**Travail complémentaire à la thèse** : Article sur l'aversion à la perte dans les contextes monétaire et alimentaire

**Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #1**

**Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #2**

**Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #4**

Travail complémentaire à la thèse : Article sur l'aversion à la perte dans les contextes monétaire et alimentaire [Preprint - [https://psyarxiv.com/pjnur/\]](https://psyarxiv.com/pjnur/)

# **Title page**

**Is loss aversion a domain-general bias? On its extendibility in the food domain Short title: Loss aversion in the food domain**

Anna M. Fiorito<sup>1,2</sup>, Jean-Claude Dreher<sup>3</sup>, Philip Gorwood<sup>4,5</sup>, Stéphanie Lefèbvre<sup>1,2</sup>, Xavier Caldú<sup>6,7,8</sup>, Audrey Versini<sup>4</sup>, Nicolas Ramoz<sup>4</sup>, Guillaume Sescousse<sup>1,2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lyon Neuroscience Research Center, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, PSYR2 Team, University of Lyon, Lyon, France.

<sup>2</sup> Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier, Bron, France.

3 Institut de sciences cognitives Marc Jeannerod, Lyon, France.

<sup>4</sup> Université Paris Cité, INSERM, U1266 (Institute of Psychiatry and Neuroscience of Paris), F-75014, Paris, France.

<sup>5</sup> CMME, GHU Paris Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, Hôpital Sainte-Anne, F-75014 Paris, France

<sup>6</sup> Departament de Psicologia Clínica i Psicobiologia, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.

<sup>7</sup>Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.

<sup>8</sup>Institut de Recerca Sant Joan de Déu, Barcelona, Spain.

### **\*Corresponding authors:**

Guillaume Sescousse (email: [guillaume.sescousse@inserm.fr\)](mailto:guillaume.sescousse@inserm.fr)

Anna Fiorito (email: [anna.fiorito4@gmail.com\)](mailto:anna.fiorito4@gmail.com)

Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre - Inserm U1028 / CNRS UMR5292 - Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier - Bâtiment 416 Unité de Recherche - 95 Bd Pinel - BP 300 39

69678 BRON Cedex France

## **Abstract**

Loss aversion is a cognitive bias influencing decision making, according to which potential losses have a larger psychological impact than potential gains of equal magnitude. Even if this bias has been extensively studied in the monetary domain, recent work has challenged its very existence, especially in the context of small symmetric stakes. Moreover, it is still unclear whether loss aversion is at play in other incentive domains. In this study, we empirically assessed monetary loss aversion for small symmetric stakes, as well as the extendibility of this bias to another domain, namely the food domain. We recruited a group of 58 female participants, who played two comparable gambling tasks in which they had to accept or reject mixed gambles involving either monetary or food outcomes. Through computational modelling we estimated loss aversion parameters in both the monetary and the food tasks. We found that participants showed loss aversion both in the monetary and in the food domain. Importantly, loss aversion in the monetary and food domain was positively correlated across participants (Spearman's rho = 0.48, [95%CI 0.21 – 0.70],  $p < 0.001$ ). Together, these results provide support for the existence of loss aversion even in the context of small symmetric monetary stakes, and further show that this bias seem to extend to at least the food domain, suggesting that it may be considered as a domain-general bias.

**Keywords:** loss aversion, prospect theory, decision-making, food

## **Introduction**

A large body of research has shown that people often do not act as mere expected value maximizers when facing risky choices. For instance, in a heads or tails game, most people would reject a 50/50 chance to win 120€ or lose 100€, while the expected value (i.e., average net value over repeated trials) is positive. In order to account for such behavior, prospect theory has postulated that human behavior is influenced by a number of cognitive biases [1]. Among these biases is *loss aversion*, which describes the fact that losses tend to have a larger psychological impact than gains of equal magnitude [2–4]. As a consequence, the idea of losing a sum of money is experienced as more painful than the anticipated pleasure of earning the same amount, leading to decisions such as the rejection of the above gamble. While the concept of loss aversion was formulated in the monetary domain in the initial version of prospect theory [1], later developments emphasized its relevance in other domains such as trading goods [5] or job choices [6].

However, the pervasiveness of loss aversion bias has recently been questioned, sparking a debate as to whether loss aversion is indeed a universal and generalizable principle in line with a domain-general view as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, or whether it is a more domain-specific bias likely to appear only under specific conditions. For instance, several moderators have been shown to influence loss aversion, such as age, level of education, and lack of knowledge or experience about the domain [2]. Additionally, substance use appear to impact loss aversion, as evidenced by studies indicating reduced or absent loss aversion bias in individuals with alcohol dependence, cocaine users, or current cigarette smokers [7–9]. Kahneman himself made an attempt to define the boundaries of loss aversion, emphasizing specific circumstances that are not subject to this bias, such as the context of an intentional trade [10]. Studies in the field of evolutionary psychology have also argued that loss aversion is highly sensitive to context and is influenced by underlying evolutionary-rooted motives [11,12]. Moreover, in recent debate, some authors have questioned the very existence of loss aversion, claiming that whether losses loom larger, equal to or smaller than gains is entirely dependent on the situation [13,14]. For instance, it has been argued that loss aversion disappears when making decisions based on experience [15–17]. In experimental economics some studies have shown that loss aversion only arises when the monetary stakes are high enough [17–21], while the magnitude of the stakes also seems to influence temporal loss aversion [22]. Finally, it has been shown that loss aversion varies with the relative range of gains and losses involved; it appears to emerge primarily in situations with a narrow range of potential losses and a wide range of potential gains, rather than in scenarios with symmetric ranges of gains and losses [21,23]. Additionally, the rank position of gains and losses has been shown to influence the manifestation of loss aversion [24].

Although loss aversion is likely influenced by moderators [2], a body of previous work suggest that it may be a domain-general bias, viewing it as a fundamental and deeply-rooted behavior that has been preserved along evolution [25]. Of note, loss aversion has been acknowledged as an influential behavioral phenomenon in several decision-making theories, even before the advent of prospect theory [26]. It has often been conceptualized as an expression of an even more general bias -the negativity bias- according to which negative events overall have more psychological weight compared with positive ones [27]. In line with this domain-general conceptualization, loss aversion -which was originally formulated in the context of risky choice- has been extended to riskless choices [10]. As such, it has been proposed to play a role in a variety of empirical phenomena ranging from finance and marketing to psychology and political science, such as the endowment effect [2,5,28], the status quo bias [29], the sunk cost fallacy [30], the equity premium puzzle [31], and the enhanced sensitivity to disadvantages compared with advantages [4]. Nevertheless, whether these phenomena are truly driven by loss aversion is still widely debated, and various alternative accounts have been proposed over the years [14,32,33]. A handful of studies have also investigated whether loss aversion behavior is observed outside the monetary domain, testing its generalizability. While some studies have failed to provide evidence supporting this generalizability (such as in effort-based decision-making, where the asymmetry in the sensitivity to increasing vs decreasing effort fails to be captured by loss aversion [32], or in the context of social and environmental outcomes [35]), others have found supporting evidence. For instance, in marketing research on brand choice involving multiple properties such as price and quality, it has been shown that not only are people loss averse for both price and quality (i.e., more sensitive to losses than gains in price/quality) [36], but that loss aversion for quality is even stronger than loss aversion for price [37]. Loss aversion has also been observed for time [38] and in the health domain, with people showing loss aversion towards remaining

years of life [39,40]. In addition to laboratory studies, field work has also supported the role of loss aversion in everyday life, explaining for instance performance behaviors of professional golfers, soccer players, and football player [41–44], as well as the decision-making tendencies of sellers in the housing market [45].

The dearth of studies on loss aversion outside the monetary domain can be partly explained by the difficulty to quantitatively assess the relative value of positive and negative non-monetary prospects [27,46]. While it is straightforward to compare monetary prospects such as +100€ or -50€, it is far more difficult to similarly quantify gains and losses in domains such as quality or health. Some previous studies have effectively quantified non-monetary prospects, as in Strickland et al. [9], where gains and losses were measured in terms of cocaine quantities. Yet, most studies circumvent this issue by translating the value of non-monetary items onto a monetary scale -e.g., using willingness-to-pay procedures [12,36,39]- thus conflating monetary and non-monetary loss aversion. Alternatively, some studies resort to qualitative or observational (rather than quantitative or experimental) approaches, which are intrinsically limited for precisely measuring loss aversion [47]. Surprisingly, even within the monetary domain, only few studies allow for parametric quantitative estimation of loss aversion [47]. Finally, another issue in non-monetary domains is that it can be non-trivial to determine the location of a reference point in relation to which gains and losses are defined [39].

Overall, results of previous research illustrate the ongoing debate concerning the generalizability of loss aversion to different contexts, such as small and symmetric stakes or other incentive domains than the monetary one. In this study we aimed to address the above debate and tackle the question of loss aversion generalizability. We tested its extendibility to small symmetric monetary stakes, as well as to an independent domain, namely food. We chose the food domain because food is easily quantifiable (e.g., in terms of weight, volume, calories) and, as a natural reinforcer, is well suited to test the idea that loss aversion is deeply rooted and fundamental bias. We used a well-established "mixed gamble" task, in which participants have to accept or reject gambles offering a 50/50 chance of variable symmetric gains or losses. We employed a monetary version of this task [48], as well as a minimallyadapted version using juice gains and losses. We reasoned that, if loss aversion is indeed a

general bias, its influence should manifest even in contexts involving small and symmetric stakes and extend beyond monetary scenarios such as food.

## **Materials and Methods**

## **Participants**

The data were acquired between  $14<sup>th</sup>$  March 2008 and  $7<sup>th</sup>$  December 2009 in the context of a larger study (ENDANO cohort, ethical authorization of French *Comité de Protection des Personne*, n° 83-03 and 2688) that included various tasks and questionnaires in healthy volunteers as well as patients with anorexia nervosa (see Table S1 for an overview of the data collected). This study was conducted according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were informed about the study and procedures, and they provided written informed consent before doing the experience. Note that one previous paper was published based partly on the same participants, but using entirely different data [49]. The present study focusses on the loss aversion task in healthy volunteers.

Sixty-seven healthy volunteers were recruited through advertisement. The following inclusion criteria were used: aged between 18 and 45 years old, female, fluent French speaker, no history of eating disorders, no psychological or neurological disorder, no current psychotropic medication, and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. We recruited only female participants because they also served as a matched control group for a group of patients with anorexia nervosa, a disorder that is much more prevalent in females than males [50]. A semistructured psychiatric interview (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies, DIGS, [51]) was performed by a trained psychologist (AV) with guidance from a senior psychiatrist (PG), and confirmed that none of the included participants suffered from lifetime psychiatric disorder.

Two participants were excluded for not completing the entirety of the two tasks. Additionally, seven participants were excluded from the analysis based on their extreme behavior (see "Participants exclusion" section). Therefore, the reported results are based on data from 58 healthy volunteers.

## **Experimental tasks**

We used two versions of the same task, in the monetary domain and the food domain, both adapted from the loss aversion paradigm introduced by Tom et al. [48]. The two versions were designed to be as similar as possible. In both tasks, participants were asked to decide whether to accept or reject mixed gambles with a 50% chance of gaining a certain amount of money/juice, and a 50% chance of losing another amount of money/juice (Fig 1). They were instructed to make a decision within a 3-second timeframe (consistent with previous task design [48]), balancing the need for thoughtful consideration with task efficiency and participant engagement. We employed symmetric gambles (i.e., equivalent range of gains and losses), in which monetary gains and losses varied between 5 and 17€, in increments of 1€, while juice gains and losses varied between 3 and 15cl, in increments of 1cl (see gain-loss matrix in Fig 1). Thus, allow to investigate loss aversion within what can be considered as small stakes. Rather than using a rigid accept/reject decision rule [48], participants responded using a four-choice response scale that aligns more closely with real-life decision-making scenarios. This approach involves more nuanced considerations beyond binary choices and encourages participants to qualitatively reflect on the attractiveness of each gamble. Possible responses were "Accept ++" (strong willingness to accept), "Accept +" (moderate willingness to accept), "Reject +" (moderate willingness to reject) and "Reject ++" (strong willingness to reject). Choice was highlighted for 1s, and then a fixation cross appeared for 1s before a new gamble was presented. All possible gambling pairs from the gain-loss matrix (i.e., 13x13 = 169 trials) were presented to the participants in a random order. In case of no response within 3-seconds, a warning appeared, and the missed gamble was presented again later. Gains and losses were defined in relation to a reference point, which were visually depicted (see 1), corresponding to an initial endowment: in the monetary task, volunteers were endowed with a 20€ voucher, while in the food task, they were endowed an 18cl glass of juice. Participants were told that at the end of each task, one randomly chosen gamble would be played for real and that the outcome would be added or subtracted from the initial endowment (in case of a rejected gamble, the endowment would remain untouched). Both tasks started with a training part, at the end of which the random draw of one gamble was simulated in order to allow subjects to visualize the whole task's procedure.



*Fig 1. Task Design for the monetary task (A) and food task (B). For each task the 13x13 matrix represents all gambles presented to participants with 50/50 chance of gaining a certain amount of money or juice (x axis) or of losing a certain amount of money or juice (y axis). Participants had to answer to all the 169 possible gambles, which were randomly presented as shown here for one example for each task. Note that the reference point for gains and losses was visually salient: in the monetary task, it was materialized by the stack of 20 coins of 1€ on the left of the picture, while in the food task, it was materialized by the red dashed line indicating the 18cl endowment.*

Both the monetary and the food tasks were administered in the same session, and their order was counterbalanced across participants. In order to maximize motivation for juice, participants could choose between three different types of juices (i.e., orange juice, tropical juice and apple juice), and were asked to fast (abstain from breakfast) in the 12 hours preceding the experiment, which always took place in the morning. Moreover, participant's motivation to earn money and juice was measured using subjective ratings both before and after each task. Motivation was measured by means of a 5-point Likert scale, asking the participants to rate the pleasure they would expect from receiving the money or appetitive juice in that moment.

Participants received a compensation of 20€ in the form of a gift voucher for taking part in this study. As mentioned above, this amount could vary as a function of the outcome of the randomly chosen gamble played for real. The mean final compensation was 20.71€ (SD = 7, [min max] = [5€ 35€]). Similarly, the amount of earned juice also varied depending on the outcome of the random gamble played for real. The mean final volume was 19.00cl (SD = 5.97,  $[min max] = [6c133c]]$ .

#### **Participants exclusion**

A basic assumption of prospect theory is that participants are motivated to obtain rewards and thus behave as utility maximizers: they are more likely to accept gambles when potential gains increase and, conversely, less likely to accept gambles when potential losses increase. It is important to exclude participants whose behavior violates this basic assumption. To do this, we employed two strategies.

First, we used the subjective motivation ratings to identify participants with an extremely low motivation to earn money or juice (criterion #1). For each task and participant, we averaged the pre-task and post-task ratings, and excluded participants with an average score < 2 out of 5. Two participants were excluded based on this criterion for not being motivated to earn juice.

Second, we quantified the influence of gains and losses on participants' behavior using a logistic regression, similarly to previous studies [48,52]. Specifically, Accept or Reject decisions were modelled as a function of gain and loss magnitude, using the glmfit function in Matlab (version 2018a): Choice =  $β_{gain}$  x Gain +  $β_{loss}$  x Loss + Intercept. We excluded participants whose choices did not appear to be driven neither by gains nor losses, which was reflected by non-significance of both β<sub>gain</sub> and β<sub>loss</sub> (criterion #2, inspired from Botvinik-Nezer et al. [52]). Corresponding response matrices (see Fig S1 and S2) typically showed numerous violations of stochastic dominance, reflecting random behavior and/or a lack of understanding of the task.

This criterion also allowed us to identify participants with problematic convergence of parameter estimation, for instance due to small variance in their responses (i.e., too few accepted or rejected gambles). Four participants were excluded on this criterion in the monetary task and one participant was excluded in both tasks.

In total, 7 participants were thus excluded based on these criteria. Note that, for the sake of transparency, results of sensitivity analyses including these participants are reported in Table S2 and Fig S3.

## *Modelling*

We used the framework of prospect theory to model participants' choice behavior, following the same approach as in our previous work [53]. Within that framework, the subjective utility of each gamble (SUG) can be approximated by the following equation:

$$
SUG = p_{Gain} \times Gain - p_{Loss} \times Loss \times \lambda
$$

In this equation, *pGain* is the gain probability and *pLoss* is the loss probability. Given that both tasks employ mixed gambles with a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing a certain amount of money or juice, these probabilities are fixed, i.e., *pGain* = *pLoss* = 0.5. *Gain* is the gain value of the gamble and *Loss* is the absolute loss value of the gamble. The relative weighting of gains and losses is reflected by the loss aversion parameter *λ*. A value of *λ* > 1 indicates overvaluation of losses relative to gains, reflecting a loss aversion bias, *λ* < 1 indicates overvaluation of gains relative to losses, while  $\lambda = 1$  indicates equal valuation of gains and losses.

Participants' choices were reduced from a qualitative scale to a binary response, i.e., "Accept ++" and "Accept +" were pooled into an "Accept" category, while "Reject +" and "Reject ++" were pooled into a "Reject" category. The probability of accepting each gamble was then modelled with a softmax function, which was fitted to these binary choices:

$$
P(\text{gample acceptance}) = \frac{1}{1 + e(-\mu(SUG + c))}
$$

This function includes two other parameters: a so-called "inverse temperature" parameter (*μ*) and a constant parameter (*c*). The constant parameter (*c*) reflects a valueindependent gambling bias toward or away from gambling. If *c* > 0, there is a tendency to accept gambles regardless of their subjective utility. If  $c < 0$ , there is a tendency to reject gambles regardless of their subjective utility (see Supplementary Methods and Results and Table S3 for more details about the rationale for including a constant parameter). The inverse temperature parameter reflects consistency of choice behavior. If *μ* = 0, choices are random, whereas increasing values of μ reflect increasing consistency in choice behavior, with positive values of *μ* reflecting higher gamble acceptance with higher gain and lower loss value, and vice versa for negative values of *μ*.

Note that we made some simplifying assumptions in our modelling, similar to previous studies [2,48,53,54]. These simplifications limit the inflation of free parameters to be estimated, in order to maximize the reliability of this estimation. First, we assumed a linear valuation of gains and losses, in contrast to the curvilinear value function of prospect theory. This is a common and reasonable assumption [48,55,56], especially given the relatively narrow range of gains and losses used in our protocol, which make the curvature negligible. Additionally, the task employed was not optimized to reliably estimate this parameter [57]. Second, we assumed no subjective transformation of probabilities as described in prospect theory and assumed equal weights for the 0.5 probability of gains and losses. This is also a reasonable assumption given that the probability weighting function of prospect theory shows a shallow slope in the middle range of probabilities (i.e., around 0.5), reflecting low sensitivity to changes in probabilities in that range [58]. Also, it has been shown that individuals are less sensitive to probability differences in the context of mixed gambles [59].

Finally, it can be argued that since the reference point (corresponding to the initial endowments of 20€ and 18cl of juice) was visually salient in both tasks (see Fig 1), participants may have perceived gains and losses in the mixed gambles as increments and decrements from an initial gain. In other words, they may have interpreted the gambles as a 50/50 chance of a small gain (endowment - loss) vs a high gain (endowment + gain). Such a "gain framing" may have in turn decreased the attractiveness of the gambles not due to loss aversion, but due to risk aversion, i.e., the concave value function in the gain domain. In order to rule out this possibility, we performed additional model comparison analyses, in which we compared our loss aversion model to such a "risk aversion" model, aiming to determine which of these two models best describes participants' behavior (see Supplementary Methods and Results).

### **Parameter estimation and statistical analyses**

Parameter estimation was performed within the framework of Hierarchical Bayesian Inference (HBI), using the "computational and behavioral modeling" toolbox (<https://payampiray.github.io/cbm>) implemented in Matlab [60]. As a hierarchical approach, it has the advantage of regularizing participant-level parameters based on group statistics, therefore providing more reliable group-level parameters as well as better individual estimates. Moreover, as a fully Bayesian approach, HBI allows the assessment of uncertainty in parameter estimation by means of probability distributions [60], and has proven more accurate than non-hierarchical inference and hierarchical parameter estimation (i.e., showing a smaller estimation error). Importantly, HBI is also less sensitive to outliers, and thus more robust, compared with hierarchical parameter estimation methods [60].

First, we fitted our model to each participant's data separately, in a non-hierarchical fashion, through Laplace approximation, employing gaussian priors (with mean 0, and variance 6.25 as suggested in Piray et al. [60]. This first step allows to define an approximation of posterior parameters at the individual level. Then, these estimated parameters were used to initialize the hierarchical Bayesian inference, which is an iterative algorithm. On each iteration, group mean and variance are updated based on individual parameters, serving as group mean and variance in the next iteration (known as empirical priors, since priors are constructed based on data). Iterations continue until the change in parameter values between two consequent iterations is considered small enough. Finally, group parameters are estimated using a weighted average, in which the influence of each participant on the group parameters depends on the extent to which the model is responsible for generating the dataset of that participant [60].

Since the estimated loss aversion parameters were not normally distributed, we employed non-parametric statistics using R (version 4.1.2). Specifically, we used a one-sample two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ratio test (*stats* package) to assess whether mean loss aversion was significantly superior to 1 in both the monetary and food domains. Finally, we tested for a correlation between loss aversion in the monetary and the food domain, using Spearman's rho coefficient (*stats* package) and Bayesian non-parametric correlation (*BayesFactor*  package).

13

## **Results**

## **Demographic characteristics**

All included participants were females, with a mean age of 31.8 years (SD = 11.0) and a mean education level of 11.2 years (SD = 2.8) after level 2 of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The average monthly income of participants was 880€ (SD  $= 959$ ).

## **Descriptive statistics**

The mean subjective motivation ratings (measured by means of a 5-point Likert scale and averaged across the pre-task and post-task ratings) were respectively 4.22 (SD = 0.81) in the monetary domain and 3.68 (SD = 0.87) in the food domain.

Participants accepted on average 29% of the gambles (50/169 gambles; SD = 28) in the monetary domain and 37% (62/169 gambles; SD = 26) in the food domain. There was a positive correlation between the mean gamble acceptance in the food and the monetary domains (Spearman's rho = 0.56, [95%CI 0.31 – 0.75], p < 0.001). Mean frequency of gamble acceptance across the gain-loss matrix is reported in Fig 2, while mean reaction times are reported in Fig S4.

Participants did not answer within the 3-second delay on 2.4% of the presented gambles on average, both in the food domain  $(4/169$  gambles; SD = 6) and in the monetary domain (4/169 gambles;  $SD = 4$ ).

#### **Loss aversion in monetary and food domains**

Model comparison analyses showed that participants' behavior was better explained by a loss aversion model than a risk aversion model (see Modelling section in Materials and Methods and Supplementary Methods and Results). We therefore reported group parameters for loss aversion, inverse temperature and the constant in Table 1. Mean subjective motivation ratings to earn money or juice were not correlated with group parameters, either in the monetary or food domain (see Supplementary Methods and Results).



*Fig 2. Frequency of gamble acceptance in the monetary task (A) and the food task (B). Heatmaps represent mean frequency of acceptance across participants as a function of gains and losses, with white color indicating a 0.5 frequency of acceptance, and red/blue colors indicating increasing frequency of acceptance/rejection of gambles. Note that, on average, participants are most uncertain in their responses (i.e., 0.5 frequency of acceptance) when gains are about twice as large as the losses, indicating loss aversion. The projection of frequency of acceptance along the gain axis (bottom) further depicts how acceptance unfolds with increasing gains, independently of losses (which are averaged). Similarly, the projection of frequency of acceptance along the loss axis (left) depicts how acceptance unfolds with increasing losses, independently of gains. Note that the slope for losses is steeper than the slope for gains, also reflecting loss aversion, i.e., faster change in frequency of acceptance for a similar change in losses compared with gains.*

*Table 1. Group parameters for the monetary and food loss aversion tasks (n = 58). Group means correspond to a weighted average output by the HBI procedure (see Parameter estimation and statistical analyses section in Materials and Methods). Note that since mean values have been argued to be biased towards loss aversion, median estimates are also reported, allowing for comparability with group metrics employed in previous studies* [6,48]*.* 





According to the Wilcoxon signed-rank one-sample test, loss aversion parameters were significantly greater than 1 in the monetary task (W = 1504, [95%CI 1.53 – 2.15],  $p < 0.001$ ) as well as in the food task (W = 1535, [95%Cl 2.29 - 3.36],  $p < 0.001$ ). Results of sensitivity analyses including all participants (i.e., no exclusions) also showed loss aversion parameters significantly greater than 1 (see Table S2).

## **Relationship between monetary and food loss aversion**

Loss aversion values in the monetary and food domains showed a positive correlation across participants (Spearman's rho = 0.48, [95%CI 0.21 – 0.70],  $p < 0.001$ ) (see Fig 3). Results of sensitivity analyses including all participants (i.e., no exclusions) also showed a significant positive correlation (see Fig S3).



*Fig 3. Correlation between loss aversion in the monetary and the food domains (n = 58). The histograms and density curves (top and right) show the distribution of loss aversion values in each domain.* 

The Bayesian correlation analysis yielded a  $BF_{10} = 452$  (Kendall's tau = 0.35, [95%Cl 0.16 – 0.50]), indicating that our data is 452 times more likely under the hypothesis of a positive relationship between monetary and food loss aversion (alternative hypothesis,  $H_1$ ) than under the null hypothesis of no relationship between the two  $(H_0)$ . Such a BF<sub>10</sub> > 10 is usually considered as strong evidence for a positive relationship [50].

## **Discussion**

In this study, we observed loss aversion behavior for small and symmetric monetary stakes, as well as for gambles involving gains and losses of fruit juice amounts, in a group of healthy female participants. These results provide some evidence for loss aversion extendibility beyond the monetary domain. Importantly, we also showed that monetary and food loss aversion were tightly correlated within participants. Overall, our results provide some evidence supporting the conceptualization of loss aversion as a domain-general individual trait.

First, we showed that loss aversion in the monetary domain was clearly observable even in the presence of low stakes and among female participants who were older than typical college student samples. This is an important observation in the context of previous critiques of loss aversion, which have suggested that loss averse behavior may have been overestimated due to the use of relatively high stakes among college students, who do not receive a regular income and may thus perceive monetary stakes as larger than older people [2]. Moreover, contrasting with previous critics [17,23,24,62] and consistent with some previous work [54–56], we could show that loss aversion was preserved when using symmetric distribution of gains and losses. Our mean estimate of monetary loss aversion is 1.87, i.e., well aligned with a recent meta-analysis reporting an average value of 1.96 [95%CI 1.82 – 2.1] [63].

Most importantly, our study shows that loss aversion is measurable in, and extendible to, the food domain. As such, participants perceived losses of juice as looming larger than corresponding gains of juice, corresponding to a loss behavior in the food domain. Moreover, loss aversion in the food domain was positively correlated with loss aversion in the monetary domain. Our study aligns with previous research, offering additional evidence against the alleged 'death' of loss aversion [2,64]. More generally, loss aversion behavior as observed in

both tasks is consistent with reaction patterns showing that participants tended to be most hesitant (i.e., longer reaction times) when deciding about gambles in which gains were about twice the losses (see Fig S4). However, this pattern was slightly less striking in the food domain, due to higher inter-individual variability in response times, probably more strongly influenced by contextual factors like thirst. Indeed, the level of thirst- measured by means of an open question on a 5-point Likert scale and averaged across the pre-task and post-task ratings- was correlated with reaction times in the food domain (BF<sub>10</sub> = 8.24, Kendall's tau = 0.25, [95%CI  $0.07 - 0.41$ ]), while motivation for money was not correlated with reaction times in the monetary domain (BF<sub>01</sub> = 4.33, Kendall's tau = -0.07, [95%CI -0.24 - 0.10]). It has been proposed that tendencies in decision-making under risk are deeply rooted in human evolutionary psychology, and represent an innate feature emerging early in human development. In line with this idea, loss averse behavior (partly via the endowment effect) has been observed in other primates such as capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees [25,65,66] (although see Farashahi et al. [67] who have reported steeper gain than loss curves in rhesus monkeys), as well as in non-primate animals such as pigeons [68,69]. In light of the probable evolutionary origins of this bias, it may thus not be surprising that loss aversion is also at play, or even greater, when considering survival-related reinforcement such as food, which has preceded more evolved and secondary rewards such as money. However, directly testing for differences between monetary and food domains poses challenges without establishing a clear correspondence between incentives (i.e., between 1€ and 1 cl of juice). Future research should try to establish this correspondence to enable meaningful comparisons of potential variations in loss aversion magnitude across different reward contexts.

Demonstrating the extension of loss aversion to the food domain among healthy individuals could hold significant clinical implications. For example, it prompts future research to explore whether the weight assigned to food losses vs gains is altered in eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa or binge eating disorder. This would build upon existing studies that have identified impairments in decision-making processes within these populations [49,70,71].

Of note, participants were on caloric restriction and thirsty when performing the experiment, as they had been asked to fast for the 12 preceding hours. Under these conditions, one might argue that the desire to gain a prompt food reward could have been fueled by the urge to respond to a physiological need, contributing to maximizing loss aversion in the food domain. Yet, there was no correlation between the level of thirst and loss aversion (as well as between the level of thirst and constant and inverse temperature parameters) in the food domain (see Supplementary Methods and Results). This result thus suggests that food loss aversion was independent of physiological thirst level.

This study has several limitations. First, the sample size employed in this study was relatively small, although larger than most previous studies [48,72,73]. Future studies should try to replicate the present results in larger samples. Second, all participants were females, which prevents us from extending our results to the male population. In particular, it has been proposed that sex might impact loss aversion, and that females might show a stronger loss aversion bias [74,75]. Future studies should explore potential sex differences in the context of loss aversion in the food domain. Future research should also investigate whether loss aversion is extendible to other food categories than juice, as well as other domains than food. Third, as detailed in the Materials and Methods section, the use of an initial endowment serving as a reference point for gains and losses may have induced a "gain framing" context, in which the attitude towards gambles would have been driven by risk aversion (concave value function) rather than loss aversion. Although our model comparison procedure suggested this was unlikely (see Supplementary Methods and Results), future studies may want to replicate the current findings while using a zero reference point unambiguously framing the gambles' options as gains and losses. Finally, it should be noted that the design of our mixed gamble task has been criticized for biasing participants towards loss aversion, given that the status quo is to reject the gamble option [18,21]. While we tried to mitigate this possibility by using a constant parameter in our modelling -aiming to capture such a value-independent bias- it is still possible that loss aversion values may have been slightly over-estimated in our study.

Despite these limitations, we believe that our study provides empirical evidence that loss aversion can be quantified and extended beyond the monetary domain. As such, our results provide some support for the conceptualization of loss aversion as a domain-general bias.

#### **Acknowledgments**

**Funding:** the ENDANO cohort (D428) was funded by the Programme Hospitalier de Recherche Clinique. The research leading to these results received funding from the MILDT/INSERM (MIL0805) to J.-C.D. G.S. was funded by a PhD fellowship from the French Ministry of Research and the Fondation pour la Recherche Médicale (FDT20091217744). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

**Competing interests:** PG has received financial support during the last 5 years from Janssen, Lundbeck, Otsuka. All other authors report no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

**Ethics approval:** This study received the ethical authorization of the French *Comité de Protection des Personne* (n° 83-03 and 2688).

**Consent to participate:** Participants were informed about the study and procedures and signed an informed consent before doing the experience.

**Consent for publication:** Not applicable.

**Authors' contribution:** XC, JCD, PG, NR, GS, and AV designed and conceptualized the research. AV collected the data. AMF, SL and GS analyzed and interpreted the data. AMF and GS drafted the manuscript. All authors were involved in the critical revision of the manuscript and approved the final manuscript for submission.

**Additional contributions:** We would like to thank Payam Piray, Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ USA, for his help with the computational and behavioral modeling toolbox.

#### **References:**

- 1. Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica. 1979;47: 263. doi:10.2307/1914185
- 2. Mrkva K, Johnson EJ, Gächter S, Herrmann A. Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated. Journal of Consumer Psychology. 2020;30: 407–428. doi:10.1002/jcpy.1156
- 3. Redelmeier DA, Tversky A. On the Framing of Multiple Prospects. Psychol Sci. 1992;3: 191–193. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00025.x
- 4. Tversky A, Kahneman D. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty. 1992;5: 297–323.
- 5. Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH. Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of political Economy. 1990;98: 1325–1348.
- 6. Tversky A, Kahneman D. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model\*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1991;106: 1039–1061. doi:10.2307/2937956
- 7. Thrailkill EA, DeSarno M, Higgins ST. Loss aversion and risk for cigarette smoking and other substance use. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 2022;232: 109307. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2022.109307
- 8. Genauck A, Quester S, Wüstenberg T, Mörsen C, Heinz A, Romanczuk-Seiferth N. Reduced loss aversion in pathological gambling and alcohol dependence is associated with differential alterations in amygdala and prefrontal functioning. Sci Rep. 2017;7: 16306. doi:10.1038/s41598- 017-16433-y
- 9. Strickland JC, Beckmann JS, Rush CR, Stoops WW. A pilot study of loss aversion for drug and nondrug commodities in cocaine users. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 2017;180: 223–226. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2017.08.020
- 10. Novemsky N, Kahneman D. The boundaries of loss aversion. Journal of Marketing research. 2005;42: 119–128.
- 11. Kenrick DT, Griskevicius V, Sundie JM, Li NP, Li YJ, Neuberg SL. Deep rationality: The evolutionary economics of decision making. Social cognition. 2009;27: 764–785.
- 12. Li YJ, Kenrick DT, Griskevicius V, Neuberg SL. Economic decision biases and fundamental motivations: How mating and self-protection alter loss aversion. Journal of personality and social psychology. 2012;102: 550.
- 13. Bault N, Coricelli G, Rustichini A. Interdependent Utilities: How Social Ranking Affects Choice Behavior. PLOS ONE. 2008;3: e3477. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477
- 14. Gal D, Rucker DD. The loss of loss aversion: Will it loom larger than its gain? Journal of Consumer Psychology. 2018;28: 497–516.
- 15. Erev I, Ert E, Yechiam E. Loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and the effect of experience on repeated decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 2008;21: 575–597. doi:10.1002/bdm.602
- 16. Garcia B, Cerrotti F, Palminteri S. The description–experience gap: a challenge for the neuroeconomics of decision-making under uncertainty. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2021;376: 20190665. doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0665
- 17. Yechiam E, Hochman G. Losses as modulators of attention: Review and analysis of the unique effects of losses over gains. Psychological Bulletin. 2013;139: 497–518. doi:10.1037/a0029383
- 18. Ert E, Erev I. On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications. Judgment and Decision Making. 2013;8: 214–235.
- 19. Harinck F, Van Dijk E, Van Beest I, Mersmann P. When Gains Loom Larger than Losses: Reversed Loss Aversion for Small Amounts of Money. Psychological Science. 2007;18: 1099–1105.
- 20. Mukherjee S, Sahay A, Pammi VSC, Srinivasan N. Is loss-aversion magnitude-dependent? Measuring prospective affective judgments regarding gains and losses. Judgment and Decision Making. 2017;12: 81–89. doi:10.1017/S1930297500005258
- 21. Zeif D, Yechiam E. Loss aversion (simply) does not materialize for smaller losses. Judgment and Decision Making. 2022;17: 1015–1042.
- 22. Mukherjee S, Srinivasan N. Hedonic impacts of gains versus losses of time: are we loss averse? Cognition and Emotion. 2021;35: 1–7. doi:10.1080/02699931.2021.1907741
- 23. Walasek L, Stewart N. How to Make Loss Aversion Disappear and Reverse: Tests of the Decision by Sampling Origin of Loss Aversion. J Exp Psychol Gen. 2015;144: 7–11. doi:10.1037/xge0000039
- 24. Walasek L, Stewart N. Context-Dependent Sensitivity to Losses: Range and Skew Manipulations. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 2019;45: 957–968. doi:10.1037/xlm0000629
- 25. Chen MK, Lakshminarayanan V, Santos LR. How basic are behavioral biases? Evidence from capuchin monkey trading behavior. Journal of Political Economy. 2006;114: 517–537.
- 26. Lejarraga T, Hertwig R. Three Theories of Choice and Their Psychology of Losses. Perspect Psychol Sci. 2022;17: 334–345. doi:10.1177/17456916211001332
- 27. Rozin P, Royzman EB. Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion. Pers Soc Psychol Rev. 2001;5: 296–320. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504\_2
- 28. Thaler R. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of economic behavior & organization. 1980;1: 39–60.
- 29. Samuelson W, Zeckhauser R. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of risk and uncertainty. 1988;1: 7–59.
- 30. Arkes HR, Blumer C. The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational behavior and human decision processes. 1985;35: 124–140.
- 31. Grossman SJ, Shiller RJ. The determinants of the variability of stock market prices. National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA; 1980.
- 32. Morewedge CK, Giblin CE. Explanations of the endowment effect: an integrative review. Trends Cogn Sci. 2015;19: 339–348. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.04.004
- 33. Plott CR, Zeiler K. The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations. American Economic Review. 2005;95: 530–545. doi:10.1257/0002828054201387
- 34. O'Brien MK, Ahmed AA. Asymmetric valuation of gains and losses in effort-based decision making. PLoS One. 2019;14: e0223268. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0223268
- 35. Wilson RS, Arvai JL, Arkes HR. My loss is your loss… sometimes: loss aversion and the effect of motivational biases. Risk Analysis: An International Journal. 2008;28: 929–938.
- 36. Fogel S, Lovallo D, Caringal C. Loss aversion for quality in consumer choice. Australian Journal of Management. 2004;29: 45–63.
- 37. Hardie BG, Johnson EJ, Fader PS. Modeling loss aversion and reference dependence effects on brand choice. Marketing science. 1993;12: 378–394.
- 38. Festjens A, Bruyneel S, Diecidue E, Dewitte S. Time-based versus money-based decision making under risk: An experimental investigation. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2015;50: 52–72. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2015.07.003
- 39. Attema AE, Brouwer WB, l'Haridon O. Prospect theory in the health domain: A quantitative assessment. Journal of Health Economics. 2013;32: 1057–1065.
- 40. Bleichrodt H, Pinto JL, Wakker PP. Making Descriptive Use of Prospect Theory to Improve the Prescriptive Use of Expected Utility. Management Science. 2001;47: 1498–1514. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.11.1498.10248
- 41. Pope DG, Schweitzer ME. Is Tiger Woods loss averse? Persistent bias in the face of experience, competition, and high stakes. American Economic Review. 2011;101: 129–57.
- 42. Yang Q, Zhao Y. Risk-taking, loss aversion, and performance feedback in dynamic and heterogeneous tournaments. Front Psychol. 2023;14: 1223369. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1223369
- 43. Elmore R, Urbaczewski A. Loss Aversion in Professional Golf. Journal of Sports Economics. 2021;22: 202–217. doi:10.1177/1527002520967403
- 44. Schneemann S, Deutscher C. Intermediate Information, Loss Aversion, and Effort: Empirical Evidence. Economic Inquiry. 2017;55: 1759–1770. doi:10.1111/ecin.12420
- 45. Genesove D, Mayer C. Loss aversion and seller behavior: Evidence from the housing market. The quarterly journal of economics. 2001;116: 1233–1260.
- 46. Yechiam E. Acceptable losses: The debatable origins of loss aversion. Psychological research. 2018; 1–13.
- 47. Walasek L, Mullett TL, Stewart N. A meta-analysis of loss aversion in risky contexts. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2024; 102740. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2024.102740
- 48. Tom SM, Fox CR, Trepel C, Poldrack RA. The neural basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk. Science. 2007;315: 515–518. doi:10.1126/science.1134239
- 49. Di Lodovico L, Lachatre M, Marcheselli J, Versini A, Ramoz N, Gorwood P. Is decision-making impairment an endophenotype of Anorexia Nervosa? Eur Psychiatry. 2022;65: S150. doi:10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.403
- 50. van Eeden AE, van Hoeken D, Hoek HW. Incidence, prevalence and mortality of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. Curr Opin Psychiatry. 2021;34: 515–524. doi:10.1097/YCO.0000000000000739
- 51. Preisig M, Fenton BT, Matthey ML, Berney A, Ferrero F. Diagnostic interview for genetic studies (DIGS): inter-rater and test-retest reliability of the French version. Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci. 1999;249: 174–179. doi:10.1007/s004060050084
- 52. Botvinik-Nezer R, Iwanir R, Holzmeister F, Huber J, Johannesson M, Kirchler M, et al. fMRI data of mixed gambles from the Neuroimaging Analysis Replication and Prediction Study. Sci Data. 2019;6: 106. doi:10.1038/s41597-019-0113-7
- 53. Timmer MHM, Sescousse G, Esselink RAJ, Piray P, Cools R. Mechanisms Underlying Dopamine-Induced Risky Choice in Parkinson's Disease With and Without Depression (History). Comput Psychiatr. 2018;2: 11–27. doi:10.1162/CPSY\_a\_00011
- 54. De Martino B, Camerer CF, Adolphs R. Amygdala damage eliminates monetary loss aversion. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2010;107: 3788–3792. doi:10.1073/pnas.0910230107
- 55. Schulreich S, Gerhardt H, Meshi D, Heekeren HR. Fear-induced increases in loss aversion are linked to increased neural negative-value coding. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 2020;15: 661–670. doi:10.1093/scan/nsaa091
- 56. Canessa N, Crespi C, Motterlini M, Baud-Bovy G, Chierchia G, Pantaleo G, et al. The functional and structural neural basis of individual differences in loss aversion. J Neurosci. 2013;33: 14307– 14317. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0497-13.2013
- 57. Barberis N, Huang M, Santos T. Prospect Theory and Asset Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2001;116: 1–53.
- 58. Abdellaoui M, Bleichrodt H, L'Haridon O. A tractable method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory. J Risk Uncertainty. 2008;36: 245–266. doi:10.1007/s11166-008-9039-8
- 59. Wu G, Markle AB. An empirical test of gain-loss separability in prospect theory. Management Science. 2008;54: 1322–1335.
- 60. Piray P, Dezfouli A, Heskes T, Frank MJ, Daw ND. Hierarchical Bayesian inference for concurrent model fitting and comparison for group studies. PLOS Computational Biology. 2019;15: e1007043. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007043
- 61. van Doorn J, van den Bergh D, Böhm U, Dablander F, Derks K, Draws T, et al. The JASP guidelines for conducting and reporting a Bayesian analysis. Psychon Bull Rev. 2021;28: 813–826. doi:10.3758/s13423-020-01798-5
- 62. Rakow T, Cheung NY, Restelli C. Losing my loss aversion: The effects of current and past environment on the relative sensitivity to losses and gains. Psychon Bull Rev. 2020;27: 1333– 1340. doi:10.3758/s13423-020-01775-y
- 63. Brown AL, Imai T, Vieider F, Camerer C. Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion. Journal of Economic Literature. 2024.
- 64. Ruggeri K, Alí S, Berge ML, Bertoldo G, Bjørndal LD, Cortijos-Bernabeu A, et al. Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk. Nat Hum Behav. 2020;4: 622–633. doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0886-x
- 65. Brosnan SF, Jones OD, Lambeth SP, Mareno MC, Richardson AS, Schapiro SJ. Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees. Current Biology. 2007;17: 1704–1707. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.08.059
- 66. Lakshminaryanan V, Keith Chen M, Santos LR. Endowment effect in capuchin monkeys. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2008;363: 3837–3844. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0149
- 67. Farashahi S, Azab H, Hayden B, Soltani A. On the Flexibility of Basic Risk Attitudes in Monkeys. J Neurosci. 2018;38: 4383–4398. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2260-17.2018
- 68. Pattison KF, Zentall TR, Watanabe S. Sunk cost: pigeons (Columba livia), too, show bias to complete a task rather than shift to another. J Comp Psychol. 2012;126: 1–9. doi:10.1037/a0023826
- 69. Sturgill J, Bergeron C, Ransdell T, Colvin T, Joshi G, Zentall TR. "What you see may not be what you get": Reverse contingency and perceived loss aversion in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev. 2021;28: 1015–1020. doi:10.3758/s13423-020-01872-y
- 70. Colton E, Wilson K-E, Chong TT-J, Verdejo-Garcia A. Dysfunctional decision-making in bingeeating disorder: A meta-analysis and systematic review. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews. 2023;152: 105250. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105250
- 71. Zink CF, Weinberger DR. Cracking the moody brain: The rewards of self starvation. Nat Med. 2010;16: 1382–1383. doi:10.1038/nm1210-1382
- 72. Charpentier CJ, Hindocha C, Roiser JP, Robinson OJ. Anxiety promotes memory for moodcongruent faces but does not alter loss aversion. Sci Rep. 2016;6: 24746. doi:10.1038/srep24746
- 73. Sokol-Hessner P, Camerer CF, Phelps EA. Emotion regulation reduces loss aversion and decreases amygdala responses to losses. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2013;8: 341–350. doi:10.1093/scan/nss002
- 74. Schmidt U, Traub S. An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2002;25: 233–49. doi:10.1023/A:1020923921649
- 75. Brooks P, Zank H. Loss Averse Behavior. J Risk Uncertainty. 2005;31: 301–325. doi:10.1007/s11166-005-5105-7

Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #1

## **SUPPLEMENT**

## **Are Brain Responses to Emotion a Reliable Endophenotype of Schizophrenia? An Image-based fMRI Meta-analysis**

Fiorito *et al.*

## **Contents:**

Supplementary Methods

Supplementary Table S1

Supplementary Table S2

Supplementary Table S3

Supplementary Figure S1

Supplementary Figure S2

Supplementary References

## **Supplementary Methods**

## *Study exclusion*

27 studies were excluded due to the following reasons:

- 8 studies employed the same dataset as in another included study(1–8)
- 8 studies used non-relevant task design (1 non-visual stimuli(9), 1 non-visual stimuli and conditioning task(10), 1 positively valenced emotional stimuli(11), 1 Theory of Mind task(12,13), 1 stress induction task(14), 1 rejection-acceptance task(15), 1 Stroop task using words(16))
- 4 studies were conference abstracts(17–20)
- 3 studies did not perform group comparisons(21–23)
- 2 studies were systematic reviews or meta-analyses(24,25)
- 1 study was a methodological paper(26)
- 1 study provided dubious data(27). Reasons for questioning the reliability of this study were that within-group T-maps showed highly unexpected results in healthy controls, opposite to what is typically observed in studies of emotional processing; unfortunately, the authors declined to engage in double-checking their results when we invited them to, so we preferred to exclude this study

## *Criteria for contrast selection*

When more than one article was published using the same sample of participants, we favored the article using methods most closely aligned with our inclusion criteria (e.g., we discarded studies that only report region of interest (ROI) results in favor of studies that report whole-brain analyses), and then we favored the one that could provide the contrast maximizing homogeneity between studies. When more than one contrast from the same study was available, we chose the contrast expected to maximize amygdala activation (e.g., contrasts related to the implicit rather than explicit condition(28), or, when a contrast with all negative emotions pooled together was not available, a contrast favoring fearful stimuli over other emotions(29)). Finally, in keeping with the goal of specifically isolating emotional processing regardless of content, when possible we preferred contrasts of the form negative emotional stimuli versus neutral stimuli, rather than negative emotional stimuli versus control condition/implicit baseline.

### *Partial brain coverage inclusion*

There is a common consensus regarding the need to exclude studies only employing ROI analyses, in order to avoid biasing whole-brain results in favor of these regions(30). In this meta-analysis, ROI studies were thus excluded. However, we included one study that used a thick-slab acquisition -and thus had a partial brain coverage(31)- given that this coverage was much wider than classical ROIs and encompassed the main brain regions typically involved in emotion processing such as the amygdala (see Supplementary Figure S1 in Wolf et al., 2011 for an image of the thick-slab acquisition employed).

Also, it is important to note that, since the latest version of SDM (SDM-PSI 6.21) no longer assumes a uniform distribution of false positive foci and does not test for spatial convergence, inclusion of studies with partial brain coverage does not necessarily lead to increased Type I errors. On the contrary, this could increase Type II errors in regions not covered by these studies(32). *Heterogeneity, publication bias and robustness*

I² statistic, which represents the percentage of total variation due to betweenstudy heterogeneity rather than sampling error, was visually inspected at the wholebrain level through the  $I^2$  statistic heterogeneity map (a meta-analytical map storing for each voxel a value of  $I^2$  statistic). Heterogeneity is considered to be low when  $I^2$  values are below 40%, moderate when I² values are between 30-60%, substantial when I² values are between 50-90%, and considerable when I² values are between 75- 100%(33). The inspection of the heterogeneity map suggests the presence of low or moderate heterogeneity almost across the whole brain, with only few clusters indicating substantial heterogeneity (see Figure S2). Moreover,  $I^2$  statistic values were extracted from amygdala ROIs with SDM-PSI. The presence of low heterogeneity in the amygdala was suggested by low  $\ell^2$  statistics in the left ( $\ell^2=10.6\%$ ) and the right (I²=15.5%) amygdala. This was also reflected by all included studies lying inside the triangular region of the funnel plot (see Figure 3C in the main text).

Additional analyses were conducted to explore the possible importance of between-study heterogeneity on the results. In order to determine whether results differ according to the definition of "at risk of schizophrenia" (i.e., familial risk, clinical high risk, or psychometric risk), we performed three whole-brain subgroup meta-analyses. The effect of the type of contrast (i.e., negative emotional versus neutral stimuli contrast, or negative emotional versus control condition/implicit baseline contrast) as well as the effect of the task itself (i.e., implicit or explicit task) were also addressed through whole-brain subgroup meta-analyses. We also ran an additional analysis only including studies employing faces, in order to further homogenize the stimuli used across several tasks. Finally, a whole-brain meta-regression with a linear model using participants' mean age as a regressor was performed to see whether age differences across studies influenced the results. Due to the limited number of studies included in subgroup analyses, and in order to reduce the increased risk of Type I error associated with multiple tests, results of additional analyses were thresholded at  $p_{TFCE} < 0.005$  as previously done in Dugré et al., 2020(34). No statistically significant results were found in either of the above sensitivity analyses.

Publication bias was assessed in amygdala ROIs, first through visual inspection of the funnel plot, which represents precision of each study as a function of its effect size. In the absence of publication bias, studies are expected to be symmetrically distributed (see Figure 3C in the main text for visual inspection of publication bias). Secondly, we used Egger's regression test, a quantitative method that tests for the presence of asymmetry in the funnel plot, which was not significant for either left (z=- 0.02, p=0.98) or right (z=-0.65, p=0.52) amygdala, indicating reasonable symmetry of the funnel plot and thus no evidence of a publication bias.

Finally, we performed sensitivity analyses for the purpose of examining the robustness of results and identifying outlier studies. For this analysis, we used a jackknife procedure, consisting of discarding one whole-brain T-map of the metaanalysis dataset at a time. The lack of significant differences in brain activation in atrisk individuals compared with healthy controls was replicated in all whole-brain jackknife analyses, suggesting that this lack of significance was not driven by single outlier studies.

#### *Partial coverage of the amygdala*

The proximity of the amygdala to the sphenoid sinus makes the BOLD signal in this region more vulnerable to susceptibility artifacts caused by air-tissue interface(35). The resulting dropout of the BOLD signal in this region led to partial coverage of the amygdala in several studies included in this meta-analysis(36–40). In order to limit the influence of this partial coverage at the group-level, the authors of these studies were contacted and asked to rerun their analyses after modifying an SPM default parameter (all studies used SPM). Indeed, in order to create first-level brain masks, SPM employs a default threshold that restricts the statistical analyses only to voxels that exhibit a value that is at least 80% of the mean global signal present in the data. If there is signal dropout in at least one participant, for instance due to susceptibility artifacts, the second-level mask (which corresponds to the intersection of first-level masks) will not cover this region. Therefore, authors were asked to rerun analysis after changing the default threshold parameter from 80% to 20%, in order to enlarge first-level brain masks, while also applying an explicit mask excluding voxels outside of the brain.

Two authors successfully engaged in this process and could provide T-maps with an improved coverage of the amygdala(36,40). Three studies with a partial amygdala coverage were still included since authors could not perform the requested analysis due to time restrictions(37–39).

Future studies, and particularly those targeting commonly artefacted regions like the amygdala, should employ acquisition protocols that counteract the negative consequences of these artifacts(41).











From: Page MJ, McKenzie JE, Bossuyt PM, Boutron I, Hoffmann TC, Mulrow CD, et al. The PRISMA 2020 statement: an updated guideline for reporting<br>systematic reviews. BMJ 2021;372:n71. doi: 10.1136/bmj.n71. For more informati

<b>Source</b>	Age, Mean (SD)	Male Sex, No. (%)	<b>MRI Field strength</b>
Bourque et al., 2017(42)	At risk: 14.26 (0.3); HC: 14.35 (0.4)	At risk: 10 (35.7); HC: 47 (34.8)	55
Cao et al., 2016(43)	risk: 33.29 (12.6); HC: 32.69 (10.1) ₹	At risk: 20 (34.5); HC: 39 (41.5)	55
de Achával et al., 2012(40)	risk: 30.4 (4.8); HC: 28.4 (8.3) ₹	At risk: 8 (57.1); HC: 8 (57.1)	ᢛ
Diwadkar et al., 2012(36)	risk: 14.3 (3.1); HC: 14.6 (2.6) ₹	At risk: 12 (63.2); HC: 16 (66.7)	4
Modinos et al., 2010(44)	risk: 19.8 (1.8); HC: 21 (2.8) ₹	At risk: 7 (41.2); HC: 7 (41.2)	55
Modinos et al., 2015(37)	risk: $24.4(4.1)$ ; HC: $23.8(4.6)$ ₹	At risk: 10 (55.6); HC: 10 (45)	$1.5$ T
Modinos et al., 2017(39)	risk: 27.36 (7.6); HC: 27 (5.6) ₹	At risk: 10 (47.6); HC: 13 (59.1)	75
Park et al., 2016(45)	risk: 23.9 (5.6); HC: 23.06 (3.9) ₹	At risk: 7 (35); HC: 8 (47.1)	55
Pulkkinen et al., 2015(46)	risk: 22.4 (0.8); HC: 22.3 (0.7) ₹	At risk: 20 (39.2); HC: 20 (38.5)	$1.5$ T
Quarto et al., 2018(47)	risk: 35.4 (10.1); HC: 31.4 (10.4) ₹	At risk: 13 (36.1); HC: 30 (53.6)	ಸ
Rasetti et al., 2009(48)	risk: 34.8(1.8); HC: 31.8 (2.2) ₹	At risk: 16 (55.2); HC: 15 (75)	ನ
Spilka et al., 2015(49)	risk: 41.19 (15.5); HC: 40.7 (11.1) ₹	At risk: 10 (37); HC: 13 (48)	్గా
van der Velde et al., 2015(38)	risk: 23.1 (4.4); HC: 22.1 (3.6) ₹	At risk: 8 (53); HC: 8 (50)	55
Shivakumar et al., in preparation(50)	risk: 29 (1.7); HC: 31 (4.8) ₹	At risk: 12 (92.3); HC: 11 (73.3)	్గ
Wang et al., 2018(51)	risk: 19.21 (0.9); HC: 19.23 (0.9) ₹	At risk: 17 (50); HC: 13 (43.3)	55
Wolf et al., 2011(31)	risk: 42.3 (14.8); HC: 39 (10.7) ₹	At risk: 9 (45); HC: 12 (48)	్గా
Wolf et al., 2015(52)	At risk: 15.7 (2.7); HC: 16.6 (3.0)	At risk: 123 (47.3); HC: 104 (47.3)	ᢛ

Supplementary Table S2. Demographic and methodological characteristics of included studies

Abbreviations: HC, Healthy Controls

Supplementary Table S3. MNI coordinates of within-group frequentist meta-analysis<br>We employed the Hammersmith brain atlas (n30r83, © Copyright Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine 2007. All<br>rights reserved






Records identified from:<br>Additional unpublished study<br>(n = 1) Reports not retrieved<br> $(n = 0)$ Identification of new studies via other methods  $\overline{\textbf{f}}$ Records identified from:<br>Bibliography Inspection (n = 7) Reports sought for retrieval<br> $(n = 7)$ Supplementary Figure S1. Flow Chart outlining the selection procedure of studies Records removed before Identification of new studies via databases and registers Records excluded<br>(n = 263) Records identified from:<br>PubMed (n = **165)**<br>Web of Science (n = **218**) Records screened<br>(n = 308) Studies included in<br>previous version of<br>meta-analysis in familial<br>risk (n = 1) Studies included in<br>previous version of<br>meta-analysis in clinical<br>high risk (n = 2) **Previous studies** ldentification



**Supplementary Figure S2.** Whole-brain heterogeneity map



*Heterogeneity map displaying for each voxel the I² statistic. Since an I² statistic above 50% is commonly interpreted as substantial heterogeneity, the map was thresholded at I²>50%. A few small clusters displayed evidence of substantial heterogeneity in bilateral superior frontal gyrus, cerebellum, posterior temporal lobe, substantia nigra and left insula. Functional T-maps are overlaid on the Colin 27 anatomical template.*

# **Supplementary References**

- 1. Tseng H-H, Roiser JP, Modinos G, Falkenberg I, Samson C, McGuire P, Allen P (2016): Corticolimbic dysfunction during facial and prosodic emotional recognition in first-episode psychosis patients and individuals at ultra-high risk. *Neuroimage Clin* 12: 645–654.
- 2. Barbour T, Murphy E, Pruitt P, Eickhoff SB, Keshavan MS, Rajan U, *et al.* (2010): Reduced intra-amygdala activity to positively valenced faces in adolescent schizophrenia offspring. *Schizophrenia Research* 123: 126–136.
- 3. Barbour T, Pruitt P, Diwadkar VA (2012): fMRI responses to emotional faces in children and adolescents at genetic risk for psychiatric illness share some of the features of depression. *J Affect Disord* 136: 276–285.
- 4. Villarreal MF, Drucaroff LJ, Goldschmidt MG, de Achával D, Costanzo EY, Castro MN, *et al.* (2014): Pattern of brain activation during social cognitive tasks is related to social competence in siblings discordant for schizophrenia. *J Psychiatr Res* 56: 120–129.
- 5. Goldschmidt MG, Villarreal MF, de Achával D, Drucaroff LJ, Costanzo EY, Castro MN, *et al.* (2014): Cluster B personality symptoms in persons at genetic risk for schizophrenia are associated with social competence and activation of the right temporo-parietal junction during emotion processing. *Psychiatry Res* 221: 30–36.
- 6. Modinos G, Pettersson-Yeo W, Allen P, McGuire PK, Aleman A, Mechelli A (2012): Multivariate pattern classification reveals differential brain activation during emotional processing in individuals with psychosis proneness. *Neuroimage* 59: 3033–3041.
- 7. Spilka MJ, Goghari VM (2017): Similar patterns of brain activation abnormalities during emotional and non-emotional judgments of faces in a schizophrenia family study. *Neuropsychologia* 96: 164–174.
- 8. Goghari VM, Sanford N, Spilka MJ, Woodward TS (2017): Task-Related Functional Connectivity Analysis of Emotion Discrimination in a Family Study of Schizophrenia. *Schizophr Bull* 43: 1348–1362.
- 9. Schneider F, Habel U, Reske M, Toni I, Falkai P, Shah NJ (2007): Neural substrates of olfactory processing in schizophrenia patients and their healthy relatives. *Psychiatry Res* 155: 103–112.
- 10. Quarmley M, Gur RC, Turetsky BI, Watters AJ, Bilker WB, Elliott MA, *et al.* (2019): Reduced safety processing during aversive social conditioning in psychosis and clinical risk. *Neuropsychopharmacol* 44: 2247–2253.
- 11. Huang J, Wang Y, Jin Z, Di X, Yang T, Gur RC, *et al.* (2013): Happy facial expression processing with different social interaction cues: An fMRI study of individuals with schizotypal personality traits. *Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry* 44: 108–117.
- 12. Takano Y, Aoki Y, Yahata N, Kawakubo Y, Inoue H, Iwashiro N, *et al.* (2017): Neural basis for inferring false beliefs and social emotions in others among individuals with schizophrenia and those at ultra-high risk for psychosis. *Psychiatry*

*Res Neuroimaging* 259: 34–41.

- 13. Modinos G, Renken R, Shamay-Tsoory SG, Ormel J, Aleman A (2010): Neurobiological correlates of theory of mind in psychosis proneness. *Neuropsychologia* 48: 3715–3724.
- 14. van Leeuwen JMC, Vink M, Fernández G, Hermans EJ, Joëls M, Kahn RS, Vinkers CH (2018): At-risk individuals display altered brain activity following stress. *Neuropsychopharmacol* 43: 1954–1960.
- 15. Premkumar P, Williams SCR, Lythgoe D, Andrew C, Kuipers E, Kumari V (2013): Neural processing of criticism and positive comments from relatives in individuals with schizotypal personality traits. *World J Biol Psychiatry* 14: 57–70.
- 16. Mohanty A, Herrington JD, Koven NS, Fisher JE, Wenzel EA, Webb AG, *et al.* (2005): Neural mechanisms of affective interference in schizotypy. *J Abnorm Psychol* 114: 16–27.
- 17. Barbour T (2010): Increased Anhedonia in Adolescent Schizophrenia Offspring Predicts Hypo-Responsivity of Subgenual Frontal Cortex to Positive Stimuli. *Biological Psychiatry* 67: 249S-249S.
- 18. Wolf D, Quarmley M, Kass J, Ruparel K, Turetsky B, Prabhakaran K, *et al.* (2015): fMRI of Aversive Face Conditioning in Clinical Risk and Schizophrenia. *Neuropsychopharmacology* 40: S382–S383.
- 19. Mirzakhanian H, Jahshan C, Light G, Nunag J, Roman PD, Cadenhead KS (2011): Automatic Sensory Discrimination and Emotion Recognition in Prodromal and First-Episode Schizophrenia. *Biol Psychiatry* 69: 234S-235S.
- 20. Pruitt PJ, Murphy ER, Keshavan MS, Rajan U, Zajac-Benitez C, Diwadkar VA (2010): Adolescent Offspring of Schizophrenia Patients Show Reduced Amygdala-Related Modulation of Memory Systems During Affective Memory Task. *Biol Psychiatry* 67: 154S-154S.
- 21. Erk S, Mohnke S, Ripke S, Lett TA, Veer IM, Wackerhagen C, *et al.* (2017): Functional neuroimaging effects of recently discovered genetic risk loci for schizophrenia and polygenic risk profile in five RDoC subdomains. *Transl Psychiatry* 7: e997.
- 22. Dzafic I, Burianová H, Periyasamy S, Mowry B (2018): Association between schizophrenia polygenic risk and neural correlates of emotion perception. *Psychiatry Res Neuroimaging* 276: 33–40.
- 23. Yan Z, Schmidt SNL, Frank J, Witt SH, Hass J, Kirsch P, Mier D (2020): Hyperfunctioning of the right posterior superior temporal sulcus in response to neutral facial expressions presents an endophenotype of schizophrenia. *Neuropsychopharmacol* 45: 1346–1352.
- 24. Scognamiglio C, Houenou J (2014): A meta-analysis of fMRI studies in healthy relatives of patients with schizophrenia. *Aust N Z J Psychiatry* 48: 907–916.
- 25. Kozhuharova P, Saviola F, Ettinger U, Allen P (2020): Neural correlates of social cognition in populations at risk of psychosis: A systematic review. *Neurosci Biobehav Rev* 108: 94–111.
- 26. Hart SJ, Shaffer JJ, Bizzell J, Weber M, McMahon MA, Gu H, *et al.* (2015):

Measurement of Fronto-limbic Activity Using an Emotional Oddball Task in Children with Familial High Risk for Schizophrenia. *J Vis Exp*. https://doi.org/10.3791/51484

- 27. Li H-J, Chan RCK, Gong Q-Y, Liu Y, Liu S-M, Shum D, Ma Z-L (2012): Facial emotion processing in patients with schizophrenia and their non-psychotic siblings: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. *Schizophr Res* 134: 143–150.
- 28. Lieberman MD, Eisenberger NI, Crockett MJ, Tom SM, Pfeifer JH, Way BM (2007): Putting feelings into words: affect labeling disrupts amygdala activity in response to affective stimuli. *Psychol Sci* 18: 421–428.
- 29. Calder AJ, Lawrence AD, Young AW (2001): Neuropsychology of fear and loathing. *Nat Rev Neurosci* 2: 352–363.
- 30. Müller VI, Cieslik EC, Laird AR, Fox PT, Radua J, Mataix-Cols D, *et al.* (2018): Ten simple rules for neuroimaging meta-analysis. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews* 84: 151–161.
- 31. Wolf DH, Satterthwaite TD, Loughead J, Pinkham A, Overton E, Elliott MA, *et al.* (2011): Amygdala abnormalities in first-degree relatives of individuals with schizophrenia unmasked by benzodiazepine challenge. *Psychopharmacology (Berl)* 218: 503–512.
- 32. Cutler J, Radua J, Campbell-Meiklejohn D. (2018): Adjusting for Variable Brain Coverage in Voxel-Based FMRI Meta-Analysis. BioRxiv. 457028. doi:10.1101/457028.
- 33. Guyatt GH, Oxman AD, Kunz R, Woodcock J, Brozek J, Helfand M, *et al.* (2011): GRADE guidelines: 7. Rating the quality of evidence—inconsistency. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology* 64: 1294–1302.
- 34. Dugré JR, Radua J, Carignan-Allard M, Dumais A, Rubia K, Potvin S (2020): Neurofunctional abnormalities in antisocial spectrum: A meta-analysis of fMRI studies on Five distinct neurocognitive research domains. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews* 119: 168–183.
- 35. Robinson S, Hoheisel B, Windischberger C, Habel U, Lanzenberger R, Moser E (2005): FMRI of the Emotions: Towards an Improved Understanding of Amygdala Function. *Current Medical Imaging Reviews* 1: 115–129.
- 36. Diwadkar VA, Wadehra S, Pruitt P, Keshavan MS, Rajan U, Zajac-Benitez C, Eickhoff SB (2012): Disordered corticolimbic interactions during affective processing in children and adolescents at risk for schizophrenia revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging and dynamic causal modeling. *Arch Gen Psychiatry* 69: 231–242.
- 37. Modinos G, Tseng H-H, Falkenberg I, Samson C, McGuire P, Allen P (2015): Neural correlates of aberrant emotional salience predict psychotic symptoms and global functioning in high-risk and first-episode psychosis. *Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci* 10: 1429–1436.
- 38. van der Velde J, Opmeer EM, Liemburg EJ, Bruggeman R, Nieboer R, Wunderink L, Aleman A (2015): Lower prefrontal activation during emotion regulation in subjects at ultrahigh risk for psychosis: an fMRI-study [no. 1]. *npj Schizophrenia* 1:

 $1 - 7.$ 

- 39. Modinos G, McLaughlin A, Egerton A, McMullen K, Kumari V, Barker GJ, *et al.* (2017): Corticolimbic hyper-response to emotion and glutamatergic function in people with high schizotypy: a multimodal fMRI-MRS study [no. 4]. *Translational Psychiatry* 7: e1083–e1083.
- 40. de Achával D, Villarreal MF, Costanzo EY, Douer J, Castro MN, Mora MC, *et al.* (2012): Decreased activity in right-hemisphere structures involved in social cognition in siblings discordant for schizophrenia. *Schizophr Res* 134: 171–179.
- 41. Soares JM, Magalhães R, Moreira PS, Sousa A, Ganz E, Sampaio A, *et al.* (2016): A Hitchhiker's Guide to Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. *Front Neurosci* 10: 515.
- 42. Bourque J, Spechler PA, Potvin S, Whelan R, Banaschewski T, Bokde ALW, *et al.* (2017): Functional Neuroimaging Predictors of Self-Reported Psychotic Symptoms in Adolescents. *Am J Psychiatry* 174: 566–575.
- 43. Cao H, Bertolino A, Walter H, Schneider M, Schäfer A, Taurisano P, *et al.* (2016): Altered functional subnetwork during emotional face processing: a potential intermediate phenotype for schizophrenia. *JAMA psychiatry* 73: 598–605.
- 44. Modinos G, Ormel J, Aleman A (2010): Altered activation and functional connectivity of neural systems supporting cognitive control of emotion in psychosis proneness. *Schizophr Res* 118: 88–97.
- 45. Park HY, Yun J-Y, Shin NY, Kim S-Y, Jung WH, Shin YS, *et al.* (2016): Decreased neural response for facial emotion processing in subjects with high genetic load for schizophrenia. *Prog Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry* 71: 90–96.
- 46. Pulkkinen J, Nikkinen J, Kiviniemi V, Mäki P, Miettunen J, Koivukangas J, *et al.* (2015): Functional mapping of dynamic happy and fearful facial expressions in young adults with familial risk for psychosis - Oulu Brain and Mind Study. *Schizophr Res* 164: 242–249.
- 47. Quarto T, Paparella I, De Tullio D, Viscanti G, Fazio L, Taurisano P, *et al.* (2018): Familial Risk and a Genome-Wide Supported DRD2 Variant for Schizophrenia Predict Lateral Prefrontal-Amygdala Effective Connectivity During Emotion Processing. *Schizophrenia Bulletin* 44: 834–843.
- 48. Rasetti R, Mattay VS, Wiedholz LM, Kolachana BS, Hariri AR, Callicott JH, *et al.* (2009): Evidence that altered amygdala activity in schizophrenia is related to clinical state and not genetic risk. *Am J Psychiatry* 166: 216–225.
- 49. Spilka MJ, Arnold AE, Goghari VM (2015): Functional activation abnormalities during facial emotion perception in schizophrenia patients and nonpsychotic relatives. *Schizophr Res* 168: 330–337.
- 50. Shivakumar V, Sreeraj VS, Kalmady SV, Venkatasubramanian G (in preparation): Neurohemodynamic correlates of emotion processing in unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia: A functional MRI Study.
- 51. Wang Y, Li Z, Liu W-H, Wei X-H, Jiang X-Q, Lui S, *et al.* (2018): Negative Schizotypy and Altered Functional Connectivity During Facial Emotion Processing. *Schizophrenia bulletin* 44. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sby036
- 52. Wolf DH, Satterthwaite TD, Calkins ME, Ruparel K, Elliott MA, Hopson RD, *et al.* (2015): Functional neuroimaging abnormalities in youth with psychosis spectrum symptoms. *JAMA Psychiatry* 72: 456–465.
- 53. Hammers A, Allom R, Koepp MJ, Free SL, Myers R, Lemieux L, *et al.* (2003): Three-dimensional maximum probability atlas of the human brain, with particular reference to the temporal lobe. *Human Brain Mapping* 19: 224–247.

# Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #2

# **SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

#### **Blunted brain responses to neutral faces in healthy first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia: an image-based fMRI meta-analysis** Fiorito *et al.*

# **Contents:**

Supplementary Methods

Literature search

Study exclusion

Sensitivity analysis combining image- and coordinate-based meta-analysis

Table S1. Quality assessment checklist

Table S2. Main objective and main results of the included studies

Table S3. MNI coordinates of within-group meta-analysis

Table S4. MNI coordinates of between-group meta-analysis

Supplementary Figure S1. Forest plots

Supplementary Figure S2. Funnel plots

Supplementary Figure S3. Combined image- and coordinate-based between-group meta-analysis

Supplementary Figure S4. Meta-analysis without studies with partial brain coverage

Supplementary Figure S5. Meta-analysis (with mean age and quality of the study as covariates)

Supplementary Figure S6. Whole-brain heterogeneity map

References

### **Supplementary Methods**

### *Literature search*

PubMed search employed a combination of the following keywords: ("schizophren\*" OR "psychosis") AND ("relatives" OR "first-degree" OR "siblings" OR "twins" OR "brothers" OR "sisters" OR "offspring" OR "parents" OR "genetic risk") AND ("neuroimaging" OR "fMRI" OR "functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging") AND ("emotion\*" OR "affect" OR "mood" OR "face" OR "facial").

Web of Science review was based on the following keywords: TS=(schizophren\* OR psychosis) AND TS=(relatives OR first-degree OR siblings OR twins OR brothers OR sisters OR offspring OR parents OR genetic risk) AND TS=(neuroimaging OR fMRI OR functional magnetic resonance) AND TS=(emotion\* OR affect\* OR mood OR face OR facial).

# *Study exclusion*

50 studies were excluded due to the following reasons:

- $-$  12 studies did not include neutral faces<sup> $1-12$ </sup>
- 11 studies used non-relevant task design (1 structural magnetic resonance imaging<sup>13</sup>, 2 non-visual stimuli<sup>14,15</sup>, 2 resting state<sup>16,17</sup>, 6 studies employed scenes or stories instead of faces $18-23$ )
- 7 were conference abstracts $24-30$
- 7 studies employed the same dataset as in another included study $31-37$
- 6 studies were systematic reviews or meta-analyses<sup>38-43</sup>
- 6 study did not include a group of first-degree relatives<sup>44-49</sup>
- 1 study was a method paper $50$

### *Sensitivity analysis combining image- and coordinate-based meta-analysis*

In order to assess the robustness of our image-based meta-analytic results, we performed a sensitivity analysis wherein we added 2 studies reporting brain coordinates. The SDM methodology allows to conduct such meta-analyses that combines 3D statistical images and peak coordinates by leveraging its ability to reconstruct 3D statistical maps from image coordinates. This involves converting t-values of peak coordinates into effect sizes and gradually imputing effect sizes for surrounding voxels, considering proximity to peaks and accounting for estimation inaccuracies through multiple imputations<sup>51,52</sup>.

**Table S1. Quality assessment checklist** adapted from Zheng et al., 2018<sup>53</sup>. For each study and each item, a score of 0/0.5/1 is assigned (0 if criteria not met, 0.5 if partially met, 1 if clearly met). Total score is 12 out of 12.

# **Category 1: Sample characteristics**

Patients were evaluated with specific standardized diagnostic criteria

Important demographic data (age, gender, and education) were reported with mean (or median) and standard deviations (or range))

Healthy comparison subjects were evaluated to exclude psychiatric and medical illnesses

Important clinical variables were reported with mean (or median) and standard deviations (or range))

Sample size per group > 10

# **Category 2: Methodology and reporting**

Whole brain analysis was automated with no a-priori regional selection

Magnet strength at least 1.5T

Whole brain coverage of fMRI scans

The acquisition and preprocessing techniques were clearly described so that they could be reproduced

Coordinates reported in a standard space

Significant results are reported after correction for multiple testing using a standard statistical procedure (FDR, FWE or permutation-based methods)

Conclusions were consistent with the results obtained and the limitations were discussed



# **Table S2. Main objective and main results of the included studies**

**Table S3. MNI coordinates of within-group meta-analysis.** We employed the Hammersmith brain atlas (n30r83, © Copyright Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine 2007. All rights reserved**<sup>61</sup>**) in order to determine the name of brain structures.





**Table S4. MNI coordinates of between-group meta-analysis.** We employed the Hammersmith brain atlas (n30r83, © Copyright Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine 2007. All rights reserved**<sup>61</sup>**) in order to determine the name of brain structures.





**Supplementary Figure S1. Forest plots** depicting the mean ± variance of effect sizes for group comparison in the left and right amygdala (defined using the Melbourne Subcortex Atlas<sup>62</sup>). The black diamonds represent the overall effect size.



**Supplementary Figure S2. Funnel plots** in left and right amygdala. The symmetrical distribution of studies suggests no evidence for publication bias.



**Supplementary Figure S3. Combined image- and coordinate-based betweengroup meta-analysis** of functional neuroimaging studies investigating brain responses to neutral faces in healthy first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia versus healthy controls ( $n = 7$  studies; 157 first-degree relatives and 207 healthy controls). *These are dual-coded* images<sup>63,64</sup> in which color represents mean Hedges' *g (brain regions showing activations are depicted in red while deactivations are depicted in blue), and transparency represents z-values. Black line contours denote significant (de- )activations at pTFCE < 0.05.* 



**Supplementary Figure S4. Meta-analysis without studies with partial brain coverage** (1 study excluded<sup>60</sup>, n = 4 studies; 100 first-degree relatives and 125 healthy controls). *These are dual-coded* images<sup>63,64</sup> in which color represents mean Hedges' g (brain *regions showing activations are depicted in red while deactivations are depicted in blue), and transparency represents z-values. Black line contours denote significant (de-)activations at pTFCE < 0.05.*



**Supplementary Figure S5. Meta-analysis (with mean age and quality of the study as covariates)** of functional neuroimaging studies investigating brain responses to neutral faces in healthy first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia versus healthy controls (n = 5 studies; 120 first-degree relatives and 150 healthy controls). *These are dual-coded* images63,64 *in which color represents mean Hedges' g (brain regions showing activations are depicted in red while deactivations are depicted in blue), and transparency represents z-values. Black line contours denote significant (de-)activations at pTFCE < 0.05.*



**Supplementary Figure S6. Whole-brain heterogeneity map.** Heterogeneity map displaying for each voxel the  $I^2$  statistic. Since an  $I^2$  statistic lower than 40% is commonly interpreted as low heterogeneity<sup>65</sup>, the map was thresholded at  $I^2$  > 40%. Black line contours denote clusters showing at least substantial heterogeneity ( $I^2$  > 60%).

# **References**

- 1. Cao H, Bertolino A, Walter H, et al. Altered functional subnetwork during emotional face processing: a potential intermediate phenotype for schizophrenia. *JAMA Psychiatry*. 2016;73(6):598-605.
- 2. de Achával D, Villarreal MF, Costanzo EY, et al. Decreased activity in righthemisphere structures involved in social cognition in siblings discordant for schizophrenia. *Schizophr Res*. 2012;134(2-3):171-179. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2011.11.010
- 3. Dodell-Feder D, DeLisi LE, Hooker CI. Neural disruption to theory of mind predicts daily social functioning in individuals at familial high-risk for schizophrenia. *Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci*. 2014;9(12):1914-1925. doi:10.1093/scan/nst186
- 4. Falkenberg I, Chaddock C, Murray RM, et al. Failure to deactivate medial prefrontal cortex in people at high risk for psychosis. *Eur Psychiatry J Assoc Eur Psychiatr*. 2015;30(5):633-640. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2015.03.003
- 5. Habel U, Klein M, Shah NJ, et al. Genetic load on amygdala hypofunction during sadness in nonaffected brothers of schizophrenia patients. *Am J Psychiatry*. 2004;161(10):1806-1813. doi:10.1176/ajp.161.10.1806
- 6. Mohnke S, Erk S, Schnell K, et al. Theory of mind network activity is altered in subjects with familial liability for schizophrenia. *Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci*. 2016;11(2):299-307. doi:10.1093/scan/nsv111
- 7. Pulkkinen J, Nikkinen J, Kiviniemi V, et al. Functional mapping of dynamic happy and fearful facial expressions in young adults with familial risk for psychosis - Oulu Brain and Mind Study. *Schizophr Res*. 2015;164(1-3):242-249. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2015.01.039
- 8. Rasetti R, Mattay VS, Wiedholz LM, et al. Evidence that altered amygdala activity in schizophrenia is related to clinical state and not genetic risk. *Am J Psychiatry*. 2009;166(2):216-225. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.08020261
- 9. Sambataro F, Mattay VS, Thurin K, et al. Altered Cerebral Response During Cognitive Control: A Potential Indicator of Genetic Liability for Schizophrenia. *Neuropsychopharmacology*. 2013;38(5):846-853. doi:10.1038/npp.2012.250
- 10. Schneider M, Walter H, Moessnang C, et al. Altered DLPFC–Hippocampus Connectivity During Working Memory: Independent Replication and Disorder Specificity of a Putative Genetic Risk Phenotype for Schizophrenia. *Schizophr Bull*. 2017;43(5):1114-1122. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbx001
- 11. Straub RE, Lipska BK, Egan MF, et al. Allelic variation in GAD1 (GAD67) is associated with schizophrenia and influences cortical function and gene expression. *Mol Psychiatry*. 2007;12(9):854-869.
- 12. Jimenez AM, Clayson PE, Hasratian AS, et al. Neuroimaging of social motivation during winning and losing: Associations with social anhedonia across the psychosis spectrum. *Neuropsychologia*. 2023;188:108621. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108621
- 13. Guimond S, Mothi SS, Makowski C, Chakravarty MM, Keshavan MS. Altered amygdala shape trajectories and emotion recognition in youth at familial high risk of schizophrenia who develop psychosis. *Transl Psychiatry*. 2022;12(1):1-8. doi:10.1038/s41398-022-01957-3
- 14. Nook EC, Dodell-Feder D, Germine LT, Hooley JM, DeLisi LE, Hooker CI. Weak dorsolateral prefrontal response to social criticism predicts worsened mood and

symptoms following social conflict in people at familial risk for schizophrenia. *NeuroImage Clin*. 2018;18:40-50. doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2018.01.004

- 15. Schneider F, Habel U, Reske M, Toni I, Falkai P, Shah NJ. Neural substrates of olfactory processing in schizophrenia patients and their healthy relatives. *Psychiatry Res*. 2007;155(2):103-112. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2006.12.004
- 16. Fornito A, Harrison BJ, Goodby E, et al. Functional dysconnectivity of corticostriatal circuitry as a risk phenotype for psychosis. *JAMA Psychiatry*. 2013;70(11):1143-1151. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2013.1976
- 17. Tian L, Meng C, Yan H, et al. Convergent evidence from multimodal imaging reveals amygdala abnormalities in schizophrenic patients and their first-degree relatives. *PloS One*. 2011;6(12):e28794. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028794
- 18. Fahim C, Stip E, Mancini-Marıe A, Beauregard M. Genes and memory: the neuroanatomical correlates of emotional memory in monozygotic twin discordant for schizophrenia. *Brain Cogn*. 2004;55(2):250-253.
- 19. Hart SJ, Bizzell J, McMahon MA, Gu H, Perkins DO, Belger A. Altered fronto-limbic activity in children and adolescents with familial high risk for schizophrenia. *Psychiatry Res*. 2013;212(1):19-27. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2012.12.003
- 20. Takano Y, Aoki Y, Yahata N, et al. Neural basis for inferring false beliefs and social emotions in others among individuals with schizophrenia and those at ultra-high risk for psychosis. *Psychiatry Res Neuroimaging*. 2017;259:34-41. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2016.11.003
- 21. van der Meer L, Swart M, van der Velde J, et al. Neural correlates of emotion regulation in patients with schizophrenia and non-affected siblings. *PloS One*. 2014;9(6):e99667. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099667
- 22. van Buuren M, Vink M, Rapcencu AE, Kahn RS. Exaggerated brain activation during emotion processing in unaffected siblings of patients with schizophrenia. *Biol Psychiatry*. 2011;70(1):81-87. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.03.011
- 23. van Leeuwen JMC, Vink M, Fernández G, et al. At-risk individuals display altered brain activity following stress. *Neuropsychopharmacology*. 2018;43(9):1954-1960. doi:10.1038/s41386-018-0026-8
- 24. Barbour T. Increased Anhedonia in Adolescent Schizophrenia Offspring Predicts Hypo-Responsivity of Subgenual Frontal Cortex to Positive Stimuli. *Biol Psychiatry*. 2010;67(9):249S-249S.
- 25. Belger A, Andersen EH, Campbell AM, et al. Aberrant ERP Measures of Attention to Emotion Associated with Abnormal Temporo-Limbic FMRI Activation in Schizophrenia and First Degree Relatives: Society of Biological Psychiatry 69th Annual Scientific Meeting. In: : 2014:338S-338S. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2014.03.016
- 26. Gonzalez-Garrido A, Quinones-Beltran S, Epelbaum JB, Gallardo-Moreno G, Gomez-Velazquez F. Working Memory Processing of Emotional Stimuli in Young Individuals with High Genetic Risk of Schizophrenia. *Psychophysiology*. 2019;56:S64-S64.
- 27. Hart SJ, Bizzell J, Woodlief J, Belger A. Neuroimaging executive-emotional processing in adolescents at genetic risk for schizophrenia. *Biol Psychiatry*. 2008;63(7):220S-220S.
- 28. Mirzakhanian H, Jahshan C, Light G, Nunag J, Roman PD, Cadenhead KS. Automatic Sensory Discrimination and Emotion Recognition in Prodromal and First-Episode Schizophrenia. *Biol Psychiatry*. 2011;69(9):234S-235S.
- 29. Pruitt P, Murphy E, Keshavan M, et al. Disordered Functional Maturation of the

Amygdala During Adolescence: Fmri Studies of Affective Judgment in Schizophrenia Offspring. *Schizophr Bull*. 2009;35:171-172.

- 30. Pruitt PJ, Murphy ER, Keshavan MS, Rajan U, Zajac-Benitez C, Diwadkar VA. Adolescent Offspring of Schizophrenia Patients Show Reduced Amygdala-Related Modulation of Memory Systems During Affective Memory Task. *Biol Psychiatry*. 2010;67(9):154S-154S.
- 31. Barbour T, Murphy E, Pruitt P, et al. Reduced intra-amygdala activity to positively valenced faces in adolescent schizophrenia offspring. *Schizophr Res*. 2010;123(2):126-136. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2010.07.023
- 32. Barbour T, Pruitt P, Diwadkar VA. fMRI responses to emotional faces in children and adolescents at genetic risk for psychiatric illness share some of the features of depression. *J Affect Disord*. 2012;136(3):276-285. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2011.11.036
- 33. Goghari VM, Sanford N, Spilka MJ, Woodward TS. Task-Related Functional Connectivity Analysis of Emotion Discrimination in a Family Study of Schizophrenia. *Schizophr Bull*. 2017;43(6):1348-1362. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbx004
- 34. Goldschmidt MG, Villarreal MF, de Achával D, et al. Cluster B personality symptoms in persons at genetic risk for schizophrenia are associated with social competence and activation of the right temporo-parietal junction during emotion processing. *Psychiatry Res*. 2014;221(1):30-36. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2013.10.008
- 35. Mahadevan AS, Cornblath EJ, Lydon-Staley DM, et al. Alprazolam modulates persistence energy during emotion processing in first-degree relatives of individuals with schizophrenia: a network control study. Published online April 23, 2021:2021.04.22.440935. doi:10.1101/2021.04.22.440935
- 36. Spilka MJ, Goghari VM. Similar patterns of brain activation abnormalities during emotional and non-emotional judgments of faces in a schizophrenia family study. *Neuropsychologia*. 2017;96:164-174.

doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.01.014

- 37. Villarreal MF, Drucaroff LJ, Goldschmidt MG, et al. Pattern of brain activation during social cognitive tasks is related to social competence in siblings discordant for schizophrenia. *J Psychiatr Res*. 2014;56:120-129. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2014.05.011
- 38. Dugré JR, Bitar N, Dumais A, Potvin S. Limbic Hyperactivity in Response to Emotionally Neutral Stimuli in Schizophrenia: A Neuroimaging Meta-Analysis of the Hypervigilant Mind. *Am J Psychiatry*. 2019;176(12):1021-1029. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2019.19030247
- 39. Kozhuharova P, Saviola F, Ettinger U, Allen P. Neural correlates of social cognition in populations at risk of psychosis: A systematic review. *Neurosci Biobehav Rev*. 2020;108:94-111. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.10.010
- 40. Saarinen AIL, Huhtaniska S, Pudas J, et al. Structural and functional alterations in the brain gray matter among first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients: A multimodal meta-analysis of fMRI and VBM studies. *Schizophr Res*. 2020;216:14- 23. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2019.12.023
- 41. Scognamiglio C, Houenou J. A meta-analysis of fMRI studies in healthy relatives of patients with schizophrenia. *Aust N Z J Psychiatry*. 2014;48(10):907-916. doi:10.1177/0004867414540753
- 42. Luna LP, Radua J, Fortea L, et al. A systematic review and meta-analysis of structural and functional brain alterations in individuals with genetic and clinical

high-risk for psychosis and bipolar disorder. *Prog Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry*. 2022;117:110540. doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2022.110540

- 43. Fiorito AM, Aleman A, Blasi G, et al. Are Brain Responses to Emotion a Reliable Endophenotype of Schizophrenia? An Image-based fMRI Meta-analysis. *Biol Psychiatry*. Published online June 22, 2022. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2022.06.013
- 44. Brüne M, Ozgürdal S, Ansorge N, et al. An fMRI study of "theory of mind" in at-risk states of psychosis: comparison with manifest schizophrenia and healthy controls. *NeuroImage*. 2011;55(1):329-337. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.018
- 45. Abé C, Petrovic P, Ossler W, et al. Genetic risk for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia predicts structure and function of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. *J Psychiatry Neurosci JPN*. 2021;46(4):E441-E450. doi:10.1503/jpn.200165
- 46. Zhang Y, Li M, Zhang X, et al. Unsuppressed Striatal Activity and Genetic Risk for Schizophrenia Associated With Individual Cognitive Performance Under Social Competition. *Schizophr Bull*. 2022;48(3):599-608. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbac010
- 47. Liang C, Pearlson G, Bustillo J, et al. Psychotic Symptom, Mood, and Cognitionassociated Multimodal MRI Reveal Shared Links to the Salience Network Within the Psychosis Spectrum Disorders. *Schizophr Bull*. 2023;49(1):172-184. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbac158
- 48. Madeira N, Martins R, Valente Duarte J, Costa G, Macedo A, Castelo-Branco M. A fundamental distinction in early neural processing of implicit social interpretation in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. *NeuroImage Clin*. 2021;32:102836. doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2021.102836
- 49. Feola B, McHugo M, Armstrong K, et al. BNST and amygdala connectivity are altered during threat anticipation in schizophrenia. *Behav Brain Res*. 2021;412:113428. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2021.113428
- 50. Hart SJ, Shaffer JJ, Bizzell J, et al. Measurement of Fronto-limbic Activity Using an Emotional Oddball Task in Children with Familial High Risk for Schizophrenia. *J Vis Exp JoVE*. 2015;(106). doi:10.3791/51484
- 51. Albajes-Eizagirre A, Solanes A, Vieta E, Radua J. Voxel-based meta-analysis via permutation of subject images (PSI): Theory and implementation for SDM. *NeuroImage*. 2019;186:174-184. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.10.077
- 52. Radua J, Mataix-Cols D, Phillips ML, et al. A new meta-analytic method for neuroimaging studies that combines reported peak coordinates and statistical parametric maps. *Eur Psychiatry*. 2012;27(8):605-611. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2011.04.001
- 53. Zheng D, Xia W, Yi ZQ, et al. Alterations of brain local functional connectivity in amnestic mild cognitive impairment. *Transl Neurodegener*. 2018;7(1):26. doi:10.1186/s40035-018-0134-8
- 54. Diwadkar VA, Wadehra S, Pruitt P, et al. Disordered corticolimbic interactions during affective processing in children and adolescents at risk for schizophrenia revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging and dynamic causal modeling. *Arch Gen Psychiatry*. 2012;69(3):231-242. doi:10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.1349
- 55. Oertel V, Kraft D, Alves G, et al. Associative Memory Impairments Are Associated With Functional Alterations Within the Memory Network in Schizophrenia Patients and Their Unaffected First-Degree Relatives: An fMRI Study. *Front Psychiatry*. 2019;10:33. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00033
- 56. Park HY, Yun JY, Shin NY, et al. Decreased neural response for facial emotion processing in subjects with high genetic load for schizophrenia. *Prog*

*Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry*. 2016;71:90-96. doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2016.06.014

- 57. Pirnia T, Woods RP, Hamilton LS, et al. Hippocampal dysfunction during declarative memory encoding in schizophrenia and effects of genetic liability. *Schizophr Res*. 2015;161(2):357-366. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2014.11.030
- 58. Quarto T, Paparella I, De Tullio D, et al. Familial Risk and a Genome-Wide Supported DRD2 Variant for Schizophrenia Predict Lateral Prefrontal-Amygdala Effective Connectivity During Emotion Processing. *Schizophr Bull*. 2018;44(4):834-843. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbx128
- 59. Spilka MJ, Arnold AE, Goghari VM. Functional activation abnormalities during facial emotion perception in schizophrenia patients and nonpsychotic relatives. *Schizophr Res*. 2015;168(1-2):330-337. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2015.07.012
- 60. Wolf DH, Satterthwaite TD, Loughead J, et al. Amygdala abnormalities in firstdegree relatives of individuals with schizophrenia unmasked by benzodiazepine challenge. *Psychopharmacology (Berl)*. 2011;218(3):503-512. doi:10.1007/s00213-011-2348-7
- 61. Hammers A, Allom R, Koepp MJ, et al. Three-dimensional maximum probability atlas of the human brain, with particular reference to the temporal lobe. *Hum Brain Mapp*. 2003;19(4):224-247. doi:10.1002/hbm.10123
- 62. Tian Y, Margulies DS, Breakspear M, Zalesky A. Topographic organization of the human subcortex unveiled with functional connectivity gradients. *Nat Neurosci*. 2020;23(11):1421-1432. doi:10.1038/s41593-020-00711-6
- 63. Allen EA, Erhardt EB, Calhoun VD. Data visualization in the neurosciences: overcoming the curse of dimensionality. *Neuron*. 2012;74(4):603-608.
- 64. Zandbelt, Bram. Slice Display. figshare. Published online 2017. 10.6084/m9.figshare.4742866
- 65. Guyatt GH, Oxman AD, Kunz R, et al. GRADE guidelines: 7. Rating the quality of evidence—inconsistency. *J Clin Epidemiol*. 2011;64(12):1294-1302. doi:10.1016/j.jclinepi.2011.03.017

# Matériel complémentaire de l'Article #4

# **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

# **Molecular mapping of a core transcriptional signature of microglia-specific**

# **genes in schizophrenia**

Fiorito *et al.*

# **Contents:**

Supplementary Methods

Microglia genes

Inclusion of datasets

Datasets included

Bayesian analyses

Supplementary Figure 1. Flow Chart outlining the selection procedure of GEO datasets

Supplementary Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Log2 (gene expression) values in brain and peripheral tissues

Supplementary Table 2. Description of the original studies from which the datasets were obtained

Supplementary Table 3. Genes with altered expression in the postmortem brain samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls

Supplementary Table 4. Results of ANCOVA and Bayesian analyses in the postmortem brain samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls

Supplementary Table 5. Genes with altered expression in the peripheral tissue samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls

Supplementary Table 6. Results of ANCOVA and Bayesian analyses in the peripheral tissue samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls

References

#### **Supplementary Methods**

#### *Microglia genes*

The present study exclusively included genes that are part of a core transcriptional signature of human microglia [1]. This signature was established by Patir and colleagues through the identification of co-expressed genes associated with microglia, ensuring their presence in at least three out of nine distinct human datasets of microglia.

Among these genes, we only included microglia genes previously shown to be transcriptionally altered in SZ. We identified these genes according to three criteria.

Firstly, we selected the following genes whose expression was found to be altered in at least one study included in the meta-analysis conducted by Snijders et al. [2] (which explored the expression of 8 genes in total):  $AIF1$  (Hedges'  $q = -1.324$ , p-value = 0.003), *CD68* (Hedges' g = -0.845, p-value = 0.028), *CSF1R* (Hedges' g = -0.874, pvalue = 0.023), *HLA-DRB4* (Hedges' g = -1.403, p-value = 0.014).

Secondly, we selected the following genes that were transcriptionnaly altered both in a postmortem study exploring 16 microglia genes from Snijders et al. [2] (*CSF1R* (Log2FC = -3.306, adj p-value = <0.05), *IRF8* (Log2FC = -2.945, adj p-value = <0.05), *ITGAX* (Log<sub>2</sub>FC = -2.535, adj p-value = <0.05), *OLR1* (Log<sub>2</sub>FC = -5.500, adj p-value =  $\langle 0.05 \rangle$ , *TMEM119* (Log<sub>2</sub>FC = -6.532, adj p-value =  $\langle 0.05 \rangle$ ) and in the largest transcriptomic study in schizophrenia investigating the expression of 25774 genes, from Gandal et al. [3] (*CSF1R* (Log2FC = -0.176, adj p-value = <0.05), *IRF8* (Log2FC = -0.229, adj p-value = <0.05), *ITGAX* (Log2FC = -0.305, adj p-value = <0.05), *OLR1*  $($ Log<sub>2</sub>FC = -0.215, adj p-value = <0.05), *TMEM119* (Log<sub>2</sub>FC = -0.237, adj p-value = <0.05)): *CSF1R*, *IRF8*, *ITGAX*, *OLR1*, *TMEM119*.

Thirdly, we selected the following genes that consistently exhibited differential expression in individuals with schizophrenia compared with healthy controls in a metaanalysis conducted by Bergon and collaborators [4] which explored the expression of 8655 genes in postmortem brain tissues (*CX3CR1* (FC = -1.24, adj p-value = < 0.001), *NCF4* (FC = 1.06, adj p-value = 0.0005), *TLR2* (FC = 1.12, adj p-value = 0.00013), *TSPO* (FC = 1.10, adj p-value = 0.0006)), as well as 16661 genes in peripheral tissues (*CX3CR1* (FC = -1.19, adj p-value = 0.0019), *NCF4* (FC = 1.13, adj p-value = 0.017),

*TLR2* (FC = 1.16, adj p-value = 0.0007), *TSPO* (FC = 1.12, adj p-value = 0.012)): *CX3CR1*, *NCF4*, *TLR2*.

HLA-DRB4 was not included due to the lack of specificity of the microarray probes, and TSPO was omitted as its relevance as a microglia marker has been questioned [5] with evidence suggesting a closer association with astrocytes [6].

Eventually, it should be noted that the genes included in this study exceeded the minimum requirement of being present in three datasets, as established by Patir et al. when defining the core transcriptional signature of human microglia [1]. Indeed, our candidate genes were present in a larger number of datasets, specifically in at least six out of the nine co-expression derived datasets, thus reinforcing their strong association with microglia. Additionally, it is noteworthy that all the genes included in this study were also identified in a recently published list of microglia signature genes that are highly expressed in bulk brain tissues [7].

### *Inclusion of datasets*

Since our primary aim was to map transcriptional alterations of microglia genes in brain and peripheral tissues samples, one dataset per brain region (or peripheral tissue) was selected. When more than one dataset from the same brain region (or peripheral tissue) was available, we selected the one that would maximize the following 2 criteria in this particular order of relevance: 1) the dataset is capable to explore the largest number of genes from our list of candidate genes; 2) the dataset has the largest number of subjects. Based on these criteria, 2 datasets (GSE21138 from Narayen et al., 2008 [8]; GSE38481 from de Jong et al., 2012 [9]) from the list of 12 eligible datasets were not included in the main analyses.

### *Datasets included*

It should be noted that the datasets included in this study are slightly different from those that were pre-registered on AsPredicted.org (#67610, [https://aspredicted.org/285rn.pdf\)](https://aspredicted.org/285rn.pdf). This is due to the following reasons: 1) we initially planned to include datasets using three types of Affymetrix arrays (HG–U133\_Plus\_2, Human Gene 1.0 ST or Human Gene 1.1 ST) which could technically interrogate our

list of candidate genes. However, this criterion precluded the inclusion of other array platforms capable of exploring these candidate genes (such as Agilent or Illumina arrays). Therefore, this criterion was removed, and only custom-designed microarrays were excluded. Consequently, an additional non pre-registered dataset was included in this study (GSE62191 from de Baumont et al., 2015 [10]); 2) we excluded one preregistered dataset (GSE93987 from Arion et al., 2015 [11] since it was captured through a laser microdissection of pyramidal cells, and thus did not contain microglia cells violating our inclusion criteria; 3) we also excluded one pre-registered dataset (GSE73129 from Horiuchi et al., 2016 [12]) due to lack of probe accuracy of at least half of the candidate genes (i.e., 5 genes present a lack of variability in gene expression values for all participants, probably reflecting transcriptional noise).

Following this selection, we report results from 9 different datasets. Finally, it should be noted that for two included datasets, we could not reliably measure the expression of a few genes (*CD68* and *ITGAX* in the superior temporal cortex; *NCF4* and *TMEM119* in the frontal cortex) due to a lack of probe accuracy for those genes. The presently reported non-significant differences between individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls for those latter genes in the relevant datasets should therefore be considered with caution.

### *Bayesian analyses*

In additional Bayesian analyses, we quantify evidence in favor of the null  $(H<sub>0</sub>)$  and alternative (H1) hypotheses using the Bayes Factor (BF). Indeed, BFs are the ratio of the likelihood of the data under the alternative hypothesis and under the null hypothesis. BF<sub>10</sub> quantifies the evidence in favor of H<sub>1</sub> compared with H<sub>0</sub>, while BF<sub>01</sub> (=  $1/BF_{10}$ ) quantifies the evidence in favor of H<sub>0</sub> compared with H<sub>1</sub>. Conventionally a BF<sub>10</sub> (or  $BF_{01}$ ) that exceeds the threshold of 3 represents moderate evidence in favor of  $H_1$ (or  $H_0$ ), while when it exceeds the threshold of 100 the evidence can be considered as decisive. Finally, it is not possible to conclude regarding the presence or absence of group differences when  $BF_{10}$  (or  $BF_{01}$ ) is between 1 and 3 (i.e., anecdotal evidence) [13].

# **Supplementary Figure 1.** Flow Chart outlining the selection procedure of GEO datasets



Abbreviations: GEO, Gene Expression Omnibus; IPSC, induced pluripotent stem cells; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; BA, Brodmann area; PBMCs, peripheral blood mononuclear cells















Abbreviations: HC, healthy controls; SZ, individuals with schizophrenia; SD, Standard deviation; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PBMCs, Peripheral blood mononuclear cells


















**Supplementary Table 3.** Genes with altered expression in the postmortem brain samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared<br>with healthy controls

Abbreviations: NS, not significant<br>'Fold change represents the expression of the target gene in individuals with schizophrenia relative to that in healthy controls<br><sup>2</sup>Significance of adjusted p-values set at 0.05

**Supplementary Table 4.** Results of ANCOVA and Bayesian analyses in the postmortem brain samples of individuals with<br>schizophrenia compared with healthy controls



Abbreviations: BF<sub>10</sub>, Bayes Factor quantifying the evidence in favor of H, compared with H<sub>o</sub>; BF<sub>01</sub>, Bayes Factor quantifying the evidence in favor of H<sub>o</sub> compared with H<sub>ri</sub>; NS, not significant

**Supplementary Table 5.** Genes with altered expression in the peripheral tissue samples of individuals with schizophrenia compared<br>with healthy controls



<sup>1</sup>Fold change represents the expression of the target gene in individuals with schizophrenia relative to that in healthy controls<br><sup>2</sup>Significance of adjusted p-values set at 0.05

**Supplementary Table 6.** Results of ANCOVA and Bayesian analyses in the peripheral tissue samples of individuals with schizophrenia<br>compared with healthy controls



Abbreviations: BF<sub>10</sub>, Bayes Factor quantifying the evidence in favor of H, compared with H<sub>o</sub>; BF<sub>01</sub>, BB<sub>V</sub>es Factor quantifying the evidence in favor of H<sub>o</sub> compared with H<sub>1</sub>; NS, not significant

## **References**

- 1. Patir A, Shih B, McColl BW, Freeman TC. A core transcriptional signature of human microglia: Derivation and utility in describing region-dependent alterations associated with Alzheimer's disease. Glia. 2019;67:1240–1253.
- 2. Snijders GJLJ, van Zuiden W, Sneeboer MAM, Berdenis van Berlekom A, van der Geest AT, Schnieder T, et al. A loss of mature microglial markers without immune activation in schizophrenia. Glia. 2021;69:1251–1267.
- 3. Gandal MJ, Haney JR, Parikshak NN, Leppa V, Ramaswami G, Hartl C, et al. Shared molecular neuropathology across major psychiatric disorders parallels polygenic overlap. Science. 2018;359:693–697.
- 4. Bergon A, Belzeaux R, Comte M, Pelletier F, Hervé M, Gardiner EJ, et al. CX3CR1 is dysregulated in blood and brain from schizophrenia patients. Schizophr Res. 2015;168:434–443.
- 5. Sneeboer MAM, van der Doef T, Litjens M, Psy NBB, Melief J, Hol EM, et al. Microglial activation in schizophrenia: Is translocator 18 kDa protein (TSPO) the right marker? Schizophr Res. 2020;215:167–172.
- 6. Zhu Y, Webster MJ, Murphy CE, Middleton FA, Massa PT, Liu C, et al. Distinct Phenotypes of Inflammation Associated Macrophages and Microglia in the Prefrontal Cortex Schizophrenia Compared to Controls. Front Neurosci. 2022;16.
- 7. Patel T, Carnwath TP, Wang X, Allen M, Lincoln SJ, Lewis-Tuffin LJ, et al. Transcriptional landscape of human microglia implicates age, sex, and APOErelated immunometabolic pathway perturbations. Aging Cell. 2022;21:e13606.
- 8. Narayan S, Tang B, Head SR, Gilmartin TJ, Sutcliffe JG, Dean B, et al. Molecular profiles of schizophrenia in the CNS at different stages of illness. Brain Res. 2008;1239:235–248.
- 9. de Jong S, Boks MPM, Fuller TF, Strengman E, Janson E, de Kovel CGF, et al. A gene co-expression network in whole blood of schizophrenia patients is independent of antipsychotic-use and enriched for brain-expressed genes. PloS One. 2012;7:e39498.
- 10. de Baumont A, Maschietto M, Lima L, Carraro DM, Olivieri EH, Fiorini A, et al. Innate immune response is differentially dysregulated between bipolar disease and schizophrenia. Schizophr Res. 2015;161:215–221.
- 11. Arion D, Corradi JP, Tang S, Datta D, Boothe F, He A, et al. Distinctive transcriptome alterations of prefrontal pyramidal neurons in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Mol Psychiatry. 2015;20:1397–1405.
- 12. Horiuchi Y, Kondo MA, Okada K, Takayanagi Y, Tanaka T, Ho T, et al. Molecular signatures associated with cognitive deficits in schizophrenia: a study of biopsied olfactory neural epithelium. Transl Psychiatry. 2016;6:e915–e915.
- 13. Jeffreys SH. The Theory of Probability. Third Edition. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
- 14. Maycox PR, Kelly F, Taylor A, Bates S, Reid J, Logendra R, et al. Analysis of gene expression in two large schizophrenia cohorts identifies multiple changes associated with nerve terminal function. Mol Psychiatry. 2009;14:1083–1094.
- 15. Chen C, Cheng L, Grennan K, Pibiri F, Zhang C, Badner JA, et al. Two gene coexpression modules differentiate psychotics and controls. Mol Psychiatry. 2013;18:1308–1314.
- 16. Lanz TA, Reinhart V, Sheehan MJ, Rizzo SJS, Bove SE, James LC, et al. Postmortem transcriptional profiling reveals widespread increase in inflammation in schizophrenia: a comparison of prefrontal cortex, striatum, and hippocampus among matched tetrads of controls with subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar or major depressive disorder. Transl Psychiatry. 2019;9:151.
- 17. Barnes MR, Huxley-Jones J, Maycox PR, Lennon M, Thornber A, Kelly F, et al. Transcription and pathway analysis of the superior temporal cortex and anterior prefrontal cortex in schizophrenia. J Neurosci Res. 2011;89:1218–1227.
- 18. van Beveren NJM, Buitendijk GHS, Swagemakers S, Krab LC, Röder C, de Haan L, et al. Marked reduction of AKT1 expression and deregulation of AKT1 associated pathways in peripheral blood mononuclear cells of schizophrenia patients. PloS One. 2012;7:e32618.
- 19. Cattane N, Minelli A, Milanesi E, Maj C, Bignotti S, Bortolomasi M, et al. Altered Gene Expression in Schizophrenia: Findings from Transcriptional Signatures in Fibroblasts and Blood. PLOS ONE. 2015;10:e0116686.