afghan trustors (in log), by experimental condition (Social Info treatment as reference)

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Baseline (d)	-0.213** (0.074)	-0.233** (0.084)	-0.188* (0.085)	-0.079 (0.158)	-0.233 (0.178)	-0.337 (0.186)
Public Condition treatment (d)	-0.076 (0.069)	-0.085 (0.071)	-0.079 (0.071)	0.362** (0.135)	0.309* (0.139)	0.262 (0.167)
Male (d)		0.168** (0.064)	0.229** (0.069)		0.137 (0.155)	0.081 (0.160)
Age in years		-0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.012)
High level of education (d)		-0.008 (0.078)	0.003 (0.081)		0.335* (0.131)	0.379* (0.147)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.036 (0.104)	-0.024 (0.110)		-0.820* (0.359)	-0.812* (0.363)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.001 (0.002)			0.005 (0.004)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			-0.043 (0.072)			0.049 (0.154)
Constant	1.351*** (0.045)	1.477*** (0.263)	1.323*** (0.266)	0.882*** (0.107)	2.936* (1.121)	2.951* (1.148)
F	4.18	2.27	1.95	6.23	3.9	3.62
r ² _a	.0412	.0677	.0826	.0981	.208	.249
rmse	.372	.369	.337	.517	.472	.457
N	152	134	117	75	55	47

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.12: OLS - Amounts sent by Turkish trustors (in log), by experimental condition including violence measures

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	TR (4)	TR (5)	TR (6)
Social Info treatment (d)	0.233** (0.084)	0.188* (0.085)	0.208 (0.111)	0.233* (0.099)	0.209* (0.096)	0.206* (0.094)
Public Condition treatment (d)	0.148 (0.089)	0.109 (0.086)	0.148 (0.106)	0.139 (0.091)	0.117 (0.092)	0.141 (0.090)
Male (d)	0.168** (0.064)	0.229** (0.069)	0.294** (0.090)	0.245** (0.079)	0.256** (0.082)	0.233** (0.077)
Age in years	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
High level of education (d)	-0.008 (0.078)	0.003 (0.081)	0.016 (0.132)	0.084 (0.104)	0.082 (0.110)	0.075 (0.108)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.036 (0.104)	-0.024 (0.110)	0.034 (0.168)	-0.007 (0.136)	-0.008 (0.129)	-0.023 (0.132)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland		0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)		-0.043 (0.072)	-0.080 (0.086)	-0.077 (0.081)	-0.094 (0.076)	-0.063 (0.079)
Number of fatalities in location of residence (in log)			-0.031 (0.030)			
Number of fatalities in province of residence (in log)				-0.037 (0.019)		
Number of (violent) incidences in location of residence (in log)					-0.036 (0.023)	
Number of (violent) incidences in province of residence (in log)						-0.055* (0.025)
Constant	1.244*** (0.234)	1.136*** (0.238)	0.896* (0.433)	1.154*** (0.294)	1.180*** (0.276)	1.426*** (0.338)
F	2.27	1.95	2.46	3.08	3.1	3.01
r2_a	.0677	.0826	.112	.131	.121	.144
rmse	.369	.337	.341	.334	.335	.33
N	134	117	70	91	93	93

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.13: OLS - Amounts sent by Afghan trustors (in log), by experimental condition including violence measures

	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)	AFG (4)	AFG (5)	AFG (6)
Social Info treatment (d)	0.233 (0.178)	0.337 (0.186)	0.444 (0.228)	0.352 (0.228)	0.349 (0.241)	0.417 (0.247)
Public Condition treatment (d)	0.542*** (0.149)	0.599*** (0.158)	0.744*** (0.168)	0.563* (0.200)	0.631*** (0.155)	0.640** (0.182)
Male (d)	0.137 (0.155)	0.081 (0.160)	0.119 (0.154)	0.181 (0.189)	0.223 (0.142)	0.072 (0.195)
Age in years	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.012)
High level of education (d)	0.335* (0.131)	0.379* (0.147)	0.316 (0.201)	0.374 (0.197)	0.200 (0.169)	0.318 (0.180)
Desirability score (in log)	-0.820* (0.359)	-0.812* (0.363)	-0.077 (0.351)	-0.522 (0.419)	-0.241 (0.354)	-0.260 (0.445)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland		0.005 (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)		0.049 (0.154)	0.328* (0.139)	0.341* (0.147)	0.328* (0.147)	0.350* (0.138)
Number of fatalities in location of residence (in log)			0.023 (0.037)			
Number of fatalities in province of residence (in log)				-0.028 (0.039)		
Number of (violent) incidences in location of residence (in log)					0.079* (0.036)	
Number of (violent) incidences in province of residence (in log)						0.038 (0.131)
Constant	2.702* (1.131)	2.614* (1.205)	0.601 (1.291)	2.139 (1.403)	0.616 (1.341)	1.118 (2.035)
F	3.9	3.62	9.63	7.08	14.1	6.95
r2_a	.208	.249	.436	.375	.476	.371
rmse	.472	.457	.369	.386	.353	.387
N	55	47	28	29	29	29

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: (d) indicates a dummy variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Trustors' beliefs about the amounts returned by the trustee across experimental conditions

Table C.14: Descriptive statistics about Swiss trustors' beliefs about the amount returned, Baseline

Swiss (CH) Baseline		
Beliefs: mean (sd)	3.56	(3.05)
Observations	200	

Table C.15: Descriptive statistics about Turkish trustors' beliefs about the amount returned, by experimental condition

	Baseline (TR)		Social Info (TR)		Public Condition (TR)	
Beliefs: mean (sd)	5.30	(3.44)	5.76	(3.65)	6.12	(3.54)
Observations	53		50		52	

Table C.16: Descriptive statistics about Afghan trustors' beliefs about the amount returned, by experimental condition

	Baseline (AFG)		Social Info (AFG)		Public Condition (AFG)	
Beliefs: mean (sd)	2.93	(3.05)	4.15	(2.61)	5.32	(4.14)
Observations	28		27		28	

Table C.17: Distribution of amounts expected to be returned, Baseline by national group

	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	15	Total
Swiss Baseline	22	4	14	43	31	17	24	17	12	2	2	8	2	2	200
	11.00	2.00	7.00	21.50	15.50	8.50	12.00	8.50	6.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	100.00
Turkish Baseline	2	0	4	3	7	7	10	5	4	3	0	5	1	2	53
	3.77	0.00	7.55	5.66	13.21	13.21	18.87	9.43	7.55	5.66	0.00	9.43	1.89	3.77	100.00
Afghan Baseline	4	0	2	6	9	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	28
	14.29	0.00	7.14	21.43	32.14	7.14	10.71	0.00	3.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.57	100.00
Total	28	4	20	52	47	26	37	22	17	5	2	13	3	5	281
	9.96	1.42	7.12	18.51	16.73	9.25	13.17	7.83	6.05	1.78	0.71	4.63	1.07	1.78	100.00
<i>N</i>	281														

Table C.18: Distribution of amounts expected to be returned, Turkish trustors by experimental condition

	-1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	15	Total
Baseline (TR)	2	4	3	7	7	10	5	4	3	0	5	1	2	53
	3.77	7.55	5.66	13.21	13.21	18.87	9.43	7.55	5.66	0.00	9.43	1.89	3.77	100.00
Social Info treatment (TR)	0	0	7	9	5	12	4	1	2	0	6	0	4	50
	0.00	0.00	14.00	18.00	10.00	24.00	8.00	2.00	4.00	0.00	12.00	0.00	8.00	100.00
Public Condition treatment (TR)	1	0	7	6	6	6	7	2	2	1	11	1	2	52
	1.92	0.00	13.46	11.54	11.54	11.54	13.46	3.85	3.85	1.92	21.15	1.92	3.85	100.00
Total	3	4	17	22	18	28	16	7	7	1	22	2	8	155
	1.94	2.58	10.97	14.19	11.61	18.06	10.32	4.52	4.52	0.65	14.19	1.29	5.16	100.00
<i>N</i>	155													

Table C.19: Distribution of amounts expected to be returned, Afghan trustors by experimental condition

	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	15	Total
Baseline (AFG)	4	0	2	6	9	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	28
	14.29	0.00	7.14	21.43	32.14	7.14	10.71	0.00	3.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.57	100.00
Social Info treatment (AFG)	0	1	3	4	5	3	3	4	1	0	2	1	0	0	27
	0.00	3.70	11.11	14.81	18.52	11.11	11.11	14.81	3.70	0.00	7.41	3.70	0.00	0.00	100.00
Public Condition treatment (AFG)	4	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	28
	14.29	3.57	3.57	3.57	7.14	7.14	10.71	3.57	17.86	7.14	10.71	3.57	3.57	3.57	100.00
Total	8	2	6	11	16	7	9	5	7	2	5	2	1	2	83
	9.64	2.41	7.23	13.25	19.28	8.43	10.84	6.02	8.43	2.41	6.02	2.41	1.20	2.41	100.00
<i>N</i>	83														

(Non)parametric testing of trustors' beliefs about amounts returned across national groups and experimental conditions

Table C.20: (Non)parametric testing of amounts expected to be returned, Baseline by national group

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
tga_belret_CHvsTR_rs	0.000382	*		0.344 P(val (CH) >val (TR))
tga_belret_CHvsAFG_rs	0.237636	-		0.568 P(val (CH) >val (AFG))
tga_belret_TRvsAFG_rs	0.000251	*		0.741 P(val (TR) >val (AFG))
tga_belret_CHvsTR_tED	0.089996	-	0.2428421	
tga_belret_CHvsAFG_tED	0.536437	-	0.1756564	
tga_belret_TRvsAFG_tED	0.397320	-	0.4024613	
tga_belret_AFGvsTR_tED	0.164151	-	0.0663455	

Note: tga_belret denotes trustors' beliefs about the amount returned by the trustee. Swiss (CH), Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 38 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/38 = 0.00131579$.

Table C.21: (Non)parametric testing of amounts expected to be returned among Turkish and Afghan trustors, by experimental condition

var name	pval	B.-H. sig. 5%	Cohen's d	P (val (group1) >val (group2))
tga_belret_TRBLT1_rs	0.815188	-		0.487 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_belret_TRBLT2_rs	0.266156	-		0.437 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_belret_TRT1T2_rs	0.421940	-		0.454 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
tga_belret_TRBLT1_tED	0.864657	-	0.0336549	
tga_belret_TRBLT2_tED	0.726052	-	0.0685593	
tga_belret_TRT1T2_tED	0.836397	-	0.0409117	
tga_belret_AFGBLT1_rs	0.059630	-		0.354 P(val (BL) >val (T1))
tga_belret_AFGBLT2_rs	0.007820	-		0.297 P(val (BL) >val (T2))
tga_belret_AFGT1T2_rs	0.205072	-		0.400 P(val (T1) >val (T2))
tga_belret_AFGBLT1_tED	0.959409	-	0.0134775	
tga_belret_AFGBLT2_tED	0.011591	-	0.6930428	
tga_belret_AFGT1T2_tED	0.010559	-	0.7127361	

Note: tga_belret denotes trustors' beliefs about the amount returned by the trustee. Turkish (TR), Afghan (AFG). Baseline (BL), Social Information treatment (T1), Public Condition treatment (T2), rank-sum test (rs), tED (t-test on mean EucD's between groups). $P < 0.05$ marked in bold. Given that we test for 38 hypotheses, a Bonferroni correction would use a critical value of $0.05/38 = 0.00131579$.

Explaining beliefs about amounts returned across national groups and across experimental conditions

Table C.22: OLS - Turkish and Afghan trustors' expected amounts to be returned (in log), by experimental condition (Social Info treatment as reference)

	TR (1)	TR (2)	TR (3)	AFG (1)	AFG (2)	AFG (3)
Baseline (d)	-0.0494 (0.124)	-0.138 (0.135)	-0.0819 (0.135)	-0.176 (0.176)	-0.289 (0.188)	-0.448* (0.203)
Public Condition treatment (d)	0.0972 (0.117)	0.0757 (0.113)	0.0801 (0.116)	0.479* (0.182)	0.286 (0.187)	0.342 (0.229)
Male (d)		0.390*** (0.101)	0.469*** (0.108)		0.279 (0.159)	0.145 (0.160)
Age in years		-0.00219 (0.007)	0.00187 (0.007)		-0.00719 (0.013)	-0.0193 (0.017)
High level of education (d)		0.183 (0.106)	0.210 (0.108)		0.339* (0.160)	0.399* (0.167)
Desirability score (in log)		-0.321* (0.156)	-0.331* (0.154)		-0.480 (0.486)	-0.740 (0.492)
Number of months stayed in Switzerland			0.000746 (0.003)			0.00708 (0.005)
Ever supported by job training in Switzerland (d)			0.0643 (0.120)			-0.0895 (0.182)
Constant	1.578*** (0.083)	2.099*** (0.438)	1.870*** (0.400)	1.272*** (0.130)	2.500 (1.570)	3.563* (1.644)
F	0.754	4.427	3.960	7.502	2.588	3.592
r ² _a	-0.00320	0.106	0.143	0.143	0.127	0.188
rmse	0.611	0.582	0.557	0.619	0.596	0.574
N	152	134	117	73	54	46

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: (d) indicates a dummy variable Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

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