Reducing The Need For Trusted Parties In Cryptography

Michel Abdalla

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Reducing The Need For Trusted Parties In Cryptography

THÈSE D’HABILITATION

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Diplôme d’Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches
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(Spécialité Informatique)

par

Michel Ferreira Abdalla

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Jean-Sébastien Coron ......................... Rapporteur
Antoine Joux .................................... Rapporteur
Kenny Paterson ................................. Rapporteur
Ronald Cramer ................................. Examinateur
Marc Fischlin ................................. Examinateur
Nigel Smart ................................. Examinateur
Jacques Stern ................................. Examinateur
David Pointcheval .......................... Directeur

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Abstract

Trusted parties are fundamental for the establishment of secure communication among users. Such is the case, for example, when establishing a trusted relationship between users and certain public information in a public-key infrastructure for public-key encryption and signature schemes or when storing high-entropy secret keys in a cryptographic device. Clearly, if the trusted party misbehaves in either of these situations, then the overall security of the scheme or protocol in which we are interested can be adversely affected.

There are several ways in which one can try to reduce the amount of trust in third parties, such as making the task of recovering the secret key harder for the adversary, as in distributed cryptosystems or minimizing the damage caused by secret-key exposures, as in forward-secure and intrusion-resilient cryptosystems. In this thesis, we consider two additional methods.

The first one, which goes by the name of password-based key exchange, is to assume that the secret keys used in authenticated key exchange protocols have low entropy and do not need to be stored in a cryptographic device. In spite of the low entropy of secret keys, such protocols can still provide a level of assurance which may be sufficient for most applications.

The second method for reducing the amount of trust in third parties is to use an identity-based cryptosystem, in which the public key of a user can be an arbitrary string such as an email address. As identity-based cryptosystems provide collusion resistance, they can also be used to lessen the damage caused by secret-key exposures by generating independent secret keys for different time periods or devices. Moreover, identity-based cryptosystems can allow users to have a more fine-grained control over the decryption capabilities of third parties, further limiting the harmful consequences due to their misbehavior.

Keywords: Provable security, password-based cryptography, identity-based cryptography.
Résumé

Les tiers de confiance sont essentiels aux communications sécurisées. Par exemple, dans une infrastructure de gestion de clés, l’autorité de certification est la clé de voute de l’authentification en garantissant le lien entre une identité et une clé publique. Une carte à puce se doit, pour sa part, d’assurer la confidentialité et l’intégrité des données secrètes lorsqu’elle sert de stockage de données cryptographiques. En effet, si ces garanties sont mises en défaut dans l’une de ces situations, alors la sécurité globale du système peut en être affectée.

Plusieurs approches permettent de réduire l’importance des tiers de confiance, telles qu’ac- croître la difficulté de recouvrer la clé secrète, en la distribuant parmi plusieurs entités, ou limiter l’impact d’une fuite d’information secrète, comme dans les cryptosystèmes « intrusion-resilient » ou « forward-secure ». Dans cette thèse, nous considérons deux méthodes complémentaires.

La première méthode consiste à utiliser des mots de passe, ou des clés secrètes de faible entropie, qui n’ont pas besoin d’être stockés dans un dispositif cryptographique sécurisé. Malgré la faible entropie du secret, de tels protocoles peuvent fournir un niveau d’assurance satisfaisant pour la plupart des applications. On considère en particulier la mise en accord de clés.

La deuxième méthode limite le besoin de garantie de la part des tiers de confiance en utilisant un cryptosystème basé sur l’identité, dans lequel la clé publique d’un utilisateur peut être une chaîne de caractères arbitraire, telle qu’une adresse email. Comme ces systèmes fournissent une résistance aux collisions, ils peuvent aussi être utilisés pour réduire les dommages causés par l’exposition de clés secrètes en générant des secrets indépendants pour chaque période de temps ou pour chaque périphérique/entité. Par ailleurs, ces systèmes basés sur l’identité permettent aux utilisateurs d’avoir un contrôle plus fin sur les capacités de déchiffrage des tiers, en limitant les conséquences liées à un mauvais usage.

Mots-clés : Sécurité prouvée, cryptographie basée sur des mots de passe, cryptographie basée sur l’identité.
Part I

Reducing The Need For Trusted Parties In Cryptography
Introduction

The primary goal of cryptography is to enable parties to communicate securely over an insecure channel, which may be under the control of an adversary. Though originally used mainly for the purpose of protecting the privacy of messages, cryptography now encompasses many other goals, such as guaranteeing the integrity of messages being exchanged or the authenticity of the sender.

For most of its history, cryptography was essentially a game played between designers and attackers in which one side would try to outsmart the other by conceiving ad hoc attack and defense mechanisms for their particular goals [Bel11]. Although this ad hoc aspect may always be present in the field, cryptography has since become a well established science, with clear security definitions and objectives.

The exact security objectives in which one might be interested will be determined by the application one has in mind and may depend on many factors, such as how powerful adversaries may be or the type of information that needs to be protected. The two most common goals usually considered are data privacy and authenticity. While the goal of data privacy is to keep unintended parties from learning the contents of the message being sent over the channel, data authenticity aims at guaranteeing that the contents of the message have not been tampered with during the course of transmission.

Encryption schemes. The usual way to achieve data privacy and allow parties to exchange messages privately over an insecure channel is to use an encryption scheme. In these schemes, there are two types of keys, known as the encryption and decryption keys. Whenever a sender wants to send a private message, or plaintext, to a receiver, he first converts it into an enciphered form, called a ciphertext, with the help of the encryption key and then sends the latter to the receiver. Upon the receipt of a ciphertext, the receiver can use the decryption key to recover the original plaintext. The algorithms used to generate the ciphertext and to recover the plaintext are known as the encryption and decryption algorithms respectively.

The classical example of an encryption scheme is Shannon’s one-time pad [Sha49]. In the one-time pad scheme, both the sender and receiver have to share a secret key whose length is at least that of the message being exchanged. To encrypt a message, the sender simply computes the bit-wise XOR of the message with the shared secret key, which serves as the encryption key, and sends it to the receiver. Upon receiving a ciphertext, the receiver can recover the original message in a similar manner using the shared secret key as the decryption key. Despite its simplicity, Shannon showed that the one-time pad is actually as secure as it gets since, as long as the shared secret key does not get reused, it is impossible for an adversary to gain any information about the plaintext, other than its length, from the ciphertext. Moreover, this is the case even if the adversary has unlimited computational resources. Its main drawback lies in the key size, which needs to be at least as long as the message, thus imposing a limit on the amount of information that can be securely transmitted.

Signature schemes. The standard way of achieving data authenticity is to use a signature
scheme. As in an encryption scheme, there are two types of keys, to which we refer as signing and verification keys. Using the signing key, a sender can create a signature for each message whose authenticity needs to be guaranteed. This signature will be attached to the message before its transmission and will serve as a testament to the fact that the message is authentic. After receiving a message together with its signature, the receiver can verify its authenticity by checking the validity of the signature with the help of the verification key. The algorithms used to generate the signature and to verify its validity are known as the signing and verification algorithms respectively.

**Symmetric and asymmetric settings.** In order for an encryption scheme to guarantee data privacy, it is clear that the decryption key used by the receiver should be kept hidden from the adversary or else the adversary could use it to recover the plaintext associated with any ciphertext sent over the channel. Likewise, to guarantee data authenticity, the signing key of a signature scheme needs to remain secret or else the adversary could fabricate authenticators for any message of its choice.

As for the encryption and verification keys used in these schemes, they might be either secret or not depending on the particular setting in which we are interested. In the *private-key* cryptographic setting, both encryption and verification keys are assumed to be unknown to the adversary. Due to the secrecy of these keys, both senders and receivers have to agree on their values before they can start communicating securely. Moreover, since these keys usually have high entropy, one may need a cryptographic device to safely store them. In this setting, signature schemes are also known as message authentication codes. On the other hand, in the *public-key* cryptographic setting, encryption and verification keys are not necessarily hidden from the adversary. They are only mathematically related to the corresponding decryption and signing keys and may be made public. Because the encryption and verification keys are usually equal to the decryption and signing keys, respectively, in the private-key setting and different from them in the public-key setting, we also refer to these settings as *symmetric* and *asymmetric*.

The notion of public-key cryptography was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] and is one of the main innovations of modern cryptography. Unlike private-key cryptography, public-key cryptography does not require previously established secrets to enable secure communication between parties. In public-key cryptography, each user has a pair of *public* and *secret* keys associated to him. While the public key is known to all parties, including the adversary, the secret key should only be known to the user with whom it is associated.

Since public and secret keys are mathematically related, it is always possible for an adversary to compute a corresponding secret key when given a public key. Hence, public-key cryptography should only be considered in an environment in which adversaries are assumed to be computationally bounded. In this *computational-complexity* setting, rather than *impossibility*, we talk about the *infeasibility* of breaking the security of a scheme.

In order to link users to their public keys, public-key encryption and signature schemes have to rely on the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI), where a trusted authority certifies the relation between users and their public keys by means of a digital signature. Since users need to know the public key associated with the trusted authority itself to be able to verify the validity of signatures issued by this authority, the latter public key needs to be pre-distributed to all users in the system.

**Key exchange.** Although public-key encryption and signature schemes can guarantee the privacy and authenticity of exchanged messages when users have access to certified copies of each other’s public keys, their costs may be too high for certain applications. To avoid the use of such primitives and improve the overall efficiency, users often prefer to secure their communication via symmetric encryption and signature schemes. Unfortunately, this is only possible when users
are in possession of pre-established common secrets. To alleviate the need for pre-established secrets without significantly impacting the overall efficiency, another way of dealing with this problem is for users to first establish a common secret key via a key exchange protocol and to use this key to derive keys for symmetric encryption and signature schemes.

Public information: \((G, g, p)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; ) (X \leftarrow g^x)</td>
<td>(y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; ) (Y \leftarrow g^y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X \rightarrow Y)</td>
<td>(Y \rightarrow X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SK_A \leftarrow Y^x)</td>
<td>(SK_B \leftarrow X^y)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [DH76]. The protocol works over a finite cyclic group \(G\) of prime order \(p\), generated by an element \(g\).

The classical example of a key exchange protocol is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH76], which is depicted in Figure 1. Let \(G\) be a cyclic group of prime order \(p\), let \(g\) be a generator for \(G\), and let Alice and Bob be two users willing to establish a shared secret key. In the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, Alice chooses a secret value \(x\) uniformly at random from \(\mathbb{Z}_p\) and then sends the ephemeral public key value \(X = g^x\) to Bob. Likewise, Bob chooses a secret value \(y\) in \(\mathbb{Z}_p\) and sends \(Y = g^y\) to Alice. Finally, after receiving the values \(X\) and \(Y\), both Alice and Bob can compute a common secret \(SK = g^{xy}\) using their corresponding secret values.

Despite its simplicity, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol can be shown to be secure under reasonable assumptions with respect to adversaries which only eavesdrop on the communication without altering it. However, the same is not true with respect to active adversaries. The problem with it is that the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol does not include any form of authentication and can be easily compromised by an adversary that plays the role of one of the parties in the protocol. It thus becomes clear that to avoid such impersonation attacks and achieve security even in the presence of active adversaries, both parties need to somehow authenticate each other in addition to establishing a common secret.

**Authenticated key exchange.** There are several ways in which one can embed authentication into a key exchange protocol. The first one, to which we refer as the 2-party asymmetric model, is to assume that each user in the system is associated with a pair of public and secret keys and to use public-key signature schemes to authenticate the communication between the parties. An example of a popular protocol in this model is the 2-party SIGMA protocol [Kra03] used as the basis for the signature-based modes of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. It is worth noting that we implicitly assume the existence of a PKI when adopting this model.

A second method of adding authentication, known as the 3-party symmetric model, is to assume the existence of a trusted server with which all parties share a secret. In this model, users can use the help of the trusted server with which they share a key together with symmetric encryption and signature schemes to avoid active attacks during the key establishment protocol. A well-known protocol in this model is the 3-party Kerberos authentication system [SNS88]. The problem with this approach is that the trusted server needs to be present during the key establishment and this may possibly cause a bottleneck.

Finally, yet another form of obtaining an authenticated key exchange, referred to as the 2-party symmetric model, is to assume that all users in the system already share a common secret. As in 3-party model, users can use their pre-established secrets to secure their communication when establishing new common secrets.
The need for trusted parties. As the above discussion shows, trusted parties are fundamental for the establishment of secure communication among parties. Such is the case, for example, when establishing a trusted relationship between users and certain public information in a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for public-key encryption and signature schemes or when storing high-entropy secret keys in a cryptographic device. Clearly, if the trusted party misbehaves in either of these situations, then the overall security of the scheme or protocol in which we are interested can be adversely affected. For instance, if the trusted certificate authority of a PKI is compromised and issues certificates for users without verifying their identities, then the privacy or authenticity of the communication can no longer be guaranteed. Likewise, if the cryptographic device in which secret keys are stored gets compromised, then the information advantage that honest users have over the adversary in the form of a secret key may no longer exist.

There are several ways in which one can try to reduce the amount of trust in third parties. One method is to use distributed cryptosystems such as the one by Desmedt and Franklin in \cite{DF92}. In their scheme, secret signing keys are shared among several servers so that the adversary needs to compromise a sufficiently large set of servers in order to recover a signing key. Another method of reducing the trust in third parties is to use an intrusion-resilient cryptosystem, such as the constructions by Dodis et al. in \cite{DKXY02,DFK+03}, which tries to minimize the damage caused by secret-key exposures. A third method requiring fewer interactions among parties is to use forward-secure cryptosystems, as in the signature scheme of Bellare and Miner in \cite{BM99}. In these schemes, even though the public key is fixed, the secret key is updated at regular intervals so that the compromise of the current secret key does not compromise the security of previous time periods.

Contributions. In this thesis, we consider two additional methods for reducing the amount of trust in third parties. The first one, which is described in Chapter 2, is to assume that the secret keys used in authenticated key exchange protocols have low entropy and do not need to be stored in a cryptographic device. As we show in Chapter 2 despite the low entropy of secret keys, such protocols can still provide a level of assurance which may be sufficient for most applications. The second method, which is described in Chapter 3, is to use a generalization of public-key cryptography known as identity-based cryptography, in which the public key of a user can be an arbitrary string such as his own identity or email address. As shown in \cite{BF03}, in addition to facilitating the deployment of a public key infrastructure, identity-based cryptosystems can have several other applications. Like intrusion-resilient cryptosystems, identity-based schemes can be used to minimize the damage caused by secret-key exposures by generating independent secret keys for different time periods or devices. Additionally, identity-based encryption schemes can also allow the sender to have a more fine-grained control over the decryption capabilities of the receiver with the appropriate use of attributes.

Outline. Since the schemes considered in this thesis follow the provable-security paradigm, we start by describing this paradigm in more detail in Chapter 1. Next, in Chapters 2 and 3 we present an overview of password-based and identity-based cryptography along with our main contributions to these areas. The main articles in which these contributions are based can be found in the appendix. Finally, we conclude this thesis by presenting some closing remarks and perspectives.
Chapter 1

Provable security

1.1 Introduction

Even though we have already mentioned in the previous chapter several properties that a cryptographic scheme may possess, such as data privacy and authenticity, we have not actually shown how one can prove that a cryptographic scheme has these properties. In the past, the most common approach to validate the security of a cryptographic scheme was to search for attacks and to declare a scheme secure if no attack is found that contradicts its security. Unfortunately, the problem with this approach is that we can never be certain that an attack does not exist. Hence, the security of the scheme can only be considered heuristic at best as the possibility that an attack exists cannot be excluded.

Another approach for proving the security of a cryptographic scheme, known as provable security, is to relate the security of a cryptographic scheme with that of its underlying primitives or computational problems. To achieve this goal, one needs to first specify the attacker’s capabilities and the security goals that a given cryptographic scheme must meet. Next, one needs to specify the attacker’s capabilities and the security goals for the underlying primitives and computational problems. Finally, one needs to provide a reduction which shows how to transform an adversary that breaks the security goals of a cryptographic scheme into an adversary against the security goals of the cryptographic primitives and computational problems on which the scheme is based.

One direct consequence of provable security is that it obviates the need to search for specific attacks against a cryptographic scheme. This is because as long as we are ready to believe that the underlying primitives are secure or the computational problems are hard, then there can be no attacks against the cryptographic scheme in question.

In order to illustrate how the provable security methodology can be used in practice, we also provide a concrete example on how to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme by considering the classical ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [ElG85a]. But before doing so, we start by recalling some of the standard tools and computational problems that are used in this thesis.

1.2 Basic tools

In this section, we recall some of the definitions and basic tools that will be used in the remaining chapters, such as the syntax of code-based games and the description of bilinear maps.
1.2.1 Notation and conventions

Let $\mathbb{N}$ denote the set of natural numbers. If $n \in \mathbb{N}$, then $\{0,1\}^n$ denotes the set of $n$-bit strings, and $\{0,1\}^*$ is the set of all bit strings. The empty string is denoted $\varepsilon$. More generally, if $S$ is a set, then $S^n$ is the set of $n$-tuples of elements of $S$, $S^{\leq n}$ is the set of tuples of length at most $n$. If $x$ is a string then $|x|$ denotes its length, and if $S$ is a set then $|S|$ denotes its size. If $S$ is finite, then $x \in^R S$ denotes the assignment to $x$ of an element chosen uniformly at random from $S$. If $A$ is an algorithm, then $y \leftarrow A(x)$ denotes the assignment to $y$ of the output of $A$ on input $x$, and if $A$ is randomized, then $y \xleftarrow{R} A(x)$ denotes that the output of an execution of $A(x)$ with fresh coins assigned to $y$. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. “PT” stands for polynomial time and “PTA” for polynomial-time algorithm or adversary. We denote by $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. A function $\nu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0,1]$ is said to be negligible if for every $c \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists a $k_c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\nu(k) \leq k^{-c}$ for all $k > k_c$, and it is said to be overwhelming if the function $|1 - \nu(k)|$ is negligible.

1.2.2 Code-based games

Some of the definitions in this thesis use code-based game-playing [BR06]. In such games, there exist procedures for initialization (Initialize) and finalization (Finalize) and procedures to respond to adversary oracle queries. A game $G$ is executed with an adversary $A$ as follows. First, Initialize executes and its outputs are the inputs to $A$. Then $A$ executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of $G$. When $A$ terminates, its output becomes the input to the Finalize procedure. The output of the latter, denoted $G(A)$, is called the output of the game, and “$G(A) = y$” denotes the event that the output takes a value $y$. Boolean flags are assumed initialized to false. Games $G_i, G_j$ are identical until bad if their code differs only in statements that follow the setting of bad to true.

1.2.3 Represented groups

Let $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$ be a finite cyclic group of prime order $p$ generated by an element $g$, where $k = |p|$ is the security parameter. Throughout this thesis, we will use the multiplicative notation for the group operation. Hence, $g^0$ denotes the identity element of $\mathbb{G}$ and $g^u$ denotes the group element of $\mathbb{G}$ that results from multiplying $u$ copies of $g$, for $u \in \mathbb{N}$. Note that $g^u = g^{u \mod |\mathbb{G}|}$ by Lagrange’s theorem.

Algorithms which operate on $\mathbb{G}$ will be given string representations of elements in $\mathbb{G}$. For that, we require an injective map $\_ : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$ associated to $\mathbb{G}$, where $\ell$ is the length of the representation of group elements. Similarly, when a number $i \in \mathbb{N}$ is an input to, or output of, an algorithm, it must be appropriately encoded, say in binary. We assume all necessary encoding methods are fixed, and do not normally write the $\_$ operators.

The schemes considered in this thesis are parameterized by a group generator, which is a PTA $\mathcal{G}$ that on input $1^k$ returns the description of a multiplicative group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order $p$, where $2^k < p < 2^{k+1}$.

1.2.4 Bilinear maps

The pairing-based schemes that we consider in this thesis are parameterized by a pairing parameter generator, which is a PTA $\mathcal{G}$ that on input $1^k$ returns the description of two multiplicative groups $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ of prime order $p$ with an admissible map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, where $2^k < p < 2^{k+1}$. By admissible, we mean that the map is bilinear, non-degenerate, and efficiently computable. Bilinearity means that for all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and all $g \in \mathbb{G}$, we have $\hat{e}(g^a, g^b) = \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab}$. By non-degenerate, we mean that $\hat{e}(g, g) = 1$ if and only if $g = 1$. 

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1.3 Standard complexity assumptions

CDH and DDH Problems. Two of the most common computational problems in finite cyclic groups are the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problems. In the CDH problem, the adversary is given a tuple \((g, g^a, g^b)\) for random integers \(a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\) and a random generator \(g \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G^*\) and its goal is to compute \(g^{ab}\). In the DDH problem, the goal is to distinguish \((g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})\) from \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\) when \(g\) is a random generator for \(G\) and \(a, b, c\) are chosen uniformly at random from \(\mathbb{Z}_p^*\).

To define more precisely the CDH problem with respect to a group generator \(G\), we consider the game \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A)\) described in Figure 1.1 using the notation of code-based games. The game is defined by two procedures and is executed with an adversary \(A\) as follows. The procedure \text{Initialize} chooses a random generator \(g \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G^*\) and two random integers \(x, y \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*\), computes \(X \leftarrow g^x\) and \(Y \leftarrow g^y\), and returns \(((\langle G, p \rangle, g, X, Y)\) to \(A\). Eventually, the adversary ends the game by querying the \text{Finalize} procedure with a guess \(Z\), which outputs true if \(Z = g^{xy}\) and false, otherwise. The advantage \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A)\) of an adversary \(A\) in solving the CDH problem relative to \(G\) is then defined as the probability that \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A)\) outputs true. In other words,

\[
\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A) = \Pr\left[ \text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A) = \text{true} \right].
\]

In order to define more formally the DDH problem relative to a group generator \(G\), consider the games \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}}(A)\) described in Figure 1.1 for \(\beta \in \{0, 1\}\). Both games are defined by two procedures, which are executed with an adversary \(A\) as follows. In the game \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-0}(A)\), the procedure \text{Initialize} chooses a random generator \(g \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G^*\) and random integers \(x, y \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*\), sets \(z \leftarrow xy \mod p\), computes \(X \leftarrow g^x\), \(Y \leftarrow g^y\), and \(Z \leftarrow g^z\), and returns \(((\langle G, p \rangle, g, X, Y, Z)\) to \(A\). In the game \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-1}(A)\), the procedure \text{Initialize} chooses a random generator \(g \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G^*\) and random integers \(x, y, z \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*\), computes \(X \leftarrow g^x\), \(Y \leftarrow g^y\), and \(Z \leftarrow g^z\), and returns \(((\langle G, p \rangle, g, X, Y, Z)\) to \(A\). In both games, the adversary eventually ends the game by querying the \text{Finalize} procedure with a guess \(\beta\), which in turn returns true if \(\beta' = 1\) and false, otherwise. The advantage \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}}(A)\) of an adversary \(A\) in solving the DDH problem relative to \(G\) is then defined as the probability that \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-0}(A)\) outputs true minus the probability that \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-1}(A)\) outputs true. That is,

\[
\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}}(A) = \Pr\left[ \text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-0}(A) = \text{true} \right] - \Pr\left[ \text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}-1}(A) = \text{true} \right].
\]

Finally, the CDH and DDH problems are said to be hard relative to \(G\) if \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{cdh}}(A)\) and \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{dh}}(A)\) are negligible functions in \(k\) for all PTAs \(A\).

BDH and BDDH Problems. In the bilinear-map setting, two of the most common computational problems are the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem and its decisional version, the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem [BF01, Jon04]. While in the BDH problem, the goal is to compute \(\hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}\) given a tuple \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\) for random integers \(a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\), in the BDDH problem, the goal is to distinguish the element \(\hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}\) from a random element of \(G_1^*\).

More precisely, the advantage \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{bdh}}(A)\) of an adversary \(A\) in solving the BDH problem relative to a pairing parameter generator \(G\) is defined as the probability that the adversary \(A\) outputs \(\hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}\) on input \(((\langle G, G_1, p, \hat{e} \rangle, g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\) for randomly chosen \(g \overset{R}{\leftarrow} G^*\) and \(a, b, c \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*\). Using the code-based notation, \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{bdh}}(A)\) corresponds to probability that the game \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{bdh}}(A)\) returns true in Figure 1.2.

To define the advantage \(\text{Adv}_{G,k}^{\text{bddh}}(A)\) of an adversary \(A\) in solving the BDDH problem relative to \(G\), we consider the game \(\text{Exp}_{G,k}^{\text{bddh}-\beta}(A)\) between \(A\) and a challenger in Figure 1.2.
for $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$. In these games, the procedure $\text{Initialize}$ first chooses a random generator $g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G^*$, random integers $a, b, c \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and a random element $T \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_T$. If $\beta = 1$, $\text{Initialize}$ returns the tuple $((G, G_T, p, \tilde{e}), g, g^a, g^b, g^c, \tilde{e}(g, g)^{abc})$ to $\mathcal{A}$; if $\beta = 0$, it returns the tuple $((G, G_T, p, \tilde{e}), g, g^a, g^b, g^c, \tilde{e}(g, g)^{acc})$ instead. The advantage $\text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{G,k}(\mathcal{A})$ is then defined as the probability that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{bdh}}_{G,k}(\mathcal{A})$ outputs true minus the probability that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{bdh-1}}_{G,k}(\mathcal{A})$ outputs true. Finally, the BDH and BDDH problems are said to be hard relative to $G$ if $\text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{G,k}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\text{Adv}^{\text{bdh-1}}_{G,k}(\mathcal{A})$ are negligible functions in $k$ for all PTAs $\mathcal{A}$.
1.4 Example: Public-key encryption

In order to illustrate how provable security can be used in practice, we provide in this section a proof of security for the classical ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [ElG85a] as an example. Towards this goal, we start by recalling the formal definition of a public-key encryption scheme and what it means to be secure. Next, we describe the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme and show that it meets the notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption described in Section 1.3.

Syntax. A public-key encryption scheme (PKE) is defined by a tuple of algorithms $PKE = (PG, KeyGen, Enc, Dec)$ and a message space $M$, providing the following functionality. Via $pars \xrightarrow{R} PG(1^k)$, one can run the probabilistic parameter generation algorithm $PG$ to setup the common parameter $pars$ for a given security parameter $k$. Via $(pk, sk) \xrightarrow{R} KeyGen(pars)$, a user can run the probabilistic algorithm $KeyGen$ to obtain a pair $(pk, sk)$ of public and secret keys with respect to common parameter $pars$. Via $C \xrightarrow{R} Enc(pk, m)$, one can send an encrypted message $m \in M$ to the user with public $pk$. Finally, via $m \leftarrow Dec(sk, C)$, the user in possession of the secret key $sk$ and a ciphertext $C$ can run the deterministic decryption algorithm to recover the underlying plaintext $m$. For correctness, it is required that for all honestly generated keys $(pk, sk) \xrightarrow{R} KeyGen$, for all messages $m \in M$, $m = Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m))$ holds with all but negligible probability.

Security definition. The now-standard definition of security of PKE schemes, suggested by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84], is indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). In this security model, the adversary receives the public key of the scheme that he is trying to attack and his goal is to find a pair of messages of the same length whose encryptions he is able to distinguish. Since the adversary is allowed to choose the challenge messages after seeing the public key, this security notion implicitly provides security against key recovery attacks.

The precise definition of IND-CPA security considers the game $Exp_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ described in Figure 1.1. $Exp_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ contains three procedures, which are executed with an adversary $A$ as follows. The procedure $\text{Initialize}$ generates the common parameter $pars \xrightarrow{R} PG(1^k)$ and a pair of public and secret keys $(pk, sk) \xrightarrow{R} KeyGen(pars)$ and returns $pk$ to $A$. During the execution of the game, the adversary is allowed to make a single query $(m^*_0, m^*_1)$ to the $LR$ procedure, where $m^*_0, m^*_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ are assumed to have the same length. To answer it, the game $Exp_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ generates a challenge ciphertext $C^* \xrightarrow{R} Enc(pk, m^*_a)$ and gives $C^*$ to $A$. Eventually, the adversary ends the game by querying the $\text{Finalize}$ procedure with a guess $\beta'$ for the bit $\beta$ used to generate the challenge ciphertext. The advantage $Adv_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ of the adversary $A$ in breaking the IND-CPA security of $PKE$ is then defined as the probability that game $Exp_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ outputs true minus the probability that game $Exp_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ outputs true. Finally, we say that $PKE$ is secure if $Adv_{PKE,k}^{ind-\text{cpa}}(A)$ is a negligible function in $k$ for all PTAs $A$.

ElGamal encryption. The ElGamal public-key encryption scheme, described in Figure 1.1 was proposed in [ElG85a]. It can be seen as an adaptation of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange described in Figure 1 on page 9 to the public-key setting by fixing the first message sent by one the parties as the public key for that party.

As in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the ElGamal encryption scheme works over a finite cyclic group $G$ of prime order $p$ obtained via a group generator $G$. To generate a pair $(pk, sk)$ of public and secret keys, the user chooses a generator $g$ for $G$ and a random element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, computes $X \leftarrow g^x$, and sets $pk = (G, p, g, X)$ and $sk = (G, p, g, x)$. To encrypt a message $m \in G$ to a user with public key $pk = (G, p, g, X)$, the sender simply chooses a random element $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$,
Figure 1.3: Game $\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE},k}^{\text{ind-CPA}}(\mathcal{A})$ for $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ defining the IND-CPA security of a public-key encryption scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{PG}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$. 

and outputs $(C_1, C_2) = (g^r, m \cdot X^r)$ as the ciphertext. To decrypt it, the user in possession of the secret key $sk = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, X)$ corresponding to $pk = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, X)$ computes $C_2 / C_1^x$ to recover the underlying message.

Figure 1.4: The ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [ElG85a], where $\mathcal{G}$ is a group generator.

**Security of ElGamal encryption.** In order to prove that the ElGamal encryption scheme meets the IND-CPA security notion depicted in Figure 1.3 if the DDH problem is hard with respect to group generator $\mathcal{G}$, we will provide a reduction which relates the advantage of the adversary in breaking IND-CPA security game to the advantage of another adversary in breaking the DDH problem with respect to $\mathcal{G}$. More precisely, we want to prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 1.4.1** Let $\text{EG}$ refer to the ElGamal PKE scheme in Figure 1.4 let $\mathcal{G}$ be the underlying group generator, let $k$ be the security parameter, and let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against IND-CPA security notion as depicted in Figure 1.3 making at most a single query to the LR procedure. Then, there exists an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the DDH problem with respect to $\mathcal{G}$, whose running time is that of $\mathcal{A}$ and such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},k}^{\text{ddh}}(\mathcal{B}).$$

The actual proof of Theorem 1.4.1 is quite simple and uses the fact that, in order to distinguish between the encryption of the challenge messages, the adversary needs to somehow distinguish the value $K = X^r = g^{x'}$ used to hide the message in $C_2$ from a random element in the group, when given the public key $pk = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, X = g^r)$ and the first part of the ciphertext, $C_1 = g^r$. However, to make this intuition more precise and to illustrate the usefulness of games in security proofs, we will prove Theorem 1.4.1 using a sequence of hybrid games.

Our proof contains a total of 5 games, which are described in Figure 1.5 in which games $G_0$ and $G_4$ correspond respectively to the games $\text{Exp}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-CPA}-0}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\text{Exp}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-CPA}-1}(\mathcal{A})$ of the IND-CPA security definition. Hence, in order to show that the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-CPA}}(\mathcal{A})$ of $\mathcal{A}$
We now claim that there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ such that

\[ \Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}) = true] = \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}) = true] \]

against $\mathcal{EG}$ is negligible for all PTAs $\mathcal{A}$, it suffices to show that the probability that $G_i^A$ outputs $true$ for $i = 0, \ldots, 4$ does not change significantly.

**Proof:** Consider the sequence of games depicted in Figure 1.3. By substituting the description of the ElGamal PKE scheme (EG) in Game $\text{Exp}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-cpa}^{\beta}}(\mathcal{A})$ for $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ in Figure 1.3, we have that

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\text{EG},k}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-cpa}^{0}}(\mathcal{A}) = true] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{EG},k}^{\text{ind-cpa}^{1}}(\mathcal{A}) = true]
\]

(1.1)

We now claim that there exists an adversary $\mathcal{B}_1$ against the DDH problem relative to $\mathcal{G}$ such that

\[
\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}) = true] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}) = true] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ddh}}_{\mathcal{G}_k}(\mathcal{B}_1).
\]

In order to prove this claim, we build $\mathcal{B}_1$ as follows. Let $((\mathcal{G}, g), g, X, Y, Z)$ be the input that $\mathcal{B}_1$ receives from the $\text{Initialize}$ procedure in $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{\beta}}(\mathcal{B}_1)$. $\mathcal{B}_1$ then sets $(\mathcal{G}, g)$ as the underlying group for $\mathcal{EG}$ and returns $pk = (g, p, g, X)$ to $\mathcal{A}$ as the output of its $\text{Initialize}$ procedure of $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{\beta}}(\mathcal{A})$. When $\mathcal{A}$ queries its $\text{LR}$ procedure with a pair of messages $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$, $\mathcal{B}_1$ simulates its behavior by setting $(C_1^*, C_2^*) = (Y, m_0^* \cdot Z)$ and returning it to $\mathcal{A}$. Finally, when $\mathcal{A}$ queries its $\text{Finalize}$ procedure with a guess $\beta'$, $\mathcal{B}_1$ queries its own $\text{Finalize}$ procedure with $\beta'$.

Given the above description of $\mathcal{B}_1$, it is not hard to see that, when we execute $\mathcal{B}_1$ in $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{0}}(\mathcal{B}_1)$, $\mathcal{B}_1$ simulates $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{0}}(\mathcal{A})$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Likewise, when $\mathcal{B}_1$ interacts with the challenger in $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{1}}(\mathcal{B}_1)$, it simulates $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{1}}(\mathcal{A})$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Thus,

\[
\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}) = true] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{0}}(\mathcal{B}_1) = true]
\]

\[
\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}) = true] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}_k}^{\text{ddh}^{1}}(\mathcal{B}_1) = true]
\]

which implies that

\[
\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}) = true] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}) = true] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ddh}}_{\mathcal{G}_k}(\mathcal{B}_1).
\]

(1.2)
Due to the similarities between games $G_0(A)$ and $G_4(A)$ and games $G_1(A)$ and $G_3(A)$, we can easily build an adversary $B_2$ against the DDH problem relative to $G$ such that

$$\Pr[G_3(A) = \text{true}] - \Pr[G_4(A) = \text{true}] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ddh}}_{G, k}(B_2).$$

(1.3)

Finally, we note that the differences between games $G_1(A)$ and $G_2(A)$ and between games $G_2(A)$ and $G_3(A)$ are purely syntactic since, in all of these cases, $C^*_2$ is a random element in the group which does not depend on the guess bit $\beta$ used to select the challenge message. Hence,

$$\Pr[G_1(A) = \text{true}] = \Pr[G_2(A) = \text{true}] = \Pr[G_3(A) = \text{true}].$$

(1.4)

The proof of Theorem 1.4.1 follows by combining equations 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 and by noticing that the adversary $B$ of the theorem statement runs $B_1$ with probability $1/2$ and $B_2$ with probability $1/2$. 

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Chapter 2

Password-based cryptography

2.1 Introduction

Password-based encrypted key exchange (PAKE) protocols are a particular case of authenticated key exchange protocols in which the secret key or password used for authentication is not uniformly distributed over a large space, but rather chosen from a small set of possible values (a four-digit pin, for example). Since PAKE protocols rely on short and easily memorizable secrets, they also seem more convenient to use as they do not require an additional cryptographic devices capable of storing high-entropy secret keys.

Due to their practicality, password-based key exchange protocols have been very popular over the years. Unfortunately, the vast majority of protocols found in practice do not account for the fact that passwords have low entropy and are often subject to the so-called dictionary attacks. These are attacks in which an adversary tries to break the security of a scheme by a brute-force method, by trying all possible combinations of secret keys in a given small set of values (i.e., the dictionary). Although not very effective in the case of high-entropy keys, dictionary attacks can be very damaging when the secret key is a password since the attacker has a non-negligible chance of winning. Such attacks are usually divided in two categories: off-line and online dictionary attacks.

To address the problem of dictionary attacks, several protocols have been designed to be secure even when the secret key is a password. The goal of these protocols is to restrict the adversary’s success to online dictionary attacks only, in which the adversary must be present and interact with the system in order to be able to verify whether its guess is correct. The security in these systems usually relies on a policy of invalidating or blocking the use of a password if a certain number of failed attempts has occurred.

Overview of this chapter. Since the security analysis of PAKE schemes is one of the most challenging aspects in their design, we recall in Section 2.2 the different security notions used in the analysis of PAKE schemes. Next, we continue our review of PAKE schemes by recalling the first seminal work in this area, namely the encrypted key exchange protocol by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92], together with its main variants. As security of existing EKE-based protocols relies on idealized models, such as the random-oracle model, we review in Section 2.4 the main PAKE schemes with a proof of security in the standard model. Then, in Section 2.5 we discuss schemes which remain secure under arbitrary composition and when participants run the protocol with different but possibly related passwords. Finally, in Sections 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 we consider extensions to the group setting.
Chapter 2. Password-based cryptography

2.2 Security models for PAKE

Due to the low entropy of passwords, password-authenticated protocols are always subject to online guessing attacks in which an attacker tries to impersonate one of the parties by simply guessing the correct password and running the protocol. Since these attacks are unavoidable and can succeed with non-negligible probability, standard notions of security for authenticated key exchange protocols cannot be used in this scenario. To tackle this issue and capture the non-negligible success probability of online dictionary attacks, three different types of security models have been proposed in the literature based on the indistinguishability-based model of Bellare and Rogaway [BR94a], on the simulation-based model of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk [BCK98], and on the universal composability of Canetti [Can01]. We now briefly review each of these security models.

2.2.1 Indistinguishability-based model

The first indistinguishability-based security model for PAKE protocols was proposed by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) in [BPR00]. As in [BR94a], each instance of a user is modeled as a stateful oracle with which the adversary can interact via specific oracle queries, which model the adversary’s capabilities in a real attack. These queries will usually have the form \((U_1, i, U_2, m)\), meaning that the adversary is sending a message \(m\) to instance \(i\) of user \(U_1\) claiming that it is from user \(U_2\) and will be answered according to the protocol specification. Since several sessions may be executed concurrently in a real execution of the protocol, several user instances may be active at any given time.

Let \(U_i^j\) denote the \(i\)-th instance of a user \(U\) and let \(b\) be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The standard queries used to model the adversary’s capabilities in a real attack are \text{Execute}, \text{Send}, \text{Reveal}, \text{Corrupt}, and \text{Test}.

- **Execute**\((U_i^j, U_j^k)\): This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest executions between a user instances \(U_i^j\) and \(U_j^k\). Its output consists of the messages that would be exchanged between these two instances during an honest execution of the protocol.

- **Send**\((U_i^j, m)\): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may intercept a message and then either modify it, create a new one, or simply forward it to the intended participant. Its output is the message that the participant instance \(U_i^j\) would generate upon receipt of message \(m\).

- **Reveal**\((U_i^j)\): This query models the misuse of session keys by clients. It returns to the adversary the session key of user instance \(U_i^j\), if the latter is defined.

- **Corrupt**\((U)\): The exact output of this query depends on the corruption model which is being assumed. Usually, this query simply returns the long-lived key of user \(U\), which in the password-based setting means his password. However, in a stronger corruption model, the adversary may also learn the internal states of all instances of user \(U\).

- **Test**\((U_i^j)\): This query captures the adversary’s ability to tell apart a real session key from a random one and returns the session key for instance \(U_i^j\) if \(b = 1\) or a random key of the same size if \(b = 0\).

While the first four queries serve to model the adversary’s capability in a real attack, the last one intends to capture a specific security goal for key exchange protocols, which is the difficulty of distinguishing real session keys from a random one. Nonetheless, in order to define the latter
security goal more precisely, we first need to introduce the notions of partnering and freshness. While partnering defines the set of user instances which should be treated together, freshness captures situations in which the adversary can trivially know the value of the session key being held by a user instance.

Partnering. Following [KY03], the notion of partnering is defined via session and partner identifiers. More precisely, let the session identifier $sid_i$ be a function of all the messages sent and received by user instance $U_i$ as specified by the key exchange protocol. Let the partner identifier $pid_i$ be the set of users with whom user instance $U_i$ wishes to establish a common secret key, including $U_i$ himself. We say that $U_1$ and $U_2$ are partners if and only if they have the same session and partner identifiers.

Freshness. A user instance is said to be fresh if neither this instance nor its partner have been corrupted and if no Reveal query has been asked to it or to its partner.

Now that we have defined these properties, we can state the two main properties that a secure PAKE protocol should satisfy: correctness and semantic security.

- **Correctness.** For a protocol to be correct, it should always be the case that, whenever two instances $U_1$ and $U_2$ are partnered and have successfully completed the protocol, both instances should hold the same non-null session key.

- **Security.** Consider an execution of the PAKE protocol $P$ by a polynomial-time adversary, in which the latter is given access to the Reveal, Execute, Send, Corrupt and Test oracles and asks a single Test query to a fresh instance, and outputs a guess bit $b'$. Let $b$ be the hidden bit used by the Test oracle and assume that user passwords are chosen uniformly from a dictionary space $Dict$. We say that the PAKE protocol $P$ is secure if the probability that $b' = b$ is only negligibly larger than $O(q/|Dict|) + 1/2$, where $q$ is number of different protocol instances to which the adversary has asked Send queries.

**Remark 2.2.1** We note that the factor $1/2$ in the security definition is to disregard as unsuccessful attacks in which the adversary simply guesses the value of the hidden bit $b$ uniformly at random. Likewise, the factor $O(q/|Dict|)$ is to account for the fact that the adversary can succeed with probability $q/|Dict| + 1/2$ by simply guessing the password of a given user and playing its role via Send queries.

**Contributions.** In [AFP05, AFP06], Fouque, Pointcheval, and I extended the security notion above to the scenario in which the adversary is allowed to ask multiple Test queries. As we show in these articles, one of the advantages of the new notion is that it provides security proofs with better concrete bounds when the PAKE protocol is used inside other protocols. This is due to the fact all session keys can be replaced with random ones in a single hybrid step within these security reductions. Though not important for the standard AKEs, such factors are extremely important in the password-based scenario due to low entropy of passwords.

2.2.2 Simulation-based model

The first simulation-based security model for PAKE protocols was proposed by Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel (BMP) in [BMP00], based on the formal security models by Shoup [Sho99] and by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk [BCK98]. As in [Sho99], security is defined using an ideal system, which models the service being performed (PAKE in this case), and a real system, which describes the actual environment in which the protocol is executed. Intuitively, in order to prove the security of a PAKE scheme, it suffices to show that anything that an adversary can do in a real system can also be done in the ideal system.
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As in the indistinguishability-based model, each user can have several instances associated to him and the adversary interacts with the system via oracle queries. Additionally, each user assumes a particular role in each session, depending on whether it is going to open itself for connection or whether it is going to connect to another instance. Unlike the BPR model, there is a new trusted entity called the ring master, which is responsible for keeping track of the session keys that are established among user instances, and an environment variable \( R \) modeling the information shared by users in higher-levels protocols.

**Ideal world.** To model the PAKE service in the ideal world, the following types of queries are available to the adversary.

- **InitUser**\( (U, id) \): This query allows the adversary to assign the string \( id \) to user \( U \) and models the initialization of the latter. Upon receiving this query, for each user \( U_i \) with identity \( id_i \) in the system, the ring master chooses a password \( pw_i \) at random from the dictionary and assigns it to the pair \((id, id_i)\).

- **SetPassword**\( (U_i, id', pw) \): This query allows the adversary to set the password for the pair \((id, id')\) to \(pw\) as long as \(id'\) has not been assigned to any user.

- **InitInstance**\( (U_j, role, pid) \): This query assigns the role for the \( j \)-th instance of user \( U_i \) in a session with user \( pid \), if the latter is defined.

- **TerminateInstance**\( (U_j) \): This query forces instance \( U_j \) to terminate its session.

- **TestPassword**\( (U_j, pw) \): This query models a password guess by the adversary with respect to user instance \( U_j \). This query returns either true or false to the adversary depending on whether the guess is correct. The adversary is only allowed to query this oracle once per user instance.

- **StartSession**\( (U_j, opt) \): This query forces the construction of a session key \( K_j \) for \( U_j \). If \( U_j \) is open for connection, untested (no query TestPassword has been asked of it), and both \( U_j \) and its partner have not been corrupted (not initialized via InitUser), then the ring master chooses \( K_j \) uniformly at random from the proper distribution. Likewise, if \( U_j \) is connecting to another instance, untested, and both \( U_j \) and its partner have not been corrupted, then \( K_j \) is set to key value assigned to its partner. If \( U_j \) is corrupted or if a successful TestPassword has been asked of it, then the ring master sets \( K_j \) to value specified in \( opt \).

- **Application**\( (U_j, f) \): This query models leakage of the session key information through the use of the latter in a real protocol. It enables the adversary to learn an efficiently computable function \( f \) about the environment variable and the session keys.

**Real world.** In the real world, user instances are defined as state machines with access to the user’s \( id, pid \), password, and private random inputs. Each user instance has an initial state and only updates its state once it receives an input message, at which point it generates a reply message. When generating the response, a user instance also updates its status to indicate that it is prepared to receive another message (continue), that it has finished and generated a session key (accept), or that it has finished unsuccessfully (reject).

In addition to the queries InitUser, InitInstance, SetPassword, and Application used in the ideal world, the adversary in the real world also has access to a message delivery query \( \text{MsgDelivery} \). Moreover, if the proof of security requires an idealized model, such as the random-oracle model \[BR93\], the adversary is also given access to the latter.
Secure PAKE. Now that we have defined the ideal and real worlds, we can state the two main properties that a secure PAKE protocol should satisfy in the BMP model: \textit{completeness} and \textit{security}.

- **Completeness.** For any real-world adversary that faithfully follows the protocol, delivering messages between two user instances with complementary roles and identities, both user instances should accept and hold the same non-null session key.

- **Security.** For any efficient real-world adversary, there exists an efficient ideal-world adversary such that the transcripts of the adversary’s operations in the ideal and real worlds are computationally indistinguishable.

### 2.2.3 Universally-composable-based model

Even though indistinguishability-based and simulation-based security models provide a security level that is sufficient for most applications, they fail to consider arbitrary compositions with other protocols or some realistic scenarios such as participants running the protocol with different but possibly related passwords. To overcome these deficiencies, Canetti, Halevi, Katz, Lindell, and MacKenzie \cite{CHK05} proposed an ideal functionality for PAKE protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework \cite{Can01, CK02}, which makes no assumption on the distribution on passwords used by the protocol participants. In particular, the model does not assume independence between the passwords of different parties.

**The $\mathcal{F}_{\text{puKE}}$ ideal functionality.** In the UC model, the aim is to ensure that UC-secure protocols will continue to behave in the ideal way even if executed in arbitrary environments. This model relies on the indistinguishability between two worlds, the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, the security is provided by an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}$, that can be thought of as a trusted party in the context of multi-party computation. In order to compute a function $f$, this functionality interacts with $n$ players, but there is no communication among the players themselves. These players give their inputs to $\mathcal{F}$, which in turn give them back their outputs. $\mathcal{F}$ ensures that the computation is correct and that the players learn nothing more than their own inputs and outputs. The security is then guaranteed since an adversary $A$ can only learn and thus modify data of corrupted players.

In order to prove that a protocol $P$ realizes $\mathcal{F}$, one considers an environment $Z$ that provides inputs to the players and plays the role of a distinguisher between the real world (with players and a real adversary that can control some of them and also the communication among them) and the ideal world (with dummy players interacting only with the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}$, and a simulated adversary also interacting with $\mathcal{F}$). The protocol $P$ is then said to realize $\mathcal{F}$ if for all polynomial adversary $A$, there exists a polynomial simulator $S$ such that no polynomial environment $Z$ can distinguish between the two worlds with a significant advantage.

In Figure 2.1 we recall the PAKE ideal functionality first described in \cite{CHK05}. The main idea behind this functionality is as follows: If neither party is corrupted and if they share the same password, then they both end up with the same uniformly-distributed session key, and the adversary learns nothing about it (except that it was indeed generated). On the other hand, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player’s password (the session is then marked as \textit{compromised}), then it is granted the right to fully determine its session key. Note that as soon as a party is corrupted, the adversary learns its key: There is in fact nothing lost by allowing it to determine the key.

In addition, the players become aware of a failed attempt of the adversary at guessing a password. This is modeled by marking the session as \textit{interrupted}. In this case, the two players are given independently-chosen random keys.
The functionality $F_{pwKE}$ is parameterized by a security parameter $k$. It interacts with an adversary $S$ and a set of parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ via the following queries:

- **Upon receiving a query** \((\text{NewSession}, sid, P_i, P_j, pw, role)\) **from party** $P_i$:
  
  Send \((\text{NewSession}, sid, P_i, P_j, role)\) to $S$. If this is the first \text{NewSession} query, or if this is the second \text{NewSession} query and there is a record \((P_j, P_i, pw')\), then record \((P_i, P_j, pw)\) and mark this record fresh.

- **Upon receiving a query** \((\text{TestPwd}, sid, P_i, pw')\) **from the adversary** $S$:
  
  If there is a record of the form \((P_i, P_j, pw)\) which is fresh, then do: If $pw = pw'$, mark the record compromised and reply to $S$ with “correct guess”. If $pw \neq pw'$, mark the record interrupted and reply with “wrong guess”.

- **Upon receiving a query** \((\text{NewKey}, sid, P_i, sk)\) **from the adversary** $S$:
  
  If there is a record of the form \((P_i, P_j, pw)\), and this is the first \text{NewKey} query for $P_i$, then:
  
  - If this record is compromised, or either $P_i$ or $P_j$ is corrupted, then output \((sid, sk)\) to player $P_i$.
  
  - If this record is fresh, and there is a record \((P_j, P_i, pw')\) with $pw' = pw$, and a key $sk'$ was sent to $P_j$, and \((P_j, P_i, pw)\) was fresh at the time, then output \((sid, sk')\) to $P_i$.
  
  - In any other case, pick a new random key $sk'$ of length $k$ and send \((sid, sk')\) to $P_i$.

Either way, mark the record \((P_i, P_j, pw)\) as completed.

Figure 2.1: The password-based key-exchange functionality $F_{pwKE}$

A session that is not compromised nor interrupted is called fresh. In such a case, the two parties receive the same, uniformly distributed session key if they execute the protocol with the same password.

Finally notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where the password is used in different protocols. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy.

**Contributions.** In [ACCP08], Catalano, Chevalier, Pointcheval, and I extend the above definition to the group setting and define an ideal functionality for password-based group key exchange with explicit authentication and contributiveness in the UC framework. As with previous definitions in the same framework, our definitions do not assume any particular distribution on passwords or independence between passwords of different parties. Additionally, the new contributiveness security notion captures security against insider adversaries and guarantees the adversary cannot bias the distribution of the session key as long as a few players involved in the protocol are honest.
2.3 The encrypted key exchange protocol and its variants

The seminal work in the area of password-based key exchange is the encrypted key exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] (see Figure 2.2). In their protocol, two users execute an encrypted version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, in which each flow is encrypted using the password shared between these two users as the symmetric key. Intuitively, since the elements to which the encryption function is applied are chosen uniformly at random from the underlying group, an adversary eavesdropping on the communication cannot learn any additional information which would allow him to perform an off-line dictionary attack.

Due to the simplicity of the EKE protocol, several other protocols were soon proposed in the literature based on it [BM93, Luc97, Jab97, STW95]. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a proper security model for the analysis of PAKE schemes, these protocols were only heuristically secure.

It was only in 2000 that Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [BPR00], as well as Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel [BMP00], proposed security models for PAKE schemes and proved variants of the EKE protocol, under ideal assumptions, such as the random-oracle model [BR93]. In addition to these, several other protocols were proposed in the literature based on EKE protocol [BCP03, BCP04, Mac02, AP05], each with its own instantiation of the encryption function. Currently, the simple password-authenticated key exchange protocol in Appendix A, to which we refer as SPAKE, is among the most efficient PAKE schemes based on the EKE protocol.

The SPAKE scheme is a variation of the EKE protocol in Figure 2.2 in which the encryption function $E_{pw}(\cdot)$ is replaced with a simple one-time pad function. More specifically, whenever a user Alice wants to send the encryption of a value $X \in G$ to a user Bob, it does so by computing $X \cdot h_1^{pw}$, where $h_1$ is an element in $G$ associated with user Alice and the password $pw$ is assumed to be in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The session identifier is defined as the transcript of the conversation between Alice and Bob together with their identities, and the session key is set to be the hash (random oracle) of the session identifier, the password $pw$, and the Diffie-Hellman key. The full description of SPAKE is given in Figure 2.2.

As we show in Appendix A, SPAKE is a secure PAKE scheme in the random-oracle model according to the definition in Section 2.2.1 if the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable in $G$.

Contributions. In addition to proposing SPAKE in [AP05] (see Appendix A), Pointcheval and I also proposed in the same paper a variant of SPAKE in which the password $pw$ is not an input.
to the hash function $H$ used to derive the session key. While the latter variant is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, its security only holds in the non-concurrent scenario. The proof of security for both protocols is in the random-oracle model and based on hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Moreover, they only require a single random-oracle instance.

In [ACP05], Chevassut, Pointcheval, and I considered a related PAKE protocol, called AuthA, and proved its security even when adversaries are allowed to corrupt users and learn their passwords, which was a known open problem at the time.

In [ABC06], together with Bresson, Chevassut, Möller, and Pointcheval, we showed how to design an efficient and provably secure PAKE scheme specifically for the TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol. The goal was to provide a technique that allows users to employ (short) passwords to securely identify themselves to servers. In addition to its provable security, our protocol is also believed to be free from patent and licensing restrictions based on an analysis of relevant patents in the area.

### 2.4 PAKE protocols in the standard model

Even though EKE-based protocols are extremely efficient and easy to use, their security relies fundamentally on a heuristic assumption, namely the random-oracle model, in which hash functions are assumed to behave as a random oracle. Unfortunately, the random-oracle model is known not to be sound [CGH98]. More precisely, there are several examples of schemes [CGH98, Nie02, GK03, BBP04] that can be proven secure in the random-oracle model and for which there does not exist any concrete instantiation of the hash function for which the scheme remains secure. Hence, it is an important security goal to design schemes which do not rely on any idealized model such as a random-oracle model.

The first protocols whose security proof did not rely on any idealized model were proposed by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung (KOY) [KOY01] based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and by Goldreich and Lindell [GL01], who proposed a solution based on general assumptions. While the former KOY protocol assumed the existence of a common reference string, the protocol by Goldreich and Lindell did not rely on any trusted setup assumption. Later, Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] abstracted and generalized (under various indistinguishability assumptions) the KOY protocol using the concept of smooth projective hash functions [CS02], which became the basis of several other protocols [BCL+05, AP06, BGS06, ACP09] in the literature. To

---

Figure 2.3: SPAKE: A simple password-based key exchange protocol [AP05]. SPAKE works over a finite cyclic group $G$ of prime order $p$ generated by an element $g$. 

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Alice} & : & x & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p ; & X & \leftarrow g^x \\
 & & X^* & \leftarrow X \cdot h_1^{pw} \\
& & K_A & \leftarrow (Y^*/h_2^{pw})^x \\
& & SK_A & \leftarrow H(\text{Alice, Bob, pw, } X^*, Y^*, K_A) \\
\text{Bob} & : & y & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p ; & Y & \leftarrow g^y \\
 & & Y^* & \leftarrow Y \cdot h_2^{pw} \\
& & K_B & \leftarrow (X^*/h_1^{pw})^y \\
& & SK_B & \leftarrow H(\text{Alice, Bob, pw, } X^*, Y^*, K_B)
\end{align*}
$$

---
understand how the Gennaro-Lindell protocol works, let us first review the concept of smooth projective hash functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(sk, vk) \xleftarrow{$} SKG(1^k)$</td>
<td>$(sk, vk) \xleftarrow{$} SKG(1^k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l \leftarrow vk | \text{Alice} | \text{Bob}$</td>
<td>$l \leftarrow vk | \text{Alice} | \text{Bob}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_A = \text{Enc}_{pk}(pw; r_A)$</td>
<td>$c_A = \text{Enc}_{pk}(pw; r_A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(l, c_A)$</td>
<td>$(h_{pk}, c_A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$hk_A \xleftarrow{$} \text{HK}(pk)$</td>
<td>$hp_A \xleftarrow{$} \alpha(hk_A, l, c_A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$hp_A \xleftarrow{$} \alpha(hk_A, l, c_A)$</td>
<td>$c_A \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(pw; r_A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_A = \text{Sign}_{sk}(l, c_A, c_B, hp_A, hp_B)$</td>
<td>$\sigma_A = \text{Sign}_{sk}(l, c_A, c_B, hp_A, hp_B)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(hp_A, \sigma_A)$</td>
<td>abort if $Vf_{vk}((l, c_A, c_B, hp_A, hp_B), \sigma_A) = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_A = \text{HP}(hp_A, c_A, l \parallel pw, r_A)$</td>
<td>$K_A = H(hk_A, c_A, l \parallel pw)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_B = H(hk_A, c_B, l \parallel pw)$</td>
<td>$K_B = \text{HP}(hp_A, c_B, l, pw, r_B)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SK_A = K_A \cdot K_B$</td>
<td>$SK_B = K_A \cdot K_B$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.4: An overview of the Gennaro-Lindell PAKE protocol [GL03]. (KG, Enc, Dec) are the key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms of a labeled public-key encryption scheme [Sho04]. (SKG, Sign, Vf) are the key generation, signing, and verification algorithms of a one-time signature scheme [EGM96]. (HK, \alpha, H, HP) are the key generation, key projection, hashing, and projected hashing algorithms of a family of smooth projective hash functions for the language $L$ consisting of triples $\{(c, \ell, pw)\}$ such that $c$ is an encryption of the password $pw$ with label $\ell$.

**Smooth projective hash functions.** One of the main tools used in the Gennaro-Lindell (GL) protocol is the notion of smooth projective hash functions (SPHF, [CS02, GL03]), which can be seen as special type of zero-knowledge proof system for an NP language. More precisely, the definition of SPHF requires the existence of a domain $X$ and an underlying NP language $L$ such that it is computationally hard to distinguish a random element in $L$ from a random element in $X \setminus L$. For instance, in the particular case of the PAKE scheme in [CHK+05], the language $L$ is defined as the set of triples $\{(c, \ell, pw)\}$ such that $c$ is an encryption of the password $pw$ with label $\ell$ under a public key given in the common reference string (CRS). The semantic security of the encryption scheme guarantees computational indistinguishability between elements from $L$ and elements from $X$.

One of the key properties that make SPHF so useful is that, for a point $x \in L$, the hash value can be computed using either a *secret* hashing key $hk$, or a *public* projected key $hp$ (depending on $x$ [GL03] or not [CS02]) together with a witness $w$ to the fact that $x \in L$. Another important property of these functions is that, given the projected key $hp$, their output is uniquely defined
for points $x \in L$ and statistically indistinguishable from random for points $x \in X \setminus L$. Moreover, without the knowledge of the witness $w$ to the fact that $x \in L$, the output of these functions on $x$ is also pseudo-random.

Overview of the GL protocol. Now that we have informally introduced the SPHF concept, we can finally review the GL PAKE protocol, whose detailed description is given in Figure 2.4. At a high level, the players in the GL protocol exchange CCA-secure encryptions of the password, under the public-key found in the common reference string, and then compute the session key by combining smooth projective hashes of the two password/ciphertext pairs. More precisely, the players first exchange ciphertexts consisting of encryption of their respective passwords with respect to the label $\ell$ containing their identities and the verification key for a one-time signature scheme. Each player can thus compute the output of its own hash function with the help of the hashing key, and the output of the other one using its knowledge of the randomness that was used to generate the ciphertext of the password. To avoid attacks in which the adversary generates new projection keys without modifying the corresponding ciphertexts and projection keys, Alice also signs the transcript of the conversation.

To understand informally why this protocol is secure, first consider the case in which the adversary plays a passive role. In this case, the pseudo-randomness property of the smooth hash function ensures that the value of the session key will be computationally indistinguishable from uniform since the adversary does not know the randomness that was used to encrypt the password. Now imagine the case in which the adversary provides the user with an encryption of the wrong password. In this case, the security of the protocol will rely on the smoothness of the hash functions, which ensures that the session key will be random and independent of all former communication. Thus, in order to be successful, the adversary has to generate the encryption of the correct password. To do so, the adversary could try to copy or modify existing ciphertexts. Since the encryption scheme is CCA-secure, and thus non-malleable, modifying is not really a possibility. Copying does not help either since either the label used for encryption will not match (making the session key look random due to the smoothness property) or the signature will be invalid (in the case where the adversary changes the projection keys without changing the label and hence the verification key). As a result, the only successful strategy left for the adversary is essentially to guess the password and perform the trivial online dictionary attack, as desired.

2.5 PAKE protocols in the UC model

Most of the existing PAKE protocols, including the ones mentioned so far, have proofs either in the indistinguishability-based security model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) or in the simulation-based of Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel (BMP). As we already mentioned in Section 2.2.3, though these models provide a security level that is sufficient for most applications, they fail to consider some realistic scenarios such as participants running the protocol with different but possibly related passwords. To surmount these deficiencies, Canetti, Halevi, Katz, Lindell, and MacKenzie [CHK+05] proposed an ideal functionality for PAKE protocols in the UC framework which makes no assumption on the distribution on passwords used by the protocol participants.

The CHKLM protocol. As noted by Canetti et al. in [CHK+05], the KOY/GL protocol is not known to achieve UC security: the main issue is that the ideal-model simulator must be able to extract the password used by the adversary. One could think that, since the simulator has control over the common reference string and knows the private keys associated with the public
2.5. PAKE protocols in the UC model

Public information (CRS): \(pk_1, pk_2\)

Secret information: \(pw\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c_0 = \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(pw; r_0))</td>
<td>((c_0)) (→) ((sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{SKG}(1^k))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hk_A \leftarrow \text{HK}(pk_2))</td>
<td>(l \leftarrow vk | \text{Alice} | \text{Bob})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hp_A \leftarrow \alpha(hk_A, l, c_1))</td>
<td>(c_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(pw; r_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(pw; r_2))</td>
<td>(→) ((hp_A, c_2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{ZKP}(c_0 \approx c_2))</td>
<td>(→) ((hp_B, c_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hk_B \leftarrow \text{HK}(pk_1))</td>
<td>(\text{SK}_B = K_A \cdot K_B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hp_B \leftarrow \alpha(hk_B, c_2))</td>
<td>(σ_B = \text{Sign}_{sk}(c_0, c_2, hp_A, hp_B))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{abort if } Vf_{vk}((c_0, c_2, hp_A, hp_B, σ_B)) = 0)</td>
<td>(K_A = \text{HP}(hp_B, c_2, pw, r_2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(K_A = \text{H}(hk_A, c_2, pw))</td>
<td>(K_B = \text{HP}(hp_B, c_1, l | pw, r_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SK_B = K_A \cdot K_B)</td>
<td>(→) ((hp_B, σ_B))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.5: An overview of the PAKE protocol by Canetti et al. [CHK⁺05]. (KG, Enc, Dec) are the key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms of a labeled public-key encryption scheme [Sho04]. (SKG, Sign, Vf) are the key generation, signing, and verification algorithms of a one-time signature scheme [EGM96]. (HK, α, H, HP) are the key generation, key projection, hashing, and projected hashing algorithms of a family of smooth projective hash functions for the language \(L\) consisting of triples \(\{(c, ℓ, pw)\}\) such that \(c\) is an encryption of the password \(pw\) with label \(ℓ\). \(ZKP(c_0 \approx c_2)\) is a simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof [Sah99] that \(c_0\) and \(c_2\) are encryptions of the same value.

keys, it can decrypt all ciphertexts sent by the adversary and recover its password. Yet, this does not seem to be sufficient. In the case where the adversary begins to play (i.e., it impersonates the client), everything works well: The simulator decrypts the ciphertext generated by the adversary and can recover the password used by the latter. If the guess of the adversary is incorrect (that is, the password is the wrong one), then the smoothness of the hash functions leads to random independent session keys. Otherwise, if the guess is correct, the execution can continue as an honest one would do (the simulator has learned which password to use).

Let us now consider the case in which the simulator has to start the game, on behalf of the client. Here, the simulator needs to send an encryption of the password before having seen anything coming from the adversary. As mentioned above, it can recover the password used by the adversary as soon as the latter has sent its value, but this may be too late in this
Chapter 2. Password-based cryptography

case. If it turns out that the guess of the adversary is incorrect, then the smoothness property guarantees the statistical independence of the session keys. Conversely, when the adversary’s guess is correct, the simulator is stuck with an incorrect ciphertext and will not be able to predict the value of the session key.

To tackle this problem, the authors of [CHK+05] provided a new scheme based on the GL construction [GL03] that securely realizes the ideal functionality for PAKE under static corruptions. In their protocol (to which we refer as CHKLM), which is described in Figure 2.5, the client first sends a pre-flow which also contains an encryption of the password. The server then sends its own encryption, and finally the client sends another encryption (this time the simulator is able to use the correct password, recovered from the value sent by the adversary), as well as a zero-knowledge proof claiming that both ciphertexts are consistent and encrypt the same password. The first flow is never used in the remaining of the protocol. This solves the problem since the simulator is of course able to give a valid proof of a false statement and the first flow is never used afterwards. Moreover, the resulting scheme is quite efficient and enjoys several nice properties such as security under arbitrary compositions with other protocols.

Adaptive security. As mentioned above, the CHKLM protocol is only known to be secure in the presence of static adversaries, when the set of corrupted players is known in advance. However, in reality, the adversary may be able to corrupt parties adaptively and learn their internal states.

To address the issue of adaptive security, Barak, Canetti, Lindell, Pass, and Rabin (BCLPR) proposed in [BCL+05] a simple and intuitive construction that uses general techniques from multi-party computation. Their construction works in two phases. In the link initialization phase, each user first generates a fresh pair of signing and verification keys for a strongly unforgeable signature scheme and then broadcasts the verification key to the other users. After receiving the verification keys of all users, each user then signs the sequence of keys received together with the identities of the users and broadcasts it to the other users. Once all signatures are received, each user verifies that all signatures refer to the same set of users. If all the checks succeed, then the users can use their corresponding keys to set up an authenticated channel among themselves. Once the link initialization phase is over, the users proceed to the secure computation phase in which they run a generic multi-party computation protocol over the authenticated channels.

As shown in [BCL+05], an adaptively-secure PAKE protocol can be easily obtained in the common reference string (CRS) model via the generic construction above by instantiating it with a multi-party computation protocol for the functionality that returns a long random key to each party if both of their inputs are the same and ⊥ otherwise. Unfortunately, due to its generality, their protocol is quite inefficient.

In order to understand the difficulties involved in design an efficient adaptively secure PAKE scheme in the standard model, let us consider the case of the CHKLM scheme [CHK+05], described in Figure 2.5. In their protocol, the client needs to remember the randomness used in the pre-flow message \( c_0 \) in order to later prove in zero-knowledge that the password encrypted in \( c_2 \) is equal to the one encrypted in \( c_0 \). Though sufficient to provide UC security with respect to static adversaries, this modification does not seem to work when dealing with adaptive adversaries. This is because the simulator cannot correctly open the commitment when the adversary corrupts the client after the pre-flow has been sent. A similar remark applies to the case in which the server gets corrupted after sending its first message.

Overview of the ACP protocol. To get around the above problem, Chevalier, Pointcheval and I take a different approach in [ACP09], whose full version can be found in Appendix B. In our protocol, we use the GL PAKE protocol (Figure 2.4) as a starting point and replace the encryption scheme with a non-interactive committing primitive with extraction and equivocation.
capabilities. Since the commitment scheme that we use allows for extraction and equivocation at any moment, the simulator can provide a consistent view to the adversary. As this change also impacts the language used by a family of smooth projective hash functions, we also provide a new instantiation of the latter. The resulting scheme, with a few minor technical modifications, is described in Figure 2.6.

**Figure 2.6:** The PAKE protocol in Appendix B for players (Alice, ssid), with index A and password $pw_A$ and (Bob, ssid) with index B and password $pw_B$. At the end of rounds 1 and 2, the players will erase the part of $R_A$ and $R_B$ which is not needed in the following rounds, keeping only $w_A$ and $w_B$. (com, decom) are the commitment and decommitment algorithms of an equivocable and conditionally extractable commitment scheme [ACP09]. (SKG, Sign, Vf) are the key generation, signing, and verification algorithms of a one-time signature scheme [EGM06]. (HK, α, H, HP) are the key generation, key projection, hashing, and projected hashing algorithms of a family of smooth projective hash functions for the language consisting of triples $\{(\text{com}(\ell, pw), \ell, pw)\}$.

**Security of the ACP protocol.** Let com be the non-malleable (conditionally) extractable
and equivocable committing scheme as described in Appendix \[B\]. \(\mathcal{H}\) be a family of smooth hash functions with respect to this commitment, and \(\mathcal{SIG}\) be a one-time signature scheme. Denote by \(\tilde{F}_{pwKE}\) the multi-session extension of the functionality \(F_{pwKE}\) described in Section 2.2.1 and let \(F_{CRS}\) be the ideal functionality that provides a common reference string \(\rho\) to all parties, where \(\rho\) are the common parameters for com. Then, as shown in [AP06], the protocol in Figure 2.6 securely realizes \(\tilde{F}_{pwKE}\) in the \(F_{CRS}\)-hybrid model, in the presence of adaptive adversaries.

**Contributions.** In addition to the construction in Appendix [B], Catalano, Chevalier, Pointcheval and I provided in [ACCP08] an alternative and more efficient construction of an adaptively-secure PAKE protocol in the UC model. Even though the scheme is almost as efficient as previous EKE-based PAKE constructions, the proof of security relies on the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models.

### 2.6 PAKE protocols in the group setting

In order to provide support for collaborative and distributed applications, authenticated key exchange has also been considered in the group setting. In these protocols, the goal is to provide a group of users communicating over an insecure channel with an authenticated session key which they can use to secure that subsequent communication. Although protocols for authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols seem to be a natural mechanism for supporting these applications, they rely on the use of public key infrastructures (PKI). To avoid the use of PKIs, Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval [BCP02b, BCP07] considered password-based authentication in the group setting and showed how to adapt their group Diffie-Hellman protocol [BCPQ01] to the password-based scenario. The resulting protocol is reasonably efficient in terms of computation and proven secure in the random-oracle model based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. However, as the original protocol [BCPQ01], the total number of communication rounds is linear in the number of players, making their scheme impractical for large groups.

In order to reduce the total number of communication rounds and improve the scalability of password-based protocols in the group setting, Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval and I proposed a new password-authenticated group key exchange (GPAKE) protocol in [ABCP06], which is reproduced in Appendix [C]. Our new protocol is based on the group key exchange (GKE) protocol by Burmester and Desmedt [BD94, BD05] and provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In addition to being provably secure, the new protocol is also very efficient and fully scalable since it only requires four rounds of communication and four multi-exponentiations per user. To better understand how our constant-round GPAKE scheme works, let us first recall the Burmester-Desmedt GKE protocol [BD94, BD05].

Let \(G\) be a finite cyclic group of prime order \(p\) generated by an element \(g\), in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption described in Section 1.3 holds. That is, given elements \(g, g^a,\) and \(g^b\) in \(G\), no PPT adversary should be able to distinguish \(g^{ab}\) from \(g^c\) with non-negligible probability, when \(a, b, c\) are chosen uniformly at random from \(\mathbb{Z}_p\). Let \(n\) be the number of players in the group key exchange protocol and assume that all the indices are taken modulo \(n\). The Burmester-Desmedt protocol, whose description is provided in Figure 2.7, works in two rounds. First, each player \(P_i\) chooses a random exponent \(x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\) and broadcasts \(X_i = g^{x_i}\). Next, after receiving all first-round messages, each player \(P_i\) computes the keys \(K_i = X_i^{x_{i-1}}\) and \(K_{i+1} = X_i^{x_{i+1}}\) that it shares with its predecessor \(P_{i-1}\) and successor \(P_{i+1}\), and broadcasts \(Z_i = K_{i+1}/K_i\). Finally, each player \(P_i\) computes his session key as \(SK_i = \prod_{j=1}^{n} K_j = K_1^n Z_i^{n-1} Z_{i+1}^{n-2} \cdots Z_{i+n-2}\) using the values \(Z_1, \ldots, Z_n\) received during the second round.
Public information: $(G, g, p)$

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P_1$</td>
<td>$\ldots$</td>
<td>$P_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_1 \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p$</td>
<td>$x_i \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p$</td>
<td>$x_n \overset{R}{\leftarrow} Z_p$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$X_1 \leftarrow g^{x_1}$</td>
<td>$X_i \leftarrow g^{x_i}$</td>
<td>$X_n \leftarrow g^{x_n}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$X_1 \rightarrow$</td>
<td>$X_i \rightarrow$</td>
<td>$X_n \rightarrow$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_1 \leftarrow X_{x_1}^{x_1}$</td>
<td>$K_i \leftarrow X_{x_i}^{x_i}$</td>
<td>$K_n \leftarrow X_{x_n}^{x_n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_2 \leftarrow X_{x_1}^{x_1}$</td>
<td>$K_{i+1} \leftarrow X_{x_i}^{x_i}$</td>
<td>$K_1 \leftarrow X_{x_1}^{x_1}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$Z_1 \leftarrow K_2 / K_1$</td>
<td>$Z_i \leftarrow K_{i+1} / K_i$</td>
<td>$Z_n \leftarrow K_1 / K_n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_1 \rightarrow$</td>
<td>$Z_i \rightarrow$</td>
<td>$Z_n \rightarrow$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SK_1 \leftarrow K_1^n \prod_{j=1}^{n-2} Z_j^{n-j}$</td>
<td>$SK_i \leftarrow K_i^n \prod_{j=1}^{n-2} Z_j^{n-j}$</td>
<td>$SK_n \leftarrow K_n^n \prod_{j=1}^{n-2} Z_j^{n-j}$</td>
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Figure 2.7: The Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol [BD94, BD05]. The protocol works over a finite cyclic group $G$ of prime order $p$ generated by an element $g$.

As shown in [BD94, BD05], the Burmester-Desmedt GKE protocol is only secure against passive adversaries. In order to convert it into a GPAKE protocol, we make four main modifications to the Burmester-Desmedt GKE protocol. First, we add a first round of nonces to the original protocol to clearly identify the different sessions. Second, we assume the existence of a family of random permutations $E_k : G \rightarrow G$ indexed by a key $k$ and use this family to encrypt the first round messages of the original Burmester-Desmedt GKE protocol. The encryption key $k$ is derived via an ideal hash function (i.e., a random oracle) from the password, together with nonces, and the index of the user. Third, in order to avoid malleability attacks in which the adversary reorders messages in the same session or replay them in a different session, we add a final round of key confirmation. Finally, we change the key derivation step to make it depend on the shared group key as well as on the session identifier with the help of another ideal hash function. The resulting protocol is described in Figure 2.8.

As shown in Appendix C, the protocol in Figure 2.8 is a secure GPAKE protocol in the ideal-cipher and random-oracle models if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption described in Section 1.3 holds in $G$.

Contributions. The GPAKE scheme in Figure 2.8 was the first provably-secure GPAKE scheme with a constant number of rounds. In Appendix C, in addition to proposing a new GPAKE protocol, we also provide concrete attacks against two constant-round GPAKE schemes previously proposed in the literature [DB06, LHL04].

2.7 GPAKE protocols in the standard model

As in the case of EKE-based protocols, the security of the GPAKE protocol in Figure 2.8 relies fundamentally on heuristic assumptions, due to the use of random oracles and ideal ciphers in the construction. To avoid having to rely on any idealized model, Pointcheval and I proposed a new GPAKE scheme in [AP06] (see Appendix D), which extends the Gennaro-Lindell (GL) PAKE protocol [GL03] to the group setting using ideas similar to those used in the Burmester-Desmedt GKE protocol [BD94, BD05]. Similarly to the GL PAKE protocol, the new protocol, to which we refer as AP, also relies on the notion of smooth projective hash functions. Hence, it
Key, a final round of signatures is added to the protocol to make sure that all users compute an additional round of communication in which each user computes and broadcasts the ratio of instead of generating a single session key in each of these instances, the original GL protocol is capable of computing the group session key. Still, to ensure that all users agree on the same S

\[ K_i = K^n_i \prod_{j=1}^{n-2} Z_{j+1}^{n-j} \]

\[ \text{Auth}_1 = H_2(S, K_i, 1) \]

\[ \text{Auth}_2 = H_2(S, K_i, i) \]

\[ SK_1 = H_3(S, K_i) \]

\[ \text{Auth}_2 = H_2(S, K_i, i) \]

\[ \text{Auth}_n = H_3(S, K_i, n) \]

\[ SK_n = H_3(S, K_i) \]

Figure 2.8: The password-authenticated group key exchange protocol in [ABCP06] (see Appendix C). The protocol works over a finite cyclic group \( G \) of prime order \( p \) generated by an element \( g \). The elements \( S, \tilde{S} \), and \( \tilde{S} \) are defined respectively as \( P_i \parallel N_1 \ldots \parallel P_n \parallel N_n \), \( S \parallel X_1^i \parallel Z_1 \ldots \parallel X_n^i \parallel Z_n \), and \( \tilde{S} \parallel \text{Auth}_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel \text{Auth}_n \). \( E \) and \( D \) are ideal symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms. \( H_1, H_2, \) and \( H_3 \) are ideal hash functions. \( \ell \) is a security parameter.

Also enjoys efficient instantiations based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and \( N \)-residuosity assumptions (see [GL03]).

**Overview of the AP protocol [AP00]**. The AP protocol is built in a modular way from four cryptographic primitives: a labeled encryption scheme, a signature scheme, a family of smooth projective hash functions, and a family of universal hash functions. Like the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, the AP protocol assumes a ring structure for the users and each user is associated with an index \( i \) between 1 and \( n \), where \( n \) is the size of the group. After deciding on the order of the users, the protocol works as follows. First, each user in the group executes two correlated instances of the GL protocol, one with his predecessor and one with his successor so each user can authenticate his neighbors (this accounts for the first 3 rounds of the protocol). However, instead of generating a single session key in each of these instances, the original GL protocol is modified so that two independent session keys are generated in each session. Next, the first of these keys is used as a test key to authenticate the neighbor with whom that key is being shared and the other one is used to help the computation of the group session key, which is defined as the product of these latter keys. As in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, this is achieved via an additional round of communication in which each user computes and broadcasts the ratio of the session keys that he shares with his predecessor and successor. After this round, each user is capable of computing the group session key. Still, to ensure that all users agree on the same key, a final round of signatures is added to the protocol to make sure that all users compute.
the group session key based on the same transcript. The key used to verify the signature of a user is the same one transmitted by that user in the first round of the GL protocol. A pictorial description can be found in Figure 2.9.

Security of the AP protocol. Let $\text{PKE}$ be a labeled encryption secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and let $\text{HASH}$ be a family of smooth projective hash functions for the language consisting of triples $\{(c, \ell, pw)\}$ such that $c$ is an encryption of the password $pw$ with label $\ell$. Let $\text{UH}$ and $\text{UH}'$ be two families of universal hash functions, and let $\text{SIG}$ be a signature scheme that is strongly unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. Then, as shown in Appendix D, the protocol in Figure 2.9 is a secure GPAKE protocol in the standard model according to the definition in Section 2.2.1.

2.8 GPAKE protocols in the UC model

Like most existing GPAKE protocols, the GPAKE protocols that we discussed so far have proofs in the indistinguishability-based security model discussed in Section 2.2.1, which does not guarantee security under arbitrary composition. To address this problem, together with Catalano, Chevalier, and Pointcheval, we defined in \[\text{ACCP08}\] an ideal functionality for GPAKE with explicit authentication and contributiveness in the UC framework. As with previous definitions in the same framework, our definitions do not assume any particular distribution on passwords or independence between passwords of different parties. In addition to the new definition, we also provided the first steps towards realizing this functionality by analyzing a variant of the GPAKE protocol in Figure 2.8 and showing that it realizes the new ideal functionality in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption described in Section 1.3.3.

To overcome the limitations of the protocol in \[\text{ACCP08}\], Chevalier, Granboulan, Pointcheval, and I proposed in \[\text{ACGP11}\] a new generic construction of password-authenticated group key exchange protocol from any UC-secure PAKE with explicit authentication. The new construction has several advantages when compared to existing solutions. First, it only assumes a common reference string and does not rely on any idealized model. Second, it enjoys a simple and intuitive security proof in the UC framework and is optimal in the sense that it allows at most one password test per user instance. Third, it also achieves a strong notion of security against insiders in that the adversary cannot bias the distribution of the session key as long as one of the players involved in the protocol is honest. Finally, the new construction can be easily extended to the dynamic case in a way that the costs of establishing a common key between two existing groups is significantly smaller than computing a common key from scratch.
Figure 2.9: The GPAKE protocol in [AP06] (also in Appendix D) with n players \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}, where \(T_k^A\) and \(T_i\) are defined respectively as \(P_i \parallel P_{i+1} \parallel c_{i+1}^z \parallel h_{p_i} \parallel h_{p_{i+1}} \parallel \text{test}_i^A\) and \(v_k \parallel P_i \parallel c_i \parallel h_{p_i} \parallel h_{P_{i+1}} \parallel Z_i \parallel SK_{i}^{L}\) for \(i = 1, \ldots, n\). (KG, Enc, Dec) are the key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms of a labeled public-key encryption scheme [Sho01]. (SKG, Sign, Vf) are the key generation, signing, and verification algorithms of a signature scheme. (HK, \(\alpha, H, HP\)) are the key generation, key projection, hashing, and projected hashing algorithms of a family of smooth projective hash functions for the language \(L\) consisting of triples \{(c, l, pw)\} such that \(c\) is an encryption of the password \(pw\) with label \(l\). UH and UH' are two universal hash functions chosen uniformly at random from their respective families [Hill99], with UH1(\(\cdot\)) and UH2(\(\cdot\)) referring to the first and second halves of UH(\(\cdot\)).
Chapter 3

Identity-based cryptography

3.1 Introduction

In order to link users to their public keys, public-key cryptosystems have to rely on the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI), where a trusted authority certifies the relation between users and their public keys by means of a digital signature. Since the costs of maintaining such a PKI can be prohibitive, Shamir proposed the concept of identity-based cryptography in [Sha85], which is a generalization of the standard notion of public-key cryptography. In identity-based cryptography, the public key of a user is his identity (e.g., his name or email address) and the corresponding private key is handed to him by a trusted key distribution center. In the particular case of identity-based encryption schemes, given an email address and a set of user-independent public parameters, one can encrypt a message to the owner of the email address without needing to obtain an authentic copy of the owner’s public key first.

Since being introduced by Shamir in 1984 [Sha85], identity-based cryptography has received a lot of attention due to the fact that one no longer needs to maintain a separate public key for each user. While an efficient construction of identity-based signatures was also proposed in the same paper, it was only in 2001 that the first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) construction appeared in the literature based on elliptic-curve pairings [BF03]. Later that year, Cocks proposed an alternative IBE construction based on the quadratic residuosity problem [Coc01].

Overview of this chapter. Since most of my work in the area of identity-based cryptography concerns the design of encryption schemes, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the latter. In Section 3.2 we start by recalling some standard definitions and security notions for IBE schemes that we will be using in the following sections. This is followed by a review of some of the main constructions in the identity-based setting in Section 3.3 such as the seminal IBE scheme by Boneh and Franklin [BF03] and the hierarchical IBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen [BB04a]. After reviewing standard IBE constructions, we discuss in the remaining sections generalizations and applications of the IBE schemes. First, in Section 3.4 we present a generalization of IBE in Section 3.4 known as IBE with wildcards, in which users can simultaneously encrypt a message to a group of users matching a certain pattern defined through a sequence of fixed strings and wildcards. Then, in Section 3.5 we discuss an extension of public-key encryption, known as public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), which is closely related to IBE schemes. As we show in Section 3.5, A PEKS scheme can be seen as a special form of IBE in which a user’s decryption key only allows him to test whether he is the intended target of a ciphertext or not. Finally, in Section 3.6 we discuss some further generalizations.
3.2 Security notions for identity-based encryption

In this section, we review some of the standard security notions used in the context of the hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE), such as data privacy, anonymity, and robustness. Towards this goal, we first recall their syntax.

3.2.1 Syntax

The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) is a generalization of the standard notion of public-key encryption in which the sender can encrypt messages to a user based only on the identity of the latter and a set of user-independent public parameters. In these systems, there exists a trusted authority, called private key generator, that is responsible for generating decryption keys for all identities in the system.

More formally, an IBE scheme is defined by a tuple of algorithms $\text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, a message space $\mathcal{M}$ and an identity space $\mathcal{ID}$. The scheme provides the following functionality. The algorithm Setup is run by a trusted authority to generate a pair of keys $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ such that mpk is made public, whereas msk is kept private. On input an identity $id \in \mathcal{ID}$, the key derivation algorithm KeyDer$(\text{msk}, id)$ uses the master secret key to generate a key $sk_{id}$ for the user with identity $id$. Then, every user holding the master public key mpk, can encrypt a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ for the identity $id$ by running $C \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, id, m)$. Finally, the ciphertext $C$ can be decrypted by running the deterministic decryption algorithm, $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk_{id}, C)$. For correctness, it is required that for all honestly generated master keys $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ $\overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Setup}$, for all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and all identities $id \in \mathcal{ID}$, $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{KeyDer}(\text{msk}, id), \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, id, m))$ holds with all but negligible probability.

Soon after being proposed, the notion of IBE was generalized to the hierarchical setting by Horwitz and Lynn [HL02], who considered the scenario in which intermediate nodes can act as private key generators. In a hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, users are hierarchically organized in a tree of depth $L$ whose root is the trusted authority. The identity of a user at level $1 \leq \ell \leq L$ is represented by a vector $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell) \in \mathcal{ID}^\ell$. Similarly to IBE, a HIBE scheme can be defined more formally by a tuple of algorithms $\text{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ working as an IBE except that a user at level $\ell$ with identity $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)$ can use the key derivation algorithm $\text{KeyDer}(sk_{id}, id')$ to generate a secret key for any of its children $id' = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell, id_{\ell+1})$ at level $\ell + 1$. Since this process can be iterated, every user can generate keys for all its descendants. In a HIBE, the encryption algorithm takes as input a vector of identities. The correctness requirement is almost the same as that of IBE, except that it is extended so that a ciphertext $C \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, id, m)$ can be decrypted by any identity $id'$ which is an ancestor of $id$. Finally, note that an IBE is a particular case of a HIBE with $L = 1$.

3.2.2 Data privacy

The now-standard definition of security of (H)IBE schemes, first suggested by Boneh and Franklin [BF03], is indistinguishability under adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). In this security model, the adversary is allowed to obtain secret keys for adaptively chosen identities before deciding the identity and a pair of messages upon which it wishes to be challenged. By allowing these queries, this notion implicitly captures resistance against collusion attacks as different users should be unable to combine their keys in an attempt to decrypt ciphertexts intended to another user.

To define this security notion more precisely, we consider the game $\text{Exp}_{\text{HIBE}, L, k}^{\text{ind-cpa-}\beta}(A)$ described in Figure 3.1 using the notation of code-based games. The game is defined by four procedures and is executed with an adversary $A$ as follows. The procedure Initialize initializes the set $U$
### 3.2. Security notions for identity-based encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$</th>
<th>Game $\text{Exp}^{\text{s-ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>proc Initialize($k, L$)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(mpk, msk) $\xleftarrow{}$ Setup($1^k, L$)&lt;br&gt;V $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$&lt;br&gt;Return mpk</td>
<td><strong>proc Initialize($k, L, id^*$)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(mpk, msk) $\xleftarrow{}$ Setup($1^k, L$)&lt;br&gt;V $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$&lt;br&gt;Return mpk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>proc KeyDer($id$)</strong>&lt;br&gt;V $\leftarrow$ V $\cup$ {$id$}&lt;br&gt;$sk_id$ $\xleftarrow{}$ KeyDer(msk, id)&lt;br&gt;Return $sk_id$</td>
<td><strong>proc Finalize($\beta'$)</strong>&lt;br&gt;if (ancestor($id^*$) $\in$ V)&lt;br&gt;then return false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>proc LR($id^<em>, m_0^</em>, m_1^*$)</strong>&lt;br&gt;C $\xleftarrow{}$ Enc(mpk, id*, $m_0^<em>$)&lt;br&gt;Return C</em></td>
<td><strong>proc LR($m_0^<em>, m_1^</em>$)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp;</td>
<td>C $\xleftarrow{}$ Enc(mpk, id*, $m_\beta$)&lt;br&gt;Return C*</td>
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Figure 3.1: Games $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{s-ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ defining IND-CPA and s-IND-CPA security (respectively) of a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) of depth L. The procedures KeyDer and Finalize are common to both games, which differ in their Initialize and LR procedures.

and the decryption key table DK to empty, generates a fresh key pair (mpk, msk) $\xleftarrow{}$ Setup and returns mpk to the adversary. During the execution of the game, the adversary is allowed to make queries to the KeyDer procedure that, on input an identity $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)$, returns the secret key $usk_id$ $\xleftarrow{}$ KeyDer(msk, id) corresponding to identity id. $A$ is also allowed to make a single query ($id^*, m_0^*, m_1^*$) to the LR procedure, where $m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0,1\}^*$ are assumed to have the same length. To answer it, the game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ generates a challenge ciphertext $C^* \xleftarrow{}$ Enc(mpk, id*, $m_\beta^*$) and gives $C^*$ to $A$. Eventually, the adversary ends the game by querying the Finalize procedure with a guess $\beta'$ for the bit $\beta$ used to generate the challenge ciphertext.

The advantage $\text{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ is then defined as the probability that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-1}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ outputs $\text{true}$ minus the probability that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-0}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ outputs $\text{true}$. Note that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ind-cpa-$\beta$}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ returns $\text{true}$ only if $A$ outputs 1 without ever having queried the key derivation oracle on any ancestor identity $id = (id^*_1, \ldots, id^*_\ell)$ of $id^*$, $\ell \leq \ell'$. Finally, a HIBE scheme HIBE is said to be secure if $\text{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ is a negligible function in $k$ for all PTAs $A$.

A weaker definition of data privacy for (H)IBE schemes, suggested by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz in [CHK03], is indistinguishability under selective-identity chosenplaintext attacks (s-IND-CPA). Unlike the standard IND-CPA definition, the adversary in the s-IND-CPA security game has to commit to the challenge identity before obtaining the public parameters of the scheme. As shown in [CHK03], selective-identity security may be sufficient for certain applications, such as the constructions of forward-secure encryption schemes. The experiment describing the s-IND-CPA security is also described in Figure 3.1.

#### 3.2.3 Anonymity

In addition to data privacy, which is captured by the notion of indistinguishability under adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks, another useful security notion is anonymity [ABC+08][ABC+05a][BBDP01]. Informally, anonymity under adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks (ANO-CPA) asks that a ciphertext does not reveal the identity under which it was created, even when the adversary is allowed to obtain secret keys for adaptively chosen identities of its choice. Though originally considered in the context of public-key encryption schemes in [BBDP01], this notion has found several other applications in the identity-based setting (see Appendix [E]). In particular, as we show in Section 3.3, anonymity is extremely important when constructing
Besides formalizing the notion of anonymity in the identity-based setting in similar assumptions. The Gentry-Silverberg HIBE scheme in [GS02] achieves a limited form of anonymity under Section 1.3 is hard in the underlying group. Moreover, we also proved that a modified version of the Gentry-Silverberg HIBE scheme in [GS02] achieves a limited form of anonymity under similar assumptions.

### Public-key cryptography with keyword search

The advantage $\text{Adv}^{\text{ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ is then defined as the probability that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ returns $\text{true}$ minus the probability that $\text{Exp}^{\text{ano-cpa-0}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ returns $\text{true}$. Note that game $\text{Exp}^{\text{ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ returns $\text{true}$ only if $A$ outputs $1$ without ever having queried the key derivation oracle on any ancestor identity $id$ of the challenge identities $id_0^*$ and $id_1^*$. Finally, a HIBE scheme $\text{HIBE}$ is said to be anonymous if $\text{Adv}^{\text{ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ is a negligible function in $k$ for all PTAs $A$.

For completeness, the notion of anonymity under selective-identity chosen-plaintext attacks (s-ANO-CPA), in which the adversary has to commit to the challenge identities before obtaining the public parameters of the scheme is also described in Figure 3.2.

#### Contributions

Besides formalizing the notion of anonymity in the identity-based setting in [ABC+05a, ABC+08] (see Appendix F), we also proved that the IBE scheme due to Boneh and Franklin in [BF03] is anonymous in the random-oracle model if the BDH problem described in Section 1.3 is hard in the underlying group. Moreover, we also proved that a modified version of the Gentry-Silverberg HIBE scheme in [GS02] achieves a limited form of anonymity under similar assumptions.

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**Figure 3.2:** Games $\text{Exp}^{\text{ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ and $\text{Exp}^{\text{s-ano-cpa-}}_{\text{HIBE},L,k}(A)$ defining ANO-CPA and s-ANO-CPA security (respectively) of a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme $\text{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ of depth $L$. The procedures $\text{KeyDer}$ and $\text{Finalize}$ are common to both games, which differ in their Initialize and LR procedures.
3.2.4 Robustness

The notion of robustness, introduced by myself together with Bellare and Neven in [ABN10] (see Appendix G), reflects the difficulty of producing a ciphertext which is valid under two different encryption keys. More precisely, suppose $C$ is an IBE ciphertext for an encrypted message $M$ under an identity $id_0$. We know that if $C$ is decrypted using the secret key $sk_0$ corresponding to $id_0$, the result would be $M$. But what if we decrypt $C$ using a secret key $sk_1$ corresponding to an identity $id_1 \neq id_0$? Previous security notions for identity-based encryption are silent about this. Roughly, we refer to a scheme as “robust” if the result of this decryption is $\perp$, meaning that the decryption algorithm rejects.

Robustness can be trivially achieved by appending the public key or identity of the intended recipient to the ciphertext, and by checking for it upon decryption. However, this solution comes at the expense of anonymity and is only acceptable in cases where the latter does not need to be preserved. Unfortunately, finding a solution which achieves robustness while preserving anonymity is not so easy. As shown in Appendix G, natural (anonymity-preserving) solutions, such as including the identity of the recipient in the plaintext and have recipients check this upon decryption, do not work in general as there are (anonymous) IBE schemes where it is possible for an adversary to create a ciphertext that multiple recipients will accept. This is where the notion of robustness comes into play. If the encryption scheme is robust, then only the intended recipient will obtain a valid result upon decryption, meaning one different from $\perp$. In hindsight, the natural solutions we just mentioned are just attempts to add robustness without violating anonymity.

Two different flavors of robustness are defined in Appendix G depending on whether ciphertexts are honestly or adversarially generated. In a weakly robust IBE scheme, the adversary outputs a pair $(id_0, id_1)$ of distinct identities together with a message $m^*$ and is considered successful if the decryption of an honest encryption of the message $m^*$ for identity $id_0$ under the decryption key $sk_1$ corresponding to $id_1$ returns non-$\perp$. In a strongly robust IBE scheme, the adversary outputs a pair $(id_0, id_1)$ of distinct identities together with a ciphertext $C^*$ and is considered successful if the decryption of $C^*$ returns non-$\perp$ under both decryption keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$ corresponding to identities $id_0$ and $id_1$. Both weak and strong robustness can be considered under chosen-plaintext (CPA) or chosen-ciphertext (CCA) attacks, depending on whether the adversary is given access to a decryption oracle. The resulting four notions are denoted WROB-CPA, WROB-CCA, SROB-CPA, and SROB-CCA.

As shown in Appendix G, the notions of weak and strong robustness can be defined more formally by considering the games $\text{Exp}_{\text{IBE},k}(A)$ and $\text{Exp}_{\text{IBE},k}^{\text{srob}}(A)$ described in Figure 3.3 using the notation of code-based games. Both games are defined by four procedures, which are executed with an adversary $A$. The procedures Initialize, KeyDer and Dec are common to both games, which differ in their Finalize procedures. While the adversary $A$ makes no Dec queries in a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), it might ask such queries in a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). The procedure Initialize initializes the set $V$ to empty, generates a fresh key pair $(mpk, msk) \xleftarrow{} \text{Setup}$, and returns $mpk$ to the adversary. To answer a KeyDer query $id$ made by $A$, the game returns the secret key $usk_{id} \xleftarrow{} \text{KeyDer}(msk, id)$ corresponding to identity $id$. To answer a Dec query $(C, id)$, the game generates a secret key $usk_{id}$ for $id$ if necessary, computes $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(usk_{id}, C)$, and returns $m$ to the adversary. Finally, in the game $\text{Exp}_{\text{IBE},k}(A)$, the adversary outputs a challenge message $m^* \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and two challenge identities $id_0^*$ and $id_1^*$ and wins the game if the encryption of $m^*$ under identity $id_0^*$ decrypts correctly under the secret key corresponding to identity $id_1^*$. In the game $\text{Exp}_{\text{IBE},k}^{\text{srob}}(A)$, the adversary outputs a challenge ciphertext $C^*$ and two challenge identities $id_0^*$ and $id_1^*$ and wins the game if $C^*$ decrypts correctly under the secret keys corresponding to $id_0^*$ and $id_1^*$.

The advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{IBE},k}^{\text{wrob}}(A)$ (resp. $\text{Adv}_{\text{IBE},k}^{\text{srob}}(A)$) is then defined as the probability that
In addition to introducing the notion of robustness, we consider and dismiss Contributions.

The procedures Initialize, KeyDer and Dec are common to both games, which differ in their Finalize procedures. ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA} indicates whether the adversary is given access to the Dec procedure.

game Exp_{IBE,k}(A) (resp. Exp_{IBE,k}(A)) returns true. Finally, a IBE scheme IBE is said to be weakly (resp. strongly) robust if Adv_{wrob}(A) (resp. Adv_{rob}(A)) is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.

Contributions. In addition to introducing the notion of robustness, we consider and dismiss natural approaches to achieve it in Appendix G. We also provide two general robustness-adding transforms; test robustness of existing schemes and patch the ones that fail; and discuss some applications.

3.3 Identity-based encryption constructions

The Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme. The first practical IBE construction to appear in the literature was due to Boneh and Franklin [BF03], based on elliptic-curve pairings. Let \( \hat{e} : G \times G \rightarrow G_T \) be a non-degenerate bilinear map as defined in Section 2.3, let g be a generator of G, and let \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^s \rightarrow G^* \) and \( H_2 : G_T \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k \) be random oracles. In the basic version of Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme, called Basicident and described in Figure 3.4, the master secret key is an exponent \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and the corresponding master public key is \( S \leftarrow g^s \). Then, given S and the user’s identity \( id \), the user’s ephemeral public key \( g_{id} \) can be computed as the pairing between S and the hash of id, i.e. \( g_{id} \leftarrow \hat{e}(S, H_1(id)) \). To encrypt a message m under identity id, the sender simply chooses \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and outputs the tuple \( (g^r, m \oplus H_2(g_{id}^r)) \) as the ciphertext. To decrypt a ciphertext \( (C_1, C_2) \), the user with identity id first needs to obtain a decryption key \( usk \leftarrow H_1(id)^s \) from the master authority and then compute \( m \leftarrow C_2 \oplus H_2(\hat{e}(C_1, usk)) \).

Security of Basicident. To understand why the Basicident IBE scheme is correct, note that \( \hat{e}(C_1, usk) = \hat{e}(g^r, H_1(id)^s) = \hat{e}(g^s, H_1(id)^r) = g_{id}^r \). To understand informally why it is also secure, first note that ephemeral public values \( g_{id} \) used in the encryption of a message for user
Figure 3.4: The Boneh-Franklin BasicIdent IBE scheme [BF03], where $G$ is a pairing parameter generator and $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G^*$ and $H_2 : G_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ are random oracles.

$id$ are independent of each other due to the use of the random oracle $H_1$ in its computation. Likewise, the use of $H_1$ in the key derivation algorithm also protects against user collusion by making the decryption key values $usk$ independent of each other. Finally, let $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$ and $id^*$ be the challenge message pair and identity and let $(C_1^*, C_2^*)$ be the challenge ciphertext, where $C_1^* = g^{r*} \beta$ and $C_2^* = m_1^* \oplus H_2(g_{id}^{id*})$ and $\beta$ is the hidden challenge bit. Since the values $S, C_1^*, H_1(id^*)$ look random to the adversary, the latter can only distinguish the encryption of $m_0^*$ from that of $m_1^*$ if it queries the random oracle $H_2$ on input $\hat{e}(S,H_1(id))^{r*}$. However, since this amounts to breaking the BDH problem, no PTA adversary should succeed in this task with non-negligible probability. As shown formally in [BF03], this is indeed the case.

Hierarchical setting. In order to consider scenarios in which intermediate nodes can act as private key generators, Horwitz and Lynn proposed in [HL02] a generalization of IBE known as hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). In their paper, they also provided a two-level HIBE construction based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme, but their scheme could provide full collusion resistance only in the upper level. The first HIBE scheme to provide full collusion resistance in all levels is due to Gentry and Silverberg [GS02]. Like the Horwitz-Lynn HIBE scheme, the Gentry-Silverberg HIBE scheme was also based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme and proven secure in the random-oracle model [BR93].

The first HIBE to be proven secure in the standard model is due to Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [CHK03], but in a weaker security model, called the selective-identity model. Unlike the IND-CPA security definition, the selective-identity model requires the adversary to commit to the challenge identity before obtaining the public parameters of the scheme (see Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2.2). Despite providing weaker security guarantees, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz showed that the selective-identity model is sufficient for building forward-secure encryption schemes, which was the main motivation of their paper.

The work by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz was soon improved by Boneh and Boyen [BB04a], who provided two very efficient selective-identity-secure (H)IBE constructions in the standard model: one based on the BDDH assumption described in Section 1.3 and another one based on the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (Decision BDHI) assumption, which was introduced in the same paper. Since the first of these HIBE schemes became the basis of several other schemes in the literature, let us recall it here.

The BB-HIBE scheme. Let $\hat{e} : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ be a non-degenerate bilinear map as defined in Section 1.2.4 and let $g_1$ and $g_2$ be two random generators of $G$. In the first Boneh-Boyen HIBE scheme [BB04a] (BB-HIBE), which is described in Figure 3.5, identities are assumed to

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[3.3. Identity-based encryption constructions]
be vectors of elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. If necessary, this can be achieved by applying a collision-resistant hash function $h : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ to binary identities before applying the scheme. To generate the master public key, the master authority first chooses $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, then computes $h_1 \leftarrow g_0^\alpha$, $h_2 \leftarrow g_0^2$, and $u_i \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ for $i = 0 \ldots L$, and sets $mpk \leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_0, \ldots, u_L)$ and $msk \leftarrow h_2$. To encrypt a message $m$ for user $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)$, the sender simply chooses $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and outputs the tuple $(g_1, ((u_1 \cdot u_0/id_1)^r, \ldots, (u_\ell \cdot u_0/id_\ell)^r)), m \cdot \hat{e}(h_1, g_2)^r$ as the ciphertext. To decrypt a ciphertext $(C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_\ell)$, the user with identity $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)$ first obtains a decryption key $(usk_0, usk_1, \ldots, usk_\ell) = (h_2 \prod_{i=1}^\ell (u_i \cdot u_0/id_i)^r, g_1^r, \ldots, g_\ell^r)$ from the master authority and then computes $m \leftarrow C_3 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^\ell \hat{e}(usk_i, C_{2,i})/\hat{e}(C_1, usk_0)$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setup$(1^k, L)$:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(G, G_T, p, \hat{e}) \leftarrow G(1^k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g_1, g_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h_1 \leftarrow g_0^\alpha$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h_2 \leftarrow g_0^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_i \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ for $i = 0 \ldots L$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$mpk \leftarrow (G, G_T, p, \hat{e}, g_1, g_2, h_1, u_0, \ldots, u_L)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$msk \leftarrow h_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(mpk, msk)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enc$(mpk, id, m)$:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parse $id$ as $(id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_{2,i} \leftarrow (u_i \cdot u_0/id_i)^r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_3 \leftarrow m \cdot \hat{e}(h_1, g_2)^r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_\ell)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KeyDer$(usk_{id_1}, \ldots, id_\ell+1)$:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parse $usk_{id_1}, \ldots, id_\ell+1$ as $(usk_0, \ldots, usk_\ell)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_{\ell+1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$usk'<em>{0} \leftarrow usk_0 \cdot (u</em>{\ell+1} \cdot u_0/id_{\ell+1})^{r_{\ell+1}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$usk'<em>{\ell+1} \leftarrow g</em>{1_{\ell+1}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(usk'<em>0, usk_1, \ldots, usk</em>\ell, usk'_{\ell+1})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec$(usk_{id_1}, \ldots, id_\ell), C)$:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parse $usk_{id_1}, \ldots, id_\ell$ as $(usk_0, \ldots, usk_\ell)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parse $C$ as $(C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_\ell, C_3)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m' \leftarrow C_3 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^\ell \hat{e}(usk_i, C_{2,i})/\hat{e}(C_1, usk_0)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $m'$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.5: The BB-HIBE scheme [BB04a], where $G$ is a pairing parameter generator. The description of KeyDer assumes $usk_z = (usk_0) = (msk) = (h_2)$.

Security of BB-HIBE. As shown in [BB04a], the BB-HIBE scheme in Figure 3.5 is a selective-identity-secure HIBE scheme if the BDDH problem described in Section 3.3 is hard with respect to the parameters $(G, G_T, p, \hat{e})$ generated by pairing parameter generator $G$. In the same paper, the authors also showed a generic transformation in the random oracle model that converts any selective-identity-secure (H)IBE scheme into a (H)IBE that is secure against adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks, described in Section 3.2.2.

3.4 Identity-based encryption with wildcards

One of the main motivating applications of (H)IBE is email-based encryption where the identity of a user is his email address. In these applications, one can encrypt a message to the owner of the email address without needing to obtain an authentic copy of the owner’s public key first. Motivated by the fact that many email addresses correspond to groups of users rather than single individuals, together with Catalano, Dent, Malone-Lee, Neven, and Smart, we introduced in [ABC+11] [ACD+06] a new primitive called wildcarded identity-based encryption, or WIBE for short. It allows a sender to encrypt messages to a whole range of receivers whose identities match a certain pattern defined through a sequence of fixed strings and wildcards, where any string can take the place of a wildcard in a matching identity.
3.4. Identity-based encryption with wildcards

To better understand the concept of WIBE, consider the scenario where there is some kind of organizational hierarchy, such as a hierarchy of email addresses at an university of the form user@dept.univ.edu. Now suppose that we wish to send an encrypted email to all the users of the computer science department, which may include several personal addresses. If we use a standard HIBE, then one would need to encrypt the message to each user individually. On the other hand, in a WIBE scheme, we can easily achieve this goal by encrypting to the pattern *@cs.univ.edu.

3.4.1 Definition

As per [ACD+06] (whose full version is described in Appendix E), a WIBE scheme is a generalization of a HIBE in which users can decide at the time of encryption whether to make the ciphertext decryptable by a group of users whose identities match a certain pattern. More formally, a WIBE scheme is defined by a tuple of algorithms $\text{WIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$. The $\text{Setup}$, $\text{KeyDer}$, and $\text{Dec}$ algorithms are defined exactly as in a HIBE. On the other hand, the encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}$ takes as input a pattern $P \in (\text{ID} \cup *)^\ell$, the master public key $\text{mpk}$ and the message $m$ and returns a ciphertext for $P$. Such a pattern may contain a special wildcard symbol $*$ at some levels. An identity $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_\ell) \in \text{ID}^\ell$ is said to match a pattern $P \in (\text{ID} \cup *)^\ell$, denoted as $id \in P$, if and only if $\forall i = 1, \ldots, \ell$: $id_i = P_i$ or $P_i = *$. Note that any ancestor of a matching identity is also a matching identity under this definition, which seems reasonable given that any ancestor can derive the secret key of a matching descendant identity.

For correctness, it is required that for all honestly generated master keys $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}$, for all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$, all patterns $P \in (\text{ID} \cup *)^\ell$ and all identities $id \in \text{ID}^\ell$ such that $id \in P$, $m \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Dec}(\text{KeyDer}(\text{msk}, id), \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, P, m))$ holds with overwhelming probability. The security of WIBE schemes against adaptive-pattern chosen-plaintext attacks can be defined analogously to those of HIBE schemes in Section 3.2.2 except that the adversary outputs a challenge pattern instead of an identity at the end of the first phase. To exclude trivial attacks, the adversary is not allowed to query the key derivation oracle on any identity that matches the challenge pattern. Moreover, similar changes also apply to the case of selective-pattern chosen-plaintext attacks.

3.4.2 Constructions

In Appendix E, several instantiations of WIBE schemes are introduced based on existing HIBE constructions, such as the BB-HIBE scheme described in Figure 3.4 and the HIBE schemes due to Waters [Wat05] and to Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [BBG05]. As the WIBE scheme based on BB-HIBE (to which we refer as the BB-WIBE) illustrates well the idea behind these constructions, let us now recall it here.

The BB-WIBE scheme. To understand how the BB-HIBE scheme in Figure 3.0 can be transformed into a WIBE scheme, let us consider a particular case in which we want to encrypt to pattern $P = (id_1, id_2, *)$ where $id_1$ and $id_2$ are two arbitrary identities in the identity space ID. In the BB-HIBE scheme, the ciphertext for an identity $(id_1, id_2, id_3)$ has the form $(C_1, C_2.1, C_2.2, C_2.3, C_3) = (g_1t, (u_1 \cdot u_0)^{id_1}, u_2 \cdot u_0^{id_2}, (u_3 \cdot u_0^{id_3}), m \cdot e(s_1, g_2)^{id})$. In order to allow decryption by any user having $id_1$ and $id_2$ as the first two components and an arbitrary value in the third component (including $*$), the first step is to leave the computation of $C_{2.1}$ and $C_{2.2}$ unchanged and to partition $C_{2.3}$ into two parts $C_{2.3.0} = u_0$ and $C_{2.3.1} = u_3$, which are independent of the third identity component. This way, any user that matches the pattern can reconstitute the original BB-HIBE ciphertext by combining these two parts by plugging in its own third identity component. That is, it simply computes $C_{2.3} = C_{2.3.0} \cdot C_{2.3.1}^{id_3}$. Unfortunately,
this modification is not enough to obtain a secure WIBE as the element $C_{2,3,0} = u_0$ can be used to change the recipient identity for non-wildcard positions as well. This is because the same value $u_0$ is used in the computation of each $C_{2,i}$. To overcome this problem and obtain a secure WIBE scheme, we further need to modify the original BB-HIBE scheme so that a different value $u_{0,i}$ is associated with each level. The resulting scheme, which we call BB-WIBE, is described in Figure 3.6.

![Figure 3.6: The BB-WIBE scheme in [ACD+06] and Appendix E](image)

```plaintext
Setup($1^k, L$):
G, $G_T, p, \hat{e} \leftarrow G(1^k)$
g_1, g_2 \leftarrow \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
h_1 \leftarrow g_1^\alpha ; h_2 \leftarrow g_2^\alpha$
u_{i,j} \leftarrow \hat{G}$ for $i = 1 \ldots L, j = 0, 1$
$mpk \leftarrow (G, G_T, p, \hat{e}, g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots, u_{L,1})$
$msk \leftarrow h_2$
Return $(mpk, msk)$

Enc($mpk, P, m$):
parses $P = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell)$
r $\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$; $C_1 \leftarrow g_1^r$
for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ do
if $i \notin W(P)$ then $C_{2,i} \leftarrow (u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}^p)^r$
if $i \in W(P)$ then $C_{2,i} \leftarrow (u_{i,0}^p \cdot u_{i,1}^\ell)^r$
$C_3 \leftarrow m \cdot \hat{e}(h_1, g_2)^r$
Return $(P, C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots, C_{2,\ell}, C_3)$

KeyDer($usk_{(id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)}, id_{\ell+1}$):
parses $usk_{(id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)}$ as $(usk_0, \ldots, usk_\ell)$
r_{\ell+1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
$usk'_{0} \leftarrow usk_0 \cdot \left(u_{\ell+1,0} \cdot u_{\ell+1,1}^{i_{\ell+1}}\right)^{r_{\ell+1}}$
$usk'_{\ell+1} \leftarrow g_1^{r_{\ell+1}}$
Return $(usk'_{0}, usk_1, \ldots, usk_\ell, usk'_{\ell+1})$

Dec($usk_{(id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)}, C$):
parses $usk_{(id_1, \ldots, id_\ell)}$ as $(usk_0, \ldots, usk_\ell)$
parse $C$ as $(P, C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots, C_{2,\ell}, C_3)$
for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ do
if $i \notin W(P)$ then $C'_{2,i} \leftarrow C_{2,i}$
if $i \in W(P)$ then
parse $C_{2,i}$ as $(v_1, v_2)$
$C'_{2,i} \leftarrow v_1 \cdot v_2^{id_i}$
m' $\leftarrow C_3 \cdot e(C_{1,usk_0})^{-1}$
Return $m'$
```

Security of BB-WIBE. Let $(G, G_T, p, \hat{e})$ be the parameters generated by pairing parameter generator $G$. If the BDDH problem described in Section 1.3 is hard with respect to $(G, G_T, p, \hat{e})$, then, as shown in Appendix E, the BB-WIBE scheme in Figure 3.6 is a secure against selective-pattern chosen-plaintext attacks.

Contributions. In addition to proposing the concept of wildcarded identity-based encryption and instantiations based on the HIBE schemes in [BB04a, BBG05, Wat05], we also propose in Appendix E a generic transformation in the random oracle model that converts any selective-pattern chosen-plaintext-secure WIBE scheme into a WIBE that is secure against adaptive-pattern chosen-plaintext attacks.

### 3.4.3 IBE with wildcard key derivation

Even though the concept of WIBE allows the sender to have a more fine-grained control over the list of recipients, its key delegation mechanism is similar to that of a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme, which is not as flexible as one would like. In [AKN07, AKN08], Kiltz, Neven, and I introduce a related primitive called identity-based encryption with wildcard key derivation (WKD-IBE, or “wicked IBE”) that enhances the concept of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) by allowing more general key delegation patterns. In a WKD-IBE, a secret
3.5 Public-key encryption with keyword search

One of the main applications of IBE, WIBE, and WKD-IBE schemes is that of intelligent email routing, where emails usually consist of some header information, a body, and a list of keywords. In the scenario where a user may use different electronic devices to read his email, this user may prefer emails to be routed to his devices depending on the associated keywords. For example, a user may like to receive emails with the keyword “urgent” on his pager, emails with the keyword “agenda” on his PDA, and all other emails on his desktop computer. Though existing mail server software could be updated to provide this type of service for plain, unencrypted email, routing becomes much harder when emails are encrypted. One option would be for the user to leave the list of keywords unencrypted. However, since the keyword information may already be considered sensitive by the user, this option may not be very useful in practice.

Public-key encryption with keyword search. To address the above problem, Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano proposed in [BDOP04] the notion of public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS for short) where the user can give the mail server or gateway some piece of trapdoor information that allows it to test whether a given keyword is among those in the list, without revealing any other information about the email to the gateway. The user can then use a standard public-key encryption scheme to encrypt the body of the email, and a PEKS scheme to separately encrypt each of the keywords.

### 3.5.1 Definition

PEKS scheme [BDOP04] is a tuple $\text{PEKS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Td}, \text{Test})$ of algorithms. Via $(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}$, the key generation algorithm produces a pair of public and private keys. The encryption algorithm $\text{PEKS}$ takes as input a keyword $w$ and the public key $pk$ and returns a ciphertext $C \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PEKS}(pk, w)$. Via $t_w \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Td}(sk, w)$, the trapdoor extraction algorithm computes a trapdoor $t_w$ for keyword $w$. The deterministic test algorithm $\text{Test}(t_w, C)$ returns 1 if $C$ is an encryption of $w$ and 0 otherwise.

In order to be useful, a PEKS scheme needs to satisfy three important conditions [ABC+05a, correctness, privacy, and consistency]. The correctness condition states that, for all honestly generated keys $(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}$ and for all keywords $w$ in the keyword space, $\text{Test}(\text{Td}(sk, w), \text{PEKS}(pk, w)) = 1$ holds with overwhelming probability. The privacy condition (IND-CPA) for PEKS schemes is similar to the standard indistinguishability notion for HIBE schemes in Section 3.2.2 and asks that no PTA adversary should be able to distinguish with non-negligible probability between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice, even if it is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any non-challenge keywords. Finally, the (computational) consistency condition requires that no PTA adversary should be able to find two different keywords $(w_0, w_1)$ such that $\text{Test}(\text{Td}(sk, w_0), \text{PEKS}(pk, w_1)) = 1$ with non-negligible probability. For a formal definition, please refer to Appendix F.
3.5.2 Constructions

In addition to proposing the concept of PEKS, Boneh et al. also showed how to build a PEKS scheme using the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme described in Figure 3.3 as a starting point. Let BDOP-PEKS and BF-IBE refer to the new PEKS and the Boneh-Franklin IBE schemes. More precisely, keywords in the BDOP-PEKS scheme are mapped to identities in the BF-IBE scheme, with a trapdoor in the former simply corresponding to a decryption key in the latter. To encrypt a keyword \( w \) in the BDOP-PEKS, one simply uses BF-IBE to the encrypt the all-zero message for identity \( w \). To test whether a ciphertext encrypts a given keyword \( w \) in the BDOP-PEKS scheme, one simply uses the BF-IBE decryption algorithm with the key associated with \( w \) and tests whether the result equals the all-zero message.

![Figure 3.7: The BDOP-PEKS scheme \[BDOP04\], where \( \mathcal{G} \) is a pairing parameter generator and \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^* \) and \( H_2 : \mathbb{G}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k \) are random oracles.](image)

**Security of BDOP-PEKS.** Let \((\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_T, p, \hat{e})\) be the parameters generated by pairing parameter generator \( \mathcal{G} \). If the BDH problem is hard with respect to \((\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_T, p, \hat{e})\), then, as shown in \[BDOP04\], the BDOP-PEKS scheme in Figure 3.7 is correct and private (IND-CPA) in the random oracle model. The computational consistency of their scheme is proven in \[ABC^{+}05a\] and \[ABC^{+}08\] also in the random oracle model (see Appendix F).

**Contributions.** In addition to proving the computational consistency of the BDOP-PEKS scheme in \[ABC^{+}05a\] and \[ABC^{+}08\], we formally define computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency and provide a new PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent. Moreover, we also suggest three extensions of the basic notions of PEKS and IBE, namely anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption, public-key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with keyword search. For more details, please refer to Appendix F.

3.5.3 Generic transforms

As the intuition behind the BDOP-PEKS scheme shows, the notions of PEKS and IBE are closely related to each other. In fact, Boneh et al. informally suggested a simple transformation from IBE to PEKS in \[BDOP04\]. The transform, to which we refer as bdop-ibe-2-peks, takes as input an IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) and returns a PEKS scheme \( \text{PEKS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Td}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Test}) \) as follows. The public key \( pk \) and secret key \( sk \) of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme (i.e., \( \text{KeyGen} = \text{Setup} \)). The trapdoor \( t_w \) associated to keyword \( w \) is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity \( w \) (i.e., \( \text{Td}(sk, w) = \text{KeyDer}(sk, w) \)). A keyword \( w \) is PEKS-encrypted by IBE-encrypting the message 0\(^k\) for the identity \( w \) (i.e., \( \text{PEKS}(pk, w) = \text{Enc}(pk, 0^k) \)).
returns attacks (ANO). Figure 3.8: The bdop-w ∈ {m encrypted message, the PEKS-encryption algorithm chooses and encrypts a random message $w$ of keyword $w$ of the IBE scheme would assign to the identity scheme. (I.e. $KeyGen_{ibe}$ transform takes input an IBE scheme $IBE$ and returns a PEKS scheme $PEKS = (KeyGen, Td, PEKS, Test)$ as follows. The public key $pk$ and secret key $sk$ of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme. (I.e. $KeyGen = Setup$.) The trapdoor associated to keyword $w$ is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity $w$. (I.e. $Td(sk, w) = KeyDer(sk, w)$.) PEKS-encryption of keyword $w$ is done as follows: $PEKS(pk, w)$ picks $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, lets $C \leftarrow Enc(pk, w, m)$, and returns $(C, m)$ as the ciphertext. Finally, $Test(t_w, (C, m))$ returns 1 iff $Dec(t_w, C) = m$.

To address the problem of oddly-behaving Dec algorithms, we propose in Appendix E a randomized variant of the bdop-ibe-2-peks transform. The new transform, to which we refer as new-ibe-2-peks, is similar to bdop-ibe-2-peks except that instead of always using $0^k$ as the encrypted message, the PEKS-encryption algorithm chooses and encrypts a random message $m \in \{0, 1\}^k$ and appends $m$ in the clear to the ciphertext. In more detail, the new-ibe-2-peks transform takes input an IBE scheme $IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec)$ and returns a PEKS scheme $PEKS = (KeyGen, Td, PEKS, Test)$ as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The bdop-ibe-2-peks transform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$KeyGen(1^k)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Setup(1^k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(pk, sk)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Td(sk, w)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_w \leftarrow KeyDer(sk, w)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $t_w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PEKS(pk, w)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m \leftarrow 0^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \leftarrow Enc(pk, w, m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $C$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Test(t_w, C)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m' \leftarrow Dec(t_w, C)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if $m' \neq 0^k$ then return 1 else return 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The new-ibe-2-peks transform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$KeyGen(1^k)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Setup(1^k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(pk, sk)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Td(sk, w)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_w \leftarrow KeyDer(sk, w)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $t_w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PEKS(pk, w)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m \leftarrow {0, 1}^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \leftarrow Enc(pk, w, m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(C, m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Test(t_w, (C, m))$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m' \leftarrow Dec(t_w, C)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if $m' = m$ then return 1 else return 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.8: The bdop-ibe-2-peks and new-ibe-2-peks transforms in [ABC+05a, ABC+08]. Both transforms take as input an IBE scheme $IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec)$ and return a PEKS scheme $PEKS = (KeyGen, Td, PEKS, Test)$.

Security of new-ibe-2-peks. Let $IBE$ be the starting IBE scheme and let $PEKS = new-ibe-2-peks(IBE)$ be the resulting PEKS scheme obtained via the new-ibe-2-peks transform in Figure 3.8. As we show in Appendix E if IBE is semantically secure under chosen-identity attacks (IND-CPA, cf. Section 3.2.2), then PEKS is computationally consistent. Further, if IBE is anonymous under adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks (ANO-CPA, cf. Section 3.2.3), then PEKS is also IND-CPA-secure.
Security of bdop-ibe-2-peks. As mentioned above, the PEKS scheme outputted by bdop-ibe-2-peks may not be computationally consistent in cases where the IBE decryption algorithm behaves oddly when the incorrect secret key is used during decryption. However, as we observe in Appendix G, the bdop-ibe-2-peks transform can provide consistency if the starting IBE scheme is robust. More precisely, let IBE denote the starting IBE scheme and let PEKS = bdop-ibe-2-peks(IBE) be the resulting PEKS scheme obtained via the new-ibe-2-peks transform in Figure 3.8. As we show in Appendix G if IBE is weakly robust (WROB-CPA, cf. Section 3.2.4), then PEKS is computationally consistent. Moreover, if IBE is anonymous under adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attacks (ANO-CPA, cf. Section 3.2.3), then PEKS is IND-CPA-secure.

3.6 Further extensions

As the transformation from IBE to PEKS above shows, IBE schemes can be quite useful for the construction of other seemingly unrelated primitives. In [ACF09], Catalano, Fiore, and I exploit yet another property of IBE schemes. More precisely, we propose a methodology to construct verifiable random functions from a class of identity based encryption schemes that we call VRF-suitable. Informally, an IBE is VRF-suitable if it provides what we call unique key derivation (by which the secret key associated with an identity id is uniquely defined when given the public key) and it satisfies an additional property that we call pseudorandom decapsulation. In a nutshell, pseudorandom decapsulation means that if one decrypts a ciphertext C, produced with respect to an identity id, using the decryption key corresponding to any other identity id’ the resulting value looks random to a polynomially bounded observer. Interestingly, we show that most known IBE schemes already achieve pseudorandom decapsulation. Our construction is of interest both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. Indeed, apart from establishing a connection between two apparently unrelated primitives, our methodology is direct in the sense that, in contrast to most previous constructions, it avoids the inefficient Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit transformation.
Conclusion

In this thesis, we explored mechanisms for reducing the amount of trust in third parties based on passwords and identities. In the password-based setting, we presented several key exchange protocols which remain secure in spite of the low entropy of the secret keys used for authentication. In the identity-based setting, we considered new security requirements, such as anonymity and robustness, as well as new extensions allowing senders to have better control over the decryption capabilities of the receiver, such as WIBE and PEKS. While these results contribute significantly to the state of the art, there are still several interesting research directions to be explored in these areas.

In the password-based setting, one important open problem is to design efficient PAKE schemes achieving adaptive security, in which adversaries can corrupt users at any time and learn their internal states. Though the security model achieved by these schemes is more realistic, current adaptively secure PAKE constructions are either too inefficient or only proven secure in idealized models, such as the random oracle model, where certain building blocks such as hash functions are assumed to behave in ideal way. Therefore, it is important to overcome these limitations and design a practical PAKE scheme achieving adaptive security without having to resort to any idealized models.

In addition to adaptive security, another interesting research direction is to design practical PAKE schemes in the group setting which can tolerate network failures and password mistypes and that can remain secure even in the presence of malicious insiders. Currently, the vast majority of the PAKE schemes do not take these cases into account.

In the identity-based setting, one interesting research direction is to reduce the gap between the existing models used in security proofs and the actual environment in which these cryptosystems are deployed. For instance, most of the existing security models assume that no information about the secret key or the randomness used to encrypt the message is leaked during the encryption process. However, it is well known that this is not always true in practice as the adversary may be able to learn partial information about these secrets using different types of side-channel attacks, such as power-consumption, fault, or time analyses. As a result, a cryptographic algorithm which is perfectly secure in theory can be completely insecure in practice if improperly implemented. In order to decrease this gap between theory and practice, it is thus important to design cryptographic schemes which are leakage-resilient in the sense that they remain secure even when the adversary is capable of learning partial information about the secret key or randomness used in these schemes. Although there have been several recent proposals of leakage-resilient identity-based cryptosystems schemes (e.g., [DHLAW10] [LLTV11] [LRVT11]) in the literature, most of these schemes either are not very inefficient or do not take into account all possible sources of side-channel attacks.

Another important direction in the identity-based setting is to design more advanced forms of encryption schemes, allowing for more complex decryption policies. In such encryption schemes, the capability of a receiver to decrypt a ciphertext may depend on the attributes associated with the decryption key and on the policy specified by the ciphertext. It is worth pointing out
that certain forms of advanced encryption schemes already exist in the literature, such as the functional encryption schemes of Lewko et al. [LOS+10], but they usually lack in efficiency or only support limited classes of functions and policies. Hence, designing more efficient functional encryption schemes which allow for more complex decryption policies still remains an important open problem.

Finally, in addition to the settings considered in this thesis, there are other interesting venues for reducing the amount of trust in third parties. Among these, perhaps the most promising direction is to use fully-homomorphic encryption schemes, such as the one by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan in [BGV11], for performing arbitrary computations on encrypted data.
Part II

Personal publications
Books


Refereed journal papers


Refereed international conference papers


Contribution to standards

Part III

Appendix: Articles
Password-Based Cryptography

Appendix A

Simple Password-Based Encrypted Key Exchange Protocols, CTRSA 2005
MICHIEL ABDALLA AND DAVID POINTCHEVAL
This article proposes two simple constructions of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols in the random-oracle model based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Both constructions are among the most efficient password-based authenticated key exchange schemes based on the encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt.

Appendix B

Smooth Projective Hashing for Conditionally Extractable Commitments, CRYPTO 2009
MICHIEL ABDALLA, CÉLINE CHEVALIER, AND DAVID POINTCHEVAL
This article shows how to generalize the password-based authenticated key exchange construction of Gennaro and Lindell so that it achieves adaptive security in the universal composability framework with erasures. The new construction is reasonably efficient and does not rely on random oracles. It also avoids the use of zero-knowledge proofs by building more complex smooth projective hash functions that can be efficiently associated to extractable commitment schemes.

Appendix C

Password-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds, PKC 2006
MICHIEL ABDALLA, EMMANUEL BRESSON, OLIVIER CHEVASSUT, AND DAVID POINTCHEVAL
This article proposes the first provably-secure password-based group key exchange protocol with a constant number of rounds. The new protocol is based on the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange and is very efficient, having low communication and computational costs per user. Its security is proven in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Appendix D

MICHIEL ABDALLA AND DAVID POINTCHEVAL
This article provides the first construction of a constant-round password-based group key exchange protocol whose security proof does not rely on any idealized model. The new construction is based on the Gennaro-Lindell password-based authenticated key exchange construction and on the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange and only assumes the existence of a common reference string. Like the Gennaro-Lindell scheme, it can be instantiated under various computational assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman and quadratic residuosity.
Appendix A

Simple Password-Based Encrypted Key Exchange Protocols

CT-RSA 2005

Abstract: Password-based encrypted key exchange are protocols that are designed to provide pair of users communicating over an unreliable channel with a secure session key even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. In this paper, we present two simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols based on that of Bellovin and Merritt. While one protocol is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, the other enjoys better security properties. Both protocols are as efficient, if not better, as any of the existing encrypted key exchange protocols in the literature, and yet they only require a single random oracle instance. The proof of security for both protocols is in the random oracle model and based on hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. However, some of the techniques that we use are quite different from the usual ones and make use of new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem, which are of independent interest. We also provide concrete relations between the new variants and the standard Diffie-Hellman problem.

A.1 Introduction

Background. Keys exchange protocols are cryptographic primitives used to provide a pair of users communicating over a public unreliable channel with a secure session key. In practice, one can find several flavors of key exchange protocols, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. An example of a popular one is the SIGMA protocol [Kra03] used as the basis for the signature-based modes of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. The setting in which we are interested in this paper is the 2-party symmetric one, in which every pair of users share a secret key. In particular, we consider the scenario in which the secret key is a password.

Password-based Key Exchange. Password-based key exchange protocols assume a more realistic scenario in which secret keys are not uniformly distributed over a large space, but rather chosen from a small set of possible values (a four-digit pin, for example). They also seem more convenient since human-memorable passwords are simpler to use than, for example, having additional cryptographic devices capable of storing high-entropy secret keys. The vast majority
of protocols found in practice do not account, however, for such scenario and are often subject to so-called *dictionary* attacks. Dictionary attacks are attacks in which an adversary tries to break the security of a scheme by a brute-force method, in which it tries all possible combinations of secret keys in a given small set of values (i.e., the dictionary). Even though these attacks are not very effective in the case of high-entropy keys, they can be very damaging when the secret key is a password since the attacker has a non-negligible chance of winning.

To address this problem, several protocols have been designed to be secure even when the secret key is a password. The goal of these protocols is to restrict the adversary’s success to on-line guessing attacks only. In these attacks, the adversary must be present and interact with the system in order to be able to verify whether its guess is correct. The security in these systems usually relies on a policy of invalidating or blocking the use of a password if a certain number of failed attempts has occurred.

**Encrypted Key Exchange.** The seminal work in the area of password-based key exchange is the encrypted key exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [BM92]. In their protocol, two users execute an encrypted version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, in which each flow is encrypted using the password shared between these two users as the symmetric key. Due to the simplicity of their protocol, several other protocols were proposed in the literature based on it [BR00, BCP03, BCP04, KI02, Mac02], each with its own instantiation of the encryption function. Our protocol is also a variation of their EKE protocol.

**Minimizing the Use of Random Oracles.** One of our main goals is to provide schemes that are simple and efficient, but relying as little as possible on random oracles. Ideally, one would want to completely eliminate the need of random oracles as done in the KOY protocol [KOY01]. However, such protocols tend to be less efficient than those based on the EKE protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [BM92].

**Figure A.1: An insecure password-based key exchange protocol.**

| Public information: $G, g, p, M, N$ |
| Secret information: $pw \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ |

- **User A**
  - $x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$; $X \leftarrow g^x$
  - $X^* \leftarrow X \cdot M^{pw}$
  - $X^* \overset{\$}{\rightarrow} Y^*$
  - $SK_A \leftarrow (Y^*/N^{pw})^x$

- **User B**
  - $y \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$; $Y \leftarrow g^y$
  - $Y^* \leftarrow Y \cdot N^{pw}$
  - $SK_B \leftarrow (X^*/M^{pw})^y$

To understand the difficulties involved in the design of protocols with few random oracles, let us consider the extreme case of the protocol in Figure A.1 in which no random oracles are used. Despite being secure against passive attacks, this protocol can be easily broken by an active adversary performing a man-in-the-middle attack. Such an adversary can easily create two different sessions whose session keys are related in a predictable manner. For instance, an adversary can do so by multiplying $X^*$ by $g^r$ for a known value $r$. The relation between the underlying session keys $SK_A$ and $SK_B$ is $SK_B = SK_A \cdot Y^r$. Hence, if the adversary learns the value of these two keys, it can perform an off-line dictionary attack using $Y = (SK_B/SK_A)^{-r}$ and $Y^*$ to recover the password. Moreover, since the adversary can use arbitrary values for $r$, we cannot detect such attacks.

**Protecting against Related Key Attacks.** In order to fix the problem in the protocol pre-
A.1. Introduction

sented in Figure A.1 and prevent the adversary from altering the messages, one may be tempted to use message authentication code (MAC) algorithms for key derivation (e.g., by making the session key equal to $\text{MAC}_{SK_A}(A, B, X^*, Y^*, 0))$ or key confirmation (e.g., by computing tags via $\text{MAC}_{SK_A}(A, B, X^*, Y^*, 1))$. In fact, this is the approach used by Kobara and Imai in the construction of their password-authenticated key exchange protocol [KI02]. Unfortunately, this approach does not quite work.

Let us now explain the main problems with using MACs. First, the standard notion of security for MACs does not imply security against related key attacks. Hence, new and stronger security notions are required. Second, such new security notions may have to consider adversaries which are given access to a related-key tag-generation oracle. These are oracles that are capable of generating tags on messages under related keys, where the related key function is also passed as a parameter. This is actually the approach used in [KI02]. However, it is not clear whether such MACs can even be built. Such security notion, for instance, may completely rule out the possibility of using block-cipher-based MAC algorithms since similar security requirements in the context of block ciphers are known to be impossible to achieve [BK03]. Perhaps, hash-based MAC algorithms may be able to meet these goals, but that does not seem likely without resorting to random oracles, which would defeat the purpose of using MACs in the first place.

Simple constructions. In this paper, we deal with the problem of related-key attacks by using a single instance of a random oracle in the key derivation process. We present two simple constructions, whose only difference to one another is the presence of the password in the key derivation function. The presence of the password in the key derivation function is an important aspect, for example, when one wants to consider extensions to the distributed case, where each server only holds a share of password (see [DG03]).

Surprisingly, the techniques that we use to prove the security of these two constructions are quite different and so are the exact security results. While we are able to provide a tight security reduction for the scheme which includes the password in the key derivation phase, the same cannot be said about the other scheme, for which we can only prove its security in the non-concurrent scenario. However, the techniques that we use to prove the security of the latter are quite interesting and make use of new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem.

New Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem that we introduce are called Chosen-Basis Diffie-Hellman assumptions due to the adversary’s capability to choose some of the bases used in the definition of the problem. These assumptions are particular interesting when considered in the context of password-based protocols and we do expect to find applications for them other than the ones in this paper. Despite being apparently stronger than the standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions, we prove that this is not the case by providing concrete reductions to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.

Contributions. In this paper, we address the issue of constructing efficient password-based encrypted key exchange protocols. Our main contributions are as follows.

Simple and efficient constructions in random oracle model. In this paper, we propose two new password-based encrypted key exchange protocols, called SPAKE1 and SPAKE2, both of which can be proven secure based on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Both protocols are comparable in efficiency to any of the existing EKE protocols, if not more efficient, and they only require one random oracle instance. This is contrast with existing EKE constructions, which require either a larger number of random oracle instances or additional ideal models, such as the ideal cipher model. Moreover, neither SPAKE1 nor SPAKE2 requires full domain hash functions or ideal ciphers onto a group, which are hard to implement efficiently. While one protocol is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, the other enjoys better security properties.
NEW DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTIONS. In proving the security of our protocols, we make use of new variations of the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, called chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions. These new assumptions are of independent interest and we do expect to find new applications for it other than the ones in this paper. Reductions between the problems underlying the new assumptions and the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption are also provided.

Related work. Password-based authenticated key exchange has been extensively studied in the last few years [BPR00, BMP00, BCP03, BCP04, GL03, GL01, HK99, KOY01, MPS00, MSJ02, DG03] with the majority of them being submitted for inclusion in the IEEE P1363.2 standard [IEE04], a standard dealing with the issues of password-authenticated key agreement (e.g. EKE) and password-authenticated key retrieval. With the exception of [GL03, GL01, KOY01], all of these protocols are only proven secure in the random oracle model.

Perhaps, the related work that is closest to ours is the pretty-simple password-authenticated key exchange protocol of Kobara and Imai [KI02], whose proof of security is claimed to be in the “standard” model. Their protocol consists of EKE phase that is similar to the one used in our protocols followed by an authentication phase based on message authentication code (MAC) algorithms. However, the security model which they use is different from the standard one and hence their result only applies to their specific model. Moreover, as we pointed out above, their protocol needs a stronger security notion for the MAC algorithm and it is not clear whether such MACs can be built without resorting to random oracles, which would contradict their claims.

Organization. In Section A.2 we recall the security model for password-based authenticated key exchange. Next, in Section A.3 we present our new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem and their relations to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Section A.4 then introduces the first of our password-based encrypted key exchange protocols, called SPAKE1, along with its proof of security. SPAKE1 is in fact based on one of the variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem introduced in Section A.3. Our second protocol, SPAKE2, is then presented in Section A.4 along with its security claims. In the appendix, we present proofs for several lemmas in Section A.3 as well as the proof of security for SPAKE2.

A.2 Security model for password-based key exchange

We now recall the security model for password-based authenticated key exchange of Bellare et al. [BPR00].

Protocol participants. Each participant in the password-based key exchange is either a client $C \in C$ or a server $S \in S$. The set of all users or participants $U$ is the union $C \cup S$.

Long-lived keys. Each client $C \in C$ holds a password $pw_C$. Each server $S \in S$ holds a vector $pw_S = \langle pw_S[C] \rangle_{C \in C}$ with an entry for each client, where $pw_S[C]$ is the transformed-password, as defined in [BPR00]. In this paper, we only consider the symmetric model, in which $pw_S[C] = pw_C$, but they may be different in general. $pw_C$ and $pw_S$ are also called the long-lived keys of client $C$ and server $S$.

Protocol execution. The interaction between an adversary $A$ and the protocol participants occurs only via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. During the execution, the adversary may create several instances of a participant. While in a concurrent model, several instances may be active at any given time, only one active user instance is allowed for a given intended partner and password in a non-concurrent model. Let $U_i^t$ denote the instance $i$ of a participant $U$ and let $b$ be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The query types available to the adversary are as follows:
A.2. Security model for password-based key exchange

- **Execute**(*C*, *S*): This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest executions between a client instance *C* and a server instance *S*. The output of this query consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.

- **Send**(*U*, *m*): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may tamper with the message being sent over the public channel. The output of this query is the message that the participant instance *U* would generate upon receipt of message *m*.

- **Reveal**(*U*): This query models the misuse of session keys by a user. If a session key is not defined for instance *U* or if a Test query was asked to either *U* or to its partner, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key held by the instance *U*.

- **Test**(*U*): This query tries to capture the adversary’s ability to tell apart a real session key from a random one. If no session key for instance *U* is defined, then return the undefined symbol ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key for instance *U* if *b* = 1 or a random key of the same size if *b* = 0.

**Notation.** Following [BR94b, BR95], an instance *U* is said to be **opened** if a query Reveal(*U*) has been made by the adversary. We say an instance *U* is **unopened** if it is not opened. We say an instance *U* has **accepted** if it goes into an accept mode after receiving the last expected protocol message.

**Partnering.** The definition of partnering uses the notion of session identifications (sid). More specifically, two instances *U* and *U* are said to be partners if the following conditions are met: (1) Both *U* and *U* accept; (2) Both *U* and *U* share the same session identifications; (3) The partner identification for *U* is *U* and vice-versa; and (4) No instance other than *U* and *U* accepts with a partner identification equal to *U* or *U*. In practice, the sid could be taken to be the partial transcript of the conversation between the client and the server instances before the acceptance.

**Freshness.** The notion of freshness is defined to avoid cases in which adversary can trivially break the security of the scheme. The goal is to only allow the adversary to ask Test queries to fresh oracle instances. More specifically, we say an instance *U* is **fresh** if it has accepted and if both *U* and its partner are unopened.

**Semantic security.** Consider an execution of the key exchange protocol *P* by an adversary *A*, in which the latter is given access to the Reveal, Execute, Send, and Test oracles and asks a single Test query to a fresh instance, and outputs a guess bit *b*′. Such an adversary is said to win the experiment defining the semantic security if *b*′ = *b*, where *b* is the hidden bit used by the Test oracle.

Let **Succ** denote the event in which the adversary is successful. The **ake-advantage** of an adversary *A* in violating the semantic security of the protocol *P* and the **ad**-function of the protocol *P*, when passwords are drawn from a dictionary *D*, are respectively

\[
\text{Adv}^{ake}_{P,D}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{Succ}] - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Adv}^{ad}_{P,D}(t, R) = \max_{A} \{ \text{Adv}^{ake}_{P,D}(A) \},
\]

where maximum is over all *A* with time-complexity at most *t* and using resources at most *R* (such as the number of queries to its oracles). The definition of time-complexity that we use henceforth is the usual one, which includes the maximum of all execution times in the experiments defining the security plus the code size [ABR01].
A.3 Diffie-Hellman assumptions

In this section, we recall the definitions for the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and introduce some new variants of it, which we use in the proof of security of simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols. We also present some relations between these assumptions. In doing so, we borrow some of the notations in [ABR01].

A.3.1 Definitions

**Notation.** In the following, we assume a finite cyclic group $G$ of prime order $p$ generated by an element $g$. We also call the tuple $G = (G, g, p)$ the represented group.

**Computational Diffie-Hellman:** CDH. The CDH assumption states that given $g^u$ and $g^v$, where $u$ and $v$ were drawn at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to compute $g^{uv}$. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption it might be possible for the adversary to compute something interesting about $g^{uv}$ given $g^u$ and $g^v$.

This can be defined more precisely by considering an Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A)$, in which we select two values $u$ and $v$ in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, compute $U = g^u$, and $V = g^v$, and then give both $U$ and $V$ to an adversary $A$. Let $Z$ be the output of $A$. Then, the Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A)$ outputs 1 if $Z = g^{uv}$ and 0 otherwise. Then, we define advantage of $A$ in violating the CDH assumption as $\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A) = 1]$ and the advantage function of the group, $\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(t)$, as the maximum value of $\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A)$ over all $A$ with time-complexity at most $t$.

**Chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman:** CCDH. The chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem is a variation of the CDH problem. It considers an adversary that is given three random elements $M$, $N$ and $X$ in $G$ and whose goal is to find a triple of values $(Y, u, v)$ such that $u = \text{CDH}(X, Y)$ and $v = \text{CDH}(X/M, Y/N)$. The idea behind this assumption is that the adversary may be able to successfully compute either $u$ (e.g., by choosing $Y = g$ and $u = X$) or $v$ (e.g., by choosing $Y = g \cdot N$ and $v = X/M$), but not both. In fact, as we prove later, solving this problem is equivalent to solving the underlying computational Diffie-Hellman problem in $G$. We now proceed with the formal definition.

**Definition A.3.1 [CCDH]** Let $G = (G, g, p)$ be a represented group and let $A$ be an adversary. Consider the following experiment, where $M$, $N$ and $X$ are elements in $G$,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Experiment } &\text{Exp}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A, M, N, X) \\
(Y, u, v) &\leftarrow A(M, N, X) \\
u' &\leftarrow \text{CDH}(X, Y) \\
v' &\leftarrow \text{CDH}(X/M, Y/N) \\
\text{if } u = u' \text{ and } v = v' \text{ then } b &\leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b \leftarrow 0 \\
\text{return } b
\end{align*}
\]

Now define the advantage of $A$ in violating the CCDH assumption with respect to $(M, N, X)$, the advantage of $A$, and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A, M, N, X) &= \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A, M, N, X) = 1] \\
\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A) &= \Pr_{M,N,X}[\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A, M, N, X)] \\
\text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(t) &= \max_{A} \{ \text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(A) \},
\end{align*}
\]

where the maximum is over all $A$ with time-complexity at most $t$. ◊
A.3. Diffie-Hellman assumptions

Password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman: PCCDH. The password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem is a variation of the chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman described above that is more appropriate to the password-based setting. The inputs to the problem and the adversarial goals are also somewhat different in this case so let us explain it.

Let \( D = \{1, \ldots, n\} \) be a dictionary containing \( n \) equally likely password values and let \( \mathcal{P} \) be a public injective map \( \mathcal{P} \) from \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \) into \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). An example of an admissible map \( \mathcal{P} \) is the one in which \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \) is mapped into the subset \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \) of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). Now let us consider an adversary that runs in two stages. In the first stage, the adversary is given as input three random elements \( M, N \) and \( X \) in \( G \) as well as the public injective map \( \mathcal{P} \) and it outputs a value \( Y \) in \( G \). Next, we choose a random password \( k \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \) and give it to the adversary. We also compute the mapping \( r = \mathcal{P}(k) \) of the password \( k \). The goal of the adversary in this second stage is to output a value \( K \) such that \( K = \text{CDH}(X/M', Y/N') \).

Note that an adversary that correctly guesses the password \( k \) in its first stage can easily solve this problem by computing \( r = \mathcal{P}(k) \) and making, for instance, \( Y = g \cdot N' \) and \( K = X/M' \). Since we assume \( k \) to be chosen uniformly at random from the dictionary \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \), an adversary that chooses to guess the password and follow this strategy can succeed with probability \( 1/n \).

The idea behind the password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is that no adversary can do much better than the adversary described above. In fact, as we later prove, this should be the case as long as the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in \( G \). We now proceed with the formal definition.

**Definition A.3.2 [PCCDH]** Let \( G = (G, g, p) \) be a represented group and let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary. Consider the following experiment, where \( M \) and \( N \) are elements in \( G \), and \( \mathcal{P} \) is a public injective map from \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \) into \( \mathbb{Z}_p \),

\[
\text{Experiment } \text{Exp}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, M, N, X', \mathcal{P}) = \Pr[(Y', st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{find}, M, N, X', \mathcal{P}) \\
\quad \quad k \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{1, \ldots, n\}; \quad r \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(k) \\
\quad \quad (K) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{guess}, st, k) \\
\quad \quad X \leftarrow X'/M' \quad ; \quad Y \leftarrow Y'/N' \\
\text{if } K = \text{CDH}(X, Y) \text{ then } b \leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b \leftarrow 0 \\
\text{return } b]
\]

Now define the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \) in violating the PCCDH assumption with respect to \( (M, N, X', \mathcal{P}) \), the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \), and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:

\[
\text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, M, N, X', \mathcal{P}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, M, N, X', \mathcal{P}) = 1] \\
\text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = \Pr_{M,N,X'}[\text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, M, N, X', \mathcal{P})] \\
\text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(t, \mathcal{P}) = \max_{\mathcal{A}} \text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}),
\]

where the maximum is over all \( \mathcal{A} \) with time-complexity at most \( t \). \( \Diamond \)

Set password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman: S-PCCDH. The set password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem (S-PCCDH) is a multidimensional variation of the password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem described above, in which the adversary is allowed to return not one key but a list of keys at the end of the second stage. In this case, the adversary is considered successful if the list of keys contains the correct value. We now proceed with the formal definition.
Definition A.3.3 [S-PCCDH] Let $G = (G, g, p)$ be a represented group and let $A$ be an adversary. Consider the following experiment, where $M$ and $N$ are elements in $G$, and $P$ is a public injective map from $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ into $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

Experiment $\text{Exp}^{s\text{-pccdh}}_{G,n,s}(A, M, N, X', P)$

$$(Y', st) \leftarrow A(\text{find}, M, N, X', P)$$

$$k \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\} ; r \leftarrow P(k)$$

$$(S) \leftarrow A(\text{guess}, st, k)$$

$$X \leftarrow X' / M^r \quad Y \leftarrow Y' / N^r$$

if $\text{CDH}(X, Y) \in S$ and $|S| \leq s$ then $b \leftarrow 1$ else $b \leftarrow 0$

return $b$

As above, we define the advantage of $A$ in violating the S-PCCDH assumption with respect to $(M, N, X', P)$, the advantage of $A$, and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_{G,n,s}^{s\text{-pccdh}}(A, M, N, X', P) = \Pr[\text{Exp}^{s\text{-pccdh}}_{G,n,s}(A, M, N, X', P) = 1]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{G,n,s}^{s\text{-pccdh}}(A, P) = \Pr_{M,N,X'} \left[ \text{Adv}_{G,n,s}^{s\text{-pccdh}}(A, M, N, X', P) \right]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{G,n,s}^{s\text{-pccdh}}(t, P) = \max_{A} \left\{ \text{Adv}_{G,n,s}^{s\text{-pccdh}}(A, P) \right\},$$

where the maximum is over all $A$ with time-complexity at most $t$.

A.3.2 Some relations

In this section, we first provide two relations between the above problems. The first result is meaningful for small $n$ (polynomially bounded in the asymptotic framework). The second one considers larger dictionaries. Then, we show that these assumptions are implied by the classical computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, we also prove that the most general assumption is also implied by the classical computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Relations between the PCCDH and CCDH problems. The following two lemmas present relations between the PCCDH and CCDH problems. The first lemma, whose proof can be found in Appendix A.7, is oriented to the case of small dictionaries, for which $n$ is polynomially-bounded. However, if $n$ is large, super-polynomial in the asymptotic framework, or more concretely $n \geq 8/\epsilon$, then one should use the second lemma, whose proof can be easily derived from the proof of the first lemma (see Appendix A.7).

Lemma A.3.4 Let $G = (G, g, p)$ be a represented group, let $n$ be an integer, and let $P$ be a public injective map from $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ into $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

$$\frac{2}{n} \geq \text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(t, P) \geq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{cdh}}(2t + 3\tau) \geq \frac{n}{128} \times \epsilon^3.$$ 

Lemma A.3.5 Let $G = (G, g, p)$ be a represented group, let $n$ be an integer, and let $P$ be a public injective map from $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ into $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

$$\text{Adv}_{G,n}^{\text{pccdh}}(t, P) \geq \epsilon \geq \frac{8}{n} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{cdh}}(2t + 3\tau) \geq \frac{\epsilon^2}{32},$$

where $\tau$ denotes the time for an exponentiation in $G$. 

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Relation between the CCDH and CDH problems. The following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A.7, shows that the CCDH and CDH problems are indeed equivalent.

**Lemma A.3.6** Let \( G = (G, g, p) \) be a represented group.

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{ccdh}}^G(t) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(t + 2\tau),
\]

where \( \tau \) denotes the time for an exponentiation in \( G \).

Relation between the S-PCCDH and CDH problems. The following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A.7, gives a precise relation between the S-PCCDH and CDH problems.

**Lemma A.3.7** Let \( G = (G, g, p) \) be a represented group, let \( n \) and \( s \) be integers, and let \( \mathcal{P} \) be a public injective map from \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \) into \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{s-pccdh}}^{G, n, s}(t, \mathcal{P}) \geq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon \implies \text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(t') \geq \frac{n^2 \epsilon^6}{2^{14}} - \frac{2s^4}{p},
\]

where \( t' = 4t + (18 + 2s)\tau \) and \( \tau \) denotes the time for an exponentiation in \( G \). More concretely,

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{s-pccdh}}^{G, n, s}(t, \mathcal{P}) \geq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon \geq \frac{1}{n} \cdot \left(1 + \frac{8(n\epsilon)^{2/3}}{p^{1/6}}\right) \implies \text{Adv}_{\text{cdh}}^G(t') \geq \frac{n^2 \epsilon^6}{2^{15}}.
\]

A.4 SPAKE1: a simple non-concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange

We now introduce our first protocol, SPAKE1, which is a non-concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange protocol, based on the multi-dimensional version of password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem, S-PCCDH.

A.4.1 Description

SPAKE1 is a variation of the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [BM92], in which we replace the encryption function \( E_{\text{pw}}(.) \) with a simple one-time pad function. More specifically, whenever a user \( A \) wants to send the encryption of a value \( X \in G \) to a user \( B \), it does so by computing \( X \cdot M^{\text{pw}} \), where \( M \) is an element in \( G \) associated with user \( A \) and the password \( \text{pw} \) is assumed to be in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). The session identification is defined as the transcript of the conversation between \( A \) and \( B \), and the session key is set to be the hash (random oracle) of the session identification, the user identities, and the Diffie-Hellman key. The password \( \text{pw} \) is not an input to the hash function. The full description of SPAKE1 is given in Figure A.2.

**Correctness.** The correctness of our protocol follows from the fact that, in an honest execution of the protocol, \( K_A = K_B = g^{xy} \).

A.4.2 Security

As Theorem A.4.1 states, our non-concurrent password-based key exchange protocol is secure in the random oracle model as long as we believe that the S-PCCDH problem is hard in \( G \).
Chapter A. Simple Password-Based Encrypted Key Exchange Protocols

Public information: \( G, g, p, M, N, H \)

Secret information: \( pw \in \mathbb{Z}_p \)

User A

\[
\begin{align*}
x & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; X \leftarrow g^x \\
X^* & \leftarrow X \cdot Mp^w \\
K_A & \leftarrow (Y^*/Mp^w)^x \\
SK_A & \leftarrow H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, K_A)
\end{align*}
\]

User B

\[
\begin{align*}
y & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; Y \leftarrow g^y \\
Y^* & \leftarrow Y \cdot Np^w \\
K_B & \leftarrow (X^*/Mp^w)^y \\
SK_B & \leftarrow H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, K_B)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure A.2: SPAKE1: a simple non-concurrent password-based key exchange protocol.

**Theorem A.4.1** Let \( G \) be a represent group and let \( D \) be a uniformly distributed dictionary of size \( |D| \). Let SPAKE1 describe the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol associated with these primitives as defined in Figure A.2. Then, for any numbers \( t, q_{\text{start}}, q^A_{\text{send}}, q^B_{\text{send}}, q_H, q_{\text{exe}} \),

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ake}}_{\text{SPAKE}, D}(t, q_{\text{start}}, q^A_{\text{send}}, q^B_{\text{send}}, q_H, q_{\text{exe}}) \\
\leq 2 \cdot (q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}}) \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{s-pccdh}}_{G, |D|, q_H}(t', \mathcal{P}) + \\
2 \cdot \left( \frac{q_{\text{exe}} + q_{\text{send}}}{2p} \right)^2 + q_H \text{Adv}^{\text{cdh}}_{G}(t + 2q_{\text{exe}} \tau + 3\tau),
\]

where \( q_H \) represents the number of queries to the \( H \) oracle; \( q_{\text{exe}} \) represents the number of queries to the \( \text{Execute} \) oracle; \( q_{\text{start}} \) and \( q^A_{\text{send}} \) represent the number of queries to the \( \text{Send} \) oracle with respect to the initiator \( A; q^B_{\text{send}} \) represents the number of queries to the \( \text{Send} \) oracle with respect to the responder \( B; q_{\text{send}} = q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{start}}; t' = t + O(q_{\text{start}} \tau) \); and \( \tau \) is the time to compute one exponentiation in \( G \).

Since the S-PCCDH problem can be reduced to the CDH problem according to Lemma A.4.1, it follows that SPAKE1 is a secure non-concurrent password-based key exchange protocol in the random oracle model as long as the CDH problem is hard in \( G \), as stated in Corollary A.4.2.

**Corollary A.4.2** Let \( G \) be a represent group and let \( D \) be a uniformly distributed dictionary of size \( |D| \). Let SPAKE1 describe the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol associated with these primitives as defined in Figure A.2. Then, for any numbers \( t, q_{\text{start}}, q^A_{\text{send}}, q^B_{\text{send}}, q_H, q_{\text{exe}} \),

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ake}}_{\text{SPAKE}, D}(t, q_{\text{start}}, q^A_{\text{send}}, q^B_{\text{send}}, q_H, q_{\text{exe}}) \\
\leq 2 \cdot \left( \frac{q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}}}{|D|} \right)^2 + \frac{2^{14}}{|D|^2} \text{Adv}^{\text{cdh}}_{G}(t') + \frac{2^{15}q^4_H}{|D|^2p} + \\
2 \cdot \left( \frac{q_{\text{exe}} + q_{\text{send}}}{2p} \right)^2 \text{Adv}^{\text{cdh}}_{G}(t + 2q_{\text{exe}} \tau + 3\tau),
\]

where \( t' = 4t + O((q_{\text{start}} + q_H) \tau) \) and the other parameters are defined as in Theorem A.4.1.
A.4. **SPAKE1**: a simple non-concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H oracle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– On hash query $H(q)$ (resp. $H'(q)$) for which there exists a record $(q, r)$ in the list $\Lambda_H$ (resp. $\Lambda_H'$), return $r$. Otherwise, choose an element $r \in {0, 1}^k$, add the record $(q, r)$ to the list $\Lambda_H$ (resp. $\Lambda_H'$), and return $r$.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A.3: Simulation of random oracles $H$ and $H'$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Send queries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| – On a query $\text{Send}(A^i, \text{start})$, assuming $A^i$ is in the correct state, we proceed as follows:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item if $\text{ActiveSessionIndex} \neq 0$ then abort $A^i$
  \end{itemize}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item $\cdot \leftarrow Z_p$; $\Theta \leftarrow g^\theta$; $\Theta^* \leftarrow \Theta \cdot M^{pw}$
  \item return $(A, \Theta^*)$
  \end{itemize}

– On a query $\text{Send}(B^i, (A, \Theta^*))$, assuming $B^i$ is in the correct state, we proceed as follows:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item $\phi \leftarrow Z_p$; $\Phi \leftarrow g^\phi$; $\Phi^* \leftarrow \Phi \cdot N^{pw}$
  \item $K \leftarrow (\Theta^*/M^{pw})^\phi$
  \item $SK \leftarrow H(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*, K)$
  \item return $(B, \Phi^*)$
  \end{itemize}

– On a query $\text{Send}(A^i, (B, \Phi^*))$, assuming $A^i$ is in the correct state, we proceed as follows:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item $K \leftarrow (\Phi^*/N^{pw})^\theta$
  \item $SK \leftarrow H(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*, K)$
  \item $\text{ActiveSessionIndex} = 0$
  \end{itemize} |

Figure A.4: Simulation of $\text{Send}$ oracle query.

**Proof idea.** Let $A$ be an adversary against the semantic security of **SPAKE**. The idea is to use $A$ to build adversaries for each of the underlying primitives in such a way that if $A$ succeeds in breaking the semantic security of **SPAKE**, then at least one of these adversaries succeeds in breaking the security of an underlying primitive. Our proof consists of a sequence of hybrid experiments, starting with the real attack and ending in an experiment in which the adversary’s advantage is 0, and for which we can bound the difference in the adversary’s advantage between any two consecutive experiments.

**Proof of Theorem [A.4.1]** Our proof uses a sequence of hybrid experiments, the first of which corresponds to the actual attack. For each experiment $\text{Exp}_n$, we define an event $\text{Succ}_n$ corresponding to the case in which the adversary correctly guesses the bit $b$ involved in the $\text{Test}$ query.

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_0$.** This experiment corresponds to the real attack, which starts by choosing a random password $pw$. By definition, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SPAKE}}^\text{ake}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{Succ}_0] - 1 \quad (A.1)$$

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_1$.** In this experiment, we simulate the $\text{Execute}$, $\text{Reveal}$, and $\text{Send}$ oracles as in the real attack (see Figure A.4 and Figure A.5), after having chosen a random password $pw$. One can easily see that this experiment is perfectly indistinguishable from the real experiment. Hence,

$$\Pr[\text{Succ}_1] = \Pr[\text{Succ}_0] \quad (A.2)$$

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_2$.** In this experiment, we simulate all oracles as in Experiment $\text{Exp}_1$, except that we halt all executions in which a collision occurs in the transcript $((A, X^*), (B, Y^*))$. Since either $X^*$ or $Y^*$ was simulated and thus chosen uniformly at random, the probability of
collisions in the transcripts is at most \( (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{exe}})^2 / (2p) \), according to the birthday paradox. Consequently,

\[
|\text{Pr}[\text{SUCC}_2] - \text{Pr}[\text{SUCC}_1]| \leq \frac{(q_{\text{exe}} + q_{\text{send}})^2}{2p} \tag{A.3}
\]

**Experiment Exp\textsubscript{3}.** In this experiment, we replace the random oracle \( H \) by a secret one, for computing \( SK_A \) and \( SK_B \) for all sessions generated via an Execute oracle query. As the following lemma shows, the difference between the current experiment and the previous one is negligible as long as the CDH assumption holds. More precisely, we use a private random oracle \( H' \), and in the Execute oracle queries, one gets \( SK_A, SK_B \leftarrow H'(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*) \).

**Lemma A.4.3** \( |\text{Pr}[\text{SUCC}_3] - \text{Pr}[\text{SUCC}_2]| \leq q_H \cdot \text{Adv}^\text{cdh}_G(t + 2q_{\text{exe}}\tau + 3\tau) \).

**Proof:** The proof of Lemma A.4.3 uses the random self-reducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Indeed, the only way for an execution to be altered by the above modification is if the adversary directly asks for \( H(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*, K) \), which will output something different from \( H'(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*) \), the answer of a Reveal query. But let us simulate the Execute oracle with a Diffie-Hellman instance \( (A, B) \), and thus \( \Theta \leftarrow A \cdot g^\theta \) and \( \Phi \leftarrow B \cdot g^\phi \). As a consequence, the above event means that \( K = \text{CDH}(\Theta, \Phi) = \text{CDH}(A, B) \times A^\theta \times B^\phi \times g^{\phi\theta} \) is in the list of the queries asked to \( H \): a random guess leads to \( \text{CDH}(A, B) \).

**Experiment Exp\textsubscript{4}.** The goal of this experiment is to bound the advantage of the adversary during active attacks, in which the adversary has possibly generated the input of a Send oracle. To achieve this goal, we change the simulation of the Send oracle so that its output is chosen uniformly at random and independently of the password. The session key associated with each oracle is a bit string of appropriate length chosen uniformly at random and independently of input being provided to the Send oracle. The exact simulation of the Send oracle is as follows:

- On a query of type \((A^i, \text{start})\), we reply with \((A, X^* = g^{x^*})\) for a random \( x^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), if \( A^i \) is in the correct state. If another concurrent session already exists for user \( A \), then we also terminate that session.
- On a query of type \((B^i, (A, X^*))\), we reply with \((B, Y^* = g^{y^*})\) for a random \( y^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and we set the session key \( SK_B \) to \( H'(A, B, X^*, Y^*) \), if \( B^i \) is in the correct state.
On a query of type \((A^i, (B, Y^*))\), we set the session key \(SK_A\) to \(H(A, B, X^*, Y^*)\), if \(A^i\) is in the correct state.

As the following lemma shows, the adversary cannot do much better than simply guessing the password when distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one.

**Lemma A.4.4** \(\left| \Pr[\text{Succ}_4] − \Pr[\text{Succ}_3] \right| \leq (q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}}) \cdot \text{Adv}^{p\text{-ccdh}}_{G,|D|,q_H}(t', P)\), where \(t' = t + O(q_{\text{start}} \tau)\).

**Proof:** The proof of this lemma is based on a sequence of \(q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}} + 1\) hybrid experiments \(\text{Hybrid}_{3,j}\), where \(j\) is an index between 0 and \(q_{\text{AB}} = q^A_{\text{send}} + q^B_{\text{send}}\). Let \(i\) be a counter for number of queries of the form \((B^k, (A, X^*))\) or \((A^k, (B, Y^*))\). That is, we do not count start queries (we do not increment this counter). We define Experiment \(\text{Hybrid}_{3,j}\) as follows:

- If \(i \leq j\), then we processes the current \(\text{Send}\) query as in Experiment \(\text{Exp}_4\).
- If \(i > j\), then we processes the current \(\text{Send}\) query as in Experiment \(\text{Exp}_3\).

It is clear from the above definition that experiments \(\text{Hybrid}_{3,0}\) and \(\text{Hybrid}_{3,q_{\text{AB}}}\) are equivalent to experiments \(\text{Exp}_3\) and \(\text{Exp}_4\), respectively. Now let \(P_j\) denote the probability of event \(\text{Succ}\) in Experiment \(\text{Hybrid}_{3,j}\). It follows that \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_3] = P_0\) and \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_4] = P_{q_{\text{AB}}}\). Moreover,

\[
\left| \Pr[\text{Succ}_4] − \Pr[\text{Succ}_3] \right| \leq \sum_{j=1}^{q_{\text{AB}}} |P_j − P_{j-1}| .
\]

The lemma will follow easily from bounding \(|P_j − P_{j-1}|\). In order to so, consider the following algorithm \(D_j\) for the S-PCCDH problem in \(G\).

**Algorithm \(D_j\).** Let \(U = g^u\), \(V = g^v\), and \(W = g^w\) be random elements in \(G\) and let \(P\) be any injective map from \(\{1, \ldots, n\}\) into \(\mathbb{Z}_p\). \(D_j\) starts running \(\mathcal{A}\), simulating all its oracles. The \(\text{Reveal, Execute, and Test oracles are simulated as in Experiment } \text{Exp}_3\). The \(\text{Send}\) oracle is simulated as follows. Let \(i\) be the index of the current \(\text{Send}\) query.

- If the \(\text{Send}\) query is of the form \((A^i, \text{start})\),
  - if \(i \leq j\), then \(D_j\) replies with \((A, X^* = WG^{*v})\) for a random \(X^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p\), if \(A^i\) is in the correct state. If another concurrent session already exists for user \(A\), then \(D_j\) also terminates that session.
  - if \(i > j\), then \(D_j\) processes it as in Experiment \(\text{Exp}_3\).
- If the query is of the form \((B^k, (A, X^*))\),
  - if \(i < j\), then \(D_j\) processes it as in Experiment \(\text{Exp}_4\).
  - if \(i = j\), then \(D_j\) replies with \((B, Y^* = W)\). It also returns \((st, Y' = X^*)\) as the output of its \(\text{find}\) stage and waits for the input \((st, k)\) of the \(\text{guess}\) stage. It then sets the password \(pw\) shared between \(A\) and \(B\) to \(P(k)\) and the session key \(SK_B\) to \(H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, K_B)\), where \(K_B = (X^*/V^{pw})^{u−u^pw}\). We note that \(st\) should contain all the necessary information for \(D_j\) to continue the execution of \(\mathcal{A}\) and the simulation of its oracles in the \(\text{guess}\) stage. Let this be \(\text{Case } B\).
  - if \(i > j\), then \(D_j\) processes it as in Experiment \(\text{Exp}_3\).
- If the \(\text{Send}\) query is of the form \((A^k, (B, Y^*))\),

\[ \text{— 71 —} \]
### Probability analysis.

Let AskH represent the event in which the adversary asks for \( H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, K) \), where \( K = \text{CDH}(X^*/U^{pw}, Y^*/V^{pw}) \) and either \( X^* \) or \( Y^* \) is involved in the crucial \( j \)-th query. We first observe that experiments \( \text{Hybrid}_{3,j-1} \) and \( \text{Hybrid}_{3,j} \) are identical if event AskH does not happen. Therefore, it follows that the probability difference \( |P_j - P_{j-1}| \) is at most \( \Pr[\text{AskH}] \).

However, whenever event AskH happens, we know that the list of queries asked to \( H \) contains the key \( K = \text{CDH}(X^*/U^{pw}, Y^*/V^{pw}) \) involved in the crucial query, and thus \( D_j \) will be able to successfully use \( A \) to help it solve the S-PCCDH problem. This is because \( K_A \) (Case A) or \( K_B \) (Case B) can be used to compute the solution \( \text{CDH}(W/U^{pw}, Y'/V^{pw}) \) for the S-PCCDH problem as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
K_A &= \text{CDH}(Y^*/V^{pw}, Wg^{x^*}/U^{pw}) = \text{CDH}(W/U^{pw}, Y'/V^{pw}) \times (Y'/V^{pw})^{x^*} \\
K_B &= \text{CDH}(X^*/V^{pw}, W/U^{pw}) = \text{CDH}(W/U^{pw}, Y'/V^{pw})
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, the list of candidates \( K'_{1}, \ldots, K'_{q_H} \) outputted by \( D_j \) should contain the solution for the S-PCCDH problem whenever AskH happens. Hence, \( \Pr[\text{AskH}] \) is less than or equal to the success probability of \( D_j \). The lemma follows easily from the fact that \( D_j \) has time-complexity at most \( t' \). \[\square\]

### A.5 SPAKE2: a simple concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange

We now introduce our second protocol, SPAKE2, which is a concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange protocol, based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, CDH.
A.5. Description

SPAKE2 is a also variation of the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] and is almost exactly like SPAKE1. The only difference between the two is in the key derivation function, which also includes the password $pw$. More specifically, the session key in SPAKE2 is set to be the hash (random oracle) of the session identification, the user identities, the Diffie-Hellman key, and the password. In other words, 

$$SK \leftarrow H(A, B, X^*, Y^*, pw, K).$$

The session identification is still defined as the transcript of the conversation between $A$ and $B$.

A.5.2 Security

As the following theorem states, our concurrent password-based key exchange protocol is secure in the random oracle model as long as the CDH problem is hard in $G$.

**Theorem A.5.1** Let $G$ be a represent group and let $D$ be a uniformly distributed dictionary of size $|D|$. Let SPAKE2 describe the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol associated with these primitives as defined in Section A.5.1. Then, for any numbers $t$, $q_{start}$, $q_{send}^A$, $q_{send}^B$, $q_H$, $q_{exe}$,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SPAKE2},D}^{\text{ake}} (t, q_{start}, q_{send}^A, q_{send}^B, q_H, q_{exe}) \leq 2 \cdot \left( \frac{q_{send}^A + q_{send}^B}{n} + \frac{(q_{exe} + q_{send})^2}{2p} \right) + 2 \cdot (q_H \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{cdh}} (t + 2q_{exe}, 3\tau) + q_H^2 \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{cdh}} (t + 3\tau)),$$

where the parameters are defined as in Theorem A.4.1.

**Proof of Theorem A.5.1** The proof of security for SPAKE2 also uses a hybrid argument consisting of a sequence of experiments, the first of which corresponds to the actual attack. Since the proof of security for SPAKE2 is similar to that of SPAKE1, we only state the differences here.

In Exp$_1$, we need to change the simulation of oracles in order to allow concurrent executions and to account for the presence of the password in the key derivation function. The claims remain unchanged.

In Exp$_2$, no changes are required and thus the claims remain unchanged.

In Exp$_3$, the only change comes from the fact the password is part of the input of $H$ but not of $H'$. This change, however, does not affect the claims.

In Exp$_4$, we also need to account for the password being part of the input of $H$ but not of $H'$. In this case, however, the claims are different. In order to bound the difference in the adversary’s success probability in experiments Exp$_3$ and Exp$_4$, we use a technique similar to the one used in the proof of security of the protocol MDHKE in [BCP04].

Let AskH$_4$ be the event in which the adversary directly asks the query $H(A, B, \Theta^*, \Phi^*, K)$ in experiment Exp$_4$, where either $\Theta^*$ or $\Phi^*$ has been simulated during an active attack. Clearly, this is the only case in which the adversary can distinguish experiment Exp$_4$ from experiment Exp$_3$.

In order to upper-bound the probability of event AskH$_4$, let us first define COLL to be the event in which there exist two different values $pw_1$ and $pw_2$ such that the tuples $(X^*, Y^*, pw_i$, - 73 -
CDH($X^*/M^{pw}, Y^*/N^{pw})$) are present in the list of queries to $H$, for $i = 1, 2$. Then, by using a technique similar to that used in Lemma 5 in [BCP04], one can show that

$$\Pr[\text{Coll}] \leq q_H^2 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{cdh}}_G(t + 3\tau).$$

Now, let us consider the event $\text{AskH}_4$ given that the event $\text{Coll}$ does not happen. That is, for each pair $(X^*, Y^*)$ involved in an active attack, there is at most one value of $pw$ such that $(X^*, Y^*, pw, \text{CDH}(X^*/M^{pw}, Y^*/N^{pw}))$ is in the list of queries to $H$. Since the password $pw$ is not needed in the simulation of the oracles, we can postpone choosing its value until the very end of the simulation, at which moment we can detect whether the event $\text{AskH}_4$ has happened. Hence, the probability that the event $\text{AskH}_4$ happens given that the event $\text{Coll}$ did not happen can be upper-bound by $q_{\text{send}}^A + q_{\text{send}}^B$. That is,

$$\Pr\left[\text{AskH}_4 \mid \text{Coll}\right] \leq \frac{q_{\text{send}}^A + q_{\text{send}}^B}{n}.$$

As a result,

$$\Pr[\text{AskH}_4] \leq \Pr[\text{AskH}_4 \land \text{Coll}] + \Pr[\text{AskH}_4 \land \overline{\text{Coll}}] \leq \Pr[\text{Coll}] + \Pr\left[\text{AskH}_4 \mid \overline{\text{Coll}}\right] \leq q_H^2 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{cdh}}_G(t + 3\tau) + \frac{q_{\text{send}}^A + q_{\text{send}}^B}{n}.$$

The proof of theorem follows immediately by noticing that the adversary’s success probability is exactly $1/2$ in this last experiment. [1]

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### A.6 Appendix: The splitting lemma

For simplicity, we reproduce here the splitting lemma presented in [PS00].

**Lemma A.6.1** [Splitting Lemma] Let $A \subset X \times Y$ such that $\Pr[(x, y) \in A] \geq \epsilon$. For any $\alpha < \epsilon$, define

$$B = \left\{(x, y) \in X \times Y \left| \Pr_{y' \in Y}[(x, y') \in A] \geq \epsilon - \alpha \right.\right\} \text{ and } B = (X \times Y) \backslash B,$$

then the following statements hold:

(i) $\Pr[B] \geq \alpha$

(ii) $\forall (x, y) \in B, \Pr_{y' \in Y}[(x, y') \in A] \geq \epsilon - \alpha$.

(iii) $\Pr[B \mid A] \geq \alpha/\epsilon$. 

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A.7. Appendix: Proof of lemmas

A.7.1 Proof of Lemma A.3.4

By definition of \( \text{Adv}_{\text{pccdh}}^{G,n}(A, P) \), we have

\[
\Pr[b = 1] \geq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon,
\]

where all the variables follow the distribution defined in Experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\text{pccdh}}^{G,n}(A, M, N, X', P) \), for uniformly distributed \( M, N, X' \in G \) and \( b \in \{0, 1\} \). The probability space is thus defined by the variables \( \omega, \rho \), the random tapes of the adversary in the find-stage and the guess-stage respectively; \( M, N, X' \), the group elements; and \( k \), the password:

\[
\Omega_0 = \{ (\omega, \rho, M, N, X', k) \mid \omega, \rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*; (M, N, X') \leftarrow G^3; k \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\} \}.
\]

By definition, we have

\[
\Pr_{\Omega_0}[b = 1] \geq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon.
\]

Applying the splitting lemma [A.6.1] we get that if we split \( \Omega_0 \) into \( \Omega_1 \times \Omega_2 \):

\[
\Omega_1 = \{ (\omega, M, N, X', k) \mid \omega \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*; (M, N, X') \leftarrow G^3; k \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\} \},
\]

there exists a set \( \mathcal{S}_1 \subseteq \Omega_1' \) such that

\[
\Pr_{\Omega_1'}[\mathcal{S}_1] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{2}, \quad \text{for any } \omega \in \mathcal{S}_1, \Pr_{\Omega_1}[b = 1] \geq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{\epsilon}{2},
\]

\[
\Pr_{\Omega_0}[\omega \in \mathcal{S}_1 | b = 1] \geq \frac{n\epsilon}{2 + 2n\epsilon}.
\]

Applying again the splitting lemma [A.6.1] we get that if we split \( \Omega_1 \) into \( \Omega_2 \times \Omega_2 \):

\[
\Omega_2 = \{ (M, N, X') \mid (M, N, X') \leftarrow G^3 \}
\]

\[
\Omega_2 = \{ (\rho, k) \mid \rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*; k \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\} \},
\]

for each random tape \( \omega \in \mathcal{S}_1 \), there exists a set \( \mathcal{S}_2(\omega) \subseteq \Omega_2' \) such that

\[
\Pr_{\Omega_2'}[\mathcal{S}_2(\omega)] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{4}, \quad \text{for any } (M, N, X') \in \mathcal{S}_2(\omega), \Pr_{\Omega_2}[b = 1] \geq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{\epsilon}{4},
\]
\[ \Pr_{\Omega_1} \left[(M, N, X') \in S_2(\omega) \mid b = 1 \right] \geq \frac{ne}{4 + 2ne}. \]

Let \((U, V, X)\) be a random instance of the CCDH problem. We choose a random tape \(\omega \sim \{0, 1\}^r\), and two random indices \(i < j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\). Then, we define \(r = \mathcal{P}(i)\) and \(r' = \mathcal{P}(j)\), and then set \(\delta = r' - r\), \(M = U^{1/\delta}\), \(N = V^{1/\delta}\), as well as \(X' = X \times M^{r}\). Since \((U, V, X)\) is a random triple, \((M, N, X')\) is also uniformly distributed (and thus independently of \(r\) and \(r'\), and thus of \(i\) and \(j\)): with probability greater than \(1/n + \epsilon\), \(A\) wins the Experiment \(\text{Exp}_{\text{pccdh}}(A, M, N, X', \mathcal{P})\), with \(k = i\), and the random tape \((\omega, \rho)\). In the favorable case, we have \(\omega \in S_1\) and \((M, N, X') \in S_2(\omega)\) with probability

\[ \frac{ne}{2 + 2ne} \times \frac{ne}{4 + 2ne} \geq \frac{1}{8} \times \left( \frac{ne}{1 + ne} \right)^2. \]

Thereafter, with probability greater than \(\epsilon/4\), \(A\) wins the Experiment \(\text{Exp}_{\text{pccdh}}^{\text{pccdh}}(A, M, N, X', \mathcal{P})\), with \(k = j\), and the random tape \((\omega, \rho')\):

\[ \Pr[K = \text{CDH}(X'/M^r, Y'/N^r) \land K' = \text{CDH}(X'/M^{r'}, Y'/N^{r'})] \geq \left( \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon \right) \times \frac{1}{8} \times \left( \frac{ne}{1 + ne} \right)^2 \times \frac{\epsilon}{4}. \]

Since we assumed, in the theorem, that \(2/n \geq 1/n + \epsilon\), then \(1 + ne \leq 2\). Furthermore,

\[
\begin{align*}
K &= \text{CDH}(X'/M^r, Y'/N^r) = \text{CDH}(X, Y) \\
K' &= \text{CDH}(X'/M^{r'}, Y'/N^{r'}) = \text{CDH}(X/M^\delta, Y/N^\delta) = \text{CDH}(X/U, Y/V)
\end{align*}
\]

This concludes the proof of this lemma. 

A.7.2 Proof of Lemma \textbf{[A.3.5]}

The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma \textbf{[A.3.4]} and is hence omitted in this version of the paper.

A.7.3 Proof of Lemma \textbf{[A.3.6]}

Let us consider an instance \(A, B\) for the Diffie-Hellman problem. We choose a random \(b \in \mathbb{Z}_p\). Then we set \(M \leftarrow A\), \(N \leftarrow B\) and \(X \leftarrow A^b\). We run an adversary \(A\) on this triple \((M, N, X)\), and get \((Y, u, v)\), which in case of success \(u = \text{CDH}(X, Y)\) and \(v = \text{CDH}(X/M, Y/N)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
u &= \text{CDH}(X,Y) = \text{CDH}(A^b, Y) = \text{CDH}(A, Y)^b \\
v &= \text{CDH}(X/M, Y/N) = \text{CDH}(A^{b-1}, Y/B) = \text{CDH}(A, Y/B)^{b-1} \\
u^{b-1} &= \text{CDH}(A, Y)^{b-1} \\
v^b &= \text{CDH}(A, Y)^{b-1}/\text{CDH}(A, B)^{b-1} = u^{b-1}/\text{CDH}(A, B)^{b-1}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus,

\[ \text{CDH}(A, B)^{b-1} = u^{b-1}/v^b \quad \text{and} \quad \text{CDH}(A, B) = u^{1/b}v^{-1/(b-1)}. \]
A.7.4 Proof of Lemma A.3.7

In this proof, we use a general technique presented in [Sho97] for computing the solution of a given instance of a problem by finding a collision between the list of candidates for two related instances.

On a given $A, B$ instance of the Diffie-Hellman problem, we use exactly the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A.3.4, running the S-PCCDH algorithm to break two instances of the CCDH problem: $U_1 = Ag^{x_1}, V_1 = Bh^{x_1}$ and $X_1 = A^{b_1}$, and $U_2 = Bh^{y_2}, V_2 = Bg^{y_2}$ and $X_2 = A^{b_2}$, for random values $u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. We then get four sets, $S_1, S'_1, S_2$ and $S'_2$, (instead of values) which contain candidates for CDH as in the proof of Lemma A.3.4, running the S-PCCDH algorithm to break two instances of the Diffie-Hellman problem, we use exactly the same argument.

But for each pair $(i, A, B)$, or $(i, K)$, or $(K, i, A, B) = X_i B / Y_i$, we build the

\[
K_i = \text{CDH}(X_i, Y_i) = \text{CDH}(A, Y_i)^{b_i}
\]

\[
K'_i = \text{CDH}(X_i/U_i, Y_i/V_i)
\]

\[
= \text{CDH}(X_i, Y_i) \times \text{CDH}(U_i, V_i) / \text{CDH}(X_i, V_i) \times \text{CDH}(U_i, Y_i)
\]

\[
= \text{CDH}(X_i, Y_i) \times \text{CDH}(Ag^{x_i}, Bh^{y_i}) / \text{CDH}(Ag^{b_i}, Bh^{y_i}) \times \text{CDH}(Ag^{u_i}, Y_i)
\]

\[
= \text{CDH}(X_i, Y_i) \times \text{CDH}(A, B) A^{v_i} B^{u_i} g^{u_i v_i} / \text{CDH}(A, B) B^{v_i} A^{u_i} \times \text{CDH}(A, Y_i) Y_i^{v_i}
\]

\[
= \text{CDH}(A, Y_i)^{b_i-1} \times \text{CDH}(A, B)^{1-b_i} \times A^{v_i (1-b_i)} (B/Y_i)^{u_i g^{u_i v_i}}
\]

\[
\text{CDH}(A, B)^{b_i-1} = \text{CDH}(A, Y_i)^{b_i-1} \times A^{v_i (1-b_i)} (B/Y_i)^{u_i g^{u_i v_i}} / K'_i
\]

\[
\text{CDH}(A, B) = \text{CDH}(A, Y_i) \times A^{v_i} (B/Y_i)^{u_i} / K'_i^{(b_i-1)}
\]

\[
= \left( K_i^{1/b_i} / K'_i^{1/b_i} \right) \times A^{-v_i} (B/Y_i)^{w_i} g^{w_i v_i},
\]

where $w_i = u_i / (b_i - 1) \mod p$.

With all the pairs in $S_1 \times S'_1$, we build the $s^2$ candidates for CDH($A, B$), and we do the same with all the pairs in $S_2 \times S'_2$. The first collision in the two lists is outputted as the value for CDH($A, B$). But for each pair $(k_i, k'_i) \in S_1 \times S'_1$, the candidate is

\[
\alpha = \left( k_i^{1/b_i} / k'_i^{1/b_i} \right) \times A^{-v_i} (B/Y_i)^{w_i} g^{w_i v_i} = \left( \frac{k_i}{K_i} \right)^{1/b_i} \times \left( \frac{K'_i}{k'_i} \right)^{1/b_i}.
\]

If $k_i \neq K_i$, or $k'_i \neq K'_i$, it is totally random in $G$, because of the randomness of $b_i$. The probability of a wrong collision is thus bounded by $2s^4/p$. \]
Appendix B

Smooth Projective Hashing for Conditionally Extractable Commitments

Abstract: The notion of smooth projective hash functions was proposed by Cramer and Shoup and can be seen as a special type of zero-knowledge proof system for a language. Though originally used as a means to build efficient chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption schemes, some variations of the Cramer-Shoup smooth projective hash functions also found applications in several other contexts, such as password-based authenticated key exchange and oblivious transfer. In this paper, we first address the problem of building smooth projective hash functions for more complex languages. More precisely, we show how to build such functions for languages that can be described in terms of disjunctions and conjunctions of simpler languages for which smooth projective hash functions are known to exist. Next, we illustrate how the use of smooth projective hash functions with more complex languages can be efficiently associated to extractable commitment schemes and avoid the need for zero-knowledge proofs. Finally, we explain how to apply these results to provide more efficient solutions to two well-known cryptographic problems: a public-key certification which guarantees the knowledge of the private key by the user without random oracles or zero-knowledge proofs and adaptive security for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols in the universal composability framework with erasures.

B.1 Introduction

In [CS02], Cramer and Shoup introduced a new primitive called smooth projective hashing and showed how to use it to generalize their chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption scheme [CS98]. The new abstraction not only provided a more intuitive description of the original encryption scheme, but also resulted in several new instantiations based on different security assumptions such as quadratic residuosity and $N$-residuosity [Pa99].

The notion of smooth projective hash functions (SPHF, [CS02], after slight modifications [GL03]) has been proven quite useful and has found applications in several other contexts, such as password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE, [GL03]) and oblivious transfer [Kal05].
In the context of PAKE protocols, the work of Gennaro and Lindell abstracted and generalized (under various indistinguishability assumptions) the earlier protocol by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [KOY01] and has become the basis of several other schemes [BCL+05, AP06, BGS06]. In the context of oblivious transfer, the work of Kalai [Kal05] also generalized earlier protocols by Naor and Pinkas [NP01] and by Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold [AIR01].

To better understand the power of SPHF, let us briefly recall what they are. First, the definition of SPHF requires the existence of a domain $X$ and an underlying NP language $L$ such that it is computationally hard to distinguish a random element in $L$ from a random element in $X \setminus L$. For instance, in the particular case of the PAKE scheme in [CHK+05], the language $L$ is defined as the set of triples $\{(c, \ell, m)\}$ such that $c$ is an encryption of $m$ with label $\ell$ under a public key given in the common reference string (CRS). The semantic security of the encryption scheme guarantees computational indistinguishability between elements from $L$ and elements from $X$.

One of the key properties that make SPHF so useful is that, for a point $x \in L$, the hash value can be computed using either a secret hashing key $hk$, or a public projected key $hp$ (depending on $x$ [GL03] or not [CS02]) together with a witness $w$ to the fact that $x \in L$. Another important property of these functions is that, given the projected key $hp$, their output is uniquely defined for points $x \in L$ and statistically indistinguishable from random for points $x \in X \setminus L$. Moreover, without the knowledge of the witness $w$ to the fact that $x \in L$, the output of these functions on $x$ is also pseudo-random.

The first main contribution of this paper is to extend the line of work on SPHF, the element-based version proposed by Gennaro and Lindell [GL03], to take into account more complex NP languages. More precisely, we show how to build SPHF for languages that can be described in terms of disjunctions and conjunctions of simpler languages for which SPHF are known to exist. For instance, let $H_m$ represent a family of SPHF for the language $\{(c)\}$, where $c$ is the encryption of $m$ under a given public key. Using our tools, one can build a family of SPHF for the language $\{(c)\}$, where $c$ is the encryption of either 0 or 1, by combining $H_0$ and $H_1$.

One of the advantages of building SPHF for more complex languages is that it allows us to simplify the design of the primitives to which they are associated. To demonstrate this, we consider in this paper the specific case of extractable commitment schemes. In most protocols in which extractable commitments are used, the capability of extracting the committed message usually depends on the commitment being properly generated. To achieve this goal and enforce the correct generation of the commitment, it is often the case that additional mechanisms, such as zero-knowledge proofs, may have to be used. This is the case, for instance, of several protocols where a specific public-key registration phase is required, such as most of the cryptographic protocols with dynamic groups (multisignatures [Bol03, LOS+06], group signatures [DP06], etc). Such a framework is sometimes named registered public-key model, where a proof of knowledge of the secret key is required before any certification.

To be able to build more efficient extractable commitment schemes and avoid the use of possibly expensive concurrent zero-knowledge proofs, a second main contribution of this paper is to generalize the concept of extractable commitments so that extraction may fail if the commitment is not properly generated. More specifically, we introduce a new notion of $L$-extractable commitments in which extraction is only guaranteed if the committed value belongs to the language $L$ and may fail otherwise. The main intuition behind this generalization is that, when used together with a SPHF for the language $L$, the cases in which extraction may fail will not be very important as the output of the SPHF will be statistically indistinguishable from random in such cases.
B.1. Introduction

B.1.1 Applications

Registered Public-Key Setting. For many cryptographic protocols, for proving the security even when users can dynamically join the system, the simulator described in the security proof often needs to know the private keys of the authorized users, which is called the registered public-key setting, in order to avoid rogue-attacks [Bol03]. This should anyway be the correct way to proceed for a certification authority: it certifies a public key to a user if and only if the latter provides a proof of knowledge of the associated private key. However, in order to allow concurrency, intricate zero-knowledge proofs are required, which makes the certification process either secure in the random oracle model [BR93] only, or inefficient in the standard model.

In this paper, we show how SPHF with conditionally extractable commitments can help to solve this problem efficiently, in the standard model, by establishing a secure channel between the players, with keys that are either the same for the two parties if the commitment has been correctly built, or perfectly independent in the other case.

Adaptively-secure PAKE schemes. We thereafter study more involved key exchange schemes. In 1992, Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] suggested a method to authenticate a key exchange based on simple passwords, possibly drawn from a space so small that an adversary might enumerate off-line all possible values. Because of the practical interest of such a primitive, many schemes have been proposed and studied. In 2005, Canetti et al. [CHK+05] proposed an ideal functionality for PAKE protocols, in the universal comosability (UC) framework [Can01, CK02], and showed how a simple variant of the Gennaro-Lindell methodology [GL03] could lead to a secure protocol. Though quite efficient, their protocol is not known to be secure against adaptive adversaries, where they can corrupt players at any time, and learn their internal states. The first ones to propose an adaptively-secure PAKE in the UC framework were Barak et al. [BCL+05] using general techniques from multi-party computation (MPC). Though conceptually simple, their solution yields quite inefficient schemes.

Here, we take a different approach. Instead of using general MPC techniques, we extend the Gennaro-Lindell methodology to deal with adaptive corruptions by using a non-malleable conditionally-extractable and equivocable commitment scheme with an associated SPHF family. The new scheme is adaptively secure in the common reference string model in the UC framework under standard complexity assumptions with erasures.

B.1.2 Related work

Commitments. Commitment schemes are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives, being used in several cryptographic applications such as zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91] and secure multi-party computation [GMW87]. Even quite practical protocols need them, as already explained above in the public-key registration setting, but also in password-based authenticated key exchange [GL03]. They allow a user to commit a value $x$ into a public value $C$, such that the latter does not reveal any information about $x$ (the hiding property), but $C$ can be opened later to $x$ only: one cannot change its mind (the binding property). Various additional properties are often required, such as non-malleability, extractability and equivocability. Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] provided an ideal functionality for such a primitive and showed that achieving all these properties at the same time was impossible in the UC plain model. They also provided the first candidate in the CRS model. Damgård and Nielsen [DN02] later proposed another construction of universally composable commitments, that is more efficient for some applications. Since we want to avoid the use of possibly inefficient proofs of relations present in the Damgård-Nielsen construction and given that the Canetti-Fischlin construction is well suited for our purpose of designing an associated smooth hash function, we opted to use the latter as the starting point for our constructions.
PAKE. The password-based setting was first considered by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] and followed by many proposals. In 2000, Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [BPR00] as well as Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel [BMP00] proposed security models and proved variants of the Bellovin and Merritt protocol, under ideal assumptions, such as the random oracle model [BR93]. Soon after, Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [KOY01] and Goldreich and Lindell [GL01] proposed the first protocols with a proof of security in the standard model, with the former being based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and the latter on general assumptions. Later, Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] proposed an abstraction and generalization of the KOY protocol and became the basis of several other variants, including ours in the last section.

B.1.3 Organization of the Paper

In Section B.2, we review the basic primitives needed in this paper. Then, in Section B.3, we describe our first contribution: SPHF families on conjunctions and disjunctions of languages. In Section B.4 we combine that with our second contribution, conditionally-extractable commitments. We focus on the ElGamal-based commitment, since this is enough to build more efficient public-key certification protocols. Finally, in Section B.5, we add equivocability to the commitment, borrowing techniques from Canetti and Fischlin [CF01]. Then, we add the non-malleability property, granted the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, which can then be used to build an adaptively-secure PAKE in the UC framework, based on the Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] framework. Due to space restrictions, formal definitions, proofs, and application details were postponed to the appendix.

B.2 Commitments

In the following, we focus on Pedersen commitments, and certification of Schnorr-like public keys, hence, we work in the discrete logarithm setting. As a consequence, to get extractable commitments, we use encryption schemes from the same family: the ElGamal encryption [ElG85b] and the labeled version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] (for achieving non-malleability).

Labeled Public-Key Encryption. Labeled encryption [Sho04] is a variation of the usual encryption notion that takes into account the presence of labels in the encryption and decryption algorithms. More precisely, both the encryption and decryption algorithms have an additional input parameter, referred to as a label, and the decryption algorithm should only correctly decrypt a ciphertext if its input label matches the label used to create that ciphertext.

The security notion for labeled encryption is similar to that of standard encryption schemes. The main difference is that, whenever the adversary wishes to ask a query to its Left-or-Right encryption oracle in the indistinguishability security game (IND-CPA) [GM84, BDJR97], in addition to providing a pair of messages \((m_0, m_1)\), it also has to provide a target label \(\ell\) to obtain the challenge ciphertext \(c\). When chosen-ciphertext security (IND-CCA) is concerned, the adversary is also allowed to query its decryption oracle on any pair \((\ell', c')\) as long as \(\ell' \neq \ell\) or the ciphertext \(c'\) does not match the output \(c\) of a query to its Left-or-Right encryption oracle whose input includes the label \(\ell\). For formal security definitions for labeled encryption schemes, please refer to [CHK+05, AP06].

One of the advantages of using labeled encryption, which we exploit in this paper, is that we can easily combine several IND-CCA labeled encryption schemes with the help of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme so that the resulting scheme remains IND-CCA [DK03].

ElGamal and Cramer-Shoup Encryption. We denote by \(G\) a cyclic group of prime order \(q\) where \(q\) is large \((n \text{ bits})\), and \(g\) a generator for this group. Let \(pk = (g_1, g_2, c = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, d = \ldots\)
$g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, h = g_1^{y_1} H)$ be the public key of the Cramer-Shoup scheme, where $g_1$ and $g_2$ are random group elements, $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2$ and $z$ are random scalars in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, and $H$ is a collision-resistant hash function (actually, second-preimage resistance is enough), and $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$ the associated private key. Note that $(g_1, h)$ will also be seen as the public key of the ElGamal encryption, with $z$ the associated private key. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the following that public keys will additionally contain all the global parameters, such as the group $G$.

If $M \in G$, the multiplicative ElGamal encryption is defined as $EG^{\times}_{pk}(M; r) = (u_1 = g_1^{x_1}, e = h^r M)$, which can be decrypted by $M = e/\ell_1^{y_1}$. If $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the additive ElGamal encryption is defined as $EG_{pk}(M; r) = (u_1 = g_1^{x_1}, e = h^r g^M)$. Note that $EG^{\times}_{pk}(g^M; r) = EG^+_{pk}(M; r)$. It can be decrypted after an additional discrete logarithm computation: $M$ must be small enough. Similarly, if $M \in G$, the multiplicative labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption is defined as $CS^{\times, \ell}_{pk}(M; r) = (u_1, u_2, e, v)$, such that $u_1 = g_1^{x_1}, u_2 = g_2^{y_1}, e = h^r M, \theta = H(\ell, u_1, u_2, e)$ and $v = (a^\ell)^r$. Decryption works as above, with $M = e/\ell_1^{y_1}$, but only if the ciphertext is valid: $v = u_1^{e_1+\theta y_1} u_2^{e_2+\theta y_2}$. If $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, its additive encryption $CS^{\times, \ell}_{pk}(M; r)$ is such that $e = h^r g^M$. The following relation holds $CS^{\times, \ell}_{pk}(g^M; r) = CS^{\times, \ell}_{pk}(M; r)$. The decryption applies as above if $M$ is small enough.

As already noted, from any Cramer-Shoup ciphertext $(u_1, u_2, e, v)$ of a message $M$ with randomness $r$, whatever the label $\ell$ is, one can extract $(u_1, e)$ as an ElGamal ciphertext of the same message $M$ with the same randomness $r$. This extraction applies independently of the additive or multiplicative version since the decryption works the same for the ElGamal and the Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, except for the validity check that provides the CCA security level to the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, whereas the ElGamal encryption scheme achieves IND-CPA security level only.

**Commitments.** With a commitment scheme, a player can commit to a secret value $x$ by publishing a commitment $C = \text{com}(x; r)$ with randomness $r$, in such a way that $C$ reveals nothing about the secret $x$, which is called the hiding property. The player can later open $C$ to reveal $x$, by publishing $x$ and a decommitment, also referred to as witness, in a publicly verifiable way: the player cannot open $C$ to any other value than $x$, which is the binding property. In many cases, the decommitment consists of the random $r$ itself or some part of it. In this paper, we only consider commitment schemes in the common reference string (CRS) model in which the common parameters, referred to as the CRS, are generated honestly and available to all parties.

Note that an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme provides such a commitment scheme: the binding property is guaranteed by the uniqueness of the plaintext (perfectly binding), and the hiding property is guaranteed by the IND-CPA security (computationally hiding). In this case, the CRS simply consists of the public-key of the encryption scheme. The Pedersen commitment $C = \text{comPed}(x; r) = g^x h^r$ provides a perfectly hiding, but computationally binding commitment under the intractability of the discrete logarithm of $h$ in basis $g$.

We now present additional properties that can be satisfied by the commitment. First, we say that a commitment is extractable if there exists an efficient algorithm, called an extractor, capable of generating a new set of common parameters (i.e., a new CRS) whose distribution is equivalent to that of an honestly generated CRS and such that it can extract the committed value $x$ from any commitment $C$. This is of course only possible for computationally hiding commitments, such as encryption schemes: the decryption key is the extraction trapdoor. Second, we say that a commitment is equivocable if there exists an efficient algorithm, called an equivocator, capable of generating a new CRS and a commitment with similar distributions to those of the actual scheme and such that the commitment can be opened in different ways. Again, this is possible for computationally binding commitments only, such as the Pedersen commitment: the knowledge
of the discrete logarithm of \( h \) in basis \( g \) is a trapdoor that allows the opening of a commitment in more than one way. Finally, a non-malleable commitment ensures that if an adversary that receives a commitment \( C \) of some unknown value \( x \) can generate a valid commitment for a related value \( y \), then a simulator could perform as well without seeing the commitment \( C \). A public-key encryption scheme that is IND-CCA provides such a non-malleable commitment [GL03]. For formal security definitions for commitment schemes, please refer to [GL03, DKOS01, CF01].

In the following, we use encryption schemes in order to construct commitments, which immediately implies the hiding, binding and extractable properties, as said above. However, when one uses the additive versions of ElGamal or Cramer-Shoup encryption schemes, extractability (or decryption) is only possible if the committed values (or plaintexts) are small enough, hence our notion of \( L \)-extractable commitments (see Section B.4) which will mean that the commitment is extractable if the committed value lies in the language \( L \). More precisely, we will split the value to be committed in small pieces (that lie in the language \( L \)), but we will then need to be sure that they actually lie in this language to guarantee extractability. We thus introduce smooth hash functions in order to allow communications if the commitments are valid only.

### B.3 Smooth Hash Functions on Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Languages

#### B.3.1 Smooth Projective Hash Functions.

Projective hash function families were first introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] as a means to design chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes. We here use the definitions of Gennaro and Lindell [GL03], who later showed how to use such families to build secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocols, together with non-malleable commitments. In addition to commitment schemes, we also consider here families of SPHF associated to labeled encryption as done by Canetti et al. [CHK+05] and by Abdalla and Pointcheval [AP06].

Let \( X \) be the domain of these functions and let \( L \) be a certain subset of points of this domain (a language). A key property of these functions is that, for points in \( L \), their values can be computed by using either a secret hashing key or a public projected key. While the computation using the secret hashing key works for all points in the domain \( X \) of the hash function, the computation using a public projected key only works for points \( x \in L \) and requires the knowledge of the witness \( w \) to the fact that \( x \in L \). A projective hash function family is said to be smooth if the value of the function on inputs that are outside the particular subset \( L \) of the domain are independent of the projected key. Another important property of these functions is that, given the projected key \( hp \), their output is uniquely defined for points \( x \in L \). Moreover, if \( L \) is a hard partitioned subset of \( X \) (i.e., it is computationally hard to distinguish a random element in \( L \) from a random element in \( X \setminus L \)), this output is also pseudo-random if one does not know a witness \( w \) to the fact that \( x \in L \) [GL03]. The interested reader is referred to Appendix B.6 for more formal definitions.

In the particular case of the Gennaro-Lindell scheme [GL03], the subset \( L_{pk,m} \) was defined as the set of \( \{(c)\} \) such that \( c \) is a commitment of \( m \) using public parameters \( pk \): there exists \( r \) for which \( c = \text{com}_{pk}(m; r) \) where \( \text{com} \) is the committing algorithm of the commitment scheme. In the case of the CHKKL scheme [CHK+05], the subset \( L_{pk,(\ell,m)} \) was defined as the set of \( \{(c)\} \) such that \( c \) is an encryption of \( m \) with label \( \ell \), under the public key \( pk \): there exists \( r \) for which \( c = E^\ell_{pk}(m; r) \) where \( E \) is the encryption algorithm of the labeled encryption scheme. In the case of a standard encryption scheme, the label is simply omitted. The interested reader is referred to [GL03, CHK+05, AP06] for more details.

**Languages.** Since we want to use more general languages, we need more detailed notations.
B.3. Smooth Hash Functions on Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Languages

Let $LPKE$ be a labeled encryption scheme with public key $pk$. Let $X$ be the range of the encryption algorithm. Here are three useful examples of languages $L$ in $X$:

- the valid ciphertexts $c$ of $m$ under $pk$, $L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,m) = \{c|\exists r \; c = E_{pk}^{\ell}(m;r)\}$;
- the valid ciphertexts $c$ of $m_1$ or $m_2$ under $pk$ (that is, a disjunction of two versions of the former languages), $L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,m_1 \lor m_2) = L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,m_1) \cup L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,m_2)$;
- the valid ciphertexts $c$ under $pk$, $L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,*c) = \{c|\exists m \; \exists r \; c = E_{pk}^{\ell}(m;r)\}$.

If the encryption scheme is IND-CPA, the first two are hard partitioned subsets of $X$. The last one can also be a hard partitioned subset in some cases: for the Cramer-Shoup encryption, $L \subseteq X = G^4$ and, in order to distinguish a valid ciphertext from an invalid one, one has to break the DDH problem. However, for the ElGamal encryption scheme, all the ciphertexts are valid, hence $L = X = G^2$.

More complex languages can be defined, with disjunctions as above, or conjunctions: the pairs of ciphertexts $(a,b)$ such that $a \in L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,0\lor1)$ and $b \in L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,2\lor3)$. This set can be obtained by $(L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,0\lor1)) \times X \cap (X \times L(LPKE,pk),(\ell,2\lor3))$.

Likewise, we can define more general languages based on other primitives such as commitment schemes. The definition would be similar to the one above, with $pk$ playing the role of the common parameters, $E_{pk}$ playing the role of the committing algorithm, $(m,\ell)$ playing the role of the input message, and $c$ playing the role of the commitment.

More generally, in the following, we denote the language by the generic notation $L(Sch,\rho,aux)$ where $aux$ denotes all the parameters useful to characterize the language (such as the label used, or a plaintext), $\rho$ denotes the public parameters such as a public key $pk$, and $Sch$ denotes the primitive used to define the language, such as an encryption scheme $LPKE$ or a commitment scheme $Com$. When there is no ambiguity, the associated primitive $Sch$ will be omitted.

We now present new constructions of SPHF to deal with more complex languages, such as disjunctions and conjunctions of any languages. The constructions are presented for two languages but can be easily extended to any polynomial number of languages. We then discuss about possible information leakage at the end of this section. The properties of correctness, smoothness and pseudo-randomness are easily verified by these new smooth hash systems. Due to the lack of space, the formal proofs can be found in Appendix [B.7]

B.3.2 Conjunction of two Generic Smooth Hashes

Let us consider an encryption or commitment scheme defined by public parameters and a public key aggregated in $\rho$. $X$ is the range of the elements we want to study (ciphertexts, tuples of ciphertexts, commitments, etc), and $L_1 = L_{1,\rho,aux}$ and $L_2 = L_{2,\rho,aux}$ are hard partitioned subsets of $X$, which specify the expected properties (valid ciphertexts, ciphertexts of a specific plaintext, etc). We consider situations where $X$ possesses a group structure, which is the case if we consider ciphertexts or tuples of ciphertexts from an homomorphic encryption scheme. We thus denote by $\oplus$ the commutative law of the group (and by $\ominus$ the opposite operation, such that $c \oplus a \ominus a = c$).

We assume to be given two smooth hash systems $SHS_1$ and $SHS_2$, on the sets corresponding to the languages $L_1$ and $L_2$: $SHS_i = \{HashKG_i,ProjKG_i,Hash_i,ProjHash_i\}$. Here, $HashKG_i$ and $ProjKG_i$ denote the hashing key and the projected key generators, and $Hash_i$ and $ProjHash_i$ the algorithms that compute the hash function using $hk_i$ and $hp_i$ respectively.

Let $c$ be an element of $X$, and $r_1$ and $r_2$ two elements chosen at random. We denote by $hk_1 = HashKG_1(\rho,aux,r_1)$, $hk_2 = HashKG_2(\rho,aux,r_2)$, $hp_1 = ProjKG_1(hk_1;\rho,aux,c)$, and
Chapter B. Smooth Projective Hashing for Conditionally Extractable Commitments

\[ hp_2 = \text{ProjKG}_2(hk_2; \rho, aux, c) \] are the keys. A smooth hash system for the language \( L = L_1 \cap L_2 \) is then defined as follows, if \( c \in L_1 \cap L_2 \) and \( w_i \) is a witness that \( c \in L_i \), for \( i = 1, 2 \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{HashKG}_L(\rho, aux, r = r_1 \parallel r_2) &= hk = (hk_1, hk_2) \\
\text{ProjKG}_L(hk; \rho, aux, c) &= hp = (hp_1, hp_2) \\
\text{Hash}_L(hk; \rho, aux, c) &= \text{Hash}_1(hk_1; \rho, aux, c) \oplus \text{Hash}_2(hk_2; \rho, aux, c) \\
\text{ProjHash}_L(hp; \rho, aux, c; (w_1, w_2)) &= \text{ProjHash}_1(hp_1; \rho, aux, c; w_1) \oplus \text{ProjHash}_2(hp_2; \rho, aux, c; w_2)
\end{align*}
\]

B.3.3 Disjunction of two Generic Smooth Hashes

Let \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \) be two languages as described above. We assume to be given two smooth hash systems \( \text{SHS}_1 \) and \( \text{SHS}_2 \) with respect to these languages. We define \( L = L_1 \cup L_2 \) and construct a smooth projective hash function for this language as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{HashKG}_L(\rho, aux, r = r_1 \parallel r_2) &= hk = (hk_1, hk_2) \\
\text{ProjKG}_L(hk; \rho, aux, c) &= hp = (hp_1, hp_2, hp_\Delta = \text{Hash}_1(hk_1; \rho, aux, c) \oplus \text{Hash}_2(hk_2; \rho, aux, c)) \\
\text{Hash}_L(hk; \rho, aux, c) &= \text{Hash}_1(hk_1; \rho, aux, c) \\
\text{ProjHash}_L(hp; \rho, aux, c; w) &= \text{ProjHash}_1(hp_1; \rho, aux, c; w) \quad \text{if } c \in L_1 \\
&\quad \text{or } hp_\Delta \oplus \text{ProjHash}_2(hp_2; \rho, aux, c; w) \quad \text{if } c \in L_2
\end{align*}
\]

where \( w \) is a witness of \( c \in L_i \) for \( i = \{1, 2\} \). Then \( \text{ProjHash}_i(hp_i; \rho, aux, c; w) = \text{Hash}_i(hk_i; \rho, aux, c) \). The player in charge of computing this value is supposed to know the witness, and in particular the language which \( c \) belongs to (and thus the index \( i \)).

B.3.4 Uniformity and Independence

In the above definition of SPHF (contrarily to the original Cramer-Shoup [CS02] definition), the value of the projected key formally depends on the ciphertext/commitment \( c \). However, in some cases, one may not want to reveal any information about this dependency. In fact, in certain cases such as in the construction of a SPHF for equivocable and extractable commitments in Section B.5, one may not even want to leak any information about the auxiliary elements \( aux \). When no information is revealed about \( aux \), it means that the details about the exact language will be concealed.

We thus add a notion similar to the smoothness, but for the projected key: the projected key may or may not depend on \( c \) (and \( aux \)), but its distribution does not: Let us denote by \( D_{\rho, aux, c} \) the distribution \( \{hp | hk = \text{HashKG}_L(\rho, aux, r) \text{ and } hp = \text{ProjKG}_L(hk; \rho, aux, c)\} \), on the projected keys. If, for any \( c, c' \in X \), \( D_{\rho, aux, c} \) and \( D_{\rho, aux, c'} \) are indistinguishable, then we say that the smooth hash system has the \( 1 \)-uniformity property. If, for any \( c, c' \in X \), and any auxiliary elements \( aux, aux' \), \( D_{\rho, aux, c} \) and \( D_{\rho, aux, c'} \) are indistinguishable, we name it \( 2 \)-uniformity property.

More than indistinguishability of distributions, the actual projected key \( hp \) may not depend at all on \( c \), as in the Cramer and Shoup’s definition. Then, we say that the smooth hash system guarantees 1-independence (resp. 2-independence if it does not depend on \( aux \) either). Note that the latter independence notions immediately imply the respective uniformity notions.

As an example, the smooth hash system associated with the ElGamal cryptosystem (see Section B.4.1) guarantees 2-independence. On the other hand, the analogous system associated with the Cramer-Shoup encryption (see Appendix B.9.1) guarantees 2-uniformity only. For smooth hash systems combinations, one can note that in the case of disjunctions, one can get, at best, the uniformity property, since hash computations on the commitment are needed for generating the projected key. Furthermore, this is satisfied under the condition that the two
B.4. A Conditionally Extractable Commitment

B.4.1 ElGamal Commitment and Associated Smooth Hash

The ElGamal commitment is realized in the common reference string model, where the CRS \( \rho \) contains \((G, pk)\), as defined in Section [B.2] for the ElGamal encryption scheme. In practice, \( sk \) should not be known by anybody, but in the security analysis, \( sk \) will be the extraction trapdoor. Let the input of the committing algorithm be a scalar \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_q \). The commitment algorithm consists of choosing a random \( r \) and computing the following ElGamal encryption under random \( r \): \( C = \text{EG}^+_pk(M, r) = (u_1 = g_1^r, e = h^r g^M) \).

The smooth projective hashing, associated with this commitment scheme and the language \( L = \text{EG}^+\rho, M \subset X = G^2 \) of the additive ElGamal ciphertexts \( C \) of \( M \) under the public key defined by \( \rho \), is the family based on the underlying ElGamal encryption scheme, as defined in [GL03]:

- \( \text{HashKG}(\text{EG}^+, \rho, M) = \text{hk} = (\gamma_1 \hat{u}, \gamma_3 \hat{u}) \notin \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q \)
- \( \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}^+, \rho, M, C) = (u_i)\gamma_i \hat{u} (eg^{-M})\gamma_3 \hat{u} \)
- \( \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}^+, \rho, M, C) = \text{hp} = (g_1)\gamma_i \hat{u} (h)\gamma_3 \hat{u} \)
- \( \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{EG}^+, \rho, M, C; r) = (\text{hp})^r \)

First, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme), \( L \) is a hard partitioned subset of \( X = G^2 \). Then, for \( C = \text{EG}^+_pk(M, r) \), and thus with the witness \( r \), the algorithms are defined as above using the same notations as in [GL03].

B.4.2 \( L \)-extractable Commitments

Note that the value \( g^M \) would be easily extractable from this commitment (seen as the multiplicative ElGamal encryption). However, one can extract \( M \) itself (the actual committed value) only if its size is small enough so that it can be found as a solution to the discrete logarithm problem. In order to obtain “extractability” (up to a certain point, see below), one should rather commit to it in a bit-by-bit way.

Let us denote \( M \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) by \( \sum_{i=1}^m M_i \cdot 2^{i-1} \), where \( m \leq n \). Its commitment is \( \text{comEG}^+_pk(M) = (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \), where \( b_i = \text{EG}^+_pk(M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}, r_i) = (u_{i,1} = g_1^{r_i}, e_i = h^{r_i} g^{M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}}) \), for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \). The homomorphic property of the encryption scheme allows to obtain, from this tuple, the above simple commitment of \( M \):

\[
C = \text{EG}^+_pk(M, r) = (u_1, c) = (\prod u_{1,i}; \prod e_i) = \prod b_i, \text{ for } r = \sum r_i.
\]

We now precise what we mean by “extractability”: Here, the commitment will be extractable if the messages \( M_i \) are bits (or at least small enough), but we cannot ensure that it will be extractable otherwise. More generally, this leads to a new notion of \( L \)-\textit{extractable commitments}, which means that we allow the primitive not to be extractable if the message does not belong
to a certain language \( L \) (e.g. the language of encryptions of 0 or 1), which is informally the language of all commitments valid and “of good shape”, and is included into the set \( X \) of all commitments.

**Smooth Hash Functions.** For the above protocol, we need a smooth hash system on the language \( L = L_1 \cap L_2 \), where \( L_1 = \{(b_1, \ldots, b_m) \mid \forall i, b_i \in L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 0)1}, L_2 = \{(b_1, \ldots, b_m) \mid C = \prod b_i \in L_{(\mathbb{EG}^x, \rho, g^M)}\} \), to within a factor (corresponding to the offset \( 2^{i-1} \)) with
\[
L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 0)1} = L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 0)} \cup L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 1)}, \\
L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 0)} = \{C \mid \exists r C = \mathbb{EG}^+_\text{pk}(0, r)\}, \\
L_{(\mathbb{EG}^+, \rho, 1)} = \{C \mid \exists r C = \mathbb{EG}^+_\text{pk}(1, r)\}.
\]

It is easy to see that this boils down to constructing a smooth hash system corresponding to a conjunction and disjunction of languages, as presented in the previous section.

### B.4.3 Certification of Public Keys

**Description.** A classical application of extractable commitments is in the certification of public keys (when we want to be sure that a person joining the system actually knows the associated private key). Suppose that a user \( U \) owns a pair of secret and public keys, and would like to have the public key certified by the authority. A natural property is that the authority will not certify this public key unless it is sure that the user really owns the related private key, which is usually ensured by a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge: the user knows the private key if a successful extractor exists.

Here we present a construction that possesses the same property without requiring any explicit proof of knowledge, furthermore in a concurrent way since there is no need of any rewinding:

- First, the user sends his public key \( g^M \), along with a bit-by-bit \( L \)-extractable commitment of the private key \( M \), i.e. a tuple \( \text{com}\mathbb{EG}_\text{pk}(M) = (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \) as described above, from which one can derive \( C = \prod b_i = \mathbb{EG}_\text{pk}^+(M, r) = \mathbb{EG}_\text{pk}^+(g^M, r) \).

- We define the smooth hash system related to the language \( L_1 \cap L_2 \), where \( L_1 = \cap_i L_{1,i} \), with \( L_{1,i} \) the language of the tuples where the \( i \)-th component \( b_i \) is an encryption of 0 or 1, and \( L_2 \) is the language of the tuples where the derived \( C = \prod b_i \) is an encryption of the public key \( g^M \) (under the multiplicative ElGamal, as in Section B.4.1).

Note that when the tuple \( (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \) lies in \( L_1 \cap L_2 \), it really corresponds to an extractable commitment of the private key \( M \) associated to the public key \( g^M \); each \( b_i \) encrypts a bit, and can thus be decrypted, which provides the \( i \)-th bit of \( M \).

- The authority computes a hash key \( \text{hk} \), the corresponding projected key \( \text{hp} \) on \( (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \) and the related hash value \( \text{Hash} \) on \( (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \). It sends \( \text{hp} \) to \( U \) along with \( \text{Cert} \oplus \text{Hash} \), where \( \text{Cert} \) is the expected certificate. Note that if \( \text{Hash} \) is not large enough, a pseudo-random generator can be used to expand it.

- The user is then able to recover his certificate if and only if he can compute \( \text{Hash} \): this value can be computed with the algorithm \( \text{ProjHash} \) on \( (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \), from \( \text{hp} \). But it also requires a witness \( w \) proving that the tuple \( (b_1, \ldots, b_m) \) lies in \( L_1 \cap L_2 \).

With the properties of the smooth hash system, if the user correctly computed the commitment, he knows the witness \( w \), and can get the same mask \( \text{Hash} \) to extract the certificate. If the user cheated, the smoothness property makes \( \text{Hash} \) perfectly unpredictable: no information is leaked about the certificate.
B.5. A Conditionally Extractable Equivocable Commitment

Security Analysis. Let us outline the security proof of the above protocol. First, the security model is the following: no one can obtain a certificate on a public key if it does not know the associated private key (that is, if no simulator can extract the private key). In other words, the adversary wins if it is able to output \((g^M, \text{Cert})\) and no simulator can produce \(M\).

The formal attack game can thus be described as follows: the adversary \(A\) interacts several times with the authority, by sending public keys and commitments, and asks for the corresponding certificates. It then outputs a pair \((g^M, \text{Cert})\) and wins if no simulator is able to extract \(M\) from the transcript.

The simulator works as follows: it is given access to a certification (signing) oracle, and generates a pair of public and private keys \((sk, pk)\) for the ElGamal encryption. The public key is set as the CRS that defines the commitment scheme. The private key will thus be the extraction trapdoor.

When the simulator receives a certification request, with a public key and a commitment, it first tries to extract the associated private key, granted the extraction trapdoor. In case of success, the simulator asks the signing oracle to provide it with the corresponding certificate on the public key, and complete the process as described in the protocol. However, extraction may fail if the commitments are not well constructed (not in \(L_1 \cap L_2\)). In such a case, the simulator sends back a random bit-string of appropriate length. In case of successful extraction, the answer received by the user is exactly the expected one. In case of failure, it is perfectly indistinguishable too since the smoothness property of the hash function would make a perfectly random mask \(\text{Hash}\) (since the input is not in the language).

After several interactions, \(A\) outputs a pair \((g^M, \text{Cert})\), which is forwarded by the simulator. Either \(g^M\) has been queried to the signing oracle, which means that the extraction had succeeded, the simulator knows \(M\) and the adversary did not win the attack game, or this is a valid signature on a new message: existential forgery under chosen-message attack.

B.5 A Conditionally Extractable Equivocable Commitment

In this section, we enhance the previous commitment schemes with equivocability, which is not a trivial task when one wants to keep the extraction property. Note that we first build a malleable extractable and equivocable commitment using the ElGamal-based commitment (see Section B.4.1), but one can address the non-malleability property by simply building the commitment upon the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. All the details of this extension are given in Appendix B.9. In the following, if \(b\) is a bit, we denote its complement by \(\overline{b}\) (i.e., \(\overline{b} = 1 - b\)). We furthermore denote by \(x[i]\) the \(i\)th bit of the bit-string \(x\).

B.5.1 Equivocability

Commitments that are both extractable and equivocable seem to be very difficult to obtain. Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] proposed a solution but for one bit only. Damgård and Nielsen [DN02] proposed later another construction. But for efficiency reasons, in our specific context, we extend the former proposal. In this section, we thus enhance our previous commitment (that is already \(L\)-extractable) to make it equivocable, using the Canetti and Fischlin’s approach. Section B.5.3 will then apply a non-malleable variant of our new commitment together with the associated smooth hash function family in order to build a password-authenticated key exchange protocol with adaptive security in the UC framework [Can01]. The resulting protocol is reasonably efficient and, in particular, more efficient than the protocol by Barak et al. [BCL+05], which to our knowledge is the only one achieving the same level of security in the standard model.
**Description of the Commitment.** Our commitment scheme is a natural extension of Canetti-Fischlin commitment scheme [CF01], in a bit-by-bit way. It indeed uses the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme, for each bit of the bit-string. Let $(y_1, \ldots, y_m)$ be random elements in $G$. This commitment is realized in the common reference string model, the CRS $\rho$ contains $(G, \text{pk})$, where pk is an ElGamal public key and the private key is unknown to anybody, except to the commitment extractor. It also includes this tuple $(y_1, \ldots, y_m)$, for which the discrete logarithms in basis $g$ are unknown to anybody, except to the commitment equivocator. Let the input of the committing algorithm be a bit-string $\pi = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi_i \cdot 2^{i-1}$. The algorithm works as follows:

- For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, it chooses a random value $x_{i, \pi_i} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_{i, \pi_i} [j] \cdot 2^{j-1}$ and sets $x_{i, \pi_i} = 0$.
- For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, the algorithm commits to $\pi_i$, using the random $x_{i, \pi_i}: a_i = \text{compPed}(\pi_i, x_{i, \pi_i}) = g^{r_i \cdot \pi_i}$ and defining $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_m)$.
- For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, it computes the ElGamal commitments (see the previous section) of $x_{i, \delta}$, for $\delta = 0, 1$: $(b_{i, \delta} = (b_{i, \delta} [j])_j = \text{compEG}_{\text{pk}}(x_{i, \delta})$, where $b_{i, \delta} [j] = \text{EG}_{\text{pk}}^+(x_{i, \delta} [j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i, \delta} [j])$. One can directly extract from the computation of the $b_{i, \delta} [j]$ an encryption $B_{\delta}$ of $x_{i, \delta}$:

$$B_{\delta} = \prod_j b_{i, \delta} [j] = \text{EG}_{\text{pk}}^+(x_{i, \delta}, r_{i, \delta})$$

The entire random string for this commitment is (where $n$ is the bit-length of the prime order $q$ of the group $G$) $R = (x_{1, \pi_1}, \ldots, x_{1, \pi_m}, \ldots, x_{m, \pi_1}, \ldots, x_{m, \pi_m})$. From which, all the values $r_{i, \pi_i}$ can be erased, letting the opening data (witness of the committed value) become limited to $w = (x_{1, \pi_1}, \ldots, x_{m, \pi_m})$. The output of the committing algorithm, of the bit-string $\pi$, using the random $R$, is $\text{comp}_{\rho}(\pi; R) = (a, b)$, where $a = (a_i = \text{compPed}(\pi_i, x_{i, \pi_i})), b = (b_{i, \delta} [j] = \text{EG}_{\text{pk}}^+(x_{i, \delta} [j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i, \delta} [j]))_i, \delta, j$.

**Opening.** In order to open this commitment to $\pi$, the above witness $w$ (with the value $\pi$) is indeed enough: one can build again, for all $i$ and $j$, $b_{i, \pi_i} [j] = \text{EG}_{\text{pk}}^+(x_{i, \pi_i} [j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i, \pi_i} [j])$, and check them with $b$. One can then also compute again all the $a_i = \text{compPed}(\pi_i, x_{i, \pi_i})$, and check them with $a$. The erased random elements would help to check the encryptions of zeroes, what we do not want, since the equivocability property will exploit that.

**Properties.** Let us briefly check the security properties, which are formally proven in Appendix [BS] First, because of the perfectly hiding property of the Pedersen commitment, unless some information is leaked about the $x_{i, \delta} [j]$’s, no information is leaked about the $\pi_i$’s. And granted the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme, the former privacy is guaranteed. Since the Pedersen commitment is (computationally) binding, the $a_i$’s cannot be opened in two ways, but only one pair $(\pi_i, x_{i, \pi_i})$ is possible. Let us now consider the new extended properties:

- (conditional) extractability is provided by the bit-by-bit encryption. With the decryption key $sk$, one can decrypt all the $b_{i, \pi_i}$, and get the $x_{i, \delta}$ (unless the ciphertexts contain values different from 0 and 1, which will be one condition for extractability). Then, one can check, for $i = 1, \ldots, m$, whether $a_i = \text{compPed}(0, x_{i, \delta})$ or $a_i = \text{compPed}(1, x_{i, \delta})$, which provides $\pi_i$ (unless none of the equalities is satisfied, which will be another condition for extractability).

- equivocability is possible using the Pedersen commitment trapdoor. Instead of taking a random $x_{i, \pi_i}$ and then $x_{i, \pi_i} = 0$, which specifies $\pi_i$ as the committed bit, one takes a random $x_{i, \pi_i}$, computes $a_i = \text{compPed}(0, x_{i, \pi_i})$, but also extracts $x_{i, \pi_i}$ so that $a_i = \text{compPed}(1, x_{i, \pi_i})$ too (which is possible with the knowledge of discrete logarithm of $y_i$ in basis $g$, the trapdoor).

The rest of the commitment procedure remains the same, but now, one can open any
bit-string for \( \pi \), using the appropriate \( x_{i,\pi} \) and the corresponding random elements (the simulator did not erase).

### B.5.2 The Associated Smooth Projective Hash Function

As noticed above, our new commitment scheme is conditionally extractable (one can recover the \( x_{i,\pi} \)'s, and then the committed value \( \pi \)), under the conditions that all the ElGamal ciphertexts encrypt either 0 or 1, and the \( a_i \) is a commitment of either 0 or 1, with random \( x_{i,0} \) or \( x_{i,1} \).

As before, one wants to make the two hash values (direct computation and the one from the projected key) be the same if the two parties use the same input \( \pi \) and perfectly independent if they use different inputs (smoothness). One furthermore wants to control that each \( a_i \) is actually a Pedersen commitment of \( \pi_i \) using the encrypted random \( x_{i,\pi} \), and thus \( g^{x_i,\pi_i} = a_i/y_i^\pi_i \); the extracted \( x_{i,\pi} \) is really the private key \( M \) related to a given public key \( g_M \) that is \( a_i/y_i^\pi_i \) in our case. Using the same notations as in Section B.4.1, we want to define a smooth hash system showing that, for all \( i, \delta, j \), \( b_{i,\delta}[j] \in L_{(EG^+,\rho),0\lor1} \) and, for all \( i \), \( B_{i,\pi} \in L_{(EG^\times,\rho),a_i/y_i^\pi} \), where \( B_{i,\pi} = \prod j b_{i,\pi}[j] \).

**Combinations of these smooth hashes.** Let \( C \) be the above commitment of \( \pi \) using randomness \( R \) as defined in Section B.5.1. We now precise the language \( L_{\rho,\pi} \), consisting informally of all the valid commitments “of good shape”:

\[
L_{\rho,\pi} = \left\{ C \mid \exists R \text{ s. t. } C = \operatorname{com}_\rho(\pi, R) \text{ and } \forall i \forall j b_{i,\pi}[j] \in L_{(EG^+,\rho),0\lor1} \text{ and } \forall i B_{i,\pi} \in L_{(EG^\times,\rho),a_i/y_i^\pi} \right\}
\]

The smooth hash system for this language relies on the smooth hash systems described previously, using the generic construction for conjunctions and disjunctions as described in Section B.3. The precise definition of this language (which is constructed from conjunctions and disjunctions of simple languages) can be found in Appendix B.9, omitting the labels and replacing the Cramer-Shoup encryption \( CS^+ \) by the ElGamal one \( EG^+ \).

**Properties: Uniformity and Independence.** With a non-malleable variant of such a commitment and smooth hash function, it is possible to improve the establishment of a secure channel between two players, from the one presented Section B.4.3. More precisely, two parties can agree on a common key if they both share a common (low entropy) password \( \pi \). However, a more involved protocol than the one proposed in Section B.4.3 is needed to achieve all the required properties of a password-authenticated key exchange protocol, as it will be explained in Section B.5.3 and proven in Appendix B.10.

Nevertheless, there may seem to be a leakage of information because of the language that depends on the input \( \pi \): the projected key \( hp \) seems to contain some information about \( \pi \), that can be used in another execution by an adversary. Hence the independence and uniformity notions presented Section B.3.4, which ensure that \( hp \) does not contain any information about \( \pi \). Proofs of these properties can be found in Appendix B.9.

**Estimation of the Complexity.** Globally, each operation (commitment, projected key, hashing and projected hashing) requires \( O(mn) \) exponentiations in \( G \), with small constants (at most 16).

### B.5.3 UC-Secure PAKE with Adaptive Security

The primitive presented above, but using the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme (as described in Section B.3.9) is a non-malleable conditionally extractable and equivocable commitment. We now sketch how to use this new primitive in order to construct the first efficient adaptively-secure
password-authenticated key exchange protocol in the UC framework with erasures. For lack of space, all the details can be found in Appendix B.10. The passwords are not known at the beginning of the simulation: \( S \) will manage to correct the errors (thanks to the equivocability) but without erasures there would remain clues on how the computations were held, which would give indications on the passwords used.

Our protocol is based on that of Gennaro and Lindell [GL03]. At a high level, the players in the KOY/GL protocol exchange CCA-secure encryptions of the password, under the public-key found in the common reference string, which are essentially commitments of the password. Then, they compute the session key by combining smooth projective hashes of the two password/ciphertext pairs. The security of this protocol relies on the properties of smoothness and pseudo-randomness of the smooth projective hash function. But as noted by Canetti et al in [CHK+05], the KOY/GL protocol is not known to achieve UC security: the main issue is that the ideal-model simulator must be able to extract the password used by the adversary before playing, which is impossible if the simulator is the initiator (on behalf of the client), leading to such situation in which the simulator is stuck with an incorrect ciphertext and will not be able to predict the value of the session key.

To overcome this problem, the authors of [CHK+05] made the client send a pre-flow which also contains an encryption of the password. The server then sends its own encryption, and finally the client sends another encryption, as well as a zero-knowledge proof showing that both ciphertexts are consistent and encrypt the same password. This time the simulator, playing as the client or the server, is able to use the correct password, recovered from the encrypted value sent earlier by the other party. The pre-flow is never used in the remaining of the protocol, hence the simulator can send a fake one, and simulate the zero-knowledge proof.

Unfortunately, the modification above does not seem to work when dealing with adaptive adversaries, which is the case in which we are interested. This is because the simulator cannot correctly open the commitment when the adversary corrupts the client after the pre-flow has been sent. A similar remark applies to the case in which the server gets corrupted after sending its first message. As a result, in addition to being extractable, the commitment scheme also needs to be equivocable for the simulator to be able to provide a consistent view to the adversary. Since the use of the equivocable and extractable commitment schemes also seems to solve the problem of proving the original Gennaro-Lindell protocol secure in the UC model, we opted to use that protocol as the starting point of our protocol.

These remarks are indeed enough (along with minor modifications) to obtain adaptive security. Thus, our solution essentially consists in using our non-malleable extractable and equivocable commitment scheme in the Gennaro-Lindell protocol when computing the first two flows. As presented in the previous subsections, extractability may be conditional: We include this condition in the language of the smooth hash function (note that the projected keys sent do not leak any information about the password). Additional technical modifications were also needed to make things work and can be found in Appendix B.10.

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B.6 Appendix: Formal Definitions for Smooth Projective Hash Functions

As defined in \cite{GL03}, a family of smooth projective hash functions, for a language $L_{pk,aux} \subset X$, onto the set $G$, based on a labeled encryption scheme with public key $pk$ or on a commitment scheme with public parameters $pk$ consists of four algorithms and is denoted by $\text{HASH}(pk) = (\text{HashKG}, \text{ProjKG}, \text{Hash}, \text{ProjHash})$. Note that $X$ is the range of either the encryption or commitment algorithm.

The probabilistic key-generation algorithm produces hash keys via $hk \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(pk, aux)$. The key projection algorithm produces projected hash keys via $hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c)$, where $c$ is either a ciphertext or a commitment in $X$. The hashing algorithm $\text{Hash}$ computes, on $c \in X$, the hash value $g = \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c) \in G$, using the hash key $hk$. Finally, the projected hashing algorithm $\text{ProjHash}$ computes, on $c \in X$, the hash value $g = \text{ProjHash}(hp; pk, aux, c; w) \in G$, using the projected hash key $hp$ and a witness $w$ of the fact that $c \in L_{pk,aux}$.

We now recall the three properties of a smooth hash system.

Correctness. Let $c \in L_{pk,aux}$ and $w$ a witness of this membership. Then, for all hash keys and projected hash keys $hk \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(pk, aux)$ and $hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c)$, then $\text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c) = \text{ProjHash}(hp; pk, aux, c; w)$.

Smoothness. For every $c$ which is not in $L_{pk,aux}$, the hash value $g = \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c)$ is statistically close to uniform and independent of the values $hp$, $pk$, $aux$ and $c$: for uniformly-chosen hash key $hk$, the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable:

\[
\{pk, aux, c, hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c), \ g = \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c)\} \\
\{pk, aux, c, hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c), \ g \xleftarrow{\$} G\}
\]

Pseudorandomness. If $c \in L_{pk,aux}$, then without a witness $w$ of this membership, the hash value $g = \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c)$ is computationally indistinguishable from random: for uniformly-chosen hash key $hk$, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

\[
\{pk, aux, c, hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c), \ g = \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, c)\} \\
\{pk, aux, c, hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, c), \ g \xleftarrow{\$} G\}
\]

Let $L_{pk,aux}$ be such that it is hard to distinguish a random element in $L_{pk,aux}$ from a random element not in $L_{pk,aux}$. Gennaro and Lindell formalized the latter property by showing in \cite{GL03} that the two following experiments are indistinguishable:

\text{Expt-Hash}(D): Let $D$ be a adversary that is given access to two oracles: $\Omega$ and $\text{Hash}$. The first oracle receives an empty input and returns $x \in L_{pk,aux}$ chosen according to the distribution of $L_{pk,aux}$. The $\text{Hash}$ oracle receives an input $x$. If $x$ was not previously outputted by $\Omega$, it outputs nothing. Otherwise, it chooses a key $hk$ and returns the pair $(\text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, x), \text{Hash}(hk; pk, aux, x))$. The output of the experiment is whatever $M$ outputs.

\text{Expt-Unif}(D): This experiment is defined exactly as above except that the $\text{Hash}$ oracle is replaced by the following $\text{Unif}$ oracle. On input $x$, if $x$ was not previously outputted by $\Omega$, it outputs nothing. Otherwise, it chooses a key $hk$ and a random element $g$ and returns the pair $(\text{ProjKG}(hk; pk, aux, x), g)$. The output of the experiment is whatever $M$ outputs.

In the case where the language $L_{pk,aux}$ is associated with a labeled encryption scheme, we rename the oracle $\Omega$ to $\text{Enc}$. In the case where the language $L_{pk,aux}$ is associated with a commitment scheme, we rename the oracle $\Omega$ to $\text{Commit}$. 

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B.7 Appendix: Proofs for SPHF Constructions in Section B.3

In this appendix, we prove the properties of the smooth projective hash functions on conjunctions and disjunctions of languages.

B.7.1 Disjunction

We first deal with \( L = L_1 \cup L_2 \), and study the additional information provided by the projected key, which contains \( h_{p_1} \) and \( h_{p_2} \), but also \( h_{p_\Delta} = Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x) \oplus Hash_2(h_{k_2}; \rho, aux, x) \).

Since both SHA1 and SHA2 are smooth projective hash functions, the pseudo-randomness property for each of them (or even the smoothness, if \( x \) does not lie in one of the languages) guarantees that the pairs \((h_{p_1}, Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x))\) are (statistically or computationally) indistinguishable from \((h_{p_1}, g_1)\). As a consequence, one easily gets that the tuple \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x), Hash_2(h_{k_2}; \rho, aux, x))\) is (statistically or computationally) indistinguishable from \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, g_1, g_2)\), where \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are independent. This a fortiori implies that the tuple \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x) \oplus Hash_2(h_{k_2}; \rho, aux, x))\) is (statistically or computationally) indistinguishable from \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, g)\): the element \( h_{p_\Delta} \) does not provide any additional information.

Efficient Hashing from Key. Given any element \( x \in X \) and a key \( h_k \), it is possible to efficiently compute \( Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) \).

Proof: This follows from the efficient hashings of the two underlying smooth projective hash functions, and namely SHA1, since \( Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) = Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x) \).

Efficient Hashing from Projected Key. Given an element \( x \in L \), a witness \( w \) of this membership, and the projected key \( hp = ProjKG_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) \), it is possible to efficiently compute the projected hash value \( ProjHash_L(hp; \rho, aux, x, w) = Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) \).

Proof: If \( x \in L_1 \), then,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hash}_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) &= \text{Hash}_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x) \\
&= \text{ProjHash}_1(h_{p_1}; \rho, aux, x, w) = \text{ProjHash}_L(hp; \rho, aux, x, w),
\end{align*}
\]

which can be computed efficiently since SHA1 is a smooth projective hash function. If \( x \in L_2 \), then,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hash}_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) &= \text{Hash}_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x) \\
&= \text{ProjHash}_1(h_{p_1}; \rho, aux, x, w) = h_{p_\Delta} \oplus \text{ProjHash}_2(h_{p_2}; \rho, aux, x, w),
\end{align*}
\]

which can be computed efficiently since SHA2 is a smooth projective hash function.

Smoothness. For each element \( x \in X \setminus L \), \( Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) \) is uniformly distributed, given the projected key.

Proof: Consider \( x \notin L \). Then, \( x \notin L_1 \) and \( x \notin L_2 \). If \( h_k = (h_{k_1}, h_{k_2}) \) is a random key, and \( hp = (h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, h_{p_\Delta}) \) the corresponding projected key, then the above analysis showed the statistical indistinguishability between the tuples \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, Hash_1(h_{k_1}; \rho, aux, x), Hash_2(h_{k_2}; \rho, aux, x))\) and \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, g_1, g_2)\), where \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are random and independent elements. This means the statistical indistinguishability between the tuples \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, h_{p_\Delta}, Hash_1(h_k; \rho, aux, x))\) and \((h_{p_1}, h_{p_2}, g_1, g_2)\). As a consequence, the tuple \((hp, Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x))\) is statistically indistinguishable from \((hp, g)\), which is the definition of the smoothness for the new system.

Pseudo-Randomness. For each element \( x \in L \), the value \( Hash_L(h_k; \rho, aux, x) \) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform, given the projected key.
B.8 Appendix: Proofs for Commitment in Section B.5

Proof: Exactly the same analysis as in the previous paragraph can be done, but with computational indistinguishability when \( x \in L_1 \) or \( x \in L_2 \). Hence one gets that the tuple \((hp, \text{Hash}_L(hk; \rho, aux, x))\) is computationally indistinguishable from \((hp, g)\), which is the definition of the pseudo-randomness for the new system. 

B.7.2 Conjunction

The case of \( L = L_1 \cap L_2 \), can be dealt as above: \((hp_1, hp_2, \text{Hash}_1(hk_1; \rho, aux, x) \oplus \text{Hash}_2(hk_2; \rho, aux, x))\) is statistically (if \( x \notin L_1 \) or \( x \notin L_2 \)) or computationally (if \( x \in L_1 \cap L_2 \)) indistinguishable from the tuple \((hp_1, hp_2, g)\).

B.7.3 Preservation of the Uniformity and Independence Properties.

If the two underlying smooth hash systems verify 1-uniformity (resp. 2-uniformity), then the smooth hash system for conjunction or disjunction verifies these properties. If the two underlying smooth hash systems verify 1-independence (resp. 2-independence), then the smooth hash system for conjunction verifies these properties. We insist on the fact that independence does not propagate to disjunction, since the hash value (that needs both \( aux \) and \( x \)) is included in the projected key.

Proof: We only prove the result for 1-uniformity for disjunction (the proof is the same in the other cases —excepted independence for disjunction, where the result does not hold). Then, if \((\rho, aux)\) are the parameters of the languages and \( x \) and \( x' \) belong to \( L \), \( D_{1,\rho,aux,x} \approx D_{1,\rho,aux,x'} \) and \( D_{2,\rho,aux,x} \approx D_{2,\rho,aux,x'} \). Due to the form of \( hp \), this ensures that the first two element of \( hp \) are indistinguishable. We now have to consider the third part. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that \( x \in L_1 \). Then, due to the pseudo-randomness of the first smooth-hash, the value \( \text{Hash}_1(hk_1; \rho, aux, x) \) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. This is at least the same for the value \( \text{Hash}_2(hk_2; \rho, aux, x) \). Since the projected keys depend on independent random values and languages, both parts of the \( \oplus \) are independent: the value \( \text{Hash}_L(hk_L; \rho, aux, x) \) is then indistinguishable from uniform. As a result, \( D_{\rho,aux,x} \approx D_{\rho,aux,x'} \). 

B.8 Appendix: Proofs for Commitment in Section B.5

Extractability. The extraction key is \( sk \), the ElGamal decryption key (or the Cramer-Shoup one in the non-malleable version of the primitive, also used for the ElGamal decryption). First, the simulator tries to decrypt all the \( b_{i,j} \) into \( x_{i,j} \) and aborts if one of them is not either 0 or 1. It then builds up the \( x_{i,j} \), and checks whether \( a_i = g^{x_i,0} \) or \( a_i = g^{x_i,1} y_i \), which makes it recover \( \pi_i \) (unless none or both are satisfied). This extraction only fails in three cases:

- First, if the ciphertexts do not encrypt 0 or 1;
- Second, if \( a_i \) satisfies none of the equalities;
- Third, if \( a_i \) satisfies both equalities.

The two first reasons will be excluded in the language \( L \), while the third one would break the binding property of the Pedersen commitment, which leads to the discrete logarithm of some \( y_i \) in base \( g \). It thus happens only with negligible probability.

Equivocability. Note that, with the knowledge of the discrete logarithms of \((y_1, \ldots, y_m)\), one is able to compute, for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \), both \( x_{i,0} \) and \( x_{i,1} \). The equivocation thus consists in
computing, for all $i$, an encryption of both $x_{i,0}$ and $x_{i,1}$ (and not that of 0). Provided one does not erase any random, this allows one to change its mind and open each commitment on any $\pi_i$ (0 or 1).

We now prove that committing to all the bit-string $\pi$ in a unique commitment does not change the view of an adversary. The proof is based on a Left-or-Right hybrid argument, see [BDJR97]. We suppose the existence of an oracle answering with either $E(g^x)$ or $E(g^0)$ when provided with $g^x$ (and $g^0$ is implicitly given). We then define hybrid games in which the encryptions for $x_{i,\pi_i}[j]$ in the commitment are computed with the help of this oracle. The first hybrid game, in which the oracle always encrypts $g^0$, is equivalent to the real computation, where only one bit-string is committed (perfectly binding). Similarly, the last one, in which it always encrypts $g^x$, is equivalent to the simulation, where all the bit-strings are committed (equivocable).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$G_{1a}$</th>
<th>$G_{1-b} = G_{2-a}$</th>
<th>$G_{2-b} = G_{3-a}$</th>
<th>$G_{mn-b}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$g^{x_{i,\pi_i}}[1]$</td>
<td>$g^{x_{i,\pi_i}}[1]$</td>
<td>$g^{x_{i,\pi_i}}[1]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>...</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$g^{x_{m,\pi_m}}[n]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hiding.** This property simply follows from the equivocability of the commitment.

**Binding.** First suppose that we do not know the discrete logarithms of $(y_1, \ldots, y_m)$ in base $g$ and that the adversary has managed to send a commitment that can be opened on $\pi$ and on $\pi'$, then, for some bit $i = 1, \ldots, m$, $\pi_i \neq \pi'_i$, and the adversary is able to give us $x_i \neq x'_i$ such that $g^{x_i}y^{\pi_i} = g^{x'_i}y^{\pi'_i}$. This event thus boils down to breaking the discrete logarithm problem, which happens only with negligible probability. This means that if equivocability is not used, the commitment is (computationally) binding, under the discrete logarithm problem.

Now, since a real commitment (with a zero encryption) and an equivocable commitment (with no zero encryption) are indistinguishable for an adversary, the view of equivocable commitments does not help the adversary to break the binding property, or otherwise it would break the IND-CPA property of the underlying encryption scheme.

### B.9 Appendix: A Non-Malleable Conditionally-Extractable Equivocable Commitment

In this section, we show how to enhance the previous commitment schemes as described in Section [B.5] with non-malleability: briefly, one simply needs to extend the ElGamal commitment to the labeled Cramer-Shoup one together with one-time signatures. As before, if $b$ is a bit, we denote its complement by $\overline{b}$ (i.e., $\overline{b} = 1 - b$). We furthermore denote by $x[i]$ the $i^{th}$ bit of the bit-string $x$.

#### B.9.1 Non-Malleability

Non-malleability is a usual requirement for encryption schemes or commitments [GL03]. We thus now aim at achieving this property. We thus use labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption instead of ElGamal, and we add a one-time signature. Using the results of Dodis and Katz [DK05] for chosen-ciphertext security of multiple encryption, one can easily show that the chosen-ciphertext...
security (and thus non-malleability) of the combined encryption scheme used to compute a ciphertext vector \((b_1, \ldots, b_m)\) follows trivially from the chosen-ciphertext security of the underlying labeled Cramer-Shoup scheme and strong unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme used to link all the ciphertexts together.

More precisely, if \(M\) is defined as before, and \(\ell\) is a label, the commitment \(\text{comCS}^\ell_{pk}(M)\) is obtained as follows. First, the user generates a key pair \((VK, SK)\) for a one-time signature scheme. Then, it computes the following values, with \(\ell' = \ell \circ VK\):

\[
\forall i \quad b_i = \text{CS}^\ell_{pk}(M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}, r_i) = (u_{1,i} = g_1^{r_i}, u_{2,i} = g_2^{r_i}, e_i = h^{r_i}g^{M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}}, v_i = (cd^\theta)^{r_i}).
\]

Defining \(b = (b_1, \ldots, b_m)\), it computes \(\sigma = \text{Sign}(SK, b)\). The final commitment is then defined as \(\text{comCS}^\ell_{pk}(M) = (b, VK, \sigma)\). One can obtain, from any \(b_i\), an ElGamal encryption of \(M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}\):

\[
B_i = \text{EG}^+_{pk}(M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}, r_i) = (u_{1,i} = g_1^{r_i}, e_i = h^r g^{M_i \cdot 2^{i-1}}).\]

The homomorphic property of the encryption scheme allows to obtain \(B = \text{EG}^+_{pk}(g^M, \sum r_i) = \text{EG}^+_{pk}(M, \sum r_i) = (\prod u_{1,i}, \prod e_i) = \prod B_i\).

In order to define the smooth projective hashing associated with this commitment scheme, we recall the family of smooth projective hashing functions for the underlying labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, as defined in [GL03].

Let \(X' = G^4\) and \(L' = L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, M)}\) be the language of the elements \(C\) such that \(C\) is a valid Cramer-Shoup encryption of \(M\) under the label \(\ell\) (aux is defined as \((\ell, M)\)). Under the DDH assumption, this is a hard subset membership problem. Denoting by \(C = \text{CS}^+_{pk}(M, r) = (u_1, u_2, e, v)\), the associated smooth hash system is the following:

\[
\text{HashKG}((\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, M)) = (hk = (\gamma_1 \hat{u}, \gamma_2 \hat{u}, \gamma_3 \hat{u}, \gamma_4 \hat{u}) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q)
\]

\[
\text{ProjKG}(hk; (\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, M), C) = (hp = (g_1)^{\gamma_1 \hat{u}}(g_2)^{\gamma_2 \hat{u}}(h)^{\gamma_3 \hat{u}}(cd^\theta)^{\gamma_4 \hat{u}})
\]

\[
\text{Hash}(hk; (\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, M), C) = (u_1)^{\gamma_1 \hat{u}}(u_2)^{\gamma_2 \hat{u}}(eg^M)^{\gamma_3 \hat{u}}(v)^{\gamma_4 \hat{u}}
\]

\[
\text{ProjHash}(hp; (\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, M), C; r) = (hp)^r
\]

From these definitions, we consider the language: \(L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, 0 \lor 1)} = L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, 0)} \cup L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, 1)}\), where \(L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, 0)} = \{ C \mid \exists r \ C = \text{CS}^+_{pk}(0, r) \}\) and \(L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell, 1)} = \{ C \mid \exists r \ C = \text{CS}^+_{pk}(1, r) \}\), and we want to define a smooth hash system showing that

\[
\forall i \quad b_i \in L_{(\text{CS}^+, \rho), (\ell', 0 \lor 1)} \quad \text{and} \quad B = \prod B_i \in L_{(\text{EG}^x, \rho), g^M}.
\]

Note that, for all \(i\), the first membership also implies that \(B_i \in L_{(\text{EG}^+, \rho), 0 \lor 1}\), since the ElGamal ciphertexts \(B_i\) are extracted from the corresponding Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts \(b_i\): It is thus enough to check the validity of the latter membership to get extractability, which means that one can extract the committed private key \(M\), associated to the public key \(g^M\). The signature has of course to be verified too, but this can be publicly performed, from VK.

### B.9.2 Equivocability

We here describe our commitment for completeness, but note that it is very similar to the one described in Section [B.3].

**Description of the Commitment.** Our scheme uses the labeled Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme and a one-time signature scheme, to achieve non-malleability as explained in the previous section. More precisely, the specific example given in this section relies on the labeled version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98], used for each bit of the bit-string, seen as an extension of the homomorphic ElGamal encryption [ElG85b].

Let the input of the committing algorithm be a bit-string \(\pi = \sum_{i=1}^m \pi_i \cdot 2^{i-1}\) and a label \(\ell\). The algorithm works as follows:

---

[71x72]
• For \( i = 1,\ldots,m \), it chooses a random value \( x_{i,\pi_i} = \sum_{j=1}^n x_{i,\pi_i}[j] \cdot 2^{j-1} \) and sets \( x_{i,\pi_i} = 0 \). It also generates a key pair \((VK, SK)\) for a one-time signature scheme.

• For \( i = 1,\ldots,m \), it commits to \( \pi_i \), using the random \( x_{i,\pi_i} : a_i = \text{comPed}(\pi_i, x_{i,\pi_i}) = g^{x_{i,\pi_i} y_i^{\pi_i}} \), and defining \( a = (a_1,\ldots,a_m) \).

• For \( i = 1,\ldots,m \), using \( \ell_i = \ell \circ VK \circ a \circ i \), it computes the Cramer-Shoup commitments (see the previous section) of \( x_{i,\delta} \), for \( \delta = 0,1 \):

\[
(b_{i,\delta} = (b_{i,\delta}[j])_j, VK, \sigma_{i,\delta}) = \text{comCS}_{pk}^{\ell_i}(x_{i,\delta}), \text{ where } b_{i,\delta}[j] = \text{CS}_{pk}^{\ell_i}(x_{i,\delta}[j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i,\delta}[j]).
\]

The computation of the \( b_{i,\delta}[j] \) implicitly defines \( B_{i,\delta}[j] = \text{EG}_{pk}^{\ell_i}(x_{i,\delta}[j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i,\delta}[j]) \), from which one can directly extract an encryption \( B_{i,\delta} \) of \( x_{i,\delta} : B_{i,\delta} = \prod_j B_{i,\delta}[j] = \text{EG}_{pk}^{\ell_i}(x_{i,\delta}, r_{i,\delta}) \), where \( r_{i,\delta} \) is the sum of the random coins \( r_{i,j}[\delta] \).

The entire random string for this commitment is (where \( n \) is the bit-length of the prime order \( q \) of the group \( G \)) \( R = (x_{1,\pi_1}, (r_{1,0}[1], r_{1,1}[1], \ldots, r_{1,0}[n], r_{1,1}[n]), \ldots, x_{m,\pi_m}, (r_{m,0}[1], \ldots, r_{m,1}[n]), SK) \). From which, all the values \( r_{i,\pi_i}[j] \) can be erased, letting the opening data (witness of the committed value) become \( w = (x_{1,\pi_1}, (r_{1,\pi_1}[1], \ldots, r_{1,\pi_1}[n]), \ldots, x_{m,\pi_m}, (r_{m,\pi_m}[1], \ldots, r_{m,\pi_m}[n])). \)

The output of the committing algorithm, of the bit-string \( \pi \), with the label \( \ell \), and using the random \( R \), is \( \text{com}_p(\ell, \pi; R) = (\ell, a, b, VK, \sigma) \), where \( a = (a_i = \text{comPed}(\pi_i, x_{i,\pi_i}))_i \), \( b = (b_{i,\delta}[j] = \text{CS}_{pk}^{\ell_i}(x_{i,\delta}[j] \cdot 2^{j-1}, r_{i,\delta}[j]))_i,\delta \), and \( \sigma = (\sigma_{i,\delta} = \text{Sign}(SK, (b_{i,\delta}[j]_j))_i,\delta \).

**Properties.** This commitment is opened as in Section B.5 and the proofs given in Section B.8 still hold.

Furthermore, let us show now that the view of equivocable commitments does not help the adversary to build a valid but non-extractable commitment (it could be open in any way, and thus extraction leads to many possibilities) due to the CCA property of the encryption. As in Appendix B.8 we use a Left-or-Right argument, see [BDJR97]. The “left” oracle, which always provides the player with an encryption \( \mathcal{E}(g^a) \), is equivalent to the game where no equivocable commitments are available, and the “right” oracle, which always provides him with \( \mathcal{E}(g^x) \), is equivalent to the game where the commitments are equivocable. Then, if the adversary was more likely to build a valid but non-extractable commitment in the latter case than in the former one, one could construct a distinguisher to the Left-or-Right oracles. However, contrarily to the proof in Appendix B.8, a decryption oracle is required to check whether the commitment is valid but non-extractable (whereas in Appendix B.8 the adversary breaks the binding property with two different opening values).

As a consequence, producing valid but non-extractable commitments is not easier when equivocable commitments are provided to the adversary, than when no equivocable commitments are provided, under the IND-CCA security of the encryption scheme. Furthermore, a valid but non-extractable commitment, with a decryption oracle leads to two different opening values for the commitment, and thus to an attack against the binding property, which relies on the discrete logarithm problem.

The additional property is non-malleability, and it is guaranteed by the labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme (IND-CCA) and the one-time signature, as already explained [DK05]. More precisely, for the results of Dodis and Katz [DK05] for chosen-ciphertext security of multiple encryption, one can easily show that the chosen-ciphertext security of the combined encryption scheme used to compute ciphertext vector \( b \) follows trivially from the chosen-ciphertext security of the underlying labeled Cramer-Shoup scheme and strong unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme used to link all the ciphertexts together.
B.9.3 The Associated Smooth Projective Hash Function

As noticed above, our new commitment scheme is conditionally extractable (one can recover the $x_{i,a}$’s, and then $\pi$), under the conditions that all the Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts encrypt either 0 or 1, and the $a_i$ is a commitment of either 0 or 1, with random $x_{i,0}$ or $x_{i,1}$.

Since we want to apply it later to the password-based setting, we want to make the two hash values (direct computation and the one from the projected key) to be the same if the two parties use the same password $\pi$, but perfectly independent if they use different passwords: using their password $\pi = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \pi_i \cdot 2^{i-1}$, one furthermore wants to ensure that each $a_i$ is actually a Pedersen commitment of $\pi_i$ using the encrypted random $x_{i,\pi_i}$, and thus $g^{2^{\pi_i \cdot } y_i} = a_i / y_i^{2^{\pi_i}}$; the extracted $x_{i,\pi_i}$ is the private key $M$ related to a given public key $g^M$ that is $a_i / y_i^{2^{\pi_i}}$ in our case. Using the same notations as in Section B.9.1, we want to define a smooth hash system showing that, for all $i, \delta, j$, $b_{i,\delta}[j] \in L_i(\text{CS}^{+}, \rho, (\ell, 0))$ and, for all $i$, $B_{i,\pi_i} \in L_i(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho, (a_i / y_i^{\pi_i}))$, where $B_{i,\pi_i} = \prod B_{i,\pi_i}[j]$.

As before, note that, for all $i, \delta, j$, the first membership also implies that $B_{i,\delta}[j] \in L_i(\text{EG}^{+}, \rho, 0)$ since this value is extracted from the corresponding value $b_{i,\delta}[j]$: It is thus enough to check the validity of the latter.

**Combinations of these smooth hashes.** Let $C$ be the above commitment of $\pi$ using label $\ell$ and randomness $R$ as defined in Section B.9.2. We now precise the language $L_{\rho, (\ell, \pi)}$, consisting informally of all the valid commitments “of good shape”:

$$L_{\rho, (\ell, \pi)} = \left\{ C \mid \exists R \text{ such that } C = \text{com}_\rho(\ell, \pi, R) \right.$$ 

and $\forall i \forall \delta \forall j \ b_{i,\delta}[j] \in L_i(\text{CS}^{+}, \rho, (\ell, 0))$ and $\forall i \ B_{i,\pi_i} \in L_i(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho, a_i / y_i^{\pi_i})$

The smooth hash system for this language relies on the smooth hash systems described in the previous subsection, using the generic construction for conjunctions and disjunctions as described in Section B.3. More precisely, adding the values $B_{i,\delta}$ easily computed from the values $b_{i,\delta}[j]$, the commitment can be converted into a tuple of the following form (we omit the signature part, since it has to be verified before applying any hashing computation):

$$\{0,1\}^s \times G^m \times (G^4)^{2n} \times \ldots \times (G^4 \times G^4 \times \ldots \times L_i(\text{CS}^{+}, \rho, (\ell, 0)) \times \ldots \times G^4 \times G^4) \times \ldots \times (G^4)^{2n} \times (G^2)^{2m}$$

and by $L_{i}(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho)$ the language that restricts the $B_{i,\pi_i}$ ElGamal ciphertexts:

if $\pi_i = 0$, $L_{i}(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho) = \{0,1\}^s \times G^m \times (G^4)^{2mn} \times (G^2)^{2} \times \ldots \times L_i(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho, a_i / y_i^{\pi_i}) \times (G^2)^{2} \times \ldots \times (G^2)^{2}$

if $\pi_i = 1$, $L_{i}(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho) = \{0,1\}^s \times G^m \times (G^4)^{2mn} \times (G^2)^{2} \times \ldots \times L_i(\text{EG}^{x}, \rho, a_i / y_i^{\pi_i}) \times (G^2)^{2} \times \ldots \times (G^2)^{2}$
Chapter B. Smooth Projective Hashing for Conditionally Extractable Commitments

Then, our language \( L_{\rho,(\ell,\pi)} \) is the conjunction of all these languages, where the \( L_{(\text{CS}^+,\rho),(\ell,0/1)}^{i,\delta,j} \)‘s are disjunctions:

\[
L_{\rho,(\ell,\pi)} = \left( \bigcap_{i,\delta,j} L_{(\text{CS}^+,\rho),(\ell,0/1)}^{i,\delta,j} \right) \cap \left( \bigcap_i L_{(\text{EG}^+,\rho)}^{i} \right).
\]

Properties: Uniformity and Independence. With such a commitment and smooth hash function, it is possible to improve the establishment of a secure channel between two players, from the one presented Section B.4.3. More precisely, two parties can agree on a common key if they both share a common (low entropy) password \( \pi \). However, a more involved protocol than the one proposed in Section B.4.3 is needed to achieve all the required properties of a password-authenticated key exchange protocol, as it will be explained and proven in the next appendix.

Nevertheless, there may seem to be a leakage of information because of the language that depends on the password \( \pi \): the projected key \( \rho \) seems to contain some information about \( \pi \), that can be used in another execution by an adversary. Hence the independence and uniformity notions presented Section B.3.3 which ensure that \( \rho \) does not contain any information about \( \pi \):

- for the languages \( L_{(\text{EG}^+,\rho)}^{i} \), the smooth hash functions satisfy the 2-independence property, since the projected key for a language \( L_{(\text{EG}^+,\rho)},M \) depends on the public key (and thus \( \rho \)) only. One thus generates one key for each pair \((B_{i,0},B_{i,1})\) only, and uses the correct ciphertext according to actual/wanted \( \pi_i \) when evaluating the hash value. But this distinction on \( \pi_i \) appears in the computation of the hash value only, that is pseudo-random. The projected key is totally independent of \( \pi_i \).

- for the languages \( L_{(\text{CS}^+,\rho),(\ell,0/1)}^{i,\delta,j} \), the smooth hash functions satisfy the 2-uniformity property only, but not 2-independence. Therefore, the projected key and \((\text{aux},\rho)\) are statistically independent, but the former depends, in its computation, of the latter. If we want the equivocability property for the commitment (as needed in the next section), we have to include all the pairs \((b_{i,0}[j],b_{i,1}[j])\), and not only the \( b_{i,\pi_i}[j]\), so that we can open later in any way. Because of 2-uniformity instead of 2-independence, we need a key for each element of the pair, and not only one as above.

Estimation of the Complexity. Globally, each operation (commitment, projected key, hashing and projected hashing) requires \( \mathcal{O}(mn) \) exponentiations in \( G \), with small constants (at most 16).

Let us first consider the commitment operation, on a \( m \)-bit secret \( \pi \), over a \( n \)-bit group \( G \). One has first to make \( m \) Pedersen commitments of one bit (\( m \) exponentiations) and then \( 2mn \) additive Cramer-Shoup encryptions (2 exponentiations and 2 multi-exponentiations each, and thus approximately the cost of \( 8mn \) exponentiations).

About the smooth hash function, the hash key generation just consists in generating random elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \): 8 for each Cramer-Shoup ciphertext, in order to show that they encrypt either 0 or 1, and 2 for each pair of ElGamal ciphertexts, then globally \( 2m(8n+1) \) random elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). The projected keys need exponentiations: \( m(4n+1) \) multi-exponentiations, and \( 4mn \) hash evaluations (one multi-exponentiation each). Then, globally, the cost of \( m(8n+1) \) exponentiations in \( G \) is required for the projected key. Finally, the hash computations are essentially the same using the hash key or the projected key, since for the sub-functions, the former consists of one multi-exponentiation and the latter consists of 1 exponentiation. They both cost \( m(4n+1) \) exponentiations, after the multiplications needed to compute the \( B_{i,\pi_i} \), which are negligible.
Appendix: A New Adaptively-Secure PAKE Protocol in the UC Framework

B.10.1 Password-Based Key Exchange and Universal Composability

The Password-Based Key Exchange Functionality.

In this section, we present the password-based key-exchange functionality $F_{pwKE}$ (see Figure B.1) first described in [CHK+05]. The main idea behind this functionality is as follows: If neither party is corrupted, then they both end up with the same uniformly-distributed session key, and the adversary learns nothing about it (except that it was indeed generated). However, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player’s password (the session is then marked as compromised), then it is granted the right to fully determine its session key. Note that as soon as a party is corrupted, the adversary learns its key: There is in fact nothing lost by allowing it to determine the key.

In addition, the players become aware of a failed attempt of the adversary at guessing a password. This is modeled by marking the session as interrupted. In this case, the two players are given independently-chosen random keys.

A session that is neither compromised nor interrupted is called fresh. In such a case, the two parties receive the same, uniformly distributed session key.

Finally notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where the password is used in different protocols. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy.

The KOY/GL Protocol.

The starting point of our protocol is the password-based key exchange protocol of Katz, Ostrovsky and Yung [KOY01], generalized by Gennaro and Lindell in [GL03]. At a high level, the players in the KOY/GL protocol exchange CCA-secure encryptions of the password, under the public-key found in the common reference string, which is essentially a commitment of the password. Then, they compute the session key by combining smooth projective hashes of the two password/ciphertext pairs. More precisely, each player chooses a hashing key for a smooth projective hash function and sends the corresponding projected key to the other player. Each player can thus compute the output of its own hash function with the help of the hashing key, and the output of the other one using the projected key and its knowledge of the randomness that was used to generate the ciphertext of the password. All the flows generated by a party are linked together with a one-time signature, generated in the last flow, but which public key is included in the label of the CCA-secure encryption of the password.

To understand informally why this protocol is secure, first consider the case in which the adversary plays a passive role. In this case, the pseudo-randomness property of the smooth hash function ensures that the value of the session key will be computationally indistinguishable from uniform since the adversary does not know the randomness that was used to encrypt the password. Now imagine the case in which the adversary provides the user with an encryption of the wrong password. In this case, the security of the protocol will rely on the smoothness of the hash functions, which ensures that the session key will be random and independent of
The functionality $F_{pwKE}$ is parameterized by a security parameter $k$. It interacts with an adversary $S$ and a set of parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ via the following queries:

- **Upon receiving a query $(\text{NewSession}, sid, P_i, P_j, pw, \text{role})$ from party $P_i$:**  
  Send $(\text{NewSession}, sid, P_i, P_j, \text{role})$ to $S$. If this is the first $\text{NewSession}$ query, or if this is the second $\text{NewSession}$ query and there is a record $(P_j, P_i, pw')$, then record $(P_i, P_j, pw)$ and mark this record fresh.

- **Upon receiving a query $(\text{TestPwd}, sid, P_i, pw')$ from the adversary $S$:**  
  If there is a record of the form $(P_i, P_j, pw)$ which is fresh, then do: If $pw = pw'$, mark the record compromised and reply to $S$ with “correct guess”. If $pw \neq pw'$, mark the record interrupted and reply with “wrong guess”.

- **Upon receiving a query $(\text{NewKey}, sid, P_i, sk)$ from the adversary $S$:**  
  If there is a record of the form $(P_i, P_j, pw)$, and this is the first $\text{NewKey}$ query for $P_i$, then:
  
  - If this record is compromised, or either $P_i$ or $P_j$ is corrupted, then output $(sid, sk)$ to player $P_i$.
  - If this record is fresh, and there is a record $(P_j, P_i, pw')$ with $pw' = pw$, and a key $sk'$ was sent to $P_j$, and $(P_j, P_i, pw)$ was fresh at the time, then output $(sid, sk')$ to $P_i$.
  
  - In any other case, pick a new random key $sk'$ of length $k$ and send $(sid, sk')$ to $P_i$.

  Either way, mark the record $(P_i, P_j, pw)$ as completed.

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**Figure B.1:** The password-based key-exchange functionality $F_{pwKE}$

all former communication. Thus, in order to be successful, the adversary has to generate the encryption of the correct password. To do so, the adversary could try to copy or modify existing ciphertexts. Since the encryption scheme is CCA-secure, and thus non-malleable, modifying is not really a possibility. Copying does not help either since either the label used for encryption will not match (making the session key look random due to the smoothness property) or the signature will be invalid (in the case where the adversary changes the projection keys without changing the label and hence the verification key). As a result, the only successful strategy left for the adversary is essentially to guess the password and perform the trivial online dictionary attack, as desired.

**Extending the protocol to the UC Framework (Static Case).** As noted by Canetti et al in [CHK+05], the KOY/GL protocol is not known to achieve UC security: the main issue is that the ideal-model simulator must be able to extract the password used by the adversary. One could think that, since the simulator has control over the common reference string, it knows all private keys corresponding to the public keys and can thus decrypt all ciphertexts sent by the adversary and recover its password.

But indeed, this doesn’t not seem to be sufficient. In the case where the adversary begins to play (i.e. it impersonates the client), everything works well: The simulator decrypts the ciphertext generated by the adversary and can thus recover the password it has used. If the guess of the adversary is incorrect (that is, the password is the wrong one), then the smoothness
of the hash functions leads to random independent session keys. Otherwise, if the guess is correct, the execution can continue as an honest one would do (the simulator has learned which password to use).

However, let’s now suppose that the simulator has to start the game, on behalf of the client. Here, the simulator needs to send an encryption of the password before having seen anything coming from the adversary. As described above, it recovers the password used by the adversary as soon as the latter has sent its value, but this is too late. If it turns out that the guess of the adversary is incorrect, there is no problem thanks to the smoothness, but otherwise, the simulator is stuck with an incorrect ciphertext and will not be able to predict the value of the session key.

To overcome this problem, the authors of [CHK+05] made the client send a pre-flow which also contains an encryption of the password. The server then sends its own encryption, and finally the client sends another encryption (this time the simulator is able to use the correct password, recovered from the value sent by the adversary), as well as a zero-knowledge proof claiming that both ciphertexts are consistent and encrypt the same password. The first flow is never used in the remaining of the protocol. This solves the problem since on the one hand, the simulator is of course able to give a valid proof of a false statement, and on the other hand, the first flow will never be used afterwards.

B.10.2 Description of the Protocol

As explained above, Canetti et al. [CHK+05] proposed a simple variant of the Gennaro-Lindell methodology [GL03] that is provably secure in the UC framework. Though quite efficient, their protocol is not known to be secure against adaptive adversaries. The only one PAKE adaptively-secure in the UC framework was proposed by Barak et al. [BCL+05] using general techniques from multi-party computation. It thus leads to quite inefficient schemes.

In the following, we use our non-malleable conditionally-extractable and equivocable commitment scheme with an associated smooth projective hash function family, in order to build an efficient PAKE scheme, adaptively-secure in the common reference string model under standard complexity assumptions, in the UC framework.

The complete description of the protocol can be found in Figure B.3, whereas an informal sketch is presented in Figure B.2. We use the index $I$ for a value related to the client Alice, and $J$ for a value related to the server Bob.

Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, if the players share the same password ($p_{wI} = p_{wJ} = p_w$), it is easy to verify that both players will terminate by accepting and computing the same values for the session key, equal to $\text{Hash}(hk_I; pw, \ell_J, com_J) + \text{Hash}(hk_J; pw, \ell_I, com_I)$.

Security. The intuition behind the security of our protocol is quite simple and builds on that of Gennaro-Lindell protocol. The key point in order to achieve adaptive security is the use of the commitment, which allows for extraction and equivocation at any moment, thus not requiring the simulator to be aware of future corruptions. The following theorem, which full proof will be given in Appendix B.10.3, states that the protocol is UC-secure. The ideal functionality $F_{pwKE}$ has been presented in Figure B.1 and described in Appendix B.10.1. Since we use the joint state version of the UC theorem, we implicitly consider the multi-session extension of this functionality. In particular, note that the passwords of the players depend on the session considered. For sake of simplicity, we denote them by $p_{wI}$ and $p_{wJ}$, but one should implicitly understand $p_{wI,ssid}$ and $p_{wJ,ssid}$.

Theorem B.10.1 Let $\text{com}$ be the non-malleable (conditionally) extractable and equivocable committing scheme described in Section B.9, $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of smooth hash functions with respect
to this commitment, and \( SIG \) be a one-time signature scheme. Denote by \( \hat{F}_{pwKE} \) the multi-session extension of the functionality \( F_{pwKE} \) of password-based key-exchange, and let \( F_{CRS} \) be the ideal functionality that provides a common reference string \( (G, \text{pk}, (y_1, \ldots, y_m), Extract) \) to all parties, where \( G \) is a cyclic group, \( y_1, \ldots, y_m \) random elements from this group, \( \text{pk} \) a public key for the Cramer-Shoup scheme and \( Extract \) a randomness extractor. Then, the above protocol securely realizes \( \hat{F}_{pwKE} \) in the \( F_{CRS} \)-hybrid model, in the presence of adaptive adversaries.

### B.10.3 Proof of Theorem B.10.1

#### Sketch of Proof.

In order to prove Theorem B.10.1 we need to construct, for any real-world adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) (interacting with real parties running the protocol), an ideal-world adversary \( \mathcal{S} \) (interacting with dummy parties and the functionality \( F_{pwKE} \)) such that no environment \( \mathcal{Z} \) can distinguish between an execution with \( \mathcal{A} \) in the real world and \( \mathcal{S} \) in the ideal world with non-negligible probability.

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**Figure B.2:** Description of the protocol for players \( (P_1, \text{ssid}) \), with index I and password \( pw_1 \) and \( (P_3, \text{ssid}) \), with index J and password \( pw_3 \). At the end of rounds 1 and 2, the players will erase the part of the random values \( R_I \) and \( R_J \) used in the commitment which is not needed in the following rounds, keeping only \( w_I \) and \( w_J \).
We first describe two hybrid queries that are going to be used in the games. The \texttt{GoodPwd} query checks whether the password of some player is the one we have in mind or not. The \texttt{SamePwd} query checks if the players share the same password, without disclosing it. In some games the simulator has actually access to the players. In such a case, a \texttt{GoodPwd} (or a \texttt{SamePwd}) query can be easily implemented by letting the simulator look at the passwords owned by the oracles. When the players are entirely simulated, \texttt{S} will replace the queries above with \texttt{TestPwd} and \texttt{NewKey} queries.

We say that a flow is \textit{oracle-generated} if it was sent by an honest player and arrives without any alteration to the player it was meant to. We say it is \textit{non-oracle-generated} otherwise, that is either if it was sent by an honest player and modified by the adversary, or if it was sent by a corrupted player or a player impersonated by the adversary (more generally denoted by \textit{attacked} player, that is, a player whose password is known to the adversary).

We incrementally define a sequence of games starting from the one describing a real execution of the protocol and ending up with game \texttt{G}_{8} which we prove to be indistinguishable with respect to the ideal experiment. For the sake of clarity, we will use the following notation: the client is Alice (hence She), the server is Bob (hence He), and we use \texttt{I} for the adversary \texttt{A} and the simulator \texttt{S}.

- \texttt{G}_{0} is the real game.
- From \texttt{G}_{1}, \texttt{S} is allowed to program the CRS.
- From \texttt{G}_{2}, \texttt{S} always extracts the password committed to by the adversary and aborts when the extraction fails due to the commitment being valid for two or more passwords. This would lead to an attack against the binding property of the commitment scheme.
- From \texttt{G}_{3}, \texttt{S} simulates all the commitments and makes them equivocable granted the simulated CRS. The commitment remains binding and hiding for the environment and the adversary, which follows from the CCA2-property of the encryption. As a side note, the knowledge of the passwords is not necessary anymore for the simulation of the committing step.
- From \texttt{G}_{4}, \texttt{S} simulates the honest client without using her password anymore (except for the hybrid queries). She is given a random key in \texttt{(U3)} in the case where \texttt{flow-two} was oracle-generated and the server was not corrupted. If the server was corrupted, \texttt{S} recovers his password \texttt{pwJ} and makes a call to the \texttt{GoodPwd} functionality for Alice. If it is incorrect, Alice is also given a random key, but if it is correct, the key is computed honestly using that password. If no password is recovered, Alice is also given a random key. Alice then aborts in \texttt{(U5)} if the signature of the server is invalid. If the server was corrupted before \texttt{(U5)}, \texttt{S} recovers his password and does exactly the same as previously described. This is indistinguishable from the former game due to the pseudo-randomness of the hash function.
- From \texttt{G}_{5}, in the case where \texttt{flow-two} was not oracle-generated, \texttt{S} extracts \texttt{pwJ} from \texttt{comJ} and proceeds as described in \texttt{G}_{4}: it asks a \texttt{GoodPwd} query for Alice and provides her with either a random value or a value computed honestly for \texttt{skJ}. Similarly, if no password is recovered, Alice is given a random key. Alice aborts in \texttt{(U5)} if the signature of the server is invalid. A corruption of the server before \texttt{(U5)} is dealt with as in \texttt{G}_{4}. This is indistinguishable from the former game due to the smoothness of the hash function.
- From \texttt{G}_{6}, \texttt{S} simulates the server without using his password anymore. It aborts if the signature received from the client is invalid. Otherwise, the server is given a random key
in \((S4)\) in the case where \textit{flow-one} was oracle-generated and the client was not corrupted. A corruption of the client before \((S4)\) is dealt with as in \(G_4\) \(S\) asks a \text{GoodPwd} query for Bob and provides him with either a random value or a value computed honestly for \(\text{sk}_I\) (if no password is recovered, Bob is given a random key). This is indistinguishable from the former game due to the pseudo-randomness of the hash function.

- From \(G_4\) in the case where \textit{flow-one} was not oracle-generated, \(S\) extracts \(\text{pw}_I\) from \text{com}_I and proceeds as described in \(G_4\). It asks a \text{GoodPwd} query for Bob and provides him with either a random value or a value computed honestly for \(\text{sk}_I\) (if no password is recovered, Bob is given a random key). This is indistinguishable from the former game due to the smoothness of the hash function.

- Finally, the hybrid queries are replaced by the real ones in \(G_5\), which is shown to be indistinguishable to the ideal-world experiment.

\textbf{Description of the simulator} The description of our simulator is based on that of [CHK+05]. When initialized with security parameter \(k\), the simulator first runs the key-generation algorithm of the encryption scheme \(E\), thus obtaining a pair \((\text{sk}, \text{pk})\). It also chooses at random \(m\) elements \((y_1, \ldots, y_m)\) in \(G\) and a randomness extractor \text{Extract}. It then initializes the real-world adversary \(A\), giving it \((\text{pk}, (y_1, \ldots, y_m), \text{Extract})\) as common reference string.

From this moment on, the simulator interacts with the environment \(Z\), the functionality \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}\) and its subroutine \(A\). For the most part, this interaction is implemented by the simulator \(S\) just following the protocol on behalf of all the honest players. The main difference between the simulated players and the real honest players is that \(S\) does not engage on a particular password on their behalf. However, if \(A\) modifies a \textit{flow-one} or a \textit{flow-two} message that is delivered to player \(P\) in session \(\text{ssid}\), then \(S\) decrypts that ciphertext (using \(\text{sk}\)) and uses the recovered message \(\text{pw}\) in a \text{TestPwd} query to the functionality. If this is a correct guess, then \(S\) uses this password on behalf of \(P\), and proceeds with the simulation. More details follow.

\textbf{Corruptions.} Since we consider adaptive corruptions, that can occur at any moment during the execution of the protocol, our simulator, given the password of a player, needs to be able to provide the adversary with an internal state consistent with any data already sent (without the knowledge of the player’s password at that time). To handle such corruptions, the key point relies in the equivocable property of our commitment. More precisely, instead of committing to a particular password, the simulator commits to \textit{all} passwords, being able in the end to open to any of them. In a nutshell, committing to all passwords means to simulate the commitment in such a way that encryptions of all \(x_i\), corresponding to all \(\text{pw}_i\), are sent instead of encryptions of 0 (see the “equivocability” part of Section \[3.9\] for details). Recall that the values \(hk\) and \(hp\) do not depend on the password, so that it does not engage the player on any of them.

\textbf{Session Initialization.} When receiving a message \((\text{NewSession}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, I, J, \text{role})\) from \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}\), \(S\) starts simulating a new session of the protocol for party \(P_1\), peer \(P_3\), session identifier \(\text{ssid}\), and common reference string \((\text{pk}, (y_1, \ldots, y_m), \text{Extract})\). We denote this session by \((P_1, \text{ssid})\). If \(\text{role} = \text{client}\), then \(S\) generates a \textit{flow-one} message by committing to all the passwords, choosing a key pair \((\text{SK}_I, \text{VK}_I)\) for a one-time signature scheme. It gives this message to \(A\) on behalf of \((P_1, \text{ssid})\).

If \((P_1, \text{ssid})\) gets corrupted at this stage, then \(S\) recovers his password \(\text{pw}_I\) and is able to open his commitment in such a way that it is a commitment on \(\text{pw}_I\). It can thus provide \(A\) with consistent data.

\textbf{Protocol Steps.} Assume that \(A\) sends a message \(m\) to an active session of some party. If this message is formatted differently from what is expected by the session, then \(S\) aborts that
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session and notifies $\mathcal{A}$. Otherwise, we have the following cases (where we denote a party in the client role as $P_1$ and a party in the server role as $P_3$):

1. Assume that the session ($P_3, ssid$) receives a message $m = (\text{flow-one}, \text{com}_1, VK_1)$. Then, $P_3$ is necessarily a server and $m$ is the first message received by $P_3$. If $\text{com}_1$ is not equal to any commitment that was generated by $S$ for a flow-one message, $S$ uses its secret key $sk$ to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain $pw_1$ or nothing. Obtaining nothing is considered similar to an invalid password below due to the construction of the smooth hash function related to the commitment. When the extraction succeeds, because of the binding property, only one $pw_1$ is possible (on-line dictionary attack), then $S$ makes a call ($\text{TestPwd}, \text{sid}, ssid, J, pw_1$) to the functionality. If this is a correct guess, then $S$ sets the password of this server session to $pw_1$, otherwise, this is an invalid password. In both cases, $S$ produces a commitment $\text{com}_1$ on all the passwords (it makes use of the equivocable property), chooses a key pair ($SK_J, VK_J$) for a one-time signature scheme, runs the key generation algorithms of the smooth hash function on $\text{com}_1$ to produce ($hk_J, hp_J$) and sends the flow-two message ($\text{com}_1, VK_J, hp_J$) to $\mathcal{A}$ on behalf of ($P_3, ssid$).

If the sender ($P_1, ssid$) of this message, or if ($P_3, ssid$) gets corrupted at the end of this step, $S$ handles this corruption just as when this player gets corrupted at the end of the initialization step. Note in addition that $S$ is able to compute and give to $\mathcal{A}$ a correct value for $Hash_J$, the projected key being independent of the password (see discussion in Section 3.9.3).

2. Assume that a session ($P_1, ssid$) receives a message $m = (\text{flow-two}, \text{com}_1, VK_J, hp_J)$. Then, $P_1$ must be a client who sent a flow-one message and is now waiting for the response. We say that ($P_3, ssid$) is a peer session to ($P_1, ssid'$) if $ssid = ssid'$, if session ($P_1, ssid$) has peer $P_3$, session ($P_1, ssid$) has peer $P_1$, and these two sessions have opposite roles (client/server). If the pair ($\text{com}_1, VK_J$) is not equal to the pair ($\text{com}_1, VK_J$) that was generated by $S$ for a flow-one message from peer session ($P_3, ssid$) (or if no such ciphertext was generated yet, or no such peer session exists) then $S$ uses its secret key $sk$ to compute $pw_J$, or nothing which is considered similar to an invalid password below (as before). Also note that $S$ can recover $pw_J$ if ($P_1, ssid$) has been corrupted after having sent its commitment. In case of recovery of $pw_J$, $S$ then makes a call ($\text{TestPwd}, \text{sid}, ssid, I, pw_J$) to the functionality. If this is a correct guess, $S$ sets the password of this client session to $pw_J$, otherwise, this is an invalid password.

Then, it runs the key generation algorithms of the smooth hash function on $\text{com}_1$ to produce ($hk_J, hp_J$), as well as the signing algorithm with $SK_I$ to compute $\sigma_I$ and sends the flow-three message ($\sigma_I, hp_J$) to $\mathcal{A}$ on behalf of ($P_1, ssid$).

Note that in the former case (correct password guess), $S$ computes honestly the session key using password $pw_J$, without issuing it yet. Otherwise, $P_1$ is provided with a key chosen at random.

If ($P_1, ssid$) gets corrupted at the end of this step, $S$ handles this corruption just as when this player gets corrupted at the end of the previous step.

If it is ($P_1, ssid$) that gets corrupted, we face two cases. If a correct password guess occurred in this step, then $S$ has computed everything honestly and can provide every value to $\mathcal{A}$ (recall that the projection key does not depend on the password). Otherwise, if $S$ has set the session key at random, recall that it has not sent anything yet, so that the adversary totally ignores the values computed. $S$ then recovers the password of ($P_1, ssid$) and is able to compute the data and give them to the adversary.
3. Assume that a session \((P_J, ssid)\) receives a message \(m = (\text{flow-three}, \sigma_I, hp_I)\). Then, \((P_J, ssid)\) must be a server who sent a \text{flow-two} message and is now waiting for the response. \(S\) aborts if the signature \(\sigma_I\) is not valid. If \text{flow-one} was not oracle-generated, then \(S\) has extracted the password \(pw_I\) from the commitment (or failed to extract it). Similarly, if the peer session \(P_I\) (exists and) was corrupted sooner in the protocol, then \(S\) knows its password \(pw_I\) (which was in particular used in the commitment). In both cases, the simulator makes a call \((\text{TestPwd}, sid, ssid, J, pw_I)\) to the functionality to check the compatibility of the two passwords. In case of a correct answer, \(S\) sets the password of this server session to \(pw_I\), and computes honestly the session key using password \(pw_I\). Otherwise, \(P_J\) is provided with a key chosen at random.

Next, \(S\) runs signing algorithm with \(SK_J\) to compute \(\sigma_J\) and sends this \text{flow-four} message to \(A\) on behalf of \((P_J, ssid)\).

\(S\) handles a corruption of \((P_I, ssid)\) just as it did at the end of the former step. And recall that no more corruption of \((P_J, ssid)\) can occur since it claimed its session as “completed” and erased its data.

4. Assume that a session \((P_I, ssid)\) receives a message \(m = (\text{flow-four}, \sigma_J)\). \((P_I, ssid)\) must then be a client who sent a \text{flow-three} message and is now waiting for the response. \(S\) aborts if the signature \(\sigma_J\) is not valid. If \text{flow-two} was not oracle-generated, then \(S\) has extracted the password \(pw_J\) from the commitment (or failed to). Similarly, if the peer session \(P_J\) (exists and) was corrupted sooner in the protocol, then \(S\) knows its password \(pw_J\) (which was in particular used in the commitment). In both cases, the simulator makes a call \((\text{TestPwd}, sid, ssid, J, pw_J)\) to the functionality to check the compatibility of the two passwords. In case of a correct answer, \(S\) sets the password of this client session to \(pw_J\) and computes honestly its session key. Otherwise, it sets its session key at random. Finally note that no corruption can occur at this stage.

If a session aborts or terminates, \(S\) reports it to \(A\). If the session terminates with a session key \(sk\), then \(S\) makes a \text{NewKey} call to \(F_{pwKE}\), specifying the session key. But recall that unless the session is compromised or corrupted, \(F_{pwKE}\) will ignore the key specified by \(S\), and thus we do not have to bother with the key in these cases.

**Description of the games** We now provide the complete proof by a sequence of games. The detailed proof of some gaps are provided in Appendix B.11.

**Game \(G_0\):** \(G_0\) is the real game.

**Game \(G_1\):** From this game on, we allow the simulator to program the common reference string, allowing it to know the trapdoors for extractability and equivocability.

**Game \(G_2\):** This game is almost the same as the previous one. The only difference is that \(S\) always tries to extract the password committed to by the adversary (without taking advantage of the knowledge of this password for the moment) whenever the latter attempts to impersonate one of the parties. We allow the simulator to abort whenever this extraction fails because the adversary has generated a commitment which is valid for two or more passwords. Due to the binding property of the commitment (see Section B.30), the probability that the adversary achieves this is negligible. Note that the extraction can also fail if the values sent were not encryptions of 0 or 1 but we do not abort in this case; For the moment we still assume that the simulator knows the passwords of the players. In the following games, when it will not have this
knowledge anymore, we will show that the smooth hashes will be random so that this failure will have no bad consequences. This shows that $G_2^3$ and $G_4^3$ are indistinguishable.

**Game $G_3$:** In this game, $S$ still knows the passwords of both players, but it starts simulating the commitments by committing to all possible passwords (in order to be able to equivocate afterwards, see Section B.9 for details). Note that since the commitment is hiding, this does not change the view of an environment, and that the commitment remains binding (even under access to equivocable commitments — see Section B.9 and Appendix B.8). Also note that the generation of the projected keys for the smooth hash function (see Section B.9) is done without requiring the knowledge of the password. Hence, $G_3^2$ and $G_4^2$ are indistinguishable.

As a side note, we have just proven that the knowledge of the passwords is not necessary anymore for steps (U1) and (S2). If a player gets corrupted, the simulator recovers its password and is able to equivocate the commitment and thus provide the adversary with consistent data (since the projected key for the smooth hash function does not depend on the password committed).

**Game $G_4$:** In this game, we suppose that flow-one was oracle-generated. We are now at beginning of round (U3) and we want to simulate the (honest) client. We suppose that the simulator still knows the password of the server but not that of the client anymore. Let’s first consider the case in which Alice received a flow-two which was oracle-generated. In such a case, the simulator chooses a random value $\text{Hash}(hk_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1)$. Then, if the server remains honest until (S4), the simulator asks a $\text{SamePwd}$ query to the functionality. If the answer is yes (that is $pw_1 = pw_2$), it gives Bob the same random value for $\text{ProjHash}(hp_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)$ and computes honestly $\text{Hash}(hk_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)$, thus completely determining $sk_1$. Otherwise, it computes correctly the entire key. If both remain honest until (U5), then, if they have the same password, $S$ sets $\text{ProjHash}(hp_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1; w_1) = \text{Hash}(hk_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1)$. Otherwise, $S$ sets $sk_1$ at random.

The description of the corruptions and the proof of the indistinguishability between $G_4^1$ and $G_4^3$ can be found in Appendix B.11.1 (it follows from the pseudo-randomness of the smooth hash function).

**Game $G_5$:** In this game, we still suppose that flow-one was oracle-generated, but we now consider the case in which flow-two was non-oracle-generated. We are now at beginning of round (U3) and we want to simulate the (honest) client. The simulator still knows the password of the server.

$\text{com}_1$, $\text{VK}_1$ or $hk_1$ has been generated by the adversary. If $\text{com}_1$ is a replay, then the adversary could not modify $\text{VK}_1$, because of the label used for $\text{com}_1$, and then the signature verification will fail. $\text{com}_1$ is thus necessarily a new commitment. Recall that from $G_2^3$, the simulator extracts the password from the commitment of the server, with the help of the secret key. The extraction can fail with negligible probability if $S$ recovers two different passwords (thanks to the binding property, see $G_2^2$ and $G_3^2$). In such a case, the simulator aborts the game. It can also happen that the extraction issues no password or that it fails if the values sent were not encryptions of 0 or 1.

Then, if it has recovered a password, the simulator asks a $\text{GoodPwd}$ query to the functionality. If it is correct, then it computes honestly the session key of the client. Otherwise, or if it has not recovered any password in the extraction, it sets the value $\text{Hash}(hk_1; \rho, (\ell_1, pw_1), \text{com}_1)$ at random (the entire key $sk_1$ will be set in round (U5)). Note that the smooth hash value will necessarily be random by construction if the values sent in the commitment were not encryptions of 0 or 1.

The corruptions which can follow this step are dealt with as in the former game (recall that the projected keys sent do not depend on the password). Due to the smoothness of the hash
function, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one (see Appendix B.11.2).

Game $G_6$: In this game, we deal with the case in which all flows received by the client up to (S4) were oracle-generated. We are now at beginning of round (S4) and we want to simulate the (honest) server. We suppose that the simulator doesn’t know any passwords anymore. Let’s first consider the case in which flow-three was oracle-generated. Note that flow-one must have been oracle-generated too, otherwise the signature $\sigma_1$ would have been rejected.

Then, the simulator asks a SamePwd query to the functionality. If it is correct, it sets the value for $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)$ equal to $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}_1; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)$, and it also sets the value for $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}_2; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)$ at random. Otherwise, it sets these values at random.

In (U5), if the passwords of Alice and Bob are the same and both remain honest, we set the value $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1) = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_1; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)$: $\text{sk}_1$ and $\text{sk}_2$ are thus equal, as required. Note that since $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}_1; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)$ is already set at random since $G_4$ or $G_5$, all the keys are already random.

If their passwords are not the same but both remain honest, Alice will be given in (U5) a key chosen independently at random: Here, $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)$ doesn’t have to be programmed, since the keys do not have any reason to be identical. In this case, as in $G_6$, the pseudo-randomness of the hash functions ensures the indistinguishability (see Appendix B.11.3 for the treatment of corruptions).

Game $G_7$: In this game, we still deal with the case in which all flows received by the client up to (S4) were oracle-generated. We are now at beginning of (S4) and we want to simulate the (honest) server, without knowing any password, but we now suppose that flow-three was not oracle-generated. Note that in this case flow-one cannot have been oracle-generated. Otherwise, the signature $\sigma_1$ would have been rejected.

Recall that from $G_2$, the simulator extracts the password from the commitment of the client, with the help of the secret key. The extraction can fail with negligible probability if $S$ recovers two different passwords (thanks to the binding property, see $G_2$ and $G_7$). In such a case, the simulator aborts the game. It can also happen that the extraction issues no password (for example if the values sent in the commitment were not encryptions of 0 or 1). Then, if it has recovered a password, the simulator asks a GoodPwd query to the functionality. If it is correct, then it computes honestly the session key of the server. Otherwise, or if it has not recovered any password in the extraction, it sets the values $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}_1; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)$ and $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)$ at random. Recall that if the values sent in the commitment were not encryptions of 0 or 1, the smooth hash value will be random.

The corruptions which can follow this step are dealt with as in the former game. Due to the smoothness of the hash function, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one: The proof is exactly the same as in $G_6$, but it is made more easier, since the key of the client is already random.

Game $G_8$: In this game, we replace GoodPwd queries by TestPwd ones, and SamePwd by NewKey ones. If a session aborts or terminates, $S$ reports it to $A$. If a session terminates with a session key $sk$, then $S$ makes a NewKey call to the functionality, specifying the session key $sk$. But recall that unless the session is compromised, the functionality will ignore the key specified by $S$.

We show in Appendix B.11.4 that this game is indistinguishable from the ideal-world experiment.
B.11 Appendix: Additional Proof Details

B.11.1 Indistinguishability of $G_4$ and $G_3$

We now describe what happens in case of corruptions. First, if Alice gets corrupted after the execution of $(U3)$, then the simulator will recover her password and thus be able to compute everything correctly. Recall that the projection key did not depend on the password.

Second, if Bob gets corrupted after $(U3)$ or after $(S4)$, then the simulator will be able to compute everything correctly. In particular in the second case, the adversary will get a coherent value of $sk_J$. Then, the simulator asks a GoodPwd query for Alice with Bob’s password to the functionality. If they are the same, $S$ recovers the password of Alice, and since it hasn’t really erased her data, it will be able to compute $sk_I$ exactly as the adversary should have done it for Bob (in particular because the projection key does not depend on the password). Otherwise, it gives Alice a random key: there is no need that the players get the same key if they don’t share the same password – recall that all private data is erased so that the adversary cannot verify anything.

Finally, if Alice gets corrupted by the end of $(U5)$, the simulator will recover her password and ask a SamePwd query to the functionality. If $\sigma_J$ is correct and they share the same password, then the simulator computes $sk_I$ exactly as the adversary should have done it for Bob (again because the projection key does not depend on the password). Otherwise, if the signature is correct but their passwords are different, then Alice is provided with a random value (recall that her data is supposed to be erased, so that the adversary is not supposed to be able to verify it). Otherwise, if the signature is incorrect, the simulator aborts the game. We can see here the necessity of step $(U5)$ in order to guarantee adaptive security.

We now show that an environment that distinguishes $G_4$ from $G_3$ can be used to construct a distinguisher between Expt-Hash and Expt-Unif as described in [GL03] (see Appendix B.6), violating their Corollary 3.3.

We first define hybrid games $H_i$ as follows. First note that the sessions are ordered with respect to the rounds $(U1)$. In all sessions before the $i$th one, the computation is random, and in all the sessions afterwards $(i, i+1, \ldots)$, the values are set as real. In all “random” cases, we set ProjHash$(hp_i; \rho, (\ell_J, pw_J), com_J; w_J)$ to the same value during the simulation of the server if everything goes well, that is, if no corruption occurred and the passwords are the same. Pictorially,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Random} & \quad 1, \ldots, i-1 \\
\text{Real} & \quad i, \ldots, q_s
\end{align*}
\]

Our aim is now to prove the indistinguishability of $H_i$ and $H_{i+1}$. We define the event $E_i$, stating that there exists a corruption between the committing $(U1)$ and hashing $(U3)$ steps in the $i$th session. Notice that the probability of this event is the same in the two following games $H_i$ and $H_{i+1}$. This is true despite the fact that we consider concurrent sessions. To see this, notice that even though $E_i$ may depend on sessions with a larger index, the only difference between these two games concerns round $(U3)$ of the $i$th session: everything is identical before this step. Since the corruption occurs before this round, the probability that the adversary corrupts a player in the $i$th session, which only depends on what happened before, is the same in both cases.

We now denote by $\text{OUT}_Z$ the output of the environment at the end of the execution and compute the difference between $\Pr[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]$ in the two different games:
then the session key generated is statistically close to uniform.

\[ |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1] - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]| \]
\[ = |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land E_i] + Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land \neg E_i] - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land E_i] - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land \neg E_i]| \]
\[ \leq |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land E_i] - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land E_i]| + |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land \neg E_i] - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1 \land \neg E_i]| \]
\[ \leq |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]| - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]| |Pr_{H_i}[E_i]| \]
\[ + |Pr_{H^{i+1}}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]| - Pr_{H_i}[\text{OUT}_Z = 1]| |Pr_{H_i}[\neg E_i]| \]

First consider the first term of this sum. If there is a corruption, we learn the password and also (in fact, we simulate in a coherent way) the randomness, enabling us to compute everything correctly. Thus, this term is equal to zero.

We now consider the second term, corresponding to the case where there is no corruption, and show that \( |Pr[\text{Expt-Hash}(D) = 1] - Pr[\text{Expt-Unif}(D) = 1]| \) bounds (to within a negligible amount) the probability that the environment distinguishes \( H^{i+1} \) from \( H_i \). More precisely, let’s consider the following game \( H \) (as described below) in which the oracles \( \text{Commit} \) and \( \text{Hash} \) appear in the \( i^{th} \) session only under the assumption \( \neg E_i \).

\( H \) is as follows: Let \( D \) be a machine that receives a randomly chosen public key \( pk_2 \) and emulates the game \( H_i \) with the following changes for the \( i^{th} \) session. On receiving a valid oracle-generated flow-one, \( D \) does not directly compute \( c_2 \) but it queries instead the oracle \( \text{Commit()} \) and sets \( c_2 \) to the value returned. If Alice receives the unmodified \( \text{com}_i \) in the flow-two message, then \( D \) queries \( \text{Hash}(\text{com}_i) \) and receives a pair \( (s_I, \eta_I) \). Then it sets \( hp_I = s_I \) and \( \text{ProjHash}(hp_I; \rho, (\ell_I, pw_I), \text{com}_i, w_J). \) Note that \( w_J \) was here the randomness used by the oracle \( \text{Commit} \) in the query that generated \( \text{com}_i \). Then, if Bob receives the unmodified projected key \( hp_I \), \( D \) also uses \( \eta_I \) for the appropriate portion of the session key – in the case they have the same password. Finally, \( D \) outputs whatever the environment outputs. It is easy to see that \( H = H^{i+1} \) in the case where the oracle \( \text{Hash} \) returns a random value, and it is equal to \( H_i \) otherwise.

\[ \Box \]

B.11.2 Indistinguishability of \( G_5 \) and \( G_4 \)

First note that the corruptions which can follow this step are dealt with as in the former game, and that this simulation is compatible with the former game.

If the password recovered from the server is correct, the simulation is done honestly, so that this game is perfectly equivalent to the previous one. Otherwise, if the password is incorrect, or if no password was recovered, then \( \text{com}_j \) is invalid.

Given an invalid \( \text{com}_i \), with \( (P_i, ssid) \)'s password \( pw_I \) and the label \( \ell_I \), the distribution \( \{pk_I, \text{com}_i, \ell_I, pw_I, hp_I, \text{Hash}(hk_i; \rho, (\ell_I, pw_I), \text{com}_i)\} \) is statistically close to the distribution \( \{pk_i, \text{com}_i, \ell_I, pw_I, hp_I, z\} \) where \( z \) is a random element of the group \( G \) (due to the smoothness of the hash function). Since \( Hash(hk_i; \rho, (\ell_I, pw_I), \text{com}_i) \) is a component of the session key \( sk_i \) for \( (P_i, ssid) \), then the session key generated is statistically close to uniform.

Then, since \( \text{com}_j \) is invalid, \( (P_j, ssid) \) will compute honestly the key, but he will not obtain the same session key since the passwords are different. This behavior is equivalent to what happens in the ideal functionality: the corresponding sessions of \( (P_i, ssid) \) and \( (P_j, ssid) \) either do not have a matching conversation, or were given different passwords by the environment, so that \( (P_j, ssid) \) will not be given the same session key as \( (P_i, ssid) \).
B.11.3 Indistinguishability of $G_6$ and $G_5$

The pseudo-randomness of the hash functions shows the indistinguishability between $G_6$ and $G_5$. Indeed, the environment cannot become aware that the keys were chosen at random. More precisely, we do the same manipulation as in the proof of $G_4$, but this time considering the smooth projective hash function $\text{Hash}$ with respect to $\text{com}_I$. Note that in the hybrid games, the sessions are ordered with respect to the rounds $(S2)$.

We now consider the case where Bob gets corrupted between $(S4)$ and $(U5)$. Then, the simulator recovers his password and it is able to compute everything correctly (recall that the projection keys do not depend on the passwords). It then asks a $\text{GoodPwd}$ query for the client. If their passwords are different, Alice is provided with a random key. Otherwise, $S$ gives her the same key as Bob.

Finally note that for sake of simplicity, we only compute $\text{Hash}_J$ in $(S4)$ in the simulation. But, if the server is corrupted after $(S2)$, the simulator recovers his password and is able to provide the adversary with a correct $\text{Hash}_J$ (once more because the projection key does not depend on the password).

B.11.4 Indistinguishability between $G_8$ and the Ideal Game

The only difference between $G_7$ and $G_8$ is that the $\text{GoodPwd}$ queries are replaced by $\text{TestPwd}$ queries to the functionality and the $\text{SamePwd}$ by a $\text{NewKey}$ query. We say that the players have matching sessions if they share the same ssid and if they agree on the values of $\text{com}_I$, $\text{com}_J$, $\text{hp}_I$ and $\text{hp}_J$ (that is, all the values that determine the key). We now show that $G_8$ and $IWE$ are indistinguishable.

First, if both players share the same password and remain honest until the end of the game, and if there are no impersonations, they will obtain a random key, both in $G_8$ (from $G_6$) and $IWE$, as there are no $\text{TestPwd}$ queries and the sessions remain fresh. Second, if they share the same password but there are impersonation attempts, then they receive independently-chosen random keys (from $G_5$ or $G_7$). Third, if they don’t share the same password, then they get independently-chosen random keys. Now, we need to show that two players will receive the same key in $G_8$ if and only if it happens in $IWE$.

First consider the case of players with matching session and the same password. If both players remain honest until the end of the game, they will receive the same key from $G_6$. If not, it will still be the same from $G_5$ or $G_7$. Recall that if there are some impersonation attempts, the keys will be random and independent, both in $G_5$ and $IWE$. In $IWE$, the functionality will receive two $\text{NewSession}$ queries with the same password. If both are honest, it will not receive any $\text{TestPwd}$ query, so that the key will be the same for the two players. And if one is corrupted and a $\text{TestPwd}$ query is done (and correct, since they have the same password), then they will also have the same key, chosen by the adversary.

Then, consider the case of players with matching session but not the same password. If both players remain honest until the end of the game, they will receive the same key from $G_6$. If not, it will still be the same from $G_5$ or $G_7$. Recall that if there are some impersonation attempts, the keys will be random and independent, both in $G_5$ and $IWE$. In $IWE$, the functionality will receive two $\text{NewSession}$ queries with different passwords. It will give them different keys by definition.

Finally, consider the case of players with no matching session. It is clear that in $G_8$, the session keys of those players will be independent because they are not set in any of the games. In $IWE$, the only way that they receive matching keys is that the functionality receives two $\text{NewSession}$ queries with the same password, and $S$ sends a $\text{NewKey}$ query for these sessions without having sent any $\text{TestPwd}$ queries. But if the two sessions do not have a matching conversation, they must differ in either $\text{com}_I$, $\text{com}_J$, $\text{hp}_I$ or $\text{hp}_J$. In this case, they will refuse the signature of the other player and abort the game.
If one of the players is corrupted by the end of the game, the simulator recovers its password and uses it in a TestPwd query for the other player to the functionality, as explained in G. If the result is correct, then both players are given the same key. Otherwise, they are given independently-chosen random keys. This is exactly the behavior of the functionality in IWE.
**Common reference string.** A tuple \((G, \text{pk}, (y_1, \ldots, y_m), \text{Extract})\), where \(G\) is a cyclic group, \(y_1, \ldots, y_m\) random elements from this group, \(\text{pk}\) a public key for the Cramer-Shoup scheme, and \(\text{Extract}\) a randomness extractor.

**Protocol steps.**

1. When \(P_1\) is activated with input \((\text{NewSession, sid, ssid, I, J, pw}_1, \text{role})\), we face two cases: If \(\text{role} = \text{server}\), it does nothing. If \(\text{role} = \text{client}\), it uses \(\text{SKG}\) to generate a key pair \((\text{VK}_1, \text{SK}_1)\) for a one-time signature scheme, sets the (public) label \(\ell_1 = J \circ I \circ \text{ssid} \circ \text{VK}_1\), computes \(\text{com}_1 = \text{com}_\rho(\ell_1, \text{pw}_1; R_1)\) and sends the message \((\text{flow-one, com}_1, \text{VK}_1)\) to \(P_2\). From this point on, assume that \(P_1\) is a party activated with input \((\text{NewSession, sid, ssid, I, J, pw}_1, \text{client})\) and that \(P_2\) is a party activated with input \((\text{NewSession, sid, ssid, I, J, pw}_2, \text{server})\). Recall that \(P_1\) erases nearly all the randoms (in \(R_1\)) used in the computation of \(\text{com}_1\) (see Section B.9). More precisely, it only keeps from \(R_1\) the values present in the witness \(w_1\) that will be used in the computation of the smooth hash function.

2. When \(P_2\) receives a message \((\text{flow-one, com}_1, \text{VK}_1)\), it (publicly) checks that \(\text{com}_1\) is well constructed. Otherwise, it aborts. Then it uses \(\text{SKG}\) to generate a key pair \((\text{VK}_2, \text{SK}_2)\) for a one-time signature scheme, and \(\text{HashKG}\) to generate a key \(h_{k_1}\) for the smooth projective hash function family \(H\) with respect to \(\rho\). It sets the (public) label \(\ell_2 = J \circ I \circ \text{ssid} \circ \text{VK}_2\) and computes the projection \(\text{hp}_2 = \text{ProjKG}(h_{k_1}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)\). Next it computes \(\text{com}_2 = \text{com}_{\rho}(\ell_2, \text{pw}_2; R_2)\) and sends the message \((\text{flow-two, com}_2, \text{VK}_2, \text{hp}_2)\) to \(P_1\). It finally computes \(\text{Hash}_2 = \text{Hash}(h_{k_1}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)\) and erases \(h_{k_1}\) and the values of \(R_2\) that are not present in the witness \(w_2\).

3. When \(P_1\) receives a message \((\text{flow-two, com}_2, \text{VK}_2, \text{hp}_2)\), it (publicly) checks that \(\text{com}_2\) is well constructed. Otherwise, it aborts. Then it uses \(\text{HashKG}\) to generate a key \(h_{k_1}\) for the smooth projective hash function family \(H\) with respect to \(pk\) and computes the projection \(\text{hp}_1 = \text{ProjKG}(h_{k_1}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)\). Next it computes \(\sigma_1 = \text{Sign}(\text{SK}_1, (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \text{hp}_1, \text{hp}_2))\) and sends the message \((\text{flow-three, } \sigma_1, \text{hp}_1)\) to \(P_2\). It computes the session key \(s_{k_1} = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_2; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1) + \text{Hash}(h_{k_1}; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1)\), and erases all private data except \(\text{pw}_1, \text{sk}_1\) and \(\text{sk}_1\), keeping all public data in memory.

4. When \(P_2\) receives a message \((\text{flow-three, } \sigma_1, \text{hp}_1)\), it checks that \(\text{Ver}(\text{VK}_1, (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \text{hp}_1), \sigma_1) = 1\). If not, it aborts the session outputting nothing. Otherwise, it computes \(\sigma_2 = \text{Sign}(\text{SK}_2, (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \text{hp}_1, \text{hp}_2))\) and sends the message \((\text{flow-four, } \sigma_1, \text{hp}_1)\) to \(P_1\). Then, it computes the session key \(s_{k_1} = \text{Hash}_1 + \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_1; \rho, (\ell_1, \text{pw}_1), \text{com}_1; w_1)\), outputs \((\text{sid, ssid, } s_{k_1})\), sets the session as accepted, which means in particular that it erases everything except \(\text{pw}_2, \text{sk}_1\) and then terminates (i.e., publishes the session key).

5. When \(P_1\) receives a message \((\text{flow-four, } \sigma_1)\), it checks that \(\text{Ver}(\text{VK}_1, (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \text{hp}_1, \text{hp}_2), \sigma_1) = 1\). If not, it aborts the session outputting nothing. Otherwise, it terminates the session (i.e., publishes the session key).

Figure B.3: Description of the protocol for two players Alice and Bob. Alice is the client \(P_1\), with index I and password \(\text{pw}_1\), and Bob is the server \(P_2\), with index J and password \(\text{pw}_2\).
Appendix C

Password-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds

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[ABCP06] with E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval

Abstract: With the development of grids, distributed applications are spread across multiple computing resources and require efficient security mechanisms among the processes. Although protocols for authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols seem to be the natural mechanisms for supporting these applications, current solutions are either limited by the use of public key infrastructures or by their scalability, requiring a number of rounds linear in the number of group members. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose in this paper the first provably-secure password-based constant-round group key exchange protocol. It is based on the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt and is provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The new protocol is very efficient and fully scalable since it only requires four rounds of communication and four multi-exponentiations per user. Moreover, the new protocol avoids intricate authentication infrastructures by relying on passwords for authentication.

C.1 Introduction

Motivation. Modern distributed applications often need to maintain consistency of replicated information and coordinate the activities of many processes. Collaborative applications and distributed computations are both examples of these types of applications. With the development of grids [FK04], distributed computations are spread across multiple computing resources requiring efficient security mechanisms between the processes. Although protocols for group Diffie-Hellman key exchange [BCP01, BCP02b, BCP02a, BCPQ01] provide a natural mechanism for supporting these applications, these protocols are limited in their scalability due to a number of rounds linear in the number of group members. An alternative is to use a protocol for group key exchange that runs in a constant number of rounds [DB06, KY03, KLL04]. The two measures of a protocol’s efficiency are the computational cost per member and the communication complexity (number of protocol rounds) of the given protocol. Since the Moore’s
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laws has told us that computing power grows faster than communication power, it is therefore natural to trade communication power for computing power in a group key exchange protocol.

A password is the ideal authentication means to exchange a session key in the absence of public-key infrastructures or pre-distributed symmetric keys. In a group, the sharing of a password among the members greatly simplifies the setup of distributed applications [BCP02b, DB06]. An example of distributed applications could simply be the networking of all the devices attached to a human. Low-entropy passwords are easy for humans to remember, but cannot of course guarantee the same level of security as high-entropy secrets such as symmetric or asymmetric keys. The most serious attack against a password-based protocol is the so-called dictionary attack: the attacker recovers the password and uses it to impersonate the legitimate user. The low-entropy feature makes the job of the attacker easier since the attacker (off-line) runs through all the possible passwords in order to obtain partial information and to maximize his success probability. The minimum required from a protocol is security against this attack.

Contributions. In the present paper, we study the problem of scalable protocols for authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Many researchers have studied and found solutions to this problem in the context of a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), yet a (secure) solution had to be found in the context of a (short) password shared among the members of the group. Two attempts in this direction are due to Dutta and Barua [DB06] and to Lee, Hwang, and Lee [LHL04]. Unfortunately, adding authentication services to a group key exchange protocol is not trivial since redundancy in the flows of the protocol can open the door to different forms of attacks. In fact, in Section C.3 we briefly describe attacks against the schemes of Dutta and Barua [DB06] and of Lee, Hwang, and Lee [LHL04]. Then, in Section C.4, we show how to add password-authentication services to the Burmester and Desmedt scheme [BD94, BD05].

Our protocol is provably secure in the random-oracle [BR94b] and ideal-cipher models [BPR00] under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Related Work. Following the work of Bresson et al. on the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange problem [BCP01, BCP02b, BCP02a, BCPQ01], several researchers have developed similar protocols but that run in a constant number of rounds. Katz and Yung [KY03] added authentication services to the original Burmester and Desmedt’s protocol [BD94, BD05]. Later, Kim, Lee, and Lee extended the work of Katz and Yung to take into account the notion of dynamicity in the membership [KLL04]. The problem of adding password-authentication services followed shortly after. In [BCP02b], Bresson et al. proposed the first solution to the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange problem in the password-based scenario. Their protocol, however, has a total number of rounds which is linear in the total number of players in the group. In [DB06, LHL04], two different password-based versions of Burmester-Desmedt protocol were proposed along with proofs in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models. Unfortunately, the latter two schemes are not secure.

Outline of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section C.2 we recall the security model usually used for password-based group Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This model was previously defined in [BCP02b], but also takes advantage of [AP05]. In Section C.3 we recall Burmester-Desmedt scheme and describe attacks against the schemes of Dutta and Barua [DB06] and of Lee, Hwang, and Lee [LHL04]. In Section C.4 we describe the mechanics behind our protocol. In Section C.5 we show that our protocol is provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
C.2 Security Model

C.2.1 Password-Based Authentication

In the password-based authentication setting, we assume each player holds a password $pw$ drawn uniformly at random from the dictionary $\text{Password}$ of size $N$. This secret of low-entropy ($N$ is often assumed to be small, i.e. typically less than a million) will be used to authenticate the parties to each other.

Unfortunately, one cannot prevent an adversary to choose randomly a password in the dictionary and to try to impersonate a player. However such on-line exhaustive search (even if $N$ is not so large) can easily be limited by requiring a minimal time interval between successive failed attempts or locking an account after a threshold of failures. Security against such active attacks is measured in the number of passwords the adversary can “erase” from the candidate list after a failure.

On the other hand, off-line exhaustive search cannot be limited by such practical behaviors or computational resources considerations. Hopefully, they can be prevented if the protocol is carefully designed and ensures that no information about the password can leak from passively eavesdropped transcripts, but also from active attacks.

C.2.2 Formal Definitions

We denote by $U_1, \ldots, U_n$ the parties that can participate in the key exchange protocol $P$. Each of them may have several instances called oracles involved in distinct, possibly concurrent, executions of $P$. We denote $U_i$ instances by $U_i^j$. The parties share a low-entropy secret $pw$ which is uniformly drawn from a small dictionary $\text{Password}$ of size $N$.

The key exchange algorithm $P$ is an interactive protocol between the $U_i$’s that provides the instances with a session key $sk$. During the execution of this protocol, the adversary has the entire control of the network, and tries to break the privacy of the key.

**Remark C.2.1** In the “constant-round” protocols that we will study, simultaneous broadcasts are intensively used. However we do not make any assumption about the correctness of the latter primitive: it is actually a multi-cast, in which the adversary may delay, modify, or cancel the message sent to each recipient independently.

In the usual security model [BCP02b], several queries are available to the adversary to model his capability. We however enhance it with the Real-or-Random notion for the semantic security [AFP05] instead of the Find-then-Guess. This notion is strictly stronger in the password-based setting. And actually, since we focus on the semantic security only, we can assume that each time a player accepts a key, the latter is revealed to the adversary, either in a real way, or in a random one (according to a bit $b$). Let us briefly review each query:

- **Send($U_i^j, m$)**: This query enables to consider active attacks by having $A$ sending a message to any instance $U_i^j$. The adversary $A$ gets back the response $U_i^j$ generates in processing the message $m$ according to the protocol $P$. A query **Send(Start)** initializes the key exchange algorithm, and thus the adversary receives the initial flows sent out by the instance.

- **Test$^b(U_i^j)$**: This query models the misuse of the session key by instance $U_i$ (known-key attacks). The query is only available to $A$ if the attacked instance actually “holds” a session key. It either releases the actual key to $A$, if $b = 1$ or a random one, if $b = 0$. The random keys must however be consistent between users in the same session. Therefore, a random key is simulated by the evaluation of a random function on the view a user has
of the session: all the partners have the same view, they thus have the same random key (but independent of the actual view.)

**Remark C.2.2** Note that it has been shown \cite{AFP05} that this query is indeed enough to model known-key attacks —where \texttt{Reveal} queries, which always answer with the real keys, are available—, and makes the model even stronger. Even though their result has only been proven in the two-party and three-party scenarios, one should note that their proof can be easily extended to the group scenario.

As already noticed, the aim of the adversary is to break the privacy of the session key (a.k.a., semantic security). This security notion takes place in the context of executing \(P\) in the presence of the adversary \(\mathcal{A}\). One first draws a password \(pw\) from \texttt{Password}, flips a coin \(b\), provides coin tosses to \(\mathcal{A}\), as well as access to the \texttt{Test} and \texttt{Send} oracles.

The goal of the adversary is to guess the bit \(b\) involved in the \texttt{Test} queries, by outputting this guess \(b'\). We denote the \textbf{AKE advantage} as the probability that \(\mathcal{A}\) correctly guesses the value of \(b\). More precisely we define \(\text{Adv}_{P}^{\text{ake}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2\Pr[b=b'] - 1\). The protocol \(P\) is said to be \((t, \epsilon)\)-\textbf{AKE-secure} if \(\mathcal{A}\)'s advantage is smaller than \(\epsilon\) for any adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) running with time \(t\).

**C.2.3 On the Simplification of the Model**

In previous models, \texttt{Execute} queries were introduced to model passive eavesdropping. However, they can easily be simulated using the \texttt{Send} queries. In our analysis, we refine the way to deal with the adversary possible behaviors. We will denote by \(q_{\text{active}}\) the number of messages the adversary produced by himself (thus without including those he has just forwarded). This number upper-bounds the number of on-line “tests” the adversary performs to guess the password. And we denote by \(q_{\text{session}}\) the total number of sessions the adversary has initiated: \(nq_{\text{session}}\), where \(n\) is the size of the group, upper-bounds the total number of messages the adversary has sent in the protocol (including those he has built and those he has just forwarded). We emphasize that this is stronger than considering only \texttt{Execute} and \texttt{Send} queries: while being polynomially equivalent, the two models are not tightly equivalent, since the adversary does not need to know in advance if he will forward all the flows, or be active when a new session starts. Moreover, suppressing the \texttt{Execute} queries makes the model even simpler.

The best we can expect with such a scheme is that the adversary erases no more than 1 password for each \textit{session} in which he plays actively (since there exists attacks which achieve that in any password-based scheme.) However, in our quite efficient scheme, we can just prevent the adversary from erasing more than 1 password for each \textit{player} he tries to impersonate (we will even show our proof is almost optimal.)

**C.3 Preliminaries**

The best starting point for an efficient password-based group key exchange, and namely if one wants a constant-round protocol, is the scheme proposed by Burmester and Desmedt \cite{BD94, BD05} at Eurocrypt 94 and later formally analyzed by Katz and Yung in 2003 \cite{KY03}.

**C.3.1 The Burmester and Desmedt Protocol**

In the Burmester-Desmedt scheme, one considers a cyclic group \(\mathbb{G}\) generated by \(g\), in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds. The protocol works as follows, where all the indices are taken modulo \(n\) (between 1 and \(n\)), and \(n\) is the size of the group:

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C.3.3 The Dutta and Barua Protocol

Dutta and Barua [DB06] proposed a variant of the Kim-Lee-Lee protocol [KLL04] presented at AsiaCrypt ’04. It makes use of the ideal-cipher model, instead of a simple mask as above, and is claimed to be secure against dictionary attacks:

- Each player $U_i$ chooses a random exponent $x_i$, as well as a random key $k_i$, computes $z_i = g^{x_i}$, and broadcasts $z_i^* = \mathcal{E}_{pw}(z_i)$;
- Each player extracts $z_{i-1}$ and $z_{i+1}$, and computes the $K_i^L = \mathcal{H}(z_i^{x_{i-1}}) = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_{i-1}x_i})$ and $K_i^R = \mathcal{H}(z_i^{x_{i+1}}) = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_{i+1}x_i})$. For $i = 1, \ldots, n-1$, $U_i$ computes $X_i = K_i^L \oplus K_i^R$, while $U_n$ computes $X_n = k_n \oplus K_n^R$; for $i = 1, \ldots, n-1$, $U_i$ broadcasts $\mathcal{E}_{pw}(k_i \parallel X_i)$, while $U_n$ broadcasts $\mathcal{E}''(X_n)$.
• After decryption, they can all recover all the \( k_i \), and then the common session key is set as \( sk = \mathcal{H}(k_1||\ldots||k_n) \).

Unfortunately, their protocol contains another source of redundancy that can be exploited by an attacker: the encryption algorithm of all users use the password as their encryption key. Therefore, a simple attack against their scheme runs as follows: the adversary plays the role of user \( U_3 \), with honest users \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \). When the adversary receives \( z_i^1 = E_{pw}(z_i) \) and \( z_i^2 = E_{pw}(z_i) \), he sets \( z_i^3 = z_i^1 \), sends it to users \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \), and waits for their responses. Note that setting \( z_i^3 = z_i^1 \) implicitly sets \( x_3 = x_1 \). At this point, the adversary knows that \( K_i^L = \mathcal{H}(g_{x_1x_2}) \) and \( K_i^R = \mathcal{H}(g_{x_1x_2}) = \mathcal{H}(g_{x_1x_2}) \), and thus \( X_2 = 0^k \) (where \( k \) is the output length of the function \( \mathcal{H} \)). Upon receiving \( E_{pw}(k_2||x_2) \) from \( U_2 \), he can perform an off-line dictionary attack that immediately leads to the correct password, since this will be the only one decrypting this value to \( k_2||0^k \).

This confirms the fact that converting a provably-secure scheme into a password-based protocol is not a simple task. The main problem we observe with the above scheme is the unique way in which the initial messages of all users are encrypted, allowing attacks where one player can easily replay messages from another player. Thus, to avoid problems such as these, one should at least make sure that the encryption key used by each user is unique to that user. In fact, this is one of the features of the protocol that we present in the next section.

### C.3.4 The Lee-Hwang-Lee Protocol

In \[\text{LHL04}\], Lee, Hwang, and Lee proposed another password-based version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, which makes use of the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models. Let \( \mathcal{E} \) be an ideal cipher and let \( \mathcal{H} \) and \( \mathcal{H}' \) be random oracles. Their protocol works as follows:

- Each player \( U_i \) chooses a random exponent \( x_i \), computes \( z_i = g^{x_i} \), and broadcasts \( (U_i, z_i^1 = \mathcal{E}_{pw}(z_i)) \);

- Each player \( U_i \) extracts \( z_{i-1} \) and \( z_{i+1} \), computes \( K_i = \mathcal{H}(z_{i+1}^{z_1}) = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_i+x_1}) \), \( K_{i-1} = \mathcal{H}(z_{i-1}^{z_1}) = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_i-x_1}) \), \( w_i = K_{i-1} \oplus K_i \), and broadcasts \( (U_i, w_i) \).

- Each player \( U_i \) first computes the values \( K_j = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_j-x_1}) \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \), using the values \( w_j \) that were broadcasted in the second round. Next, each player \( U_i \) sets \( sk = \mathcal{H}'(\mathcal{H}(g^{x_1x_2})||\ldots||\mathcal{H}(g^{x_{n-1}x_2})||\mathcal{H}(g^{x_nx_1})) \) as the common session key.

To show that the protocol above is not secure, we present the following simple attack against the semantic security of the session key. First, we start two sessions with player \( U_1 \) using \( \{U_1, \ldots, U_4\} \) as the group. Let \( x_1 \) and \( x_1' \) be the corresponding values chosen by the two instances of player \( U_1 \) in each of these sessions and let \( (U_1, z_1^1 = \mathcal{E}_{pw}(z_1)) \) and \( (U_1, z_1'^1 = \mathcal{E}_{pw}(z_1')) \) be the corresponding values outputted by these instances. For the instance that outputted \( (U_1, z_1^1) \), we provide to it the values \( (U_2, z_1'^1), (U_3, z_1^1), \) and \( (U_4, z_1'^1) \), as the first-round messages of players \( U_2, U_3 \), and \( U_4 \). This implicitly makes \( K_1 = K_2 = K_3 = K_4 = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_1x_2}) \). Likewise, for the instance that outputted \( (U_1, z_1'^1) \), we provide to it the values \( (U_2, z_1^1), (U_3, z_1'^1), \) and \( (U_4, z_1^1) \), as the first-round messages of players \( U_2, U_3 \), and \( U_4 \). This implicitly makes \( K_1' = K_2' = K_3' = K_4' = \mathcal{H}(g^{x_1x_2}) \). As a result, \( w_1 = w_2 = w_3 = w_4 = 0 \) and \( w_1' = w_2' = w_3' = w_4' = 0 \) and, thus, we can easily compute the appropriate second-round messages for players \( U_2, U_3 \), and \( U_4 \) in both sessions. Moreover, the session keys of these two sessions are the same. Thus, we can ask test queries to both instances of player \( U_1 \) and check whether we get back the same value. This should be the case whenever the output of test oracle is the actual session key.
C.4 Our protocol

As above, we use the ideal-cipher model. The latter considers a family of random permutations $E_k : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ indexed by a $\ell_k$-bit key $k$ which are accessible (as well as their inverses) through oracle queries ($\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{D}$). Here we use the password, together with nonces, and the index of the user, to encrypt the values in the first round. Other values are sent in the clear. Also a preliminary round is used during which each player chooses random nonces to be used. This will be crucial to define sessions, and then link the encrypted values altogether.

Key generations (for the symmetric encryption $\mathcal{E}$, and for the session key) will make use of hash functions $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_H}$ and $G : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_G}$. Key confirmations will apply the function $\mathcal{A}uth : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{\mathcal{A}uth}}$.

C.4.1 Description

The protocol runs as follows:

1. Each player $U_i$ chooses a random nonce $N_i$ and broadcasts $(U_i, N_i)$;
2. The session $S = U_1 \| N_1 \| \ldots \| U_l \| N_l \| \ldots \| U_n \| N_n$ is then defined, in which each player has a specific index $i$, and a specific symmetric key $k_i = H(S, i, pw)$. Each player $U_i$ chooses a random exponent $x_i$ and broadcasts $z_i^x = E_{k_i}(z_i)$, where $z_i = g^{x_i}$;
3. Each player extracts $z_{i-1} = D_{k_{i-1}}(z_{i-1}^x)$ and $z_{i+1} = D_{k_{i+1}}(z_{i+1}^x)$, and computes the $Z_i = z_{i-1} = z_{i+1}$ and $Z_{i+1} = z_{i+1}^x = z_{i+1}^x$. He then broadcasts $X_i = Z_{i+1}/Z_i$;
4. Each player computes his secret as $K_i = Z_i^nX_i^{-1}X_{i+1}^{n-2}\cdots X_{i+n-2}$, and broadcasts his key confirmation $\mathcal{A}uth_i = \mathcal{A}uth(S, \{z_j^x, X_j\}j, K_i, i)$.
5. After having received and checked all the key confirmations, each player defined is session key as $sk_i = G(S, \{z_j^x, X_j, \mathcal{A}uth_j\}j, K_i)$.

C.4.2 Security Theorem

Here we present the main security result of this paper, whose proof appears in Section C.5

**Theorem C.4.1** Let $P$ the above protocol in which the password is chosen in a dictionary of size $N$. Then for any adversary $A$ running in time $t$, that makes at most $q_{active}$ attempts within at most $q_{Session}$ sessions, his advantage in breaking the semantic security of the session key, in the ideal-cipher model, is upper-bounded by:

\[
Adv_{P, sk_i}^\text{sk}(t) \leq \frac{2q_{active}}{N} + 4q_{Session}tAdv_{P, sk_i}^\text{dry}(t) + \frac{2q_H^3}{2^\ell_H} + \frac{2q_{A}^2}{2^\ell_{A}} + \frac{8q_{G} + 2q_{A} + 2q_{D} + 2mq_{q_{Session}}(q_{F} + q_{D})^2}{|G|} + \frac{2q_{H}(q_{H} + q_{D})}{2^\ell_{H}}
\]

where $q_{G}, q_{H}, q_{A}, q_{F}, q_{D}$ denote the number of oracle queries the adversary is allowed to make to the random oracles $G$, $H$ and $\mathcal{A}uth$, and to the ideal-cipher oracles $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathcal{D}$, respectively.

This theorem states that the security of the session key is protected against dictionary attacks: the advantage of the adversary essentially grows linearly with the number of active attempts that the adversary makes (i.e., the number of messages that the adversary builds by himself). While the number of sessions includes both active attacks and passive ones (i.e., the session transcripts $A$ passively eavesdropped), the theorem shows that these passive attacks are essentially negligible: a honest transcript does not help a computationally bounded adversary in guessing the password.
C.4.3 On the tightness of Theorem C.4.1

Clearly, Theorem C.4.1 ensures that when building a message by himself, the adversary cannot “test” more than one password per message. Actually, in the proof, we use \( q_{\text{active}} \) to upper-bound the number of players the adversary tries to impersonate and thus the number of different passwords he can inject. Hence, we achieve a stronger security result than the one claimed in Theorem C.4.1. However, it leaves open the possibility of whether an adversary can test several passwords in the same session. Since one may wonder whether a security proof with a tighter reduction could be found, here we present an online dictionary attack against our scheme that shows that this is not the case. More precisely, we exhibit an online dictionary attack in which the adversary can test several passwords in the same session (but still no more than one password for each message!). The idea behind the attack is to create a session in which the number of dishonest players (whose roles are played by the adversary) is twice the number of honest players and to surround each of the honest players with two dishonest players.

Let \( k \) be the number of honest players. The attack works as follows. First, the adversary starts a session in which all the honest players have indices of the form \( 3(i-1)+2 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, k \). Then, let \( \{pw_1, \ldots, pw_k\} \) be a list of candidate passwords that an adversary wants to try and let \( i' = 3(i-1) \). To test whether \( pw_i \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, k \) is the correct password, the adversary plays the role of players \( U_{i'+1} \) and \( U_{i'+3} \) and follows the protocol using \( pw_i \) as the password. That is, he chooses random exponents \( x_{i'+1} \) and \( x_{i'+3} \), computes the values \( z_{i'+1} = g^{x_{i'+1}} \) and \( z_{i'+3} = g^{x_{i'+3}} \), and then computes \( z_{i'+1}^* \) and \( z_{i'+3}^* \) from \( z_{i'+1} \) and \( z_{i'+3} \) using \( pw_i \) as the password.

Let \( X_{i'+2} \) be the value that the honest user \( U_{i'+2} \) outputs in the third round of our protocol. To verify if his guess \( pw_i \) for the password is the correct one, the adversary computes \( z_{i'+2}^{x_{i'+3}} = X_{i'+2} \). This should be the case whenever \( pw_i \) is equal to the actual password.

C.4.4 Computational Assumptions

**Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption:** DDH. The DDH assumption states (roughly) that the distributions \((g^u, g^v, g^{uv})\) and \((g^u, g^v, g^w)\) are computationally indistinguishable when \( u, v, w \) are indices chosen uniformly at random. This can be made more precise by defining two experiments, \( \text{DDH}^+ \) and \( \text{DDH}^\delta \). In experiment \( \text{DDH}^+ \), the inputs given to the adversary are \( U = g^u \), \( V = g^v \), and \( W = g^{uv} \), where \( u \) and \( v \) are two random indices. In experiment \( \text{DDH}^\delta \), the inputs given to the adversary are \( U = g^u \), \( V = g^v \), and \( W = g^{uv} \), where \( u, v, w \) are random indices.

The goal of the adversary is to guess a bit indicating the experiment he thinks he is in. A \((t, \epsilon)\)-distinguisher against DDH for \( G \) is a probabilistic Turing machine \( \Delta \) with time-complexity \( t \), which is able to distinguish these two distributions with an advantage \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{ddh}}(\Delta) \) greater than \( \epsilon \). The advantage function \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{ddh}}(t) \) for the group \( G \) is then defined as the maximum value of \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{ddh}}(\Delta) \) over all \( \Delta \) with time-complexity at most \( t \).

**Parallel Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption:** PDDH. We define a variant of the DDH problem, we name it the Parallel Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, which is equivalent to the usual DDH problem. To this aim, we define the two following distributions:

\[
PDDH^+_n = \{g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}, g^{x_1 x_2}, \ldots, g^{x_{n-1} x_n}, g^{x_n x_1} | x_1, \ldots, x_n \in_R Z_q \},
\]

\[
PDDH^\delta_n = \{g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}, g^{y_1}, \ldots, g^{y_n} | x_1, \ldots, x_n, y_1, \ldots, y_n \in_R Z_q \}.
\]

A \((t, \epsilon)\)-distinguisher against \( \text{PDDH}_n \) for \( G \) is a probabilistic Turing machine \( \Delta \) with time-complexity \( t \), which is able to distinguish these two distributions with an advantage \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{pddh}}(\Delta) \) greater than \( \epsilon \). The advantage function \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{pddh}}(t) \) for the group \( G \), is then defined as the maximum value of \( \text{Adv}_G^{\text{pddh}}(\Delta) \) over all \( \Delta \) with time-complexity at most \( t \).
Lemma C.4.2 [Equivalence between PDDH$_n$ and DDH] For any group $G$ and any integer $n$, the PDDH$_n$ and the DDH problems are equivalent: for any time bound $T$,
$$\text{Adv}^\text{ddh}_G(T) \leq \text{Adv}^\text{pddh}_G(T) \leq n \text{Adv}^\text{ddh}_G(T).$$

Proof: We omit the proof of this lemma in this version of the paper as it follows from a standard hybrid argument \cite{Goldreich04,GM84} with $n+1$ hybrid experiments, in which the first $i$ DDH values are replaced by random ones in the $i$-th hybrid experiment for $i \in \{0,\ldots,n\}$. In fact, a proof of this lemma was implicitly made in the proceedings version of the paper by Katz and Yung in Crypto 2003 \cite{KY03} when showing an upper bound for the probability distance between the experiments $\text{Fake}_n$ and $\text{Real}$. Moreover, in the full version of their paper, they provide an even tighter security reduction between these two problems.

In our security analysis, we will need a challenger that outputs a new tuple either from PDH$^*_n$ or PDH$^h_n$, according to an input bit. That is, we have a fixed bit $\beta$, and for any new query $S$, $\text{Chall}^\beta(S)$ outputs a new tuple from PDH$^*_n$ if $\beta = 0$, or from PDH$^h_n$ if $\beta = 1$. If the same $S$ is queried again, then the same output tuple is returned. It is a well-known result that after $q$ queries to the challenger, any adversary in time $t$ cannot guess the bit $\beta$ with advantage larger than $q \times \text{Adv}^\text{pddh}_G(t) \leq qn \times \text{Adv}^\text{ddh}_G(t)$.

C.5 Proof of Theorem C.4.1

We proceed by defining several experiments (or games), the first one being the real-world experiment (in which the success of the adversary in outputting $b' = b$ — denoted by event $S$ — is larger than $(1 + \text{Adv}^\text{ake}(A))/2$ by definition), the last one being a trivially secure experiment in which the success of the adversary is straightforwardly $1/2$.

Game $G_9$: This is the real attack game, in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models.

Game $G_{10}$: We simulate the random oracles $G$, $H$ and Auth in a classical way using the lists $\Lambda_G$, $\Lambda_H$ and $\Lambda_{\text{Auth}}$, with a random value for any new query, and we cancel executions (by halting the simulation and declaring the adversary successful) in which a collision occurs in the output of hash functions. The probability of such bad event is upper-bounded by the birthday paradox.
$$|\Pr[S_{10}] - \Pr[S_0]| \leq \frac{q_G^2}{2^{\ell_G}} + \frac{q_H^2}{2^{\ell_H}} + \frac{q_{\text{Auth}}^2}{2^{\ell_{\text{Auth}}} \cdot n}.$$  

Game $G_{11}$: In this game, we start to control the simulation of the ideal cipher by maintaining a list $\Lambda$ that keeps track of the previous queries-answers and that links each query to a specific user. Members of the list $\Lambda$ are of the form $(\text{type},S,i,\alpha,k,z,z^*)$, where $\text{type} \in \{\text{enc,dec}\}$. Such record means that $\mathcal{E}_k(z) = z^*$, and type indicates which kind of queries generated the record. The index $i$ indicates which player is associated with the key $k$, while $S$ indicates the session with which we are dealing. These values are both set to $\bot$ if $k$ does not come from a $H$ query of the form $(S,i,\ast)$ with $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$, and $S$ of any form. The element $\alpha$ will be explained later.

- On encryption query $\mathcal{E}_k(z)$, we look for a record $(\ast,\ast,\ast,k,z,z^*)$ in $\Lambda$. If such a record exists, we return its last component. Otherwise, we choose uniformly at random $z^* \in G$, add $(\text{enc},\bot,\bot,\bot,k,z,z^*)$ to $\Lambda$, and return $z^*$.

- On decryption query $\mathcal{D}_k(z^*)$, we look for a record $(\ast,\ast,\ast,k,\ast,z^*)$ in $\Lambda$. If such a record exists, we return its sixth component. Otherwise, we distinguish two sub-cases, by looking up in $\Lambda_H$ if $k$ has been returned to a hash query of the form $(S,i,\ast)$: if it the case,
we choose \( z \) at random in \( G^* = \mathbb{G}\setminus\{0\} \) and update the list \( \Lambda \) with \((\text{dec}, S, i, \bot, k, z, z^*)\); otherwise, we choose \( z \) at random in \( G^* \) and update the list \( \Lambda \) with \((\text{dec}, \bot, \bot, \bot, k, z, z^*)\).

In both cases, the decryption query on \( z^* \) is answered with \( z \).

Such a simulation is perfect, except for the following three points. First, collisions may appear that contradict the permutation property of the ideal-cipher: the probability can be upper-bounded by \((q_G + q_D)^2/2|\mathbb{G}|\). Second, we avoided \( z \) being equal to 1 in the decryption queries. Finally, in the case of the decryption query simulation, one will cancel executions (by halting the simulation and declaring the adversary successful) if the value \( k \) (involved in a decryption query) is output later by \( \mathcal{H} \). Fortunately, this happens with probability at most \( q_H/2^\ell n \) for each decryption query. Intuitively, as it will become clear in the next games, we indeed want to make sure that, for any \( k \) involved in a decryption query, if \( k \) comes from a \( \mathcal{H} \) query, we know the corresponding pair \((S, i)\). All being considered, such bad events are unlikely:

\[
|\Pr[S_{11}] - \Pr[S_{10}]| \leq \frac{(q_G + q_D)^2}{2|\mathbb{G}|} + \frac{q_D}{|\mathbb{G}|} + \frac{q_Hq_D}{2^\ell n}.
\]

**Game G\(_{12}\):** In this game, we change the simulation of the decryption queries, and make use of our challenger to embed an instance of the PDH problem in the protocol simulation. In this game, we set \( \beta = 0 \), so that our challenger \( \text{Chall}^{\beta}(\cdot) \) output tuples \((\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_n, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\) according to the \( \text{PDH}_a \) distribution. We use these \((2n)\)-tuples to properly simulate the decryption queries.

More precisely, we issue a new tuple each time a new session \( S \) appears in a decryption query. But if several queries are asked with the same \( S \), the challenger outputs the same tuple, so we will derive many related instances, granted the random self-reducibility. The latter tells us that, given one tuple outputted by the challenger, then for any randomly chosen \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\), the tuple \((\xi_1^\alpha, \ldots, \xi_n^\alpha, \gamma_1^{\alpha_2}, \ldots, \gamma_n^{\alpha_n})\) has the same distribution as the original one.

We make use of this property as follows, by modifying the first sub-case previously considered for new decryption queries.

- On a new decryption query \( D_k(z^*) \), such that \( k = \mathcal{H}(S, i, *) \) was previously obtained from \( \mathcal{H} \) for some valid index \( i \), we query \( \text{Chall}^{\beta}(S) \) in order to get a tuple \((\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_n, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\).

  We then randomly choose \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \), add \((\text{dec}, S, i, \alpha, k, z = \xi_1^\alpha, z^*)\) to \( \Lambda \), and return \( z \).

Above, we have defined the list \( \Lambda \) whose elements are of the form \((\text{type}, S, i, \alpha, k, z, z^*)\). The component \( \alpha \) now comes into play. This element is an exponent indicating how we applied the random self-reducibility of the PDH problem, to the instance generated by the challenger upon the request \( S \): \( X = \xi_1^\alpha \). Here, the element \( \alpha \) can only be defined if \( S \) and \( i \) are known (in order to know which tuple, and which \( \zeta_i \), we are working with.) If \( \alpha \) is unknown to the simulator, we set \( \alpha = \bot \).

This change does not modify the view of the adversary, so: \( \Pr[S_{12}] = \Pr[S_{11}] \).

**Game G\(_{13}\):** We are now ready to simulate the \texttt{Send} queries in a different way, but only in the second and third rounds: when the session \( S \) is defined, user \( i \) computes the symmetric keys as before \( k_j = \mathcal{H}(S, j, pw) \), for all \( j \). We thus know we are working with the tuple \((\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_n, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\).

In the second round, \( U_i \) randomly chooses a value \( z_i^* \in \mathbb{G} \) to be broadcasted, and asks \( z_i = D_{k_i}(z_i^*) \), using the above simulation (which leads to add \( \alpha_i \) to the list \( \Lambda \), unless \( z_i^* \) already appeared as an encryption result. But the latter event cannot happen with probability greater than \( q_G/|\mathbb{G}| \).)

In the third round, \( U_i \) recovers \( z_{i-1} = D_{k_{i-1}}(z_{i-1}^*) \) and \( z_{i+1} = D_{k_{i+1}}(z_{i+1}^*) \). But then, two situations may appear:
• $z'_{i-1}$ and $z'_{i+1}$ have been simulated according to the above simulation of the second round, and then one gets $\alpha_{i-1}$ and $\alpha_{i+1}$ in the list $\Lambda$ such that $z_{i-1} = \zeta_{i-1}^{\alpha_{i-1}}$ and $z_{i+1} = \zeta_{i+1}^{\alpha_{i+1}}$.

• one of the $z'_j$ has been previously answered by the encryption oracle in response to an attacker query $E_k(z^*)$, where $k = \mathcal{H}(S, j, pw)$ is the correct key for player $U_j$ in session $S$.

We denote such an event by $\text{Encrypt}$. In such a case, we stop the simulation, letting the adversary win.

If everything runs smoothly, one gets

$$z_i = \zeta_i^\alpha, \quad z_{i-1} = \zeta_{i-1}^{\alpha_{i-1}}, \quad z_{i+1} = \zeta_{i+1}^{\alpha_{i+1}}.$$ 

One can then correctly compute

$$Z_i = \text{CDH}(z_{i-1}, z_i) = \gamma_i^{\alpha_i-1}\alpha, \quad Z_{i+1} = \text{CDH}(z_i, z_{i+1}) = \gamma_i^{\alpha_i\alpha_{i+1}}.$$ 

One then broadcasts $X_i = Z_{i+1}/Z_i$. After this final round, everybody can compute the session key as before. The simulation is still perfect, unless the above bad events happen:

$$|\Pr[S_{13}] - \Pr[S_{12}]| \leq \frac{q_{G}q_{\text{passive}}}{|G|} + \Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{13}] \leq \frac{nq_{G}q_{\text{session}}}{|G|} + \Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{13}].$$

**Game $G_{14}$:** Since it is clear that the security of the above scheme still relies on the DDH assumption, we now flip the bit $\beta$ to 1, in order to receive tuples $((\zeta_1, \ldots, \zeta_n, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n))$ according to the $\text{PDH}_n^8$ distribution (in which the $y_i$’s denote the values $\log_g \gamma_i$).

$$|\Pr[S_{14}] - \Pr[S_{13}]| \leq q_{\text{session}} \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{ddh}}(t)$$

$$|\Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{14}] - \Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{13}]| \leq q_{\text{session}} \text{Adv}_{G}^{\text{ddh}}(t).$$

**Game $G_{15}$:** In order to stop active attacks, where the adversary forges flows, we modify the computation of the key confirmations: we replace the function $\text{Auth}$ by a private one $\text{Auth'}$:

$$\text{Auth}_i = \text{Auth}'(S, \{z_j^*, X_j\}_j, K_i, i),$$

where

$$K_i = Z_i^n X_{i+1}^{-1} \cdots X_{i+n-2}^{-1} = \gamma_i^{\alpha_i-1}\alpha X_i^{n-1} X_{i+1}^{-2} \cdots X_{i+n-2}^{-2} = g^{n(\alpha_i-1)\alpha_j}\gamma_i X_{i+1}^{n-2} \cdots X_{i+n-2}.$$ 

Let us list all the information a (powerful) adversary may have, from all the $X_j$ sent by $U_j$ in the $S$-th session:

$$\log X_j = y_j(\alpha_j\alpha_j) - y_{j-1}(\alpha_{j-1}\alpha_j) = A_j y_j - A_{j-1} y_{j-1}.$$ 

As explained in [KY03], this does not leak any information about $y_{n-1}$, since the above system contains only $n - 1$ independent equations with $n$ unknowns. Any value for $y_{n-1}$ is thus possible and would determine all the other values.

Therefore, after this modification, the probability for the adversary to see the difference between the current and the previous experiments is to query $\text{Auth}(S, \{z_j^*, X_j\}_j, K_i, i)$, which is upper-bounded by $q_{\text{Auth}}/|G|$.

$$|\Pr[S_{15}] - \Pr[S_{14}]| \leq \frac{q_{\text{Auth}}}{|G|}$$

$$|\Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{15}] - \Pr[\text{Encrypt}_{14}]| \leq \frac{q_{\text{Auth}}}{|G|}.$$ 

**Game $G_{16}$:** Finally, we now derive the session keys using a private random oracle $G'$:

$$sk_i = G'(S, \{z_j^*, X_j, \text{Auth}_j\}_j).$$ 

As above, after the modification of the derivation of the session
key, the probability for the adversary to see the difference between the current and the previous experiments is to query $G(S, \{z^*_j, X_j, Auth_j\}, K_i)$. Since the previous game, we know that inside each session, all the honest users have the same view, and thus these queries are identical: the probability of such an event can also be upper-bounded by $q_{\text{G}}/|G|$, since no information has been leaked about $K_i$ (except it does not correspond to the $\text{Auth}$ queries asked above.)

\[
|\text{Pr}[S_{16}] - \text{Pr}[S_{15}]| \leq \frac{q_{\text{G}}}{|G|} - \frac{q_{\text{Auth}}}{|G|} \leq \frac{2q_{\text{G}}}{|G|}
\]

Furthermore, because the private oracle $G'$ is private to the simulator, it is clear that

\[
\text{Pr}[S_{16}] = \frac{1}{2}.
\]

**Game $G_{17}$**: In order to conclude the proof, we need to upper-bound the event $\text{Encrypt}_{16}$. One can note that the password $pw$ is only used in the simulation of the second and third rounds, to compute $z_i, z_{i-1}$ and $z_{i+1}$ (using the elements $\zeta_i, \zeta_{i-1}$ and $\zeta_{i+1}$), but eventually, we output $X_i$ only, which are computed from the $\gamma_{i-1}$ and $\gamma_i$. The latter is totally independent of the former.

We can thus simplify the simulation of the second and third rounds: In the second round, $U_i$ randomly chooses $z^*_i \in G$, and sends it (this is exactly as before.) However no decryption is needed. In the third round, $U_i$ simply computes and sends $X_i = \gamma_i/\gamma_{i-1}$ (this is just to make sure that the product of the $X_i$ is equal to 1, but we just need random elements satisfying this relation, since they do not appear anywhere else.) This is a perfect simulation, since one does not need anymore to compute $K_i$.

At this point, the password is never used, and can thus be chosen at the very end only, which makes clear that the probability of the $\text{Encrypt}$ event is less than the number of first flows manufactured by the adversary, divided by $N$. The latter part is upper-bounded by $q_{\text{active}}$:

\[
\text{Pr}[\text{Encrypt}_{16}] = \frac{q_{\text{active}}}{N}.
\]

In the above, we used the fact that collisions in the output of $H$ have been eliminated in previous games.

Putting all equations together, one easily gets the announced bound.

**C.6 Conclusion**

We described a constant-round password-based key exchange protocol for group, derived from the Burmester-Desmedt scheme. The protocol is proven secure against dictionary attacks under the DDH assumption, in the ideal-cipher and random oracle models. It remains an open problem to find a scheme whose security depends on the number of active sessions rather than on the number of manufactured flows.

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Appendix D

A Scalable Password-based Group Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model

Abstract: This paper presents a secure constant-round password-based group key exchange protocol in the common reference string model. Our protocol is based on the group key exchange protocol by Burmester and Desmedt and on the 2-party password-based authenticated protocols by Gennaro and Lindell, and by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung. The proof of security is in the standard model and based on the notion of smooth projective hash functions. As a result, it can be instantiated under various computational assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and $N$-residuosity.

D.1 Introduction

Key exchange is one of the most useful tools in public-key cryptography, allowing users to establish a common secret which they can then use in applications to achieve both privacy and authenticity. Among the examples of key exchange protocols, the most classical one is the Diffie-Hellman protocol [DH76]. Unfortunately, the latter only works between two players and does not provide any authentication of the players.

Group Key Exchange.

Group key exchange protocols are designed to provide a pool of players communicating over an open network with a shared secret key which may later be used to achieve cryptographic goals like multicast message confidentiality or multicast data integrity. Secure virtual conferences involving up to one hundred participants is an example.

Due to the usefulness of group key exchange protocols, several papers have attempted to extend the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol to the group setting. Nonetheless, most of these attempts were rather informal or quite inefficient in practice for large groups. To make the analyses of such protocols more formal, Bresson et al. [BCP01, BCPQ01] introduced a formal security model for
group key exchange protocols, in the same vein as [BR94a, BR95, BPR00]. Moreover, they also proposed new protocols, referred to as group Diffie-Hellman protocols, using a ring structure for the communication, in which each player has to wait for the message from his predecessor before producing his own. Unfortunately, the nature of their communication structure makes their protocols quite impractical for large groups since the number of rounds of communication is linear in the number of players.

A more efficient and practical approach to the group key exchange problem is the one proposed by Burmester and Desmedt [BD94, BD05], in which they provide a constant-round Diffie-Hellman variant. Their protocol is both scalable and efficient, even for large groups, since it only requires 2 rounds of broadcasts. Thus, with reasonable time-out values, one could always quickly decide whether or not a protocol has been successfully executed. Furthermore, their protocol has also been formally analyzed, in the above security framework [KY03].

Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange.

The most classical way to add authentication to key exchange protocols is to sign critical message flows. In fact, as shown by Katz and Yung [KY03] in the context of group key exchange protocols, this technique can be made quite general and efficient, converting any scheme that is secure against passive adversaries into one that is secure against active ones. Unfortunately, such techniques require the use of complex infrastructures to handle public keys and certificates. One way to avoid such infrastructures is to use passwords for authentication. In the latter case, the pool of players who wants to agree on a common secret key only needs to share a low-entropy password—a 4-digit pin-code, for example—against which an exhaustive search is quite easy to perform. In password-based protocols, it is clear that an outsider attacker can always guess a password and attempt to run the protocol. In case of failure, he can try again with a different guess. After each failure, the adversary can erase one password. Such an attack, known as “on-line exhaustive search” cannot be avoided, but the damage it may cause can be mitigated by other means such as limiting the number of failed login attempts. A more dangerous threat is the “off-line exhaustive search”, also known as “dictionary attack”. It would mean that after one failure, or even after a simple eavesdropping, the adversary can significantly reduce the number of password candidates.

In the two-party case, perhaps the most well known Diffie-Hellman variant is the encrypted key exchange protocol by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92]. However, its security analyses [BPR00, BMP00, BCP03, BCP04] require ideal models, such as the random oracle model [BR93] or the ideal cipher model. The first practical password-based key exchange protocol, without random oracles, was proposed by Katz et al. [KOY01] in the common reference string model and it is based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [CS98]. Their work was later extended by Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] using the more general smooth projective hash function primitive [CS98, CS02, CS03].

In the group key exchange case, very few protocols have been proposed with password authentication. In [BCP02b, BCP07], Bresson et al. showed how to adapt their group Diffie-Hellman protocols to the password-based scenario. However, as the original protocols on which they are based, their security analyses require ideal models and the total number of rounds is linear in the number of players, making their schemes impractical for large groups. More recently, several constant-round password-based group key exchange protocols have been proposed in the literature by Abdalla et al. [ABCP06], by Dutta and Barua [DB06], and by Kim, Lee, and Lee [KLL04]. All of these constructions are based on the Burmester and Desmedt protocol [BD94, BD05] and are quite efficient, but their security analyses usually require the random oracle and/or the ideal cipher models. Independently and concurrently to our work,

1In fact, in [ABCP06], Abdalla et al. showed that the protocols by Dutta and Barua [DB06] and by Kim, Lee,
a new constant-round password-based group key exchange protocol has been proposed by Bohli
et al. [BGS06]. Their protocol is more efficient than ours and also enjoys a security proof in the
standard model.

Contributions.
In this paper, we propose the first password-based authenticated group key exchange protocol
in the standard model. To achieve this goal, we extend the Gennaro-Lindell framework [GL03]
to the group setting, using ideas similar to those used in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol
[BD94, BD05]. In doing so, we take advantage of the smooth projective hash function primitive
[CS02] to avoid the use of ideal models. Our protocol has several advantages. First, it is
efficient both in terms of communication, only requiring 5 rounds, and in terms of computation,
with a per-user computational load that is linear in the size of the group. Second, like the
Burmester-Desmedt protocol, our protocol is also contributory since each member contributes
equally to the generation of the common session key. Such property, as pointed out by Steiner,
Tsudik and Waidner [STW00], may be essential for certain distributed applications. Finally, as
in the Gennaro-Lindell framework [GL03], our protocol works in the common reference string
model and is quite general, being built in a modular way from four cryptographic primitives:
a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, a signature scheme, a family of smooth
projective hash functions, and a family of universal hash functions. Thus, it can be instan-
tiated under various computational assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic
residuosity, and N-residuosity (see [GL03]). In particular, the Diffie-Hellman variant (based
on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [CS98]) can be seen as a generalization of the KOY proto-
col [KOY01] to the group setting.

D.2 Security Model

The security model for password-based group key exchange protocols that we present here is
the one by Bresson et al. [BCP07], which is based on the model by Bellare et al. [BPR00] for
2-party password-based key exchange protocols.

Protocol participants.
Let \( U \) denote the set of potential participants in a password-based group key exchange protocol.
Each participant \( U \in U \) may belong to several subgroups \( \mathcal{G} \subseteq U \), each of which has a unique
password \( pw_\mathcal{G} \) associated to it. The password \( pw_\mathcal{G} \) of a subgroup \( \mathcal{G} \) is known to all the users
\( U_i \in \mathcal{G} \).

Protocol execution.
The interaction between an adversary \( A \) and the protocol participants only occurs via oracle
queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. During the execution of the
protocol, the adversary may create several instances of a participant and several instances of the
same participant may be active at any given time. Let \( U^{(i)} \) denote the instance \( i \) of a participant
\( U \) and let \( b \) be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The query types available to the adversary
are as follows:

- **Execute\((U_1^{(i_1)}, \ldots, U_n^{(i_n)})\)**: This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eaves-
drops on honest executions among the participant instances \( U_1^{(i_1)}, \ldots, U_n^{(i_n)} \). It returns the
messages that were exchanged during an honest execution of the protocol.
• \textit{Send}(U^{(i)}, m): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may tamper with the message being sent over the public channel. It returns the message that the participant instance \(U^{(i)}\) would generate upon receipt of message \(m\).

• \textit{Reveal}(U^{(i)}): This query models the misuse of session keys by a user. It returns the session key held by the instance \(U^{(i)}\).

• \textit{Test}(U^{(i)}): This query tries to capture the adversary’s ability to tell apart a real session key from a random one. It returns the session key for instance \(U^{(i)}\) if \(b = 1\) or a random key of the same size if \(b = 0\).

**Partnering.**

Following \cite{KY03}, we define the notion of partnering via session and partner identifiers. Let the session identifier \(\text{sid}^{i}\) of a participant instance \(U^{(i)}\) be a function of all the messages sent and received by \(U^{(i)}\) as specified by the group key exchange protocol. Let the partner identifier \(\text{pid}^{i}\) of a participant instance \(U^{(i)}\) is the set of all participants with whom \(U^{(i)}\) wishes to establish a common secret key. Two instances \(U^{(i)}_{1}\) and \(U^{(i)}_{2}\) are said to be partnered if and only if \(\text{pid}^{i}_{1} = \text{pid}^{i}_{2}\) and \(\text{sid}^{i}_{1} = \text{sid}^{i}_{2}\).

**Freshness.**

Differently from \cite{KY03}, our definition of freshness does not take into account forward security as the latter is out of the scope of the present paper. Let \(\text{acc}^{i}\) be \text{true} if an instance \(U^{(i)}\) goes into an accept state after receiving the last expected protocol message and \text{false} otherwise. We say that an instance \(U^{(i)}\) is fresh if \(\text{acc}^{i} = \text{true}\) and no \textit{Reveal} has been asked to \(U^{(i)}\) or to any of its partners.

**Correctness.**

For a protocol to be correct, it should always be the case that, whenever two instances \(U^{(i)}_{1}\) and \(U^{(i)}_{2}\) are partnered and have accepted, both instances should hold the same non-null session key.

**Indistinguishability.**

Consider an execution of the group key exchange protocol \(P\) by an adversary \(\mathcal{A}\), in which the latter is given access to the \textit{Reveal}, \textit{Execute}, \textit{Send}, and \textit{Test} oracles and asks a single \textit{Test} query to a fresh instance, and outputs a guess bit \(b\). Let \text{Succ} denote the event \(b\) correctly matches the value of the hidden bit \(b\) used by the \textit{Test} oracle. The AKE-IND advantage of an adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol \(P\) and the advantage function of the protocol \(P\), when passwords are drawn from a dictionary \(\mathcal{D}\), are respectively \(\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{P,\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{A}) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{Succ}] - 1\) and \(\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{P,\mathcal{D}}(t, R) = \max_{\mathcal{A}} \{\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{P,\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{A})\}\), where maximum is over all \(\mathcal{A}\) with time-complexity at most \(t\) and using resources at most \(R\) (such as the number of queries to its oracles). The definition of time-complexity that we use henceforth is the usual one, which includes the maximum of all execution times in the experiments defining the security plus the code size.

We say that a password-based group key exchange protocol \(P\) is secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is only negligibly larger than \(O(q/|\mathcal{D}|)\), where \(q\) is number of different protocol instances to which the adversary has asked \textit{Send} queries. Given that the dictionary size can be quite small in practice, the hidden constant in the big-\(O\) notation should be as small as possible (preferably 1) for a higher level of security.
D.3 Building blocks

D.3.1 Universal Hash Function Families

One of the tools used in our protocol is a family of universal hash functions. A family \( \mathcal{UH} \) of universal hash function is a map \( K \times G \rightarrow R \), where \( K \) is the key or seed space, \( G \) is the domain of the hash function, and \( R \) is the range. For each seed or key \( k \in K \), we can define a particular instance \( \mathcal{UH}_k : G \rightarrow R \) of the family by fixing the key being used in the computation of the function. For simplicity, we sometimes omit the seed \( k \) from the notation when referring to a particular instance of the family. Let \( \mathcal{UH}_k \) be a universal hash function chosen at random from a family \( \mathcal{UH} \). One of the properties of universal hash function families in which we are interested is the one that says that, if an element \( g \) is chosen uniformly at random from \( G \), then the output distribution of \( \mathcal{UH}_k(g) \) is statistically close to uniform in \( R \) [HILL99].

D.3.2 Signatures

The signature scheme used in our protocol is the standard one introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [GMR88]. A standard signature scheme \( \mathcal{SIG} = (\text{SKG}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver}) \) is composed of three algorithms. The key generation algorithm \( \text{SKG} \) takes as input \( 1^k \), where \( k \) is a security parameter, and returns a pair \( (sk, vk) \) containing the secret signing key and the public verification key. The signing algorithm \( \text{Sign} \) takes as input the secret key \( sk \) and a message \( m \) and returns a signature \( \sigma \) for that message. The verification algorithm \( \text{Ver} \) on input \( (vk, m, \sigma) \) returns 1 if \( \sigma \) is a valid signature for the message \( m \) with respect to the verification key \( vk \).

The security notion for signature schemes needed in our proofs is strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks [GMR88]. More precisely, let \( (sk, vk) \) be a pair of secret and public keys for a signature scheme \( \mathcal{SIG} \), let \( \text{SIGN}(\cdot) \) be a signing oracle which returns \( \sigma = \text{Sign}(sk, m) \) on input \( m \), and let \( \mathcal{F} \) be an adversary. Then, consider the experiment in which the adversary \( \mathcal{F} \), who is given access to the public key \( vk \) and to the signing oracle \( \text{SIGN}(\cdot) \), outputs a pair \( (m', \sigma') \). Let \( \{(m_i, \sigma_i)\} \) denote the set of queries made to the signing oracle with the respective responses and let \( \text{SUCC} \) denote the event in which \( \text{Ver}(vk, m', \sigma') = 1 \) and that \( (m', \sigma') \not\in \{(m_i, \sigma_i)\} \). The SIG-SUF-CMA-advantage of an adversary \( \mathcal{F} \) in violating the chosen message security of the signature scheme \( \mathcal{SIG} \) is defined as \( \text{Adv}^{\text{sig-suf-cma}}_{\mathcal{SIG}, \mathcal{F}}(k) = \Pr[\text{SUCC}] \). A signature scheme \( \mathcal{SIG} \) is said to be SIG-SUF-CMA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in \( k \) for all polynomial time adversaries (PTAs) \( \mathcal{F} \) asking a polynomial number of queries to their signing oracle.

D.3.3 Labeled Encryption

The notion of labeled encryption, first formalized in the ISO 18033-2 standard [Sho04], is a variation of the usual encryption notion that takes into account the presence of labels in the encryption and decryption algorithms. More precisely, in a labeled encryption scheme, both the encryption and decryption algorithms have an additional input parameter, referred to as a label, and the decryption algorithm should only correctly decrypt a ciphertext if its input label matches the label used to create that ciphertext.

Formally, a labeled encryption scheme \( LEPKE = (\text{LKG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) consists of three algorithms. Via \( (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{LKG}(1^k) \), where \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter, the randomized key-generation algorithm produces the public and secret keys of the scheme. Via \( c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, l; m; r) \), the randomized encryption algorithm produces a ciphertext \( c \) for a label \( l \) and message \( m \) using \( r \) as the randomness. Via \( m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, l, c) \), the decryption algorithm decrypts the ciphertext \( c \) using \( l \) as the label to get back a message \( m \).
The security notion for labeled encryption is similar to that of standard encryption schemes. The main difference is that, whenever the adversary wishes to ask a query to his Left-or-Right encryption oracle, in addition to providing a pair of messages \((m_0, m_1)\), he also has to provide a target label \(l\) in order to obtain the challenge ciphertext \(c\). Moreover, when chosen-ciphertext security (LPKE-IND-CCA) is concerned, the adversary is also allowed to query his decryption oracle on any pair \((l, c)\) as long as the ciphertext \(c\) does not match the output of a query to his Left-or-Right encryption oracle whose input includes the label \(l\). Formally, let \(LPKE = (\text{LKG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) be a labeled encryption scheme. To any bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\) and any adversary \(D\), we associate the experiment:

\[
\text{Experiment } \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-}

\end{equation}

The LPKE-IND-CCA-advantage of an adversary \(D\) in violating the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of \(LPKE\) is defined as

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{lpke-}

\end{equation}

A LPKE scheme \(LPKE\) is said to be LPKE-IND-CCA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in \(k\) for all PTAs \(D\). As shown by Bellare et al. in the case of standard encryption schemes [BBM00], one can easily show that the Left-or-Right security notion for labeled encryption follows from the more standard Find-Then-Guess security notion (in which the adversary is only allowed a single query to his challenging encryption oracle).

### D.3.4 Smooth Projective Hash Functions

The notion of projective hash function families was first introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] as a means to design chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes. Later, Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] showed how to use such families to build secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocols. One of the properties that makes these functions particularly interesting is that, for certain points of their domain, their values can be computed by using either a secret hashing key or a public projective key. While the computation using secret hashing key works for all the points in the domain of the hash function, the computation using a public projective key only works for a specified subset of the domain. A projective hash function family is said to be smooth if the value of the function on inputs that are outside the particular subset of the domain are independent of the projective key. In [GL03], the notion of smooth hash functions was presented in the context of families of hard (partitioned) subset membership problems. Here we follow the same approach.

**Hard Partitioned Subset Membership Problems.** Let \(k \in \mathbb{N}\) be a security parameter. In a family of hard (partitioned) subset membership problem, we first specify two sets \(X(k)\) and \(L(k)\) in \(\{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(k)}\) such that \(L(k) \subseteq X(k)\) as well as two distributions \(D(L(k))\) and \(D(X(k) \setminus L(k))\) over \(L(k)\) and \(X(k) \setminus L(k)\) respectively. Next, we specify a witness set \(W(k) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(k)}\) and a NP-relation \(R(k) \subseteq X(k) \times W(k)\) such that \(x \in L(k)\) if and only if there exists a witness \(w \in W(k)\) such that \((x, w) \in R(k)\). Then, we say that a family of subset membership problems is hard if \((X(k), L(k), D(L(k)), D(X(k) \setminus L(k)), W(k), R(k))\) instances can be efficiently generated, that a member element \(x \in L(k)\) can be efficiently sampled according to \(D(L(k))\) along with a
witness \( w \in W(k) \) to the fact that \((x, w) \in R(k)\), that non-member elements \( x \in X(k) \setminus L(k) \) can be efficiently sampled according to \( D(X(k) \setminus L(k)) \), and that the distributions of member and non-member elements cannot be efficiently distinguished. The definition of hard partitioned subset membership problem is an extension of the one given above in which the set \( X(k) \) is partitioned in disjoint subsets \( X(k, i) \) for some index \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \) and for which for all \( i \) it remains hard to distinguish an element \( x \in L(k, i) \) chosen according to a distribution \( D(L(k, i)) \) from an element \( x \in X(k, i) \setminus L(k, i) \) chosen according to a distribution \( D(X(k, i) \setminus L(k, i)) \).

**Hard partitioned subset membership problems from labeled encryption.** The families of hard partitioned subset membership problems in which we are interested are those based on LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption schemes. More precisely, let \( \mathcal{LPKE} = (\text{LKG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme and let \( pk \) be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter \( k \). Let \( \text{Enc}(pk) \) denote an efficiently recognizable superset of the space of all ciphertexts that may be outputted by the encryption algorithm \( \text{Enc} \) when the public key is \( pk \) and let \( L \) and \( M \) denote efficiently recognizable supersets of the label and message spaces. Using these sets, we can define a family of hard partitioned subset membership problems as follows. First, we define the sets \( X \) and \( L \) for the family of hard subset membership problems as \( X(pk) = \text{Enc}(pk) \times L \times M \) and \( L(pk) = \{(c, l, m) \mid \exists r \text{ s.t. } c = \text{Enc}(pk, l, m; r)\} \). Next, we define the partitioning of the sets \( X \) and \( L \) with respect to the message and label used in the encryption as \( X(pk, l, m) = \text{Enc}(pk) \times l \times m \) and \( L(pk, l, m) = \{(c, l, m) \mid \exists r \text{ s.t. } c = \text{Enc}(pk, l, m; r)\} \). The distribution \( D(L(pk, l, m)) \) can then be defined by choosing a random \( r \in R \) and outputting the triple \( (\text{Enc}(pk, l, m; r), l, m) \) with \( r \) as a witness. Likewise, the distribution \( D(X(pk, l, m) \setminus L(pk, l, m)) \) can be defined by choosing a random \( r \in R \) and outputting the triple \( (\text{Enc}(pk, l, m'; r), l, m) \), where \( m' \) is a dummy message different from \( m \) but of the same length. Finally, we define the witness set \( W(pk) \) to be \( r \) and the NP-relation \( R(pk) \) in a natural way. It is easy to see that the hardness of distinguishing non-members from members follows from the LPKE-IND-CCA security of the labeled encryption scheme.

**Smooth projective hash functions.** Let \( \mathcal{HASN}(pk) = (\text{HashKG}, \text{ProjKG}, \text{Hash}, \text{ProjHash}) \) associated with \( \mathcal{LPKE} \) consists of four algorithms. Via \( h(k) \leftarrow \text{HashKG}(pk) \), the randomized key-generation algorithm produces hash keys \( h(k) \in \text{HK}(pk) \), where \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter and \( pk \) is the public key of a labeled encryption scheme \( \mathcal{LPKE} \). Via \( phk \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk, l, c) \), the randomized key projection algorithm produces project key hash keys \( phk \in \text{PHK}(pk) \) for a hash key \( hk \) with respect to label \( l \) and ciphertext \( c \). Via \( g \leftarrow \text{Hash}(hk, c, l, m) \), the hashing algorithm computes the hash value \( g \in G(pk) \) of \( (c, l, m) \) using the hash key \( hk \). Via \( g \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(phk, c, l, m; r) \), the projected hashing algorithm computes the hash value \( g \in G(pk) \) of \( (c, l, m) \) using the projected hash key \( phk \) and a witness \( r \) to the fact that \( c \) is a valid encryption of message \( m \) with respect to the public-key \( pk \) and label \( l \).

**Properties.** The properties of smooth projective hash functions in which we are interested are correctness, smoothness, and pseudorandomness.

**Correctness.**

Let \( \mathcal{LPKE} \) be a labeled encryption scheme and let \( pk \) be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter \( k \). Let \( c = \text{Enc}(pk, l, m; r) \) be the ciphertext for a message \( m \) with respect to public key \( pk \) and label \( l \) computed using \( r \) as the randomness. Then, for any hash key \( hk \in \text{HK}(pk) \) and projected hash key \( phk \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk, l, c) \), the values
Hash(hk, c, l, m) and ProjHash(phk, c, l, m, r) are the same.

Smoothness.

Let hk ∈ HK(pk) be a hash key and let phk ∈ PHK(pk) be a projected hash key for hk with respect to l and c. Then, for every triple (c, l, m) for which c is not a valid encryption of message m with respect to the public-key pk and label l (i.e., (c, l, m) ∈ X(pk, l, m) \ L(pk, l, m)), the hash value g = Hash(hk, c, l, m) is statistically close to uniform in G and independent of the values (phk, c, l, m).

Pseudorandomness.

Let LPKE be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, let pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k, and let (l, m) ∈ L × M be a message-label pair. Then, for uniformly chosen hash key hk ∈ HK(pk) and randomness r ∈ R(pk), the distributions \{c = Enc(pk, l, m; r), l, m, phk ∸ ProjKG(hk, l, c), g ← Hash(hk, c, l, m)\} and \{c = Enc(pk, l, m; r), l, m, phk ∸ ProjKG(hk, l, c), g ∼ G\} are computationally indistinguishable.

More formally, let LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec) be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k, and let ALPKE = (X(pk), L(pk), D(X(pk, l, m) \ L(pk, l, m)), D(L(pk, l, m)), W(pk), R(pk)) be a family of hard (partitioned) subset membership problems based on LPKE. To any adversary D, consider the experiments Exp_{\text{RSA}, D}^{\text{h-prf-real}}(k) and Exp_{\text{RSA}, D}^{\text{h-prf-random}}(k), defined as follows.

**Exp_{\text{RSA}, D}^{\text{h-prf-real}}(k)**

\[
\begin{align*}
(pk, sk) & \sim \text{LKG}(1^k) \\
EncList & \leftarrow \emptyset \\
b & \leftarrow D^{\text{Enc}(\cdot), \text{Hash}(\cdot, \cdot)}(pk) \\
\text{return } b
\end{align*}
\]

Oracle ENC(l, m)

\[
\begin{align*}
c & \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, l, m) \\
\text{EncList} & \leftarrow \text{EncList} \cup \{(l, m, c)\} \\
\text{return } c
\end{align*}
\]

Oracle Hash(l, m, c)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (l, m, c) & \not\in \text{EncList} \\
\text{then return } \bot \\
hk & \leftarrow \text{HashKG}(pk) \\
\text{phk} & \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk, l, c) \\
g & \leftarrow \text{Hash}(hk, l, m, c) \\
\text{return } (\text{phk}, g)
\end{align*}
\]

**Exp_{\text{RSA}, D}^{\text{h-prf-random}}(k)**

\[
\begin{align*}
(pk, sk) & \sim \text{LKG}(1^k) \\
EncList & \leftarrow \emptyset \\
b & \leftarrow D^{\text{Enc}(\cdot), \text{Hash}(\cdot, \cdot)}(pk) \\
\text{return } b
\end{align*}
\]

Oracle ENC(l, m)

\[
\begin{align*}
c & \sim \text{Enc}(pk, l, m) \\
\text{EncList} & \leftarrow \text{EncList} \cup \{(l, m, c)\} \\
\text{return } c
\end{align*}
\]

Oracle Hash(l, m, c)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (l, m, c) & \not\in \text{EncList} \\
\text{then return } \bot \\
hk & \leftarrow \text{HashKG}(pk) \\
\text{phk} & \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk, l, c) \\
g & \sim G \\
\text{return } (\text{phk}, g)
\end{align*}
\]

Then, for every (non-uniform) PTAs D, the advantage Adv_{\text{RSA}, D}^{\text{h-prf}}(k) = Pr[Exp_{LPKE, D}^{\text{h-prf-real}}(k) = 1] − Pr[Exp_{LPKE, D}^{\text{h-prf-random}}(k) = 1] is a negligible function in k.

Examples. To provide the reader with an idea of how efficient smooth projective hash functions are, we recall here the example given in [GL03] based on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].

The labeled version of the Cramer-Shoup scheme works as follows. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q where q is large. The key generation algorithm chooses two additional random generators g₁, g₂ in G, a collision-resistant hash function H, and random values z, z₁, z₂, z₁, z₂ in Z_q with z ≠ 0. The secret key is set to (z, z₁, z₂, z₁, z₂) and the public key is defined to be (h, h, h, g₁, g₂, H), where h = g₁ z, h = g₁ z₂ g₂, and h = g₁ z₂. To encrypt a message m ∈ G
with respect to label \( l \), the sender chooses \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), and computes \( u_1 = g_1^r \), \( u_2 = g_2^r \), \( e = h^r \cdot m \), \( \theta = H(l, u_1, u_2, e) \) and \( v = (\hat{h}h^\theta)^r \). The ciphertext is \( c = (u_1, u_2, e, v) \). To decrypt a ciphertext \( c = (u_1, u_2, e, v) \) with respect to label \( l \), the receiver computes \( \theta = H(l, u_1, u_2, e) \) and tests if \( v \) equals \( u_1^{z_1 + \theta z_2} u_2^{z_2 + \theta z_2} \). If equality does not hold, it outputs \( \perp \); otherwise, it outputs \( m = e u_1^{-z} \).

The smooth projective hashing for the labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is then defined as follows. The hash key generation algorithm \( \text{HashKG} \) simply sets the key \( hk \) to be the tuple \((a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4)\) where each \( a_i \) is a random value in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). The key projection function \( \text{ProjKG} \), on input \((hk, l, c)\), first computes \( \theta = H(l, u_1, u_2, e) \) and outputs \( phk = g_1^{a_1} g_2^{a_2} h^{a_3} (\hat{h}h^\theta)^{a_4} \). The hash function \( \text{Hash} \) on input \((hk, l, m)\) outputs \( a_1 u_1^{a_2} u_2^{e/m} g^{a_3} v^{a_4} \). The projective hash function \( \text{ProjHash} \) on input \((phk, c, l, m, r)\) simply outputs \( phk^r \).

### D.4 A scalable password-based group key exchange protocol

In this section, we finally present our password-based group key exchange protocol. Our protocol is an extension of the Gennaro-Lindell password-based key exchange protocol \([GL03]\) to the group setting and uses ideas similar to those used in the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol \([BD05]\). The Gennaro-Lindell protocol itself is an abstraction of the password-based key exchange protocol of Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung \([KOY01, KOY02]\). Like the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, our protocol is built in a modular way from four cryptographic primitives: a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, a signature scheme, a family of smooth projective hash functions, and a family of universal hash functions. Thus, our protocol enjoys efficient instantiations based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and \( N \)-residuosity assumptions (see \([GL03]\)). Like the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol, our protocol only requires a constant number of rounds and low per-user computation.

As done in the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, we also assume the existence of a mechanism to allow parties involved in the protocol to differentiate between concurrent executions as well as identify the other parties with which they are interacting. As in their case, this requirement is only needed for the correct operation of the protocol. No security requirement is imposed on this mechanism.

#### D.4.1 Protocol Description

**Overview.** As in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, our protocol assumes a ring structure for the users so that we can refer to the predecessor and successor of a user. Moreover, we associate each user with an index \( i \) between 1 and \( n \), where \( n \) is the size of the group. After deciding on the order of the users, our protocol works as follows. First, each user in the group executes two correlated instances of the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, one with his predecessor and one with his successor so each user can authenticate his neighbors (this accounts for the first 3 rounds of the protocol). However, instead of generating a single session key in each of these instances, we modify the original Gennaro-Lindell protocol so that two independent session keys are generated in each session (this requires an extra hash key and an extra projection key per user). We then use the first one of these as a test key to authenticate the neighbor with whom that key is shared and we use the other one to help in the computation of the group session key, which is defined as the product of these latter keys. To do so, we add one more round of communication like in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, so that each user computes and broadcasts the ratio of the session keys that he shares with his predecessor and successor. After this round, each user is capable of computing the group session key. However, to ensure that all users agree on the same key, a final round of signatures is added to the protocol to make sure that all users compute the group session key based on the same transcript. The key used to verify the signature of a user...
is the same one transmitted by that user in the first round of the Gennaro-Lindell protocol.

**User** $U_i$

\[
pid_i = \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}
\]

$(sk_i, vk_i) \xleftarrow{\$} SKG(t^R_i)$

$l_i = vk_i \parallel U_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel U_n$

$c^{L_i}_i = Enc(pk_i, l_i, pw; r^{R_i}_i) \\
\xrightarrow{\ } l_i, c^{L_i}_i$

\[h^R_i \leftarrow HK(pk) \\
pkh^R_i \leftarrow ProjKG(hk^R_i, l_{i-1}, c^{L_{i-1}}_i) \\
c^R_i = Enc(pk_i, l_i, pw; r^{R_i}_i) \\
\xrightarrow{\ } phk^R_i, c^R_i
\]

\[hk_i, hk^R_i \leftarrow HK(pk) \\
pkh_i \leftarrow ProjKG(hk_i, l_{i+1}, c^{R}_{i+1}) \\
pkh^R_i \leftarrow ProjKG(hk^R_i, l_{i+1}, c^{R}_{i+1}) \\
K^R_i = ProjHash(phkh^R_{i+1}, c^{R}_{i+1}, l_i, pw, r^{R_i}_i) \\
K^R_i = Hash(hk^R_i, c^{R}_{i+1}, l_{i+1}, pw) \\
X^R_i = X^R_{i+1} - K^R_i \\
\]

if $test^R_{i+1} = UH_1(X^R_{i+1})$ then $acc_i = false$

\[
x_i = K_i / K_{i-1} \\
\xrightarrow{\ } x_i, test^R_i
\]

\[
if test^L_i \neq UH_2(X^R_i) \then acc_i = false \\
if \prod_{j=1}^{i} X_{i} \neq 1 \then acc_i = false \\
T = T_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel T_n \\
\sigma_i = Sign(sk_i, T)
\]

\[
\xrightarrow{\ } \sigma_i
\]

\[
for j = 1, \ldots, i-1, i+1, \ldots, n \\
if Ver(sk_j, T, \sigma_j) = 0 \then acc_i = false \\
MSK = K_{\sigma_i} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} X^{\sigma_j}_{i-j} \\
SK = UH'(MSK) \\
acc_i = true \\
sid_i = T
\]

Figure D.1: An honest execution of the password-authenticated group key exchange protocol by player $U_i$ in a group $\{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}$, where $T^R_i = U_1 || U_{i+1} || c^{L_i}_i || c^{R}_{i+1} || phk^R_i || phk^R_{i+1} || test^R_i$ and $T_i = vk_i || U_i || c_i || phk_i || phk^R_i || phk^R_{i+1} || X_i || X^R_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

For a pictorial description of our protocol, please refer to Figure D.1. The formal description follows.

**DESCRIPTION.** Let $\mathcal{LKG} = (\mathcal{LKG}, \mathcal{Enc}, \mathcal{Dec})$ be a labeled encryption scheme, let $\mathcal{Sig} = (SKG, Sign, Ver)$ be a signature scheme, and let $\mathcal{MSH}(pk) = (\mathcal{HashKG}, \mathcal{ProjKG}, Hash, \mathcal{ProjHash})$ be a family smooth projective hash functions based on $\mathcal{LKG}$. Let $UH : G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ and $UH' : G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ be two universal hash functions chosen uniformly at random from the
families $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{U}'$ and let $\text{UH}_1(g)$ and $\text{UH}_2(g)$ refer to the first and second halves of $\text{UH}(g)$. Let $U_1, \ldots, U_n$ be the users wishing to establish a common secret key and let $pw$ be their joint password chosen uniformly at random from a dictionary $\text{Dict}$ of size $N$. We assume $pw$ either lies in the message space $\text{M}$ of $\text{LPRF}$ or can be easily mapped to it. Our protocol has a total of five rounds of communication and works as follows.

**Initialization.**

A trusted server runs the key generation algorithm $\text{LKG}$ on input $1^k$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ is a security parameter, to obtain a pair $(pk, sk)$ of secret and public keys and publishes the public key $pk$ along with randomly selected universal hash function $\text{UH}$ and $\text{UH}'$ from the families $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{U}'$.

**Round 1.**

In this first round, each player $U_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ starts by setting the partner identifier $\text{pid}_i$ to $\{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}$. Then, each player $U_i$ generates a pair $(sk_i, vk_i)$ of secret and public keys for a signature scheme and a label $l_i = vk_i \parallel U_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel U_n$. Next, each player encrypts the joint group password $pw$ using the encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}$ with respect to the public key $pk$ and label $l_i$ using $r_i^k$ as the randomness. Let $c_i^L$ denote the resulting ciphertext (i.e., $c_i^L = \text{Enc}(pk, l_i, pw; r_i^k)$). At the end of this round, each player $U_i$ broadcasts the pair $(l_i, c_i^L)$.

**Round 2.**

In this second round, each player $U_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ encrypts once more the joint group password $pw$ using the encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}$ with respect to the public key $pk$ and label $l_i$ using $r_i^k$ as the randomness. Let $c_i^R$ denote the resulting ciphertext (i.e., $c_i^R = \text{Enc}(pk, l_i, pw; r_i^k)$). Next, each player $U_i$ chooses a hash key $hk_i^L$ uniformly at random from $\text{HK}(pk)$ for the smooth projective hash function and then generates a projection key $phk_i^L$ for it with respect to the pair $(c_i^L, l_i)$. That is, $phk_i^L \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk_i^L, l_i, c_i^R)$. Here and in other parts of the protocol, the indices are taken modulo $n$. At the end of this round, each player $U_i$ broadcasts the pair $(c_i^R, phk_i^L)$.

**Round 3.**

In this round, player $U_i$ first chooses two new hash keys $hk_i$ and $hk_i^R$ uniformly at random from $\text{HK}(pk)$ for the smooth projective hash function. Next, player $U_i$ generates two projection keys $phk_i$ and $phk_i^R$ for the hash keys $hk_i$ and $hk_i^R$, both with respect to the pair $(c_i^{L+1}, l_{i+1})$. That is, $phk_i^L \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk_i, l_{i+1}, c_i^{L+1})$ and $phk_i^R \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk_i, l_{i+1}, c_i^{L+1})$. Then, player $U_i$ computes a test master key $X_i^L = K_i^{L+1} \cdot K_i^R$ for its successor, where $K_i^L = \text{Hash}(hk_i^L, c_i^{L+1}, l_i, pw)$ and $K_i^R = \text{Hash}(hk_i^R, c_i^{L+1}, l_i, pw)$. Note that player $U_i$ can compute $K_i^L$ using $hk_i^L$ and $K_i^{L+1}$ using $phk_i^{L+1}$ and the witness $r_i^k$ to the fact that $c_i^L$ is a valid encryption of $pw$ with respect to $pk$ and $l_i$. Finally, player $U_i$ computes a test key $\text{test}_i^R = \text{UH}_1(X_i^R)$, sets $T_i^R = U_i \parallel U_{i+1} \parallel c_i^L \parallel c_i^{L+1} \parallel phk_i \parallel phk_i^R \parallel phk_i^{L+1} \parallel \text{test}_i^R$, and computes a signature $\sigma_i^R$ on $T_i^R$ using $sk_i$. At the end of this round, player $U_i$ broadcasts the tuple $(phk_i, phk_i^R, \text{test}_i^R, \sigma_i^R)$.

**Round 4.**

In this round, each player $U_i$ first verifies if the signature $\sigma_i^{L-1}$ on the transcript $T_i^{L-1}$ is correct using $vk_{i-1}$. If this check fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $acc_i = \text{false}$. Otherwise, player $U_i$ computes the values $K_i^L$ and $K_i^{R-1}$, using the hash key $hk_i^L$ and the projection key $phk_i^{R-1}$ along with the witness $r_i^k$ to the fact that $c_i^L$ is a valid encryption of $pw$ with respect to $pk$ and $l_i$. That is, $K_i^L = \text{Hash}(hk_i^L, c_i^{L-1}, l_{i-1}, pw)$ and $K_i^{R-1} = \text{ProjHash}(phk_i^{R-1}, c_i^L, l_i, pw, r_i^k)$. Next, player $U_i$ computes the test master key $X_i^L = K_i^L \cdot K_i^{R-1}$ for its predecessor and verifies if $\text{test}_i^{R-1} = \text{UH}_1(X_i^{R-1})$ is correct using $vk_{i-1}$. If this check fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $acc_i = \text{false}$. Otherwise, player $U_i$ computes the projection master key $K_i^L = K_i^L \cdot K_i^{R-1}$ for its predecessor and verifies if $\text{test}_i^{R-1} = \text{UH}_1(X_i^{R-1})$ is correct using $vk_{i-1}$. If this check fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $acc_i = \text{false}$. Otherwise, player $U_i$ computes the joint group password $pw_i$ using the encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}$ with respect to the public key $pk$ and label $l_i$ using $r_i^k$ as the randomness. Let $c_i^{L+1}$ denote the resulting ciphertext (i.e., $c_i^{L+1} = \text{Enc}(pk, l_i, pw; r_i^k)$). At the end of this round, each player $U_i$ broadcasts the pair $(l_i, c_i^{L+1})$. The protocol terminates and $pw_i$ is the joint group password.
Theorem D.4.1. Once again, if this test fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $\text{acc}_i = \text{false}$. If this test succeeds, then player $U_i$ computes a test key $\text{test}^{L+1}_i = UH_2(X^L_i)$ for its predecessor and an auxiliary key $X_i = K_i / K_{i-1}$, where $K_i \triangleq \text{Hash}(hk_i, c_{i+1}, l_{i+1}, \text{pw})$. More precisely, player $U_i$ computes the value $K_i$ using the hash key $hk_i$ and the value $K_{i-1}$ using the projection key $phk_{i-1}$ along with the witness $r_{i-1}^L$ to the fact that $c_{i-1}^L$ is a valid encryption of $\text{pw}$ with respect to $pk$ and $l_i$. Finally, each player $U_i$ broadcasts the pair $(X_i, \text{test}^{L+1}_i)$.

Round 5.

First, each player $U_i$ checks whether $\text{test}^{L+1}_i = UH_2(X^R_i)$ and whether $\prod_{j=1}^n X_j = 1$. If any of these tests fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $\text{acc}_i = \text{false}$. Otherwise, each player $U_i$ sets $T_j = v_{i,j} || c_j || phk_j || phk_j^R || X_j || X_j^L$ for $j = 1, \ldots, n$ and $T = T_1 || \ldots || T_n$ and then signs it using $sk_i$ to obtain $\sigma_i$. Finally, each player $U_i$ broadcasts $\sigma_i$.

Finalization.

Each player $U_i$ checks for $j \neq i$ whether $\sigma_j$ is a valid signature on $T$ with respect to $vk_j$. If any of these checks fails, then player $U_i$ halts and sets $\text{acc}_i = \text{false}$. Otherwise, player $U_i$ sets $\text{acc}_i = \text{true}$ and computes the master key $MSK = \prod_{j=1}^n K_j = K_1 \cdot X_{i+1}^n \cdot X_{i+2}^n \cdot \ldots \cdot X_{i+n-3}^n \cdot X_{i+n-1}$, and the session key $SK = UH'(MSK)$. Each player $U_i$ also sets the session identifier $\text{sid}_i$ to $T$.

Observation.

Let $K_i \triangleq \text{Hash}(hk_i, c_{i+1}, l_{i+1}, \text{pw})$, $K^R_i \triangleq \text{Hash}(hk_i^R, c_{i+1}, l_{i+1}, \text{pw})$, and $K^L_i \triangleq \text{Hash}(hk_i^L, c_{i-1}, l_{i-1}, \text{pw})$ denote temporary keys. In a normal execution of the protocol, the temporary keys $K_i$ and $K^R_i$ are known to both player $U_i$ (who knows $hk_i$ and $hk_i^R$) and his successor $U_{i+1}$ (who knows $phk_i$, $phk_i^R$, and the witness $r_{i-1}^L$ to the fact that $c_{i-1}^L$ is a valid encryption of $\text{pw}$ with respect to $pk$ and $l_{i+1}$). Likewise, the temporary key $K^L_i$ is known to both player $U_i$ (who knows $hk_i^L$) and his predecessor $U_{i-1}$ (who knows $phk_i^L$ and the witness $r_{i-1}^L$ to the fact that $c_{i-1}^L$ is a valid encryption of $\text{pw}$ with respect to $pk$ and $l_{i-1}$).

D.4.2 Correctness and Security

Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, it is easy to verify that all participants in the protocol will terminate by accepting and computing the same values for the partner identifier, session identifiers, and the session key. The session key in this case is equal to $\prod_{j=1}^n \text{Hash}(hk_j, c_{j+1}, l_{j+1}, \text{pw}) = \prod_{j=1}^n K_j$.

Security. As the following theorem shows, the $\text{GPAKE}$ protocol described above and in Figure 8.4 is a secure password-based authenticated group key exchange protocol as long as the primitives on which the protocol is based meet the appropriate security notion described in the theorem.

Theorem D.4.1 Let $\text{LPKE}$ be a labeled encryption secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks, let $\text{HASH}$ be a family of smooth projective hash functions, let $\text{uni}$ and $\text{uni}'$ be families of universal hash functions, and let $\text{SIG}$ be a signature scheme that is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. Let $\text{GPAKE}$ denote the protocol built from these primitives as described above and let $A$ be an adversary against $\text{GPAKE}$. Then, the advantage function $\text{Adv}_{\text{GPAKE}, A}(k)$ is only negligibly larger than $O(q/N)$, where $q$ denotes the maximum number of different protocol instances to which $A$ has asked $\text{Send}$ queries and $N$ is the dictionary size.
The proof of Theorem D.4.1 is in Appendix D.5. In it, we actually show that the security of our protocol is only negligibly larger than $(q_{send-1} + q_{send-2}) / N$, where $q_{send-1}$ and $q_{send-2}$ represent the maximum number of Send queries that the adversary can ask with respect to the first and second round of communication and $N$ is dictionary size. Even though we believe this security level is good enough for groups of small to medium sizes, it may not be sufficient in cases where the number of users in a group is large and the dictionary size is small. In the latter case, it would be desirable to have a scheme whose security is only negligibly larger than the number of sessions (and not protocol instances) over the size of the dictionary. Unfortunately, the latter cannot be achieved by our protocol as it is possible for an active adversary to test in the same session a number of passwords that is linear in the total number of users, for instance by playing the role of every other user.

D.4.3 Efficiency

Our protocol is quite efficient, only requiring a small amount of computation by each user. In what concerns encryption and hash computations, each user only has to perform 2 encryptions, 3 projection key generations, 3 hash computations, 3 projected hash computations, and 5 universal hash computations. The most expensive part of our protocol, which is linear in the group size, is the number of signature verifications and the master session key computation. While the latter computation can be improved by using algorithms for multi-exponentiations, the former can be improved by using two-time signature schemes.

It is worth mentioning here that, as done by Katz et al. [KMTG05] in the case of the KOY protocol [KOY01], one could also improve the efficiency of our protocol by using two different encryption schemes in the computation of the ciphertexts $c_R$ and $c_L$ broadcasted in the first and second rounds. While the computation of the ciphertexts $c_{R_i}$ would require a CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, the computation of the ciphertexts $c_{L_i}$ would only require a CPA-secure encryption scheme. To show that this would actually be the case, one would need to modify the proofs of lemmas D.5.9 and D.5.13 in Appendix D.5. In the case of the proof of Lemma D.5.9 (which would rely on the CPA-secure encryption scheme), the decryption oracle can be avoided by using the secret key for the CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme to check the validity of a ciphertext $c_{R_i}$. In the case of the proof of Lemma D.5.13 (which would rely on the CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme), one would only need the decryption oracle to check the validity of a ciphertext $c_{L_i}$, since the validity of a ciphertext $c_{L_i}$ would be checked using the secret key for the CPA-secure encryption scheme.

D.4.4 Future Work

One issue not addressed in the current paper is whether our protocol remains secure in the presence of Corrupt queries, through which the adversary can learn the values of the long-term secret keys held by a user. This is indeed a significant limitation of our security model which we expect to address in a future version of this paper. In fact, we do hope to be able to prove that our protocol achieves forward security according to the definition given in [KY03].

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D.5 Appendix: Proof of Theorem D.4.1

Notation.

Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem D.4.1 we define some basic notation and terminology that will be used in the proof. We start by classifying the Send queries into 6 categories, depending on the stage of the protocol to which the query is associated.

- **Send0.** This query has the form \((U_{ij}^0, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\})\) and denotes the initial Send query made to user instance \(U_i^j\) when executing the protocol in a group \(G = \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}\) that contains user \(U_i\). The output of this query is the pair \((l_i, e_i^R)\) that user instance \(U_i^j\) generates in the first round of communication.

- **Send1.** This query has the form \((U_{ij}^0, \{(l_i, e_i^R), \ldots, (l_n, e_n^R)\}, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\})\) and denotes the second Send query to user instance \(U_i^j\). It returns the tuple \((phk_{L_i}^1, e_i^L)\) that instance \(U_i^j\) would generate on input \((l_i, e_i^R), \ldots, (l_n, e_n^R)\).

- **Send2.** This query has the form \((U_{ij}^0, \{(phk_{L_1}^1, e_1^L), \ldots, (phk_{L_n}^1, e_n^L)\}, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\})\) and denotes the third Send query to user instance \(U_i^j\). It returns the tuple \((phk_i, phk_{R_i}^1, test_{R_i}^1, \sigma_R^1)\) that instance \(U_i^j\) would generate on input \((phk_{L_1}^1, e_1^L), \ldots, (phk_{L_n}^1, e_n^L)\).

- **Send3.** This query has the form \((U_{ij}^0, \{(phk_1, phk_{R_1}^1, test_{R_1}^1, \sigma_R^1), \ldots, (phk_n, phk_{R_n}^1, test_{R_n}^1, \sigma_R^1)\}, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\})\) denotes the fourth Send query to user instance \(U_i^j\). It returns the pair \((X_i, test_{L_i}^1)\) that instance \(U_i^j\) would generate on input \((phk_1, phk_{R_1}^1, test_{R_1}^1, \sigma_R^1), \ldots, (phk_n, phk_{R_n}^1, test_{R_n}^1, \sigma_R^1)\).

- **Send4.** This query has the form \((U_{ij}^0, \{(X_1, test_{L_1}^1), \ldots, (X_n, test_{L_n}^1)\}, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\})\) denotes the fifth Send query to user instance \(U_i^j\). It returns the signature \(\sigma_i\) that instance \(U_i^j\) would generate on input \((X_1, test_{L_1}^1), \ldots, (X_n, test_{L_n}^1)\).

- **Send5**, \(U_{ij}^0, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n, \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}\). This denotes the last Send query to user instance \(U_i^j\). This query forces instance \(U_i^j\) to either halt and reject (setting \(acc_i^j = false\)) or to halt, accept (setting \(acc_i^j = true\)), and compute a session key. It has no output.

We say a message is t-oracle-generated if that message has been generated by an oracle in round \(t\) of some session. We say that a ciphertext-label pair \((c^R, l = vk \parallel U_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel U_n)\) is valid for \(U_i^j\) if \(c^R\) is a valid encryption of the password \(pw_G\) with respect to the public key \(pk\) and the label \(l\), and \(pid_i^j = G = \{U_1, \ldots, U_n\}\).

Proof of Theorem D.4.1

Let \(\mathcal{A}\) be an adversary against our password-based group key exchange protocol \(GPAKE\). The goal of proof is to show that the advantage of \(\mathcal{A}\) in breaking the semantic security of \(GPAKE\) is only negligibly better than \(q_{send-1} + q_{send-2}\) over the size of the dictionary. To do so, our proof uses a sequence of hybrid experiments, the first of which corresponds to the actual attack. For each hybrid experiment \(Hyb_n\), we define an event \(Succ_n\) corresponding to the case in which the adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) correctly guesses the bit \(b\) involved in the Test query. Likewise, we also define the corresponding advantage of the adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) in each of these experiments to be \(Adv_{GPAKE, A, Hyb_n}(k) = 2 \cdot Pr[Succ_n] - 1\).

**Hybrid experiment Hyb_0.** This first experiment corresponds to a real attack, in which all the parameters, such as the public parameters in the common reference string and the passwords
associated with each group of users, are chosen as in the actual scheme. By definition, the advantage of an adversary $A$ in guessing the bit $b$ involved in the Test query in this experiment is exactly the same as in the real attack.

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_1}(k) = \text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_0}(k)$$  \hspace{1cm} (D.1)

**Hybrid experiment $Hyb_1$.** In this experiment, we change the simulation of the $\text{Execute}$ oracle so that the values $K_i$, $K^c_i$, and $K^R_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ are chosen uniformly at random from $G$, where $n$ is the size of the group $G$. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. This is due to pseudorandomness property of the smooth projective hash function.

**Lemma D.5.1** $|\text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_1}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_0}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k)$.

**Proof:** To prove this lemma, we show how to construct an adversary $D$ against the pseudorandomness property of the smooth projective hash function from an adversary $A$ capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one.

To do so, we recall that the adversary $D$ is given a public key $pk$ for a labeled encryption scheme and access to two oracles: $\text{Enc}(\cdot, \cdot)$ and $\text{Hash}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$. The oracle $\text{Enc}(\cdot, \cdot)$ receives as input a message $m$ and a label $l$ and outputs a ciphertext $c$, which is an encryption of message $m$ with respect to the public key $pk$ and the label $l$. The oracle $\text{Hash}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ receives as input a label $l$, a message $m$, and a ciphertext $c$. If the ciphertext $c$ is not the result of a previous query $(l, m)$ to the oracle $\text{Enc}$, then it outputs $\perp$. Otherwise, the oracle $\text{Hash}$ computes a hash key $hk$ via $hk \leftarrow \text{HashKG}(pk)$ and a projection hash key $phk$ as $phk \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(hk, l, c)$. Then, $\text{Hash}$ computes the output $g$ of the hash function in one of two ways depending on the experiment in which it is. In experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-real}}(k)$, $\text{Hash}$ sets $g$ to $\text{Hash}(hk, l, m, c)$. In experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-random}}(k)$, it sets $g$ to a random value in $G$. Finally, $\text{Hash}$ outputs $(phk, g)$. The goal of adversary $D$ is to tell the exact experiment with which he is dealing. By the pseudorandomness property of a smooth projective hash function, no adversary $D$ should be able to distinguish the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-random}}(k)$ from the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-real}}(k)$ with non-negligible probability.

We construct an adversary $D$ as follows. First, $D$ uses $pk$ to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment $\text{Hyb}_0$. Then, whenever $A$ asks a $\text{Send}$ or $\text{Execute}$ query with respect to a group $G$ for which no password has been defined, then $D$ chooses a password $pw_G$ for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary $\text{Dict}$. Then, $D$ continues to simulate all of $A$’s oracles exactly as in experiment $\text{Hyb}_0$, except when computing the values $c^R_i$, $c^c_i$, $phk_i$, $phk^R_i$, $K_i$, $K^c_i$, and $K^R_i$ in a $\text{Execute}$ query for a group $G$. To compute the latter values, $D$ makes uses of its $\text{Enc}$ and $\text{Hash}$ oracles. That is, $D$ first computes $c^R_i = \text{Enc}(l_i, pw_G)$ and $c^c_i = \text{Enc}(l_i, pw_G)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, |G|$. Next, $D$ queries its oracle $\text{Hash}$ three times for each $i$ in the set $\{1, \ldots, |G|\}$ on inputs $(l_{i-1}, c^c_{i-1})$, $(l_{i+1}, c^c_{i+1})$, and $(l_{i-1}, c^R_{i+1})$, to obtain respectively the values $(phk^c_i, K^c_i)$, $(phk^R_i, K^R_i)$, and $(phk_i, K_i)$. Finally, $D$ continues the simulation of the $\text{Execute}$ query using the values above exactly as in the experiment $\text{Hyb}_0$. At the end of the simulation, $D$ outputs the same guess as $A$.

One can easily see that, whenever $D$ is in experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-real}}(k)$, then its simulation of the $\text{Execute}$ oracle is performed exactly as in experiment $\text{Hyb}_0$. Moreover, whenever $D$ is in experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-random}}(k)$, then its simulation of the $\text{Execute}$ oracle is performed exactly as in experiment $\text{Hyb}_1$. Thus, the probability that $D$ distinguishes between experiments $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-real}}(k)$ and $\text{Exp}_{\text{H}, \text{D}}^{\text{prf-random}}(k)$ is exactly $\text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_1}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\text{ake-ind}_{\text{H}}, A}^{\text{Hyb}_0}(k)$. 

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Thus, the proof of Lemma D.5.1 follows from the pseudorandomness property of the family of smooth projective hash functions.

**Hybrid experiment Hyb₂.** In this experiment, we change again the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the master key $MSK_i$ computed by each player in an Execute query is chosen uniformly at random from the group $G$. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The arguments used to prove this lemma are in fact information theoretic.

**Lemma D.5.2**

$$\text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_2}(k) = \text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_1}(k).$$

**Proof:** The proof of Lemma D.5.2 uses an argument similar to the one used by Katz and Yung in their proof of Burmester-Desmedt protocol [KY03]. First, we note that in the simulation of the Execute oracle in experiment Hyb₁, the values $K_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, |G|$ are all chosen at random in $G$. Second, let $g$ denote a generator for $G$. We note that, from the transcript $T$ that the adversary $A$ sees, the values $K_i$ are constrained by the following $|G|$ equations.

$$\log_g X_1 = \log_g K_1 - \log_g K_{|G|}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\log_g X_{|G|} = \log_g K_{|G|} - \log_g K_{|G|} - 1.$$  

Of these equations, only $|G| - 1$ are linearly independent. Finally, the master key computed by the players defines an additional equation

$$\log_g MSK = \sum_{i=1}^{\lvert G \rvert} \log_g K_i.$$  

Since the last equation is linearly independent of the previous ones, the master secret key $MSK_i$ that each player in the group $G$ computes in an Execute query is independent of the transcript $T$ that the adversary $A$ sees. Thus, no computationally unbounded adversary $A$ can tell experiment Hyb₂ apart from Hyb₁. As a result, for any $A$, $\text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_2}(k) = \text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_1}(k)$.  

**Hybrid experiment Hyb₃.** In this experiment, we change once more the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the session key $SK_i$ computed by each player in an Execute query is chosen uniformly at random in $\{0,1\}^l$. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.3 follows easily from the properties of the family of universal hash functions $UH'$, which guarantees that its output is statistically close to uniform in $\{0,1\}^l$ when given a random value in $G$ as input.

**Lemma D.5.3**

$$|\text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_3}(k) - \text{Adv}_{GPAKE, A, \text{Hyb}_2}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k).$$

**Hybrid experiment Hyb₄.** In this experiment, we change one last time the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the password $pw_G$ associated with a group $G$ is no longer used. More specifically, when simulating an Execute query, the ciphertexts $c^*_i$ and $c^*_j$ that each player $U_i \in G$ computes becomes the encryption of a dummy password $pw'_G \neq pw_G$. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.4 follows from the semantic security of the labeled encryption scheme $LPKE$. 

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Lemma D.5.4 \[ \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) \leq \text{neg}(k). \]

**Proof:** To prove this lemma, we show how to construct an adversary \( D \) against the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of \( \mathcal{LPKE} \) from an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one. We recall that the adversary \( D \) is given a public key \( pk \) for the labeled encryption scheme and access to two oracles: the Left-or-Right encryption oracle \( \text{Enc}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot) \) and a decryption oracle \( \text{Dec}(\cdot, \cdot) \). The latter, however, is not needed in this part of the proof.

We construct an adversary \( D \) as follows. First, \( D \) uses \( pk \) to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment \( \text{Hyb}_3 \). Then, whenever \( \mathcal{A} \) asks a \text{Send} or \text{Execute} query with respect to a group \( G \) for which no password has been defined, then \( D \) first chooses a password \( pw_G \) for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary \( \text{Dict} \). At this time, \( D \) also chooses a dummy password \( pw'_G \neq pw_G \) of the appropriate length. Next, \( D \) continues to simulate all of \( \mathcal{A} \)'s oracles exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_3 \) except when computing the ciphertext values \( c_i^R \) and \( c_i^L \) in a \text{Execute} query for a user group \( G \). To simulate the latter values, \( D \) makes use of its Left-or-Right encryption oracle \( \text{Enc} \). More precisely, \( D \) computes \( c_i^R = \text{Enc}(i, pw_G, pw'_G) \) and \( c_i^L = \text{Enc}(i, pw'_G, pw'_G) \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, |G| \). Finally, \( D \) continues the simulation of the remaining part of the \text{Execute} query exactly as in the experiment \( \text{Hyb}_3 \), choosing the session key \( SK_i \) of each player \( U_i \) and the intermediate values \( K_i^L, K_i^R \), and \( K_i \) uniformly at random in their respective groups. At the end of the simulation, \( D \) outputs the same guess as \( \mathcal{A} \).

One can easily see that, whenever \( D \) is in experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{D}}^{\text{ake-ind-ccar}=0}(k) \), then its simulation of the \text{Execute} oracle is performed exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_3 \), since in this case the Left-or-Right encryption oracle \( \text{Enc} \) always returns the encryption of the actual password. Moreover, whenever \( D \) is in experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{D}}^{\text{ake-ind-ccar}=1}(k) \), then its simulation of the \text{Execute} oracle is performed exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_4 \), since in this case the Left-or-Right encryption oracle \( \text{Enc} \) always returns the encryption of a dummy password. Thus, the probability that \( D \) distinguishes between experiments \( \text{Exp}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{D}}^{\text{ake-ind-ccar}=1}(k) \) and \( \text{Exp}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{D}}^{\text{ake-ind-ccar}=0}(k) \) is exactly \[ \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k). \] Thus, the proof of Lemma D.5.4 follows from the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of \( \mathcal{LPKE} \).

**Hybrid experiment \( \text{Hyb}_3 \).** In this new experiment, we change the simulation of the \text{Send} oracle of an instance \( U'_i(j) \) whenever the latter receives an \text{1-oracle-generated} ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^R \) (the one that should have been created by its predecessor) in \( \text{Send}_3 \) query. Let \( U'_i(j') \) be the instance that created this ciphertext (note that \( i' \) may or may not be equal to \( i - 1 \)). More precisely, if the instance \( U'_i(j) \) does not reject after a \text{Send}_3 \) query (by setting \( \text{acc}_i^R = \text{false} \)), then the values \( K_i-1 \) and \( K_i^R \) are chosen uniformly at random from \( G \). Remember from the protocol that instance \( U'_i(j) \) halts and sets \( \text{acc}_i^R = \text{false} \) whenever the signature \( \sigma_i^R \) on the transcript \( T_{i-1}^R \) with respect to \( vk_{i-1} \) is not valid or the test session key \( \text{test}_i^R \) is not correct. Furthermore, if \( i' = i - 1 \) and the values \( c_{i-1}^R \) and \( c_i^R \) seen by instances \( U'_i(j) \) and \( U'_i(j') \) are the same, then the values \( K_i^L \) and \( K_i^R \) for instance \( U'_i(j') \) are also chosen uniformly at random. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.5 follows from the security properties of the smooth projective hash function family \( \text{ASH} \).

Lemma D.5.5 \[ \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\gamma \mathcal{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Hyb}_3}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) \leq \text{neg}(k). \]

**Proof:** The proof of Lemma D.5.5 has two cases depending on whether or not the \text{1-oracle-generated} ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^R \) is \text{valid} for \( U'_i(j) \). We observe here that ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^R \) is \text{valid} for \( U'_i(j) \) if it
has been created by an instance $U_i^{(j)'}$, forwarded to instance $U_i^{(j)}$, and it holds that $\text{pid}_i^{(j)'} = \text{pid}_i^{(j)}$ and $i' = i - 1$.

$c_{i-1}^A$ is invalid for $U_i^{(j)}$. The proof in this case follows easily from the smoothness property of the family of smooth projective hash functions, which says that if $c_{i-1}^A$ is not a valid encryption of the password $\text{pw}_G$ with respect to the public-key $pk$ and label $l_{i-1}$, then the hash value $K_{i-1}^A = \text{Hash}(hk_i, c_{i-1}^A, l_{i-1}, \text{pw})$ is statistically close to uniform in $G$. Likewise, the master key $X_i^A = K_i^A$. $K_i^A$ is used to check the test session key of its predecessor is also statistically close to uniform in $G$. As a result, except with negligible probability, the instance $U_i^{(j)}$ will halt and reject (by setting $\text{acc}_i^{j} = \text{false}$) after receiving the test value $\text{test}_{i-1}^A$. Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter.

$c_{i-1}^A$ is valid for $U_i^{(j)}$. The proof of this case follows from pseudorandomness property of the family of smooth projective hash functions. To prove so, we show how to construct an adversary $D$ against the pseudorandomness property of the family $\text{HASH}$ from an adversary $A$ capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one when $c_{i-1}^A$ is valid for $U_i^{(j)}$.

We construct an adversary $D$ as follows. First, $D$ uses $pk$ to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment $\text{Hyb}_4$. Then, whenever $A$ asks a $\text{Send}$ or $\text{Execute}$ query with respect to a group $G$ for which no password has been defined, then $D$ chooses a password $\text{pw}_G$ for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary $\text{Dict}$. Then, $D$ continues to simulate all of $A$’s oracles exactly as in experiment $\text{Hyb}_4$ except when an instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives a valid 1-oracle-generated ciphertext $c_{i-1}^A$ from an instance $U_i^{(j)}$. In the latter, instead of computing the ciphertext $c_i^A$ as in the original protocol, $D$ obtains $c_i^A$ by making a call to its $\text{Enc}$ oracle using the label $l_i$ and password $\text{pw}_G$ as the input. Then, if the adversary $A$ correctly forwards the ciphertext $c_i^A$ to instance $U_i^{(j)}$ in a $\text{Send}_2$ query, then $D$ makes two calls to its $\text{HASH}$ oracle using $c_i^A$ and label $l_i$ as input to obtain respectively the values $(phk_{i-1}^A, K_{i-1}^A)$, and $(phk_{i-1}, K_{i-1})$ instead of computing these values by itself. $D$ also uses the value $K_{i-1}^A$ and $K_{i-1}$ to compute $\text{test}_{i-1}^A$ in round 3 and the value $X_{i-1}$ in round 4. Next, if instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives the projection keys $phk_{i-1}^A$ and $phk_{i-1}$ in a $\text{Send}_2$ query that $D$ obtained from the $\text{HASH}$ oracle, then $D$ also uses the values $K_{i-1}^A$ and $K_{i-1}$ to compute $X_i^A$ and $X_i$. If instance $U_i^{(j)}$ does not receive the projection keys $phk_{i-1}^A$ and $phk_{i-1}$ in a $\text{Send}_2$ query, then it halts and sets $\text{acc}_i^{j} = \text{false}$. Apart from these changes, no other modification is made to the simulation. At the end of the simulation, $D$ outputs the same guess as $A$.

To analyze the success probability of $D$, first notice that if instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives projection keys $phk_{i-1}^A$ and $phk_{i-1}$ different from those outputted by the $\text{HASH}$ oracle, then $U_i^{(j)}$ rejects with overwhelming probability due to the security of the signature scheme $\text{SIG}$. This is because the case we are considering is the one in which the ciphertext $c_{i-1}^A$ is 1-oracle-generated and valid for $U_i^{(j)}$. Thus, the only way for $A$ to send projections keys $phk_{i-1}^A$ and $phk_{i-1}$ different from those computed by instance $U_i^{(j)}$ is for the latter to forge the signature $\sigma_{i-1}^A$. A formal reduction to the security of the signature scheme $\text{SIG}$ in this case is straightforward and omitted here.

Next, notice that, whenever $D$ is in experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{basef-reqf-real}}_{\text{Hyb}_4, D}(k)$, then its simulation of the $\text{Send}$ oracle is performed exactly as in experiment $\text{Hyb}_4$. This is because in this case, whenever an instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives a valid 1-oracle-generated ciphertext $c_{i-1}^A$, the values for $K_{i-1}$ and $K_{i-1}^A$ that $U_i^{(j)}$ computes come from the $\text{HASH}$ oracle and are thus correct. Moreover, if both $U_i^{(j)}$
and \( U_{i-1}^{(j)} \) see the same transcript \( T_{i-1}^r \), then \( U_{i-1}^{(j)} \) also computes the same values for \( K_{i-1} \) and \( K_r^{i-1} \) (except when \( A \) succeeds in forging a signature). Finally, notice that, whenever \( D \) is in experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{h-prf-random}}_{\text{H}_{\text{GPAKE}}, D} (k) \), then its simulation of the \( \text{Send} \) oracle is performed almost exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \) since the values for \( K_{i-1} \) and \( K_r^{i-1} \) that \( U_{i-1}^{(j)} \) computes when receiving a valid 1-oracle-generated ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^r \) are random in this case. The only difference occurs when \( A \) succeeds in forging the signature \( \sigma_{\text{H}_{\text{GPAKE}}, i} \) of instance \( U_{i-1}^{(j)} \). Thus, the probability that \( D \) distinguishes between experiments \( \text{Exp}^{\text{h-prf-real}}_{\text{H}_{\text{GPAKE}}, D} (k) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{h-prf-random}}_{\text{H}_{\text{GPAKE}}, D} (k) \) is negligibly close to \( \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k) \). Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter.

Since in both cases, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter, the proof of Lemma D.5.5 follows.

Hybrid experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \). In this new experiment, we change once again the simulation of the \( \text{Send} \) oracle of an instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) whenever the latter receives an 1-oracle-generated ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^r \) in a \( \text{Send}_1 \) query so that \( U_i^{(j)} \) computes the ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^r \) using a dummy password \( \text{pw}_G \) that is different from the password \( \text{pw}_G \) associated with the group \( G \). As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.6 follows from the chosen-plaintext security of the labeled encryption scheme \( \text{LPKE} \).

Lemma D.5.6 \( |\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k)| \leq \text{neg}(k) \).

Proof: The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma D.5.4 and follows easily from the chosen-plaintext security of the labeled encryption scheme \( \text{LPKE} \). To construct the adversary \( D \) for \( \text{LPKE} \) from an adversary \( A \) capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one, we proceed as follows. First, \( D \) uses \( pk \) to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \). Then, whenever \( A \) asks a \( \text{Send}_0 \) or \( \text{Execute} \) query with respect to a group \( G \) for which no password has been defined, then \( D \) first chooses a password \( \text{pw}_G \) for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary \( \text{Dict} \) as well as a dummy password \( \text{pw}_G \neq \text{pw}_G \) of the appropriate length. Also, \( D \) chooses a dummy password \( \text{pw}_G \neq \text{pw}_G \) of the appropriate length. Next, \( D \) continues to simulate all of \( A \)'s oracles exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \) except when \( A \) makes a \( \text{Send}_1 \) query to an \( U_i^{(j)} \) using a 1-oracle-generated value for the ciphertext \( c_{i-1}^r \). To simulate the latter query, \( D \) computes \( c_{i-1}^r \) as \( \text{ENC}(l_i, \text{pw}_G, \text{pw}_G) \) with the help of its Left-Or-Right encryption oracle \( \text{Enc} \). One should note here that this change is only possible because the values \( K_{i-1} \) and \( K_r^{i-1} \) that \( U_i^{(j)} \) may need to compute in the sessions are chosen at random from \( G \) since the previous experiment. No other change is made to the simulation. At the end of the simulation, \( D \) outputs the same guess as \( A \).

One can easily see that, whenever \( D \) is in experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-0}}_{\text{LPKE}, D} (k) \), then its simulation of the \( \text{Send}_1 \) oracle is performed exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \), since \( \text{Enc} \) always returns the encryption of the actual password in this case. Moreover, whenever \( D \) is in experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-1}}_{\text{LPKE}, D} (k) \), then its simulation of the \( \text{Send}_1 \) oracle is performed exactly as in experiment \( \text{Hyb}_5 \), since \( \text{Enc} \) always returns the encryption of a dummy password in this case. Thus, the probability that \( D \) distinguishes between experiments \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-0}}_{\text{LPKE}, D} (k) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-1}}_{\text{LPKE}, D} (k) \) is exactly \( \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{G}_{\text{GPAKE}}, A, \text{Hyb}_5} (k) \). Thus, the Lemma D.5.6 follows from the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of \( \text{LPKE} \).
Hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_7$. In this experiment, we change the simulation so that, whenever an instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives a valid adversarially-generated ciphertext $c_{i-1}^R$ in a $\text{Send}_1$ query, we halt the simulation and consider the adversary $A$ successful. No other change is made to simulation. Clearly, if such ciphertext $c_{i-1}^R$ is never sent by $A$, then the current and the previous experiments are identical. On the other hand, if the adversary $A$ does happen to send such a valid ciphertext, then $A$ is considered successful. Therefore, as the following lemma states, the advantage of $A$ in the current experiment is greater or equal to that in the previous experiment.

Lemma D.5.7 $\text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_7}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_5}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k)$.

Hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_9$. In this experiment, we change the simulation so that, whenever an instance $U_i^{(j)}$ receives an invalid adversarially-generated ciphertext $c_{i-1}^R$ in a $\text{Send}_1$ query, then $U_i^{(j)}$ always chooses the value $K_i^L$ uniformly at random from $G$. Moreover, it always halts and rejects (by setting $\text{acc}_i^L = \text{false}$) after receiving a $\text{Send}_3$ query from $A$. Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.

Lemma D.5.8 $|\text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_9}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_7}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k)$.

Proof: The proof of Lemma [D.5.8] follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family $\mathcal{Hash}$, that says that if $c_{i-1}^R$ is not a valid encryption of the password $\text{pw}_G$ with respect to the public-key $pk$ and label $l_{i-1}$, then the hash value $K_i^L = \text{Hash}(h_i^L, c_{i-1}^R, l_{i-1}, \text{pw})$ is statistically close to uniform in $G$. Likewise, the master key $X_i^L = K_i^L$. $K_i^R$ used to check the test session key of its predecessor is also statistically close to uniform in $G$. As a result, except with negligible probability, the instance $U_i^{(j)}$ will halt and reject (by setting $\text{acc}_i^L = \text{false}$) after receiving the test value $\text{test}_i^R$. Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter. 

Hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_9$. In this experiment, we change once again the simulation of the $\text{Send}$ oracle of an instance $U_i^{(j)}$ whenever the latter receives a invalid adversarially-generated ciphertext $c_{i-1}^R$ in a $\text{Send}_1$ query so that the latter computes the ciphertext $c_i^L$ using dummy password $\text{pw}_G'$ that is different from the $\text{pw}_G$ associated the group $G$. Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma [D.5.9] follows from the semantic security of the labeled encryption scheme $LPKE$.

Lemma D.5.9 $|\text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_9}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{G\mathcal{PAKE}, A, \text{Hyb}_7}^{\text{ake-ind}}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k)$.

Proof: The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma [D.5.6] and follows easily from the chosen-ciphertext security of the labeled encryption scheme $LPKE$. As in that case, we are only able to make this change to the simulation because instance $U_i^{(j)}$ always chooses the value $K_i^L$ uniformly at random from $G$ and because it always halts and rejects (by setting $\text{acc}_i^L = \text{false}$) after receiving a $\text{Send}_3$ query from $D$. The only difference between the proof of Lemma [D.5.6] and the present one is that here we need to make use of the decryption oracle for $LPKE$ to find out if $c_{i-1}^R$ is a valid encryption of the group password $\text{pw}_G$ with respect to the public key $pk$ and the label $l_{i-1}$. This is because the ciphertext $c_{i-1}^R$ is generated by the adversary in this case. Like in the proof of Lemma [D.5.6] the probability that $D$ distinguishes between experiments $\text{Exp}_{LPKE, D}^{\text{lpahe-ind-cca-1}}(k)$ and
\textbf{D.5. Appendix: Proof of Theorem D.4.1}

\begin{align*}
\text{Exp}_{\ell \in \text{PKE} \cdot D}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}\cdot \text{ccar}}(k) \text{ is exactly } & \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D}}(k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k). \text{ Thus, Lemma D.5.9 follows from the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of } \text{LPKE}.
\end{align*}

\textbf{Hybrid experiment Hyb}_{10}. In this new experiment, we change the simulation of the Send\textsubscript{2} oracle of an instance \( U^{(j)} \) so that, whenever the latter receives an 2-oracle-generated ciphertext \( c_{i+1}^L \), the values \( K_i \) and \( K_i^R \) are chosen uniformly at random from \( G \). As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.10 is omitted here since it follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family \( \gamma \text{ASH} \) as, since the previous any 2-oracle-generated ciphertext \( c_{i+1}^L \text{ is always an encryption of a dummy password in this case and hence not valid.} \)

\textbf{Lemma D.5.10} \(|\text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k)\).

\textbf{Hybrid experiment Hyb}_{11}. In this experiment, we change the simulation of the Send\textsubscript{2} oracle of an instance \( U^{(j)} \) so that, whenever an instance \( U^{(j)} \) receives a valid adversarially-generated ciphertext \( c_{i+1}^L \) in a Send\textsubscript{2} query, we halt the simulation and consider the adversary \( A \) successful. No other change is made to simulation. Clearly, if such ciphertext \( c_{i+1}^L \) is never sent by \( A \), then the current and the previous experiments are identical. On the other hand, if the adversary \( A \) does happen to send such a valid ciphertext, then \( A \) is considered successful. Therefore, as the following lemma states, the advantage of \( A \) in the current experiment is greater or equal to that in the previous experiment.

\textbf{Lemma D.5.11} \( \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k) \).

\textbf{Hybrid experiment Hyb}_{12}. In this experiment, we change once again the simulation of the Send\textsubscript{2} oracle of an instance \( U^{(j)} \) so that, whenever an instance \( U^{(j)} \) receives an invalid adversarially-generated ciphertext \( c_{i+1}^L \) in a Send\textsubscript{2} query, then \( U^{(j)} \) always chooses the values \( K_i^R \) and \( K_i \) uniformly at random from \( G \). Moreover, it always halts and rejects (by setting \( \text{acc}^j = \text{false} \)) after receiving a Send\textsubscript{2} query from \( A \). Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.

\textbf{Lemma D.5.12} \( |\text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k) - \text{Adv}^{\text{pk}\cdot \text{ind}}_{\ell \cdot \text{PKE} \cdot \text{D} \cdot \text{Hyb}_b}(k)| \leq \text{neg}(k)\).

\textbf{Proof}: As in the proof of Lemma D.5.8 Lemma D.5.12 follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family \( \gamma \text{ASH} \), which says that if \( c_{i+1}^L \) is \textit{not} a valid encryption of the password \( \text{pw}_G \) with respect to the public-key \( pk \) and label \( l_i \), then the hash values \( K_i^R = \text{Hash}(hk_i^R, c^L_i, l_i, \text{pw}_G) \) and \( K_i = \text{Hash}(hk_i, c^L_i, l_i, \text{pw}_G) \) are statistically close to uniform in \( G \). Likewise, the master key \( X_i^R = K_i^R \). \( K_i^L \) used to check the test session key of its successor is also statistically close to uniform in \( G \). As a result, except with negligible probability, the instance \( U^{(j)} \) will halt and reject (by setting \( \text{acc}^j = \text{false} \)) after receiving the test value \( \text{test}^j_{i+1} \). Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter. \]

\textbf{Hybrid experiment Hyb}_{13}. In this experiment, we change the simulation of the Send\textsubscript{0} oracle of an instance \( U^{(j)} \) so that the latter computes the ciphertext \( c_i^R \) using dummy password \( \text{pw}_G \) that is different from the \( \text{pw}_G \) associated the group \( G \). Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma D.5.13 follows from the semantic security of the labeled encryption scheme \( \text{LPKE} \).
Lemma D.5.13 \( |\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{13}^j \right) | - |\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{12}^j \right) | \leq \text{neg}(k) \).

Proof: The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma D.5.9 and follows easily from the chosen-ciphertext security of the labeled encryption scheme \( \mathcal{LPKE} \). As in that case, we are only able to make this change because at this point instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) no longer needs to know the randomness \( r_i^j \) used to create the ciphertext \( \tau_i^j \) to be able to compute the test master key \( X_i^j \) since the latter is always a random value in \( G \) (this is because \( K_i^j \) is always chosen uniformly at random from \( G \)). As in the proof of Lemma D.5.9 we also need access to a decryption oracle for \( \mathcal{LPKE} \) to be able to verify whether adversarially-generated ciphertexts \( c_i^1 \) and \( c_i^2 \) are valid encryptions of the group password \( pw \), the first with respect to the pair \((pk, l_i-1)\) and the second with respect to the pair \((pk, l_i+1)\). Like in the proof of Lemma D.5.9 the probability that \( D \) distinguishes between experiments \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-1}}_{\mathcal{LPKE}, D}(k) \) and \( \text{Exp}^{\text{lpke-ind-cca-0}}_{\mathcal{LPKE}, D}(k) \) is exactly \( \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{13}^j \right) - \text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{12}^j \right) \). Thus, Lemma D.5.13 follows from the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of \( \mathcal{LPKE} \).

Hybrid experiment \( \text{Hyb}_{14}^j \). In this experiment, we change the simulation of the \( \text{Send}_3 \) oracle so that the master key \( MSK \) computed by an instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) is chosen uniformly at random from the group \( G \) whenever \( U_i^{(j)} \) accepts (by setting \( \text{acc}^i_j = \text{true} \)). As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.

Lemma D.5.14 \( |\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{14}^j \right) | - |\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}_{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{PKX}}, A} \left( \text{Hyb}_{13}^j \right) | \leq \text{neg}(k) \).

Proof: The proof of Lemma D.5.14 follows from the unforgeability of the signature scheme \( \text{sig}_A \) and uses arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma D.5.2. To prove this, first, we note that an instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) that accepts only does so after verifying that the instances of users \( U_{i-1} \) and \( U_{i+1} \) in \( G \) that are next to it actually know the correct password (this is done in rounds 3 and 4) and after verifying the correctness of all the signatures that it receives in the last round of communication. Thus, whenever an instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) does not halt and reject, it must be the case that its neighbors are in fact oracle instances not played by the adversary (since we always halt the simulation when the adversary produces a valid ciphertext). Moreover, the keys \( K_i \) and \( K_{i-1} \) computed by instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) and by its predecessor are chosen at random from \( G \). Second, we note that in all sessions in which the adversary plays an active role, with very overwhelming probability, he causes all the oracles instances in that session to halt and reject. While the instances that are next to \( A \) reject in round 3 or 4 because \( A \) has sent an invalid ciphertext in one of the first two rounds, the other ones reject with overwhelming probability because \( A \) does not succeed in forging the signatures of those instances that have rejected before the last round of communication (this requires a formal reduction to the security of the signature scheme \( \text{sig}_{GA} \), which is straight-forward and omitted here). This holds because the signature of a user always guarantees the validity of the verification keys associated with his successor and predecessor. Thus, attacks in which the adversary sends different verification keys to different users will always cause at least one of signatures in the ensemble to be invalid.

Putting everything together, we can conclude that, whenever an instance \( U_i^{(j)} \) accepts, its session partners are in fact oracle instances not played by the adversary and that all keys \( K_t \) for \( t = 1, \ldots, |G| \) are random values in \( G \). As a result, the values \( X_t \) for \( t = 1, \ldots, |G| \) outputted by the \( \text{Send}_4 \) oracles define exactly \(|G|\) equations, of which \(|G| - 1\) are linearly independent, as in the proof of Lemma D.5.2. Since in round 5, each instance broadcasts its own signature of the transcript, it must be the case that, if \( U_i^{(j)} \) accepts after a \( \text{Send}_5 \) query, with high probability.
it has received the correct values $X_t$ computed by each partner instance of $U_t$ in that session. If that is not the case, then it is straight-forward to build an adversary capable of breaking the security of the signature scheme $\text{SIG}$. Finally, since the master key computed by instance $U_j^{(i)}$ defines an additional equation, which is linearly independent of the other $|G| - 1$ equations that were defined by the values $X_1, \ldots, X_{|G|}$, its value is independent of the transcript $T$ that the adversary $A$ sees. It follows that the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.

To conclude the proof, we first notice that, since the session keys of all accepting instances are chosen at random and since all session partners that accept end up computing the same session key (due to the security of the signature scheme $\text{SIG}$), the advantage of $A$ in the current experiment is 0 when $A$ does not generate a valid ciphertext round 1 or 2. Second, in the current experiment, all oracle instances are simulated using dummy passwords, $A$’s view of the protocol is independent of the passwords that are chosen for each group of users. Finally, since each ciphertext uniquely defines a password, we have that the probability that any given adverarially generated ciphertext is valid is at most $1/N$, where $N$ is the size of the dictionary. As the number of adverarially generated ciphertexts is bounded by $q_{\text{send-1}} + q_{\text{send-2}}$, the advantage of $A$ in the current experiment is only negligibly larger than $(q_{\text{send-1}} + q_{\text{send-2}})/N$.

**Lemma D.5.15** $\text{Adv}^{\text{ake-ind}}_{\text{gFZXE},A,\text{Hyb}_{14}}(k) \leq (q_{\text{send-1}} + q_{\text{send-2}})/N + \text{neg}(k)$.

By combining all the lemmas above, one easily obtains the announced result in Theorem **D.4.1**.
Identity-Based Cryptography

Appendix E

M. Abdalla, J. Birkett, D. Catalano, A. Dent, J. Malone-Lee, G. Neven, J. Schuldt, and N. Smart
This article introduces the notion of identity-based encryption with wildcards, which is a generalization of identity-based encryption that allows a sender to encrypt messages to a whole range of receivers whose identities match a certain pattern. In addition to proposing the new primitive, this paper also presents several efficient implementations which are shown to be secure under an appropriate security notion.

Appendix F

M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, D. Catalano, E. Kiltz, T. Kohno, T. Lange, J. Malone-Lee, G. Neven, P. Paillier, and H. Shi
This article revisits the notion of public-key encryption with keyword search, also known as searchable encryption, and provides new security definitions for these schemes which take false positives into account. It also provides generic transformations to and from anonymous identity-based encryption schemes and suggests a few extensions, such as public-key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with keyword search.

Appendix G

Robust Encryption, TCC 2010
Michel Abdalla, Mihir Bellare, and Gregory Neven
This article formalizes the notion of robust encryption which reflects the difficulty of producing a ciphertext that is valid under two different encryption keys. In addition to the formalization in the public-key and identity-based settings, this paper also assesses the robustness of specific encryption schemes in the literature, providing simple patches for some that lack the property. Moreover, it also shows that the robustness of anonymous identity-based encryption schemes is closely related to issue of false positives of searchable encryption schemes.
Appendix E

Wildcarded Identity-Based Encryption

Abstract: In this paper we introduce a new primitive called identity-based encryption with wildcards, or WIBE for short. It allows a sender to encrypt messages to a whole range of receivers whose identities match a certain pattern. This pattern is defined through a sequence of fixed strings and wildcards, where any string can take the place of a wildcard in a matching identity. Our primitive can be applied to provide an intuitive way to send encrypted email to groups of users in a corporate hierarchy. We propose a full security notion and give efficient implementations meeting this notion under different pairing-related assumptions, both in the random oracle model and in the standard model.

E.1 Introduction

The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir as early as in 1984 [Sha85], and the same paper proposed an identity-based signature scheme. However, it took nearly twenty years for an efficient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to be proposed. In 2000 and 2001 respectively Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [SOK00] and Boneh and Franklin [BF03] proposed IBE schemes based on elliptic curve pairings. Also, in 2001 Cocks proposed a system based on the quadratic residuosity problem [Coc01].

One of the main application areas proposed for IBE is that of email encryption. In this scenario, given an email address, one can encrypt a message to the owner of the email address without needing to obtain an authentic copy of the owner's public key first. In order to decrypt the email the recipient must authenticate itself to a trusted authority who generates a private key corresponding to the email address used to encrypt the message.

E.1.1 Identity-Based Encryption with Wildcards

Our work is motivated by the fact that many email addresses correspond to groups of users rather than single individuals. Consider the scenario where there is some kind of organisational
hierarchy. Take as an example an organisation called ECRYPT which is divided into virtual labs, say AZTEC and STVL. In addition, these virtual labs are further subdivided into working groups WG1, WG2 and WG3. Finally, each working group may consist of many individual members. There are several extensions of the IBE primitive to such a hierarchical setting (HIBE) [HL02, GS02]. The idea is that each level can issue keys to users on the level below. For example the owner of the ECRYPT key can issue decryption keys for ECRYPT.AZTEC and ECRYPT.STVL.

Suppose that we wish to send an email to all the members of the AZTEC.WG1 working group, which includes the personal addresses

- ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.Nigel,
- ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.Dario,

Given a standard HIBE one would have to encrypt the message to each user individually. To address this limitation we introduce the concept of identity-based encryption with wildcards (WIBE). The way in which decryption keys are issued is exactly as in a standard HIBE scheme; what differs is encryption. Our primitive allows the encrypter to replace any component of the recipient identity with a wildcard so that any identity matching the pattern can decrypt. Denoting wildcards by *, in the example above the encrypter would use the identity

- ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.*

to encrypt to all members of the AZTEC.WG1 group.

It is often suggested that identity strings should be appended with the date so as to add timeliness to the message, and so try to mitigate the problems associated with key revocation. Using our technique we can now encrypt to a group of users, with a particular date, by encrypting to an identity of the form

- ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.*.22Oct2006

for example. Thus any individual in the group

- ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1

with a decryption key for 22nd October 2006 will be able to decrypt.

As another example, take a hierarchy of email addresses at academic institutions of the form

- name@department.university.edu,

i.e., the email address of John Smith working at the computer science department of Some State University would be johnsmith@cs.ssu.edu. Using our primitive, one can send encrypted email to everyone in the computer science department at Some State University by encrypting to identity *@cs.ssu.edu, to everyone at SSU by encrypting to *@*.ssu.edu, to all computer scientists at any institution by encrypting to *@cs.*.edu, or to all system administrators in the university by encrypting to sysadmin@*.ssu.edu.

E.1.2 Our Contributions

In this paper, we introduce the primitive of identity-based encryption with wildcards, or a WIBE for short. We define appropriate security notions under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attack, and present the first instantiations of this primitive. In more detail, we present the
syntax and security notions in Section E.3. To illustrate the relationship between WIBEs and other identity-based primitives, we show how WIBE schemes can be built from HIBE schemes and from fuzzy identity-based encryption schemes.

As is the case for most public-key and identity-based encryption schemes, the non-hybrid WIBE schemes can only be used to encrypt relatively short messages, typically about 160 bits. To encrypt longer messages, one will have to resort to hybrid techniques: the sender uses the WIBE to encrypt a fresh symmetric key $K$ and encrypts the actual message under the key $K$. The basic construction has been used within the cryptographic community for years, dating back to the work of Blum and Goldwasser in 1984 [BG85], but its security for the case of public-key encryption was not properly analysed until the work of Cramer and Shoup [CS03]. One would intuitively expect these results to extend to the case of WIBEs, which is indeed the case. We present the syntax for a WIB-KEM in Section E.4, along with the composition theorem which proves that the combination of a secure WIB-KEM and a secure DEM results in a secure WIBE scheme.

We also give several constructions for a WIBE scheme, classified according to their security guarantees. We first present the Boneh-Boyen WIBE (BB-WIBE – see Section E.5.1) and the Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE (BBG-WIBE – see Section E.5.2). These schemes are IND-CPA secure in the selective identity model and do not require random oracles to be proven secure, although we do require random oracles in order to prove their security in the full (non-selective-identity) model (see Section E.5.4). We also present the Waters WIBE scheme (see Section E.5.3) which is secure in the non-selective-identity IND-CPA setting without random oracles.

The range of IND-CPA WIBE schemes available makes selection difficult. The Waters WIBE scheme has the best security guarantees, but the worst performance. In particular, the number of elements in the master public key depends upon the maximum length of an identity, which is typically of the order of 160 bits. Hence, even with a small number of levels, the size of the master public key can be prohibitive. Both the BB-WIBE scheme and the BBG-WIBE scheme have better performance characteristics, but their security (in the non-selective-identity model) depends on random oracles. Furthermore, the BBG-WIBE scheme reduces to the less-studied $L$-BDHI assumption, but has the best performance characteristics.

The construction of IND-CCA secure WIBE schemes is more difficult. We present two generic transformations from an IND-CPA scheme into an IND-CCA scheme. The first transformation is based on the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform (see Section E.6.1) which builds an $L$-level IND-WID-CCA secure WIBE from an $(L+1)$-level IND-WID-CPA WIBE. The disadvantage of our construction compared to the original CHK transform is that our construction always encrypts messages under patterns of length $L+1$. This often increases the space and time complexity of the scheme in practical situations (as the worst performance characteristic are often obtained for “full-length” patterns). The approach we present in this paper is different from the approach given in the ePrint version of [ACD+06], which requires using $2L+2$ levels as opposed to $L+1$. We thank the anonymous referee for helping guide us to this improvement.

Our second transform is based on Dent’s construction of a KEM (see Section E.6.2). This converts a weakly secure (one-way) WIBE scheme into an IND-CCA secure WIB-KEM, but requires the random oracle model in order to prove its security. We note that one-way security is implied by IND-CPA security (for sufficiently large messages spaces). Consequently, we can use any of the IND-CPA constructions given in Section E.5 to build an IND-CCA secure scheme.

In [BDNS07], we also presented a WIB-KEM in the standard model based on the Kiltz-Galindo HIB-KEM from [KG09]. Due to our improved CPA to CCA transform described above this is no longer as efficient as the transformed Waters WIBE, hence we do not consider the Kiltz-Galindo WIB-KEM in this paper.

An overview of all the schemes we present is given in Table E.1 and Table E.2.
Table E.1: Efficiency comparison between our CPA-secure schemes. We compare the generic scheme of Section E.3.3, the BB-WIBE scheme of Section E.5.1, the BBG-WIBE scheme of Section E.5.2, and the Waters-WIBE scheme of Section E.5.3. The schemes are compared in terms of master number of elements in the public key (|mpk|), number of elements in the user secret key (|d|), number of elements in the ciphertext (|C|), number of pairing operations required for decryption (Decrypt), the security assumption under which the scheme is proved secure, and whether this proof is in the random oracle model or not. The generic construction does not introduce any random oracles, but if the security proof of the HIBE scheme is in the random oracle model, then the WIBE obviously inherits this property. \(L\) is the maximal hierarchy depth and \(n\) is the bit length of an identity string. Figures are worst-case values, usually occurring for identities at level \(L\) with all-wildcard ciphertexts.

Table E.2: Efficiency comparison between our CCA-secure schemes. The BB-WIBE scheme is the IND-WID-CPA scheme given in E.5.1, the BBG-WIBE scheme is the IND-WID-CPA scheme given in E.5.2, and the Waters scheme is the IND-WID-CPA scheme given in E.5.3. The \(OML(\cdot)\) transformation refers to the (one more level) generic CCA-secure construction of a CCA-secure WIBE from a CPA-secure WIBE presented in Section E.6.1. The \(OW(\cdot)\) transformation is our random-oracle based construction of a WIB-KEM scheme from a CPA-secure WIBE presented in Section E.6.2. We compare the schemes in terms of number of elements in the master public key (|mpk|), number of elements in the user secret key (|d|), number of elements in the ciphertext (|C|), number of exponentiations required for key encapsulation (Encap), number of pairings required for key decapsulation (Decap), and the dominant factor lost in the security reduction to the underlying assumption. \(L\) is the maximal hierarchy depth and \(n\) is the bit length of an identity string. The values \(q_H\) and \(q_K\) refer to the number of queries made by an adversary to the random oracle and key derivation oracle, respectively.

E.2 A Recap on Various Primitives

In this section, we recall basic notation and known results on different primitives that we will be using throughout this paper. In particular, we will recall several constructions of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption schemes (HIBE)s upon which our Wildcarded Identity-Based Encryption schemes (WIBE)s are based.

E.2.1 Basic Notation

Let \(\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots\}\) be the set of natural numbers. Let \(\varepsilon\) be the empty string. If \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), then \(\{0, 1\}^n\) denotes the set of \(n\)-bit strings and \(\{0, 1\}^*\) is the set of all finite bit strings. If
In order to amplify the security of a HIBE/WIBE (from IND-CPA security to IND-CCA security), we will introduce further security notions in later sections and may model these hash functions as random oracles.

**Definition E.2.1** A $(t, \epsilon)$-adversary $A$ against the second pre-image resistance property of a family of hash functions $F_k : \mathcal{IP} \rightarrow \mathcal{OP}$ with a finite input space $\mathcal{IP}$ is an algorithm that runs in time at most $t$ and has advantage at least $\epsilon$, where the adversary’s advantage is defined to be:

$$\Pr[x \neq y \wedge F_k(x) = F_k(y) : x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{IP}; k \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}; y \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} A(k, x)].$$

**E.2.3 One-Time Signature Schemes**

In order to amplify the security of a HIBE/WIBE (from IND-CPA security to IND-CCA security) we will make use of a one-time signature scheme. A one-time signature scheme is a triple of algorithms $(\text{SigGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$. The key generation algorithm $\text{SigGen}$ outputs signing and verification keys $(sk, vk)$ for the signature scheme. The signing algorithm takes as input a signing key $sk$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and outputs a signature $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$. The verification algorithm takes as input a verification key $vk$, a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and a signature $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and outputs either $\top$ (indicating a valid signature) or $\perp$ (indicating an invalid signature). For correctness, we require that for all key pairs $(sk, vk)$, messages $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and signatures $\sigma \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Sign}(sk, m)$, we have that $\text{Verify}(vk, m, \sigma) = \top$ with probability one.

The security notion for a one-time unforgeable signature scheme is captured by the following game played between an adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ and a hypothetical challenger:

1. The challenger generates a key pair $(sk^*, vk^*) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SigGen}.$
2. The adversary runs $A_1$ on input $vk^*$. The adversary outputs a message $m^*$ and some state information state.
3. The challenger computes $\sigma^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Sign}(sk^*, m^*).$
4. The adversary runs $A_2$ on $\sigma^*$ and state. The adversary outputs a message signature pair $(m, \sigma)$.

The adversary wins the game if $\text{Verify}(vk^*, m, \sigma) = \top$ and $(m, \sigma) \neq (m^*, \sigma^*)$. The adversary’s advantage is defined to be $\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}].$
Definition E.2.2 A \((t, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the one-time unforgeability of the signature scheme is an algorithm that runs in time \(t\) and has advantage at least \(\epsilon\) in winning the above game.

E.2.4 Bilinear Maps and Related Assumptions

Let \(G, G_T\) be multiplicative groups of prime order \(p\) with an admissible map \(\hat{e} : G \times G \rightarrow G_T\). By admissible we mean that the map is bilinear, non-degenerate and efficiently computable. Bilinearity means that for all \(a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p\) and all \(g \in G\) we have \(\hat{e}(g^a, g^b) = \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab}\). By non-degenerate we mean that \(\hat{e}(g, g) = 1\) if and only if \(g = 1\).

In such a setting we can define a number of computational problems. The first we shall be interested in is called the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem \([\text{Jou04}]\): given a tuple \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c, T)\), the problem is to decide whether \(T = \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}\) or whether it is a random element of \(G_T\). More formally, we define the following game between an adversary \(A\) and a challenger. The challenger first chooses a random generator \(g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^*\), random integers \(a, b, c \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p\), a random element \(T \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_T\), and a random bit \(\beta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}\). If \(\beta = 1\) it feeds \(A\) the tuple \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c, \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc})\) as input; if \(\beta = 0\) it feeds \(A\) the tuple \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c, T)\) as input. The adversary \(A\) must then output its guess \(\hat{\beta}'\) for \(\beta\). The adversary has advantage \(\epsilon\) in solving the BDDH problem if

\[
\left| \Pr \left[ A(g, g^a, g^b, g^c, \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A(g, g^a, g^b, g^c, T) = 1 \right] \right| \geq \epsilon,
\]

where the probabilities are over the random choice of \(g, a, b, c, T\) and over the random coins of \(A\).

Definition E.2.3 A \((t, \epsilon)\)-adversary \(A\) against the BDDH problem is an algorithm that runs in time at most \(t\) and has advantage at least \(\epsilon\).

We note that throughout this paper we will assume that the time \(t\) of an adversary includes its code size, in order to exclude trivial “lookup” adversaries.

A second problem we will use in our constructions is the \(\ell\)-bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (\(\ell\)-BDHI) problem \([\text{BB04a, MSK02}]\). The problem is to compute \(\hat{e}(g, g)^{1/\alpha}\) for random \(g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^*\) and \(\alpha \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p\) given \(g, g^a, \ldots, g^{(\ell)}\). The decisional variant of this problem is to distinguish \(\hat{e}(g, g)^{1/\alpha}\) from a random element of \(G_T\). We say that adversary \(A\) has advantage \(\epsilon\) in solving the decisional \(\ell\)-BDHI problem if

\[
\left| \Pr \left[ A(g, g^a, \ldots, g^{(\ell)}, \hat{e}(g, g)^{1/\alpha}) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ A(g, g^a, \ldots, g^{(\ell)}, T) = 1 \right] \right| \geq \epsilon,
\]

where the probability is over the random choice of \(g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^*\), \(\alpha \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p\), \(T \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_T\), and the coins of \(A\).

Definition E.2.4 A \((t, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the decisional \(\ell\)-BDHI problem is an algorithm that runs in time at most \(t\) and has advantage at least \(\epsilon\) in the above game.

We note that the BDDH problem is a weaker assumption than the \(\ell\)-BDHI assumption. Hence, all other things being equal schemes which are based on the BDDH assumption are to be preferred to ones based on the \(\ell\)-BDHI assumption. However, our most efficient constructions are based on the \(\ell\)-BDHI assumption as opposed to the BDDH assumption. As the two assumptions are very different in nature, it is hard to compare precisely various schemes; indeed the comparison would depend on the readers view with respect to the interpretation of exact security results and the view of the relative hardness of the two underlying problems.
E.2.5 Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption

An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms \(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}\) providing the following functionality. The trusted authority runs \text{Setup} to generate a master key pair \((mpk, msk)\). It publishes the master public key \(mpk\) and keeps the master secret key \(msk\) private. When a user with identity \(ID\) wishes to become part of the system, the trusted authority generates a decryption key \(d_{ID} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(msk, ID)\), and sends this key over a secure and authenticated channel to the user. To send an encrypted message \(m\) to the user with identity \(ID\), the sender computes the ciphertext \(C \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, ID, m)\), which can be decrypted by the user as \(m \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(d_{ID}, C)\). We refer to [BF03] for details on the security definitions for IBE schemes.

In this paper, we are more interested in the concept of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [HL02, CS02]. In a HIBE scheme, users are organised in a tree of depth \(L\), with the root being the master trusted authority. The identity of a user at level \(0 \leq \ell \leq L\) in the tree is given by a vector \(ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_{\ell}) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell\). A HIBE scheme is a tuple of algorithms \(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}\) providing the same functionality as in an IBE scheme, except that a user \(ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_{\ell})\) at level \(\ell\) can use its own secret key \(d_{ID}\) to generate a secret key for any of its descendants \(ID’ = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell, ID_{\ell+\delta})\), \(\delta \geq 0\). We will occasionally use the overloaded notation

\[d_{ID’} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(d_{ID}, (ID_{\ell+1}, \ldots, ID_{\ell+\delta}))\]

to denote this process. The secret key of the root identity at level 0 is \(d_r \leftarrow msk\). Encryption and decryption are the same as for IBE, but with vectors of bit strings as identities instead of ordinary bit strings.

The security of a HIBE scheme is defined through the following IND-HID-CPA game, played between an adversary \(A = (A_1, A_2)\) and a hypothetical challenger:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).
2. The adversary runs \(A_1\) on \(mpk\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle that, on input of an identity \(ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_{\ell})\), returns the secret key \(d_{ID} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(msk, ID)\) corresponding to that identity. The adversary outputs two equal-length messages \((m_0, m_1)\) and a challenge identity \(ID^* = (ID^*_1, \ldots, ID^*_\ell)\), along with some state information \(state\).
3. The challenger chooses a bit \(\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\) and computes the ciphertext \(C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, ID^*, m_\beta)\).
4. The adversary runs \(A_2\) on the input \(C^*\) and the state information \(state\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit \(\beta’\).

In most cases, we will suppress the \(state\) information passed between adversary algorithms and simply assume that all necessary details are passed from one algorithm to the next. The adversary wins the game if \(\beta = \beta’\) and it never queries the key derivation oracle with any ancestor identity of \(ID^*\), i.e. any identity \(ID = (ID_1^*, \ldots, ID^*_\ell)\) where \(\ell \leq \ell^*\). The adversary’s advantage is defined to be equal to \(2 \cdot \Pr[A_2\text{ wins}] - 1\).

**Definition E.2.5** A \((t, q_K, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of a HIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most \(t\), makes at most \(q_K\) queries to the key derivation oracle, and has advantage at least \(\epsilon\) in winning the IND-HID-CPA game described above.
The IND-HID-CCA security game is identical to the IND-HID-CPA security game with the exception that in the IND-HID-CCA security game the adversary additionally has access to a decryption oracle that, on input of a ciphertext \( C \) and an identity \( ID \), returns the decryption \( m \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(\text{KeyDer}(\text{msk},\text{id}),C) \). The adversary wins the game if \( \beta = \beta' \), it never queries the key derivation oracle with any ancestor identity of \( ID^* \), and it never queries the decryption oracle with the pair \((C^*,ID^*)\) after the challenge ciphertext is computed.

**Definition E.2.6** A \((t,q_K,q_D,\epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-HID-CCA security of the HIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most \( t \), makes at most \( q_K \) queries to the key derivation oracle, makes at most \( q_D \) queries to the decryption oracle, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in winning the IND-HID-CCA game described above.

In a *selective-identity* (sID) attack \([BB04a]\), the adversary has to output the challenge identity \( ID^* \) at the very beginning of the game, before even seeing the master public key. In other words, the adversary is considered to be a triple \((A_0,A_1,A_2)\), where \( A_0 \) simply outputs the challenge identity (and some state information to be passed to \( A_1 \)). The definitions for IND-HID-CPA and IND-HID-CCA security are otherwise identical to those above. In the random oracle model \([BR93]\), all algorithms, as well as the adversary, have access to a random oracle mapping arbitrary bit strings onto a range that possibly depends on the master public key. All above security definitions then take an extra parameter \( q_H \) denoting the adversary’s maximum number of queries to the random oracle.

We now recap on the main efficient HIBE constructions in the literature, namely the HIBE schemes of Waters (W-HIBE), Boneh-Boyen (BB-HIBE), and Boneh-Boyen-Goh (BBG-HIBE).

### E.2.6 The Boneh-Boyen HIBE

In this section, we present a variant of the HIBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen \([BB04a]\). In this scheme, we assume that identities are vectors of elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) — if necessary this can be achieved by applying a collision-resistant hash function \( h : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) to binary identities before applying the scheme. The scheme is described in Figure E.1. The main difference between the original HIBE scheme of \([BB04a]\) and our variant above is that our scheme uses a different value \( u_i \) for each level, while the original scheme uses the same value \( u_1 \) for all levels. Adding wildcard functionality to the original scheme would require us to include \( u_1^* \) in the ciphertext, but this ruins security as it can be used to change the identity for which a ciphertext is encrypted.

For completeness, we prove the security of this new HIBE scheme, despite its similarities to scheme of Boneh and Boyen \([BB04a]\).

**Theorem E.2.7** If there exists a \((t,q_K,\epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BB-HIBE (with hierarchy depth \( L \)) then there exists a \((t',\epsilon')\)-adversary against the BDDH problem in \( \mathbb{G} \), where \( \epsilon' \geq \epsilon - q_K/p \) and \( t' \leq t + O(L \cdot q_K \cdot t_{\exp}) \) and \( t_{\exp} \) is the maximum time for an exponentiation in \( \mathbb{G} \) and \( p \) is the order of \( \mathbb{G} \).

**Proof:** The present proof follows very closely the proof of security for the original scheme in \([BB04a]\). As before, we assume that there exist an adversary \( A = (A_0,A_1,A_2) \) that breaks the IND-sID-CPA-secure of the BB-HIBE scheme and then we show how to efficiently build another adversary \( B \) that, using \( A \) as a subroutine, manages to solve the BDDH problem in \( \mathbb{G} \).

Algorithm \( B \) first receives as input a random tuple \((g,A = g^a,B = g^b,C = g^c,Z)\) and its goal is to determine whether \( Z = \hat{e}(g,g)^{abc} \) or \( \hat{e}(g,g)^2 \) for a random element \( z \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). Algorithm \( B \) should output 1 if \( Z = \hat{e}(g,g)^{abc} \) and 0 otherwise. Algorithm \( B \) works as follows.
Algorithm Setup:
\[ \begin{align*} 
g_1, g_2 &\leftarrow \mathbb{G} ; \quad \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
h_1 &\leftarrow g_1^\alpha ; \quad h_2 \leftarrow g_2^\alpha \\
u_{i,j} &\leftarrow \mathbb{G} \quad \text{for } i = 1 \ldots L, j = 0, 1 \\
mpk &\leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots , u_{i,1}) \\
msk &\leftarrow h_2 \\
\text{Return } (\mpk, \msk) \end{align*} \]

Algorithm Encrypt(\mpk, ID, m):
\[ \begin{align*} 
r &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; \quad C_1 \leftarrow g_1^r \\
&\text{For } i = 1, \ldots , \ell \text{ do} \\
&C_{2,i} \leftarrow (u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}^{ID_i})^r \\
&C_3 \leftarrow m \cdot \tilde{e}(h_1, g_2)^r \\
&\text{Return } (C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots , C_{2,\ell}, C_3) \end{align*} \]

Algorithm KeyDer(d_{ID_1, \ldots , ID_\ell}):
\[ \begin{align*} 
m_r &\leftarrow d_0 \cdot (u_{\ell+1,0} \cdot u_{\ell+1,1})^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
d_{\ell+1} &\leftarrow g_{\ell+1}^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
&\text{Return } (d_0', d_1, \ldots , d_{\ell}, d_{\ell+1}) \end{align*} \]

Algorithm Decrypt(d_{ID_1, \ldots , ID_\ell}, C):
\[ \begin{align*} 
m' &\leftarrow C_3 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^\ell e(d_i, C_{2,i}) \text{ as } (d_1, \ldots , d_\ell) \\
\text{Return } m' \end{align*} \]

Figure E.1: The Boneh-Boyen HIBE scheme.

Initialisation. Algorithm \( B \) starts by running algorithm \( A_0 \), which responds with the challenge identity \( ID^* = (ID_1^*, \ldots , ID_\ell^*) \) where \( 0 \leq \ell^* \leq L \). If \( \ell^* = \ell \) then \( B \) sets \( ID^* \leftarrow ID^* \). Otherwise, \( B \) randomly generates \( ID_{i+1}^*, \ldots , ID_L^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and sets \( ID^* \leftarrow (ID_1^*, \ldots , ID_L^*) \).

Setup. To generate the systems parameters, \( B \) first sets \( g_1 \leftarrow g, h_1 \leftarrow A, \) and \( g_2 \leftarrow B \). Algorithm \( B \) then chooses \( \alpha_{1,0}, \ldots , \alpha_{L,0}, \alpha_{1,1}, \ldots , \alpha_{L,1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) at random and sets \( u_{i,0} \leftarrow g_1^{\alpha_{i,0}} \cdot h_1^{-ID_{i,1}} \) and \( u_{i,1} \leftarrow h_1^{\alpha_{i,1}} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots , L \). \( B \) defines the master public key to be \( \mpk = (g_1, h_1, g_2, u_{1,0}, \ldots , u_{i,1}, \ldots , u_{L,1}) \). Note that the corresponding master secret key \( \msk = g_2^\alpha \) is unknown to \( B \).

Phase 1. \( B \) runs \( A_1 \) on input \( \mpk \). If \( A_1 \) makes a key derivation oracle query on \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots , ID_{\ell}) \), where \( ID_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and \( \ell \leq L \) then \( B \) cannot be a prefix of \( ID^* \). Hence, if \( ID \) is a prefix of \( ID^* \) then \( A \) aborts; we let \( E \) be the event that this occurs. Otherwise, let \( j \) be the smallest index such that \( ID_j \neq ID^*_j \). To reply to this query, \( B \) first computes the key for identity \( ID' = (ID_1, \ldots , ID_j) \) and then derive the key for \( ID \) using the key derivation algorithm. To derive the key for identity \( ID' \), \( B \) chooses the values \( r_1, \ldots , r_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) at random and sets \( d_{ID'} = (a_0, a_1, \ldots , a_j) \) where
\[ \begin{align*} 
a_0 &\leftarrow g_2^{-\alpha_{1,0}} \prod_{i=1}^j (u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}^{ID_i})^{r_i} \\
a_i &\leftarrow g_1^{r_i} \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots , j-1 \\
a_j &\leftarrow g_2^{-\alpha_{1,0}} \cdot g_1^{r_j} \end{align*} \]
Algorithm \( A_1 \) terminates and outputs two equal-length messages \( (m_0, m_1) \).

Challenge. Algorithm \( B \) then chooses a random bit \( \beta \leftarrow \{0,1\} \) and sends \( C^* = (C, C^{\alpha_{1,0}}, \ldots , C^{\alpha_{j,0}}, m_\beta \cdot Z) \) to \( A \) as the challenge ciphertext. Since \( u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}^{ID*} = g_1^{\alpha_{i,0}} \) for all \( i \), we have
The scheme is described in Figure E.2.

This implies that in this section we present the HIBE scheme due to Boneh, Boyen and Goh [BBG05], referred to E.2.7 The Boneh-Boyen-Goh Scheme as the BBG-HIBE scheme here. Again, we assume that identities are vectors of elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Suppose $E$ does not occur. Clearly, when $Z = \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}$, the view of $A$ is identical to its view in a real attack and, thus, the probability that $b = b'$ is exactly the probability that $A$ wins the IND-shID-CPA game. On the other hand, when $Z$ is a random group element in $\mathbb{G}_T$, then the probability that $b = b'$ is exactly $1/2$. Hence, if $E$ does not occur then $A$ wins with probability $\epsilon$. If $E$ does occur, then the simulator fails; however, for $E$ to occur then $A$ must submit a key extraction query for an identity $ID$ where $ID^*$ is a prefix of $ID$ and $ID$ is a prefix of $ID^*$. This implies that $ID^*_{r+1} = ID^*_{r+1}$ but, since $ID^*_{r+1}$ is chosen at random and hidden from the execution of the attacker $A$, we have that $\Pr \{ E \} \leq q_K/p$. From the above, the result announced in Theorem E.2.7 follows immediately.

### Phase 2

$B$ runs $A_2$ on the challenge ciphertext $C^*$. If $A_2$ makes any key derivation oracle queries, then they are answered as in Phase 1. $A_2$ terminates and outputs a bit $\beta'$.

#### Output

If $\beta = \beta'$ then $B$ outputs 1, guessing that $Z = \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}$, otherwise $B$ outputs 1.

#### E.2.7 The Boneh-Boyen-Goh Scheme

In this section we present the HIBE scheme due to Boneh, Boyen and Goh [BBG05], referred to as the BBG-HIBE scheme here. Again, we assume that identities are vectors of elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The scheme is described in Figure E.2.

![Figure E.2: The Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE scheme.](image-url)
The following theorem about the security of the scheme was proved in (the full version of) [BBG05].

**Theorem E.2.8** If there exists a \((t, q_K, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BBG-HIBE (with hierarchy depth \(L\)) then there exists a \((t', \epsilon')\)-adversary against the \(L\)-BDHI problem in \(G\), where \(\epsilon' \geq \epsilon\) and \(t' \leq t + O(L \cdot q_K \cdot t_{exp})\) and \(t_{exp}\) is the time for an exponentiation in \(G\).

### E.2.8 The Waters Scheme

Waters [Wat05] argued that his IBE scheme can easily be modified into an \(L\)-level HIBE scheme. Here we explicitly present this construction, that we refer to as the Waters-HIBE scheme. The scheme makes use of \(n\)-bit identities and is described in Figure E.3. The scheme makes use of group elements \((u_1, \ldots, u_{L,n})\) which are available as part of the scheme’s public parameters. These group elements define a series of hash functions \(\{F_1, \ldots, F_L\}\) where

\[
F_i(ID_i) = u_{i,0} \prod_{j \in [ID_i]} u_{i,j}.
\]

**Algorithm Setup:**

\[
\begin{align*}
g_1, g_2 &\leftarrow G; \alpha \leftarrow Z_p \\
h_1 &\leftarrow g_1^\alpha; h_2 \leftarrow g_2^n \\
u_{i,j} &\leftarrow G \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, L; j = 0 \ldots n \\
mpk &\leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots, u_{L,n}) \\
msk &\leftarrow h_2 \\
Return (mpk, msk)
\end{align*}
\]

**Algorithm KeyDer\((d_{1,ID_1}, \ldots, d_{L,ID_L}), ID_{L+1}\):**

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Parse } d_{1,ID_1,\ldots,ID_L} \text{ as } (d_0, \ldots, d_L) \\
r_{L+1} \leftarrow Z_p \\
d_0' \leftarrow d_0 \cdot F_{t+1(ID_{L+1})}^{r_{L+1}} \\
d_{L+1}' \leftarrow g_1 \\
Return (d_0', d_1, \ldots, d_L, d_{L+1}')
\end{align*}
\]

**Algorithm Decrypt\((d_{1,ID_1}, \ldots, d_{L,ID_L}), C\):**

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Parse } d_{1,ID_1,\ldots,ID_L} \text{ as } (d_0, \ldots, d_L) \\
&\text{Parse } C \text{ as } (C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_{L+1}, C_{L+2}) \\
m' \leftarrow C_3 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{L+1} \frac{\hat{e}(d_i, C_{2,i})}{\hat{e}(d_i, C_{2,0})} \\
&\Return m'
\end{align*}
\]

Figure E.3: The Waters HIBE scheme.

Waters [Wat05] informally states that the above HIBE scheme is IND-HID-CPA secure under the BDDH assumption, in the sense that if there exists a \((t, q_K, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the HIBE, then there exists an algorithm solving the BDDH problem with advantage \(\epsilon' = O((n \cdot q_K)^L \epsilon)\). We shall assume in what follows that the Waters HIBE scheme is indeed IND-HID-CPA secure. However, the reader should be aware that any security results we state for schemes derived from the Water HIBE scheme are conjectural relative to the above assumption.

### E.2.9 Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation

One efficient paradigm for producing HIBE schemes is the hybrid KEM-DEM construction. In the public key setting, this was first formally investigated by Cramer and Shoup [CS03] and extended to the identity-based setting by Bentahar et al. [BFMLS08]. A hybrid construction consists of an asymmetric KEM and a symmetric DEM.
A hierarchical identity-based KEM (HIB-KEM) consists of four algorithms \(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap}\). The setup algorithm \(\text{Setup}\) and key derivation algorithm \(\text{KeyDer}\) have the same syntax as for a HIBE scheme. The encapsulation algorithm \(\text{Encap}\) takes as input a master public key \(\mpk\) and an identity \(\text{id} = (\text{id}_1, \ldots, \text{id}_\ell)\) with \(0 \leq \ell \leq L\); it outputs a symmetric key \(K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and an encapsulation \(C\). The decapsulation algorithm \(\text{Decap}\) takes as input a private key \(d_{\text{id}}\) and an encapsulation \(C\), and outputs either a symmetric key \(K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) or the error symbol \(\perp\).

The security models for a HIB-KEM is similar to those of a HIBE scheme. The IND-HID-CCA game for a HIB-KEM, played between an attacker \(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)\) and a challenger, is defined as follows:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \((\mpk, \msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).
2. The adversary runs \(\mathcal{A}_1\) on \(\mpk\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle that, on input of an identity \(\text{id} = (\text{id}_1, \ldots, \text{id}_\ell)\), returns the secret key \(d_{\text{id}} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(\msk, \text{id})\) corresponding to that identity. The adversary is also given access to a decryption oracle that will, on input of an identity \(\text{id} = (\text{id}_1, \ldots, \text{id}_\ell)\) and a ciphertext \(C\), return \(\text{Decap}(\text{KeyDer}(\msk, \text{id}), C)\). The adversary outputs a challenge identity \(\text{id}^* = (\text{id}_1^*, \ldots, \text{id}_\ell^*)\) and some state information \(\text{state}\).
3. The challenger chooses a bit \(\beta \leftarrow \{0,1\}\), computes the encapsulation \((C^*, K_0) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\mpk, \text{id}^*)\) and chooses a random key \(K_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda\).
4. The adversary runs \(\mathcal{A}_2\) on the input \((C^*, K_\beta)\) and the state information \(\text{state}\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle and decryption oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit \(\beta'\).

The adversary wins the game if \(\beta = \beta'\), it never queries the key derivation oracle with any ancestor identity of \(\text{id}^*\), and if it doesn’t query the decryption oracle on the pair \((\text{id}^*, C^*)\) after it receives the challenge ciphertext. As usual, the adversary’s advantage is defined to be equal to \(|2 \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - 1|\).

**Definition E.2.9** A \((t, q_K, q_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-HID-CCA security of the HIB-KEM is an algorithm that runs in time at most \(t\), makes at most \(q_K\) queries to the key derivation oracle, makes at most \(q_D\) queries to the decryption oracle, and has advantage at least \(\epsilon\) in winning the IND-HID-CCA game described above.

Again, if the random oracle model \([BR93]\) is used in the analysis of a scheme, then the above security definitions take an extra parameter \(q_H\) as input. This parameter denotes the adversary’s maximum number of queries to the random oracle.

A DEM is a pair of deterministic algorithms \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\). The encryption algorithm \(\text{Enc}\) takes as input a symmetric key \(K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and a message \(m\) of arbitrary length, and outputs a ciphertext \(C \leftarrow \text{Dec}(K, C)\). The decryption algorithm \(\text{Dec}\) takes as input a symmetric key \(K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and a ciphertext \(C\), and returns either a message \(m\) or the error symbol \(\perp\). The DEM must satisfy the following soundness property: for all \(K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and for all \(m \in \{0,1\}^*,\) we have that \(\text{Dec}(K, \text{Enc}(K, m)) = m\).

The only security model which will concern us for DEMs is the (one-time) IND-CCA security game, which is played between an adversary \(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)\) and a challenger:

1. The challenger generates a key \(K \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda\).
2. The adversary runs \(\mathcal{A}_1\). The adversary outputs two equal-length messages \((m_0, m_1)\) and some state information \(\text{state}\).
3. The challenger chooses a bit \( \beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \) and computes the ciphertext \( C^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(K, m_\beta) \).

4. The adversary runs \( A_2 \) on input \( C^* \) and the state information \( \text{state} \). The adversary may query a decryption oracle which will, on input of a ciphertext \( C \neq C^* \), return \( \text{Dec}(K, C) \).

The adversary outputs a bit \( \beta' \).

The adversary wins if \( \beta = \beta' \) and its advantage is defined to be \( |2 \cdot \Pr[A \text{ wins}] - 1| \).

**Definition E.2.10** A \( (t, q_D, \epsilon) \)-adversary against the (one-time) IND-CCA security of the DEM is an algorithm that runs in time at most \( t \), makes at most \( q_D \) decryption oracle queries, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in winning the IND-CCA game described above.

A HIB-KEM and a DEM can be “glued” together to form a complete HIBE scheme. Further details can be found in [BFMLS08].

**E.2.10 The Canetti-Halevi-Katz Transform**

We shall, in one of our constructions of a CCA WIBE scheme, make use of the techniques behind the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [CHK04]. To aid the reader we recap on this here. This is a transform to turn a weakly secure (IND-sID-CPA) IBE scheme into a fully secure (IND-CCA) public key encryption scheme. We let \( (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) denote the key-generation, extraction, encryption, and decryption algorithms of the IBE scheme, and \( (\text{Setup}', \text{Encrypt}', \text{Decrypt}') \) denote the key-generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms of the derived public key scheme. The transform also makes use of a one-time signature scheme, defined by a tuple of algorithms (\( \text{SigGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify} \)).

The algorithm \( \text{Setup}' \) is defined to be equal to \( \text{Setup} \), i.e. public/private key of the PKE scheme is the master public/private keys, \( (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \), of the IBE scheme. Algorithm \( \text{Encrypt}' \) is defined as follows: First a key-pair \( (sk, vk) \) for the one-time signature scheme is created by calling \( \text{SigGen} \); then the message is encrypted via \( \text{Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, vk, m) \) with respect to the “identity” \( vk \) to produce \( c \). The resulting ciphertext \( c \) is then signed with \( sk \) to produce \( \sigma = \text{Sign}(sk, c) \). The tuple \( (vk, c, \sigma) \) is the ciphertext for our PKE.

To decrypt the recipient first verifies \( \sigma \) is a valid signature on \( c \) with respect to the verification key \( ek \), by calling \( \text{Verify}(vk, c, \sigma) \). If it is then the function \( \text{KeyDer} \) is called with respect to the “identity” \( vk \), using private key of the PKE (i.e. \( \text{msk} \)). Then the ciphertext can be decrypted using the algorithm \( \text{Decrypt} \).

**E.3 Wildcard Identity-Based Encryption**

**E.3.1 Syntax**

Identity-based encryption with wildcards (WIBE) schemes are essentially a generalisation of HIBE schemes where at the time of encryption, the sender can decide to make the ciphertext decryptable by a whole range of users whose identities match a certain pattern. Such a pattern is described by a vector \( P = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell) \in (\{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\ast\})^\ell \), where \( \ast \) is a special wildcard symbol. We say that identity \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell) \) matches \( P \), denoted \( ID \in P \), if and only if \( \ell' \leq \ell \) and for all \( i = 1, \ldots, \ell' \) we have that \( ID_i = P_i \) or \( P_i = \ast \). Note that under this definition, any ancestor of a matching identity is also a matching identity. This is reasonable for our purposes because any ancestor can derive the secret key of a matching descendant identity anyway.

If \( P = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell) \) is a pattern, then we define \( W(P) \) to be the set of wildcard positions in \( P \), i.e.

\[
W(P) = \{ 1 \leq i \leq \ell : P_i = \ast \}.
\]
Formally, a WIBE scheme is a tuple of algorithms \( (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) providing the following functionality. The \( \text{Setup} \) and \( \text{KeyDer} \) algorithms behave exactly as those of a HIBE scheme. To create a ciphertext of a message \( m \) intended for all identities matching pattern \( P \), the sender computes \( C \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, P, m) \). Any of the intended recipients \( ID \in \star \) can decrypt the ciphertext using its own decryption key as \( m \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(d_{ID}, C) \).

Note that we implicitly assume that the pattern \( P \) used to encrypt the message is included within the ciphertext. This is because any parent of the pattern should be able to decrypt the message, and hence the parent will need to be able to fill in the non-wildcarded entries in the pattern for decryption. For example, suppose the pattern is \( P = (ID_1, \star, ID_2) \) and that the decryptor has identity \( ID = (ID_1, ID_2) \). Then by our definition of a matching pattern we have \( ID \in \star, P \), and so the decryptor will need to be informed of \( ID_2 \) so as to be able to decrypt the ciphertext. Note that an anonymous version of the definitions can be presented, but we do not consider this further in this paper for simplicity.

Correctness requires that for all key pairs \( (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \) output by \( \text{Setup} \), all messages \( m \in \{0, 1\}^\star \), all \( 0 \leq \ell \leq L \), all patterns \( P \in (\{0, 1\}^\star \cup \{\star\})^\ell \), and all identities \( ID \in \star, P \), we have

\[
\text{Decrypt}(\text{KeyDer}(\text{msk}, ID), \text{Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, P, m)) = m
\]

with probability one.

### E.3.2 Security Notions

We define the security of WIBE schemes analogously to that of HIBE schemes, but with the adversary choosing a challenge pattern instead of an identity to which the challenge ciphertext will be encrypted. To exclude trivial attacks, the adversary is not able to query the key derivation oracle on any identity that matches the challenge pattern, nor is it able to query the decryption oracle on the challenge ciphertext in combination with any identity matching the challenge pattern.

More formally, the IND-WID-CPA security model is defined through the following game, played between an adversary \( A = (A_1, A_2) \) and a challenger:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \( (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup} \).

2. The adversary runs \( A_1 \) on \( \text{mpk} \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle that, on input of an identity \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell) \), returns the secret key \( d_{ID} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(\text{msk}, ID) \) corresponding to that identity. The adversary outputs two equal-length messages \( (m_0, m_1) \) and a challenge pattern \( P^* \), along with some state information \( \text{state} \).

3. The challenger chooses a bit \( \beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \) and computes the ciphertext \( C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, P^*, m_\beta) \).

4. The adversary runs \( A_2 \) on the input \( C^* \) and the state information \( \text{state} \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit \( \beta' \).

The adversary wins the game if \( \beta = \beta' \) and it never queries the decryption oracle on any identity \( ID \) which matches the pattern \( P^* \), i.e. any identity \( ID \in \star, P^* \). The adversary’s advantage is defined as \( |2 \cdot \Pr [A \text{ wins}] - 1| \).

**Definition E.3.1** A \( (t, q_K, \epsilon) \)-adversary against the IND-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most \( t \), makes at most \( q_K \) key derivation oracle queries, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in the IND-WID-CPA game described above.
In the IND-WID-CCA security model is identical to the IND-WID-CPA security model with the exception that the adversary has access to a decryption oracle, which will, on input of an identity \( ID \) and a ciphertext \( C \), return \( \text{Decrypt}(\text{KeyDer}(msk, ID), C) \). The adversary wins the game if \( \beta = \beta' \), it never queries the decryption oracle on any identity \( ID \in \mathcal{P}^* \), and the adversary doesn’t query the decryption oracle the combination of any identity \( ID \in \mathcal{P}^* \) and the ciphertext \( C^* \). The adversary’s advantage is defined as \( 2 \cdot \Pr \left[ A \text{ wins} \right] - 1 \).

**Definition E.3.2** A \((t, q_K, q_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most \( t \), makes at most \( q_K \) key derivation oracle queries, makes at most \( q_D \) decryption oracle queries, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in the IND-WID-CCA game described above.

As for the case of HIBEs, we also define a weaker selective-identity (sWID) security notion, in which the adversary commits to the challenge pattern at the beginning of the game, before the master public key is made available. The notions of IND-sWID-CPA and IND-sWID-CCA security are defined analogously to the above. In the random oracle model, the additional parameter \( q_H \) denotes the adversary’s maximum number of queries to the random oracle, or the total number of queries to all random oracles when it has access to multiple ones.

If the WIBE scheme has a finite message space \( \mathcal{M} \), then we may also define a one-way notion for encryption security (OW-WID-CPA). This is formally defined via the following game, played between an adversary \( A = (A_1, A_2) \) and a challenger:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).  
2. The adversary runs \( A_1 \) on input \( mpk \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as in the IND-WID-CPA game. The adversary outputs a challenge pattern \( P^* \) and some state information \( \text{state} \).  
3. The challenger generates \( m \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \) and computes the ciphertext \( C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, P^*, m) \).  
4. The adversary runs \( A_2 \) on the input \( C^* \) and the state information \( \text{state} \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as before. It output a message \( m' \). The adversary wins the game if \( m = m' \) and the adversary never queries the key derivation oracle on an identity \( ID \in \mathcal{P}^* \). The adversary’s advantage is defined to be \( 2 \cdot \Pr \left[ A \text{ wins} \right] - 1 \).

**Definition E.3.3** A \((t, q_K, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the OW-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most \( t \), makes at most \( q_K \) key derivation oracle queries, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in winning the OW-WID-CPA game described above.

### E.3.3 Constructing a WIBE from a HIBE

In order to clarify the relationship between HIBEs and WIBEs, we first point out a generic construction of a WIBE scheme from any HIBE scheme. However, this WIBE scheme has a secret key size that is exponential in the depth of the hierarchy tree. Let “*” denote a dedicated bitstring that cannot occur as a user identity. Then the secret key of a user with identity \((ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell)\) in the WIBE scheme contains the \( 2^\ell \) HIBE secret keys of all patterns matching this identity. For example, the secret key of identity \((ID_1, ID_2)\) contains four HIBE secret keys, namely those corresponding to identities

\[(ID_1, ID_2), (\text{"*"}, ID_2), (ID_1, \text{"*"}), (\text{"*"}, \text{"*"})\].
To encrypt to a pattern \((P_1, \ldots, P_\ell)\), one uses the HIBE scheme to encrypt to the identity obtained by replacing each wildcard in the pattern with the “*” string, i.e. the identity \((ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell)\) where \(ID_i = \text{"*"}\) if \(P_i = \text{"*"}\) and \(ID_i = P_i\) otherwise. The final WIBE ciphertext consists of the pattern and the HIBE ciphertext. Decryption is done by selecting the appropriate secret key from the list and using the decryption algorithm of the HIBE scheme.

**Theorem E.3.4** If there exists a \((t, q_K, \epsilon)\) attacker against the IND-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme (with hierarchy depth \(L\)) then there exists a \((t', 2^L q_K t_K, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of the corresponding HIBE scheme, where \(t' \leq t + 2^L q_K t_K\) and \(t_K\) is the time taken to compute a key derivation query. If there exists a \((t, q_K, t_D, \epsilon)\) attacker against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIBE scheme (with hierarchy depth \(L\)) then there exists a \((t', 2^L q_K t_K + q_D t_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-HID-CCA security of the corresponding HIBE scheme, where \(t' \leq t + 2^L q_K t_K + q_D t_D\), \(t_K\) is the time taken to compute a key derivation query, and \(t_D\) is the time taken to compute a decryption query.

Notice that the appearance of the term \(2^L\) in the security reduction means that this construction is only guaranteed to be secure when the number of levels grows poly-logarithmically in the secure parameter. This restriction occurs in the security analysis of all the HIBE schemes that we consider.

The efficiency of the WIBE scheme obtained with this construction is roughly the same as that of the underlying HIBE scheme, but with the major disadvantage that the size of the secret key is \(2^\ell\) times that of a secret key in the underlying HIBE scheme. This is highly undesirable for many applications, especially since the secret key may very well be kept on an expensive secure storage device. It is interesting to investigate whether WIBE schemes exist with overhead polynomial in all parameters. We answer this question in the affirmative here by presenting direct schemes with secret key size linear in \(\ell\). Unfortunately, for all of our schemes, this reduction in key size comes at the cost of linear-size ciphertexts, while the generic scheme can achieve constant-size ciphertexts when underlain by a HIBE with constant ciphertext size, e.g. that of [BBG05].

### E.3.4 The Relationship Between WIBE and GIBE, FIBE, and ABE

As we have seen WIBEs are closely related to HIBEs. They are also related to a concept called Generalised Identity-Based Encryption (GIBE) [BH08]. In a GIBE one has a set of policies \(P\) and a set of roles \(R\). The roles are partially ordered so that a “higher” role can delegate its abilities to a “lower” role. Whether a party can decrypt a ciphertext depends on whether a predicate defined on the set \(P \times R\) evaluates to true. In particular a ciphertext is encrypted to a policy \(\pi \in P\), and it can be decrypted by a role \(\rho\) if and only if the predicate evaluated on \((\pi, \rho)\) evaluates to true. It is easy to see that the roles in a GIBE correspond to the identities in a WIBE, whilst the policies correspond to the wildcarded patterns. Hence, a WIBE is a specific example of a GIBE. However, the expressive nature of a GIBE being greater than that of a WIBE comes at a cost, in that one can construct WIBE schemes which are more secure than the equivalent GIBE.

Another related primitive is fuzzy identity-based encryption (FIBE) [SW05], which allows a ciphertext encrypted to identity \(ID\) to be decrypted by any identity \(ID'\) that is “close” to \(ID\) according to some metric. In the schemes of [SW05], an identity is a subset containing \(n\) elements from a finite universe. Two identities \(ID\) and \(ID'\) are considered “close” if \(|ID \cap ID'| \geq d\) for some parameter \(d\). A FIBE with \(n = 2L\) and \(d = L\) can be used to construct a WIBE scheme (without hierarchical key derivation) by letting the decryption key for identity \((ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell)\)
correspond to the decryption key for the set
\[
\{1\|ID_1, \ldots, \ell\|ID_\ell, (\ell + 1)\|\varepsilon, \ldots, L\|\varepsilon,
1\|\ast, \ldots, L\|\ast\}.
\]

Suppose that “\(\perp\)” is a unique string which cannot occur as a user identity and distinct from “\(\ast\)”. One can encrypt to pattern \(P = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell)\) by encrypting to the set
\[
\{1\|P'_1, \ldots, \ell\|P'_\ell, (\ell + 1)\|\varepsilon, \ldots, L\|\varepsilon, 1\|\ast, \ldots, L\|\ast\},
\]
where the \(P'_i \leftarrow P_i\) if \(i \notin W(P)\) and \(P'_i \leftarrow \ast\) if \(i \in W(P)\). The dummy symbols “\(\perp\)” are only used to ensure that the size of the encryption set is exactly \(2L\) (as required by the definition of the FIBE scheme). We stress that this construction does not give a full WIBE scheme as it does not permit hierarchical key derivation. This also implies that a “parent” identity cannot decrypt message sent to its “children” identities as it cannot derive the key for the child.

Fuzzy-IBE, GIBEs, and WIBEs are themselves examples of a policy-based encryption mechanisms. In such systems access to encrypted data is provided as long as the recipient has a key (or set of keys) which correspond to some policy. The power of identity-based mechanisms to enable policy-based access control to encrypted data was realised very early on in the history of pairing-based IBE [Sma03]. In recent years this idea has been formalised under the heading of Attribute Based Encryption.

In Attribute Based Encryption [SW05], or, more correctly, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07, GPSW06], a recipient is issued keys corresponding to a number of credentials. An encryptor will encrypt a message under a policy, i.e. a set of credentials which are required by any user who wishes to obtain access to the message. Any recipient which has credential key which meet the policy statement has access to the encrypted data. The defining characteristic of CP-ABE is that the policies are embedded in the ciphertexts.

In the context of WIBEs the policy is that the user should have a key (credential) which matches the pattern. For a pattern such as \((ID_1, \ast, ID_3)\) this can be interpreted as having a credential for an identity with \(ID_1\) in the first position and an identity with \(ID_3\) in the third position. However, a CP-ABE scheme would offer separate credentials (keys) for each position, whereas a WIBE compresses all of these credentials in a single key. Hence, ABE is clearly a more powerful concept than a WIBE, as it allows more expressive policies, but WIBE schemes are often simpler to construct.

### E.4 Identity-based Key Encapsulation with Wildcards

We can also define a notion of Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism with Wildcards (WIB-KEM). A WIB-KEM consists of the following four algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap). The algorithms Setup and KeyDer are defined as in the WIBE case. The encapsulation algorithm Encap takes the master public key \(mpk\) of the system and a pattern \(P\), and returns \((C, K)\), where \(K \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\) is a symmetric key and \(C\) is an encapsulation of the key \(K\). Again we assume that the encapsulation includes a public encoding of the pattern \(P\) under which the message has been encrypted. Finally, the decapsulation algorithm Decap\((mpk, d_{ID}, C)\) takes a private key \(d_{ID}\) and an encapsulation \(C\), and returns either a secret key \(K\) or the error symbol \(\perp\).

A WIB-KEM must satisfy the following soundness property: for all pairs \((mpk, msk)\) output by Setup, all \(0 \leq \ell \leq L\), all patterns \(P \in \{(0, 1)^* \cup \{\ast\}\}^\ell\), and all identities \(ID \in \bullet, P\), we have
\[
\Pr \left[ K' = K : (C, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(mpk, P); K' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Decap}(\text{KeyDer}(msk, ID), C) \right] = 1.
\]
Chapter E. Wildcarded Identity-Based Encryption

The IND-WID game for WIB-KEMs is similar to both the IND-WIB game for WIBEs and the IND-HIB game for HIB-KEMs. The IND-WIB-CCA game is played between an adversary \( \mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) \) and a challenger:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).

2. The adversary runs \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) on \( mpk \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle that, on input of an identity \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell) \), returns the secret key \( d_{ID} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(msk, ID) \) corresponding to that identity. The adversary is also given access to a decryption oracle that will, on input of an identity \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell) \) and a ciphertext \( C \), return \( \text{Decap}(\text{KeyDer}(msk, ID), C) \). The adversary outputs a challenge pattern \( P^* \) and some state information \( \text{state} \).

3. The challenger chooses a bit \( \beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \), computes the encapsulation \((C^*, K_0) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(mpk, P^*)\) and chooses a random key \( K_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \).

4. The adversary runs \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) on the input \((C^*, K_\beta)\) and the state information \( \text{state} \). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle and decryption oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit \( \beta' \).

The adversary wins the game if \( \beta = \beta' \), it never queries the key derivation oracle on any identity \( ID \in \star \cdot P^* \), and if it doesn’t query the decryption oracle on the pair \((ID, C^*)\) for some \( ID \in \star \cdot P^* \) after it receives the challenge ciphertext. As usual, the adversary’s advantage is defined to be equal to \( |2 \cdot \text{Pr}[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - 1| \).

Another common form for writing the advantage of an IND-WID-CCA adversary for a WIB-KEM is given by the following simple lemma.

**Lemma E.4.1** If \( \mathcal{A} \) is a \((t, q_K, q_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM and \( \beta, \beta' \) are as in the IND-WID-CCA security game, then

\[
\epsilon = |\text{Pr}[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 1] - \text{Pr}[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 0]|.
\]

**Definition E.4.2** A \((t, q_K, q_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of a HIB-KEM is an algorithm that runs in time \( t \), makes at most \( q_K \) queries to the key derivation oracle, makes at most \( q_D \) queries to the decryption oracle, and has advantage at least \( \epsilon \) in winning the IND-WID-CCA game described above.

We may combine a WIB-KEM \((\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})\) with a DEM \((\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) (see Section E.2.9) to form a complete WIBE scheme \((\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt})\), where the encryption and decryption algorithms are as follows:

- **Encrypt\((mpk, P^*, m)\):**
  1. Compute \((C_1, K) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(mpk, P^*)\).
  2. Compute \(C_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(K, m)\).
  3. Output the ciphertext \( C = (C_1, C_2) \).

- **Decrypt\((d_{ID}, C)\):**
  1. Parse \( C \) as \((C_1, C_2)\).
  2. Compute \( K \leftarrow \text{Decap}(d_{ID}, C_1) \). If \( K = \bot \) then output \( \bot \).
  3. Compute \( m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(K, C_2) \).
We show that any change in the actions of the challenge ciphertext is issued. The random key is used to compute the challenge ciphertext and to decrypt certain ciphertexts after the challenge ciphertext is issued.

Theorem E.4.3 If there exists a \((t, q_K, q_D, \epsilon)\)-adversary \(A = (A_1, A_2)\) against IND-WID-CCA security of the hybrid WIBE, then there is a \((t_B, q_K, q_D, \epsilon_B)\)-adversary \(B = (B_1, B_2)\) against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM and a \((t_B', q_D, \epsilon_B')\)-adversary \(B' = (B_1', B_2')\) against the IND-CCA security of the DEM such that:

\[
\begin{align*}
t_B &\leq t + q_d t_{\text{Dec}} + t_{\text{Enc}} \\
t_B' &\leq t + q_d (t_{\text{Dec}} + t_{\text{Decap}} + t_{\text{KeyDer}}) + q_K t_{\text{KeyDer}} \\
&\quad + t_{\text{Encap}} + t_{\text{Setup}} \\
\epsilon &\leq 2\epsilon_B' + \epsilon_B
\end{align*}
\]

where \(t_{\text{Enc}}\) is the time to run the DEM’s \text{Enc} algorithm, \(t_{\text{Dec}}\) is the time to run the DEM’s \text{Dec} algorithm, \(t_{\text{Setup}}\) is the time to run the KEM’s \text{Setup} algorithm, \(t_{\text{Decap}}\) is the time to run the KEM’s \text{Decap} algorithm and \(t_{\text{KeyDer}}\) is the time to run the KEM’s \text{KeyDer} algorithm.

Proof: This proof mirrors the proofs of Cramer and Shoup [CS03] and Bentahar et al. [BFMLS08]. We prove this result in two stages. First, we change the nature of the security game. Let Game 1 be the normal IND-WID-CCA game for the WIBE scheme. Let Game 2 be the slight adaptation of the IND-WID-CCA game:

1. The challenger generates a master key pair \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).

2. The adversary runs \(A_1\) on \(mpk\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle that, on input of an identity \(ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_l)\), returns the secret key \(d_{ID} \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(msk, ID)\) corresponding to that identity. The adversary is also given access to a decryption oracle that, on input of an identity \(ID\) and a ciphertext \(C\), returns \(\text{Decrypt}(\text{KeyDer}(msk, ID), C)\). The adversary outputs two messages \((m_0, m_1)\) of equal length and a challenge pattern \(P^*\), along with some state information \(\text{state}\).

3. The challenger chooses a bit \(\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\) and a key \(K^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda\), then computes the ciphertext \((C^*_1, K) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(mpk, P^*)\) and \(C_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(K^*, m_\beta)\). The challenge ciphertext is \(C^* \leftarrow (C^*_1, C_2)\).

4. The adversary runs \(A_2\) on the input \(C^*\) and the state information \(\text{state}\). The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as before. The adversary is also given access to a decryption oracle that, on input of an identity \(ID\) and a ciphertext \(C = (C_1, C_2)\), returns

\[
\begin{cases}
\text{Decrypt}(\text{KeyDer}(msk, ID), C) & \text{if } ID \notin \bullet \text{ or } C_1 \neq C^*_1 \\
\text{Dec}(K^*, C_2) & \text{if } ID \in \bullet \text{ and } C_1 = C^*_1
\end{cases}
\]

The adversary outputs a bit \(\beta'\).

Note that the only two differences between the game and the IND-WID-CCA game are that a random key is used to compute the challenge ciphertext and to decrypt certain ciphertexts after the challenge ciphertext is issued.

We show that any change in the actions of \(A\) between Game 1 and Game 2 give rise to an adversary \(B = (B_1, B_2)\) against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM. We describe the algorithm \(B_1\) below:

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1. $B_1$ takes as input the master public key $mpk$.

2. $B_1$ runs $A_1$ on $mpk$. If $A_1$ makes a key derivation oracle query, then $B_1$ forwards this query to its own oracle and returns the result. If $A_1$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID$ and a ciphertext $(C_1, C_2)$, the $B_1$ forwards $C_1$ to its decapsulation oracle and receives a key $K$ in return. $B_1$ returns $\text{Dec}(K, C_2)$ to $A$. $A_1$ outputs a challenge pattern $P^*$ and two equal-length messages $(m_0, m_1)$.

3. $B_1$ outputs the challenge pattern $P^*$.

The challenger then computes a challenge encapsulation $(C_1^*, K^*)$ where $K^*$ is either the decapsulation of $C_1^*$ or a random key. The algorithm $B_2$ runs as follows:

1. $B_2$ takes as input the challenge encapsulation $(C_1^*, K^*)$. $B_2$ chooses a bit $\beta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ and computes the remainder of the challenge ciphertext $C_2^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(K^*, m_\beta)$.

2. $B_2$ runs $A_2$ on the challenge ciphertext $C^* = (C_1^*, C_2^*)$. If $A_2$ makes a key derivation oracle query, then $B_2$ forwards this query to its own oracle and returns the result. If $A_2$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID \in \pi \bar{P}$ and a ciphertext $(C_1^*, C_2)$, then $B_2$ returns $\text{Dec}(K^*, C_2)$ to $A_2$. Otherwise, if $A_2$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID$ and a ciphertext $(C_1, C_2)$, then $B_2$ answers the query as before, by querying its own oracle to find the decapsulation of $C_1$ and decrypting $C_2$ itself. $A_2$ outputs a bit $\beta'$.

3. If $\beta = \beta'$ then $B_2$ outputs 1; otherwise $B_2$ outputs 0.

If $K^*$ is the decapsulation of $C_1^*$ then $B$ simulates Game 1 for $A$; whereas if $K^*$ is a random key then $B$ simulates Game 2 for $A$. Thus we have,

$$\Pr[A \text{ wins in Game 1}] - \Pr[A \text{ wins in Game 2}] = \epsilon_B$$

by virtue of Lemma E.4.1.

However, the security of Game 2 depends only on the (one-time) IND-CCA security of the DEM. We give an algorithm $B' = (B'_1, B'_2)$ reduces the security of the WIBE in Game 2 to the security of the DEM. We describe the algorithm $B'_1$ below:

1. $B'_1$ computes $(mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}$.

2. $B'_1$ runs $A_1$ on $mpk$. If $A_1$ makes a key derivation or decryption oracle query, then $B'_1$ computes the correct answer using its knowledge of the master private key $msk$. $A_1$ outputs a challenge pattern $P^*$ and two equal-length messages $(m_0, m_1)$.

3. $B'_1$ outputs the messages $(m_0, m_1)$.

The challenger chooses a bit $\beta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ and computes $C_2^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Enc}(K^*, m_\beta)$ as the challenge encryption using a randomly chosen (and hidden) key $K^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. The algorithm $B'_2$ runs as follows:

1. $B'_2$ takes $C_2^*$ as input. $B'_2$ computes the encapsulation $(C_1^*, K) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Encap}(mpk, P^*)$ and sets the challenge ciphertext $C^* \leftarrow (C_1^*, C_2^*)$. 

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2. $\mathcal{B}'_2$ runs $\mathcal{A}_2$ on the input $C^*$. If $\mathcal{A}_2$ makes a key derivation oracle query, then $\mathcal{B}'_2$ answers it correctly using its knowledge of the master private key $msk$. If $\mathcal{A}_2$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID \in P^*$ and a ciphertext $(C'_1, C'_2)$ then $\mathcal{B}'_2$ computes the correct answer by querying its own decryption on $C'_2$ and returning the result. Otherwise, if $\mathcal{A}_2$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID \in P^*$ and a ciphertext $(C_1^*, C_2)$ then $\mathcal{B}'_2$ computes the correct answer using its knowledge of the master private key $msk$. $\mathcal{A}_2$ outputs a bit $\beta'$. $\mathcal{B}'_2$ outputs the bit $\beta'$. $\mathcal{B}'$ correctly simulates Game 2 for $\mathcal{A}$. Furthermore, $\mathcal{A}$ wins in Game 2 if and only if $\mathcal{B}$ wins the IND-CCA game for a DEM. Hence,

$$|2 \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins Game 2}] - 1| = \epsilon_{B'}$$

and so we have that

$$\epsilon = |2 \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins Game 1}] - 1| \leq 2 \cdot |\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins in Game 1}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins in Game 2}]| + |2 \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins in Game 2}] - 1| = 2\epsilon_B + \epsilon_{B'}.$$
The BB-WIBE can actually be seen as a close relative of the Waters-WIBE scheme (see Section E.5.3) with the hash function $F_l(ID_l)$ being defined as

$$F_l(ID_l) = u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}^{ID_l}.$$ 

Its security properties are different though since the BB-WIBE scheme can be proved secure in the selective-identity model only. We reduce its security to that of the BB-HIBE scheme, which in its turn is proved IND-sHID-CPA secure under the BDDH assumption in Section E.2.6. The proof of the theorem below is analogous to that of Theorem E.5.3 and hence omitted. One important difference with Theorem E.5.3 is that the reduction from the BB-HIBE scheme is tight: because we prove security in the selective-identity model, we do not lose a factor $2^L$ due to having to guess the challenge pattern upfront.

**Theorem E.5.1** If there exists a $(t, q_K, \epsilon)$-adversary against the IND-sWID-CPA security of a BB-WIBE (with hierarchy depth $L$) then there exists a $(t', q'_K, \epsilon')$-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BB-HIBE, where

$$t' \leq t + 2L(1 + q_K) \cdot t_{exp}, \quad q'_K \leq q_K \quad \text{and} \quad \epsilon' \geq \epsilon,$$

where $t_{exp}$ is the time required to compute an exponentiation in $\mathbb{G}$.

In terms of efficiency, the BB-WIBE scheme easily outperforms the Waters-WIBE scheme: the master public key contains $2L + 3$ group elements. Encryption to a recipient pattern of length $\ell$ and $w$ wildcards involves $\ell + w + 2$ (multi-)exponentiations and produces ciphertexts containing $\ell + w + 2$ group elements, or $2L + 2$ group elements in the worst case that $\ell = w = L$. Decryption requires the computation of $\ell + 1$ pairings, just like the Waters-WIBE scheme. However, this scheme is outperformed by the BBG-WIBE.
E.5.2 The Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE

Our second construction is based on the BBG-HIBE [BBG05] (see Section E.2.7). The BBG-HIBE scheme has the advantage of constant-sized ciphertexts. Our BBG-WIBE scheme does not have this advantage, but does have the advantage that a pattern with \( w \) wildcards leads to a ciphertext with \( w + 3 \) elements and is secure under the same decisional \( L \)-BDH problem as the BBG-HIBE. Again, identities are considered to be vectors of elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

\[
E.5.2 \text{ The Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE}
\]

Algorithm Setup:
\[
\begin{align*}
g_1, g_2 & \leftarrow \mathbb{G}; \quad \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
h_1 & \leftarrow g_1^\alpha; \quad h_2 \leftarrow g_2^\alpha \\
u_i & \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \; \text{for} \; i = 1, \ldots, L \\
mpk & \leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_0, \ldots, u_L) \\
d_0 & \leftarrow h_2 \\
\text{For} \; i = 1, \ldots, L + 1 \; \text{do} \\
d_i & \leftarrow 1 \\
msk & \leftarrow (d_0, d_1, \ldots, d_L, d_{L+1}) \\
\text{Return} \; (mpk, msk)
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm KeyDer(\( d_{ID_1, \ldots, ID_L}, \text{ID}_{t+1} \)):
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Parse} \; d_{ID_1, \ldots, ID_L} \; \text{as} \; (d_0, d_{L+1}, \ldots, d_{L+1}) \\
r_{t+1} & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
d'_0 & \leftarrow d_0 \cdot d_{ID_{t+1}}^{u_0} \cdot (u_0 \prod_{i=1}^{t} u_i^{ID_i})^{r_{t+1}} \\
\text{For} \; i = \ell + 2, \ldots, L \; \text{do} \\
d'_i & \leftarrow d_i \cdot u_i^{r_{t+1}} \\
d'_{L+1} & \leftarrow d_{L+1} \cdot g_1^{r_{t+1}} \\
\text{Return} \; (d'_0, d'_{t+2}, \ldots, d'_{L}, d'_{L+1})
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm Decrypt(\( d_{ID_1, \ldots, ID_L}, C \)):
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Parse} \; d_{ID_1, \ldots, ID_L} \; \text{as} \; (d_0, d_{L+1}, \ldots, d_{L+1}) \\
\text{Parse} \; C \; \text{as} \; (P, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4) \\
\text{Parse} \; C_4 \; \text{as} \; (v_1)_{i \in W(p)} \\
C_2 & \leftarrow C_2 \prod_{i=1, i \in W(p)} u_i^{ID_i} \\
m' & \leftarrow C_3 \cdot \left( \frac{C_4}{\prod_{i=1, i \in W(p)} u_i^{ID_i}} \right) \\
\text{Return} \; m'
\end{align*}
\]

Figure E.5: The Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE scheme.

The BBG-WIBE scheme is significantly more efficient than the Waters-WIBE and BB-WIBE schemes in terms of decryption, and also offers more efficient encryption and shorter ciphertexts when the recipient pattern contains few wildcards. More precisely, the master public key contains \( L + 4 \) group elements. Encryption to a recipient pattern of length \( \ell \) with \( w \) wildcards involves \( w + 3 \) (multi-)exponentiations and \( w + 3 \) group elements in the ciphertext, or \( L + 3 \) of these in the worst case that \( \ell = w = L \). Decryption requires the computation of two pairings, as opposed to \( \ell + 1 \) of these for the Waters-WIBE and BB-WIBE schemes.

Again, the proof of the following theorem is analogous to that of Theorem E.5.3 and hence omitted.

**Theorem E.5.2** If there is a \( (t, q_K, \epsilon) \)-adversary against the IND-sWID-CPA security of the BBG-WIBE (with hierarchy depth \( L \)) then there exists a \( (t', q'_K, \epsilon') \)-adversary against the IND-shID-CPA security of the BBG-HIBE where

\[
t' \leq t - L(1 + 2q_K) \cdot t_{\text{exp}}, \quad q'_K \leq q_K, \quad \text{and} \; \epsilon' \geq \epsilon,
\]

where \( t_{\text{exp}} \) is the time it takes to perform an exponentiation in \( \mathbb{G} \).

E.5.3 The Waters WIBE

Our third construction is based on the Waters-HIBE [Wat05] (see Section E.2.8). As in the HIBE scheme, the WIBE makes use of identities which are \( n \)-bit strings and a series of hash
functions \( (F_1, \ldots, F_L) \) where
\[
F_i(ID_i) = u_{i,0} \prod_{j \in |ID_i|} u_{i,j}.
\]
The scheme is described in Figure E.6.

Algorithm Setup:
\[
\begin{align*}
g_1, g_2 &\leftarrow G; \; \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
h_1 &\leftarrow g_1^\alpha; \; h_2 \leftarrow g_2^\alpha \\
u_{i,j} &\leftarrow G \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, L; \; j = 0 \ldots n \\
mpk &\leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots, u_{L,n}) \\
msk &\leftarrow h_2 \\
\text{Return } (mpk, msk)
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm KeyDer\((d_{[ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell]}, ID_{\ell+1})\):
\[
\begin{align*}
p_{\ell+1} &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
d_0' &\leftarrow d_0 \cdot F_{\ell+1}(ID_{\ell+1})^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
d_{\ell+1}' &\leftarrow g_1^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
\text{Return } (d_0', d_1, \ldots, d_\ell, d'_{\ell+1})
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm Decrypt\((d_{[ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell]}, C)\):
\[
\begin{align*}
p_{\ell+1} &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
C_0' &\leftarrow (d_0', \ldots, d_\ell) \\
C_0' &\leftarrow (C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_\ell, C_3) \\
\text{For } i = 1, \ldots, \ell &\text{ do} \\
\text{If } i \notin W(P) \text{ then } C_{2,i}' &\leftarrow F_i(ID_i)^{r_i} \\
\text{If } i \in W(P) \text{ then } C_{2,i}' &\leftarrow (u_{i,0}', \ldots, u_{i,n}') \\
C_3' &\leftarrow m' \cdot \hat{e}(h_1, g_2)^{r_i} \\
\text{Return } (P, C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_\ell, C_3)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure E.6: The Waters WIBE scheme.

In terms of efficiency, the Waters-WIBE compares unfavourably with the BB-WIBE and BBG-WIBE (but (conjecturally) provides stronger security guarantees in the standard model). The master public key of the Waters-WIBE scheme contains \( (n + 1)L + 3 \) group elements. Encrypting to a pattern of length \( \ell \) containing \( w \) wildcards comes at the cost of \( \ell + nw + 2 \) exponentiations and \( \ell + nw + 2 \) group elements in the ciphertext; in the worst case of \( \ell = w = L \) this means \( (n + 1)L + 2 \) exponentiations and group elements. (The pairing \( \hat{e}(h_1, g_2) \) can be precomputed.) Decryption requires the computation of \( \ell + 1 \) pairings.

In terms of efficiency, the Waters-WIBE scheme performs well enough to be considered for use in practice, but definitely leaves room for improvement. The main problem is the dependency of the scheme on \( n \), the bit length of identity strings. In practice, one would typically use the output of a collision-resistant hash function as identity strings, so that \( n = 160 \) for a reasonable level of security. We note that the techniques of \([CS05, Nac07]\) could be applied to trade a factor \( d \) in efficiency against the loss of a factor of \( 2^{Ld} \) in the tightness of the reduction.

We now prove the security of the Waters-WIBE, relative to the security of the Waters-HIBE. This proof provides a template for the proofs of the security theorems for the BB and BBG WIBE’s mentioned above. We reduce the security of the Waters-WIBE to the security of the Waters-HIBE. The security of the latter scheme, as has already been mentioned, is believed to reduce to the security of the BDDH problem (see Section E.2.8).

**Theorem E.5.3** If there exists a \( (t, q_K, \epsilon) \)-adversary against the IND-WID-CPA security of the Waters-WIBE scheme (with hierarchy depth \( L \)) then there exists a \( (t', q'_K, \epsilon') \)-adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of the HIBE scheme, where
\[
t' \leq t + \ln (1 + q_K) \cdot t_{exp}, \; q'_K \leq q_K \text{ and } \epsilon' \geq \epsilon / 2^L,
\]
and $t_{exp}$ is the time it takes to perform an exponentiation in $G$.

**Proof:** Suppose there exists a $(t,q_K,\epsilon)$-adversary $A = (A_1,A_2)$ against the IND-WID-CPA security of the Waters-WIBE scheme. We construct an adversary $B = (B_1,B_2)$ against the IND-HID-CPA security of the Waters-HIBE.

The intuitive idea behind the proof is that $B$ guesses the levels in which the challenge pattern contains wildcards. Any query that $A$ makes is passed by $B$ to its own oracles after stripping out the levels corresponding to wildcards in the challenge pattern. To this end, we construct a "projection" map $\pi : \{1, \ldots, L\} \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, L\}$. Suppose that $\bar{P}^* \in \{\varepsilon, \ast\}^L$ is $B$’s guess for the wildcard positions in the challenge pattern. Define $\bar{E}_{<i}$ to be equal to the first $i$ components of $\bar{P}^*$ and define $\pi$ as

$$
\pi(i) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } i \in W(\bar{P}) \\
1 - |W(\bar{P}_{<i})| & \text{if } i \notin W(\bar{P}) 
\end{cases}
$$

$B$ is an adversary against the Waters-HIBE scheme. We denote parameters associated with the HIBE scheme using tildes. The algorithm $B_1$ runs as follows:

1. $B_1$ takes as input the master public key of the HIBE scheme $\tilde{mpk} = (\tilde{g}_1, \tilde{g}_2, \tilde{h}_1, \tilde{u}_{1,0}, \ldots, \tilde{u}_{L,n})$.

2. $B_1$ computes $\bar{P} = (\bar{P}_1, \ldots, \bar{P}_L) \xrightarrow{\$} \{\varepsilon, \ast\}^L$.

3. $B_1$ computes the master public key $mpk = (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots, u_{L,n})$ as follows:

$$
g_1 \leftarrow \tilde{g}_1, \quad g_2 \leftarrow \tilde{g}_2, \quad h_1 \leftarrow \tilde{h}_1
$$

$$
u_{i,j} \leftarrow \tilde{u}_{(i,j)} \text{ if } i \notin W(\bar{P}) \text{ and } j = 1, \ldots, n
$$

$$
u_{i,j} \leftarrow g_1^{\alpha_{i,j}} \text{ if } i \in W(\bar{P}), \quad j = 1, \ldots, n \text{ and } \alpha_{i,j} \leftarrow Z_p
$$

4. $B_1$ runs $A_1$ on $mpk$. If $A_1$ makes a key derivation oracle on input $ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_\ell)$ then $B_1$ constructs an identity $\bar{ID} = (\bar{ID}_1, \ldots, \bar{ID}_\ell)$ by setting $\bar{ID}_{\pi(i)} \leftarrow ID_i$ for each $i \in W(P^*_{<\ell})$. $B_1$ queries its key derivation oracle on $\bar{ID}$ and receives $(\bar{d}_0, \ldots, \bar{d}_\ell)$. $B_1$ reconstructs the decryption key $d_{ID} = (d_0, \ldots, d_\ell)$ for $ID$ as:

$$
d_0 \leftarrow \bar{d}_0 \prod_{i \in W(\bar{P}^*_{<\ell})} (u_{i,0} \prod_{j \in [ID_i]} u_{i,j})^{r_i} \quad \text{for } r_i \leftarrow Z_p
$$

$$
d_i \leftarrow \bar{d}_{\pi(i)} \quad \text{if } i \notin W(\bar{P}^*_{<\ell})
$$

$$
d_i \leftarrow g_1^{r_i} \quad \text{if } i \in W(\bar{P}^*_{<\ell})
$$

$B_1$ returns the key $d_{ID}$ to $A_1$. $A_1$ outputs two equal-length messages $(m_0, m_1)$ and a challenge pattern $P^* = (P^*_1, \ldots, P^*_\ell)$.

5. If $\bar{P}^*_{<\ell}$ and $P^*$ do not have wildcards in exactly the same positions, then $B_1$ aborts. Otherwise, $B_1$ computes a challenge identity $\bar{ID}' = (\bar{ID}'_1, \ldots, \bar{ID}'_{\ell'})$ by setting $\bar{ID}'_i \leftarrow P^*_i$ for all $i \notin W(P^*)$. $B_1$ outputs the challenge identity $\bar{ID}'$ and the two messages $(m_0, m_1)$.

The challenger will now encrypt $m_\beta$ under the identity $\bar{ID}'$ using the Waters-HIBE (for $\beta \notin \{0, 1\}$). This results in a ciphertext $\bar{C}' = (\bar{C}'_1, \bar{C}'_{2,1}, \ldots, \bar{C}'_{2,\ell'}, \bar{C}'_3)$ which is input to the algorithm $B_2$ described below:
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1. \( B_2 \) computes a challenge WIBE ciphertext \( C^* = (P^*, C_1^*, C_2^*, \ldots, C_{2^L}^*) \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
C_1^* &\leftarrow \tilde{C}_1^* \\
C_{2,i}^* &\leftarrow \tilde{C}_{2,i}^* & \text{if } i \notin W(P^*) \\
C_{2,i}^* &\leftarrow (C_{1,\pi_0}^*, \ldots, C_{1,\pi_{\alpha_L}}^*) & \text{for } i \in W(P^*) \\
C_3^* &\leftarrow \tilde{C}_3^*
\end{align*}
\]

2. \( B_2 \) runs \( A_2 \) on the input \( C^* \). If \( A_2 \) makes a key derivation oracle query, then \( B_2 \) answer its queries as before. \( A_2 \) outputs a guess \( \beta' \).

3. \( B_2 \) outputs \( \beta' \).

We make several observations about the adversary \( B \). First, note that \( B \) cannot correctly guess the bit \( \beta' \) unless it correctly guesses the locations of the wildcards in the challenge pattern. This happens with probability at least \( 1/2^L \). Second, we observe that if \( B \) correctly guesses the position of the wildcards in the challenge ciphertext, then \( B \) correctly simulates the key derivation oracle and challenge ciphertext for \( A \). Furthermore, if \( B \) correctly guesses the position of the wildcards in the challenge ciphertext, then any legal key derivation oracle query that \( A \) makes results in a legal key derivation oracle query made by \( B \). This is because for any identity \( ID \neq \ast \) and \( P^* \) there must exist an index \( i \) such that \( P_i^* \neq \ast \) and \( ID_i \neq P_i^* \). Hence, the “projected” identity \( \tilde{ID} \) has \( \tilde{ID}_{\pi(i)} = ID_i \neq P_i^* = \tilde{ID}_{\pi(i)}^* \). Hence, if \( B \) correctly guesses the position of the wildcards in the challenge ciphertext, then \( B \) wins if and only if \( A \) wins. This leads to the results of the theorem.

Note that the proof above loses a factor of \( 2^L \) in the security reduction. This limits the secure use of the scheme in practice to very small (logarithmic) hierarchy depths, but this was already the case for the Waters-HIBE scheme, which loses a factor \( (\log K)^L \) in its reduction to the BDDH problem. Alternatively, if we only consider patterns with a single sequence of consecutive wildcards, for example \((ID_1, \ast, \ast, \ast, ID_2)\) or \((ID_1, \ast, \ast)\), then we only lose a factor of \( L^2 \) when reducing to the Waters-HIBE scheme. If we consider the selective-identity notion, there is no need to guess the challenge pattern, so we do not lose any tightness with respect to the Waters-HIBE scheme. In addition, the Waters-HIBE scheme would itself also have a tight security reduction to the BDDH problem in the selective-identity notion.

E.5.4 Converting Selective-Identity Security to Full Security

As observed by Boneh and Boyen [BB04a] for the case of IBE schemes and by Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [BBG05] for the case of HIBE schemes, any HIBE scheme that is selective-identity (IND-sHID) secure can be transformed into a HIBE scheme that is fully (IND-HID) secure in the random oracle model. The transformation only works for small hierarchy depths though, since the proof loses a factor \( O(q_H^L) \) in reduction tightness. We show here that the same transformation works for the case of WIBE schemes at a similar cost of a factor \( O(q_H^L) \) in reduction.

Let \( \Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) be a WIBE scheme with maximum hierarchy depth \( L \). We construct a WIBE scheme \( \Pi' = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}', \text{Encrypt}', \text{Decrypt}') \) where \( \text{KeyDer}', \text{Encrypt}', \) and \( \text{Decrypt}' \) are identical to \( \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \) and \( \text{Decrypt} \) with the exception that the identity/pattern is input to a hash function before it is input to the relevant algorithm. A pattern \( P = (P_1, \ldots, P_L) \) is transformed into a pattern \( P' = (P'_1, \ldots, P'_L) \) where

\[
P'_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} H_i(P_i) & \text{if } P_i \neq \ast \\ \ast & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]
where $H_i : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{ID}$ (for $1 \leq i \leq L$) are independent hash functions (modelled as distinct random oracles) and $\mathcal{ID}$ is an appropriately sized subset of the allowable identities for the original WIBE scheme.

**Theorem E.5.4** In the random oracle model, suppose that there exists a $(t,q_K,q_H,\epsilon)$-adversary against the IND-WID-CP A security of $\Pi'$ (with hierarchy depth $L$) then there exists a $(t',q_K,\epsilon')$-adversary against the IND-sWID-CP A security of $\Pi$, where $t' \leq t$ and

$$\epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon}{(L+1)(q_H + q_KL + 1)^L} - \frac{(q_H + q_KL + 1)^2}{|\mathcal{ID}|}.$$ 

**Proof:** Suppose there exists a $(t,q_K,q_H,\epsilon)$-adversary $A = (A_1,A_2)$ against the IND-WID-CP A security of $\Pi'$. We construct an IND-sWID-CP A adversary $B = (B_0,B_1,B_2)$ against $\Pi$ that uses $A$ as a subroutine. The algorithm $B_0$ runs as follows:

1. $B_0$ chooses $\ell^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1,\ldots,L\}$ and $\text{ctr} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1,\ldots,q_H + q_KL + 1\}$. $B_0$ computes the challenge pattern $P^* \leftarrow (\hat{P}_1^*,\ldots,\hat{P}_{\ell^*})$ where

$$\hat{P}_i^* \leftarrow \begin{cases} \star & \text{if } \text{ctr} = 0 \\ \text{id} & \text{if } \text{ctr} \neq 0 \text{ where } \text{id} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{ID} \end{cases}$$

$B_0$ outputs $\hat{P}^*$.

The challenger now issues the master public key $mpk$ to the adversary. Algorithm $B_1$ run as follows:

1. $B_1$ receives the master public key $mpk$.

2. $B_1$ initialises a set of lists $T_i$ to answer the random oracle queries for the hash function $H_i$. These lists are initially empty. For each list, $B_1$ initialises a counter $\text{ctr}_i \leftarrow 1$.

3. $B_1$ runs $A_1$ on $mpk$. $B_1$ answers $A_1$’s oracle queries as follows:

   - Suppose $A_1$ queries the random oracle $H_i$ on input $ID$. If $T_i[ID]$ is defined, then $B_1$ returns $T_i[ID]$. Otherwise, if $\text{ctr}_i = \text{ctr}_i$, then $B_1$ sets $T_i[ID] \leftarrow \hat{P}_i^*$, else $B_1$ sets $T_i[ID] \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{ID}$. In either case, $B_1$ increments $\text{ctr}_i$ by one and returns $T_i[ID]$.

   - Suppose $A_1$ queries the key derivation oracle on $ID = (ID_1,\ldots,ID_L)$. $B_1$ computes the hashed identity $ID' = (ID'_1,\ldots,ID'_L)$ where $ID'_i \leftarrow H_i(ID_i)$ using the random oracle algorithm defined above. $B_1$ queries its own key derivation oracle on the input $ID'$ and returns the result to $A_1$.

   $A_1$ terminates by outputting a challenge pattern $P^* = (P_1^*,\ldots,P_{\ell^*})$ and two equal-length messages $(m_0,m_1)$.

4. If $\ell^* \neq \ell^\star$, if there exists $i \in W(\hat{P}^*)$ such that $P_i^* \neq \star$, or if there exists $1 \leq i \leq \ell^*$ such that $i \notin W(\hat{P}^*)$ and $H_i(P_i^*) \neq \hat{P}_i^*$, then $B_1$ aborts.

5. $B_1$ outputs the two messages $(m_0,m_1)$.

---

1 These $L$ independent random oracles $(H_1,\ldots,H_L)$ can easily be constructed from a single random oracle $H$, e.g. by setting $H_i(\cdot) = H([i]|\cdot)$ where $[i]$ is a fixed-length representation of the integer $i$. 

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The challenger computes the challenge ciphertext $C^*$ (which is the encryption of $m_\beta$ for some randomly chosen $\beta \overset{r}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$). This value is input to algorithm $B_2$ which runs as follows:

1. $B_2$ runs $A_2$ on the input $C^*$. If $A_2$ makes any oracle query, then they are answered as above. $A_2$ outputs a bit $\beta'$.
2. $B_2$ outputs $\beta'$.

$B$ wins the IND-sWID-CP A game if (1) $A$ wins the IND-WID-CP A game; (2) $B$ does not abort because the challenge pattern it outputs is incorrect; (3) $A$ does not force $B$ to make an illegal key derivation oracle query. The idea is that the counters $\hat{\text{ctr}}_i$ are $B$'s guess as to which oracle query will define the challenge patterns (where a counter values of $\hat{\text{ctr}}_i = 0$ means that that position is a wildcard). We require that for each of the hash oracles provides no collisions – i.e. for each $ID \neq ID'$ we have $H_i(ID) \neq H_i(ID')$. Since such a collision could only occur by accident, the probability is bounded by $(q_H + q_K L + 1)^2 / |ID|$ as there exists at most $q_H + q_K L + 1$ entries in all the lists. We exclude the possibility this occurs by losing an additive factor of $(q_H + q_K L)^2 / |ID|$ in the security reduction.

Furthermore, we require that the algorithm $B$ correctly identifies the pattern that $A$ outputs. Since the values are chosen at random, we have that $\hat{\ell}^* = \ell^*$ with probability $1 / (L + 1)$ and that the $\hat{\text{ctr}}_i$ value will be correct with probability $1 / (q_H + q_K L + 1)$. If $B$ correctly guesses these values and there are no hash collisions, then $A$ will never force $B$ to make an illegal key derivation query. Hence, the result of the theorem holds.

The above theorem is easily seen to extend to the case of converting an IND-sWID-CCA scheme into an IND-WID-CCA scheme, with an appropriate alteration of the error term in the advantage statement; to take into account the number of decryption oracle queries. Indeed adversary $B$ is modified so that when it obtains a decryption query it first hashes the identities to produce a decryption query suitable for $A$. Such a simulation will fail if and only if the hashed identity is equivalent to the challenge identity for $A$, but this would imply a collision in the random oracle.

### E.6 IND-WID-CCA Secure WIBEs

In this section, we present constructions for IND-WID-CCA secure WIBEs. We present one generic transform from an IND-WID-CP A WIBE into an IND-WID-CCA WIBE based on the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [CHK04] and a generic random-oracle-based transform from an OW-WID-CP A WIBE into an IND-WID-CCA WIB-KEM based on a transform of Dent [Den03].

#### E.6.1 The Canetti-Halevi-Katz Transform

In this section, we construct a variant of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [CHK04] to convert an IND-WID-CP A secure WIBE with hierarchy depth $L + 1$ into an IND-WID-CCA secure WIBE with hierarchy depth $L$, using a one-time signature scheme (see Section E.2.3).

In order to complete this transform, we will make liberal use of an “encoding” function $\text{Encode}$. We will need to restrict the space of allowable identities. We assume that “$-$” represents some fixed, public-known allowable identity for the CPA scheme; we will deliberately exclude “$-$” from the space of allowable identities in the CCA scheme. We assume that $1^k$ is an allowable identity in the CCA scheme. We then encode a pattern $P = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell)$ and a verification key $vk$ as the $L + 1$ level identity:

\[
\text{Encode}(P, vk) = (P_1, \ldots, P_\ell, -, \ldots, -, vk).
\]
We define a similar map for identities (interpreted as patterns without wildcards).

Given an IND-WID-CPA WIBE scheme \( \Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) with hierarchy depth \( L + 1 \), we define an IND-WID-CCA WIBE \( \Pi' = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}', \text{Decrypt}') \) with hierarchy depth \( L \). This scheme is described in Figure E.7. The encryption algorithm now produces ciphertexts which are (a) encrypted under the pattern \( \text{Encode}(P, vk) \) for a randomly generated \((sk, vk) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{SigGen}\), and (b) signed using \( sk \). The decryption algorithm checks the signature and (if correct) decrypts the ciphertext using a key for an identity which matches \( \text{Encode}(P, vk) \) (using the valid identity \( 1^k \) in place of wildcards).

\[
\text{Algorithm Encrypt'}(mpk, P, m):
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
& (sk, vk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SigGen} \\
& P' \leftarrow \text{Encode}(P, vk) \\
& C' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encrypt}(mpk, P', m) \\
& \sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}(sk, (P, C')) \\
& C \leftarrow (vk, C', \sigma) \\
& \text{Return } C
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{Algorithm Decrypt'}(d_{ID}, C):
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{Parse } C \text{ as } (vk, C', \sigma) \\
& \text{If } \text{Verify}(vk, C', \sigma) = \bot \text{ then return } \bot \\
& \text{For } i \text{ equals } 1 \text{ to } |P| - |ID| \\
& \quad \text{If } P_{ID[i+]} \neq * \text{ then } ID_i' \leftarrow P_{ID[i+]} \\
& \quad \text{If } P_{ID[i+]} = * \text{ then } ID_{i+}' \leftarrow 1^k \\
& \text{For } i \text{ equals } 1 \text{ to } L - |P| \\
& \quad ID_{|P|-|ID[i+]}' \leftarrow = \\
& \quad ID_{L-|ID[i+]+1}' \leftarrow vk \\
& d \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}(d_{ID}, ID') \\
& m \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(d, C) \\
& \text{Return } m
\end{align*}
\]

Figure E.7: The Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform.

**Theorem E.6.1** Suppose that there exists a \((t, q_K, q_D, \varepsilon)\)-adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIBE \( \Pi' \) then there exists a \((t_w, q_K + q_D, \varepsilon_w)\)-adversary against the IND-WID-CPA security of \( \Pi \) and a \((t_s, \varepsilon_s)\)-adversary against the one-time unforgeability of the signature scheme, where

\[
\begin{align*}
t_w &\leq t + t_{\text{SigGen}} + t_{\text{Sign}} + q_D(t_{\text{Verify}} + t_{\text{Decrypt}}), \\
t_s &\leq t + t_{\text{Setup}} + t_{\text{Encrypt}} + q_K \cdot t_{\text{KeyDer}} + q_D \cdot t_{\text{Decrypt}}, \\
\varepsilon &\geq \varepsilon_w + 2\varepsilon_s,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( t_{\text{ALG}} \) is the time to execute the algorithm \( \text{ALG} \).

**Proof:** The proof closely follows that of [CHK04]. Let \( A \) be an IND-WID-CCA adversary against the scheme \( \Pi' \). Suppose \( P^* \) is the challenge pattern that \( A \) chooses and \((vk^*, C^*, \sigma^*)\) is the challenge ciphertext that \( A \) receives during an execution of the attack game. Let \( \text{Forge} \) be the event that at some point during its execution \( A \) queries the decryption oracle on an identity \( ID \in \varepsilon, P^* \) and a ciphertext of the form \((vk^*, C, \sigma)\) such that the algorithm \( \text{Verify}(vk^*, C, \sigma) \) returns \( \top \). Then we have that \( A \)'s advantage is

\[
|2 \cdot \Pr[A \text{ wins}] - 1/2| \leq |2 \cdot \Pr[A \text{ wins } \neg \text{Forge}] - 1| + 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{Forge}].
\]

**Claim E.6.2** \( \Pr[\text{Forge}] \leq \varepsilon_s. \)

We describe an algorithm \( B = (B_1, B_2) \) which breaks the one-time unforgeability of the signature scheme if the event \( \text{Forge} \) occurs. The algorithm \( B_1 \) runs as follows:
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1. \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) receives \( vk^* \) as input.
2. \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) generates a master key pair \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}\).
3. \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) runs \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) on \( mpk \). If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) makes a decryption or key derivation oracle query, then \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) answers it using its knowledge of the master private key \( msk \). \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) outputs a challenge pattern \( P^* \) and two equal-length messages \((m_0, m_1)\).
4. If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) submitted a decryption oracle query \((vk^*, C, \sigma)\) for which \( \text{Verify}(vk^*, C, \sigma) = \top \), then \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) chooses a ciphertext \( C^* \neq C \) and returns \( C^* \). This is known as the error event.
5. Otherwise, \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) chooses \( \beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \), computes \( C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, \text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*), m_\beta) \) and returns \( C^* \).

The challenger then computes a signature \( \sigma^* \) on the “message” \( C^* \). This is input to the algorithm \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) described as follows:

1. \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) receives \( \sigma^* \) as input.
2. If the error event occurred during the first phase, then \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) outputs \((C, \sigma)\).
3. Otherwise \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) runs \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) on the input \((vk^*, C^*, \sigma^*)\). If \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) makes a key derivation or decryption oracle query, then \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) answers them using its knowledge of the master private key \( msk \). \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) outputs a bit \( \beta' \).
4. If \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) submitted a decryption oracle query \((vk^*, C, \sigma)\) for which \( \text{Verify}(vk^*, C, \sigma) = \top \), then \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) outputs \((C, \sigma)\). Otherwise \( \mathcal{B}_2 \) outputs the error symbol \( \bot \).

Algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) is designed to output a valid forgery if the event \( \text{FORGE} \) occurs. If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) makes a valid decryption oracle query on \((vk^*, C, \sigma)\), then the error event occurs, and \( \mathcal{B} \) trivially wins. If \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) makes a valid decryption oracle query on \((vk^*, C, \sigma)\), then, since \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) is forbidden from making a decryption oracle query on \((vk^*, C^*, \sigma^*)\), \( \mathcal{B} \) wins after \( \mathcal{A} \) finishes its execution. Hence, we have \( \epsilon_s = \Pr[\text{FORGE}] \).

**Claim E.6.3** \( 2 \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } | \neg \text{FORGE}] - 1 \leq \epsilon_w \).

We describe an algorithm \( \mathcal{B}' = (\mathcal{B}'_1, \mathcal{B}'_2) \) which breaks the IND-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme \( \Pi \) whenever \( \mathcal{A} \) wins and \( \text{FORGE} \) did not occur. Algorithm \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) runs as follows:

1. \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) receives a master public key \( mpk \) as input.
2. \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) generates \((vk^*, sk^*) \leftarrow \text{SigGen}\).
3. \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) runs \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) on \( mpk \). If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) makes a key derivation oracle query on identity \( ID \), then \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) makes a key derivation oracle query on \( ID \) and returns the result. If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) makes a decryption oracle query on identity \( ID \) and ciphertext \((vk, C, \sigma)\), then \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) returns \( \bot \) if \( vk = vk^* \) or if \( \text{Verify}(vk, C, \sigma) = \bot \). Otherwise, \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) computes the extension identity \( ID' \) required so that \( ID || ID' \) matches the pattern \( \text{Encode}(P, vk) \) as in the decryption algorithm, queries the key extraction algorithm on \( ID || ID' \) to obtain a decryption key \( d \) and returns \( \text{Decrypt}(d, C) \). \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) outputs a pattern \( P^* \) and two equal-length messages \((m_0, m_1)\).
4. \( \mathcal{B}'_1 \) returns the challenge pattern \( \text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*) \) and the messages \((m_0, m_1)\).
The challenger will pick a random $\beta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ and computes the ciphertext
\[ C^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, \text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*), m_\beta). \]
This ciphertext is input to the algorithm $B'_2$ below:

1. $B'_2$ receives the ciphertext $C$. $B'_2$ computes $\sigma^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Sign}(sk^*, C^*)$.
2. $B'_2$ runs $A_2$ on the ciphertext $(vk^*, C^*, \sigma^*)$. All oracle queries are answered in exactly the same way as in the first phase. $A_2$ outputs a bit $\beta'$.
3. $B'_2$ outputs $\beta'$. It is clear that as long as $B'$ does not make an illegal key derivation oracle query, then $B'$ wins if and only if $A$ wins (assuming that Forge does not occur). $B'$ may make key derivation oracle queries in response to $A$ making a key derivation oracle query or a decryption oracle query. If $A$ makes a decryption oracle query on an identity $ID$ and ciphertext $(vk, C, \sigma)$ then $B'$ makes a key derivation query on $\text{Encode}(ID \parallel ID', vk)$; however $\text{Encode}(ID \parallel ID', vk) \not\in \text{Encode}(P^*, vk)$ as both encodings are $(L + 1)$-bits long and $vk \neq vk^*$ since Forge does not occur. Furthermore, if $A$ makes a key derivation oracle query on an identity $ID$ then, by definition, we have $ID \not\in \text{Encode}(P^*, vk)$. We need to show that $ID \not\in \text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*)$. This is true as:
   - if $|ID| > |P^*|$ then $ID$ and $\text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*)$ do not agree at level $|P^*| + 1$ (where $\text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*)$ is defined to be “−” and $ID$ cannot be defined to be “−” since it was excluded from the message space);
   - if $|ID| \leq |P^*|$ then $ID \not\in \text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*)$ as $\text{Encode}(P^*, vk^*)_i = P^*_i$ for levels $1 \leq i \leq |ID|$ and $ID \not\in P^*$.
Hence, $A$ never forces $B'$ to make an illegal key derivation oracle query and so $B'$ wins whenever $A$. Thus,
\[ |2 \cdot \Pr[A \text{ wins } \neg \text{Forge}] - 1| \leq \epsilon_w. \]
A combination of the two claims gives the theorem.

Applying the transformation to Waters-WIBE.

We may optimise the CHK transform in the particular case of the Waters-WIBE scheme described in Section [E.6.3]. In particular, there is no implicit functional reason why we have to fix the encoded identity using “−” strings, as it is possible to determine a key for which the $(L + 1)$-th level is fixed to $vk$ while leaving lower levels undetermined. In particular, we obtain the scheme given in Figure [E.8] which is IND-CCA secure and has depth $L$. We assume (for simplicity) that verification keys $vk$ are $n$-bits long.

E.6.2 The Dent KEM Transform

One approaching to building systems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is to transform a weakly-secure (OW-WID-CPA) WIBE scheme into a strongly-secure (IND-WID-CCA) WIB-KEM scheme. This obviously gives rise to an IND-WID-CCA WIBE scheme when combined with a suitably secure DEM (see Sections [E.2.9] and [E.4]). We apply an analogue of the transformation of Dent [Den03].
where the probability is taken over the choice of the randomness pattern under which the message was originally encrypted. Recall that the set \( P \) be output by the key generation algorithm, for all patterns random values taken from a set \( A \).

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We transform the WIBE scheme \((\text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt})\) with a finite message space which on input \((\text{Setup}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt})\) with a finite message space \(\mathcal{M} \) and hierarchy depth \( L \) into a WIBE scheme \(\Pi' = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt})\) using two hash functions:

\[
H_1: (\{0, 1\}^n \cap \{\star\})^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{R}
\]

Algorithm Setup:

\[
\begin{align*}
    g_1, g_2 & \leftarrow \mathbb{G} ; \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
    h_1 & \leftarrow g_1^\alpha ; h_2 \leftarrow g_2^\alpha \\
    u_{i,j} & \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, L + 1 ; j = 0 \ldots n \\
    mpk & \leftarrow (g_1, g_2, h_1, u_{1,0}, \ldots, u_{L+1,n}) \\
    msk & \leftarrow h_2 \\
    \text{Return } (mpk, msk)
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm Encrypt(mpk, P, m):

\[
\begin{align*}
P & \leftarrow \{P_1, \ldots, P_t\} \\
r & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p ; C_1 & \leftarrow g_1^r \\
& \text{For } i = 1 \ldots t \text{ do} \\
& \quad \text{If } i \notin W(P) \text{ then } C_{2,i} & \leftarrow F_i(ID_i)^r \\
& \quad \text{If } i \in W(P) \text{ then } C_{2,i} & \leftarrow (u_{r,0}, \ldots, u_{r,n}) \\
& \quad (sk, vk) & \leftarrow \text{SigGen} \\
& \quad C_{2,L+1} & \leftarrow F_{L+1}(vk)^r \\
& \quad C_3 & \leftarrow m \cdot \varepsilon(h_1, g_2)^r \\
& \quad \text{Return } (sk, P, C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots, C_{2,t}, C_{2,L+1}, C_3)
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm KeyDer(d_{(ID_1, \ldots, ID_t)}, ID_{t+1}):

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{Parse } d_{(ID_1, \ldots, ID_t)} & \text{ as } (d_0, \ldots, d_t) \\
    r_{t+1} & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
    d'_0 & \leftarrow d_0 \cdot F_{t+1}(ID_{t+1})^{r_{t+1}} \\
    d'_{t+1} & \leftarrow g_1^{r_{t+1}} \\
    \text{Return } (d'_0, d_1, \ldots, d_t, d'_{t+1})
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm Decrypt(d_{(ID_1, \ldots, ID_t)}, C):

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{Parse } d_{(ID_1, \ldots, ID_t)} & \text{ as } (d_0, \ldots, d_t) \\
    C & \leftarrow (vk, P, C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots, C_{2,t}, C_{2,L+1}, C_3, \sigma) \\
    \text{If } \text{Verify}(vk, (P, C_1, C_{2,1}, \ldots, C_{2,t}, C_{2,L+1}, C_3, \sigma) = \perp \text{ then } \text{Return } \perp \\
    \text{For } i = 1, \ldots, t \text{ do} \\
    \quad \text{If } i \notin W(P) \text{ then } C_{2,i} & \leftarrow C_{2,i} \\
    \quad \text{If } i \in W(P) \text{ then } \\
    \quad \quad \text{Parse } C_{2,i} & \leftarrow (v_0, \ldots, v_n) \\
    \quad \quad C_{2,i} & \leftarrow \ell_0 \prod_{i \notin W(P)} v_i \\
    \quad m' & \leftarrow C_3 \cdot \varepsilon(h_1, C_{2,L+1}) \prod_{i \notin W(P)} \ell(d_i, C_{2,i}) \\
    \text{Return } m'
\end{align*}
\]

Figure E.8: The IND-WID-CCA Waters WIBE scheme.

Suppose \( \Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) be an OW-WID-CPA WIBE scheme (see Section E.3.2) with a finite message space \( \mathcal{M} \). We assume that the Encrypt algorithm uses random values taken from a set \( \mathcal{R} \). We can write Encrypt as a deterministic algorithm \( C \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, P, m; r) \) where \( r \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \). We require that the scheme satisfies a notion of randomness called \( \gamma \)-uniformity.

Definition E.6.4 A WIBE scheme \( \Pi \) is \( \gamma \)-uniform if for all master public keys \( mpk \) that could be output by the key generation algorithm, for all patterns \( P \), for all messages \( m \) and ciphertexts \( C \), we have

\[
\text{Pr}[\text{Encrypt}(mpk, P, m; r) = C] \leq \gamma,
\]

where the probability is taken over the choice of the randomness \( r \) used in the encryption function.

The only difficulty in applying the method of Dent [Den03] is that we must re-encrypt the recovered message as an integrity check. In the WIBE setting, this means we must know the pattern under which the message was originally encrypted. Recall, that the set \( W(C) = \{i \in Z : P_i = \star\} \) of the pattern \( P \) used to encrypt the message, along with the length \( L \) of the pattern, is easily derived from the ciphertext. We use this information to give an algorithm \( P \), which on input \((ID, C)\), where \( C \) is a ciphertext and \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_t) \), returns the pattern \( P = (P_1, \ldots, P_t) \) where

\[
P_i = \begin{cases} \star & \text{if } i \in W(C) \\ id_i & \text{if } i \notin W(C) \end{cases}
\]

We transform the WIBE scheme \( \Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Decrypt}) \) with a finite message space \( \mathcal{M} \) and hierarchy depth \( L \) into a WIBE scheme \( \Pi' = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap}) \) using two hash functions:

\[
H_1: (\{0, 1\}^n \cap \{\star\})^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{R}
\]
and
\[ H_2 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda. \]

The complete scheme is given in Figure E.9.

**Theorem E.6.5** Suppose that there exists a \((t,q_K,q_D,q_H,\epsilon)\)-adversary, in the random oracle model, against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM \(\Pi\) then there exists a \((t',q_K,\epsilon')\)-adversary against the OW-WID-CPA security of the WIBE \(\Pi\), where
\[ \epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon - q_D(|\mathcal{M}|^{-1} + \gamma)}{q_H + q_D} \]
\[ t' \leq t + q_H t_{\text{Encrypt}} \]

where \(t_{\text{Encrypt}}\) is the time taken to perform an encryption, \(\Pi\) has finite message space \(\mathcal{M}\), and \(\Pi\) is \(\gamma\)-uniform.

**Proof:** Suppose there exists a \((t,q_K,q_D,q_H,\epsilon)\)-adversary \(A = (A_1,A_2)\) against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM in the random oracle model. We construct an adversary \(B = (B_1,B_2)\) against the OW-WID-CPA security of the WIBE. The algorithm \(B_1\) runs as follows:

1. \(B_1\) receives a master public key \(mpk\).
2. \(B_1\) initialises three lists \(T_1, E_1, \) and \(T_2\) which are initially set to be empty.
3. \(B_1\) runs \(A_1\) on \(mpk\). \(B_1\) answers \(A_1\)'s oracle queries as follows:
   - Suppose \(A_1\) queries the \(H_1\)-oracle on input \((P,m)\). If \(T_1[P,m]\) is defined, \(B_1\) returns \(T_1[P,m]\). Otherwise, \(B_1\) chooses \(r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}\), sets \(T_1[P,m] \leftarrow r\), sets \(E_1[P,m] \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk,P,m;r)\), and returns \(r\).
   - Suppose \(A_1\) queries the \(H_2\)-oracle on input \(r\). If \(T_2[r]\) is defined, \(B_1\) returns \(T_2[r]\). Otherwise, \(B_1\) chooses \(K \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^\lambda\), sets \(T_2[r] \leftarrow K\), and returns \(K\).
   - Suppose \(A_1\) queries the key derivation oracle on the input \(ID\). \(B_1\) forwards this request to its own key derivation oracle and returns the result.
   - Suppose \(A_1\) queries the decryption oracle on the identity \(ID\) and the ciphertext \(C\). \(B_1\) searches the list \(T_1\) for an entry \(C = E_1[P,m]\) where \(P = P(ID,C)\). If no such entry exists, then \(B_1\) returns \(\perp\). Otherwise, \(B_1\) computes \(K \leftarrow H_2(m)\) as above and returns \(K\).

The adversary outputs a challenge pattern \(P^*\).
4. \(B_1\) outputs the challenge pattern \(P^*\).
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The challenger then computes a challenge encryption $C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(mpk, P^*, m^*; r^*)$ for $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ and $r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$. This ciphertext is input to the algorithm $B_2$:

1. $B_2$ receives $C^*$.

2. $B_2$ generates $K^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.

3. $B_2$ runs $A_2$ on the input $(C^*, K^*)$. If $A_2$ queries any oracle, then $B_2$ answers these queries as before. $A_2$ outputs a bit $\beta'$.

4. $B_2$ randomly chooses a defined entry for one of the hash functions, either $T_1[P, m]$ or $T_2[m]$, and outputs $m$.

The basic strategy of this security proof is to take advantage of the fact that the only way that $A$ can determine if $C^*$ is an encapsulation of $K^*$ is to query the $H_2$-oracle on $m^*$. However, we first have to show that the simulated hash function, key derivation, and decryption oracles are consistent with the real IND-WID-CCA game.

The simulated key derivation oracle is perfect, as is the hash function oracle, with the exception that the hash function oracle fails to respond to correctly to an $H_1$-oracle query on $(P^*, m^*)$ or a $H_2$-oracle query on $m^*$. However, the decryption oracle is more problematic. There are two types of error event that can occur with the decryption oracle:

- The decryption oracle will respond incorrectly if $A_1$ queries the oracle on an identity $ID \in P^*$ and the ciphertext $C^*$. However, since $m^*$ is information theoretically hidden from $A_1$, this occurs with probability at most $1/|\mathcal{M}|$.

- The decryption oracle will respond incorrectly if $A$ queries the decryption oracle on an identity $ID$ and a ciphertext $C$ for which $T_1[P, m]$ is undefined, where $P \leftarrow P(ID, C)$ and $m \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(dID, C)$, but for which

$$C = \text{Encrypt}(mpk, P(ID, C), m; T_1[P, m])$$

where $T_1[P, m]$ is randomly chosen at the end of the game if it is not defined later by an adversarial query. Since $T_1[P, m]$ is randomly chosen and $\Pi$ is $\gamma$-uniform, we have that this occurs with probability $\gamma$.

We have that the probability that either of these events occurs is therefore bounded by $q_D(|\mathcal{M}|^{-1} + \gamma)$. Assuming none of these events occur, we have that the simulation is perfect unless $A_1$ makes a query which defines the hash function values $T_1[P^*, m^*]$ or $T_2[m^*]$. Since $A$ cannot determine whether $K^*$ is the correct key for $C^*$ without querying the $H_2$-oracle on $m^*$, we have that this event will occur with probability at least $\epsilon - q_D(|\mathcal{M}|^{-1} + \gamma)$. However, if this event occurs, then $B$ will win the OW-WID-CPA with probability at least $1/(q_H + q_D)$ (as there exists at most $q_H + q_D$ entries on $T_1$ and $T_2$). Hence, $B$ wins with probability at least

$$\epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon - q_D(|\mathcal{M}|^{-1} + \gamma)}{q_H + q_D}$$

which gives the theorem. \hfill \qed
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Appendix F

Searchable Encryption Revisited: Consistency Properties, Relation to Anonymous IBE, and Extensions


Abstract: We identify and fill some gaps with regard to consistency (the extent to which false positives are produced) for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). We define computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency, show that the scheme of [BDOP04] is computationally consistent, and provide a new scheme that is statistically consistent. We also provide a transform of an anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to a secure PEKS scheme that, unlike the previous one, guarantees consistency. Finally, we suggest three extensions of the basic notions considered here, namely anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption, public-key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with keyword search.

F.1 Introduction

There has recently been interest in various forms of “searchable encryption” [SWP00, BDOP04, Goh103, GSW04, WBDS04]. In this paper, we further explore one of the variants of this goal, namely public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) as introduced by Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano [BDOP04].

The killer application envisaged by Boneh et al. is that of intelligent email routing. We consider emails as consisting of some header information, a body, and a list of keywords. Imagine Alice uses different electronic devices to read her email, including a pager, a PDA, and a desktop computer. Alice may prefer emails to be routed to her devices depending on the associated keywords. For example, she may like to receive emails with the keyword “urgent” on her pager, emails with the keyword “agenda” on her PDA, and all other emails on her desktop computer.

Existing mail server software could be updated to provide this type of service for plain, unencrypted email. When Bob sends an email to Alice encrypted under her public key, however,
routing becomes much harder. One option would be for Bob to leave the list of keywords unencrypted; if Bob is a colleague of Alice however, he may not like the gateway to know that he is exchanging emails with her with the keyword “personal”. Alice is probably not willing to hand her decryption key to the gateway either. Rather, she would like to give the gateway some piece of trapdoor information that allows it to test whether the keyword “urgent” is among those in the list, without revealing any other information about the email to the gateway. This is exactly the type of functionality provided by a PEKS scheme. Bob can then use a standard public-key encryption scheme to encrypt the body of the email, and a PEKS scheme to separately encrypt each of the keywords.

The routing configuration of the email gateway need not be static. Alternatively, Alice could send the trapdoors for the keywords that she wants to receive at the time of login. This could be useful for checking email over a low-bandwidth connection: when Alice is at a conference, for example, she may want to download to her laptop only those emails tagged with keyword “urgent”.

As another application, Waters et al. [WBDS04] show how PEKS schemes can be used to let an untrusted logging device maintain an encrypted audit log of privacy-sensitive data (e.g. user actions on a computer system) that is efficiently searchable by authorized auditors only. The entries in the audit log are encrypted under the public key of a PEKS scheme, of which the corresponding secret key is unknown to the logging device. If the device is ever confiscated, or if the logbook leaks, privacy of users and their actions is maintained. The secret key is known only to a trusted audit escrow agent, who provides (less trusted) authorized investigators with trapdoors for the keywords they want to search for.

In this paper, we investigate some consistency-related issues and results of PEKS schemes, then consider the connection to anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE), and finally discuss some new extensions.

F.1.1 Consistency in PEKS

Any cryptographic primitive must meet two conditions. One is of course a security condition. The other, which we will here call a consistency condition, ensures that the primitive fulfills its function. For example, for public-key encryption, the security condition is privacy. (This could be formalized in many ways, eg. IND-CPA or IND-CCA.) The consistency condition is that decryption reverses encryption, meaning that if $M$ is encrypted under public key $pk$ to result in ciphertext $C$, then decrypting $C$ under the secret key corresponding to $pk$ results in $M$ being returned.

PEKS. In a PEKS scheme, Alice can provide a gateway with a trapdoor $t_w$ (computed as a function of her secret key) for any keyword $w$ of her choice. A sender encrypts a keyword $w'$ under Alice’s public key $pk$ to obtain a ciphertext $C$ that is sent to the gateway. The latter can apply a test function $Test$ to $t_w, C$ to get back 0 or 1. The consistency condition as per [BDOP04] is that if $w = w'$ then $Test(t_w, C)$ returns 1 and if $w \neq w'$ it returns 0. The security condition is that the gateway learn nothing about $w'$ beyond whether or not it equals $w$. (The corresponding formal notion will be denoted PEKS-IND-CPA.) The application setting is that $C$ can be attached to an email (ordinarily encrypted for Alice under a different public key), allowing the gateway to route the email to different locations (eg. Alice’s desktop, laptop or pager) based on $w$ while preserving privacy of the latter to the largest extent possible.

Consistency of $BDOP$-PEKS. It is easy to see (cf. Proposition 3.1) that the main construction of $BDOP$ (a random oracle (RO) model, bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) based PEKS-IND-CPA secure PEKS scheme that we call $BDOP$-PEKS) fails to meet the consistency condition defined in [BDOP04] and stated above. (Specifically, there are distinct keywords $w, w'$
such that \( \text{Test}(t_w, C) = 1 \) for any \( C \) that encrypts \( w' \).) The potential problem this raises in practice is that email will be incorrectly routed.

**New notions of consistency.** It is natural to ask if \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) meets some consistency condition that is weaker than theirs but still adequate in practice. To answer this, we provide some new definitions. Somewhat unusually for a consistency condition, we formulate consistency more like a security condition, via an experiment involving an adversary. The difference is that this adversary is not very “adversarial”: it is supposed to reflect some kind of worst case but not malicious behavior. However this turns out to be a difficult line to draw, definitionally, so that some subtle issues arise. One outcome of this approach is that it naturally gives rise to a hierarchy of notions of consistency, namely perfect, statistical and computational. The first asks that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be zero; the second that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be negligible; the third that the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary be negligible. We note that perfect consistency as per our definition coincides with consistency as per [BDOP 04], and so our notions can be viewed as natural weakenings of theirs.

**An analogy.** There is a natural notion of decryption error for encryption schemes [Gol04, Section 5.1.2]. A perfectly consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with zero decryption error (the usual requirement). A statistically consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with negligible decryption error (a less common but still often used condition [AD97, DNR04]). However, computational consistency is a non-standard relaxation, for consistency conditions are typically not computational. This is not because one cannot define them that way (one could certainly define a computational consistency requirement for encryption) but rather because there has never been any motivation to do so. What makes PEKS different, as emerges from the results below, is that computational consistency is relevant and arises naturally.

**Consistency of \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \), revisited.** The counter-example (cf. Proposition F.3.1) showing that \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) is not perfectly consistent extends to show that it is not statistically consistent either. However, we show (cf. Theorem F.3.3) that \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) is computationally consistent. In the random-oracle model, this is not under any computational assumption: the limitation on the running time of the adversary is relevant because it limits the number of queries the adversary can make to the random oracle. When the random oracle is instantiated via a hash function, we would need to assume collision-resistance of the hash function. The implication of this result is that \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) is probably fine to use in practice, in that incorrect routing of email, while possible in principle, is unlikely to actually happen.

**A statistically consistent PEKS scheme.** We provide the first construction of a PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent. The scheme is in the random oracle model, and is also PEKS-IND-CPA secure assuming the BDH problem is hard. The motivation for the new scheme was largely theoretical. From a foundational perspective, we wanted to know whether PEKS was an anomaly in the sense that only computational consistency is possible, or whether, like other primitives, statistical consistency could be achieved. However, it is also true that while computational consistency is arguably enough in an application, statistical might be preferable because the guarantee is unconditional.

**F.1.2 PEKS and anonymous IBE**

\( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) is based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE (BF-IBE) scheme [BF03]. It is natural to ask whether one might, more generally, build PEKS schemes from IBE schemes in some blackbox way. To this end, a transform of an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme is suggested in [BDOP04].
Interestingly, they note that the property of the IBE scheme that appears necessary to provide PEKS-IND-CPA of the PEKS scheme is not the usual IBE-IND-CPA but rather anonymity. (An IBE scheme is anonymous if a ciphertext does not reveal the identity of the recipient [BBDP01].) While [BDOP04] stops short of stating and proving a formal result here, it is not hard to verify that their intuition is correct. Namely one can show that if the starting IBE scheme $\text{IBE}$ meets an appropriate formal notion of anonymity ($\text{IBE}$-$\text{ANO}$-$\text{CPA}$, cf. Section F.4.1) then $\text{PEKS} = \text{ibe-2-peks}(\text{IBE})$ is PEKS-IND-CPA, where $\text{ibe-2-peks}$ denotes the transform suggested in [BDOP04].

**Consistency in $\text{ibe-2-peks}$.** Unfortunately, we show (cf. Theorem F.4.1) that there are IBE schemes for which the PEKS scheme outputted by $\text{ibe-2-peks}$ is not even computationally consistent. This means that $\text{ibe-2-peks}$ is not in general a suitable way to turn an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme. (Although it might be in some cases, and in particular is when the starting IBE scheme is $\text{BF-IBE}$, for in that case the resulting PEKS scheme is $\text{BDOP-PEKS}$.)

**new-ibe-2-peks.** We propose a randomized variant of the $\text{ibe-2-peks}$ transform that we call $\text{new-ibe-2-peks}$, and prove that if an IBE scheme $\text{IBE}$ is IBE-ANO-CPA and IBE-IND-CPA then the PEKS scheme $\text{new-ibe-2-peks}(\text{IBE})$ is PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent (cf. Section F.4.3). We do not know of a transform where the resulting PEKS scheme is statistically or perfectly consistent.

**Anonymous IBE schemes.** The above motivates finding anonymous IBE schemes. Towards this, we begin by extending Halevi’s condition for anonymity [Hal05] to the IBE setting (cf. Section F.4.3). Based on this, we are able to give a simple proof that the (random-oracle model) $\text{BF-IBE}$ scheme [BF03] is IBE-ANO-CPA assuming the BDH problem is hard (cf. Theorem F.4.4). (We clarify that a proof of this result is implicit in the proof of security of the $\text{BF-IBE}$ based $\text{BDOP-PEKS}$ scheme given in [BDOP04]. Our contribution is to have stated the formal definition of anonymity and provided a simpler proof via the extension of Halevi’s condition.) Towards answering the question of whether there exist anonymous IBE schemes in the standard (as opposed to random oracle) model, we present in Appendix F.8.1 an attack to show that Water’s IBE scheme [Wat05] is not IBE-ANO-CPA.

**F.1.3 Extensions**

**Anonymous HIBE.** We provide definitions of anonymity for hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes. Our definition can be parameterized by a level, so that we can talk of a HIBE that is anonymous at level $l$. We note that the HIBE schemes of [GS02, BBG05] are not anonymous, even at level 1. (That of [HL02] appears to be anonymous at both levels 1 and 2 but is very limited in nature and thus turns out not to be useful for our applications.) We modify the construction of Gentry and Silverberg [GS02] to obtain a HIBE that is (HIBE-IND-CPA and) anonymous at level 1. The construction is in the random oracle model and assumes BDH is hard.

**PETKS.** In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain keyword, it can test whether this keyword was present in any past ciphertexts or future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that we call public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) that allows this. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval $[s, e]$ and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword. We provide definitions of privacy and consistency for PETKS, and then show how to implement it with overhead that is only logarithmic in the total number of time periods. Our construction can use any HIBE that is anonymous at level 1. Using the above-mentioned HIBE we get a particular instantiation that is secure in the random-oracle model if BDH is hard.
IBEKS. We define the notion of an identity-based encryption with keyword search scheme. This is just like a PEKS scheme except that encryption is performed given only the identity of the receiver and a master public-key, just like in an IBE scheme. We show how to implement IBEKS given any level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme. The first suitable implementation of the latter primitive was proposed in subsequent work by Boyen and Waters [BW06].

F.1.4 Remarks

peks-2-ibe. Boneh et. al. [BDOP04] showed how to transform a PEKS-IND-CPA PEKS scheme into an IBE-IND-CPA IBE scheme. We remark that their transform requires the starting PEKS scheme to be perfectly consistent. Unfortunately, no perfectly consistent PEKS schemes are known to date. If it is only statistically or computationally consistent, the resulting IBE scheme will only meet a corresponding statistical or computational relaxation of the consistency condition for IBE schemes. Thus, the resulting scheme will not be an IBE scheme as per the standard definition of the latter [BF03].

Limited PEKS schemes. Boneh et. al. [BDOP04] also present a couple of PEKS schemes that avoid the RO model but are what they call limited. Both use a standard public-key encryption scheme as a building block. In the first scheme, the public key has size polynomial in the number of keywords that can be used. In the second scheme, the key and ciphertext have size polynomial in the number of trapdoors that can be securely issued to the gateway. Although these schemes are not very interesting due to their limited nature, one could ask about their consistency. In [ABC+05b], we extend our definitions of consistency to this limited setting. Interestingly, we show that based on only a computational assumption about the underlying standard public-key encryption scheme (namely, that it is IND-CPA, or even just one-way), the first scheme is statistically consistent. We also show that the second scheme is computationally consistent under the same assumption on the standard public-key encryption scheme, and present a variant that is statistically consistent.

Consistency of other searchable encryption schemes. Of the other papers on searchable encryption of which we are aware [SWP00, Goh03, GSW04, WBDS04], none formally define or rigorously address the notion of consistency for their respective types of searchable encryption schemes. Goh [Goh03] and Golle, Staddon, and Waters [GSW04] define consistency conditions analogous to BDOP’s “perfect consistency” condition, but none of the constructions in [Goh03, GSW04] satisfy their respective perfect consistency condition. Song, Wagner, and Perrig [SWP00] and Waters et al. [WBDS04] do not formally state and prove consistency conditions for their respective searchable encryption schemes, but they, as well as Goh [Goh03], do acknowledge and informally bound the non-zero probability of a false positive.

Subsequent work. In a preliminary version of our work, we raised various open problems that have subsequently been solved. The first one of these problems was to find a construction of an (IBE-IND-CPA and) IBE-ANO-CPA IBE scheme with a proof of security in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles). This problem was solved independently by Gentry [Gen06] and by Boyen and Waters [BW06]. As a result, one can also obtain a PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent PEKS scheme in the standard model due to Theorem F.4.2.

Another interesting question that we raised was to find a HIBE scheme providing anonymity at the second level, even in the RO model. This open problem was solved by Boyen and Waters [BW06], who proposed a fully anonymous HIBE scheme in the standard model.

Finally, we raised the issue of building a searchable encryption scheme that allows for more advanced searching tools such as searches for simple boolean formulas on keywords (say \( w_1 \land w_2 \lor w_3 \)). First steps in this direction have been taken [GSW04, Goh03, BK7, BW07] by schemes that allow for conjunctive combinations of keywords, range queries, and subset queries.
F.2 Some definitions

Notation and conventions. If $x$ is a string then $|x|$ denotes its length, and if $S$ is a set then $|S|$ denotes its size. The empty string is denoted $\varepsilon$. Constructs in the RO model [BR93] might use multiple random oracles, but since one can always obtain these from a single one [BR93], formal definitions will assume just one RO. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. “PT” stands for polynomial time and “PTA” for polynomial-time algorithm or adversary. We denote by $\mathbb{N}$ the set of positive integers, and by $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. A function $\nu : \mathbb{N} \to [0, 1]$ is said to be negligible if for every $c \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists a $k_c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\nu(k) \leq k^{-c}$ for all $k > k_c$, and it is said to be overwhelming if the function $|1 - \nu(k)|$ is negligible. A message space $\text{MsgSp}$ is a map, assigning to every $k \in \mathbb{N}$ a set of strings, such that $\{0, 1\}^k \subseteq \text{MsgSp}(k) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and the following conditions hold: first, there is a PTA that on input $1^k, M$ returns $1$ if $M \in \text{MsgSp}(k)$ and $0$ otherwise; second, $\{0, 1\}^{|M|} \subseteq \text{MsgSp}(k)$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $M \in \text{MsgSp}(k)$.

PEKS. A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme [BDOP04] $\text{PEKS} = (\text{KG}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Td}, \text{Test})$ consists of PTAs. Via $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^k)$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter and $\text{KG}$ is the randomized key-generation algorithm, the receiver produces its keys; via $C \leftarrow \text{PEKS}^H(pk, w)$ a sender encrypts a keyword $w$ to get a ciphertext; via $t_w \leftarrow \text{Td}^H(sk, w)$ the receiver computes a trapdoor $t_w$ for keyword $w$ and provides it to the gateway; via $b \leftarrow \text{Test}^H(t_w, C)$ the gateway tests whether $C$ encrypts $w$, where $b$ is a bit with $1$ meaning “accept” or “yes” and $0$ meaning “reject” or “no”. Here $H$ is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on $k$ and $pk$.

Consistency. The requirement of [BDOP04] can be divided into two parts. The first, which we call right keyword consistency, is that $\text{Test}(t_w, C)$ always accepts when $C$ encrypts $w$. More formally, for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and all $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr \left[ \text{Test}^H(t_w, C), \text{PEKS}^H(pk, w) = 1 \right] = 1 ,$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^k)$, the random choice of $H$, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Since we will always require this, it is convenient henceforth to take it as an integral part of the PEKS notion and not mention it again, reserving the term “consistency” to only refer to what happens when the ciphertext encrypts a keyword different from the one for which the gateway is testing. In this regard, the requirement of [BDOP04], which we will call perfect consistency, is that $\text{Test}(t_w', C)$ always reject when $C$ doesn’t encrypt $w'$. More formally, for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and all distinct $w, w' \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr \left[ \text{Test}^H(t_w', C), \text{PEKS}^H(pk, w') = 1 \right] = 0 ,$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^k)$, the random choice of $H$, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. (We note that [BDOP04] provide informal rather than formal statements, but it is hard to interpret them in any way other than what we have done.)

Privacy. Privacy for a PEKS scheme [BDOP04] asks that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice, even if it is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any non-challenge keywords. Formally, we associate to an adversary $A$ and a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ the following experiment:
F.3. Consistency in PEKS

We show that the \textsc{bdop-peks} scheme is not perfectly consistent, introduce new notions of statistical and computational consistency, and show that although \textsc{bdop-peks} continues to fail the former it does meet the latter. We then provide a new PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent.

F.3.1 Perfect consistency of \textsc{bdop-peks}

Figure F.1 presents the \textsc{bdop-peks} scheme. It is based on a pairing parameter generator \( G \).

**Proposition F.3.1** The \textsc{bdop-peks} scheme is not perfectly consistent.

**Proof:** Since the number of possible keywords is infinite, there will certainly exist distinct keywords \( w, w' \in \{0,1\}^* \) such that \( H_1(w) = H_1(w') \). The trapdoors for such keywords will be the same, and so \( \text{Test}^{H_1,H_2}(\text{Td}(sk,w),\text{PEKS}^{H_1,H_2}(pk,w')) \) will always return 1. 

It is tempting to say that, since \( H_1 \) is a random oracle, the probability of a collision is small, and thus the above really does not matter. Whether or not this is true depends on how one wants to define consistency, which is the issue we explore next.
\[
\begin{align*}
KG(1^k) & \quad \text{(}\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, p, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) ; \quad P \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1^* ; \quad s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \\
pk & \leftarrow (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, p, e, P, sP) ; \quad sk \leftarrow (pk, s) \\
\text{return} \quad (pk, sk) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PEKS}^{H_1, H_2}(pk, w) & \quad \text{parse} \quad pk \quad \text{as} \quad (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, p, e, P, sP) \\
r & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* ; \quad T \leftarrow e(H_1(w), sP)^r \\
C & \leftarrow (rP, H_2(T)) ; \quad \text{return} \quad C \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Td}^{H_1}(sk, w) & \quad \text{parse} \quad sk \quad \text{as} \quad (pk = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, p, e, P, sP), s) \\
t_w & \leftarrow (pk, sH_1(w)) ; \quad \text{return} \quad t_w \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Test}^{H_1, H_2}(t_w, C) & \quad \text{parse} \quad t_w \quad \text{as} \quad ((\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, p, e, P, sP), X) \\
\text{return} \quad 1 \quad \text{if} \quad V = H_2(T) \quad \text{then return} \quad 1 \\
\text{else return} \quad 0 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure F.1: Algorithms constituting the BDOP-PEKS scheme. \( \mathcal{G} \) is a pairing parameter generator and \( H_1: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1 \) and \( H_2: \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k \) are random oracles.

**F.3.2 New notions of consistency**

We consider a possible relaxation of perfect consistency and argue that it is inadequate because it is too weak. We then motivate and present our approach and definitions.

A possible relaxation of perfect consistency. One way to obtain a relaxed definition of perfect consistency is by analogy with the definition of encryption with negligible decryption error \[ [Gol04, \text{Section 5.1.2}] \]. This results in asking that there exist a negligible function \( \nu(\cdot) \) such that for all \( k \) and all distinct keywords \( w, w' \),

\[
\forall w \neq w' : \quad \text{Pr} \left[ \text{Test}^H(pk, \text{Td}^H(sk, w'), \text{PEKS}^H(pk, w)) = 1 \right] \leq \nu(k), \quad (F.1)
\]

where the probability is taken over the choice of \( (pk, sk) \leftarrow KG(1^k) \), the random choice of \( H \), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Now, since we are fixing \( w, w' \) before taking the probability, and the latter includes the choice of \( H_1 \) in the BDOP scheme, the probability that \( H_1(w) = H_1(w') \) is at most \( 2^{-k} \). Our “attack” of Proposition \[ F.3.1 \] therefore no longer applies. And in fact (using the techniques of our proof of Theorem \[ F.3.3 \]) one can show that the BDOP scheme does meet the above condition. However, Equation \[ F.1 \] is in our view an incorrect definition of consistency because it does not allow \( w, w' \) to depend on public quantities related to the receiver, such as its public key, the hash functions being used, or queries to them if they are random oracles. Our claim is that, as a result, the condition is too weak to guarantee that email is correctly routed by the gateway.

Our definitions. To define consistency, we take a different approach. Namely, we imagine the existence of an adversary \( \mathcal{U} \) that wants to make consistency fail. More precisely, let \( \text{PEKS} = (KG, \text{PEKS}, \text{Td}, \text{Test}) \) be a PEKS scheme. We associate to an adversary \( \mathcal{U} \) the following experiment:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Experiment} \quad & \text{Exp}_{\text{peks-consist}}^{\text{PEKS}, \mathcal{U}}(k) \\
& (pk, sk) \leftarrow KG(1^k) ; \quad \text{pick random oracle} \quad H \\
& (w, w') \leftarrow \mathcal{U}^H(pk) ; \quad C \leftarrow \text{PEKS}^H(pk, w) ; \quad t_w \leftarrow \text{Td}^H(sk, w') \\
& \text{if} \quad w \neq w' \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Test}^H(t_w, C) = 1 \quad \text{then return} \quad 1 \quad \text{else return} \quad 0
\end{align*}
\]

We define the advantage of \( \mathcal{U} \) as

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{peks-consist}}^{\text{PEKS}, \mathcal{U}}(k) = \text{Pr} \left[ \text{Exp}_{\text{peks-consist}}^{\text{PEKS}, \mathcal{U}}(k) = 1 \right],
\]

where the probability is taken over all possible coin flips of all the algorithms involved, and over all possible choices of random oracle \( H \). The scheme is said to be *perfectly consistent* if this advantage is 0 for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries \( \mathcal{U} \), *statistically consistent* if it is negligible for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries \( \mathcal{U} \), and *computationally consistent* if it is negligible for all (statistically unrestricted) adversaries \( \mathcal{U} \).
if it is negligible for all PTAs $U$. We remark that we have purposely re-used the term perfect consistency, for in fact the above notion of perfect consistency coincides with the one from [BDOP04] recalled above.

**Stronger notions?** In giving the adversary $U$ the public key and access to the random oracle, our definition is already quite liberal. One could however, consider an even more liberal (i.e. stronger) definition in which the adversary gets a trapdoor oracle and/or a test oracle under trapdoors for keywords of its choice. To be able to tell whether or not this would be appropriate, we must ask whether in “real-life” there could be an occasion in which the keywords chosen by a sender could depend on information provided by these oracles. Given that the answer is not cut-and-dry and since we believe that our current definition is already quite strong, we opted here not to consider these stronger variants of our definition.

### F.3.3 Statistical and computational consistency of $\texttt{BDOP-PEKS}$

Having formally defined the statistical and computational consistency requirements for PEKS schemes, we return to evaluating the consistency of $\texttt{BDOP-PEKS}$. We first observe that Proposition [F.3.1] extends to show:

**Proposition F.3.2** The $\texttt{BDOP-PEKS}$ scheme is not statistically consistent.

**Proof:** Recall that in the proof of Proposition [F.3.1] we show that there exist two distinct keywords $w, w' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $H_1(w) = H_1(w')$, and that, for these two keywords, $	ext{Test}(\text{TD}(sk, w'), \text{PEKS}(pk, w))$ will always return 1. A computationally unbounded adversary can find two such keywords by exhaustive search.

On the positive side, the following means that $\texttt{BDOP-PEKS}$ is probably fine in practice:

**Theorem F.3.3** The $\texttt{BDOP-PEKS}$ scheme is computationally consistent.

**Proof:** Let $U$ be a PTA. Let $(w, w')$ denote the pair of keywords that $U$ returns in the consistency experiment, and assume without loss of generality that $w \neq w'$. Let $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ denote the value chosen at random by $\text{PEKS}^{H_1, H_2}(pk, w)$. Let $T = e(H_1(w), sP)^r$ and let $T' = e(H_1(w'), sP)^r$. Note that $U$ wins exactly when $w \neq w'$ and $H_2(T) = H_2(T')$. Let $w_1, \ldots, w_{\ell}$ be the queries of $U$ to $H_1$ and let $WSet = \{w_1, \ldots, w_{\ell}(k)\} \cup \{w, w'\}$. Let $T_1, \ldots, T_{\ell}(k)$ be the queries of $U$ to $H_2$ and let $TSet = \{T_1, \ldots, T_{\ell}(k)\} \cup \{T, T'\}$. Let $E_1$ be the event that there exist distinct $w, w' \in WSet$ such that $H_1(w) = H_1(w')$, and let $E_2$ be the event that there exist distinct $x, x' \in TSet$ such that $H_2(x) = H_2(x')$. If $\Pr[\cdot]$ denotes the probability in the consistency experiment, then

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{BDOP-PEKS}}^{\text{consist}}(k) \leq \Pr[E_1] + \Pr[E_2] + \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{BDOP-PEKS}}^{\text{consist}}(k) = 1 \land E_1 \land E_2]. \quad (F.2)$$

Our definition of $G$ required that $|G_1| > 2^k$, and hence the first and second terms are respectively upper bounded via $(q_1 + 2)^2/|G_1| < (q_1 + 2)^2/2^k$ and $(q_2 + 2)^2/2^k$. Now we claim that if $H_1(w) \neq H_1(w')$, then $T \neq T'$. Under this claim, the last term of Equation (F.2) is 0, since if $E_1$ occurs, then $H_1(w) \neq H_1(w')$ and $T \neq T'$, and if $E_2$ also occurs, then $H_2(T) \neq H_2(T')$. To justify our claim above, note that if $H_1(w) \neq H_1(w')$, then $H_1(w) = \alpha P$ and $H_1(w') = \alpha' P$ for some distinct $\alpha, \alpha' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Setting $g = e(P, P)^{\alpha'}$, we can rewrite $T, T'$ as $T = g^\alpha$ and $T' = g^{\alpha'}$. Since $e(P, P)$ is a generator of $G_2$, since $G_2$ is of prime order $p$, and since $p$ does not divide $rs$, $g$ must also be a generator of $G_2$. Thus $T \neq T'$.

### F.3.4 A statistically consistent PEKS scheme

We present the first PEKS scheme that is (PEKS-IND-CPA and) statistically consistent. To define the scheme, we first introduce the function $f(k) = k_{\text{sec}}(k)$. (Any function that is super-
a keyword in order to query it to its challenge oracle. (This is where we use the fact that the problem is hard relative to generator \( \mathcal{G} \).

Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. While sending \( w \) in the clear looks at first glance like it violates privacy, the reason it does not is that this only happens when \( w \) has length at least \( f(k) \), and the privacy adversary is poly \( (k) \) time and thus cannot even write down such a keyword in order to query it to its challenge oracle. (This is where we use the fact that \( f(k) \) is super-polynomial. We will use the fact that it is sub-exponential in the proof of statistical consistency.) The privacy adversary is thus effectively restricted to attacking the scheme only on keywords of size at most \( f(k) \). Here, privacy can be reduced to solving the BDH problem using techniques used to prove IBE-IND-CPA of the \( \mathcal{G} \)-IBE scheme \([BF03]\) and to prove anonymity of the same scheme (cf. Theorem \[F.4.4\]).

**Proposition F.3.4** The \( \mathcal{G} \)-SE scheme is PEKS-IND-CPA-secure assuming that the BDH problem is hard relative to generator \( \mathcal{G} \).

Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. While sending \( w \) in the clear looks at first glance like it violates privacy, the reason it does not is that this only happens when \( w \) has length at least \( f(k) \), and the privacy adversary is poly \( (k) \) time and thus cannot even write down such a keyword in order to query it to its challenge oracle. (This is where we use the fact that \( f(k) \) is super-polynomial. We will use the fact that it is sub-exponential in the proof of statistical consistency.) The privacy adversary is thus effectively restricted to attacking the scheme only on keywords of size at most \( f(k) \). Here, privacy can be reduced to solving the BDH problem using techniques used to prove IBE-IND-CPA of the \( \mathcal{G} \)-IBE scheme \([BF03]\) and to prove anonymity of the same scheme (cf. Theorem \[F.4.4\]).

**Proof of Proposition F.3.4** Let \( B \) be a PTA attacking the PEKS-IND-CPA security \( \mathcal{G} \)-SE = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test). Say it makes at most \( q \) queries to its \( \text{Trap}_d(\cdot, \cdot) \) oracle and at most \( q_1 \) queries to \( H_i \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \). (These are actually functions of \( k \), but we drop the argument to simplify notation.) We construct a PTA \( A \) attacking the BDH relative to \( \mathcal{G} \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{G}, A}^{\text{bdh}}(k) \geq \frac{1}{e(1 + q)} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{G} \text{-SE}, B}^{\text{peks-IND-CPA}}(k) - \frac{q_3}{2^k} \right).
\]

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---

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Our adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) is shown in Figure F.3. We show that \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs the correct answer \( T = e(P, P)^r \) with probability at least the quantity on the right-hand-side of Equation F.3.

Let \( t(k) \) be a polynomial which bounds the running time of \( \mathcal{B} \). So there is an integer \( N \) such that \( t(k) < f(k) \) for all \( k \geq N \). Notice that the PEKS algorithm of the PEKS scheme in Figure F.2 returns \( w \) in the clear when \( |w| \geq f(k) \). However, the keywords output by \( \mathcal{B} \) in the \texttt{find} stage have length at most \( t(k) \), so if \( k \geq N \), the encryption is done by the code for the case \( |w| < f(k) \) shown in PEKS. Since it suffices to prove Equation (F.3) for all \( k \geq N \), we assume that the encryption is done by the code for the case \( |w| < f(k) \) shown in PEKS.

Let \( \Pr \{ \cdot \} \) denote the probability over the experiment for \( \text{Adv}_{G_A,B}^{\text{bdh}} \) as defined in Section F.2. Let \( E_1 \) denote the event in this experiment that \( \mathcal{A} \) aborts in simulating the trapdoor oracle. Let \( E_2 \) denote the event that \( d[u_b] = 0 \) (which also causes \( \mathcal{A} \) to abort). Let \( E_3 \) denote the event that \( Q = \emptyset \) (which also causes \( \mathcal{A} \) to abort). Let \( E_4 \) denote the event that \( \mathcal{B} \) issues a query \( H_2(e(rP, sH_1(u_b))) \) or \( H_4(e(rP, sH_1(u_b))) \). Let \( \Pr_2 \{ \cdot \} \) denote the probability over \( \text{Exp}_{\text{peks-ind-cpa-b}} \) for a random choice for \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), and let \( b' \) denote the output of \( \mathcal{B} \) in this experiment. Let \( E_5 \) be the event that \( \mathcal{B} \) issues a query \( H_2(e(rP, sH_1(u_b))) \) or \( H_4(e(rP, sH_1(u_b))) \) to its oracles in this experiment. Let \( E_6 \) denote the event that \( \mathcal{B} \) issues a query \( K||y_b \) to its oracle \( H_3 \), where \( K \) is the random \( k \)-bit string that \( \text{Exp}_{\text{peks-ind-cpa-b}} \) used in PEKS when replying \( \mathcal{B} \)'s challenge after the \texttt{find} stage. Equation (F.3) follows from the following claims.

\[ \text{Claim 1. } \text{Adv}_{G_A,B}^{\text{bdh}}(k) \geq \Pr_1 \{ \neg E_1 \land \neg E_2 \land \neg E_3 \land E_4 \} / (q_2 + q_4). \]

In the above simulation if none of the events \( E_1, E_2 \) and \( E_3 \) happens, then \( \mathcal{A} \) will randomly choose an element \( T \sim Q \) and return \( T^{x[w_b]} \). However, by definition of event \( E_4 \), one of the
elements in $Q$ is equal to $\epsilon(P, P)^{srato[u]}$, thus $A$ has at least the probability of $1/|Q| \geq 1/(q_2+q_4)$
to give the correct answer to the BDH problem. □

Claim 2. $\Pr[-E_1 \land -E_2 \land -E_3 \land E_4] = \Pr[E_4|E_1 \land -E_2] \cdot \Pr[-E_1 \land -E_2]$. 

Notice that when event $E_4$ happens, the set $Q$ must contain at least one element, thus $E_3$ is always false. Therefore we have $\Pr_1 [-E_1 \land -E_2 \land -E_3 \land E_4] = \Pr_1 [-E_1 \land -E_2 \land E_4]$. The claim follows by conditioning off of the event $-E_1 \land -E_2$. □

Claim 3. $\Pr_1 [E_4 | -E_1 \land -E_2] = \Pr_2 [E_5]$. 

Under the condition that $A$ does not abort, the simulation is perfect, i.e. all $A$’s answers to the simulated oracles $\text{TRAPD}(sk, \cdot), H_1(\cdot) \ldots H_4(\cdot)$ have exactly the same distribution as those in the real PEKS-IND-CPA experiment. □

Claim 4. $\Pr_2 [E_5] \geq 1/2 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{peks-ind-\text{cpa}}}_{peks,B}(k) - q_3 \cdot 2^{-k}$. 

First observe that

$$
\Pr_2 [b = b'] = \Pr_2 [b = b' \land E_5] + \Pr_2 [b = b' \land -E_5 \land E_6] + \Pr_2 [b = b' \land -E_5 \land -E_6] \\
\leq \Pr_2 [E_5] + \Pr_2 [E_6] + \Pr_2 [b = b' | -E_5 \land -E_6] \cdot \Pr_2 [-E_5 \land -E_6] \\
\leq \Pr_2 [E_5] + q_3 \cdot 2^{-k} + \Pr_2 [b = b' | -E_5 \land -E_6] \cdot \Pr_2 [-E_5 \land -E_6] \quad (F.4) \\
\leq \Pr_2 [E_5] + q_3 \cdot 2^{-k} + 1/2 . \quad (F.5)
$$

Equation (F.4) comes from the fact that, by assumption, $B$ makes at most $q_3$ queries to $H_3$. Equation (F.5) comes from the fact that, if $E_5$ and $E_6$ both do not occur, $B$ learns no information from the ciphertext. Rearranging gives

$$
\Pr_2 [E_5] \geq \Pr_2 [b = b'] - 1/2 - q_3 \cdot 2^{-k} = 1/2 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{peks-ind-\text{cpa}}}_{peks,B}(k) - q_3 \cdot 2^{-k} .
$$

The last equality follows from the standard result that $\text{Adv}^{\text{peks-ind-\text{cpa}}}_{peks,B}(k) = 2 \cdot \Pr_2 [b = b'] - 1$. □

Claim 5. $\Pr[-E_1 \land -E_2] \geq 1/(\epsilon(q+1))$ for $\delta = 1/(q+1)$. 

Since for every keyword $w$ the biased coin $d[w]$ is flipped independently, and $\Pr[d[w] = 1] = \delta$ for all $w$, let $Q_T$ be the set of queries issued by $B$ to the $\text{TRAPD}(sk, \cdot)$ oracle, then

$$
\Pr[-E_1 \land -E_2] = \delta \cdot \prod_{w \in Q_T} (1 - \delta) = \delta \cdot (1 - \delta)^{|Q_T|} \geq \delta \cdot (1 - \delta)^q .
$$

The last quantity is maximized at $\delta = 1/(q+1)$ with value at least $1/\epsilon(q+1)$. □

Let us move to the more interesting claim, namely consistency:

**Proposition F.3.5** The $\text{peks-stat}$ scheme is statistically consistent.

Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. The main issue is that the computationally unbounded consistency adversary $U$ can easily find any collisions that exist for the random-oracle hash functions. Let $w, w'$ denote the keywords output by the adversary $U$. We proceed via a case analysis. One can show that if either $w$ or $w'$ have length at least $f(k)$ then $\text{Test}$ will not be wrong. The interesting case is when $w, w'$ both have length at most $f(k)$. Let $(rP, c, t, K_2)$ denote the challenge ciphertext formed by encrypting $w$. Let $T = e(rP, H_1(w))$ and let $K = c \oplus H_4(T)$ be the underlying session key. Let $T' = e(rP, H_1(w'))$ and let $K' = c \oplus H_4(T')$. Now consider two cases.

The first case is that $H_1(w) \neq H_1(w')$. Properties of pairings imply $T \neq T'$. Now we claim that this means $K_2 = H_2(T) \neq H_2(T')$ with high probability, and thus $\text{Test}$ will correctly reject,
meaning $U$ does not win. This is not merely because $H_2$ is random, for remember the adversary is not computationally bounded and can search for, and find, any collisions that exist. The reason is that $H_2$ is with high probability an injective function and collisions for it simply do not exist. The reason for this is that its domain is $\mathbb{G}_2$ which has size $p < 2^{k+1}$ (our definition of a pairing parameter generator required this) but $H_2$ outputs $3k$ bits, and thus a union bound can be used to show that $H_2$ is injective except with probability $4 \cdot 2^{-k}$.

The second case, which is the harder one, is that $H_1(w) = H_1(w')$ (again, we cannot prevent $U$ from finding collisions in $H_1$), and this is where we will use the fact that $f(k)$ is sub-exponential.

Here the idea is that at the time it chooses $w$, $w'$, adversary $U$ does not know the value of the session key $K$ that is randomly chosen later. We divide pairs $(V, V')$ of strings of length at most $f(k)$ (candidate keywords) into two classes. A pair is heavy if there are “lots” of session keys $L$ such that $H_3(L || V) = H_3(L || V')$, and light otherwise, where “lots” is defined as $2^{k/2}$. Now we again consider two cases. If $(w, w')$ is light then the randomly chosen $K$ has only a $2^{-k/2}$ chance of being a session key for which $H_3(K || w) = H_3(K || w')$ and thus $Test$ will most likely reject, so $U$ does not win. Next we use an occupancy problem based counting argument to show that the probability (over $H_3$) that a particular pair $(V, V')$ of keywords is heavy is double exponentially small in $k$. But the number of choices of keyword pairs is $2^{O(f(k))}$ which is sub-double-exponentially small by choice of $f(k)$, and thus a union bound allows us to conclude that $(w, w')$ is not likely to be heavy.

**Proof of Proposition F.3.5**: Let $U$ be a computationally unbounded adversary algorithm. We show that there is a constant $c > 0$ such that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{PEKS}, U}^\text{consist}(k) \leq O(2^{-ck}).
$$

Consider the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{PEKS}, U}^\text{consist}(k)$. Let $w, w'$ denote the keywords output by $U$ and assume they are distinct, since otherwise $U$ does not win. Let $Win$ be the event that the experiment outputs 1. Let $r, K$ be the random choices made by $\text{PEKS}^{H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4}(pk, w)$ in the experiment. Then we let

- $T = e(rP, sH_1(w))$
- $c = K \oplus H_4(T)$
- $K_2 = H_2(T)$
- $t = H_3(K || w)$
- $T' = e(rP, sH_1(w'))$
- $c' = c \oplus H_4(T')$
- $K'_2 = H_2(T')$
- $t' = H_3(K' || w')$.

The random choices of $H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, r$ and $K$ determine all these random variables. Let $\text{BAD}$ be the event that $\text{Test}(t', (C, c, t, K_2)) = 1$. Let $\text{BIG}$ be the event that either $w$ or $w'$ has length greater than or equal to $f(k)$. Then

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{PEKS}, U}^\text{consist}(k) = \Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \Pr[\text{BAD} \land \text{BIG}] + \Pr[\text{BAD} \land \lnot \text{BIG}].
$$

Suppose $\text{BIG}$ holds. If $|w| \geq f(k)$ then $\text{Test}(t', C)$ will return 1 only if $C = w'$. But this will not be the case because either $|w| \geq f(k)$ and $C = w \neq w'$, or $|w| < f(k)$ and, for large enough $k$, $|C| < f(k) \leq |w'|$. On the other hand if $|w| \geq f(k)$ and $|w'| < f(k)$ then $C = w$ and the latter cannot be parsed as an appropriate 4-tuple $(rP, c, t, K_2)$, so $\text{Test}$ will return 0. We conclude that $\Pr[\text{BAD} \land \lnot \text{BIG}] = 0$ for all large enough $k$. We now want to bound

$$
\Pr[\text{BAD} \land \lnot \text{BIG}] = \Pr[\text{BAD} \land \lnot \text{BIG} \land H_1(w) \neq H_1(w')] + \Pr[\text{BAD} \land \lnot \text{BIG} \land H_1(w) = H_1(w')].
$$

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We bound \( p_1, p_2 \) in turn. We let \( S \) be the set of all distinct pairs \((g,g')\) of elements in \( \mathbb{G}_1 \). So \( p_1 \) is at most the sum, over all \((g,g') \in S\), of the product terms
\[
\Pr \left[ H_2(e(rP, g)) = H_2(e(rP, g')) \mid (H_1(w), H_1(w')) = (g, g') \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ (H_1(w), H_1(w')) = (g, g') \right].
\]
Properties of pairings tell us that \( g \neq g' \) implies \( e(rP, g) \neq e(rP, g') \). So due to the randomness of \( H_2 \), the first term of each product above is \( 2^{-3k} \). However, there are at most \( p_2^2 \) choices for the pair \((g,g')\), and we know that \( p < 2^{k+1} \). Thus we have
\[
p_1 \leq p^2 \cdot 2^{-3k} \leq 2^{k+2-3k} = 4 \cdot 2^{-k}.
\]
(As we discussed above, the intuition here is that with probability at least \( 1 - 4 \cdot 2^{-k} \) the function \( H_2 \) is injective.) We now proceed to bound \( p_2 \). In this argument, we regard \( H_1 \) as fixed. (Formally, imagine that we condition on a particular choice of \( H_1 \). This suffices since what follows holds for all values of this choice.) Let \( U \) be the set of all pairs \((V,V')\) of distinct keywords of length at most \( f(k) \) each such that \( H_1(V) = H_1(V') \). For any \((V,V') \in U\) we let
\[
\text{Keys}(V,V') = \{ A \in \{0,1\}^k : H_3(A \| V) = H_3(A \| V') \}.
\]
We say that \((V,V')\) is heavy if \( |\text{Keys}(V,V')| \geq 2^{k/2} \), and light otherwise. We let \( \text{Lt}(V,V') \) denote the event that \((V,V')\) is light and \( \text{Hw}(V,V') \) the event that \((V,V')\) is heavy, where the probability is over the choice of \( H_3 \) only. Then \( p_2 \leq p_L + p_H \) where
\[
p_L = \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ \text{BAD} \land (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Lt}(V,V') \right]
\]
\[
p_H = \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ \text{BAD} \land (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Hw}(V,V') \right] .
\]
We bound these in turn. We have
\[
p_L = \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ \text{BAD} \mid (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Lt}(V,V') \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Lt}(V,V') \right]
\]
\[
\leq \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \frac{2^{k/2}}{2^k} \cdot \Pr \left[ (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Lt}(V,V') \right] \quad \text{(F.6)}
\]
\[
= 2^{-k/2} \cdot \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Lt}(V,V') \right]
\]
\[
\leq 2^{-k/2} .
\]
Equation (F.6) is justified by the definition of the \text{Test}, the fact that \( K \) is chosen at random from \( \{0,1\}^k \) and the fact that \((V,V')\) is light. Now we turn to bounding \( p_H \).

\textbf{CLAIM.} For any \((V,V') \in U\),
\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Hw}(V,V') \right] \leq O(2^{-2k/2}) ,
\]
where the probability is only over the choice of \( H_3 \).

Note the bound of the claim is double-exponentially small. We prove the claim later. Using it we can conclude via the union bound:
\[
p_H = \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ \text{BAD} \land (w, w') = (V,V') \land \text{Hw}(V,V') \right]
\]
\[
\leq \sum_{(V,V') \in U} \Pr \left[ \text{Hw}(V,V') \right] \leq 2^{2+2f(k)} \cdot O(2^{-2k/2}) \leq O(2^{-g(k)}) ,
\]

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where \( g(k) = 2^{k/2} - 2 - 2f(k) = \Omega(2^{k/2}) \). So certainly \( 2^{-g(k)} \) is \( O(2^{-k}) \).

**Proof of Claim.** We use an occupancy problem approach:

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Hw}(V, V') \right] = \sum_{i=2^{k/2}}^{2^k} \left( \begin{array}{c} 2^k \\ i \end{array} \right) \cdot (2^{-k})^i \cdot (1 - 2^{-k})^{2^k - i} \leq \sum_{i=2^{k/2}}^{2^k} \left( \begin{array}{c} 2^k \\ i \end{array} \right) \cdot (2^{-k})^i \\
\leq \sum_{i=2^{k/2}}^{2^k} \left( \frac{2^k \cdot e}{i} \right)^i \cdot (2^{-k})^i \leq \sum_{i=2^{k/2}}^{\infty} \left( \frac{e}{i} \right)^i .
\]

Let \( x = e^{2^{-k/2}} \). For \( k \geq 6 \), we have \( x \leq 1/2 \). So the above is at most

\[
\sum_{i=2^{k/2}}^{\infty} x^i = x^{2^{k/2}} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} x^i = x^{2^{k/2}} \cdot \frac{1}{1 - x} \leq \frac{2}{2^{2^{k/2}}} ,
\]

as desired. \( \square \)

### F.4 PEKS and anonymous IBE

We formally define anonymity of IBE schemes and investigate the relation between PEKS and anonymous IBE.

#### F.4.1 Definitions

**IBE Schemes.** An *identity-based encryption* (IBE) scheme [Sha85, BF03] \( \mathcal{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) consists of four PTAs. Via \((pk, msk) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^k)\) the master generates master keys for security parameter \( k \in \mathbb{N} \); via \((usk[id]) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}^h(\text{msk}, \text{id})\) the master computes the secret key for identity \( \text{id} \); via \((pk, msk, \text{id}) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{Enc}^h(\text{pk}, \text{id}, \text{M})\) a sender encryps a message \( M \) to identity \( \text{id} \) to get a ciphertext; via \( M \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Dec}^h(\text{usk}, \text{C}) \) the possessor of secret key \( \text{usk} \) decrypts ciphertext \( C \) to get back a message. Here \( H \) is a random oracle with domain and range possibly depending on \( k \) and \( pk \). Associated to the scheme is a message space \( \text{MsgSp} \) obeying the conventions discussed in Section F.2. For consistency, we require that for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), all identities \( \text{id} \) and messages \( M \in \text{MsgSp}(k) \) we have \( \Pr[\text{Dec}^h(\text{KeyDer}^h(\text{msk}, \text{id}), \text{Enc}^h(\text{pk}, \text{id}, \text{M}))) = \text{M}] = 1 \), where the probability is taken over the choice of \((pk, msk) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^k)\), the random choice of \( H \), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.

**Privacy and Anonymity.** Privacy (IBE-IND-CPA) follows [BF03] while anonymity (IBE-ANO-CPA) is a straightforward adaptation of [BBDP01] to IBE schemes. Let \( \mathcal{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) be an IBE scheme with associated message space \( \text{MsgSp} \). To an adversary \( A \) and bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), we associate the following experiments:

**Experiment** \( \text{Exp}^\text{ibe-ano-plied-cpa-b}(n, \mathcal{IBE}_{A,B}) \)

\begin{itemize}
  \item Pick random oracle \( H \)
  \item \((id_0, M_0, \text{state}) \xrightarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}(\text{msk}, \text{id}, \text{M})\)
  \item if \( \{M_0, M_1\} \not\subseteq \text{MsgSp}(k) \) then return 0
  \item \( C \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}^H(\text{pk}, \text{id}, \text{M})\)
  \item \( C \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}^h(\text{msk}, \text{id}, \text{M})\)
  \item if \( b \in \text{MsgSp} \) then return 0
  \item if \( \{id_0, id_1\} \cap \text{MsgSp} = \emptyset \) then return 0
\end{itemize}
where the oracle KeyDer(id) is defined as

\[ IDSet \leftarrow IDSet \cup \{id\}; \ usk[id] \leftarrow KeyDer^H(msk, id); \ Return \ usk[id] \]

For prop ∈ \{ind, ano\}, we define the advantage of A in the corresponding experiment as

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{prop-cpa}, A}(k) = \text{Pr}\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{prop-cpa}, A}^1(k) = 1\right] - \text{Pr}\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{prop-cpa}, A}^0(k) = 1\right]. \]

IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} \) is said to be IBE-IND-CPA-secure (resp., IBE-ANO-CPA-secure) if the respective advantage function is negligible for all PTAs A.

### F.4.2 The ibe-2-peks transform

The ibe-2-peks transform suggested in [BDOP04] takes input an IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) and returns a PEKS scheme \( \text{PEKS} = (\text{KG}, \text{Td}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Test}) \) as follows. The public key \( pk \) and secret key \( sk \) of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme (i.e., \( \text{KG} = \text{Setup} \)). The trapdoor \( t_w \) associated to keyword \( w \) is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity \( w \) (i.e., \( \text{Td}(sk, w) = \text{KeyDer}(sk, w) \)). A keyword \( w \) is PEKS-encrypted by IBE-encrypting the message \( 0^k \) for the identity \( w \) (i.e., \( \text{PEKS}(pk, w) = \text{Enc}(pk, w, 0^k) \)). Finally, testing is done by checking that the ciphertext decrypts to \( 0^k \) (i.e., \( \text{Test}(t_w, C) \) returns 1 iff \( \text{Dec}(t_w, C) = 0^k \).

We know that \( \text{BF-IBE} \) is anonymous (Theorem F.4.4), that \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} = \text{ibe-2-peks(BF-IBE)} \), and that \( \text{BDOP-PEKS} \) is not statistically consistent (Proposition F.3.2). Thus, we can conclude that the ibe-2-peks transform does not necessarily yield a statistically consistent PEKS scheme. Unfortunately, as the following theorem shows, the ibe-2-peks transform does not necessarily yield a computationally consistent PEKS scheme either (under the minimal assumption of the existence of some IBE-IND-CPA- and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme). As a result, ibe-2-peks is not in general a suitable way to obtain a PEKS scheme.

**Theorem F.4.1** Assume there exist IBE-ANO-CPA-secure and IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE schemes. Then there exists an IBE-ANO-CPA-secure and IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} \) such that the PEKS scheme \( \text{PEKS} \) derived from \( \text{IBE} \) via ibe-2-peks is not computationally consistent.

**Proof of s:** The proof of Theorem F.4.1 is quite simple and its details are omitted here. Instead, we only provide the general intuition behind it. In order to show that ibe-2-peks does not necessarily yield a computationally consistent PEKS scheme, we first assume the existence of a IBE-IND-CPA- and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setup ((1^k))</th>
<th>Enc ((pk, id, M))</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((pk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^k))</td>
<td>parse ( pk ) as ((pk, R))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R \leftarrow {0, 1}^k)</td>
<td>(C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, id, M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pk \leftarrow (pk, R); \ msk \leftarrow (msk, R))</td>
<td>return ( C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ((pk, msk))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{KeyDer}(msk, id) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parse ( msk ) as ((msk, R))</th>
<th>(\text{Dec}(usk, C))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(usk \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(msk, id))</td>
<td>parse ( usk ) as ((usk, R))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(usk \leftarrow (usk, R))</td>
<td>(X \leftarrow \text{Dec}(usk, C))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ( usk)</td>
<td>if ( R' = R ) then return ( M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>else return ( 0^k)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F.4: IBE scheme for proof of Theorem F.4.1.
then build an IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) as shown in Figure F.4. It is easy to see that the IBE-IND-CPA- and IBE-ANO-CPA-security of \( \text{IBE} \) follows from simple reductions from the security of \( \text{IBE} \). Now, let \( \text{PEKS} \) denote the PEKS scheme outputted by \( \text{ibe-2-peks} \) on input \( \text{IBE} \). Clearly, \( \text{PEKS} \) is not computationally consistent as its test algorithm outputs 1 with overwhelming probability, when given the trapdoor for the wrong keyword. The only case in which it outputs 0 when given the wrong trapdoor is when the last \( k \) bits of the decryption of the ciphertext \( C \) with the wrong trapdoor matches the random value \( R \) in the public key \( \overline{pk} \), but this only happens with negligible probability due to the IBE-IND-CPA security of the IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} \).

### F.4.3 The new-ibe-2-peks transform

The negative result in Theorem F.4.1 raises the question: Does the existence of IBE schemes imply the existence of computationally consistent PEKS schemes? We answer that in the affirmative by presenting a revision of the \( \text{ibe-2-peks} \) transform, called \( \text{new-ibe-2-peks} \), that transforms any IBE-IND-CPA- and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme into a PEKS-IND-CPA-secure and computationally consistent PEKS scheme. It is similar to \( \text{ibe-2-peks} \) except that instead of always using \( 0^k \) as the message encrypted, the PEKS-encryption algorithm chooses and encrypts a random message \( R \) and appends \( R \) in the clear to the ciphertext. In more detail, the \( \text{new-ibe-2-peks} \) transform takes input an IBE scheme \( \text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) and returns a PEKS scheme \( \text{PEKS} = (\text{KG}, \text{Td}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Test}) \) as follows. The public key \( pk \) and secret key \( sk \) of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme. (I.e. KG = Setup.) The trapdoor associated to keyword \( w \) is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity \( w \). (I.e. \( \text{Td}(sk, w) = \text{KeyDer}(sk, w) \).) PEKS-encryption of keyword \( w \) is done as follows: PEKS(\( pk, w \)) picks \( R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k \), lets \( C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, w, R) \), and returns \((C, R)\) as the ciphertext. Finally, \( \text{Test}(t_w, (C, R)) \) returns 1 iff \( \text{Dec}(t_w, C) = R \).

Intuitively, this construction avoids the problem of oddly-behaving \( \text{Dec} \) algorithms by making sure that the only way to ruin the consistency of the PEKS scheme is by correctly guessing the value encrypted by a ciphertext, using the secret key of a different identity, which should not be possible for an IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme. Hence, the consistency of the resulting PEKS scheme is due to the data privacy property of the IBE scheme, while the data privacy property of the PEKS scheme comes from the anonymity of the IBE scheme. The formal result statement and proof follow.

**Theorem F.4.2** Let \( \text{IBE} \) be an IBE scheme and let \( \text{PEKS} \) be the PEKS scheme derived from \( \text{IBE} \) via \( \text{new-ibe-2-peks} \). If \( \text{IBE} \) is IBE-IND-CPA-secure, then \( \text{PEKS} \) is computationally consistent. Further, if \( \text{IBE} \) is IBE-ANO-CPA-secure, then \( \text{PEKS} \) is PEKS-IND-CPA-secure.

**Proof:** Let \( \mathcal{U} \) be any PTA attacking the computational consistency of \( \text{PEKS} \), and consider the following PTA \( \mathcal{A} \) attacking the IBE-IND-CPA-security of \( \text{IBE} \). In its find stage, given master public key \( pk \), adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) runs \( \mathcal{U}(pk) \) to get keywords \( w, w' \). It returns \( w \) as the challenge identity and \( R_0, R_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k \) as the challenge messages. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext \( C \) (that encrypts \( R_b \) under identity \( w \) for challenge bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \)), \( \mathcal{A} \) uses its key-derivation oracle to obtain a trapdoor \( t_w' \) for \( w' \). If \( \text{Dec}(t_w', C) = R_1 \) then it returns 1 else it returns 0. It is easy to see that

\[
\Pr\left[ \text{Exp}_{\text{IBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ibe-2-peks-consist}}(k) = 1 \right] \geq \Pr\left[ \text{Exp}_{\text{IBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ibe-2-peks-1}}(k) = 1 \right] \leq 2^{-k}.
\]

Thus \( \text{Adv}_{\text{IBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ibe-2-peks-consist}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ibe-2-peks-1}}(k) + 2^{-k} \), proving the first claim of the theorem.
Let $B$ be any PTA attacking the PEKS-IND-CPA-security of $\aleph$, and consider the following PTA $A$ attacking the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of $\aleph$. In its find stage, given master public key $pk$, adversary $A$ runs $B$(find, $pk$) to get challenge keywords $w_0, w_1$, which it returns along with a message $R \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k$. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext $C$ (that encrypts $R$ under identity $w_0$ for challenge bit $b \in \{0,1\}$), $A$ runs $B$, in its guess stage, with challenge ciphertext $(C, R)$, to get its guess bit $b'$, which $A$ returns. In both stages, $A$ answers any trapdoor-oracle queries of $B$ via its key-derivation oracle. It is easy to see that for $b = 0, 1$,

$$\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-cpa-b}}(b) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ \text{Exp}_{\aleph, B}^{\text{peks-IND-CPA-b}}(b) = 1 \right].$$

Thus $\text{Adv}_{\aleph, B}^{\text{peks-IND-CPA}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-cpa}}(k)$, proving the second claim of the theorem.

### F.4.4 A sufficient condition for anonymity

Halevi [Hal05] provides a simple sufficient condition for an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme to meet the notion of anonymity (a.k.a. key-privacy) of [BBDP01]. The condition is that even a computationally unbounded adversary, given public keys $pk_0, pk_1$ and the encryption of a random message under $pk_b$, have only a negligible advantage in determining the random challenge bit $b$. Towards finding anonymous IBE schemes (a task motivated by Theorem F.4.2), we extend Halevi’s condition to identity-based encryption. In the process we also extend it in two other ways: first to handle the random oracle model (the standard model is a special case) and second to weaken the statistical (i.e. information-theoretic) requirement of [Hal05] to a computational one. (The application of this paper does not need the last extension, but it may be useful in other contexts.)

We begin by defining a relevant (new) notion of security that we call IBE-ANO-RE-CPA. Let $\aleph = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IBE scheme with associated message space $\text{MsgSp}$. We associate to an adversary $A$ and bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ the following experiment:

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-re-b}}(k)$**

- $IDSet \leftarrow \emptyset$; $(pk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^k)$
- pick random oracle $H$
- $(id_0, id_1, M, \text{state}) \leftarrow A^{\text{KeyDer}(\cdot), H}(\text{find}, pk)$
- if $M \notin \text{MsgSp}(k)$ then return 0
- $R \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{|M|}$; $C \leftarrow H(pk, id_b, R)$
- $b' \leftarrow A^{\text{KeyDer}(\cdot), H}(\text{guess}, C, \text{state})$
- if $\{id_0, id_1\} \cap IDSet = \emptyset$ then return $b'$
- else return 0

The IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-advantage of an adversary $A$ in violating the anonymity of the scheme $\aleph$ is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-re}}(k) = \Pr \left[ \text{Exp}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-re-1}}(k) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ \text{Exp}_{\aleph, A}^{\text{cpe-ano-re-0}}(k) = 1 \right].$$

A scheme $\aleph$ is said to be IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure if the above advantage is a negligible function in $k$ for all PTAs $A$.

**Lemma F.4.3** Let $\aleph$ be an IBE scheme that is IBE-IND-CPA and IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure. Then it is also IBE-ANO-CPA-secure.

**Proof of Lemma F.4.3**: The proof is a simple hybrid argument. Let $A$ be a PTA attacking the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of $\aleph$. It is easy to construct PTAs $A_1, A_3$ attacking the
F.5. Anonymous HIBE

F.5.1 Definitions

HIBE schemes. A hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme \([\text{HIBE}]\) is a generalization of an IBE scheme in which an identity is a vector of strings \(id = (id_1, \ldots, id_l)\) with the understanding that when \(l = 0\) this is the empty vector (\(\cdot\)). The number of components
in this vector is called the level of the identity and is denoted $|id|$. If $0 \leq i \leq l$ then $id_i = (id_1, \ldots, id_l)$ denotes the vector containing the first $i$ components of $id$. If $|id| \geq l + 1 (l \geq 0)$ and $id_i = id$ then we say that id is an ancestor of id', or equivalently, that id' is a descendant of id. If the level of id' is $l + 1$ then id is a parent of id', or, equivalently, id' is a child of id. For any id with $|id| \geq 1$ we let $\text{par}(id) = id_{|id|-1}$ denote its parent. Two nodes id = $(id_1, \ldots, id_l)$ and id' = $(id'_1, \ldots, id'_l)$ at level $l$ are said to be siblings if id$_{l-1} = id'_{l-1}$. Moreover, if id$_1 < id'_1$ in lexicographic order, then id is a left sibling of id' and id' is a right sibling of id. An identity at level one or more can be issued a secret key by its parent. (And thus an identity can issue keys for any of its descendants if necessary.)

Formally a HIBE scheme $\mathcal{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ consists of four PTAs. Via $(pk, msk = usk([])) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^k)$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ is a security parameter, the root generates master keys, with the secret key being associated to the (unique) identity () at level 0. Via $usk[id] \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}^H((usk[\text{par}(id)], id)$ the parent of an identity id with $|id| \geq 1$ can compute a secret key for id. Note that by iteratively applying the KeyDer algorithm a user id can derive secret keys for any of its descendants id'; we occasionally use the notation $usk[id] \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}^H((usk[id], id')$ to denote this process. Via $C \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}^H(pk, id, M)$ a sender encrypts a message $M$ to identity id to get a ciphertext; via $M \leftarrow \text{Dec}^H(usk[id], C)$ the identity id decrypts ciphertext C to get back a message. Here $H$ is a random oracle with domain and range possibly depending on $k$ and $pk$. Associated to the scheme is a message space $\text{MsgSp}$ obeying the conventions discussed in Section F.2. For consistency, we require that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$, all identities id with $|id| \geq 1$ and all messages $M \in \text{MsgSp}(k)$,

$$\text{Pr} \left[ \text{Dec}^H(\text{KeyDer}^H(usk[\text{par}(id)], id), \text{Enc}^H(pk, id, M)) = M \right] = 1,$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of $(pk, usk([])) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^k)$, the random choice of $H$, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.

**Privacy and Anonymity.** The notion of privacy for HIBE schemes is analogous to that for IBE schemes (IBE-IND-CPA) but using identity vectors rather than identity strings and where the adversary is not allowed to query the KeyDER oracle for the secret key of any ancestor of the identity under attack. Since we will deal with schemes where privacy holds only up to some level, the notion is parameterized by a maximum depth function $d : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, and all identities id (in queries or challenges) must have $|id| \leq d(k)$. To allow a fine-grained treatment of anonymity we introduce the concept of anonymity at a set $L(k)$ of levels, meaning that in an experiment the adversary $A$ is challenged to distinguish two distinct identities differing only at levels $l \in L(k)$. (Here for each $k$, $L(k)$ is a finite set of integers. For ease of notation, we will write $l$ rather than $\{l\}$ when $L(k) = \{l\}$ is a singleton set.)

Formally, let $\mathcal{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an identity-based encryption scheme with message space $\text{MsgSp}$, let $d : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be the maximum depth, and let $L$ be a set of levels. Let $\text{diff}(\cdot, \cdot)$ be the function that returns the set of coordinates at which the input identities differ, and $\text{anc}(\cdot)$ the function returning the set of ancestors of the input identity. To any bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and any adversary $A$, we associate the experiments:
F.5. Anonymous HIBE

We further extend Lemma 4.3 to the hierarchical case. To this end, we introduce a new notion HIBE-ANO-CPA[L, d]-secure (resp. HIBE-ANO-CPA[L, d]-secure) if the respective advantage function is negligible for all PTAs $\mathcal{A}$.

F.5.2 A sufficient condition for anonymity

We extend Lemma 4.3 to the hierarchical case. To this end, we introduce a new notion HIBE-ANO-CPA[L, d] as follows. Let $\mathcal{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a HIBE scheme with message space $\text{MsgSp}$, let $L$ be a set of levels, and let $d$ be the maximum hierarchy depth. To an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and a bit $b$, we associate the following experiment:

The HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA[L, d]-advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in violating the level-$L$ anonymity of the scheme $\mathcal{HIBE}$ with depth $d(k)$ is defined as

A scheme $\mathcal{HIBE}$ is said to be HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA[L, d]-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in $k$ for all PTAs $\mathcal{A}$. The following lemma follows from a hybrid argument similar to that of Lemma 4.3.

Lemma F.5.1 Let $\mathcal{HIBE}$ be a HIBE scheme that is HIBE-IND-CPA[d] and HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA[L, d]-secure for some set of levels $L$ and hierarchy depth $d$. Then $\mathcal{HIBE}$ is also HIBE-ANO-CPA[L, d]-secure.
Chapter F. Searchable Encryption Revisited

Figure F.6: Algorithms of the \(mG\)-\(\mathit{HIBE}\) scheme. \(G\) is a pairing parameter generator and \(H_{1,i} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_1^*\) and \(H_2 : G_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k\) are random oracles.

### F.5.3 Construction

The HIBE scheme of [HL02] appears to be anonymous, but supports only two levels of identities, and is only resistant against limited collusions at the second level, and hence is not usable for our constructions that follow. Since the HIBE of [GS02], here denoted \(\mathit{G\mathit{S}-HIBE}\), is equivalent to the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [BF03] when restricted to the first level, and since the latter is provably anonymous as per Theorem F.4.4, one could hope that \(\mathit{G\mathit{S}-HIBE}\) is level-1 anonymous, but this turns out not to be true, and the HIBE of [BBG05] is not level-1 anonymous either.

To see why, consider the following. The \(\mathit{HIBE}\) of [BBG05], here denoted \(\mathit{HIBE}\), is level-1 anonymous, but even if restricted to the first level, and since the latter is provably anonymous as per Theorem F.4.4, one could hope that \(\mathit{G\mathit{S}-HIBE}\) is level-1 anonymous, but this turns out not to be true, and the HIBE of [BBG05] is not level-1 anonymous either.

To see why, consider the following. The \(\mathit{G\mathit{S}-HIBE}\) encryption of a message \(M\) under identity \(id = (id_1, \ldots, id_l)\) is a tuple

\[
(rP, rH_1(id_1), \ldots, rH_1(id_l), H_2(e(rP, H_1(id_1))) \mod m)
\]

where \(H_1, H_2\) are random oracles, \(P\) is a generator of a pairing group that is part of \(pk\), and \(r\) is chosen at random from \(Z_p^*\) by the encryption algorithm. Anonymity is violated because an adversary can decide whether a given ciphertext \((C_1, C_2, C_3)\) is intended for \(id = (id_1, id_2)\) or \(id' = (id_1, id_3)\) by checking whether \(e(C_2, P)\) equals \(e(C_1, H_1(id))\) or \(e(C_1, H_1(id'))\).

The lack of anonymity in \(\mathit{G\mathit{S}-HIBE}\) stems from the fact that the hashes in the first \(l\) components of the ciphertext depend on the first component of the recipient’s identity. In Figure F.6 we present a modified \(mG\)-\(\mathit{HIBE}\) scheme that uses a different random oracle \(H_{1,l}\) for each level \(l\), and that computes ciphertexts as

\[
(rP, rH_{1,l}(id_2), \ldots, rH_{1,l}(id_l), H_2(e(rP, H_{1,l}(id_l))) \mod m)
\]

The following implies in particular that \(mG\)-\(\mathit{HIBE}\) is the first full HIBE scheme providing anonymity at any level. The restriction on \(d\) is inherited from [GS02]. We note that, subsequently to our work, Boyen and Waters [BW06] proposed a HIBE scheme that is anonymous at all levels in the standard (i.e., non-random-oracle) model.

**Theorem F.5.2** For any \(d(k) = O(\log(k))\), the \(mG\)-\(\mathit{HIBE}\) scheme is HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, \(d\)]-secure and HIBE-IND-CPA[\(d\)]-secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator \(G\).

We split up the proof in the following two lemmas. The proof of the first is given in Appendix F.9 and recycles ideas from [GS02, BF03]. We use Lemma F.5.1 to prove the second lemma.
Lemma F.5.3 For any \( d(k) = O(\log(k)) \), the \( mG_5HIBE \) scheme is HIBE-IND-CPA[\( d \)]-secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator \( G \).

Lemma F.5.4 For any \( d(k) = O(\log(k)) \), the \( mG_5HIBE \) scheme is HIBE-ANO-CPA[1,\( d \)]-secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator \( G \).

**Proof:** Given Lemmas F.5.1 and F.5.3 it suffices to show that \( mG_5HIBE \) is HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA[1,\( d \)]-secure. In the challenge ciphertext \( (C_1^t, \ldots, C_{t+1}^t) \), the first component \( C_1^t \) is chosen uniformly at random from \( G_1^t \). Component \( C_i^t \) for \( 2 \leq i \leq l \) is uniquely defined by \( C_1^t \) and the \( i \)-th component of the identity, which is the same for both challenge identities since they can only differ at level 1. Finally, if the message \( M \) is chosen uniformly at random from \( \{0,1\}^k \), then the last component \( C_{t+1}^t \) is also uniformly distributed over \( \{0,1\}^k \), independent of \( H_2(e(rH_{1,1}(id_1), Q_0)) \). Hence, the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed in both worlds, and the advantage of any adversary is 0. \( \square \)

### F.6 Public-key encryption with temporary keyword search

In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain keyword, it can test whether this keyword was present in past ciphertexts, and can test its presence in any future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that allows this. We call it public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) or temporarily searchable encryption for short. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval \([s, e]\) and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword.

#### F.6.1 Definitions

**PETKS schemes.** Public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) is a generalization of PEKS in which a trapdoor can be issued for any desired window of time rather than forever. Formally, the scheme \( PETKS = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Td}, PETKS, \mathsf{Test}, N) \) consists of four PTAs and a function \( N: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). Via \((pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{KG}(1^k)\), the receiver generates its public and secret key; via \( C \xleftarrow{\$} PETKS^H(pk, w, i) \) a sender encrypts a keyword \( w \) in time period \( i \in [0, N(k) − 1] \) to get a ciphertext; via \( t_w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Td}^H(sk, w, s, e) \) the receiver computes a trapdoor \( t_w \) for keyword \( w \) in period \([s, e]\) where \( 0 \leq s \leq e \leq N(k) − 1 \), and provides it to the gateway; via \( b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Test}^H(t_w, C) \) the gateway tests whether \( C \) encrypts \( w \), where \( b \) is a bit with 1 meaning “accept” or “yes” and 0 meaning “reject” or “no”. Here \( H \) is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on \( k \) and \( pk \). We require that for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), all \( s, e, i \) with \( 0 \leq s \leq i \leq e \leq N(k) − 1 \), and all \( w \in \{0,1\}^* \),

\[
\Pr \left[ \mathsf{Test}^H(\mathsf{Td}^H(sk, w, s, e), PETKS^H(pk, w, i)) = 1 \right] = \frac{1}{2},
\]

where the probability is taken over the choice of \((pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{KG}(1^k)\), the random choice of \( H \), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.

**Consistency.** Consistency for PETKS schemes requires that no user \( U \) can output keywords \( w, w' \) and time period indices \( s, e, i \in [1, N(k) − 1] \) such that \( w \neq w' \) or \( i \notin [s, e] \), yet still an encryption of \( w \) for time period \( i \) tests positively under a trapdoor for keyword \( w' \) and time period \([s, e]\). We define the advantage \( \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{petek}\mathsf{s},U}^{\mathsf{consist}}(k) \) as the probability that \( U \) succeeds in doing so. Just like for standard PEKS schemes, we distinguish between perfect, statistical and computational consistency.
PRIVACY. Privacy for a PETKS scheme asks that an adversary be unable to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice in a time period \( i \in [0, N(k) - 1] \) of its choice, even if it is allowed not only to obtain trapdoors for non-challenge keywords issued for any time interval, but also is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any keywords (even the challenge ones), issued for time intervals not containing \( i \). The formal experiment and the definition of PETKS-IND-CPA-advantage and security are otherwise analogous to those of standard PEKS schemes, and hence are omitted here.

F.6.2 Constructions for PETKS schemes

CONSTRUCTIONS WITH LINEAR COMPLEXITY. PETKS is reminiscent of forward-security [BM99], [CHK03], and, as in these works, there are straightforward solutions with keys or trapdoors of length linear in \( N(k) \). One such solution is to use a standard PEKS scheme and generate a different key pair \((pk_i, sk_i)\) for each time period \( i \in [0, N(k) - 1] \). Let \( pk = (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{N(k)-1}) \) be the PET KS public key and \( sk = (sk_0, \ldots, sk_{N(k)-1}) \) be the PET KS secret key. During time period \( i \), the sender encrypts a keyword \( w \) by encrypting \( w \) under \( pk_i \) using the PEKS scheme. The trapdoor for a keyword \( w \) in the interval \([s, e]\) consists of all PEKS trapdoors for \( w \) of periods \( s, \ldots, e \). A somewhat more efficient solution is to let the PETKS master key pair be a single key pair for the standard PEKS scheme, and append the time period to the keyword (making sure that the string is uniquely decodable, e.g. by using a special separator symbol) when encrypting or computing trapdoors. This scheme achieves short public and secret keys, but still has trapdoor length linear in \( N(k) \), because the PETKS trapdoor still contains PEKS trapdoors for all time periods \( s, \ldots, e \). Note that both these construction only work for polynomially bounded \( N(k) \).

THE hibe-2-petks TRANSFORM. We now present a transformation hibe-2-petks of a HIBE scheme into a PETKS scheme that yields a PETKS scheme with complexity logarithmic in \( N(k) \) for all parameters. The construction is very similar to the generic construction of forward-secure encryption from binary-tree encryption [CHK03]. The number of time periods is \( N(k) = 2^{\lceil t(k) \rceil} \) for some polynomially bounded function \( t : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). If \( i \in [0, N(k) - 1] \), then let \( \bar{i}_1 \ldots \bar{i}_{t(k)} \) denote its binary representation as a \( \lceil t(k) \rceil \)-bit string. Intuitively, our construction instantiates a HIBE of depth \( t(k) + 1 \) with keywords as the first level of the identity tree and the time structure on the lower levels. The trapdoor for keyword \( w \) and interval of time periods \([s, e]\) consists of the user secret keys of all identities from \((w, s_1, \ldots, s_{\bar{i}(k)})\) to \((w, e_1, \ldots, e_{\bar{i}(k)})\), but taking advantage of the hierarchical structure to include entire subtrees of keys.

More precisely, let \( \text{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) be a HIBE scheme. Then we associate to it a PETKS scheme \( \text{PETKS} = \text{hibe-2-petks}(\text{HIBE}, t(k)) = (\text{KG}, \text{Td}, \text{PETKS}, \text{Test}, N) \) such that \( N(k) = 2^{\lceil t(k) \rceil}, \text{KG}(1^k) = \text{Setup}(1^k) \) and PETKS\((pk, w, i) = (i, R, C) \) where \( R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k \) and \( C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, (w, i_1, \ldots, i_{\bar{i}(k)}), R) \). The trapdoor algorithm \( \text{Td}(sk, w, s, e) \) first constructs a set \( T \) of identities as follows. Let \( j \) be the smallest index so that \( s_j \neq e_j \). Then \( T \) is the set containing \((w, s_1, \ldots, s_{\bar{i}(k)}), (w, e_1, \ldots, e_{\bar{i}(k)})\), the right siblings of all nodes on the path from \((w, s_1, \ldots, s_{\bar{i}(k)})\) to \((w, s_1, \ldots, s_{\bar{i}(k)})\), and the left siblings of all nodes on the path from \((w, e_1, \ldots, e_{\bar{i}(k)})\) to \((w, e_1, \ldots, e_{\bar{i}(k)})\). If \( j \) does not exist, meaning \( s = e \), then \( T \leftarrow \{(w, s_1, \ldots, s_{\bar{i}(k)})\} \). The trapdoor \( t_w \) is the set of tuples \((w, i_1, \ldots, i_r), \text{KeyDer}(sk, (w, i_1, \ldots, i_r))\) for all \((i_1, \ldots, i_r) \in T \). To test a ciphertext \((i, R, C)\), the Test algorithm looks up a tuple \((w, i_1, \ldots, i_r), \text{usk}[(w, i_1, \ldots, i_r)]\) in \( t_w \). It returns 0 when no such tuple is found. Otherwise, it derives \( \text{usk}[(w, i_1, \ldots, i_{\bar{i}(k)})] \) using repetitive calls to the KeyDer algorithm, and returns 1 iff \( \text{Dec}(\text{usk}[(w, i_1, \ldots, i_{\bar{i}(k)})], C) = R \).

**Theorem F.6.1** Let \( \text{HIBE} \) be a HIBE scheme, and let \( \text{PETKS} = \text{hibe-2-petks}(\text{HIBE}, t(k)) \) for some polynomially bounded function \( t : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). If \( \text{HIBE} \) is HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, \lceil t(k) \rceil + 1]-secure,
then \( \text{PETKS} \) is PETKS-IND-CPA-secure. Furthermore, if \( \text{HIBE} \) is HIBE-IND-CPA[\( t(k) + 1 \)]-secure, then \( \text{PETKS} \) is computationally consistent.

We split the proof of the theorem over the following two lemmas.

**Lemma F.6.2** Let \( \text{HIBE} \) be a HIBE scheme, and let \( \text{PETKS} = \text{hibe-2-petks}(\text{HIBE}, t(k)) \) for some polynomially bounded function \( t : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). If \( \text{HIBE} \) is HIBE-ANO-CPA[\( 1, t(k) + 1 \)]-secure, then \( \text{PETKS} \) is PETKS-IND-CPA-secure.

**Proof:** Let \( \text{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) be a level-1 anonymous (HIBE-ANO-CPA[\( 1, t(k) + 1 \)]-secure) HIBE scheme, and let \( \text{PETKS} = \text{hibe-2-petks}(\text{HIBE}, t(k)) = (\text{KG}, \text{Td}, \text{PETKS}, \text{Test}, N) \) be the associated PETKS scheme. Given an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) breaking the PETKS-IND-CPA security of \( \text{PETKS} \), we construct an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) breaking the HIBE-ANO-CPA[\( 1, t(k) + 1 \)] security of \( \text{HIBE} \) as follows. On input public parameters \( pk \), \( \mathcal{B} \) runs \( \mathcal{A} \) on inputs \( (\text{find}, pk) \). When \( \mathcal{A} \) queries its \( \text{Td} \) oracle for the trapdoor of keyword \( w \) for interval \([s, e]\), then \( \mathcal{B} \) constructs a set \( T \) exactly as the \( \text{Td} \) algorithm does, and constructs the corresponding trapdoor by querying its \( \text{KeyDer} \) oracle for the user secret keys corresponding to all identities in \( T \).

When \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs challenge keywords \( w_0, w_1 \) and time period \( i \), \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs challenge identities \( id_0 = (w_0, i_1, \ldots, i_{t(k)}), id_1 = (w_1, i_1, \ldots, i_{t(k)}) \) and a randomly chosen message \( M \) of length \( k \). Note that identities \( id_0 \) and \( id_1 \) differ on level 1, but are otherwise equal, as required for level-1 anonymity. Upon receiving challenge ciphertext \( C \), adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) sends \( (i, R, C) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \) and runs it until \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs a bit \( b' \) (responding to \( \mathcal{A} \)'s oracle queries the same way as before). Adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs the same bit \( b' \).

It is easy to see that, due to the ordered structure of the time tree, adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) does not need to corrupt any ancestors of its challenge identities. Therefore, adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) succeeds whenever \( \mathcal{A} \) does, and we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PETKS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{petks-IND-CPA}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HIBE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{hibe-ANO-CPA}[1,t(k)+1]}(k)
\]

for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), from which the lemma follows.

**Lemma F.6.3** Let \( \text{HIBE} \) be a HIBE scheme, and let \( \text{PETKS} = \text{hibe-2-petks}(\text{HIBE}, t(k)) \) for some polynomially bounded function \( t : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). If \( \text{HIBE} \) is HIBE-IND-CPA[\( t(k) + 1 \)]-secure, then \( \text{PETKS} \) is computationally consistent.

**Proof:** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary of the consistency of \( \text{PETKS} \). We construct an HIBE-IND-CPA adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) of \( \text{HIBE} \) as follows.

**Adversary \( \mathcal{B}^{\text{KeyDer}(\cdot)}(\text{find}, pk) \)**

\[
\begin{align*}
(w, w', s, e, i) &\xleftarrow{} \mathcal{A}(pk) \\
R, R' &\xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}^k \quad \text{(where \{0, 1\}^k is the message space of \text{HIBE})} \\
id &\leftarrow (w, i_1, \ldots, i_{t(k)}) \\
M_0 &\leftarrow R; M_1 = R' \\
state &\leftarrow (pk, w, w', R, R', s, e, i) \\
\text{return} \ (id, M_0, M_1, state)
\end{align*}
\]

**Adversary \( \mathcal{B}^{\text{KeyDer}(\cdot)}(\text{guess}, C, state) \)**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parse} \ C \text{ as } (i, R, C') \\
t_w &\xleftarrow{} \text{KeyDer}((w, i_1, \ldots, i_{t(k)})) \text{; } X &\leftarrow \text{Dec}(t_w, C') \\
\text{if } X = R' \text{ then return 1 else return 0}
\end{align*}
\]
Since, by construction, Test($t_w, C$) returns 0 whenever $i \notin [s, e]$, we can assume that $w' \neq w$ and $i \in [s, e]$. Then, exactly as in Theorem F.4.2 we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca-1}[t(k)+1]}_{\text{HIBE}, B} (k) = 1 \right] & \geq \Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{petks-consist}}_{\text{PETKS}, A} (k) = 1 \right] \quad (F.8) \\
\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca-0}[t(k)+1]}_{\text{HIBE}, B} (k) = 1 \right] & \leq 2^{-l}. \quad (F.9)
\end{align*}
\]

Equation (F.8) and Equation (F.9) give us

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PETKS}, A}^{\text{petks-consist}} (k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HIBE}, B}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca}[t(k)+1]} (k) + 2^{-l}.
\]

The result follows.

**COMPLEXITY.** Since the $m_{G_5, HIBE}$ has user secret keys and ciphertexts of size linear in the depth of the tree, our resulting PETKS scheme has public and secret keys of size $O(1)$, ciphertexts of size $O(\log N(k))$ and trapdoors of size $O(\log^2 N(k))$. We note that in this case a user can decrypt ciphertexts intended for any of its descendants directly, without needing to derive the corresponding secret key first. This makes the call to the KeyDer algorithm in the Test algorithm superfluous, thereby improving the efficiency of Test. Note that since the $m_{G_5, HIBE}$ scheme is only secure for tree depths $d(k) = O(\log(k))$, the derived PETKS scheme is restricted to a polynomial number of time periods.

**UNBOUNDED TIME PERIODS.** Using the techniques of [MMM02], one can create a variant of our scheme with efficiency depending on the number of elapsed time periods, rather than the maximal number of time periods $N(k)$. This means that there is no efficiency penalty for overestimating $N(k)$, so that a sufficiently high value can be chosen when setting up the system. However, for security reasons the number of time periods remains limited to a maximum of $N(k) \leq 2^{d(k) - \lfloor \log d(k) \rfloor - 1}$ periods, where $d(k)$ is the maximum depth of the underlying HIBE scheme.

### F.7 Identity-based encryption with keyword search

In this section, we show how to combine the concepts of identity-based encryption and PEKS to obtain identity-based encryption with keyword search (IBEKS) or ID-based searchable encryption for short. Like in IBE schemes, this allows to use any string as a recipient’s public key for the PEKS scheme.

#### F.7.1 Definitions

**IBEKS schemes.** An identity-based encryption with keyword search scheme $\text{IBEKS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Td}, \text{IBEKS}, \text{Test})$ is made up of five algorithms. Via $(pk, msk) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Setup}(1^k)$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter, the master generates the master keys; via $\text{usk}[id] \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{KeyDer}^H(\text{msk}, id)$, the master computes the secret key for identity $id$; via $C \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{IBEKS}^H(pk, id, w)$, a sender encrypts a keyword $w$ to identity $id$ to get a ciphertext; via $t_w \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Td}^H(\text{usk}[id], w)$, the receiver computes a trapdoor $t_w$ for keyword $w$ and identity $id$ and provides it to the gateway; via $b \leftarrow \text{Test}^H(t_w, C)$, the gateway tests whether $C$ encrypts $w$, where $b$ is a bit with 1 meaning “accept” or “yes” and 0 meaning “reject” or “no”. As usual $H$ is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on $k$ and $pk$. For correctness, we require that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$, all identities $id$, and all $w \in \{0,1\}^*$,

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Test}^H(\text{Td}^H(\text{KeyDer}^H(\text{msk}, id), w), \text{IBEKS}^H(pk, id, w)) = 1 \right] = 1,
\]
where the probability is taken over the choice of $(pk, msk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^k)$, the random choice of $H$, and the coins of all algorithms in the expression above.

**Consistency.** The notion of consistency for IBEKS is similar to the one given for PEKS. The advantage of a user $U$ is defined as the probability that, on input the master public key $pk$, it can output keywords $w, w'$ and identities $id, id'$ such that $w \neq w'$ or $id \neq id'$, yet still an encryption of $w$ under identity $id$ tests positively under a trapdoor derived for keyword $w'$ and identity $id'$. We again distinguish between perfect, statistical and computational consistency. Note that this definition also considers it a consistency problem if a trapdoor for identity $id'$ tests positively for a ciphertext intended for identity $id \neq id'$. This type of problems is easily avoided by having the $\text{KeyDer}$, $\text{TD}$ and IBEKS algorithms include the intended identity into the user secret keys, trapdoors and ciphertexts, respectively.

**Privacy.** We define privacy for IBEKS schemes says that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two different challenge keywords $w_0, w_1$ of its choice for any identity $id$ of its choice. Moreover, this should be the case even if the adversary is allowed to obtain trapdoors for non-challenge keywords issued for any identity and to obtain trapdoors for $w_0, w_1$ for identities other than $id$. The advantage function $\text{Adv}_{\text{IBEKS-IND-CPA}}(k)$ of an adversary $A$ and the notion of IBEKS-IND-CPA security are defined analogously to standard PEKS schemes.

**F.7.2 A generic transformation from anonymous HIBE schemes**

We now propose a generic transform, called $\text{hibe-ibeeks}$, to convert any HIBE scheme with two levels into an IBEKS scheme. To obtain an IBEKS that is IBEKS-IND-CPA-secure, it is sufficient to start with a HIBE that is anonymous at level 2. Moreover, if the underlying HIBE is HIBE-IND-CPA[2]-secure, then the resulting IBEKS is also computationally consistent.

The $\text{hibe-ibeeks}$ transformation. Given a HIBE scheme $\text{HIBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with two levels, $\text{hibe-ibeeks}$ returns the IBEKS scheme $\text{IBEKS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyDer}, \text{IBEKS}, \text{TD}, \text{Test})$ such that $\text{KeyDer}(msk, id) = (\text{usk}, id)$ where $\text{usk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}(msk, id)$, IBEKS$(pk, id, w) = (id, R, C)$ where $R \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$ and $C = \text{Enc}(pk, (id, w), R)$, $\text{TD}(\text{usk} = (\text{usk}, id), w) = (id, t_w)$ where $t_w \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyDer}((\text{usk}, (id, w)))$ and $\text{Test}(t_w = (id, t_w), (id', R, C))$ returns 1 iff $\text{Dec}(t_w, C) = R$ and $id = id'$.  

**Theorem F.7.1** Let $\text{HIBE}$ be a HIBE scheme and let $\text{IBEKS} = \text{hibe-ibeeks}(\text{HIBE})$. If $\text{HIBE}$ is HIBE-IND-CPA[2]-secure, then $\text{IBEKS}$ is computationally consistent. Furthermore, if $\text{HIBE}$ is HIBE-ANO-CPA[2, 2]-secure, then $\text{IBEKS}$ is IBEKS-IND-CPA-secure.

The proof of Theorem [F.7.1] follows from Lemma [F.7.2] and Lemma [F.7.3].

**Lemma F.7.2** Let $\text{HIBE}$ be a HIBE scheme and let $\text{IBEKS} = \text{hibe-ibeeks}(\text{HIBE})$. If $\text{HIBE}$ is HIBE-ANO-CPA[2, 2]-secure, then $\text{IBEKS}$ is IBEKS-IND-CPA-secure.

**Proof:** Given an adversary $A$ breaking the IBEKS-IND-CPA-security of $\text{IBEKS}$, we construct an HIBE-ANO-CPA[2, 2]-adversary $B$ breaking $\text{HIBE}$ as follows. On input a public key $pk$, algorithm $B$ runs $A$ on the same input, answering $A$‘s $\text{KEYDER}(\cdot)$ queries by forwarding the output of its own $\text{KEYDER}(\cdot)$ oracle, and answering $A$‘s $\text{TRAPD}(id, w)$ oracle queries by querying its own $\text{KEYDER}(\cdot)$ oracle for the secret key corresponding to identity $(id, w)$. When $A$ outputs a challenge identity $id^*$ and two challenge keywords $w_0^*, w_1^*$, adversary $B$ chooses a random message $M^* \in \{0,1\}^k$ and outputs $M^*$ as the challenge message and $id_0^* = (id^*, w_0^*)$ and $id_1^* = (id^*, w_1^*)$ as the challenge identities, which in fact differ only in the second entry. Let $C^*$ be the challenge ciphertext that $B$ receives at the beginning of its guess phase. Adversary $B$ returns $(M^*, C^*)$ to
\( \mathcal{A} \), and continues to run \( \mathcal{A} \) (answering TRAPD queries the same way as before) until it outputs a bit \( b' \). Algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) then outputs the same bit \( b' \) as its own output.

It is clear from the construction that \( \mathcal{B} \)'s simulation of \( \mathcal{A} \)'s environment is perfect. Since \( \mathcal{A} \) cannot query its TRAPD oracle on keywords \((id^*, w_0^*)\) and \((id^*, w_1^*)\), \( \mathcal{B} \) will not be forced to query its KEYDER on identities \( id_0' \) and \( id_1' \), and hence wins the game whenever \( \mathcal{A} \) does. Therefore, we have that

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ibeks-ind-cpa}}_{\text{IBEKS}, A}(k) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-ano-cpa}[2,2]}_{\text{HIBE}, B}(k),
\]

from which the theorem follows for CPA security. This proves the lemma.

**Lemma F.7.3** Let \( \text{HIBE} \) be a HIBE scheme and let \( \text{IBEKS} = \text{hibe-2-ibeks}(\text{HIBE}) \). If \( \text{HIBE} \) is HIBE-IND-CPA[2]-secure, then \( \text{IBEKS} \) is computationally consistent.

**Proof:** Let \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) be an adversary of the consistency of \( \text{IBEKS} \). We construct an HIBE-IND-CPA[2] adversary \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) of \( \text{HIBE} \) as follows.

Adversary \( \mathcal{B}_1^{\text{KEYDER}(\cdot)}(\text{find, pk}) \)

\[
(w, w', id, id') \xleftarrow{} A_1(pk); R, R' \xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}^l \text{ (where } \{0, 1\}^l \text{ is the message space of } \text{HIBE})
\]

\[
id = (id', w)
\]

\[
w_0 = R; w_1 = R'
\]

\[
\text{state} = (pk, w, w', R, R')
\]

return \((id, w_0, w_1, \text{state})\)

Adversary \( \mathcal{B}_1^{\text{KEYDER}(\cdot)}(\text{guess, C, state}) \)

\[
t_w \xleftarrow{} \text{KEYDER}((id', w')); X \xleftarrow{} \text{Dec}(t_w, C)
\]

if \( X = R' \) then return 1 else return 0

Since, by construction, \( \text{Test}(t_w, C) \) returns 0 whenever \( id \neq id' \), we can assume that \( w' \neq w \) and \( id' = id \). Thus, exactly as in Theorem [F.4.2] we have

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{hibe-2-ibeks-consist}}_{\text{HIBE}, B_1}(k) = 1 \right] \geq \Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{ibeks-consist}}_{\text{IBEKS}, A}(k) = 1 \right] \quad (\text{F.10})
\]

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Exp}^{\text{hibe-2-ibeks-consist}}_{\text{HIBE}, B_1}(k) = 1 \right] \leq 2^{-l}. \quad (\text{F.11})
\]

Equation (F.10) and Equation (F.11) give us

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ibeks-consist}}_{\text{IBEKS}, A_1}(k) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-2-ibeks-consist}}_{\text{HIBE}, B_1}(k) + 2^{-l}.
\]

The result follows.

**F.7.3 Concrete instantiations**

Neither the \( gS\text{-HIBE} \) scheme of [GS02] nor the \( mGS\text{-HIBE} \) scheme of Figure [F.6] are anonymous at the second level. For the \( gS\text{-HIBE} \) scheme, consider an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) who outputs challenge identities \( id = (id_1, id_2) \) and \( id' = (id_1, id_2') \) for any \( id_1, id_2, id_2' \in \{0, 1\}^k \) such that \( id_2 \neq id_2' \), and any challenge message \( M \in \{0, 1\}^k \). When given the challenge ciphertext \( C = (C_1, C_2, C_3) \), \( \mathcal{A} \) checks whether \( e(C_1, H_1(id)) = e(P, C_2) \). (See Equation (F.7) for how ciphertexts are created in the \( gS\text{-HIBE} \) scheme.) If the test succeeds, then \( \mathcal{A} \) returns 0, otherwise it returns 1. It is easy to see that the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \) is \( \text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-2-ibeks-consist}}_{gS\text{-HIBE}, A}(k) \geq 1 - 2^{-k} \). A similar attack can be mounted on the \( mGS\text{-HIBE} \) scheme by checking whether \( e(C_1, H_{1,2}(id_2)) = e(P, C_2) \).
In Appendix F.8.3 we show that the recently introduced HIBE scheme by Boneh et al. [BBG05] is not level-2 anonymous either (and actually, not anonymous at any level). Subsequent to our work, Boyen and Waters [BW06] proposed a fully anonymous HIBE scheme that, when used to instantiate our generic construction, immediately yields an IBEKS scheme with security and consistency in the standard model.

F.7.4 Identity-based encryption with temporary keyword search

The ideas of Sections F.6 and F.7 can be further combined to create an identity-based encryption scheme with temporary keyword search. This can be constructed from a level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme by putting the users’ identities at the first level of the hierarchy, the keywords at the second, and a binary tree of time frames on the levels below.

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F.8 Appendix: Attacks against the anonymity of existing schemes

F.8.1 Waters’ IBE scheme

We recall Waters’ IBE scheme [Wat05] \( \mathbb{W}_{-\text{IBE}} = (\text{Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec}) \) in Figure F.7. Associated with \( \mathbb{W}_{-\text{IBE}} \) is a polynomial \( n \). It is assumed that all user identities are \( n(k) \)-bit (e.g. 160-bit) strings (for instance obtained by hashing the actual identity using a collision-resistant hash function), which are written as \( \text{id} = \text{id}[1] \text{id}[2] \ldots \text{id}[n] \), where each \( \text{id}[i] \) \((1 \leq i \leq n)\) is a bit \( \text{id}[i] \in \{0, 1\} \). (We drop the argument \( k \) to \( n \) when \( k \) is understood.) The message space is defined by \( \text{MsgSp}(k) = \{0, 1\}^k \), and messages are encoded as elements of \( G_2 \) in the scheme.

We now describe a \( \text{PTA} \, \mathcal{A} \) against the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of \( \mathbb{W}_{-\text{IBE}} \). In the \textit{find} stage it gets input a public key \( (G_1, G_2, p, e, P, P_1, U, E) \), and returns any two distinct \( n \)-bit strings \( \text{id}_0, \text{id}_1 \) as challenge identities, along with any \( k \)-bit challenge message. In the \textit{guess} phase, given a challenge ciphertext \( C = (C_1, C_2, C_3) \) formed by encrypting \( M \) under \( \text{id}_b \), where \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) is the challenge bit, it computes \( V' \leftarrow U[0] + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{id}_1[i] U[i] \). If \( e(P, C_3) = e(C_2, V') \) then it returns 1 else it returns 0. It is easy to see that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{IBE-ANO-CPA}}_{\mathcal{A}}(k) \geq 1 - 2^{-k} \).

F.8.2 Boneh-Boyen’s IBE scheme

The IBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen [BB04b], here referred to as \( \mathbb{BB}_{-\text{IBE}} \), is depicted in Figure F.8. An identity is represented by a vector of \( n(k) \) symbols \( \text{id}[1 \ldots n] \in \Sigma^m \) where \( \Sigma \) is an alphabet of size \( s \). In the original scheme, these are obtained as the output of an admissible hash function, but we ignore this here as it is irrelevant to the attack.
Consider a PTA $\mathcal{A}$ that, on input $pk = (G_1, G_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, U)$, outputs any two distinct identities $id_0, id_1 \in \Sigma^n$, and any message $M \in \{0,1\}^k$. Let $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ be an index so that $id_0[i] \neq id_1[i]$. When $\mathcal{A}$ is given the challenge ciphertext $C = (C_1, \ldots, C_{n+2})$, it checks whether $e(C_2, U[i], id_0[i]) = e(P, C_{n+2})$. If so, then $\mathcal{A}$ returns 0; else it returns 1. It is easily verified that $\text{Adv}_{\text{3G-IBE},\mathcal{A}}(k) \geq 1 - 2^{-k}$.

F.8.3 Boneh-Boyen-Goh’s HIBE scheme

The recently proposed $\text{3G-IBE}$ scheme [BBG05], depicted in Figure F.7, is not anonymous at any single level, and therefore not at any set of multiple levels either. This can be seen from the following adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the anonymity at level $l$. On input $pk = (G_1, G_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, Q_2, U)$, adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs challenge identities $(id_1, \ldots, id_{l-1}, id_l)$ and $(id_1, \ldots, id_{l-1}, id'_l)$ for any $id_1, \ldots, id_l, id'_l \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $id_l \neq id'_l$, and any challenge message $M \in \{0,1\}^k$. When given the challenge ciphertext $C = (C_1, C_2, C_3)$, $\mathcal{A}$ checks whether $e(C_2, id_l U[1] + \ldots + id_l U[l] + Q_2) = e(P, C_3)$. If this is the case, then $\mathcal{A}$ returns 0; otherwise it returns 1. It is easily verified that $\text{Adv}_{\text{3G-IBE},\mathcal{A}}(k) \geq 1 - 2^{-k}$. 

---

**Figure F.7:** The algorithms constituting $w$-ibe. Identities are represented as bit strings $id = id[1, \ldots, n] \in \{0,1\}^n$.

**Figure F.8:** The algorithms constituting $3\text{G-IBE}$. Identities are represented as vectors of symbols $id = id[1, \ldots, n] \in \Sigma^n$, where $|\Sigma| = s$. 
Setup(1^k)  
(\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, p, e) \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}(1^k) 
P \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*; P_1 \leftarrow \alpha P 
Q, Q_2 \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_1; Q_1 \leftarrow \alpha Q 
U_{[1 \ldots d(k)]} \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_2^{d(k)} 
pk \leftarrow (\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, Q_2, U) 
msk \leftarrow (pk, Q_1, 0, \ldots, 0) 
return (pk, msk) 

KeyDer(usk, id) 
l \leftarrow |id|; \text{ parse } usk \text{ as } (pk, A, B, S_1, \ldots, S_{d(k)}) 
parse pk \text{ as } (\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, Q_2, U) 
parse id \text{ as } (id_1, \ldots, id_l); r \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p 
A' \leftarrow A + id_i S_1 + r(id_i U[1] + \ldots + i d_i U[l] + Q_2) 
B' \leftarrow B + rP 
for \ l + 1 \leq i \leq d(k) \text{ do } S_i' \leftarrow S_i + rU[i] 
return (pk, A', B', S_1', \ldots, S_{d(k)}') 

Enc(pk, id, M) 
\text{ parse pk as } (\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, Q_2, U) 
parse id \text{ as } (id_1, \ldots, id_l) 
t \overset{\xleftarrow{} }{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*; T \leftarrow e(P_i, Q)^t 
C_3 \leftarrow t(id_1 U[1] + \ldots + id_l U[l] + Q_2) 
C \leftarrow (T \cdot M, tP, C_3) 
return C 

Dec(usk, C) 
\text{ parse usk as } (pk, A, B, S_1, \ldots, S_{d(k)}) 
\text{ parse pk as } (\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, p, e, P, P_1, Q, Q_2, U) 
\text{ parse C as } (C_1, C_2, C_3) 
T' \leftarrow e(A, C_2) \cdot e(B, C_3)^{-1} 
return T' \cdot C_1 

Figure F.9: The algorithms constituting PBBG-HIBE with maximum hierarchy depth d(k). An identity at level l is represented as a vector id = (id_1, \ldots, id_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l.

F.9 Appendix: Proof of Lemma F.5.3

Suppose that there is an adversary A of m\$\mathcal{G}^{\&-HIBE}$ that breaks its HIBE-IND-CPA[d] security. We will show how to use A in the construction of a simulator B that solves the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Let n_{1.1} be the number of queries to the \textit{H}_1 oracle, let n_2 be the number of queries to the \textit{H}_2 oracle, let n_c be the number of queries to the key extraction oracle, and let n_h = \sum_{i=1}^{d(k)} n_{1,i} + n_2 be the total number of hash queries.

The simulator is given as input (P, aP, bP, cP). It sets Q_0 \leftarrow bP as the public key and then runs A(find, pk). The simulator responds to A’s queries as described below. To maintain consistency between queries it keeps lists L_{1,1}, \ldots, L_{1,d(k)}; L_2 and L_3. All lists are initially empty. At the very beginning the simulator chooses n^*_{1,1} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{1, \ldots, n_{1,1}\} and s^*_i, x^*_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*, and it computes Q^*_i \leftarrow s^*_i(bP) for 1 \leq i \leq d(k).

For the description of the simulation we distinguish between \textit{H}_{1,1} queries and \textit{H}_{1,i} queries for i \geq 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that before querying the KEYDER oracle to obtain the secret key of id = (id_1, \ldots, id_l), adversary A first queried \textit{H}_{1,i}(id_i) for all 1 \leq i \leq l.

\textbf{H}_{1,1} Queries: To respond to a query id_1, proceed as follows.

\begin{itemize}
  \item If L_{1,1} contains (id_1, P_1, \ast) for some P_1, respond with P_1.
  \item If this is the n^*_{1,1}-th call to the \textit{H}_{1,1} oracle, let id^*_1 \leftarrow id_1, add (id^*_1, aP, \perp) to L_{1,1} and respond with aP.
  \item Else, randomly choose an integer x_1 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*, add (id_1, x_1 P, x_1) to L_{1,1} and reply with x_1 P.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{H}_{1,i} Queries, i \geq 2: To respond to a query id_i, proceed as follows.

\begin{itemize}
  \item If L_{1,i} contains (id_i, P_i, \ast) for some P_i then respond with P_i.
  \item If this is the n^*_{1,i}-th query to the \textit{H}_{1,i} oracle, let id^*_i \leftarrow id_i, add (id^*_i, x^*_i P, x^*_i) to L_{1,i} and respond with x^*_i P.
\end{itemize}
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- Else, choose an integer $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute $P_i \leftarrow x_i P - s_{i-1}^{-1}(aP + \sum_{j=2}^{i-1} s_{j-1}^* x_j^* P)$. If $P_i = 0$, then abort; else, add $(id_i, P_i, x_i)$ to $L_{1,i}$ and reply with $P_i$.

**H2 Queries:** To respond to a query $\kappa$, proceed as follows.

- If $(\kappa, K) \in L_2$ for some $K$, respond with $K$.
- Else, choose $K$ uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^n$, respond with $K$ and add $(\kappa, K)$ to $L_2$.

**KEYDER Queries:** To respond to a query $id = (id_1, \ldots, id_l)$, proceed as follows.

- If $(id_1, \ldots, id_l) = (id_1^*, \ldots, id_l^*)$, then $B$ aborts.
- Let $j$ be the largest integer $1 \leq j \leq l$ so that $(id_j, S_j, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{j-1}, s_j) \in L_3$, or let $j = 0$ if such element does not exist.
- For $i = j + 1, \ldots, l$, do the following:
  - Find $(id_i, P_i, x_i) \in L_{1,i}$.
  - If $i = 1$ and $id_1 = id_1^*$, then add $(id_1^*, \bot, \bot)$ to $L_3$. If $i = 1$ and $id_1 \neq id_1^*$, then compute $S_i \leftarrow x_i(bP)$, choose $s_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and add $(id_1, S_1, s_1)$ to $L_3$.
  - If $i > 1$ and $S_{i-1} \neq \bot$, then look up $(id_i, P_i, x_i)$ in $L_{1,i}$; compute $S_i \leftarrow S_{i-1} + s_{i-1}P$, $Q_{i-1} \leftarrow s_{i-1}P$, choose $s_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and add $(id_i, S_i, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{i-1}, s_i)$ to $L_3$.
  - If $i > 1$ and $S_{i-1} = \bot$ and $id_i = id_i^*$, then compute $Q_i \leftarrow s_{i-1}^{-1}(bP)$ and add $(id_i, S_i, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{i-1}, \bot)$ to $L_3$.
  - If $i > 1$, $S_{i-1} = \bot$ and $id_i \neq id_i^*$, then look up $(id_i, P_i, x_i)$ in $L_{1,i}$; compute $S_i \leftarrow s_{i-1}^* x_i P$, let $Q_i \leftarrow s_{i-1}^{-1}(bP)$, choose $s_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and add $(id_i, S_i, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{i-1}, s_i)$ to $L_3$.

- Find $(id, S_i, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{l-1}, s_i) \in L_3$ and return $(id, S_i, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{l-1}, s_i)$.

At some point $A$ outputs $(id = (id_1, id_2, \ldots, id_l), M_0, M_1, state)$. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary submitted $id_i$ to the $H_{1,i}$ oracle before for all $1 \leq i \leq l$. If $id \neq (id_1^*, \ldots, id_l^*)$, then $B$ aborts. Otherwise, he sets $C_{1}^* \leftarrow cP$, $C_{2}^* \leftarrow x_2^*(cP)$, $C_{l+1}^* \leftarrow x_l^*(cP)$, he chooses $C_{i+1}^*$ uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^n$, and lets $C_s^* \leftarrow (C_{1}^*, C_{2}^*, \ldots, C_{l+1}^*)$. He then proceeds to run $A(guess, C_s^*, state)$. Once $A$ completes its attack by outputting its guess $b'$, the simulator chooses a random element $(\kappa, K)$ from $L_2$ and outputs $\kappa$ as its solution to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.

We first show that our simulator $B$ provides a real attack environment for $A$ as long as $B$ doesn’t abort. The public key $pk$ given to $A$ is correctly distributed because the challenge elements $aP, bP, cP$ are random elements from $\mathbb{G}_1^*$. The responses to $H_{1,i}$ queries are uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{G}_1^*$ due to the independent random choices of $x_i$ (when simulating queries $H_{1,i}(id_i)$, $id_i \neq id_i^*$, $1 \leq i \leq d(k)$), of $x_i^*$ (which is used to simulate $H_{1,i}(id_i)$ queries, $2 \leq i \leq d(k)$) and due to the uniform distribution of $aP$ (which is used to simulate $H_{1,1}(id_i^*)$). Responses to $H_2$ queries are easily seen to be correctly distributed. The way KEYDER queries are handled requires a bit more explanation. For all level-1 identities $id_i \neq id_i^*$, the returned secret key $(S_1, s_1)$ contains the unique group element $S_1$ such that $e(Q_0, H_{1,1}(id_i)) = e(S_1, P)$ and a uniformly distributed scalar $s_1$, as in the real game. For all descendants of $id_1 \neq id_1^*$, the secret keys are derived from $(S_1, s_1)$ exactly as in the real scheme. Now consider identity $(id_1^*, \ldots, id_{n-1}^*, id_l)$ with $id_l \neq id_l^*$, for which a tuple $(S_1, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{l-1}, s_i)$ is returned as the secret key. The values $Q_1, \ldots, Q_{l-2}$ are inherited from the ancestors, as in the real scheme; $Q_{l-1}$ is a random group element due to the random choice of $s_{l-1}^*$; and $s_i$ is a random element in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. The simulated value $S_i = s_{i-1}^* x_i(bP)$ is then the unique group element such that $e(H_{1,1}(id_1^*), Q_0) =$
Let $s_0$ be the master secret key of the scheme in a real HIBE-IND-CPA$[d]$ attack on $m_{GS-HIBE}$, and let $D ← e(s_0H_{1,1}(id_1), C^*_1)$. Let $\text{Ask}$ be the event that $\mathcal{A}$ queries the $H_2$ oracle on point $D$. Let $\Pr_R[\cdot]$ denote the probability of an event taking place in a real attack on $m_{GS-HIBE}$, and let $\Pr_B[\cdot]$ denote the probability in the environment simulated by $\mathcal{B}$. We argue that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}]$, as long as $\mathcal{B}$ doesn’t abort. Let $\text{Ask}_i$ be the event that $\mathcal{A}$ queries $H_2(D)$ within the first $i$ queries to $H_2$. Obviously, $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_0] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}_0] = 0$. Now assume that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_{i-1}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}_{i-1}]$. We have that

$$
\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i] = \Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i \mid \text{Ask}_{i-1}] \cdot \Pr_R[\text{Ask}_{i-1}]
+ \Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i \mid \neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}] \cdot \Pr_R[\neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}]
= \Pr_R[\text{Ask}_{i-1}] + \Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i \mid \neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}] \cdot \Pr_R[\neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}].
$$

We know that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_{i-1}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}_{i-1}]$, so we only have to show that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i \mid \neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}_i \mid \neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}]$. Given that $\neg\text{Ask}_{i-1}$ and that $\mathcal{B}$’s simulation didn’t abort, the simulated public key, the oracle responses and the first $l$ components of the ciphertext provided by $\mathcal{B}$ are distributed exactly as in a real attack, as we explained before. Moreover, since $\mathcal{A}$ did not query for $H_2(D)$ yet, from $\mathcal{A}$’s point of view the last ciphertext component $C^*_l$ is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^n$, both in the real attack and in the simulated environment. Since all the information on which $\mathcal{A}$ can base its decision for its next query is identically distributed in both environments, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ chooses to query $D$ is the same in both environments as well. Hence, we have that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}_i] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}_i]$, and by induction that $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}]$.

The probability that $\mathcal{A}$ wins a real attack against $m_{GS-HIBE}$ can be written as

$$
\Pr_R[\text{A wins}] = \Pr_R[\text{A wins} \land \text{Ask}] + \Pr_R[\text{A wins} \land \neg\text{Ask}]
= \Pr_R[\text{A wins} \land \text{Ask}] + \frac{1}{2}
\leq \Pr_R[\text{Ask}] + \frac{1}{2},
$$
where the second equation is true because in the event $\neg \text{Ask}$, the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is completely independent of $M_0, M_1$, and hence the probability that $A$ guesses correctly is $1/2$. Since $\Pr_R[\text{Ask}] = \Pr_B[\text{Ask}]$ and moreover

$$\Pr_R[A \text{ wins}] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca}[d]}_{\text{mGS-HIBE},A}(k) + \frac{1}{2},$$

it follows that

$$\Pr_B[\text{Ask}] \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca}[d]}_{\text{mGS-HIBE},A}(k).$$

Now we only have to relate $B$'s advantage in solving the BDH problem to $\Pr_B[\text{Ask}]$. In the game simulated by $B$, the probability that $B$ guesses the correct identities such that $id = (id_1^*, \ldots, id_l^*)$ $1/\prod_{i=1}^l n_{1,i} \geq n_h^{-d(k)}$; the probability that $B$ guesses the correct $H_2$ query is $1/n_2 \geq n_h^{-1}$; and the probability that $B$ aborts when answering $H_1,i$ queries is $\sum_{i=1}^{d(k)} n_{1,i}/(p - 1) \leq n_h/2^k$. The advantage of $B$ in solving the BDH problem is

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{G,B}(k) \geq \frac{1}{n_h^{d(k)+1}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{n_h}{2^k}\right) \cdot \Pr_B[\text{Ask}],$$

and hence

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{hibe-ind-cca}[d]}_{\text{mGS-HIBE},A}(k) \leq 2 \cdot n_h^{d(k)+1} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{G,B}(k) + \frac{n_h}{2^k},$$

from which the theorem follows.
Appendix G

Robust Encryption

Abstract: We provide a provable-security treatment of “robust” encryption. Robustness means it is hard to produce a ciphertext that is valid for two different users. Robustness makes explicit a property that has been implicitly assumed in the past. We argue that it is an essential conjunct of anonymous encryption. We show that natural anonymity-preserving ways to achieve it, such as adding recipient identification information before encrypting, fail. We provide transforms that do achieve it, efficiently and provably. We assess the robustness of specific encryption schemes in the literature, providing simple patches for some that lack the property. We explain that robustness of the underlying anonymous IBE scheme is essential for PEKS (Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search) to be consistent (meaning, not have false positives), and our work provides the first generic conversions of anonymous IBE schemes to consistent (and secure) PEKS schemes. Overall, our work enables safer and simpler use of encryption.

G.1 Introduction

This paper provides a provable-security treatment of encryption “robustness.” Robustness reflects the difficulty of producing a ciphertext valid under two different encryption keys. The value of robustness is conceptual, “naming” something that has been undefined yet at times implicitly (and incorrectly) assumed. Robustness helps make encryption more misuse resistant. We provide formal definitions of several variants of the goal; consider and dismiss natural approaches to achieve it; provide two general robustness-adding transforms; test robustness of existing schemes and patch the ones that fail; and discuss some applications.

The definitions. Both the PKE and the IBE settings are of interest and the explication is simplified by unifying them as follows. Associate to each identity an encryption key, defined as the identity itself in the IBE case and its (honestly generated) public key in the PKE case. The adversary outputs a pair $id_0, id_1$ of distinct identities. For strong robustness, it also outputs a ciphertext $C^*$; for weak, it outputs a message $M^*$, and $C^*$ is defined as the encryption of $M^*$ under the encryption key $ek_1$ of $id_1$. The adversary wins if the decryptions of $C^*$ under the decryption keys $dk_0, dk_1$ corresponding to $ek_0, ek_1$ are both non-$\perp$. Both weak and strong robustness can be considered under chosen plaintext or chosen ciphertext attacks, resulting in
four notions (for each of PKE and IBE) that we denote WROB-CPA, WROB-CCA, SROB-CPA, SROB-CCA.

Why robustness? The primary security requirement for encryption is data-privacy, as captured by notions IND-CPA or IND-CCA \cite{GM84,RS92,DDN00,BDPR98,BF03}. Increasingly, we are also seeing a market for anonymity, as captured by notions ANO-CPA and ANO-CCA \cite{BBDP01,ABC+08}. Anonymity asks that a ciphertext does not reveal the encryption key under which it was created.

Where you need anonymity, there is a good chance you need robustness too. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that robustness is an essential companion of anonymous encryption. The reason is that without it we would have security without basic communication correctness, likely upsetting our application. This is best illustrated by the following canonical application of anonymous encryption, but shows up also, in less direct but no less important ways, in other applications. A sender wants to send a message to a particular target recipient, but, to hide the identity of this target recipient, anonymously encrypts it under her key and broadcasts the ciphertext to a larger group. But as a member of this group I need, upon receiving a ciphertext, to know whether or not I am the target recipient. (The latter typically needs to act on the message.) Of course I can’t tell whether the ciphertext is for me just by looking at it since the encryption is anonymous, but decryption should divulge this information. It does, unambiguously, if the encryption is robust (the ciphertext is for me iff my decryption of it is not ⊥) but otherwise I might accept a ciphertext (and some resulting message) of which I am not the target, creating mis-communication. Natural “solutions,” such as including the encryption key or identity of the target recipient in the plaintext before encryption and checking it upon decryption, are, in hindsight, just attempts to add robustness without violating anonymity and, as we will see, don’t work.

We were lead to formulate robustness upon revisiting Public key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) \cite{BDOP04}. In a clever usage of anonymity, Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano (BDOP) \cite{BDOP04} showed how this property in an IBE scheme allowed it to be turned into a privacy-respecting communications filter. But Abdalla et. al \cite{ABC+08} noted that the BDOP filter could lack consistency, meaning turn up false positives. Their solution was to modify the construction. What we observed instead was that consistency would in fact be provided by the original construct if the IBE scheme was robust. PEKS consistency turns out to correspond exactly to communication correctness of the anonymous IBE scheme in the sense discussed above. (Because the PEKS messages in the BDOP scheme are the recipients identities from the IBE perspective.) Besides resurrecting the BDOP construct, the robustness approach allows us to obtain the first consistent IND-CCA secure PEKS without random oracles.

Sako’s auction protocol \cite{Sak00} is important because it was the first truly practical one to hide the bids of losers. It makes clever use of anonymous encryption for privacy. But we present an attack on fairness whose cause is ultimately a lack of robustness in the anonymous encryption scheme (cf. Appendix G.8).

All this underscores a number of the claims we are making about robustness: that it is of conceptual value; that it makes encryption more resistant to mis-use; that it has been implicitly (and incorrectly) assumed; and that there is value to making it explicit, formally defining and provably achieving it.

Weak versus strong. The above-mentioned auction protocol fails because an adversary can create a ciphertext that decrypts correctly under any decryption key. Strong robustness is needed to prevent this. Weak robustness (of the underlying IBE) will yield PEKS consistency for honestly-encrypted messages but may allow spammers to bypass all filters with a single ciphertext, something prevented by strong robustness. Strong robustness trumps weak for applications and goes farther towards making encryption mis-use resistant. We have defined and
G.1. Introduction

Achieving robustness. As the reader has surely already noted, robustness (even strong) is trivially achieved by appending the encryption key to the ciphertext and checking for it upon decryption. The problem is that the resulting scheme is not anonymous and, as we have seen above, it is exactly for anonymous schemes that robustness is important. Of course, data privacy is important too. Letting \( \text{AI-ATK} = \text{ANO-ATK} + \text{IND-ATK} \) for \( \text{ATK} \in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\} \), our goal is to achieve \( \text{AI-ATK} + \text{XROB-ATK} \), ideally for both \( \text{ATK} \in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\} \) and \( \text{X} \in \{\text{W, S}\} \). This is harder.

Transforms. It is natural to begin by seeking a general transform that takes an arbitrary AI-ATK scheme and returns a AI-ATK + XROB-ATK one. This allows us to exploit known constructions of AI-ATK schemes, supports modular protocol design and also helps understand robustness divorced from the algebra of specific schemes. Furthermore, there is a natural and promising transform to consider. Namely, before encrypting, append to the message some redundancy, such as the recipient encryption key, a constant, or even a hash of the message, and check for its presence upon decryption. (Adding the redundancy before encrypting rather than after preserves AI-ATK.) Intuitively this should provide robustness because decryption with the “wrong” key will result, if not in rejection, then in recovery of a garbled plaintext, unlikely to possess the correct redundancy.

The truth is more complex. We consider two versions of the paradigm and summarize our findings in Figure G.1. In encryption with unkeyed redundancy, the redundancy is a function \( \text{RC} \) of the message and encryption key alone. In this case we show that the method fails spectacularly, not providing even weak robustness regardless of the choice of the function \( \text{RC} \). In encryption with keyed redundancy, we allow \( \text{RC} \) to depend on a key \( K \) that is placed in the public parameters of the transformed scheme, out of direct reach of the algorithms of the original scheme. In this form, the method can easily provide weak robustness, and that too with a very simple redundancy function, namely the one that simply returns \( K \).

But we show that even encryption with keyed redundancy fails to provide strong robustness. To achieve the latter we have to step outside the encryption with redundancy paradigm. We present a strong robustness conferring transform that uses a (non-interactive) commitment scheme. For subtle reasons, for this transform to work the starting scheme needs to already be weakly robust. If it isn’t already, we can make it so via our weak robustness transform.

In summary, on the positive side we provide a transform conferring weak robustness and another conferring strong robustness. Given any AI-ATK scheme the first transform returns a WROB-ATK + AI-ATK one. Given any AI-ATK + WROB-ATK scheme the second transform returns a SROB-ATK + AI-ATK one. In both cases it is for both \( \text{ATK} = \text{CPA and ATK = CCA} \) and in both cases the transform applies to what we call general encryption schemes, of which both PKE and IBE are special cases, so both are covered.

Robustness of specific schemes. The robustness of existing schemes is important because they might be in use. We ask which specific existing schemes are robust, and, for those that are not, whether they can be made so at a cost lower than that of applying one of our general transforms. There is no reason to expect schemes that are only AI-CPA to be robust since the decryption algorithm may never reject, so we focus on schemes that are known to be AI-CCA. This narrows the field quite a bit. Our findings and results are summarized in Figure G.1. Canonical AI-CCA schemes in the PKE setting are Cramer-Shoup (CS) in the standard model \([\text{CS03, BBDP01}]\) and DHIES in the random oracle (RO) model \([\text{ABR01, BBDP01}]\). We show that both are WROB-CCA but neither is SROB-CCA, the latter because encryption with
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transform</th>
<th>WROB-ATK</th>
<th>SROB-ATK</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encryption with unkeyed redundancy (EuR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption with keyed redundancy (EkR)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>setting</th>
<th>AI-CCA</th>
<th>WROB-CCA</th>
<th>SROB-CCA</th>
<th>RO model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$cS$</td>
<td>PKE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>[CS03, BBDP01]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$cS^*$</td>
<td>PKE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHIES</td>
<td>PKE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>[ABR01]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHIES*</td>
<td>PKE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b\forall$</td>
<td>IBE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>[BF01, ABC+08]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$bW$</td>
<td>IBE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>[BW06]</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure G.1: Achieving Robustness. The first table summarizes our findings on the encryption with redundancy transform. “No” means the method fails to achieve the indicated robustness for all redundancy functions, while “yes” means there exists a redundancy function for which it works. The second table summarizes robustness results about some specific AI-CCA schemes.

0 randomness yields a ciphertext valid under any encryption key. We present modified versions $cS^*$, $DHIES*$ of the schemes that we show are SROB-CCA. Our proof that $cS^*$ is SROB-CCA builds on the information-theoretic part of the proof of [CS03]. The result does not need to assume hardness of DDH. It relies instead on pre-image security of the underlying hash function for random range points, something not implied by collision-resistance but seemingly possessed by candidate functions.

In the IBE setting, the CCA version $b\forall$ of the RO model Boneh-Franklin scheme is AI-CCA [BF01, ABC+08], and we show it is SROB-CCA. The standard model Boyen-Waters scheme $bW$ is AI-CCA [BW06], and we show it is neither WROB-CCA nor SROB-CCA. It can be made either via our transforms but we don’t know of any more direct way to do this.

$b\forall$ is obtained via the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [FO99] and $bW$ via the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transform [CHK04, BCHK07]. We can show that neither transform generically provides strong robustness. This doesn’t say whether they do or not when applied to specific schemes, and indeed the first does for $b\forall$ and the second does not for $bW$.

Summary. Protocol design suggests that designers have the intuition that robustness is naturally present. This seems to be more often right than wrong when considering weak robustness of specific AI-CCA schemes. Prevailing intuition about generic ways to add even weak robustness is wrong, yet it can be done by an appropriate tweak of these ideas. Strong robustness is more likely to be absent than present in specific schemes, but important schemes can be patched. Strong robustness can also be added generically, but with more work.

Related work. There is growing recognition that robustness is important in applications and worth defining explicitly, supporting our own claims to this end. In particular the correctness requirement for predicate encryption [KSW08] includes a form of weak robustness and, in recent work concurrent to, and independent of, ours, Hofheinz and Weinreb [HW08] introduced a notion of well-addressedness of IBE schemes that is just like weak robustness except that the adversary gets the IBE master secret key. Neither work considers or achieves strong robustness, and neither treats PKE.
G.2. Definitions

Notation and conventions. If $x$ is a string then $|x|$ denotes its length, and if $S$ is a set then $|S|$ denotes its size. The empty string is denoted $\varepsilon$. By $a_1\ldots a_n$, we denote a string encoding of $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ from which $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ are uniquely recoverable. (Usually, concatenation suffices.) By $a_1\ldots a_n \leftarrow a$, we mean that $a$ is parsed into its constituents $a_1, \ldots, a_n$. Similarly, if $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ then $(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \leftarrow a$ means we parse $a$ as shown. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. By $y \leftarrow A(x_1, x_2, \ldots)$ we denote the operation of running $A$ on inputs $x_1, x_2, \ldots$ and fresh coins and letting $y$ denote the output. We denote by $[A(x_1, x_2, \ldots)]$ the set of all possible outputs of $A$ on inputs $x_1, x_2, \ldots$. We assume that an algorithm returns $\perp$ if any of its inputs is $\perp$.

Games. Our definitions and proofs use code-based game-playing [BR06]. Recall that a game —look at Figure G.2 for an example— has an Initialize procedure, procedures to respond to adversary oracle queries, and a Finalize procedure. A game $G$ is executed with an adversary $A$ as follows. First, Initialize executes and its outputs are the inputs to $A$. Then $A$ executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of $G$. When $A$ terminates, its output becomes the input to the Finalize procedure. The output of the latter, denoted $G^A$, is called the output of the game, and we let “$G^A$” denote the event that this game output takes value true. Boolean flags are assumed initialized to false. Games $G_i, G_j$ are identical until bad if their code differs only in statements that follow the setting of bad to true. Our proofs will use the following.

Lemma G.2.1 [BR06] Let $G_i, G_j$ be identical until bad games, and $A$ an adversary. Then

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_i \right] - \Pr \left[ G^A_j \right] \leq \Pr \left[ G^A_j \text{ sets bad} \right].$$

The running time of an adversary is the worst case time of the execution of the adversary with the game defining its security, so that the execution time of the called game procedures is included.

General encryption. We introduce and use general encryption schemes, of which both PKE and IBE are special cases. This allows us to avoid repeating similar definitions and proofs. A general encryption (GE) scheme is a tuple $\mathcal{G} = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec)$ of algorithms. The
parameter generation algorithm $\Pi$ takes no input and returns common parameter $\mathsf{pars}$ and a master secret key $\mathsf{msk}$. On input $\mathsf{pars}$, $\mathsf{msk}$, $\mathsf{id}$, the key generation algorithm $\mathsf{KG}$ produces an encryption key $\mathsf{ek}$ and decryption key $\mathsf{dk}$. On inputs $\mathsf{pars}$, $\mathsf{ek}$, $\mathsf{M}$, the encryption algorithm $\mathsf{Enc}$ produces a ciphertext $\mathsf{C}$ encrypting plaintext $\mathsf{M}$. On input $\mathsf{pars}$, $\mathsf{ek}$, $\mathsf{dk}$, $\mathsf{C}$, the deterministic decryption algorithm $\mathsf{Dec}$ returns either a plaintext message $\mathsf{M}$ or $\bot$ to indicate that it rejects. We say that $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{E}$ is a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme if $\mathsf{msk} = \varepsilon$ and $\mathsf{KG}$ ignores its $\mathsf{id}$ input. To recover the usual syntax we may in this case write the output of $\Pi$ as $\mathsf{pars}$ rather than $(\mathsf{pars}, \mathsf{msk})$ and omit $\mathsf{msk}$, $\mathsf{id}$ as inputs to $\mathsf{KG}$. We say that $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{E}$ is an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme if $\mathsf{ek} = \mathsf{id}$, meaning the encryption key created by $\mathsf{KG}$ on inputs $\mathsf{pars}$, $\mathsf{msk}$, $\mathsf{id}$ always equals $\mathsf{id}$. To recover the usual syntax we may in this case write the output of $\mathsf{KG}$ as $\mathsf{dk}$ rather than $(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{dk})$. It is easy to see that in this way we have recovered the usual primitives. But there are general encryption schemes that are neither PKE nor IBE schemes, meaning the primitive is indeed more general.

**Correctness.** Correctness of a general encryption scheme $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{E} = (\Pi, \mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ requires that, for all $(\mathsf{pars}, \mathsf{msk}) \in |\Pi|$, all plaintexts $\mathsf{M}$ in the underlying message space associated to $\mathsf{pars}$, all identities $\mathsf{id}$, and all $(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{dk}) \in |\mathsf{KG}(\mathsf{pars}, \mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{id})|$, we have $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pars}, \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{dk}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pars}, \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{M})) = \mathsf{M}$ with probability one, where the probability is taken over the coins of $\mathsf{Enc}$.

**AI-ATK Security.** Historically, definitions of data privacy (IND) [GM84], [RS92], [DDN00], [BDDP09], [BF03] and anonymity (ANON) [BBDP01] have been separate. We are interested in schemes that achieve both, so rather than use separate definitions we follow [BGGH07] and capture both simultaneously via game $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{E}}$ of Figure G.2. A cpa adversary is one that makes no $\mathsf{Dec}$ queries, and a cca adversary is one that might make such queries. The ai-advantage of such an adversary, in either case, is

$$\mathsf{Adv}^a_{\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{E}}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr[A^{\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{E}}] - 1.$$ 

We will assume an ai-adversary makes only one LR query, since a hybrid argument shows that making $q$ of them can increase its ai-advantage by a factor of at most $q$.

Oracle $\mathsf{GetDK}$ represents the IBE key-extraction oracle [BF03]. In the PKE case it is
G.3. Robustness failures of encryption with redundancy

A natural privacy-and-anonymity-preserving approach to add robustness to an encryption scheme is to add redundancy before encrypting, and upon decryption reject if the redundancy is absent. Here we investigate the effectiveness of this encryption with redundancy approach, justifying the negative results discussed in Section G.1 and summarized in the first table of Figure G.1.

Relations between notions. Figure G.4 shows implications and separations in the style of [BDPR98]. We consider each robustness notion in conjunction with the corresponding AI one since robustness is interesting only in this case. The implications are all trivial. The first separation shows that the strongest notion of privacy fails to imply even the weakest type of robustness. The second separation shows that weak robustness, even under CCA, doesn’t imply strong robustness. We stress that here an implication $A \rightarrow B$ means that any $A$-secure, unaltered, is $B$-secure. Correspondingly, a non-implication $A \not\rightarrow B$ means that there is an $A$-secure that, unaltered, is not $B$-secure. (It doesn’t mean that an $A$-secure scheme can’t be transformed into a $B$-secure one.) Only a minimal set of arrows and barred arrows is shown; others can be inferred. The picture is complete in the sense that it implies either an implication or a separation between any pair of notions.

G.3 Robustness failures of encryption with redundancy

ROBUSTNESS. Associated to general encryption scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{K}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ are games WROB, SROB of Figure G.3. As before, a CPA adversary is one that makes no Dec queries, and a CCA adversary is one that might make such queries. The wrob and srob advantages of an adversary, in either case, are

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{wrob}}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) = \Pr \left[ WROB^A_{\mathcal{E}} \right]$$

and

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{srob}}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) = \Pr \left[ SROB^A_{\mathcal{E}} \right].$$

The difference between WROB and SROB is that in the former the adversary produces a message $M$, and $C$ is its encryption under the encryption key of one of the given identities, while in the latter it produces $C$ directly, and may not obtain it as an honest encryption. It is worth clarifying that in the PKE case the adversary does not get to choose the encryption (public) keys of the identities it is targeting. These are honestly and independently chosen, in real life by the identities themselves and in our formalization by the games.

superfluous in the sense that removing it results in a definition that is equivalent up to a factor depending on the number of GetDK queries. That’s probably why the usual definition has no such oracle. But conceptually, if it is there for IBE, it ought to be there for PKE, and it does impact concrete security.
Chapter G. Robust Encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RKG</th>
<th>RC($K, ek∥M$)</th>
<th>RV($K, ek∥M, r$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Return $K ← \varepsilon$</td>
<td>Return $\varepsilon$</td>
<td>Return 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $K ← \varepsilon$</td>
<td>Return $0^k$</td>
<td>Return $(r = 0^k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $K ← \varepsilon$</td>
<td>Return $ek$</td>
<td>Return $(r = ek)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $K ← \varepsilon$</td>
<td>$L \overset{$}{\leftarrow} {0,1}^k$ ; Return $L∥H(L, ek∥M)$</td>
<td>Return $(r = H(L, ek∥M))$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure G.5: Examples of redundancy codes, where the data $x$ is of the form $ek∥M$. The first four are unkeyed and the last two are keyed.

Redundancy codes and the transform. A redundancy code $raxd = (\text{RKG, RC, RV})$ is a triple of algorithms. The redundancy key generation algorithm RKG generates a key $K$. On input $K$ and data $x$ the redundancy computation algorithm RC returns redundancy $r$. Given $K$, $x$, and claimed redundancy $r$, the deterministic redundancy verification algorithm RV returns 0 or 1. We say that $raxd$ is unkeyed if the key $K$ output by RKG is always equal to $\varepsilon$, and keyed otherwise. The correctness condition is that for all $x$ we have $RV(K, x, RC(K, x)) = 1$ with probability one, where the probability is taken over the coins of RKG and RC. (We stress that the latter is allowed to be randomized.)

Given a general encryption scheme $g\varepsilon = (\text{PG, KG, Enc, Dec})$ and a redundancy code $raxd = (\text{RKG, RC, RV})$, the encryption with redundancy transform associates to them the general encryption scheme $\overline{g\varepsilon} = (\text{PG, RC, Enc, Dec})$ whose algorithms are shown on the left side of Figure G.6. Note that the transform has the first of our desired properties, namely that it preserves AI-ATK. Also if $g\varepsilon$ is a PKE scheme then so is $\overline{g\varepsilon}$, and if $g\varepsilon$ is an IBE scheme then so is $\overline{g\varepsilon}$, which means the results we obtain here apply to both settings.

Figure G.5 shows example redundancy codes for the transform. With the first, $\overline{g\varepsilon}$ is identical to $g\varepsilon$, so that the counterexample below shows that AI-CCA does not imply WROB-CPA, justifying the first separation of Figure G.3. The second and third rows show redundancy equal to a constant or the encryption key as examples of (unkeyed) redundancy codes. The fourth row shows a code that is randomized but still unkeyed. The hash function $H$ could be a MAC or a collision resistant function. The last two are keyed redundancy codes, the first the simple one that just always returns the key, and the second using a hash function. Obviously, there are many other examples.

SROB failure. We show that encryption with redundancy fails to provide strong robustness for all redundancy codes, whether keyed or not. More precisely, we show that for any redundancy code $raxd$ and both ATK $\in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\}$, there is an AI-ATK encryption scheme $g\varepsilon$ such that the scheme $\overline{g\varepsilon}$ resulting from the encryption-with-redundancy transform applied to $g\varepsilon$, $raxd$ is not SROB-CPA. We build $g\varepsilon$ by modifying a given AI-ATK encryption scheme $g\varepsilon^* = (\text{PG, KG, Enc^*, Dec^*})$. Let $l$ be the number of coins used by RC, and let $RC(x; \omega)$ denote the result of executing RC on input $x$ with coins $\omega \in \{0,1\}^l$. Let $M^*$ be a function that given $pars$ returns a point in the message space associated to $pars$ in $g\varepsilon^*$. Then $g\varepsilon = (\text{PG, KG, Enc, Dec})$ where the new algorithms are shown on the bottom right side of Figure G.6. The reason we used $0^l$ as coins for RC here is that Dec is required to be deterministic.

Our first claim is that the assumption that $g\varepsilon^*$ is AI-ATK implies that $g\varepsilon$ is too. Our second claim, that $\overline{g\varepsilon}$ is not SROB-CPA, is demonstrated by the following attack. For a pair $id_0, id_1$ of distinct identities of its choice, the adversary $A$, on input $(pars, K)$, begins with queries $ek_0 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{GetEK}(id_0)$ and $ek_1 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{GetEK}(id_1)$. It then creates ciphertext $C \leftarrow 0∥K$ and returns $(id_0, id_1, C)$. We claim that $\text{Adv}_{\overline{g\varepsilon}}^\text{SROB}(A) = 1$. Letting $dk_0, dk_1$ denote the decryption keys
corresponding to $e_k_0$, $e_k_1$ respectively, the reason is the following. For both $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the output of $\text{Dec}(\text{pars}, e_k_b, d_k_b, C)$ is $M^*(\text{pars})||r_b(\text{pars})$ where $r_b(\text{pars}) = \text{RC}(K, e_k_b, M^*(\text{pars}); 0^l)$. But the correctness of $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{E}_D}$ implies that $\text{RV}(K, e_k_b, M^*(\text{pars}), r_b(\text{pars})) = 1$ and hence $\text{Dec}((\text{pars}, K), e_k_b, d_k_b, C)$ returns $M^*(\text{pars})$ rather than $\perp$.

WROB FAILURE. We show that encryption with redundancy fails to provide even weak robustness for all unkeyed redundancy codes. This is still a powerful negative result because many forms of redundancy that might intuitively work, such as the first four of Figure G.5, are included. More precisely, we claim that for any unkeyed redundancy code $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_D}$ and both ATK $\in \{\text{CPA}, \text{CCA}\}$, there is an AI-ATK encryption scheme $\mathcal{E}_E$ such that the scheme $\mathcal{E}_F$ resulting from the encryption-with-redundancy transform applied to $\mathcal{E}_E, \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_D}$ is not WROB-CPA. We build $\mathcal{E}_E$ by modifying a given AI-ATK + WROB-CPA encryption scheme $\mathcal{E}_{E^*} = (\text{PG}, \text{KG}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Dec}^*)$. With notation as above, the new algorithms for the scheme $\mathcal{E}_E = (\text{PG}, \text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ are shown on the top right side of Figure G.6.

Our first claim is that the assumption that $\mathcal{E}_{E^*}$ is AI-ATK implies that $\mathcal{E}_E$ is too. Our second claim, that $\mathcal{E}_E$ is not WROB-CPA, is demonstrated by the following attack. For a pair $i_d_0, i_d_1$ of distinct identities of its choice, the adversary $A$, on input $(\text{pars}, \varepsilon)$, makes queries $e_k_0 \xrightarrow{\delta} \text{GetEK}(i_d_0)$ and $e_k_1 \xrightarrow{\delta} \text{GetEK}(i_d_1)$ and returns $(i_d_0, i_d_1, M^*(\text{pars}))$. We claim that $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}_{E^*}}(A)$ is high. Letting $d_k_1$ denote the decryption key corresponding to $e_k_1$, the reason is the following. Let $r_0 \xrightarrow{\delta} \text{RC}(\varepsilon, e_k_0||M^*(\text{pars}))$ and $C \xrightarrow{\delta} \text{Enc}(\text{pars}, e_k_0, M^*(\text{pars})||r_0)$. The assumed WROB-CPA security of $\mathcal{E}_{E^*}$ implies that $\text{Dec}(\text{pars}, e_k_1, d_k_1, C)$ is most probably $M^*(\text{pars})||r_1(\text{pars})$ where $r_1(\text{pars}) = \text{RC}(\varepsilon, e_k_1||M^*(\text{pars}); 0^l)$. But the correctness of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_D}$ implies that $\text{RV}(\varepsilon, e_k_1||M^*(\text{pars}), r_1(\text{pars})) = 1$ and hence $\text{Dec}((\text{pars}, \varepsilon), e_k_1, d_k_1, C)$ returns $M^*(\text{pars})$ rather than $\perp$.

G.4 Transforms that work

We present a transform that confers weak robustness and another that confers strong robustness. They preserve privacy and anonymity, work for PKE as well as IBE, and for CPA as well as

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**Figure G.6:** Left: Transformed scheme for the encryption with redundancy paradigm. Top Right: Counterexample for WROB. Bottom Right: Counterexample for SROB.
CCA. In both cases the security proofs surface some delicate issues. Besides being useful in its own right, the weak robustness transform is a crucial step in obtaining strong robustness, so we begin there.

**Weak robustness transform.** We saw that encryption-with-redundancy fails to provide even weak robustness if the redundancy code is unkeyed. Here we show that if the redundancy code is keyed, even in the simplest possible way where the redundancy is just the key itself, the transform does provide weak robustness, turning any AI-ATK secure general encryption scheme into an AI-ATK + WROB-ATK one, for both ATK ∈ \{CPA, CCA\}.

The transformed scheme encrypts with the message a key \(K\) placed in the public parameters. In more detail, the weak robustness transform associates to a given general encryption scheme \(\mathcal{E} = (\mathsf{PG}, \mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})\) and integer parameter \(k\), representing the length of \(K\), the general encryption scheme \(\overline{\mathcal{E}} = (\overline{\mathsf{PG}}, \overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})\) whose algorithms are depicted in Figure G.7. Note that if \(\mathcal{E}\) is a PKE scheme then so is \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\) and if \(\mathcal{E}\) is an IBE scheme then so is \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\), so that our results, captured by Theorem G.4.1 below, cover both settings.

The intuition for the weak robustness of \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\) is that the \(\mathcal{E}\) decryption under one key, of an encryption of \(M|K\) created under another key, cannot, by the assumed AI-ATK security of \(\mathcal{E}\), reveal \(K\), and hence the check will fail. This is pretty much right for PKE, but the delicate issue is that for IBE, information about \(K\) can enter via the identities, which in this case are the encryption keys and are chosen by the adversary as a function of \(K\). The AI-ATK security of \(\mathcal{E}\) is no protection against this. We show however that this can be dealt with by making \(K\) sufficiently longer than the identities.

**Theorem G.4.1** Let \(\mathcal{E} = (\mathsf{PG}, \mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})\) be a general encryption scheme with identity space \(\{0,1\}^n\), and let \(\overline{\mathcal{E}} = (\overline{\mathsf{PG}}, \overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})\) be the general encryption scheme resulting from applying the weak robustness transform to \(\mathcal{E}\) and integer parameter \(k\). Then

1. **AI-ATK:** Let \(A\) be an ai-adversary against \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\). Then there is an ai-adversary \(B\) against \(\mathcal{E}\) such that

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{ai}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) = \text{Adv}^\text{ai}_{\overline{\mathcal{E}}}(B).
\]

Adversary \(B\) inherits the query profile of \(A\) and has the same running time as \(A\). If \(A\) is a cpa adversary then so is \(B\).

2. **WROB-ATK:** Let \(A\) be a wrob adversary against \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\) with running time \(t\), and let \(\ell = 2n + \lceil \log_2(t) \rceil\). Then there is an ai-adversary \(B\) against \(\mathcal{E}\) such that

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{wrob}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ai}_{\overline{\mathcal{E}}}(B) + 2^{\ell - k}.
\]

Adversary \(B\) inherits the query profile of \(A\) and has the same running time as \(A\). If \(A\) is a cpa adversary then so is \(B\).

The first part of the theorem implies that if \(\mathcal{E}\) is AI-ATK then \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\) is AI-ATK as well. The second part of the theorem implies that if \(\mathcal{E}\) is AI-ATK and \(k\) is chosen sufficiently larger than \(2n + \lceil \log_2(t) \rceil\) then \(\overline{\mathcal{E}}\) is WROB-ATK. In both cases this is for both \(\text{ATK} \in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\}\). The theorem says it directly for CCA, and for CPA by the fact that if \(A\) is a cpa adversary then so is \(B\). When we say that \(B\) inherits the query profile of \(A\) we mean that for every oracle that \(B\) has, if \(A\) has an oracle of the same name and makes \(q\) queries to it, then this is also the number \(B\) makes. The proof of the first part of the theorem is straightforward and is omitted. The proof of the second part is given in Appendix G.9. It is well known that collision-resistant hashing of identities preserves AI-ATK and serves to make them of fixed length \(|\mathcal{E}|\), so the assumption that the identity space is \(\{0,1\}^n\) rather than \(\{0,1\}^*\) is not really a restriction. In practice we might hash with SHA256 so that \(n = 256\), and, assuming \(t \leq 2^{128}\), setting \(k = 768\) would make \(2^{\ell - k} = 2^{-128}\).
G.4. Transforms that work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm $\mathbb{PG}$</th>
<th>Algorithm $\mathbb{KG}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(\text{pars}, \text{msk}) \xrightarrow{s} \mathbb{PG}$</td>
<td>$(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \xrightarrow{s} \mathbb{KG}(\text{pars}, \text{msk}, \text{id})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K \xrightarrow{s} {0,1}^k$</td>
<td>Return $(\text{ek}, \text{dk})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $((\text{pars}, K), \text{msk})$</td>
<td>Algorithm $\text{Dec}((\text{pars}, K), \text{ek}, \text{dk}, C)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \xrightarrow{s} \text{Enc}(\text{pars}, \text{ek}, M</td>
<td>K)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $C$</td>
<td>If $M = \bot$ then return $\bot$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M \parallel K^* \leftarrow M$</td>
<td>Else Return $\bot$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure G.7: General encryption scheme $\overline{\mathcal{E}} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ resulting from applying our weak-robustness transform to general encryption scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ and integer parameter $k$.

Commitment schemes. Our strong robustness transform will use commitments. A commitment scheme is a 3-tuple $\mathcal{CMT} = (\mathbb{Com}, \text{Com}, \text{Ver})$. The parameter generation algorithm $\mathbb{CPG}$ returns public parameters $\text{cpars}$. The committal algorithm $\text{Com}$ takes $\text{cpars}$ and data $x$ as input and returns a commitment $\text{com}$ to $x$ along with a decommittal key $\text{dec}$. The deterministic verification algorithm $\text{Ver}$ takes $\text{cpars}, x, \text{com}, \text{dec}$ as input and returns 1 to indicate that accepts or 0 to indicate that it rejects. Correctness requires that, for any $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, any $\text{cpars} \in [\mathbb{CPG}]$, and any $(\text{com}, \text{dec}) \in [\text{Com}(\text{cpars}, x)]$, we have that $\text{Ver}(\text{cpars}, x, \text{com}, \text{dec}) = 1$ with probability one, where the probability is taken over the coins of $\text{Com}$. We require the scheme to have the uniqueness property, which means that for any $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, any $\text{cpars} \in [\mathbb{CPG}]$, and any $(\text{com}, \text{dec}) \in [\text{Com}(\text{cpars}, x)]$ it is the case that $\text{Ver}(\text{cpars}, x, \text{com}^*, \text{dec}) = 0$ for all $\text{com}^* \neq \text{com}$. In most schemes the decommittal key is the randomness used by the committal algorithm and verification is by re-applying the committal function, which ensures uniqueness. The advantage measures $\text{Adv}^\text{hide}_{\mathcal{CMT}}(A)$ and $\text{Adv}^\text{bind}_{\mathcal{CMT}}(A)$, referring to the standard hiding and binding properties, are recalled in Appendix G.6. We refer to the corresponding notions as $\text{HIDE}$ and $\text{BIND}$.

The strong robustness transform. The idea is for the ciphertext to include a commitment to the encryption key. The commitment is not encrypted, but the decommittal key is. In detail, given a general encryption scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ and a commitment scheme $\mathcal{CMT} = (\mathbb{CPG}, \text{Com}, \text{Ver})$, the strong robustness transform associates to them the general encryption scheme $\overline{\mathcal{E}} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ whose algorithms are depicted in Figure G.8. Note that if $\mathcal{E}$ is a PKE scheme then so is $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$ and if $\mathcal{E}$ is an IBE scheme then so is $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$, so that our results, captured by the Theorem 4.4.2, cover both settings.

In this case the delicate issue is not the robustness but the AI-ATK security of $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$ in the CCA case. Intuitively, the hiding security of the commitment scheme means that a $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$ ciphertext does not reveal the encryption key. As a result, we would expect AI-ATK security of $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$ to follow from the commitment hiding security and the assumed AI-ATK security of $\mathcal{E}$. This turns out not to be true, and demonstrably so, meaning there is a counterexample to this claim. (See below.) What we show is that the claim is true if $\mathcal{E}$ is additionally WROB-ATK. This property, if not already present, can be conferred by first applying our weak robustness transform.

Theorem G.4.2 Let $\mathcal{E} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a general encryption scheme, and let $\overline{\mathcal{E}} = (\mathbb{PG}, \mathbb{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be the general encryption scheme resulting from applying the strong robustness transform to $\mathcal{E}$ and commitment scheme $\mathcal{CMT} = (\mathbb{CPG}, \text{Com}, \text{Ver})$. Then

1. **AI-ATK**: Let $A$ be an ai-adversary against $\overline{\mathcal{E}}$. Then there is a wrob adversary $W$ against
The need for weak-robustness. As we said above, the AI-ATK security of \( g^E \) won’t be implied merely by that of \( g^E \). (We had to additionally assume that \( g^E \) is WROB-ATK.) Here we justify this somewhat counter-intuitive claim. This discussion is informal but can be turned into a formal counterexample. Imagine that the decryption algorithm of \( g^E \) returns a fixed string of the form \((M, \text{dec})\) whenever the wrong key is used to decrypt. Moreover, imagine \( \mathcal{CMT} \) is such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{g^E}^\text{AI-ATK}(A) = 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{g^E}^\text{WROB}(W) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{CMT}}^\text{HIDE}(H) + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{g^E}^\text{AI}(B).
\]

Adversaries \( W, B \) inherit the query profile of \( A \), and adversaries \( W, H, B \) have the same running time as \( A \). If \( A \) is a CPA adversary then so are \( W, B \).

2. SROB-ATK: Let \( A \) be a srob adversary against \( g^E \) making \( q \) \( \text{GetEK} \) queries. Then there is a binding adversary \( B \) against \( \mathcal{CMT} \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{g^E}^\text{SROB}(A) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{CMT}}^\text{BIND}(B) + \left( \frac{q}{2} \right) \cdot \text{Coll}_{g^E}.
\]

Adversary \( B \) has the same running time as \( A \).

The first part of the theorem implies that if \( g^E \) is AI-ATK and WROB-ATK and \( \mathcal{CMT} \) is HIDE then \( g^E \) is AI-ATK, and the second part of the theorem implies that if \( \mathcal{CMT} \) is BIND secure and \( g^E \) has low encryption key collision probability then \( g^E \) is SROB-ATK. In both cases this is for both ATK \( \in \{\text{CPA}, \text{CCA}\} \). We remark that the proof shows that in the CPA case the WROB-ATK assumption on \( g^E \) in the first part is actually not needed. The encryption key collision probability \( \text{Coll}_{g^E} \) of \( g^E \) is defined as the maximum probability that \( ek_0 = ek_1 \) in the experiment

\[
(pars, msk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PG} : (ek_0, dk_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(pars, msk, id_0) : (ek_1, dk_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(pars, msk, id_1),
\]

where the maximum is over all distinct identities \( id_0, id_1 \). The collision probability is zero in the IBE case since \( ek_0 = id_0 \neq id_1 = ek_1 \). It is easy to see that \( g^E \) being AI implies \( \text{Coll}_{g^E} \) is negligible, so asking for low encryption key collision probability is in fact not an extra assumption. (For a general encryption scheme the adversary needs to have hardwired the identities that achieve the maximum, but this is not necessary for PKE because here the probability being maximized is the same for all pairs of distinct identities.) The reason we made the encryption key collision probability explicit is that for most schemes it is unconditionally low. For example, when \( g^E \) is the ElGamal PKE scheme, it is \( 1/|G| \) where \( G \) is the group being used. Proofs of both parts of the theorem are in Appendix G.29.
Given a key commitment $\hat{\com}$, for the latter, the advantage is the maximum probability over all and is implied by the notion of “everywhere pre-image resistance” of [RS04], the difference being that, for the latter, the advantage is the maximum probability over all $\com \in \mathbb{G}^4$. The message space is $\mathbb{G}$.

that it is easy, given $\ca{pars}, x, \dec$, to find $\com$ so that $\Ver(\ca{pars}, x, \com, \dec) = 1$. (This is true for any commitment scheme where $\dec$ is the coins used by the $\Com$ algorithm.) Consider then the $\Al$-ATK adversary $\Al$ against the transformed scheme that that receives a challenge ciphertext $(\com^* \cdot \com^*)$ where $\com^* \leftarrow \Enc(\ca{pars}, \EK[xid])$, $\com^* \parallel \dec$ for hidden bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. It then creates a commitment $\com \cdot \com^*$ of $\EK[xid]$ with opening information $\dec$, and queries $(\com^* \cdot \com^*)$ to be decrypted under $\DK[xid]$. If $b = 0$ this query will probably return $\bot$ because $\Ver(\ca{pars}, \EK[xid], \com \cdot \com^*, \dec)_{com}$ is unlikely to be $1$, but if $b = 1$ it returns $\hat{M}$, allowing $\Al$ to determine the value of $b$. The weak robustness of $\hat{\com} \com$ rules out such anomalies.

### G.5 A SROB-CCA version of Cramer-Shoup

Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order $p$, and $H \colon \Keys(H) \times \mathbb{G}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ a family of functions. We assume $\mathbb{G}, p, H$ are fixed and known to all parties. Figure G.9 shows the Cramer-Shoup (CS) scheme and the variant $\com^*$ scheme where $\mathbb{1}$ denotes the identity element of $\mathbb{G}$. The differences are boxed.

Recall that the CS scheme was shown to be IND-CCA in [CS03] and ANO-CCA in [BBDP01]. However, for any message $M \in \mathbb{G}$ the ciphertext $(1, 1, M, 1)$ in the CS scheme decrypts to $M$ under any $\ca{pars}, \pk$, and $\sk$, meaning in particular that the scheme is not even SROB-CPA. The modified scheme $\com^*$ — which continues to be IND-CCA and ANO-CCA — removes this pathological case by having $\Enc$ choose the randomness $u$ to be non-zero — $\Enc$ draws $u$ from $\Z_p$ while the CS scheme draws it from $\Z_p$ — and then having $\Dec$ reject $(a_1, a_2, c, d)$ if $a_1 = 1$. This thwarts the attack, but is there any other attack? We show that there is not by proving that $\com^*$ is actually SROB-CCA. Our proof of robustness relies only on the security — specifically, pre-image resistance — of the hash family $H$: it does not make the DDH assumption. Our proof uses ideas from the information-theoretic part of the proof of [CS03].

We say that a family $H \colon \Keys(H) \times \Domain(H) \rightarrow \Range(H)$ of functions is $\preimage$ resistant if, given a key $K$ and a random range element $\com^*$, it is computationally infeasible to find a pre-image of $\com^*$ under $H(K, \cdot)$. The notion is captured formally by the following advantage measure for an adversary $I$:

$$\Adv^\preimage_H(I) = \Pr \left[ H(K, x) = \com^* : K \xleftarrow{\$} \Keys(H) ; \com^* \xleftarrow{\$} \Range(H) ; x \xleftarrow{\$} I(K, \com^*) \right].$$

Pre-image resistance is not implied by the standard notion of one-wayness, since in the latter the target $\com^*$ is the image under $H(K, \cdot)$ of a random domain point, which may not be a random range point. However, it seems like a fairly mild assumption on a practical cryptographic hash function and is implied by the notion of “everywhere pre-image resistance” of [RS04], the difference being that, for the latter, the advantage is the maximum probability over all $\com^* \in \Range(H)$. We now

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm $\PG$</th>
<th>Algorithm $\KG(g_1, g_2, K)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$K \xleftarrow{$} \Keys(H) ; g_1 \xleftarrow{$} \mathbb{G}^* ; w \xleftarrow{$} \Z_p^*$</td>
<td>$x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z_1, z_2 \xleftarrow{$} \Z_p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g_2 \leftarrow g_1^w$ ; Return $(g_1, g_2, K)$</td>
<td>$e \leftarrow g_1^1 g_2^2 ; f \leftarrow g_1^1 g_2^2$ ; $h \leftarrow g_1^1 g_2^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u \xleftarrow{$} \mathbb{G}$</td>
<td>Return $((e, f, h), (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z_1, z_2))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_1 \leftarrow g_1^1 ; a_2 \leftarrow g_1^2 ; b \leftarrow h^u$</td>
<td>$a_1, a_2, c, d) \leftarrow C$ ; $v \leftarrow H(K, (a_1, a_2, c)) ; M \leftarrow c \cdot a_1^{-1} a_2^{-2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e \leftarrow b \cdot M ; v \leftarrow H(K, (a_1, a_2, c))$</td>
<td>If $d \neq a_1^{-1} a_2^{-2} g_2^2 + g_2^2 v$ Then $M \leftarrow \bot$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d \leftarrow e^u f^v$ ; Return $(a_1, a_2, c, d)$</td>
<td>If $a_1 = 1$ Then $M \leftarrow \bot$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $M$</td>
<td>Return $M$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure G.9: The original CS scheme [CS03] does not contain the boxed code while the variant $\com^*$ does. Although not shown above, the decryption algorithm in both versions always checks to ensure that the ciphertext $\com \in \mathbb{G}^4$. The message space is $\mathbb{G}$.
claim the following.

**Theorem G.5.1** Let $B$ be an adversary making two $\text{GetEK}$ queries, no $\text{GetDK}$ queries and at most $q - 1$ $\text{Dec}$ queries, and having running time $t$. Then we can construct an adversary $I$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{CS}^*}^\text{stop}(A) \leq \text{Adv}_H^\text{pre-im}(I) + \frac{2q + 1}{p}. \quad (G.1)$$

Furthermore, the running time of $I$ is $t + q \cdot O(t_{\text{exp}})$ where $t_{\text{exp}}$ denotes the time for one exponentiation in $G$.

Since $\text{CS}^*$ is a PKE scheme, the above automatically implies security even in the presence of multiple $\text{GetEK}$ and $\text{GetDK}$ queries as required by game $\text{SROB}_{\text{CS}^*}$. Thus the theorem implies that $\text{CS}^*$ is SROB-CCA if $H$ is pre-image resistant. A detailed proof of Theorem G.5.1 is in Appendix G.10. Here we sketch some intuition.

We begin by conveniently modifying the game interface. We replace $B$ with an adversary $A$ that gets input $(y_1, y_2, K), (e_0, f_0, h_0), (e_1, f_1, h_1)$ representing the parameters that would be input to $B$ and the public keys returned in response to $B$’s two $\text{GetEK}$ queries. Let $(x_{01}, x_{02}, y_{01}, y_{02}, z_{01}, z_{02})$ and $(x_{11}, x_{12}, y_{11}, y_{12}, z_{11}, z_{12})$ be the corresponding secret keys. The decryption oracle takes (only) a ciphertext and returns its decryption under both secret keys, setting a WIN flag if these are both non-$\bot$. Adversary $A$ no longer needs an output, since it can win via a $\text{Dec}$ query.

Suppose $A$ makes a $\text{Dec}$ query $(a_1, a_2, d, c)$. Then the code of the decryption algorithm $\text{Dec}$ from Figure G.9 tells us that, for this to be a winning query, it must be that

$$d = a_1^{x_{01} + y_{01}v} a_2^{x_{02} + y_{02}v} = a_1^{x_{11} + y_{11}v} a_2^{x_{12} + y_{12}v}$$

where $v = H(K, (a_1, a_2, c))$. Letting $u_1 = \log_{y_1}(a_1), u_2 = \log_{y_2}(a_2)$ and $s = \log_{y_1}(d)$, we have

$$s = u_1(x_{01} + y_{01}v) + wu_2(x_{02} + y_{02}v) = u_1(x_{11} + y_{11}v) + wu_2(x_{12} + y_{12}v) \quad (G.2)$$

However, even acknowledging that $A$ knows little about $x_{b1}, x_{b2}, y_{b1}, y_{b2} \in \{0, 1\}$ through its $\text{Dec}$ queries, it is unclear why Equation (G.2) is prevented by pre-image resistance—or in fact any property short of being a random oracle—of the hash function $H$. In particular, there seems no way to “plant” a target $v^*$ as the value $v$ of Equation (G.2) since the adversary controls $u_1$ and $u_2$. However, suppose now that $a_2 = a_1^{\gamma}$. (We will discuss later why we can assume this.) This implies $wu_2 = wu_1$ or $u_2 = u_1$ since $w \neq 0$. Now from Equation (G.2) we have

$$u_1(x_{01} + y_{01}v) + wu_1(x_{02} + y_{02}v) - u_1(x_{11} + y_{11}v) - wu_1(x_{12} + y_{12}v) = 0. $$

We now see the value of enforcing $a_1 \neq 1$, since this implies $u_1 \neq 0$. After canceling $u_1$ and re-arranging terms, we have

$$v(y_{01} + w y_{02} - y_{11} - w y_{12}) + (x_{01} + w x_{02} - x_{11} - w x_{12}) = 0. \quad (G.3)$$

Given that $x_{b1}, x_{b2}, y_{b1}, y_{b2} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $w$ are chosen by the game, there is at most one solution $v$ (modulo $p$) to Equation (G.3). We would like now to design $I$ so that on input $K, v^*$ it chooses $x_{b1}, x_{b2}, y_{b1}, y_{b2} \in \{0, 1\}$ so that the solution $v$ to Equation (G.3) is $v^*$. Then $(a_1, a_2, c)$ will be a pre-image of $v^*$ which $I$ can output.

To make all this work, we need to resolve two problems. The first is why we may assume $a_2 = a_1^{\gamma}$—which is what enables Equation (G.3)—given that $a_1, a_2$ are chosen by $A$. The second is to properly design $I$ and show that it can simulate $A$ correctly with high probability. To solve these problems, we consider, as in [CSES13], a modified check under which decryption, rather than rejecting when $d \neq a_1^{x_1 + y_1 v} a_2^{x_2 + y_2 v}$, rejects when $a_2 \neq a_1^{\gamma}$ or $d \neq a_1^{x + y v}$, where $x = x_1 + w x_2, y = y_1 + w y_2, v = H(K, (a_1, a_2, c))$ and $(a_1, a_2, c, d)$ is the ciphertext being decrypted. In our
proof in Appendix G.10, games G0–G2 move us towards this perspective. Then, we fork off two
game chains. Games G3–G6 are used to show that the modified decryption rule increases the
adversary’s advantage by at most $2q/p$. Games G7–G11 show how to embed a target value $v^*$
into the components of the secret key without significantly affecting the ability to answer Dec
queries. Based on the latter, we then construct $I$ as shown in Appendix G.10.

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**G.6 Appendix: Hiding and blinding of commitment schemes**

The advantage measures

$$\text{Adv}_c^{\text{hide}}(A) = 2 \cdot \Pr[HIDE_A^c \Rightarrow \text{true}] - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Adv}_c^{\text{bind}}(A) = \Pr[BIND_A^c \Rightarrow \text{true}],$$

which refer to the games of Figure G.10 capture, respectively, the standard hiding and binding
properties of a commitment scheme. We refer to the corresponding notions as HIDE and BIND.

**G.7 Appendix: More results on robustness of specific transforms and schemes**

**The Boneh-Franklin IBE.** Boneh and Franklin proposed the first truly practical provably
secure IBE scheme in [BF01]. They also propose a variant that uses the FO transform to obtain
provable IND-CCA security in the random oracle model under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
assumption; we refer to it as the BF-IBE scheme here. A straightforward modification of
the proof can be used to show that BF-IBE is also ANO-CCA in the random oracle model under the
same assumption. We now give a proof sketch that BF-IBE is also (unconditionally) SROB-CCA
in the random oracle model.
In an initialization step, the auctioneer generates $N$ practical one to hide the bids of losers. Let Sako’s auction protocol [Sak00] is important because it is the first truly The protocol. way to attacks on applications like Sako’s auction protocol [Sak00]. For random oracles $H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1^*$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k$, $H_3 : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and $H_4 : \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l$, the encryption of a message $M$ under identity $id$ is a tuple
\[
\left( g^{r}, x \oplus H_2(e(S,H_1(id))^r), M \oplus H_4(x) \right),
\]
where $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$ and $r \leftarrow H_3(x,M)$. To decrypt a ciphertext $(C_1, C_2, C_3)$, the user with identity $id$ and decryption key $usk = H_1(id)^*$ computes $x \leftarrow C_2 \oplus H_2(e(C_1, usk))$, $M \leftarrow C_3 \oplus H_4(x)$, and $r \leftarrow H_3(x,M)$. If $C_1 \neq g^r$ he rejects, otherwise he outputs $M$.

Let us now consider a SROB-CCA adversary $A$ that even knows the master secret $s$ (and therefore can derive all keys and decrypt all ciphertexts that it wants). Since $H_1$ maps into $\mathbb{G}_1^*$, all its outputs are of full order $p$. The probability that $A$ finds two identities $id_1$ and $id_2$ such that $H_1(id) = H_1(id_2)$ is negligible. Since $S \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$ and the map is non-degenerate, we therefore have that $g_{id_1} = e(S,H_1(id_1))$ and $g_{id_2} = e(S,H_1(id_2))$ are different and of full order $p$. Since $H_3$ maps into $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, we have that $r \neq 0$, and therefore that $g_{id_1}$ and $g_{id_2}$ are different. If the output of $H_2$ is large enough to prevent collisions from being found, that also means that $H_2(g_{id_1})$ and $H_2(g_{id_2})$ are different. Decryption under both identities therefore yields two different values $x_1 \neq x_2$, and possibly different messages $M_1, M_2$. In order for the ciphertext to be valid for both identities, we need that $r = H_3(x_1, M_1) = H_3(x_2, M_2)$, but the probability of this happening is again negligible in the random oracle model. As a result, it follows that the BF-IBE scheme is also SROB-CCA in the random oracle model.

The Boyen-Waters IBE. Boyen and Waters [BW06] proposed a HIBE scheme which is IND-CPA and ANO-CPA in the standard model, and a variant that uses the CHK transform to achieve IND-CCA and ANO-CCA security. Decryption in the IND-CPA secure scheme never rejects, so it is definitely not SROB-CPA. Without going into details here, it is easy to see that the IND-CCA variant is not SROB-CPA either, because any ciphertext that is valid with respect to one identity will also be valid with respect to another identity, since the verification of the one-time signature does not depend on the identity of the recipient. (The natural fix to include the identity in the signed data may ruin anonymity.)

The IND-CCA-secure variant of Gentry’s IBE scheme [Gen06] falls to a similar robustness attack as the original Cramer-Shoup scheme, by choosing a random exponent $r = 0$. We did not check whether explicitly forbidding this choice restores robustness, however.

### G.8 Appendix: Application to auctions

**Robustness of ElGamal.** The parameters of the ElGamal encryption scheme consist of the description of a group $G$ of prime order $p$ with generator $g$. The secret key of a user is $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, the corresponding public key is $X = g^x$. The encryption of a message $M$ is the pair $(g^{r}, X^r \cdot M)$ for $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. A ciphertext $(R, S)$ is decrypted as $M \leftarrow R/S^r$. Since the decryption algorithm never returns $\bot$, the ElGamal scheme is obviously not robust. Stronger even, the ciphertext $(1, M)$ decrypts to $M$ under any secret key. It is this strong failure of robustness that opens the way to attacks on applications like Sako’s auction protocol [Sak00].

**The protocol.** Sako’s auction protocol [Sak00] is important because it is the first truly practical one to hide the bids of losers. Let $1, \ldots, N$ be the range of possible bidding prices. In an initialization step, the auctioneer generates $N$ ElGamal key pairs $(x_1, X_1), \ldots, (x_N, X_N)$, and publishes $g, X_1, \ldots, X_N$ and a fixed message $M \in G$. A bidder places a bid of value
\(v \in \{1, \ldots, N\}\) by encrypting \(M\) under \(X_v\) and posting the ciphertext. Note that the privacy of the bids is guaranteed by the anonymity of ElGamal encryption. The authority opens bids \(C_1 = (R_1, S_1), \ldots, C_n = (R_n, S_n)\) by decrypting all bids under secret keys \(x_N, \ldots, x_1\), until the highest index \(w\) where one or more bids decrypt to \(M\). The auctioneer announces the identity of the winner(s), the price of the item \(w\), and the secret key \(x_w\). All auctioneers can then check that \(S_i/R_i^{x_w} = M\) for all winners \(i\).

An attack. Our attack permits a dishonest bidder and a colluding auctioneer to break the fairness of the protocol. (Security against colluding auctioneers was not considered in [Sak00], so we do not disprove their results, but it is a property that one may expect the protocol to have.) Namely, a cheating bidder can place a bid \((1, M)\). If \(w\) is the highest honest bid, then the auctioneer can agree to open the corrupted bid to \(x_{w+1}\), thereby winning the auction for the cheating bidder at one dollar more than the second-highest bidder.

Sako came close to preventing this attack with an “incompatible encryption” property that avoids choosing \(r = 0\) at encryption. A dishonest bidder however may deviate from this encryption rule; the problem is that the decryption algorithm does not reject ciphertexts \((R, S)\) when \(R = 1\). The attack is easily prevented by using any of our robust encryption schemes, so that decryption under any other secret key than the intended one results in ⊥ being returned. Note that for this application we really need the strong robustness notion with adversarially generated ciphertexts.

It is worth noting that, to enforce that all bids are independent of each other even in the presence of a colluding auctioneer, all bidders would also need to commit to their sealed bids (using a non-malleable commitment scheme) during a first round of communication and only open their commitments once all commitments made public.

G.9 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems G.4.1 and G.4.2

The proof of Part 2 of Theorem G.4.1 relies on the following information-theoretic lemma.

Lemma G.9.1 Let \(\ell \leq k\) be positive integers and let \(A_1, A_2\) be arbitrary algorithms with the length of the output of \(A_1\) always being \(\ell\). Let \(P\) denote the probability that \(A_2(A_1(K)) = K\) where the probability is over \(K\) drawn at random from \(\{0, 1\}^k\) and the coins of \(A_1, A_2\). Then \(P \leq 2^{\ell-k}\).

Proof of Lemma G.9.1 We may assume \(A_1, A_2\) are deterministic for, if not, we can hardwire a “best” choice of coins for each. For each \(\ell\)-bit string \(L\) let \(S_L = \{K \in \{0, 1\}^k : A_1(K) = L\}\) and let \(s(L) = |S_L|\). Let \(L\) be the set of all \(L \in \{0, 1\}^\ell\) such that \(s(L) > 0\). Then

\[
P = \sum_{L \in L} \Pr[A_2(L) = K \mid A_1(K) = L] \cdot \Pr[A_1(K) = L]
= \sum_{L \in L} \frac{1}{s(L)} \cdot \frac{s(L)}{2^k}
= \sum_{L \in L} \frac{1}{2^k}
\]

which is at most \(2^{\ell-k}\) as claimed.

Proof of Part 2 of Theorem G.4.1 Games \(G_0, G_1\) of Figure G.11 differ only in their Finalize procedures, with the message encrypted at line 04 to create ciphertext \(C\) in \(G_1\) being
a constant rather than $\overline{M}_0$ in $G_0$. We have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Grob}}(A) = \Pr \left[ G_0^A \right] = \left( \Pr \left[ G_0^A \right] - \Pr \left[ G_1^A \right] \right) + \Pr \left[ G_1^A \right].$$

we design $B$ so that

$$\Pr \left[ G_0^A \right] - \Pr \left[ G_1^A \right] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Grob}}(B).$$

On input $pars$, adversary $B$ executes lines 02, 03 of $\text{Initialize}$ and runs $A$ on input $(pars, K)$. It replies to $\text{GetEK}$, $\text{GetDK}$ and $\text{Dec}$ queries of $A$ via its own oracles of the same name. When $A$ halts with output $M, id_0, id_1$, adversary $B$ queries its LR oracles with $id_0, id_0, 0^{\overline{M}_0||0^k}, M||K$ to get back a ciphertext $C$. It then makes query $\text{GetDK}(id_1)$ to get back $\overline{D}[id_1]$. Note this is a legal query for $B$ because $id_1$ is not one of the challenge identities in its LR query, but it would not have been legal for $A$. Now $B$ executes lines 01–09 of the code of $\text{Finalize}$ of $G_1$. If $\overline{M}_1 \neq \bot$ it outputs 1, else 0.

To complete the proof we show that $\Pr[G_1^A] \leq 2^{t-k}$. We observe that $M$ as computed at line 05 of $\text{Finalize}$ in $G_1$ depends only on $pars, EK[id_1], EK[id_0], DK[id_1], [M_0, k]$. We would have liked to say that none of these depend on $K$. This would mean that the probability that $M \neq \bot$ and parses as $\overline{M}_1||K$ is at most $2^{-k}$, making $\Pr[G_1^A] \leq 2^{-k}$. In the PKE case, what we desire is almost true because the only item in our list that can depend on $K$ is $[M_0], k$, which can carry at most $\log_2(t)$ bits of information about $K$. But $id_0, id_1$ could depend on $K$ so in general, and in the IBE case in particular, $EK[id_0], EK[id_1], DK[id_1]$ could depend on $K$. However we assumed that identities are $n$ bits, so the total amount of information about $K$ in the list $pars, EK[id_1], EK[id_0], DK[id_1], [M_0, k]$ is at most $2n + \log_2(t)$ bits. We conclude by applying Lemma [G.9.1] with $t = 2n + \lceil \log_2(t) \rceil$. |
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem [G.4.2]: Game $G_0$ of Figure G.12 is game \textsc{wrob}$_{\xi}$ tailored to the case that $A$ makes only one \textsc{lr} query, an assumption we explained we can make. If we wish to exploit the assumed \textsc{ai-atk} security of $\varphi \xi$, we need to be able to answer \textsc{dec} queries of $A$ using the \textsc{dec} oracle in game $A_{\varphi \xi}$. Thus we would like to substitute the \textsc{dec}(pars, \textsc{ek}[id], \textsc{dk}[id], C) call in a \textsc{dec}({$(C, \text{com})$, id}) query of $G_0$ with a \textsc{dec}(C, id) call of an adversary $B$ in $A_{\varphi \xi}$. The difficulty is that $C$ might equal $C^*$ but $\text{com} \neq \text{com}^*$, so that the call is not legal for $B$. To get around this, the first part of our proof will show that the decryption procedure of $G_0$ can be replaced by the alternative one of $G_4$, where this difficulty vanishes. This part exploits the uniqueness of the commitment scheme and the weak robustness of $\varphi \xi$. After that we will exploit the \textsc{ai-atk} security of $\varphi \xi$ to remove dependence on $\text{dec}^*$ in \textsc{lr}, allowing us to exploit the \textsc{hide} security of $\text{cmr}$ to make the challenge commitment independent of $\textsc{ek}[id^*_0]$. This allows us to conclude by again using the \textsc{ai-atk} security of $\varphi \xi$. We proceed to the details.

In game $G_0$, if $A$ makes a $\text{dec}((C^*, \text{com}), id^*_0)$ query with $\text{com} \neq \text{com}^*$ then the uniqueness of $\text{cmr}$ implies that the procedure in question will return $\bot$. This means that line 02 of $\text{dec}$ in $G_0$ can be rewritten as line 02 of $\text{dec}$ in $G_1$ and the two procedures are equivalent. Procedure $\text{dec}$ of $G_2$ includes the boxed code and hence is equivalent to procedure $\text{dec}$ of $G_1$. Hence

$$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Adv}_{\varphi \xi}^a(A) = \Pr \left[ G^A_0 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_1 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_2 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_3 \right] + \Pr \left[ G^A_2 \right] - \Pr \left[ G^A_3 \right] \leq \Pr \left[ G^A_3 \right] + \Pr \left[ G^A_4 \right] \text{ sets bad}.$$  

The inequality above is by Lemma [G.2.1] which applies because $G_2, G_3$ are identical until bad. We design $W$ so that

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_3 \text{ sets bad} \right] \leq \text{Adv}_{\varphi \xi}^\text{wrob}(W).$$

On input \textit{pars}, adversary $W$ executes lines 02,03,04,05 of \textit{initialize} and runs $A$ on input $(\text{pars}, \text{c\textit{pars}})$. It replies to \textit{get\textsc{ek}}, \textit{get\textsc{dk}}, \textit{\textsc{dec}} queries of $A$ via its own oracles of the same name, as per the code of $G_3$. When $A$ makes its \textit{\textsc{lr}} query $id^*_0, id^*_1, M_0, M_1$, adversary $W$ executes lines 01,02,03 of the code of \textsc{lr} of $G_3$. It then outputs $M_0 \parallel \text{\textsc{dec}^*}, id^*_0, id^*_1, id_{-l}$, so that the call is not legal for $B$. To get around this, the first part of our proof will show that the decryption procedure of $G_0$ can be replaced by the alternative one of $G_4$, where this difficulty vanishes. This part exploits the uniqueness of the commitment scheme and the weak robustness of $\varphi \xi$. After that we will exploit the \textsc{ai-atk} security of $\varphi \xi$ to remove dependence on $\text{dec}^*$ in \textsc{lr}, allowing us to exploit the \textsc{hide} security of $\text{cmr}$ to make the challenge commitment independent of $\textsc{ek}[id^*_0]$. This allows us to conclude by again using the \textsc{ai-atk} security of $\varphi \xi$. We proceed to the details.

Next we bound $\Pr[G^A_3]$. Procedure $\text{dec}$ of $G_4$ results from simplifying the code of procedure $\text{dec}$ of $G_3$, so

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_3 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_4 \right] = \left( \Pr \left[ G^A_1 \right] - \Pr \left[ G^A_5 \right] \right) + \Pr \left[ G^A_5 \right].$$

The step from $G_4$ to $G_5$ modifies only \textsc{lr}, replacing $\text{dec}^*$ with a constant. We are assuming here that any decommitment key output by \textsc{com}, regardless of the inputs to the latter, has length $d$ bits. We design $B_1$ so that

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_4 \right] - \Pr \left[ G^A_5 \right] = \text{Adv}_{\varphi \xi}^a(B_1).$$

On input \textit{pars}, adversary $B_1$ executes lines 02,03,04,05 of \textit{initialize} and runs $A$ on input $(\text{pars}, \text{c\textit{pars}})$. It replies to \textit{get\textsc{ek}}, \textit{get\textsc{dk}}, \textit{\textsc{dec}} queries of $A$ via its own oracles of the same name, as per the code of $G_4$. Here we make crucial use of the fact that the alternative decryption rule of $\text{dec}$ of $G_4$ allows $B_1$ to respond to $\text{dec}$ queries of $A$ without the need to query its own $\text{dec}$ oracle on $(C^*, id^*_0)$ or $(C^*, id^*_1)$. When $A$ makes its \textit{\textsc{lr}} query $id^*_0, id^*_1, M_0, M_1$, adversary $B_1$ executes lines 01,02,03 of the code of \textsc{lr} of $G_4$. It then queries $id^*_0, id^*_1, M_1 \parallel \text{\textsc{dec}^*}$ to its own \textsc{lr} oracle to get back a ciphertext $C^*$, and returns $(C^*, \text{com}^*)$ to $A$. When $A$ halts with output a bit $b'$, adversary $B_1$ outputs 1 if $b = b'$ and 0 otherwise.
Chapter G. Robust Encryption

\begin{figure}[h]
\begin{center}
\begin{verbatim}
proc Initialize // G0-G6
01 (pars, msk) \xrightarrow{} PG
02 cpars, \xrightarrow{} CPG
03 b \xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}
04 S, U, V \leftarrow 0; \text{C*} \leftarrow \bot; \text{com*} \leftarrow \bot
05 id_0 \leftarrow \bot; id_1 \leftarrow \bot
06 Return (pars, cpars)

proc GetEK(id) // G0-G6
01 U \leftarrow U \cup \{id\}
02 (EK[id], DK[id]) \xleftarrow{} KG(pars, msk, id)
03 Return EK[iid]

proc GetDK(id) // G0-G6
01 If id \notin U then return \bot
02 If id \in \{id_0, id_1\} then return \bot
03 V \leftarrow V \cup \{id\}
04 Return DK[id]

proc Finalize(b) // G0-G6
01 Return (b' = b)

proc LR(id_0', id_1', M_0', M_1') // G0-G4
01 If (id_0' \notin U) \lor (id_1' \notin U) then return \bot
02 If (id_0' \in V) \lor (id_1' \in V) then return \bot
03 (com*, dec*) \xleftarrow{} Com(cpars, EK[id_0'])
04 C* \xleftarrow{} Enc(pars, EK[id_0'], M_0'\|dec*)
05 Return (C*, com*)

proc LR(id_0', id_1', M_0', M_1') // G5
01 If (id_0' \notin U) \lor (id_1' \notin U) then return \bot
02 If (id_0' \in V) \lor (id_1' \in V) then return \bot
03 (com*, dec*) \xleftarrow{} Com(cpars, EK[id_1'])
04 C* \xleftarrow{} Enc(pars, EK[id_1'], M_1'\|dec*)
05 Return (C*, com*)

proc LR(id_0', id_1', M_0', M_1') // G6
01 If (id_0' \notin U) \lor (id_1' \notin U) then return \bot
02 If (id_0' \in V) \lor (id_1' \in V) then return \bot
03 (com*, dec*) \xleftarrow{} Com(cpars, 0')
04 C* \xleftarrow{} Enc(pars, EK[id_0'], M_0'\|0')
05 Return (C*, com*)

proc Dec((C, com), id) // G0
01 If id \notin U then return \bot
02 If (id = id_0') \land (C, com) = (C*, com*) then return \bot
03 If (id = id_1' \neq id_0') \land (C, com) = (C*, com*) then
04 Return \bot
05 M \leftarrow Dec(pars, EK[id], DK[id], C)
06 If M = \bot then return \bot
07 \overrightarrow{M}[\text{dec} \leftarrow M]
08 If Ver(cpars, EK[id], com, dec) = 1 then return \overrightarrow{M}
09 Else return \bot

proc Dec((C, com), id) // G1
01 If id \notin U then return \bot
02 If (id = id_0') \land (C = C*) then return \bot
03 If (id = id_1' \neq id_0') \land (C, com) = (C*, com*) then
04 Return \bot
05 M \leftarrow Dec(pars, EK[id], DK[id], C)
06 If M = \bot then return \bot
07 \overrightarrow{M}[\text{dec} \leftarrow M]
08 If Ver(cpars, EK[id], com, dec) = 1 then return \overrightarrow{M}
09 Else return \bot

proc Dec((C, com), id) // G2-G3
01 If id \notin U then return \bot
02 If (id = id_0') \land (C = C*) then return \bot
03 If (id = id_1' \neq id_0') \land (C, com) = (C*, com*) then
04 Return \bot
05 M \leftarrow Dec(pars, EK[id], DK[id], C)
06 If (id = id_1' \neq id_0') \land (C = C*) \land (com \neq com*) then
07 M* \leftarrow M
08 If M \neq \bot then bad \leftarrow true; M \leftarrow \bot; \\ \overrightarrow{M} \leftarrow M*
09 If M = \bot then return \bot
10 \overrightarrow{M}[\text{dec} \leftarrow M]
11 If Ver(cpars, EK[id], com, dec) = 1 then return \overrightarrow{M}
12 Else return \bot

proc Dec((C, com), id) // G4-G6
01 If id \notin U then return \bot
02 If (id = id_0') \land (C = C*) then return \bot
03 If (id = id_1') \land (C = C*) then return \bot
04 M \leftarrow Dec(pars, EK[id], DK[id], C)
05 If M = \bot then return \bot
06 \overrightarrow{M}[\text{dec} \leftarrow M]
07 If Ver(cpars, EK[id], com, dec) = 1 then return \overrightarrow{M}
08 Else return \bot
\end{verbatim}
\end{center}
\caption{Games for the proof of Part 1 of Theorem G.4.2}
\end{figure}

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Next we bound \( \Pr[G_5^4] \). Procedure LR of G_6 uses a constant 0^e rather than EK[id_6^e] as data for Com at line 03. The value of e is arbitrary, and we can just let e = 1. Then

\[
\Pr[G_5^4] = \left( \Pr[G_5^A] - \Pr[G_6^A] \right) + \Pr[G_6^A].
\]

We design H so that

\[
\Pr[G_5^A] - \Pr[G_6^A] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{hide}}_{\text{CMT}}(H).
\]

On input cpars, adversary H executes lines 01,03,04,05 of Initialize and runs A on input (pars, cpars). It replies to GetEK, GetDK, Dec queries of A by direct execution of the code of these procedures in G_5, possible since it knows msk. When A makes its LR query \( id_0^*, id_1^*, M_0, M_1 \), adversary H executes line 01,02 of the code of LR of G_5. It then queries 0^e,EK[id_6^e] to its own LR oracle to get back a commitment com^*. It executes line 04 of LR of G_5 and returns (C^*, com^*) to A. When A halts with outut a bit b', adversary H returns 1 if \( b = b' \) and 0 otherwise.

Finally we design B_2 so that

\[
2 \cdot \Pr[G_6^A] - 1 \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ai}}_{\varphi}(B_2).
\]

On input pars, adversary B_2 executes lines 02,04,05 of Initialize and runs A on input (pars, cpars). It replies to GetEK, GetDK, Dec queries of A via its own oracles of the same name, as per the code of G_6. Again we make crucial use of the fact that the alternative decryption rule of Dec of G_6 allows B_2 to respond to Dec queries of A without the need to query its own Dec oracle on (C^*, id_0^*) or (C^*, id_1^*). When A makes its LR query \( id_0^*, id_1^*, M_0, M_1 \), adversary B_2 executes lines 01,02,03 of the code of LR of G_6. It then queries \( id_0^*, id_1^*, M_0||0^e, M_1||\text{dec}^* \) to its own LR oracle to get back a ciphertext C^*, and returns (C^*, com^*) to A. When A halts with outut a bit b', adversary B_2 outputs b'.

Adversary B of the theorem statement runs B_1 with probability 2/3 and B_2 with probability 1/3.

Proof of Part 2 of Theorem G.4.2 In the execution of A with game SROB_{\varphi} let coll be the event that there exist distinct \( id_0, id_1 \) queried by A to its GetEK oracle such that the encryption keys returned in response are the same. Then

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{srob}}_{\varphi}(A) = \Pr[SROB_{\varphi}^A \land \text{coll}] + \Pr[SROB_{\varphi}^A \land \lnot \text{coll}]
\]

\[
\leq \Pr[\text{coll}] + \Pr[SROB_{\varphi}^A \land \lnot \text{coll}].
\]

But

\[
\Pr[\text{coll}] \leq \left( \frac{q}{2} \right) \cdot \text{Coll}_{\varphi}\epsilon
\]

and we can design B such that

\[
\Pr[SROB_{\varphi}^A \land \lnot \text{coll}] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{bind}}_{\text{CMT}}(B).
\]

We omit the details.

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Appendix: Proof of Theorem [G.5.1]

The proof relies on Games G₀–G₁₁ of Figures [G.13–G.16] and the adversary I of Figure G.16. See Section [G.5.5] for intuition.

We begin by transforming B into an adversary A such that

\[ \text{Adv}_{G^*}^{\text{rob}}(B) \leq \Pr[\text{G}_0^A]. \] \hspace{1cm} (G.4)

On input \((g_1, g_2, K), (e_0, f_0, h_0), (e_1, f_1, h_1)\), adversary A runs B on input \((g_1, g_2, K)\). Adversary A returns to B the public key \((e_0, f_0, h_0)\) in response to B’s first GetEK query \(id_0\), and \((e_1, f_1, h_1)\) in response to its second GetEK query \(id_1\). When B makes a Dec query, which can be assumed to have the form \((a_1, a_2, c, d)\), adversary A queries \((a_1, a_2, c, d)\) to its own Dec oracle to get back \((M_0, M_1)\) and returns \(M_0\) to B. When B halts, with output that can be assumed to have the form \(((a_1, a_2, c, d), id_0, id_1)\), adversary A makes a final query \((a_1, a_2, c, d)\) to its Dec oracle and also halts.

We assume that every Dec query \((a_1, a_2, c, d)\) of A satisfies \(a_1 \neq 1\). This is without loss of generality because the decryption algorithm rejects otherwise. This will be crucial below. Similarly, we assume \((a_1, a_2, c, d) \in \mathbb{G}^4\). We now proceed to the analysis.

Games G₁, G₂ start to move us to the alternative decryption rule. In G₁, if \(a_0 = a_1^w\) and \(d = a_1^{x_6+y_9} v\) then \(d = a_1^{x_6+y_9} v \equiv a_2^{x_6+y_9} v\), so Dec in G₁ returns the correct decryption, like in G₀. If \(a_2 \neq a_1^w\) or \(d \neq a_1^{x_6+y_9} v\), then, if \(d \neq a_1^{x_6+y_9} v \cdot a_2^{x_6+y_9} v\), Dec in G₁ returns \(\perp\), else it returns \(c a_1^{x_6} a_2^{x_6} \cdot a_2^{x_6} v\), so again correct either way. Thus,

\[ \Pr[\text{G}_0^A] = \Pr[\text{G}_1^A] = \Pr[\text{G}_2^A] + (\Pr[\text{G}_1^A] - \Pr[\text{G}_2^A]) \leq \Pr[\text{G}_2^A] + \Pr[\text{G}_2^A \text{ sets bad}], \] \hspace{1cm} (G.5)

where the last line is by Lemma [G.2.1] since G₁, G₂ are identical until bad. We now fork off two game chains, one to bound each term above.

First, we will bound the second term in the right-hand side of Inequality (G.5). Our goal is to move the choices of \(x_{b_1}, x_{b_2}, y_{b_1}, y_{b_2}, z_{b_1}, z_{b_2}\) \((b = 0, 1)\) and the setting of bad into Finalize while still being able to answer Dec queries. We will then be able to bound the probability that bad is set by a static analysis. Consider Game G₃. If \(a_2 \neq a_1^w\) and \(d = a_1^{x_6+y_9} v \cdot a_2^{x_6+y_9} v\) then bad is set in G₂. But \(a_2 = a_1^w\) and \(d \neq a_1^{x_6+y_9} v\) implies \(d \neq a_1^{x_6+y_9} v \cdot a_2^{x_6+y_9} v\), so bad is not set in G₂. So,

\[ \Pr[\text{G}_2^A \text{ sets bad}] = \Pr[\text{G}_3^A \text{ sets bad}]. \] \hspace{1cm} (G.6)

Since we are only interested in the probability that G₃ sets bad, we have it always return true. The flag bad may be set at line 315, but is not used, so we move the setting of bad into the Finalize procedure in G₄. This requires that G₄ do some bookkeeping. We have also done some restructuring, moving some loop invariants out of the loop in Dec. We have

\[ \Pr[\text{G}_3^A \text{ sets bad}] = \Pr[\text{G}_4^A \text{ sets bad}]. \] \hspace{1cm} (G.7)

The choice of \(x_{b_1}, x_{b_2}, x_b\) at lines 404, 405 can equivalently be written as first choosing \(x_b\) and \(x_{b_2}\) at random and then setting \(x_{b_1} = x_b - w x_{b_2}\). This is true because \(w\) is not equal to 0 modulo \(p\). The same is true for \(y_{b_1}, y_{b_2}, y_b\). Once this is done, \(x_{b_1}, x_{b_2}, y_{b_1}, y_{b_2}\) are not used until Finalize, so their choice can be delayed. Game G₅ makes these changes, so we have

\[ \Pr[\text{G}_4^A \text{ sets bad}] = \Pr[\text{G}_5^A \text{ sets bad}]. \] \hspace{1cm} (G.8)
Figure G.13: Games $G_0, G_1, G_2, G_3$, and $G_4$ for proof of Theorem G.5.1 $G_1$ includes the boxed code at line 116 but $G_2$ does not.
Games $G$\textsuperscript{5,6}

\begin{align*}
\text{proc Initialize} & \quad \text{Games } G_5, G_6 \\
500 & \quad g_1 \leftrightarrow G^* ; w \leftarrow Z_p ; g_2 \leftrightarrow g_1^w \\
501 & \quad K \leftarrow \text{Keys}(H) ; S \leftarrow \emptyset \\
502 & \quad \text{For } b = 0, 1 \text{ do} \\
503 & \quad x_b, y_b, z_{b1}, z_{b2} \leftarrow Z_p \\
504 & \quad e_b \leftarrow g_1^{x_b} ; f_b \leftarrow g_1^{y_b} ; h_b \leftarrow g_1^{z_{b1}} g_2^{z_{b2}} \\
505 & \quad \text{Return } (g_1, g_2, K, (e_0, f_0, h_0), (e_1, f_1, h_1)) \\
\text{proc Dec}((a_1, a_2, c, d)) & \quad \text{Games } G_5, G_6 \\
510 & \quad v \leftarrow H(K, (a_1, a_2, c)) \\
511 & \quad \text{For } b = 0, 1 \text{ do } M_b \leftarrow c \cdot a_1^{-z_{b1}} a_2^{-z_{b2}} \\
512 & \quad \text{If } (a_2 \neq a_1^w) \text{ Then} \\
513 & \quad S \leftarrow S \cup \{(a_1, a_2, c, d, v)\} ; M_0, M_1 \leftarrow \perp \\
514 & \quad \text{Return } (M_0, M_1) \\
\text{proc Finalize} & \quad \text{Game } G_5 \\
520 & \quad \text{For } b = 0, 1 \text{ do} \\
521 & \quad x_{b1}, y_{b2} \leftarrow Z_p \\
522 & \quad x_{b1} \leftarrow x_b - y_{b2} ; y_{b1} \leftarrow y_b - y_{b2} \\
523 & \quad \text{For all } (a_1, a_2, c, d, v) \in S \text{ do} \\
524 & \quad \text{If } d = a_1\beta_1 + y_{b1} \cdot a_2\beta_2 + y_{b2} \text{ Then } \text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true} \\
525 & \quad \text{Return } \text{true} \\
\text{proc Finalize} & \quad \text{Game } G_6 \\
620 & \quad \text{For } b = 0, 1 \text{ do} \\
621 & \quad x_{b2}, y_{b2} \leftarrow Z_p \\
622 & \quad x_{b1} \leftarrow x_b - w_{b2} ; y_{b1} \leftarrow y_b - w_{b2} \\
623 & \quad \text{For all } (a_1, a_2, c, d, v) \in S \text{ do} \\
624 & \quad a_1 \leftarrow \log_{g_1}(a_1) ; a_2 \leftarrow \log_{g_2}(a_2) \\
625 & \quad s \leftarrow \log_{g_1}(d) ; t_b \leftarrow s - a_1 x_b + u_1 y_b v \\
626 & \quad \alpha \leftarrow w_t(u_2 - u_1) ; \beta \leftarrow w_t(u_2 - u_1) \\
627 & \quad \text{If } t_b = \alpha x_{b2} + \beta y_{b2} \text{ Then } \text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true} \\
628 & \quad \text{Return } \text{true}
\end{align*}

Figure G.14: Games $G_5$ and $G_6$ for proof of Theorem G.5.1

Game $G_6$ simply writes the test of line 524 in terms of the exponents. Note that this game computes discrete logarithms, but it is only used in the analysis and does not have to be efficient. We have

$$\Pr\left[ G_5^A \text{ sets bad } \right] = \Pr\left[ G_6^A \text{ sets bad } \right]. \quad (G.9)$$

We claim that

$$\Pr\left[ G_6^A \text{ sets bad } \right] \leq \frac{2q}{p}, \quad (G.10)$$

(Recall $q$ is the number of Dec queries made by $A$.) We now justify Equation (G.10). By the time we reach Finalize in $G_6$, we can consider the adversary coins, all random choices of Initialize, and all random choices of Dec to be fixed. We will take probability only over the choice of $x_{b2}, y_{b2}$ made at line 621. Consider a particular $(a_1, a_2, c, d, v) \in S$. This is now fixed, and so are the quantities $u_1, u_2, s, t_0, t_1, \alpha$, and $\beta$ as computed at lines 624–626. So we want to bound the probability that bad is set at line 627 when we regard $t_b, \alpha, \beta$ as fixed and take the probability over the random choices of $x_{b2}, y_{b2}$. The crucial fact is that $u_2 \neq u_1$ because $(a_1, a_2, c, d, v) \in S$, and lines 612, 613 only put a tuple in $S$ if $a_2 \neq a_1^w$. So $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are not 0 modulo $p$, and the probability that $t_b = \alpha x_{b2} + \beta y_{b2}$ is thus $1/p$. The size of $S$ is at most $q$ so line 627 is executed at most $2q$ times. Equation (G.10) follows from the union bound.

We now return to Equation (G.5) to bound the first term. Game $G_7$ removes from $G_2$ code that does not affect outcome of the game. Once this is done, $x_{b1}, y_{b1}, x_{b2}, y_{b2}$ are used only to define $x_b, y_b$, so $G_7$ picks only the latter. So we have

$$\Pr\left[ G_7^A \right] = \Pr\left[ G_7^A \right]. \quad (G.11)$$
Figure G.15: Games G7–G11 for proof of Theorem G.5.1. G9 includes the boxed code at line 805 but G8 does not.

Game G8 is the same as G7 barring setting a flag that does not affect the game outcome, so

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_8 \right]$$

$$= \Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right] + \Pr \left[ G^A_8 \right] - \Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right]$$

$$\leq \Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right] + \Pr \left[ G^A_8 \text{ sets bad} \right]$$

$$\leq \Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right] + \frac{1}{p}.$$ (G.12)

Equation (G.12) is by Lemma G.2.1 since G8, G9 are identical until bad. The probability that G8 sets bad is the probability that $y_1 = y_0$ at line 805, and this is $1/p$ since $y$ is chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$, justifying Equation (G.13). The distribution of $y_1$ in G9 is always uniform over $\mathbb{Z}_q - \{y_0\}$, and the setting of bad at line 805 does not affect the game outcome, so

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_9 \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_{10} \right].$$ (G.14)

Game G11 picks $x_9, y_9$ differently from G10, but since $y_1 - y_0 \neq 0$, the two ways induce the same distribution on $x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1$. Thus,

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_{10} \right] = \Pr \left[ G^A_{11} \right].$$ (G.15)

We now claim that

$$\Pr \left[ G^A_{11} \right] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{pre-img}_H(I)$$ (G.16)

where I is depicted in Figure G.16. To justify this, say that the $A$ makes a Dec query $(a_1, a_2, c, d)$
Chapter G. Robust Encryption

Adversary $I(K, v^*)$

\[
g_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^*; w \leftarrow Z_p^*; g_2 \leftarrow g_1^w; x_0, y_0 \leftarrow Z_p; y_1 \leftarrow z - \{y_0\}; x_1 \leftarrow x_0 - (y_1 - y_0)\nu^*
\]

For $b = 0, 1$ do

\[
z_{b1}, z_{b2} \leftarrow Z_p; e_b \leftarrow g_{1b}^{x_b}; f_b \leftarrow g_{1b}^{y_b}; h_b \leftarrow g_{1b}^{z_{b1}}g_{2b}^{z_{b2}}
\]

Run $A$ on \((g_1, g_2, K), (e_0, f_0, h_0), (e_1, f_1, h_1)\)

On query $\text{Dec}((a_1, a_2, c, d))$

\[
v \leftarrow H(K, (a_1, a_2, c))
\]

For $b = 0, 1$ do

\[
M_b \leftarrow c \cdot a_1^{z_{b1}}a_2^{z_{b2}}
\]

If \((a_2 \neq a_1 \vee d \neq a_1^{x_2 + y_b v})\) Then $M_b \leftarrow \perp$

If \((M_0 \neq \perp) \wedge (M_1 \neq \perp)\) Then \((a_1^*, a_2^*, c^*) \leftarrow (a_1, a_2, c)

Return \((M_0, M_1)\) to $A$

Until $A$ halts

Return \((a_1^*, a_2^*, c^*)\)

Figure G.16: Adversary $I$ for proof of Theorem G.5.1

which returns \((M_0, M_1)\) with $M_0 \neq \perp$ and $M_1 \neq \perp$. This means we must have

\[
d = a_1^{x_0 + y_0 v} = a_1^{x_1 + y_1 v}, \quad (G.17)
\]

where $v = H(K, (a_1, a_2, c))$. Let $u_1 = \log_{g_1}(a_1)$ and $s = \log_{g_1}(d)$. Now, the above implies

\[
u_1(x_0 + y_0 v) = u_1(x_1 + y_1 v). 
\]

But $(a_1, a_2, c, d)$ is a $\text{Dec}$ query, and we know that $a_1 \neq 1$, so $u_1 \neq 0$. (This is a crucial point. Recall the reason we can without loss of generality assume $a_1 \neq 1$ is that the decryption algorithm of $C$ rejects otherwise.) Dividing $u_1$ out, we get $x_0 + y_0 v = x_1 + y_1 v$. Rearranging terms, we get $(y_1 - y_0) v = x_0 - x_1$. However, we know that $y_1 \neq y_0$, so $v = (y_1 - y_0)^{-1}(x_0 - x_1)$. However, this is exactly the value $v^*$ due to the way $I$ and Game $G_{11}$ define $x_0, y_0, x_1, y_1$. Thus, we have $H(K, (a_1, a_2, c)) = v^*$, meaning $I$ will be successful. Putting together Equations (G.4)–(G.11), (G.13)–(G.16) concludes the proof of Theorem G.5.1

G.11 Appendix: Applications to searchable encryption

Public-key encryption with keyword search. A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme [BDOP04] is a tuple $\mathcal{PEKS} = (\mathcal{KG}, \mathcal{PEKS}, \mathcal{T}_d, \mathcal{T}_\text{test})$ of algorithms. Via $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{KG}$, the key generation algorithm produces a pair of public and private keys. Via $C \leftarrow \mathcal{PEKS}(pk, w)$, the encryption algorithm encrypts a keyword $w$ to get a ciphertext under the public key $pk$. Via $t_w \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_d(sk, w)$, the trapdoor extraction algorithm computes a trapdoor $t_w$ for keyword $w$. The deterministic test algorithm $\mathcal{T}_\text{test}(t_w, C)$ returns 1 if $C$ is an encryption of $w$ and 0 otherwise. PRIVACY and CONSISTENCY of PEKS schemes. We formulate privacy notions for PEKS using the games of Figure G.17. Let $\text{ATK} \in \{\text{CPA}, CCA\}$. We define the advantage of an adversary $A$ against the indistinguishability of $\mathcal{PEKS}$ as follows:

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{PEKS}}^{\text{IND-atk}}(A) = \Pr[\text{IND-ATK}^A_{\mathcal{PEKS}} \Rightarrow \text{true}] .
\]

We re-formulate the consistency definition of PEKS schemes of [ABC+08] using the game of Figure G.17. We define the advantage of an adversary $A$ against the consistency of $\mathcal{PEKS}$ as
The proposition is as follows:

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{consist}_{\text{PEKS}} (A) = \Pr \left[ \text{CONSIST}^A_{\text{PEKS}} \Rightarrow \text{true} \right].
\]

Furthermore, we also recall the advantage measure \(\text{Adv}^\text{consist}_{\text{PEKS}} (A)\), which captures the notion CONSIST of computational consistency of PEKS scheme \(\text{PEKS}\).

**TRANSFORMING IBE TO PEKS.** The \texttt{bdop-ibe-2-peks} transform of [BDOP04] transforms an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme. Given an IBE scheme \(\text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Ext}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\), the transform associates it to the PEKS scheme \(\text{PEKS} = (\text{KG}, \text{PEKS}, \text{Td}, \text{Test})\), where the key-generation algorithm \(\text{KG}\) returns \((pk, sk) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Setup}\); the encryption algorithm \(\text{PEKS}(pk, w)\) returns \(C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, w, 0^k)\); the trapdoor extraction algorithm \(\text{Td}(sk, w)\) returns \(t \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Ext}(pk, sk, w)\); the test algorithm \(\text{Test}(t, C)\) returns 1 if and only if \(\text{Dec}(pk, t, C) = 0^k\). Abdalla et al. [ABC+08] showed that this transform generally does not provide consistency, and presented the consistency-providing new-\texttt{ibe-2-peks} transform as an alternative. We now show that the original \texttt{bdop-ibe-2-peks} transform does yield a consistent PEKS if the underlying IBE scheme is robust. We also show that if the base IBE scheme is ANO-CCA, then the PEKS scheme is IND-CCA, thereby yielding the first IND-CCA-secure PEKS schemes in the standard model, and the first consistent IND-CCA-secure PEKS schemes in the RO model. (Non-consistent IND-CCA-secure PEKS schemes in the RO model are easily derived from [FP07].)

**Proposition G.11.1** Let \(\text{IBE}\) be an IBE scheme, and let \(\text{PEKS}\) be the PEKS scheme associated to it per the \texttt{bdop-ibe-2-peks} transform. Given any adversary \(A\) running in time \(t\), we can construct an adversary \(B\) running in time \(t + O(t)\) executions of the algorithms of \(\text{IBE}\) such that

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{consist}_{\text{PEKS}} (A) \leq \text{Adv}^\text{stob-cca}_{\text{IBE}} (B) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Adv}^\text{ind-cca}_{\text{PEKS}} (A) \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ano-cca}_{\text{IBE}} (B).
\]

To see why the first inequality is true, it suffices to consider the adversary \(B\) that on input \(\text{pars}\) runs \((w, w') \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} A(\text{pars})\) and outputs \(C \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Enc}(\text{pars}, w)\). The proof of the second inequality is an easy adaptation of the proof of the new-\texttt{ibe-2-peks} transform in [ABC+08], where \(B\) answers \(A\)'s \textbf{Test} queries using its own \textbf{Dec} oracle.
Securely combining PKE and PEKS. Searchable encryption by itself is only of limited use since it can only encrypt individual keywords, and since it does not allow decryption. Fuhr and Paillier [FP07] introduce a more flexible variant that allows decryption of the keyword. An even more powerful (and general) primitive can be obtained by combining PEKS with PKE to encrypt non-searchable but recoverable content. For example, one could encrypt the body of an email using a PKE scheme, and append a list of PEKS-encrypted keywords. The straightforward approach of concatenating ciphertexts works fine for CPA security, but is insufficient for a strong, combined IND-CCA security model where the adversary has access to both a decryption oracle and a testing oracle. Earlier attempts to combine PKE and PEKS [BSNS06, ZI07] do not give the adversary access to the latter. A full IND-CCA-secure PKE/PEKS scheme in the standard model can be obtained by combining the IND-CCA-secure PEKS schemes obtained through our transformation with the techniques of [DK05]. Namely, one can consider label-based [Sho01] variants of the PKE and PEKS primitives, tie the different components of a ciphertext together by using as a common label the verification key of a one-time signature scheme, and append to the ciphertext a signature of all components under the corresponding signing key. We omit the details.
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Abstract

Trusted parties are fundamental for the establishment of secure communication among users. Such is the case, for example, when establishing a trusted relationship between users and certain public information in a public-key infrastructure for public-key encryption and signature schemes or when storing high-entropy secret keys in a cryptographic device. Clearly, if the trusted party misbehaves in either of these situations, then the overall security of the scheme or protocol in which we are interested can be adversely affected.

There are several ways in which one can try to reduce the amount of trust in third parties, such as making the task of recovering the secret key harder for the adversary, as in distributed cryptosystems or minimizing the damage caused by secret-key exposures, as in forward-secure and intrusion-resilient cryptosystems. In this thesis, we consider two additional methods.

The first one, which goes by the name of password-based key exchange, is to assume that the secret keys used in authenticated key exchange protocols have low entropy and do not need to be stored in a cryptographic device. In spite of the low entropy of secret keys, such protocols can still provide a level of assurance which may be sufficient for most applications.

The second method for reducing the amount of trust in third parties is to use an identity-based cryptosystem, in which the public key of a user can be an arbitrary string such as an email address. As identity-based cryptosystems provide collusion resistance, they can also be used to lessen the damage caused by secret-key exposures by generating independent secret keys for different time periods or devices. Moreover, identity-based cryptosystems can allow users to have a more fine-grained control over the decryption capabilities of third parties, further limiting the harmful consequences due to their misbehavior.

Résumé

Les tiers de confiance sont essentiels aux communications sécurisées. Par exemple, dans une infrastructure de gestion de clés, l’autorité de certification est la clé de voute de l’authentification en garantissant le lien entre une identité et une clé publique. Une carte à puce se doit, pour sa part, d’assurer la confidentialité et l’intégrité des données secrètes lorsqu’elle sert de stockage de données cryptographiques. En effet, si ces garanties sont mises en défaut dans l’une de ces situations, alors la sécurité globale du système peut en être affectée.

Plusieurs approches permettent de réduire l’importance des tiers de confiance, telles qu’accroître la difficulté de recouvrer la clé secrète, en la distribuant parmi plusieurs entités, ou limiter l’impact d’une fuite d’information secrète, comme dans les cryptosystèmes « intrusion-resilient » ou « forward-secure ». Dans cette thèse, nous considérons deux méthodes complémentaires.

La première méthode consiste à utiliser des mots de passe, ou des clés secrètes de faible entropie, qui n’ont pas besoin d’être stockés dans un dispositif cryptographique sécurisé. Malgré la faible entropie du secret, de tels protocoles peuvent fournir un niveau d’assurance satisfaisant pour la plupart des applications. On considère en particulier la mise en accord de clés.

La deuxième méthode limite le besoin de garantie de la part des tiers de confiance en utilisant un cryptosystème basé sur l’identité, dans lequel la clé publique d’un utilisateur peut être une chaîne de caractères arbitraire, telle qu’une adresse email. Comme ces systèmes fournissent une résistance aux collisions, ils peuvent aussi être utilisés pour réduire les dommages causés par l’exposition de clés secrètes en générant des secrets indépendants pour chaque période de temps ou pour chaque périphérique/entité. Par ailleurs, ces systèmes basés sur l’identité permettent aux utilisateurs d’avoir un contrôle plus fin sur les capacités de déchiffrement des tiers, en limitant les conséquences liées à un mauvais usage.