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Matteo Cavallaro

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en vue d'obtenir le grade de

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## TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES

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# INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of this research, candidates of radical right parties (RRPs) have secured a position at the second round in two presidential elections in Austria (2016) and France (2017) respectively. At the same time, a conservative government organized a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) on whether the country should remain a member of the European Union (EU) under the pressure of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), an increasingly important RRP in this country. The UKIP ‘won’ the referendum, and different works show that the British people who voted for ‘leave’ did so mostly on the basis of an anti-immigration stance (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). Finally, Donald Trump and the Republican party won the 2016 US presidential election on a platform that explicitly promised the construction of a wall between the US and Mexico: a proposition close to the agenda of different RRP. Following the economic crisis of 2008, it appears that many countries in the Northern Hemisphere have entered a political phase characterized by significant electoral gains of different RRP.

RRPs are characterized by the coexistence of a nativist, authoritarian, and populist ideology (Mudde, 2007) (see Chapter 1). Even before these recent political developments, the academia has focused on these parties. Mudde (2016a, 2) argues that the radical right (RR) ‘is by far the best-studied party family within political science’. Nevertheless, some gaps, including the crucial recent evolutions, still need to be filled within this large body of literature, in particular concerning their impact on national political systems. Moreover, despite the existence of this important body of literature, various theoretical questions remain open. Scholars have not been able to reach any consensus even on the *name* that should be used to identify such parties. Each of these names (‘radical right’, ‘extreme right’, ‘far-right’...) corresponds to a different definition of the nature of RRP. In our work, we use the term ‘radical right’ by considering that these parties are no longer at the ‘extreme’ of the political system (Mudde 2007). The evolution of the position of RRP, which is away from ‘extremism’,

contributes to the justification of our research: far from being marginal (when compared to previous contexts), these parties have become key actors in different national contexts and thus deserve particular attention; this attention should include matters going beyond their core ideology (M. H. Williams 2006; Carvalho 2013).<sup>1</sup> However, with only a few exceptions (Afonso 2014; Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015), the literature does not consider the effects of RRPs on what could be considered as secondary issues in their ideology. This is especially the case with the economy irrespective of the academic field (economics, sociology, or political science). This deficiency remains true in spite of an existing economic literature on the effects of racial prejudice, xenophobia, and anti-immigration stances (Becker 1957; Arrow 1973; Reich 1981).

To fill this gap, our research attempts to answer the following question: ‘Do RRPs influence economic policies and economic performance?’ By influence (or impact), we mean ‘the capacity to change a course of events that might develop differently without the introduction of the impact stimulus’ (M. H. Williams 2006, 42). By ‘economic policies’, we mean the laws, directives, and actions taken by governments on economic matters. ‘Economic performance’ is considered in a broad sense, as we wish to deal with the overall outcomes of RRPs on economic variables. The analysis of economic performance is therefore a way for us to consider the indirect effects of RRPs on the economy. Within this perspective, we aim to foster an interdisciplinary dialogue by relying on theories and methodologies from different social sciences (economics, sociology, and political science). It should be noticed that our work focuses on one aspect of the relation between RRPs and the economy, namely the impact of RRPs on the economy, while the impact of the economic situation on the development of RRPs is left to further research.

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<sup>1</sup> One might argue that the importance given by RRPs to immigration make them ‘single-issue’ parties (Mudde 1999). However, we disagree with such an interpretation (see Chapter 1 and 2).



In the next pages, we insist on the relevance of our research by highlighting (i) its topical issue dimension (the rise of RRP in the European political context) and (ii) the major theoretical concerns it raises. Finally, (iii) we present our approach and (iv) methodology.

*(i) The third wave of RRP: Towards a renewed interest for RRP's impact on political decisions*

A major motivation for as well as the legitimacy of our research question depends on the rising electoral strength of RRP in most European countries since the 1980s. According to Von Beyme (1988), we can classify the electoral progression of RRP in three different waves. First, a 'nostalgic wave' in the early post-Second World War period corresponding to neo-fascist parties; second, an 'anti-tax wave', especially in France, which was less interested in defending previous fascist regimes; finally, since the mid-1980s, a 'third wave' has been emerging in Western Europe, as detailed in Chapter 1.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 highlight the growing electoral strength of European RRP between the beginning of 1990s and today.<sup>2</sup> It appears that RRP have developed in many countries, such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands, with a few exceptions and nuances. In particular, this phenomenon is extremely diversified between Eastern and Western Europe. In Western Europe, the average of RRP electoral score increased from 5.4% in 1990–1994 to more than 10% in the most recent national election results, even though they are almost non-existent in some countries like Spain and Portugal. Consequently, RRP have become an almost common presence in parliaments across Western Europe. As of today, we find at least either a Member of Parliament (MP) or a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from RRP in 12 Western European countries, while they could be found in just four Western European countries in the 1990s. Finally, RRP were also part of different

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<sup>2</sup> Data for 1990–1994 represents the average electoral score of each RRP in national legislative elections. For today's data, we relied on the most recent national election. Data has been collected from the ParlGov Dataset (Döring and Manow 2016).





Figure 1 - Average electoral score in legislative elections (1990–1994). Source: author’s own calculations on ParlGov data.

ruling coalitions in Italy, Austria, Denmark etc. (see Chapter 4 for a more in-depth discussion), and they are either in power or provide external support to minority governments in two countries (Denmark and Finland). Conversely, in some countries they are still ostracized and a *cordon sanitaire*, which is an agreement to avoid alliances with RRP by all other parties, prevent them to rule, as it is the case in France (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015; Minkenberg 2013b).

In Eastern Europe, RRP’s electoral score experienced a small decline from the early 1990s when they obtained, on average, 9.2% of the popular vote compared to today’s 7.8%. The life expectancy for Eastern European RRP is rather short. Only one of the RRP with a parliamentary representation in the early 1990s, namely the Slovak National Party (SNS), is currently represented at the national or European Parliament. This is probably due to the fact that moderate right-wing parties in some Eastern European countries underwent a process of radicalisation, ‘stealing’ the place of older RRP. These parties are now classified as RR by some authors, but their actual nature is still being debated on (Mudde 2015b, 2016b). This is particularly the case in Hungary and Poland, where moderate right-wing parties are radicalising and show clear signs of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.



*Figure 2 - Electoral score for RRP in the latest legislative election. Source: author's own calculations on ParlGov data.*

Overall, while the rise of RRP is clear in many countries, it has to be relativized in others. In most cases, they are still far from being hegemonic actors, but might be in a position that allows them to influence the political decisions of a country.

(ii) The development of RRP has raised theoretical issues related to their potential impact on the economy.

A first question within this new political context concerns the nature of RRP and the consequences it may have on their economic perspective. Are they comparable to the fascist movements in interwar Europe? RRP and fascist movements have often been identified as ‘bedfellows’ (Saull et al. 2014). However, RRP and fascist movements differ on at least one major point: ‘[T]he radical right is (nominally) democratic, even if they oppose some fundamental values of liberal democracy, whereas the extreme right is in essence antidemocratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people’ (Mudde 2007, 31). This difference is reinforced by the fact that the political and economic systems within which RRP act are different from what they were in the interwar period. In particular, contemporary democratic institutions appear stronger than their counterparts in the Italy of the 1920s

or the Weimar's Republic during that period (Eatwell and Mudde 2004; Mudde 2014a, 2014c): this should lead to different economic outcomes.

A second theoretical aspect concerns the role played by RRP and their related impact on European politics, especially since the 'third wave'. On the one hand, Minkenberg (2001, 2002, 2013b) argues that RRP have an 'influence', albeit conditionally on various factors. On the other hand, Mudde (2013) underlines the absence of empirical evidence in support of such interpretation. In particular, Mudde defines RRP as a 'pathological normalcy' and holds that 'the populist radical right constitutes a radicalization of mainstream views' (Mudde 2010, 1178). In other words, the core ideas of RRP are already present in contemporary political systems; these are often held by mainstream parties. Hence, they should not be considered in opposition to, but rather in relation to, the European political system. With this respect, much of the literature considers the contagion process (i.e. the capacity of RRP to get voters and parties to share their political agendas on economic policies when in government). This is not, however, the only way in which RRP may influence policy. In particular, on economic matters, the mechanism might be more complex and include indirect consequences of the development of RRP. For instance, if RRP can spread xenophobic ideas in the population, this might influence the labour market, as stressed by the literature on the economic impact of racial discrimination (Roemer 1979; Roemer, Lee, and Straeten 2007; Becker 1957; Arrow 1973).

Thus, the analysis of the impact of RRP form part of a movement, which Mudde (Mudde 2016a) identifies as a 'fourth wave of scholarship' on RRP. They contribute to different dimensions, but also have strong limitations, especially when talking about economic issues. Recently, researchers have started to investigate the nature of RRP's impact and the channel through which such impact may occur. In a pioneering study, Minkenberg (2001) identifies two levels of impact: agenda-setting and policymaking. Williams (2006) adds a third level between agenda and policy to assess the effects on political competition (institution level). The use of Williams's three categories appears to be an interesting grid to present the major contributions in the field (Figure 3); it allows us to highlight the

scarcity of works that analyse the possible economic impact of RRP: such impact is generally restricted to attitudes towards immigration (whether related to feelings, platforms, or policies), while the literature ignores economic issues, even on the economic conditions of migrants.





Figure 3 - Impact levels. Source: Williams (2006).

RRPs affect the agenda as far as they can influence public discourses by prioritizing certain issues. Indeed, by analysing four different cases (Austria, France, Germany, and Italy), Minkenberg (2001, 18) concludes that ‘the most substantive impacts [of RRP] were a change in cultural issues, a new *Kulturkampf* against the left, its allies and against foreigners’. He then concludes that RRP might reshape the concept of ‘people’ (i.e. the identification of those who supposedly belong to the people), which would drive public action in an ethnocentric way. Other authors share his conclusions, even though in relation to a different extent and underlying different conditions (Schain 2002; M. H. Williams 2006; Carvalho 2013).

RRPs also make impact at the institutional level, which refers to the ‘relationship between political parties, the position of parties on the political ideological spectrum’; they also impact the rule of the game such as the electoral law or the form of governments (M. H. Williams 2006). To our knowledge, no study has actually assessed the latter dimension (the impact on the form of governments or the electoral law), while most research on the impact of RRP at the institutional level focuses on the former dimension (the relationship between political parties). For example, according to

Minkenberg's (2002, 266) analysis of French and German political systems, RRP's produce 'a growing polarization in the French case with some signs of a shift to the right and a general shift to the right in the German case with some signs of polarization'. In particular, some non-RR parties, mostly from the right, radicalized on certain issues (mainly immigration), follow the success of RRP's (Van Spanje 2010; Akkerman 2012; S. Alonso and Fonseca 2012).



*Figure 4 - The relationship between the three levels of impact. Source: Williams (2006).*

Finally, RRP's can also be considered to have an impact at the policy level. The policy level analyses the concrete outcomes such as a stricter law on immigration (see below).

The three levels are intended in Williams (2006) to take the form of a pyramid so that changes at the lowest level (agenda level) might cause changes at the policy level (Figure 4): (i) RRP's agendas influence the priorities of voters or their attitudes towards a certain issue; (ii) this change in the priorities of voters or their attitudes pushes other parties to adapt their own behaviours (more or less, however, depends on the institutional structure of the political system); (iii) ultimately, new policies are adopted in accordance with the new population's attitude. The aim of our work is to study this mechanism when dealing with economic matters. However, the extent to which the presence of large RRP's influences policymaking remains unclear (Minkenberg (2013a)). One of the reasons is that policymaking depends highly on the level of interactions between RRP's and non-RRP's (Minkenberg

2001; Carvalho 2013). It may also depend on the reaction of non-RRPs to shifts in electorate attitudes or priorities even in the absence of a strong RR competitor.

Minkenberg (2001) finds no evidence of generalized legislative action by RRP holding parliamentary representation. He examines the first year of the FPÖ-ÖVP government in Austria and finds that the cabinet's record 'is far from the implementation of right-wing radical ideology' (Minkenberg 2001, 15). Zaslove (2004a) comes to a different conclusion concerning RRP in office. In his critical assessment of government actions in Austria and Italy, he concludes that RRP influence both public discourse (the 'agenda' level) and public policy if they are members of a cabinet.

Akkerman and De Lange (2013) study RRP government records and compare four RRP when in office. They show that even when RRP are part of a ruling coalition, policy shifts on the migratory policy vary among countries, but they are often very few and even non-existent. Carvalho (2013) argues that the impact of RRP varies among countries as he analyses French, Italian, and British cases. He assesses RRP's impact on the immigration policy through contagion and finds evidence for France and Italy, while this seems less clear in the British case; he underlines that these effects are conditional on non-RRP's agency: Mainstream parties have a certain degree of resistance to RR contagion which limits the extent of the impact of RRP. Minkenberg (2013b) provides a review of the above literature and an analysis of Central and Eastern Europe. He argues that centre-right parties have 'tamed' RRP by co-opting the anti-immigration issue in Western Europe, while in Central and Eastern Europe there is no mainstreaming of RRP, only a radicalization of the whole political system. In addition, while conducting a qualitative analysis of 10 case studies in Central and Eastern Europe, Minkenberg (2015) finds potential signs of the impact on policymaking for seven countries, but still mostly in the form of harsher laws concerning migrants and minorities. He concludes that RRP's impact should be assessed in terms of electoral strength and that their influence is not enhanced by

participation in a coalition government as co-optation of RR issues by mainstream parties usually precedes the entry of RRP to office.

However, not all scholars agree with this conclusion. Akkerman (2012) develops a Nationalist Immigration and Integration Policy Index (NIIP) to measure changes in migration and integration policies. He compares this index for nine countries from 1996 to 2010 and finds that while centre-right governments favour tighter anti-immigration policies, this does not seem to be correlated with the presence of strong RRP. Considering the many ‘failures’ of RRP influence, Mudde (2013) argues that tightening control over immigration goes beyond RRP and is a more general trend. Moving away from country comparisons, Boblin et al. (2014) propose an analysis of the impact of RRP on the asylum policy at the municipality level. Relying on an OLS estimation of time series cross-section data, they test whether the strength of Swedish Democrats (SD) has any impact on the ratio of accepted refugees to inhabitants in Swedish municipalities. They find no relation with the size of SD representation in the city council, even though a significant negative effect is found if the SD holds the ‘balance of power’ (i.e. when its votes are important to support a political majority).

Indeed, most of the literature focuses on immigration as it is considered as a central issue in the definition of RR ideology (See Chapter 1), but only a few papers go beyond as has been proposed in our research. Some studies have broadened the subject and included economic policies: Afonso (2014, 2015) analyses RRP’s strategies and their impact on welfare state reforms. He shows that RRP face a ‘trade-off between office and votes in the area of welfare’ (Afonso 2014, 287) and are forced to choose between their government’s allies (usually centre-right parties that want to curtail welfare) and their voters (increasingly pro-welfare). According to Afonso and Papadopoulous (2015, 21), ‘The reforms that survived both the parliamentary and the referendum veto points were those that could be framed as targeting “undeserving” recipients of social benefits’. According to Afonso and Papadopoulous (2015), most of the SVP electorate would not support welfare retrenchment



(despite the SVP being a pro-austerity party) unless framed as an anti-immigration measure because migrants are perceived as ‘undeserving’.

Overall, the review of the literature on the impact of RRPs shows that beyond the absence of any consensus on the existence of significant impact, studies assessing such impact on the economy are largely missing within the debate. As stated by Mudde (2016a, 14), current studies focus ‘almost exclusively on the impact on policies (of other parties) on the issues of immigration and integration. More research is needed to study the impact on other issues, including socio-economic issues (e.g. redistributive policies) and socio-cultural issues (e.g. crime, corruption)’.

## APPROACH

To fill this gap and answer our research question, the first part of our work aims to understand RRPs’ stance on economic matters and thus the way in which these parties might have an influence on the economy. It first defines and identifies RRPs (Chapter 1) and provides taxonomies of their economic proposals (Chapter 2). The second part analyses the mainstream economic literature on the political determinants of the economy and derives a series of hypotheses (Chapter 3, See Table 1) that are tested empirically (Chapter 4). Finally, the third part identifies the limits of this mainstream approach and proposes a more comprehensive as well as inter-disciplinary theorisation to assess the economic impact of RRPs (Chapter 5).

### *Part I: RRPs and their economic ideas*

Chapter 1 critically reviews the literature on the definition of RRPs. We first discuss the difference between spatial and ideological definitions of RRPs (the debate between the use of the terms ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’, justifying our choice of the term ‘radical right’), then we analyse the core ideological features characterising RRPs. In particular, we show that ‘nativism’ (the idea that a nation should be inhabited solely by people from the native ethnic group) is by far the most common category used to identify RRPs. Other ideological features (mainly authoritarianism and populism)

can be considered as important characteristics, especially for the third wave of RRP. However, they are less central features of such parties. We rely on this dimension to identify the RRP considered in this empirical work.

In Chapter 2, we analyse the economic policy positions of RRP relying on various datasets (MARPOR's project database on party manifestos and the voting records at the European Parliament) and use different methodologies (Principal Component Analysis, NOMINATE, clustering methods). This work provides a set of original contributions through the identification of a taxonomy of RRP according to their economic proposals and voting records on economic matters. As the literature highlights, RRP do not share common views in this respect (Kitschelt 1995; De Lange 2007; Rovny 2013). Indeed, Mudde (2007) describes RRP's economic programmes as 'schizophrenic agendas' due to the inherent incoherence of their proposals and eventually concludes that the economy is a 'secondary issue' for the RR family. However, the 2008 economic crisis clearly generated new incentives for RRP to deal with economic matters (Hernández and Kriesi 2016); there are some indications that RRP have been moving to the economic left by adopting pro-welfare positions (Ivaldi 2016). The goal of Chapter 2 is then twofold. First, we wish to verify the importance of economic policies in RRP's programmes and do so by analysing the evolution of RRP manifestos. We show that RRP now attach more importance to economic policies in the current period than they did in the 1990s and accordingly identify different types of RRP. Second, we argue that RRP's legislative behaviours might be inconsistent with their own economic proposals. This leads us to analyse their behaviours at the EP. The combination of RRP's typologies based on their own manifestos and voting behaviours allows us to highlight the incoherence of certain RRP, but also a converging process: RRP, despite being part of an extremely divided family, are moving towards a common pro-welfare position. Still, these findings indicate that RRP's should not be treated as other parties in terms of economic impact: while other party families (supposedly) share a common view on economic topics, this is still not the case for RRP. As such, we decide to derive the economic

impact from RR ideology, rather than from their position on economic matters. Moreover, the Chapter provides further justifications to our study. RRPs have been increasing their focus on economic programmes; they are no longer (if they ever were) single-issue parties. An analysis of their impact on especially on economic policy, as a mean to realise their ideology, appears particularly relevant.

### Part II: RRPs economic impact: A mainstream approach

To address the impact of RRPs, our research reviews the mainstream economic literature on the political determinants of the economy. Chapter 3 provides this critical review. In particular, we focus on the so-called ‘political economics’ (Torsten Persson and Tabellini 2004) approach, developed within the school of ‘Public Choice’. Within this approach, we distinguish between opportunistic and partisan models. In opportunistic models (Nordhaus 1975; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997), politicians are office-seeker agents (this means that they are exclusively interested in securing re-election). As such, the incumbents have incentives to adopt temporary policies to satisfy the electorate. In partisan models (Hibbs 1977; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997), politicians are policy-seeker agents. In other words, left-wing and right-wing politicians differ in the political programmes they apply after being elected. Despite the limits of these two models, they at least give us a starting point for our analysis. We derive two hypotheses for each model around the idea that regardless of the model, the presence of strong RRPs may influence economic policies and outcomes. In particular, we distinguish between the consequences of RRPs in office and the consequences of their political strength (Table 1).

The hypothesis based on the opportunistic model considers a specific behaviour of incumbents just in the election year (whether RRPs are part of the incumbent coalition [OH-GOV] or not [OH-GOV]).

Opportunistic models – Hyp. 1 (OH-STR): In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.

Opportunistic models - Hyp.2 (OH-GOV): When RRP are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in lines with their ideological profiles.

The hypothesis based on the partisan model considers a possible long-term influence of RRP on economic policies (not just for the electoral year) and distinguishes between the case when the governing coalition includes [PH-GOV] or does not include [PH-STR] RRP.

Partisan models – Hyp.1 (PH-STR): In countries characterized by strong RRP, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.

Partisan models – Hyp 2 (PH-GOV): Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRP are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profiles.

	<b>RRPs' POLITICAL STRENGTH (STR)</b>	<b>RRPs ARE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT (GOV)</b>
<b>OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS' HYPOTHESIS (OH)</b>	OH-STR	OH-GOV
<b>PARTISAN MODELS' HYPOTHESIS (PH)</b>	PH-STR	PH-GOV

*Table 1 - Matrix of the hypotheses on the impact of RRP.*

We test our hypotheses in Chapter 4 by using econometric tools. We identify the dependant economic variables related to the RR ideology. We present different types of operationalisation of the 'political strength' beyond the electoral-only results. In particular, we consider the fact that political institutions might limit the impact of RRP (this is the case, in particular, when RRP with a rather high percentage of votes are not able to get any seat, or very few, in parliaments). As such, we develop an original definition of political strength based on RRP's electoral results, their presence in parliaments, and their participation in governments. These dimensions provide some of our independent variables.

We then test our hypotheses by using the estimator of Arellano–Bond (1991) for dynamic panel analysis. Our original findings show little to none evidence of our ‘opportunistic’ hypotheses (OH-1 and OH-2). The hypotheses based on partisan models, however, provide the evidence of a nativist impact of RRPs on the economy; it is stronger when they are in government (PH-1), but also present when we look at their political strength (PH-2). We find that countries characterized by strong RRPs show a larger difference between natives and foreigners in terms of unemployment and employment rates. Our results are stronger when we focus on Western European countries (this seems to indicate that RRPs could hinder the economic integration of non-native population in certain countries). Our results, however, lack a proper understanding of the mechanisms behind our findings. In other words, our statistical tests underline a significant relation between RRPs and economic exclusion of foreigners (and lack of significant relations on other variables such as deficits or budget shares dedicated to security and police), but we do not know how this relation works (except that, according to these theories, it would result from the rational behaviours of office-seekers or policy-seeker agents). Therefore, we need to open the black box to describe in detail the mechanisms that may explain these effects of RRPs (or its absence thereof) on economic policies and performances, as it cannot be done by opportunistic or partisan theories.

### *Part III: RRPs economic impact: Elements towards a neo-realist approach*

In Chapter 5, we propose an original, qualitative, and transdisciplinary contribution to the political determinant of the economy which would allow us to identify the perspective for further research. We consider this approach as necessary because mainstream models leave us with no satisfying explanations of the mechanisms behind the observed impacts (or the absence of impacts) of RRPs on economic policies and performances. As stated by Palombarini (2001), these models do not respect the autonomy and specificity of politics. To integrate this autonomy and specificity in our work, we propose an original extension of the work by Amable and Palombarini’s (2005). In their neo-realist approach, strongly influenced by Gramsci, these authors consider economic policies as the outcome

of a political mediation of social conflict. Political parties compete to obtain the support of different social blocs that signify the alliance between social categories expressing similar demands. When a bloc is large enough to guarantee the defence of its interests, we have a dominant social bloc (DSB). This allows us to add a layer to our analyses: The previous discussion was exclusively based on the supply-side of politics, namely parties. Here we add the demand-side, which is the social characteristics and priorities of the electorate. As other authors (Rydgren 2013), we underline the strength that RRP have on industrial and service workers, although we stress the fact that only a part of the working class is turning to RRP. Therefore, we discuss the nativist faction of the working class as the cornerstone of a contemporary RR social bloc.

In Chapter 5, our contribution is the analysis of the conditions and viability for the construction of a RR dominant social bloc, starting from its current electorate. In particular, we introduce Amable's and Palombarini's (2005) approach of two original dimensions. On the one hand, social blocs are influenced by the supranational level, which imposes constraints on the different actors (e.g. some policies might be prescribed by international treaties) and generates opportunities (e.g. the politicization of the European integration helped the diffusion of Eurosceptic parties). On the other hand, the viability of a dominant social bloc depends on the 'power' of its different components in terms of the resources owned, structural power, electoral power, and organizational power.

We rely on the example of the Italian *Lega Nord* to illustrate how hard it might be for RRP to fulfil all the conditions to form their own dominant social bloc (at least in the Italian context). We argue that the only possible way seems to be a nativist compromise with non-RR parties that would accept the need to develop exclusionary policies (either by including RRP in their governing coalitions or by co-opting RR issues). If this illustration of our theoretical contribution of a single case study cannot be considered as a definitive demonstration of its general validity, it at least provides a perspective for deeper analysis and further research.

## METHODOLOGY

Our approach includes both theoretical and empirical dimensions; it relies on different methodologies, ranging from the review of a multidisciplinary literature to the use of different statistical methods.

The theoretical part of our work relies on a critical review of the literature which has been developed in all three parts of the thesis. In Part 1 (Chapter 1), it allows us to define RRP in accordance with their main ideological features. We also rely on a critical assessment of this review to identify, by the means of a meta-analysis of their ideological features, the different parties that we wish to include in our study. In Part 2 (Chapter 3), it allows us to analyse the mainstream framework of the political determinants of the economy in the economic literature and to derive four hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. Finally, the theoretical contributions proposed in Part 3 (Chapter 5) rely on our transdisciplinary approach to the literature in order to propose original extensions to Amable's and Palombarini's (2005) neo-realist approach: (i) The extension introducing the relationship between the national and supranational levels in terms of constraints and opportunities, as already highlighted by the literature on international relations; (ii) the extension introducing class power as far as social blocs are not equal in terms of resources, structural power, associational power, and electoral power. The amended model is then used to provide an original contribution to analyse the interactions between the political and economic systems.

On the empirical side, a large set of complementary methods and data is mobilized. In Chapter 2, we rely on two main datasets: The MARPOR project (Volkens et al. 2015) to assess RRP's economic proposals and a dataset of parliamentary voting records provided by Simon Hix to analyse RRP's voting behaviours. These datasets are analysed thanks to various statistical methods, including descriptive analysis, principal component analysis, NOMINATE, and Ward's criterion, to obtain a taxonomy of RRP according to their economic proposals or voting behaviours and additive trees to provide a representation of the distance between the parties.

In Chapter 4, we build our own dataset on economic policies and economic performances by collecting data from different sources (Eurostat, OECD, World Bank DPI, and ParlGov database) and obtain a panel data made of economic and political variables covering 27 European countries between 1990 and 2014. They are used to test the hypotheses derived from the literature (Chapter 3) by relying on the econometric estimator of Arellano–Bond (1991).

Finally, in Chapter 5, beyond the theoretical construction we develop from the existing literature, we rely on the latest round of the European Social Survey to identify the main components of the RR social bloc. We run a probit model with selection sample (Heckman 1979), in order to identify the probability that an individual coming from a certain social category or expressing certain political demands would vote for an RRP. The final part of the chapter, where we illustrate the strategy pursued by the Italian *Lega Nord* to build its own dominant social bloc, relies on the qualitative assessment of different factors, either obtained in the previous chapters (such as the evolution of *Lega Nord*'s economic programme) or the new ones.



# 1. RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES: TERMINOLOGY, DEFINITIONS AND PROFILES

## 1.1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of ‘Radical Right’ (RR) is at the core of our research question. However, defining this a concept is particularly challenging since it refers to historical, ideological and theoretical perspectives, which are dependent also on the national context. A variety of terms has been proposed to describe the political context including: far-right (Saull et al. 2014), extreme-right (Ignazi 2003), right-wing extremism (Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins 2013), populist RR (Mudde 2007), RR-wing populism (Rydgren 2002), populist parties of the right (Betz 2005), movements of exclusion (Rydgren 2005), anti-immigrant parties (Art 2011), Neo-fascism (Goodwin 2012) - the list goes on. Underlying all of these terms is what each author considers are the defining characteristic of these parties.

The variety of these terms is related to the variety of RR theoretical approaches. Definitions vary widely in both their relation to analytical framework and their content. Some parties are characterized by an extreme relative position within the political system (Ignazi 2003): they are part of the RR because they do not accept the democratic values and are, therefore, on the margins of the political system. Other authors define such parties based on certain common ideological features are at the core of the definition, regardless of their position within the political system, i.e. accepted or not by the others (Mudde 2007). Nevertheless, their ideological content is highly multidimensional with nationalism, xenophobia, populism, nativism, authoritarianism and traditionalism among the many concepts highlighted in Mudde's (1995) survey of the RR.

This variety in the RR's ideological background is problematic for a finite identification of those parties that can be considered as belonging to the RR. This aspect is complicated by the fact that for some parties on the margins the situation is fluid and may depend on who is leading the party. For instance, the American Republican Party would never be described 'radical' although it is to the right. However, Donald Trump was able to secure the nomination (and the Presidency) on an anti-immigration platform. Had the Republican Party changed and now embraced a more radical direction? The answer to this question will likely emerge in the next few months. However, in an online *Washington Post* column published in August 2015, Mudde (2015c) compared 'Trumpism' with his definition of Populist Radical Right Parties (RRP). Although there seem to be some superficial connections, Mudde's (2015c) response was rather negative: Donald Trump's 'general views on immigration and integration are much more in line with U.S. conservatives than with European far right' and he does not hold 'a populist RR ideology'. Indeed, one might consider Trump as a functional equivalent, but with many caveats and mostly because of similarities between Trump's primary voters and RR European voters. In another column, published less than a year later, Mudde (2016c) provided a different response to the question, as he argues that: 'The case for labelling Trump "far right" is pretty straightforward'. This change of view is well founded: between the publication of these articles Trump proposed the building of a wall between Mexico and the US, the ban of Muslim migrants, and accused Mexicans of being rapists. This example shows how hard it is, to keep pace with a fast-changing topic in the context of RRP.

As such, Chapter 1 describes the theoretical framework and the boundaries to the empirical research. In particular, Section 1.2 presents and justifies the definition RRP used in this Thesis. Section 1.3 discusses and describes the major RRP in Europe. It underlines the differences in the success, organization and attitudes among these parties and identifies the main protagonist for the subsequent chapters.

## 1.2. WHAT COLOUR IS A CHAMELEON? WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE TALK OF RRP: TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION

In this Section, we provide our definition of RRP. In order to do so, Section 1.2.1 summarizes the debate over the terminology and justifies our choice to use the label RRP from the large selection of possible labels. Section 1.2.2 provides a review of the different definitions of RRP and it identifies the main ideological features highlighted by the literature. Section 1.2.3 concludes and presents our definition of RRP.

### 1.2.1. THE NAME GAME: WHY DO WE CHOOSE ‘RADICAL’ RATHER THAN ‘EXTREME’ RIGHT TERMINOLOGY?

On the eve of the 2014 European elections, the rise of populist and euro-sceptical right-wing parties or RRP was front-page news. Not all scholars agree on the real extent of this rise (Mudde 2014c; Maggini 2014). However, it is true that since the mid-1990s, and for some observers even before that (Kitschelt 1995), RRP have become an important and well-established political actor in Europe (Aichholzer et al. 2014). Labels such as ‘Front National’ and the ‘Northern League’ are well known to readers both within and outside of academia and are seen as pivotal agents in their respective political systems.

What do we call these parties? Unfortunately there is no consensus on the terminology and, according to some authors, there are no fundamental difference between the terms used (Mudde 2007). While this is true in most cases, it is possible to identify a dichotomy that has important theoretical consequences. On the one hand, we have ‘far/extreme right’ (Harrison and Bruter 2011; Shields 2007; Ignazi 2003), where parties are labelled according to their acceptance of democratic values as well as their position within the political system. On the other hand, the term ‘RR’ (Goodwin 2009; Kitschelt

	<b>EXTREME RIGHT</b>	<b>RADICAL RIGHT</b>
<b>MEANING</b>	We define the Party according to its relatively extreme position in the political system and its acceptance of democratic values.	We define the Party according to its radical ideological features, regardless of its position within the political system. They might contest democratic values, but this is not a defining feature of the party family.

*Table 2 - The main dichotomy in radical/extreme right terminology. Source: original compilation.*

1995; Minkenberg 2001; Zaslove 2004b) categorizes parties according to the radicalism of their ideas with no reference to the position within the political system nor their acceptance of democratic values. This debate emerged first in the 1960s with the publication of *The Radical Right* (1963) by Daniel Bell. Although the term had already been coined (Rush 1963), Bell is usually recognized as having popularized the adjective *radical*. The substance of the debate is summarized in Table 2.

The terminological variety derives in part from cultural difference. Under the ‘*extreme*’ right umbrella, for example, we find neo-fascist and neo-Nazi movements in Europe, while the adjective ‘*radical*’ is more commonly applied in the United States (Hainsworth 2008). According to this reading, the two terms are identical conceptually and indicative only of the writer's academic background. However, the two terminologies also can mirror different conceptualizations of the party family. As Backer (2000) states in her analysis of the German RR, extreme right parties are characterized by their rejection of political pluralism, thus, including all those nationalist and xenophobic movements supporting an anti-democratic re-organization of society. RR movements share the same principles, but accept democracy and are not openly desirous of overturning it. This is echoed in Carter’s (2005a, 17) work which identifies the ‘rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state’ as one of the defining elements of right-wing extremism. This definition derives from the classification proposed by the German Federal Constitutional Court which distinguished between anti-democratic forces (‘extreme right’) and forces

that were critical of, but not against liberal democracy.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, outside Germany, the label ‘extreme’ right was applied to neo-fascist formations, which are opposed to the democratic system. This changed after the 1980s (Ignazi 2003): for him, the topological dimension appears to be a key feature of ‘extremeness’, rather than an exclusively ideological element. Accordingly, when we talk of ‘extreme’ right (or left), we identify all parties situated at the extremes of their respective political systems: this is the ‘topological’ justification for the use of the term ‘extreme right’ rather than RR‘ (Ignazi 2003, 20) Thus, given a political space divided into Left and Right, the label ‘extreme’ refers to both the location (i.e. the party family is at the fringe of the political system) and the ideology (i.e. the party family is extreme inasmuch it opposes the common values of the political system). ‘Radicalism’ is considered an ‘ambiguous’ term (Ignazi 2003, 28) and the notion of extremeness is preferred since it encompasses both location and ideology.

The preference in this work for the term ‘radical’ rather than ‘extreme’ is justified for two main reasons. First, the topological argument proposed by Ignazi (1992, 2003) becomes less and less valid as time passes: parties that all scholars consider as belonging to the RR family<sup>4</sup> increasingly are integrated in the political system. It is difficult to consider “a party such as the Northern League, which has been governing in a stable centre-right coalition for the greater part of the first decade of 2000, as ‘extreme’. The same holds true for other parties, such as the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) and, very recently, ‘The Finns’ (P). The political forces the literature usually considers as RRP are (i) no longer at the extreme of their respective political systems in case of most pre-1990s parties, (ii) accepted as political forces in a way that their 1950-1980s homologues were not. In a way, RRP have lost their extremeness despite keeping part of their former ideological core, which may endow these parties with more power in various fields including

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<sup>3</sup> The classification made by the German Federal Constitutional Court is mentioned by Hainsworth (2008, 9).

<sup>4</sup> The proper way to identify a party family is still being debated and is part of the discussion in this paragraph. Regardless of the methodology applied, a party family identifies ‘links and equivalences among parties in different polities’ and regroups these parties accordingly (Mair and Mudde 1998, 212).

economic matters, with a possible impact on economic policies. The second reason for privileging ‘radical’ over ‘extreme’ is that the notion of extremeness, as underlined in Backer (2000), is accompanied by a rejection of democracy and, in some cases, a violent political actions. This no longer applies to the major RRP in Europe,<sup>5</sup> which should be acknowledged. As Mudde (2007, 31) notes: ‘the radical right is (nominally) democratic, even if they oppose some fundamental values of liberal democracy, whereas the extreme right is in essence antidemocratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people’. This idea is shared by the most recent literature on the evolution of RRP. According to Akkerman et al. (2016), many RRP are undergoing a process of mainstreaming, in other words, they are becoming closer to ‘mainstream’ (mainly centre-left and centre-right) parties. This is due to both a radicalization of the mainstream parties, which integrate elements from the RRP as they progress, and moderation of the RRP. Akkerman et al. (2016) focus on the latter and consider four dimensions of ‘mainstreaming’: 1) moderating their radical ideas (‘radical’ dimension); 2) including other non-core issues in their programme (‘niche’ dimension); 3) accepting and collaborating with the establishment (‘populist’ dimension); 4) moving away from past extreme reputation (‘extreme’ dimension). They conclude that there is insufficient support for a thesis of a ‘mainstreaming’ of RRP in dimensions 1 to 3. In other words, RRP remain radical, niche and populist parties. However, there is enough support to argue that RRP are moving away from their extreme polarization: they have severed ties with the most extreme organizations (e.g. neo-Nazi groups) and, in most cases, have abandoned anti-Semitism.

Thus, we can conclude that the label ‘extreme’ is no longer apt to describe the party family as a whole. This is not to say that extreme right parties no longer exist: as we will see in Section 1.2, some parties are indeed characterized by their ‘extremeness’ (they refuse democratic values and are on the margins

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<sup>5</sup> The parties considered in this study are not extreme in that sense although there are two partial exceptions: the Hungarian Jobbik (Varga 2014), which had close ties with the para-military group ‘Hungarian Guard’, and the Greek Golden Dawn (Ellinas 2014).

of the political system). However, we consider extreme right parties just as a subgroup within the RR party family. Since the largest part of the parties we discuss in this thesis about are no longer on the fringes of the political system and do not overtly contest liberal democracy, the term ‘RR’, which defines an ideology, is more fruitful for this research.

### 1.2.2. A DIVERSE AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY FOCALIZED ON NATIVISM, POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

In this Section, we discuss ideology, which is at the core of RR. The debate on the boundaries to RR, has reached no consensus (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). For the purposes of the present research, the definition must be broad enough to allow comparison and to embrace different types of RRP across time and space, but not so wide as to include parties, albeit rightist, have more in common with the conservative movement than with right-wing radicalism.

Some authors define RR movements according to a broad set of characteristics which include parties’ organizational structures (Payne 1983) or their voters’ preferences (Ignazi 2003). In this study, the focus is on RR ideology. This choice is in line with the most recent literature (Bruter and Harrison 2011; 2000b, 2007; Pirro 2015) that seeks to identify RRP according to a few core features. The other characteristics of RR, in particular their electorates’ preferences (Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2013), are not used to delimit the RR family, but only, in a second stage, to categorize the parties within the RR family.

The rationale behind the ideological approach is that ‘the ‘nature’ of the party is provided by its identity’ (Ignazi 2003, 30): As such, although organizational features are important descriptors, they derive from a vision of society rather than vice versa (Backes 2001). Similarly, voters respond to the ideological appeal of a political party, rather how it is defined. Voters’ attitudes tell us how important a certain topic is in the electoral success of a political organization, but if we want to consider parties also as agents in their own right, we need to focus on what they tell us, and identify the core features

of their message. These features are not necessarily *policies*. They might be one of the sources that help the researcher, but, as Seiler (1985) warns, comparing parties exclusively in terms of their policies might lead to comparison of countries instead. Recommended or implemented policies constitute part of the literature on parties, revealing part, but not all, of their ideology.

Considering the autonomy of the parties in positioning themselves and taking decisions, it appears relevant to define them through the set of coherent ideological features common to a number of different parties, which we will identify as RRP.

In contrast to many scholars who do not define the concept of ‘ideology’, we want to be precise about the fact that we use the term in the same way as Adorno (1950, xxxiii:2): ideology is ‘an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values- a way of thinking about man and society’.

The reason for this choice is that Adorno’s definition includes parties’ attitudes and makes it possible to see ideology as less structured than an intellectual product, thus, embracing a broader point of view. As Ignazi (2003, 30) underlines, an ideology is composed of either a combination of sophisticated theorizing and recall of thinkers and cultural traditions at a high level of ideological construction, or by a set of less structured myths, symbols, beliefs, attitudes, issues and policies.’

Some concepts are more important than others and, therefore, are prioritized in the construction of the ideology. We can determine a core and a periphery to ideology (Freedon 2003, 61), both composed of a set of ideas, attitudes and values that are more or less significant. The core is shared by the whole community of members, while the peripheral ideological elements might vary.

#### 1.2.2.1. NATIVISM AS THE CORE FEATURE OF RR IDEOLOGY

Many studies present a list of ideological features that represent the ‘core’ of RR, sometimes oversimplified and sometimes including redundant features. Some scholars propose a one-feature definition, thus reducing RRP to single-issue movements (see Mudde 1999), usually anti-immigration. Although anti-immigration is often considered a core feature common to many RRP



in Western Europe (Givens 2005), the single-issue thesis fails to acknowledge the multifaceted system of beliefs held by these parties and from which single issues derive (Mudde 1999). Others propose large sets of characteristics. For instance, Falter and Schumann (1988) highlight ten core ideological features of RRP.

However, most works fall in between these two extremes, and the features identified often vary more in terminology than in meaning. Table 3 provides a summary of the different characteristics identified by the major authors. A review of these works shows that at least fifty-eight different terms are used in the literature to identify ideological features. Only five (nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and a strong state, this being a combination of militarism and attitudes to law and order) are mentioned in at least half of the studies reviewed (Mudde 1995, 2006). While militarism is defined as ‘the call for a strong army to protect the national interests’, law-and-order refers to ‘the belief in order and authority, accompanied by the demand for strong punishment of breach of the rules’ (Mudde 2000b, 188).

Using these features as a starting point, Mudde (2007) comes up with two different definitions for RR parties. The first is a ‘minimum definition’, which ‘delineates the bare core of the ideologies of the individual parties, but at the same time the full core of the whole party family’ (Mudde 2007, 14), in other words it identifies the ‘lowest common denominator’ shared by all RRP. The author finds this bare core in the concept of ‘nativism’, which Mudde (2007, 19) argues, ‘closely resembles the combination of nationalism and xenophobia’ and defines it as:

‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 19)

This conceptualization resonates with definitions proposed by other authors, such as Higham (2002, 4), who interprets nativism as an ‘intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its

foreign (i.e. anti-American) connections’, and Friedman (1967, 408), who defines the concept as an ‘antipathy for internal ‘foreign’ groups of various kind (national, cultural, religious’.

Authors belonging to the French *Nouvelle Droite* (ND) provide a theoretical framework partly fitting this perspective. According to Ignazi (2003, 24):

‘The ND, despite its minuscule dimension and its very limited direct impact on the political discourse in the various countries, has nevertheless produced a series of interpretations and intellectual tools that, beyond the intentions of the Nouvelle Droite itself, have been reframed and adopted by the extreme right parties.’

One of the main influences imposed by the ND on RRP is the development of a ‘differentialist’ approach which seems to reject racism and xenophobia (Spektorowski 2000, 298). Indeed, differentialism does not overtly propose a hierarchical classification of ethnic groups and it claims to fight xenophobia (P.-A. Taguieff 1993, 14). In contrast, it describes the impossibility of their living together, since this would lead to the extinction of national cultures. In De Benoist’s words: ‘diversity of peoples and cultures exist, however, only because, in the past, these various peoples and cultures were relatively isolated from one another’ (De Benoist 1999, 46). Thus, differentialism rejects the accusations of xenophobia, in the sense that it does not see other ethnic groups and differences as enemies or threats in themselves, they actually portray themselves as ethnophile. They wish to keep differences alive and for this reason De Benoist accuses ‘egalitarian’ antiracism of supporting a more perverse racism: ‘which absolutizes the Same and, in the name of Same, challenges the very idea of difference’ (De Benoist 1999, 47–48). The ‘ethnophilia’ of the ND (Spektorowski 2000, 299), however, is grounded in ‘an organic conception of ethnically homogeneous communities’ (Antón-Mellón 2013, 61) and is characterized by an exclusionary dimension: The right to the difference is accompanied by the necessity for each ‘people’ to follow its own path far from one another. To sum up, the ND shifts away from ‘the old discourse of racial ‘technophobia’ into a libertarian concept of ethnophilian separatism’ (Spektorowski 2000, 301) where separatism is used as a way to preserve

both native and non-native groups. The legitimacy of the existence of these elements and their right to be different are recognized only inasmuch as the homogeneity of each community is preserved. By relying on an essentialist vision of what constitutes a national community, the ND was the first movement to justify exclusionary ideas without advocating for biological racism or xenophobia.

Taguieff (1994) strongly criticized differentialism as he sees it, as just a tactic, a ruse, to adopt the same old racist messages in a world that now would reject any claims based on biological superiority. He refers to it usually as differentialist racism, to underline this linkage. However, Taguieff recognizes the differences between universal and differentialist racism, since the latter abstains from any claim to superiority. Similarly, most scholars have accepted the idea that differentialism represents a qualitatively important change in the ideology of the European RR (Rydgren 2005). Hence, racism, although still able to define a large part of the RR, does not seem to be an ideological core feature.

We then agree with Mudde (2007) and consider 'Nativism' as the main ideological core feature of RRP. Nativism catches the differentialist approach developed by De Benoist and the French *ND* in a way that the pairing racism/xenophobia would not. However 'nativism' and 'differentialism' are not totally equivalent.: using Taguieff's (1994) categories, nativism regroups both differentialist and universal racism under a single label since it is difficult to find a non-nativist formulation of xenophobia. Furthermore, the term 'nativism' appears particularly relevant since it avoids use of the more ambiguous 'nationalism', which could represent liberal/conservative right parties as well.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Leftist movements also can be labelled nationalists, as in the case of the Basque *Batasuna* or the Irish *Sinn Fein*. According to Laegaard (2007, 39), in order to be classified as nationalist, a view simply needs to (i) operate with or rely on 'criteria expressing a conception of the nation' and (ii) 'assign some political significance to the nation thus conceptualised'.

#### 1.2.2.2. AUTHORITARIANISM AND POPULISM: COMPLEMENTARY DIMENSIONS TO DESCRIBE CONTEMPORARY RR FAMILY

According to Mudde (2007), in order to understand contemporary RR, nativism should be considered together with two other ideological features, also highlighted in much of the literature, to form a ‘maximum definition’ which includes the ‘greatest possible number of similarities within (part of) the family’ (Mudde 2007, 15). Those two ideological features are ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘populism’. The former is defined as ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’ (Mudde 2007, 23), while the latter describes ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’.<sup>7</sup> So while the RR party family as a whole is identified by Mudde's ‘minimum definition’ (nativism), this ‘maximum definition’ identifies a subgroup within the party family. This subgroup, the RR populist category, includes most of today’s successful RRs.

Bruter and Harrison (2011) developed a multi-dimensional, but closed framework to differentiate RRs. This conceptual framework is composed of two structural ideological dimensions, a negative identity and authoritarianism, each divided in two ‘conceptions’. The negative identity dimension is similar to the previously cited concept of nativism, and it differentiates between possible threats to national homogeneity. It is broken down into (i) xenophobic and (ii) populist conceptions. These conceptions distinguish parties that consider foreigners as the most important threat (xenophobic conception) to national homogeneity, and those that focus more on attacking the elites. The authoritarian dimension is composed of (iii) a social and (iv) an institutional conception, differentiating between law-and-order and more traditional/moral forms of authoritarianism.

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<sup>7</sup> The author does not clarify the reasons for excluding the term authoritarianism from its minimum definition, despite it being identified explicitly as a core concept by much of previous literature (Mudde 1995).

However, not all of the literature in this field agrees on the category of authoritarianism as a defining feature. Betz (2003) is one of a few authors who does not include authoritarianism. Reflecting on the differences between contemporary RR and non-radical right-wing parties, Betz (2003) argues that RRP's peculiarity lies in their explicit radical nativist position and their populist tactics and rhetoric. For Betz, the RR family is better described as a form of exclusionary populism, which has at its core a restrictive notion citizenship and a conception of democracy viable only in a homogeneous community. Thus, RRP's might indeed be authoritarian, but so might other right-wing parties: the category is not a valid criterion to distinguish between the two party families.

'Populism' is becoming recognized more and more as a core feature of most RRP's (Pirro 2015). However, there are two main critiques to its inclusion as a core feature. First, according to some authors, such as Carter (2005a, 23), this term 'refers to a particular political style or form rather than to a specific political ideology'. Mudde (2000b) also initially was quite sceptical about the ideological stance of populism, and these concerns are shared by other researchers (Alvares and Dahlgren 2016; Ignazi 2003, 2002). However, Tarchi (2016) offers an intermediate position in considering populism as a 'mentality', something different from a political style, which he sees just as a form of communication, but, he argues, not as well-formed as an ideology.<sup>8</sup> However, despite the presence of important dissenting voices, the majority of the recent literature on populism considers it a political ideology. Second, populism (if we accept that it is an ideological feature) is common to one (rather successful) sub-type of RRP, the 'Populist' RRP, and not the entire party family. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2007) stress the legitimacy of populism as an ideology and suggest that the ambiguity of many modern RRP's, such as the Italian Lega Nord, are deserving of their own categories, separated from RR. Indeed, not all populist parties belong to the RR, while not all RRP's should be considered

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<sup>8</sup> Tarchi (2016) comes to the same conclusion because of its definition of ideology. He argues that a mentality is an intellectual attitude while an ideology is intellectual content. Since 'populist thinking is no doubt based more on emotional inputs than on rational considerations' (Tarchi 2016, 104), he concludes that we should consider it as a mentality.

populist. There is a long tradition of RRP that follow a clearly elitist ideology, especially those that have been more influenced by the political thinking of Julius Evola (Ignazi 2003).<sup>9</sup> For instance, Mudde (2007) describes some non-populist RRP, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). The existence of a non-populist RR is recognized also by Betz (1994), who argues that the populist dimension is more part of ‘the nature of contemporary right rather than the nature of right-wing extremism’ (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 3).

The problems raised by the inclusion of populism led Mudde, later, to admit that ‘the RR’, as a more general term, consisted only of a mixture of nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism (Mudde 2009, 331). Indeed, adopting the definition Mudde proposed for today’s subgroup would result in ‘a conceptualization of the radical right that is frozen within time and space’ (Zaslove 2009, 313). Consequently, most neo-fascist movements would not fall in the ‘populist’ category, if this were to be considered a core ideological feature.

To summarize, most recent definitions of RR revolve around three concepts: nativism, populism and authoritarianism. Table 3 shows that the first is the most common feature, although going under a large set of labels. There is less consensus over the latter two characteristics. In this study we rely on nativism as a necessary and sufficient ideological feature to consider a party as belonging to the RR family. This family then is often associated with populism and authoritarianism, but these two features, although shared, are neither necessary nor sufficient. They are considered in the following chapters, which develop the hypotheses, because of the importance accorded to them in the literature. However, we agree with Zaslove (2009) that focusing on them identifies a subgroup rather than the whole party family.

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<sup>9</sup> Indeed, these movements were fringe groups, such as the Italian *Ordine Nuovo* and the *Avanguardia Nazionale*, but Evola’s ideas were widely accepted and well regarded within the Italian MSI *Movimento Sociale Italiano* as well (Ignazi 1998; Rao 2010). For this reason, Mudde (2007) excludes the MSI from his analysis because of its elitism.

Author(s)	Terminology	Core Features
<b>Ignazi (2003)</b>	Extreme Right	* Topological extremeness: ‘the party is located close to the extreme right of the political spectrum’. (Ignazi 2003, 30) * Ideological extremeness: the party exhibits ‘a delegitimizing pattern with regard to the political system’. (Ignazi 2003, 30)
<b>Carter (2005)</b>	Extreme Right	* Anti-democratic sentiment
<b>Mudde (1995, 2000)</b>	Extreme Right	*Nationalism *Racism *Xenophobia *Anti-democracy *Strong state
<b>Mudde minimum def. (2007)</b>	Radical Right	* Nativism : ‘states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’. (Mudde 2007, 19)
<b>Mudde maximum def. (2007)</b>	Populist Radical Right	* Nativism * Authoritarianism : ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society’ (Mudde 2007, 19) * Populism : society is ‘ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2007, 19)
<b>Mudde (2009)</b>	Populist Radical Right	* Nationalism * Xenophobia * Authoritarianism
<b>Bruter and Harrison (2011)</b>	Extreme Right	* Negative identity: either xenophobic or populist * Authoritarianism: either social or institutional
<b>Rydgren (2005)</b>	Radical right-wing populism (or movements of exclusion)	*Nationalist xenophobia *Anti-establishment populism *Socio-cultural authoritarianism
<b>Betz (2003)</b>	Radical Right	* Exclusionary populism : a combination of radical nativism and populist rhetoric

*Table 3 - A summary of the different definitions of RRP. Source: original compilation.*

### 1.2.3. CONCLUSION

In this Section, we reviewed the theoretical debate over the terminology and definition of RRP. The debate over terminology has important theoretical consequences since the ‘extreme’ and the ‘radical’ right point to different common characteristics. We chose the term ‘radical’ since most successful RRP no longer publicly contest the democratic system. On the opposite, they run in democratic elections and have taken part in various governments’ coalitions. Recent research focuses on the ‘mainstreaming’ of RRP (Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn 2016), but in our view their ‘extremeness’ is not a defining feature.

Rather, the modern literature focuses on a set of three ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007). However, authoritarianism and populism do not seem to be peculiar only to RRP's and their inclusion seems to identify only a subgroup within the party family, albeit an important and winning one (Mudde 2009; Zaslove 2009). Thus, we decided to use nativism as the sole criterion to identify RRP's, in line with Mudde's (2007) 'minimum definition'. Authoritarianism and populism are common characteristics that might play a role in RRP's' success and ultimate impact, but do not allow us to delimit the parties we want to treat.

### 1.3. THE PROFILE OF TODAY'S RR: WHICH PARTIES, WHERE AND HOW STRONG.

Relying on our theoretical definition of RR family, this Section aims to identify the European RRP's that will be included in our empirical work, and to describe their main characteristics. In particular, it aims to resolve the difficulty related to categorizing some parties (e.g. the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, the British United Kingdom Independence Party etc.) whether due to their recent creation and lack of in depth study or because the academic literature has not reached a consensus about them.

Where should we look for party ideology in order to list the parties belonging to the RR family in Europe? Within this debate, Mudde (2000b, 20–21) identifies different possible sources such as: programmes, leaders and officials surveys and internal party documents. As the main aim of this study is not to provide a definition of RRP's, in what follows we rely on the literature to describe the identity of these different parties. There is a large consensus on the inclusion of certain parties (such as the French FN) in the RR family. Therefore, we consider these parties as belonging to the RR party family: as we saw in 1.2.2, our criterion, the presence of nativism as a core ideological element, is a major defining element in most of the authors on which we rely. Recent or ambiguous cases will rely on our assessment of their nativism. In other words, if the literature disagrees about the inclusion of a party in the RR family, we provide our best assessment of the presence of nativism as a core ideological feature.



The Section is organized as follows: for each country,<sup>10</sup> we present the main RRP, summarizing their history, their main features and their importance in their respective national political systems. Based on each party's path of development and within a certain margin of error, we also try to analyse their different trajectories. In other words, we address when the party embarks on its path to right radicalism and when its journey to de-radicalization begins.

## FRANCE

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
MNR	<i>Mouvement National Republicain</i>	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
FN	<i>Front National</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus

*Table 4 - RRP in France.*

France hosts one of the most well-known RRP: Le Pen's *Front National* (FN). The FN is probably the RRP which attracts the least discussion in the literature since it is considered by all authors the ideal-type of modern RRP (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992) since its origins. The FN has been an important actor in French politics since the 1980s: in particular, in the 2002 Presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen managed to enter the second round, knocking out the socialist candidate and then-incumbent Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. In 2011, Le Pen's daughter, Marine, replaced her father at the head of the party. Whether this succession brought any real changes to the party line has been discussed (see Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015); however, the FN is considered as still belonging to the RR party family despite its new 'mainstream' role (Ivaldi 2016). The results under Marine's rule have been significant, with a 17.9% score, which positioned the frontist candidate in third place in the first round

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<sup>10</sup> Some countries (Iceland, Malta, and Luxembourg) are excluded because of lack of available information on (possible) RRP in the English-speaking literature. These three countries are included in the econometric study since we consider the absence of relevant RRP as not a valid reason to exclude them from the statistical tests. In the case of countries whose full democratic status is contested we identified them using the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (Transformation Index BTI 2016 2016) score and excluded those categorized as 'defective democracy' or worse, between 2006 and 2014 (no data pre 2006 are available). These countries are: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine. The BTI is used frequently to assess the democratic level of non-Western countries (Merkel 2010; Minkenberg 2015)

of the 2012 Presidential election. The party's progression continues and the FN achieved the highest number of votes in the 2014 European election with 24.86% of the votes and twenty-four seats. At the beginning of 2017, the FN is still excluded from the larger coalition with the centre-right. Because of the major consensus on the inclusion of the FN in the RR family (see Table 4), it is part of our study. The same reasoning applies to the *Mouvement National Republicain* (National Republican Movement – MNR), a marginal FN split led by Bruno Mégret, which is generally recognized as a RRP.

## ITALY

Italy is home to the most successful neo-fascist party, the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement - MSI). Similar to the French FN, the origins of the MSI can be traced back to neo-fascist groups trying to survive a historical defeat. In 1945, after the end of the Fascist regime, former members of the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF) were imprisoned or tried to reinvent themselves as members of other political parties (Buchignani 2007). A group of former cadres of the Italian Social Republic sought to create a new political part to 'keep the idea of Fascism alive' (Ignazi 1994, 1015). During the First Republic, the MSI was precluded from governing positions and was ostracized, despite achieving growing support, especially during the 1970s. This *cordon-sanitaire* ended in 1994 when the businessperson, Silvio Berlusconi, forged an alliance with the MSI's leader, Gianfranco Fini, and, in the same year, won the legislative election. This historic event also changed the political nature of the MSI, starting a slow ideological shift with the launch of *Alleanza Nazionale* (National alliance - AN) at the Fiuggi convention in 1995.

To what extent AN was still a RR party during its ten-year life is open to debate. Some authors consider AN as belonging to the RRP family (Norris 2005; Zaslove 2011) before it disappeared in 2009 with the creation of the more traditional Silvio Berlusconi's *Popolo della Libertà* (PDL - later back to the original name of *Forza Italia* - FI). Indeed, the party's stance on immigration was in line

with our definition (Ignazi 1998). However, Ignazi (2003, 255) argues that, at the beginning of the 2000s, the party ‘no longer display[ed] any common alignment with the political agenda of the other Extreme Right Parties’. Mudde (2007, 56) comes to a similar conclusion, stating that ‘the AN transformed itself into a conservative party, in which neither nativism nor populism is prominent’. AN was on a trajectory away from the modern contemporary RRP family. To what extent and when it actually achieved this is open to debate. We, along with Mudde (2007) and Ignazi (2003), consider that 1995 Fiuggi was a turning point, which moved the party out the RR party family. Although the party’s stance on more than one topic was in line with that of other RRP, it did not seem to inform the core ideology of the Italian AN in the 1996-2009 period. The creation of the PDL led to a first split, *La Destra* (The Right – LD), described as RR, and ran as an electoral alliance with smaller neo-fascist parties (Padovani 2008).

The current most important legacy of heir, *Fratelli d’Italia* (Brothers of Italy - FdI), is addressed in this study. Although there is no academic literature on this split, a review of the Italian newspapers shows clearly that FdI focuses mainly on its anti-immigration and homophobic stances. While AN was a party trying to move away from right-wing radicalism (and, in our view, there is enough evidence that this was accomplished), FdI is moving in the opposite direction highlighting a strong nativism. Ivaldi and Zaslove (2015, 133) include the party in their review of RRP, but a deeper analysis is still lacking. Neo-fascist parties such as *Casa Pound* (House Pound - CP) and *Forza Nuova* (New Force – FNi) are also included since they clearly display xenophobia and authoritarianism as core ideological features (Froio and Gattinara 2015).

During the 1980s another important actor was to emerge in the Italian RR: the *Lega Nord* (Northern League - LN). Although the official year of foundation is 1991, other regional leagues existed before that time and for a decade had experienced certain success in electing members of parliament including the future leader of the LN, Umberto Bossi. While the first leagues focused more on regional cultures, the new frame, developed by Bossi’s *Lega Lombarda* at the end of 1980s, clearly

identified the ‘southern Italians as the ‘enemy’ (Zasllove 2011, 109). The differences between northern and southern Italians are described aggressively. The south (and Rome) is accused of stealing from the hard-working people of the north.<sup>11</sup> As for the MSI, The arrival of Berlusconi marked a shift. In 1994, allied with Berlusconi’s FI and Fini’s AN, the Northern League entered the right-wing government, only to leave it shortly after.

This led to a new phase in Lega’s history with the party turning away from federalism to support the independence of the North and even, in May 1996, founding a ‘Parliament of the North’. Thus, Bossi’s new strategy demanded the autonomy of the LN from its former ally, Berlusconi. The not-so-positive electoral results following the choice for independence as to convince Bossi and the rest of the party in 2001 to accept the alliance with the centre-right. This political coalition, despite some tensions, has persisted for ten years until the end of Bossi’s leadership due to personal scandals that almost finished the party. The new leaders, Maroni until 2013, and then Salvini, confirmed the alliance, but Salvini currently is directing his efforts to becoming the leader of the whole Italian centre-right. Due to Forza Italia’s internal problems and Berlusconi’s absence, the LN was able to reach new peaks in the 2015 regional election, becoming the most voted party in the right-wing coalition in Northern Italy.

Can we classify the Lega Nord as a RRP? The political positioning of the ‘*Leghe*’, which preceded the *LN*, is disputed. Those parties shared an ‘ethno-regionalist character’ (Ignazi 2003, 54) which was a core feature and recalls the nativist negative side of our definition. However, Ignazi argues that the *Leghe* were still autonomist parties. The situation leans towards the RR with the foundation of the *LN* and the hegemony of Bossi’s *Lega Lombarda*, but there again, according to Ignazi the *LN*, at the time

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<sup>11</sup> This xenophobic message proved quite successful in Lombardy, where between a third and a quarter of the population regarded southerners with distrust and hostility (Biorcio 1991, 59).

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>CP</b>	<i>Casa Pounds</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Froio and Gattinara (2015)	Y	Neo-fascism (considered as proxy of nativism)
<b>FdI</b>	<i>Fratelli d'Italia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ivaldi and Zaslove (2015)	Y	Nativism as core ideology
<b>FNi</b>	<i>Forza Nuova</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Froio and Gattinara (2015)	Y	Neo-fascism (considered as proxy of nativism)
<b>LD</b>	<i>La Destra</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Padovani (2008)	Y	Cartel made of of RRP's
<b>LN</b>	<i>Lega Nord</i>	Y		Y	Y	N (until 2003)	Y		Y	Nativism as core ideology : anti-Southern Italians and then anti-migrants
<b>MS-FT</b>	<i>Fiamma Tricolore</i>	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Consensus
<b>AN</b>	<i>Alleanza Nazionale</i>	-		Y	Y	Y (until 2003)	N		N	Nativism non-core ideology.

*Table 5 - RRP's in Italy.*

was ‘on the border of the extreme right family rather than one of its components’ (Ignazi 2003, 61), an analysis shared also by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2007).

According to Ignazi, two main reasons justify this choice: first, voters’ self-location is much more to the ‘centre’ than that of other parties. Secondly, anti-immigration did not become a key party issue until the second experience in cabinet (2001-2006). The first argument is easy to dismiss: as we have seen, our focus is on *party* ideology, the spatial self-positioning of the electorate telling us something else that we do not need at this stage. The second argument is not shared unanimously. Zaslove backdates LN’s radical anti-immigration to the second half of the 1990s (Zaslove 2011, 119). However, even before it began attacking foreigners, the LN demonstrated a clear and explicit nativist discourse against Italian southerners. According to our definition, it does not change anything if the enemy is a national or not, as long as it is considered an external body that has to be removed. Under the current leadership of Salvini, Lega’s discourse is characterized by a somewhat harsher anti-immigrant rhetoric and a clear openness to extremist movements such as the previously cited CP. Moreover, Ignazi (2005) notes a strong shift towards more radical positions and now includes it in

the other RRP. The most evident proof of this marked shift is the alliance forged by Salvini and Marine Le Pen at the European level, choosing the French FN with an ally in the newly formed ENL group in the EP. Our selection of parties is summarized in Table 5.

## BELGIUM

For some time, Belgium did not have a strong RRP. In the French speaking part of the country, various parties occupied a similar marginal position to the French FN during the 1970s. The Belgian *Front National* (FNb) was the only party which still exists today and includes people from its various previous incarnations (Delwit, Waele, and Rea 1998, 63). The party seems itself as undeniably belonging to the RR family (see Table 6). The FNb, since its foundation, has aspired to follow its French homologue, but without success. It was excluded from both the national parliament and the EP at the beginning of 1990s and has been relegated to the margins of Belgian politics.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>FNb</b>	<i>Front National</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
<b>VB</b>	<i>Vlaams Blok/Belang</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus

*Table 6 - RRP in Belgium.*

In Flanders, the situation is different. Flemish nationalist represented a fertile reservoir for many RR movements, the most relevant being the *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc - VB). Created in 1979 after the merger of different Flemish nationalist parties, the VB initially presented a programme characterized by a strong anti-French ethno-centrism, which rejected the ‘artificial’ Belgian state (Ceuppens 2001, 145). Similar to what happened with the Italian Lega Nord, this ethno-centrism soon moved away from attacks on the French-speaking community, to adopting migrants as its new target (Ceuppens 2001, 149). The inclusion of the party in our analysis is justified by its being one of the few major RR movements to be disbanded by a judicial verdict in 2004. The party survived by reorganizing under a different name, *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish interest - VB). The VB, so far, has been able to achieve

greater success than the FNb. Since the end of 1980s, it has constantly won more than 4% of the national vote and is a stable actor represented both in the national parliament and EP.

## NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands, as in Belgium, RR movements have been marginal for many years. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Dutch RR assembled around three main parties: the *Centrum Partij* (Centre Party - CP), the *Centrum Partij '86* (Centre Party 86 - CP86) and the *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats - CD), this last being the most successful of the three. These parties were quite small and, at its peak in 1994, the CD was unable to win more than 2.5% of the popular vote (Milza 2005, 337–41). The situation changed at the beginning of 2000 with the entry of the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (Pim Fortuyn List - LPF). The ‘radical rightness’ of this movement is not recognized by all of the literature and is seen by some as representing a border-case. For example, Mudde (2007, 47), includes the party with the ‘non-radical right populists’. However, according to Akkerman (2005, 350), ‘the LPF program has a substantial overlap of liberal and nationalist principles’. It adheres to a form of civic nationalism not so very far from the other parties in our list. Norris (2005, 61), bases her judgement on the strong anti-immigration programme of the list and, ultimately, considers the LPF to be a RRP.

According to our definition, LPF represents a true border case that is difficult to classify. A true border-case is treated by some authors, such as Rydgren and Van Holsteyn (2005, 49), as a functional equivalent rather than a RRP *per se*. In the absence, at the time, of another major Dutch RRP, the LPF occupied its political space with a clearly Islamophobic message central to its party’s ideology. The LPF's strong anti-Islam position is a core feature of that party’s ideology, as recognized by Akkermans (2005, 341), and which we identify as a particular form of nativism where the non-native enemy is the Islamic religion as well as Muslims. Indeed, apart from Islamophobia, the remaining LPF ideology shows no signs of nativism and was open to the assimilation (rather than integration) of foreigners (Rydgren 2004b, 17). However, according to our definition, Islamophobia is sufficient

as long as it is a core ideological concept, as indeed in this case it was. Islam, in this case, is an external threat to the homogeneity of the Dutch national community, thus falling into the category of ‘nativism’. We therefore include the Dutch LPF in our study. The LPF experienced incredible success in its first election in 2002, obtaining 17% of the vote and 26 seats. Much of this success was due to the demise of Pim Fortuyn a few days before the election. Based on its success, the party joined the coalition government, but in the following 2003 legislative election, it lost two-thirds of its electorate, beginning a decline that led to its dissolution in 2008.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
CD	<i>Centrumdemocraten</i>	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	-	Y	Consensus
LPF	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>	-	-	N	-	Y	-	Rydgren and Van Holsteyn (2005) Norris (2005)	Y	Islamophobia as core. (considered as a proxy of nativism)
PVV	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	-	Y	-	Y	-	-	Vossan (2011)	Y	Islamophobia as core (considered as a proxy of nativism)

*Table 7 - RRP in the Netherlands.*

LPF’s place was filled by the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom – PVV). Founded in 2006, the party owes much of its success to its leader and founder, Geert Wilders. A former conservative, Wilders left the liberal-conservative VVD in 2004 to start a new political party. According to Vossen (2011, 187), the PVV demonstrates what can be considered ‘civic’ nationalism rather than nativism, but we would disagree. Its explicit Islamophobia, a central message in Wilders' speeches, places it within RRP family. Islamophobia is explicitly in proposals, such as banning the Koran (Ross 2015), which leave little room for discussion. Thus, we include the party in our study. Recently, the PVV joined the ENL European together with other RRP included in our study (notably the French FN and the Italian LN), which we see as confirming our choice. The PVV almost immediately gained wide support and backed a minority right-wing government in 2010, like LPF before it. The government



phase stopped the party's progression, which now seems to have stabilized at between 10% and 15% of the popular vote.

## GERMANY

Section 1.2 shows that RRP in Germany are under strict scrutiny by the Federal authority which can decide to dissolve them. One of the best known extremist parties in Germany, the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany – NPD) was threatened with dissolution. It was founded in 1964 and, since its beginnings, had been a refuge for former members of the Nazi regime, who accounted for up to two-thirds of the party executive (Mudde 2000b, 26). The party has never been able to gain a seat in the Bundestag, despite regional surges, and lost a major opportunity in 1969, when, with just 4.3% of the vote, it did not achieve the 5% threshold, becoming, once more, a marginal party (Hainsworth 2008, 54). A first attempt in 2003 to have the NPD banned failed, and more recent efforts have also been unsuccessful (Gude, Röbel, and Stark 2012).

While the NPD was in decline, a new party entered the political arena: *Die Republikaner* (The Republicans - REP). Founded in 1983 by some former Bavarian centre-right party members, the party started its process of radicalization a few years later. Early REP policy focused on German reunification, with nationalist, but not necessarily nativist tones (Backes 1990). It was only after Franz Schönhuber was elected chairperson in 1985 that the party shifted to a more radical position and, despite changes in its leadership, it has maintained its stance (Mudde 2007, 42, 2000b, 58). In terms of electoral results, for a long time, the REP has been able to gain more support than the NPD. In 1989, the REP won 7.1% of the vote and was able to win six seats in the EP, alongside the French FN and the VB. This represented the apogee for the REP since, just one year later, its support declined to 2.1% and the REP failed to send a representative to the Bundestag. From then on, the party has experienced some regional surges in Eastern Germany. In 2014, due to a change in the law for

European Parliamentary elections, the NPD was able to gain one seat in the EP, despite a rather low score.

Recently, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany – AfD), a new Eurosceptic party, has emerged in the German political arena. From an ideological perspective, the party, at first, was characterized by strong anti-EU sentiment with no trace of nativism, as highlighted in Arzheimer (2015). However, recent developments show that the party has undergone a rapid radicalization when the nationalist wing seized the power in 2014 (Kemper 2016). Among other things, the party has aligned itself more closely with the PEGIDA (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* - Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) movement, a RR movement characterized by strong Islamphobia (Popp and Wassermann 2015), and shown clear nativist attitudes during the so-called refugee crisis in 2015-2016 (Mudde 2016d). Thus, we consider the AfD as belonging to the RR party family as of 2014 congress (as in Table 8). The party made a major electoral breakthrough in 2017 German federal elections, as it obtained 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats. However, shortly after the elections the party faced a split from former leader Frauke Petry

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
AfD	<i>Alternative für Deutschland</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Arzheimer (2015), Kemper, (2016)	Y (after 2014)	Islamophobia (considered as a proxy of nativism)
NPD	<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
REP	<i>Republikaner</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus

Table 8 - RRP in Germany.

## AUSTRIA

For much of the post second world war period, Austrian RRP were closely related to the then-recent Nazi past, for example, the *Verband der Unabhängigen* (Federation of Independents - VdU), which was dissolved in 1955. The history of today's Austrian main RRP, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party – FPÖ) is similar at the beginning, but shows a non-linear development. Founded in

1956 by Anton Reinthaller, former Nazi Minister of Agriculture, the FPÖ included a large number of former Nazis among its members. For this reason, the other Austrian parties initially avoided any form of collaboration with the FPÖ. The party began a slow process of liberalization from the 1960s. The process culminated in 1979 when the party was able to join the Liberal International (Knight 1992). The process was abruptly reversed in 1986 when Jorg Haider was appointed party leader. From then on the FPÖ experienced a process of rapid radicalization and, like the French FN, was seen unanimously as included in the RRP family (Betz 1993). The only dissenter was Luther (2000, 440), according to whom the FPÖ started '*a new phase in its development*', leaving the RR pole, in agreement with the EU report. However, this opinion was immediately rejected by Ignazi (2003, 123), since Haider's extremist statements were not to be downplayed and were a central part of the party's ideology. Moreover, Luther (2003) later reconsidered the de-radicalization process and labelled the FPÖ a RRP.

As a reaction to the party's radicalization, it was again excluded from the governing coalitions. However, this exclusion did not stop the party's growth and, in the 1999 general election, the FPÖ obtained more votes than the centre-right ÖVP (27%). This success allowed the FPÖ to form a new coalition government. The EU reaction initially was harsh, and other European countries boycotted the new government (Fallend 2004). However, the sanctions were lifted almost immediately after the EU issued a report attesting to the democratic nature of the FPÖ, described as 'right-wing with populist elements', but not a threat to European democracy (Marchart 2001, 8). Nevertheless, the EU's reaction led to Haider's resignation from his Junior Ministerial position and triggered a deep internal crisis. In the 2002 general election, the party vote declined to 10.2%, but this did not result in an ending of the government alliance with the ÖVP.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
FPÖ	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
BZÖ	<i>Bundnis Zukunft Österreichs</i>	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	Consensus

*Table 9 - RRP in Austria.*

Internal fights convinced Haider to leave the party in 2005 to found a new party, the *Bundnis Zukunft Österreichs* (Alliance for Austria's future, BZÖ). The new party, ideologically, is close to the original FPÖ, the main difference lying in its openness to a possible coalition government with the ÖVP (Mudde 2007, 42). As such, it is included in our study. Despite losing its leader, the FPÖ managed to survive under the guidance of Heinz-Christian Strache and was able, in 2016, to reach the final stage of the presidential election.

## SWITZERLAND

The Swiss case is rather similar to the Austrian one, in the sense that its main RRP, the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (Swiss People's Party, SVP), was for long considered a non-radical party (Art 2011, 166). The process of radicalization started later and was due to the work of the party leader Christoph Blocher. It was at the end of 1980s that the liberal-conservative SVP started its shift. As in Haider's case, this shift led to rapid important electoral gains. In 1993, the party successfully campaigned against accession to the EU in a referendum, and in the 1995 election obtained 15% of the vote. The radical turn became even more evident when Uli Maurer was elected to party chairman following the election (Stockemer 2012). Under his leadership, the party began targeting migrants, especially those of the Islamic religion, and saw an increasing surge in its electoral score, which reached 28% in 2007. Its campaigns, such as the one against the constructions of new minarets, were particularly popular and successful. The peculiar Swiss political system allowed the SVP to be in the cabinet for almost 50 years, contrasting with the 20 year wait experienced by the FPÖ. This situation was not to last as the other parties eventually reacted and, in 2007, decided to oppose Blocher's election to the Federal

Council, *de facto* firing the SVP from government (Norris 2005, 63). However, in 2008, the party regained its place in the Federal government. Shortly afterwards, it experienced a minor internal crisis with the split of the *Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz* (Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland – BDP). This split followed the election of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf to the Federal Council, ‘stealing’ Blocher's place, with the support of the other Swiss parties. The literature has yet to address the positioning of the BDP and the only reference is in Skenderovic (2009, 342), who argues that both Widmer-Schlumpf and her followers were supporters of the ‘old’ SVP, pre-Blocher. Hence, based on the limited information at our disposal, the BDP can be excluded.

The SVP is not the only RRP to have played a role in Swiss politics. The Italian-speaking *Lega dei Ticinesi* (Ticino League - TL) also secured representation in the National Council, despite its marginal score (around 1%). The TL, like the Italian LN, merges autonomist and regionalist elements with straightforward populism (Albertazzi 2007). Although included in the RRP family by various authors (Art 2011, 168–69; Mudde 2000b, 186; Norris 2005, 63), the party classification remains contested (Mazzoleni 1999; Mudde 2007, 57) mainly because of the TL’s position regarding homosexuality and gender equality. However, the TL shows clear signs of nativism as a core ideology, evident in the party’s defence of the Ticinese identity and well-being, against Bern, Brussels, and Italy (Mazzoleni 2005), which justifies its inclusion in our analysis.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
SVP	<i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i>	-	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
TL	<i>Lega dei Ticinesi</i>	-	-	Y	-	-	N	-	Y	Nativism

*Table 10 - RRP in Switzerland.*

## DENMARK

In Denmark, the *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People’s Party – DF) is commonly described as a RRP (see Table 11). The DF is a young party; it was founded in 1995 based on a moderates split from the *Fremskridtsparti* (Progress Party – FRPd). The leader of the FRPd party, Pia Kjaersgaard, lost control

of the parliamentary group in 1994 to a more xenophobic group and was forced to leave the FRPd. This resulted in the establishment of the new DF. In a departure from her previous political leanings, Kjaersgaard as leader of the DF opted for a more radical approach and ‘*indulged in radical anti-immigrant and xenophobic statements and even introduced some veins of nationalism*’ (Ignazi 2003, 144). From an electoral view point, the party experienced steadily increasing support until the 2011 legislative election, when it lost three seats and won only 12.3% of the votes. However, in the 2014 European election the DF more than doubled its score to 26.6%, becoming the most popular party in Denmark. In 2015, the DF won 21.1% of the vote and was overtaken by the Social Democrats, but still managed to be the first party on the Danish right. The party has yet to be part of a formal majority coalition, but gave external support to centre-right cabinets throughout the first years of the 2000 and currently is supporting Lokke Rasmussen's second cabinet.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
DF	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i>	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus

*Table 11 - RRP in Denmark.*

## NORWAY

The Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party - FrP) is considered to be at the interSection between right radicalism and the conservative right, based mainly on the high importance the FrP gives to economic matters. As a result, some authors classify it as a neo-liberal or non-RR populist party (Mudde 2010, 47). However, the presence of core ideological features other than nativism should not prevent a party from belonging to the RRP family as long as nativism is a core ideological feature. According to Hainsworth (2008, 49), the FrP puts strong emphasis on immigration control. However, Widfeldt (2015, 113–14) considers that the party prioritizes economic liberalism over anti-immigrant policies. Thus, it is difficult to classify this party, but we would agree with Jungar and Jupskås (2014, 215) who consider the party as ‘a hybrid between a PRR party and a more traditional

conservative party'. The FrP is not a RRP inasmuch as it has no nativist elements at the core of its ideology. Indeed, the FrP, in the absence of a RR competitor, plays the same role. This is why many authors who include the FrP in the RRP category (see Table 12). However, we agree with Mudde (2007) that occupying that political space does not connote with being a RRP in ideological terms. Thus, we exclude it from our analysis.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
FrP	<i>Fremskrittspartiet</i>	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	N	-	N	Nativist elements only peripheral

*Table 12 - RRP in Norway.*

## SWEDEN

For many years, Sweden has been an example of RRP failure. For a long period, the *Ny Demokrati* (New Democracy – NyD) was seen as the most successful member of the RRP family (Rydgren 2002), although this is contested by Mudde (2007), according to whom nativism is not a core component of its ideology. However, the other authors considered in this study disagree. Based on the limited documentation on the matter available in English, we follow this majority and include the NyD in our study. The NyD was founded in 1991 and, in the same year, won 6.7% of the votes in the legislative election. It occupied 25 seats on an anti-tax and anti-immigration platform. This success was ephemeral and, three years later, in 1994, its share fell to 1.2% and it failed to elect any members to the parliament. It disappeared at the end of the 1990s. In 2017, the main RR party in Sweden is the *Sverigedemokraterna* (Swedish Democrats – SD) (Hainsworth 2008, 52). The SD party has occupied a marginal role for almost 20 years since its foundation in 1988. Following the examples of the DF and the French FN, the party embarked on a process of modernization. This activity and its ‘Swedes First’ slogan enabled a breakthrough in the 2002 local elections. However, it was not until the 2010 parliamentary election that it won seats in the national parliament. In 2014, the SD won 12.9% of the

vote and achieved 49 seats. Although less influential than its Danish counterpart, the SD is playing an increasingly important role in Swedish politics (Arter 2015).

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
NyD	<i>Ny Demokrati</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	-	Y	Partial Consensus
SD	<i>Sverigedemokraterna</i>	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus

*Table 13 - RRP in Sweden.*

## FINLAND

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
P	<i>Perussuomalaiset</i>	-	Y	N	Y	N	N	Arter (2010, 2012), Raunio (2012)	Y	Nativism is now core

*Table 14 - RRP in Finland.*

The Finnish case presents some similarities with the Norwegian situation. While there are some small RRP, such as the *Isänmaallinen Kansanliitto* (Patriotic National Alliance – IKL), they are marginal and have not achieved the status of official political party. The rather difficult to classify *Perussuomalaiset* (Finns Party – P) fulfils the role of an RRP (see Table 14) (Ignazi 2003, 160) and is considered in the recent literature as belonging to the RRP family. Arter (2012, 815) notes that ‘the ethno-nationalist ideological dimension has become more pronounced in the P’s policy output’ and the P has adopted a welfare chauvinist economic programme (Arter 2010, 499). Also, Raunio (2012, 20) emphasizes that ‘the empirical analysis of The Finns’ EU policy in turn has shown that their discourse is overall broadly similar with other European populist or radical right parties’. For these reasons, the PS can be considered as belonging to the RRP family rather than being a functional equivalent. The PS achieved unexpected success in 2011 when it increased its votes fivefold to 19.05%. In 2015, despite losing some support, the party was in second place and joined the centre-right minority cabinet led by May Sipilä along a path similar to that followed by the Danish DF.



## UNITED KINGDOM

In the mid-1990s, Eatwell (1995, 179) described British RRP as a ‘lengthy list of one-man-and-his-dog’ organizations; there were multiple parties but most were absolutely marginal. The only group that managed to achieve national support was Tyndall’s National Front (NF). As the result of a Conservative party split, Tyndall took over leadership of the movement in 1972 and added a neo-Nazi spin (Eatwell 2003, 65). The NF did badly in the 1979 general election, despite previous encouraging results at the local level. This led to a political crisis and to Tyndall's leaving the party and founding the British National Party (BNP). The BNP is considered by many to be the most successful RRP in UK history (Goodwin 2014). After the election of Nick Griffin to party leader in the late 1990s, the BNP experienced an electoral breakthrough, which peaked in the 2009 European election. The BNP won 6.3% of the votes and two seats in the EP. However, crippled by its leader’s financial scandals, the BNP was unable to capitalize on this success and, by the 2014 European election, had lost much of its support and did not manage to win a single seat.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>BNP</b>	<i>British National Party</i>	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
<b>NF</b>	<i>National Front</i>	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Consensus
<b>UKIP</b>	<i>United Kingdom Independence Party</i>	-	Y	N	N	N	N	-	Y (after 2006)	Under Farage, nativism becomes core.

*Table 15 - RRP in the United Kingdom.*

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is a rather complex and disputed case. UKIP, which was founded in 1991, is identified by scholars either as a single-issue party focused, principally, focused on its anti-European campaign, or as a Conservative split (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Mudde 2007). However, after the election of Nigel Farage to party leader in 2006, its discourse began to shift and it became included in the RRP family (Mondon 2015b). UKIP is focusing more and more on immigration policy, depicting foreigners as a ‘threat [...] to a reified national identity’ (Mondon

2015a, 26) which, in our view, is a perfect example of a RRP. Therefore, despite wide scepticism in the literature (see Table 15), we consider the UKIP as being a member of the RR family. UKIP's results rocketed under Farage's leadership, peaking at 26.6% in the 2014 European election, when the party won its first seat. However, dogged with the one-issue label which preceded Farage's leadership, UKIP failed to transform its European success into national success and, despite obtaining a record 12.6% of the vote in 2015 General Election, it managed to elect only one Member of Parliament. The party successfully pushed for the organization of a Referendum on the EU membership of the United Kingdom, held in 2016. The 'Leave' option eventually won, which led to a strange type of crisis within the party: having obtained a victory on the most important topic in its program, i.e. Euroscepticism, the party *raison-d'être* was no longer present. Following Farage resignation and the the defeat at 2017 General election (the party obtained just 1.8% of the vote and no seat), the party is currently facing a new leadership crisis.

## IRELAND

In Ireland, parties on the left of the spectrum historically, have focused on nationalism. Thus, since we do not adopt a spatial definition of RRP, whether the main nationalist party, *Sinn Féin* (We Ourselves - SF), should be included is questionable. In 2017, the party is no longer a simple extension of the IRA, and has an autonomous agenda. It supports same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein 2015), and stresses that diversity 'is a source of strength and opportunity' for the country; it calls for an extension of the right to vote to foreign refugees and advocates for anti-racism to be taught in public schools (Sinn Fein 2011). The party does not match the RR profile since it re-defines Irish nationalism in an open and pro-integrationist way (Tonge 2006); for this reason it has never been included in any study of RRP's.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> This can be applied also to other British nationalist parties, such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) (van der Zwet, 2015, pp. 70–71) and Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales – PC) (Elias 2009, 549), whose profiles are similar to SF.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
SF	<i>Sinn Féin</i>	N	N	N	N	N	N	-	N	Consensus

Table 16 - RRP in Ireland.

## SPAIN

In continental Europe, the Iberian countries present the least successful case of RRP. This is probably due to their too recent fascist past, which is a barrier to any RR developments. In Spain, the consensual end to Francoism was followed by a period of fragmentation. The Falangist groups were marginalized and the various parties that tried to reunite the country (*Frente Nacional*, *Falange Española de la JONS*, *España 2000*) were unable to win any seats in the National Assembly. They are so weak that some authors argue that they have only a web presence (Caiani and Parenti 2011). The lack of literature on these movements does not allow us to make an assessment of their ideologies. However, since various authors describe them as RRP, we include them in our study.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
FNs	<i>Frente Nacional</i>	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y	Consensus
E2000	<i>España 2000</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y		Y	Consensus
FEJ	<i>Falange Española de la JONS</i>	-	-	Y	-	Y	-		Y	Consensus

Table 17 - RRP in Spain.

## PORTUGAL

There is a similar situation in Portugal despite Portugal's different transition from dictatorship to democracy. The Portuguese extreme right does not differ significantly in form or strength from its Spanish counterpart (Gallagher 1992). In 2017, the main Portuguese RRP is the *Partido Nacional Renovador* (National Renovator Party - PNR), which was founded in 2001. However, English sources on the PNR are scarce due to the party's weak performance (see Table 18). According to Marchi (2013, 142), the party has close ties to Nazi movements around Europe and 'adopts the classic posture

of the European extreme right, viewing immigration as an invasion that poses a threat to national identity, security, employment, and trade'. Its electoral results have not been sufficient to win a seat or play a role at the national level (Zúquete 2007).

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
PNR	<i>Partido Nacional Renovador</i>	-	-	-	Y	-	Y	Marchi (2013)	Y	

*Table 18 - RRP in Portugal.*

## GREECE

Throughout much of its democratic history, Greece's path has been similar although there was a rise in some RRP at the end of 1970s. The centre-right *Nea Demokratia* (New Democracy – ND), played a similar role to the Spanish *Partido Popular* and was able to contain the more radical movements. However, a few parties managed to achieve fleeting support. In 1977 the RR *Ethniki Paretoxi* (National Alignment – EPg) party achieved some importance, winning 6.8% of the vote. Despite this success, the ND rapidly absorbed the EPg, which ceased to exist as an independent organization. Other Greek RRP followed a similar although less successful trajectory during the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, for most of the period of the analysis in this thesis, there was no relevant Greek RRP. However, in the most recent years, two RRP have emerged: *Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos* (Popular Orthodox Rally – LAOS) and *Chrysi Avgi* (Golden Dawn – XA). Work on the former is limited due to its short lifetime. According to Greek researchers, the party's ideology is characterized by a focus on ethnic values and patriotic interference, which closely resembles Mudde's definition of nativism (Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and Vasilopoulou 2012). Therefore, it is included in the analysis. LAOS gained some support in the early 2000s, winning some parliamentary seats and also seats in Papademos's cabinet. The coincidence between the rise of XA and the government's experience led to LAOS's to electoral marginalization in 2012 parliamentary elections. The research on Golden Dawn and its rapid ascent, compared to LAOS, is more extensive. Despite XA's protest, the literature

frequently identifies XA as a neo-Nazi movement (Ellinas 2014; Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013), which categorizes it as a RRP in our context.<sup>13</sup> The XA for much of its life was marginalized and, in the 2009 parliamentary election, won only 0.3% of the vote. Less than a year later, XA's leader Michaloliakos won a seat on the Athens municipal council. This marked the start of the party's rise. In May 2012 the party received almost 7% of the vote and won 21 seats in the Greek National Assembly. The political crisis provided a favourable environment for XA, which achieved similar positive results in the June 2012 and 2015 parliamentary elections. Unlike LAOS, XA has never been considered as a coalition partner due to its much more radical profile.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
LAOS	<i>Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos</i>	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	Halikiopoulou et al ( 2012)	Y	Consensus
XA	<i>Chrysi Avgi</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ellinas (2014); Koronaiou and Sakellariou, (2013)	Y	Neo-Nazism (considered as a proxy of nativism)

*Table 19 - RRP in Greece.*

## CROATIA

For some years after the independence, the Croatian *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* (Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ) was led by its more radical faction (Ramet 1999, 176). According to Mudde (2000a), the HDZ leaders ‘have also been exemplary in their use of nationalist and authoritarian theory and practice, and can rightfully be called extreme right’. Only the ill-health and eventual death of party leader Franjo Tuđman in 1999 led to its less radical positioning (Longo 2006), which culminated in its full membership of the European People’s Party in 2013. Thus, we agree with Mudde (2007), who categorizes the HDZ as a RRP until 2000. *Hrvatska stranka prava* (Croatian

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<sup>13</sup> Another proof of XA's extremeness is that, like Hungary's Jobbik, it was accused of violent activities. In 2017, , some 70 members of XA are awaiting trial under allegations of beating migrants and political opponents. The accused includes the party's leader, Michaloliakos, who was stripped of parliamentary immunity in 2014 together with 6 other Greek MPs (Squires, 2015).

Party of Rights - HSP) is less controversial and, usually, is included in the RR family (Batusic 1992; Mudde 2000a; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Due to the consensus on its categorization among scholars of Eastern European RRP, we include it in our study. The HSP has participated in Croatia's political life for almost 15 years, although with decreasing influence. Since the 2011 parliamentary election, it no longer holds any seat in the national parliament.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>HDZ</b>	<i>Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y (until 2000)	Ramet (1999), Longo (2006), Mudde (2000a)	Y (until 2000)	Nativism
<b>HSP</b>	<i>Hrvatska stranka prava</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Mudde (2000a), Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus

*Table 20 - RRP in Croatia.*

## SLOVENIA

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>SNS-slv</b>	<i>Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Mudde (2000a), Bustikova (2009), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus

*Table 21 - RRP in Slovenia.*

The *Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka* (Slovenian National Party – SNS-slv), despite its 1996 split from the most radical wing, is included in our list of RRP, due mainly to its irredentism. The party refers openly to a ‘United Slovenia’, which would include all Slovenian-speaking areas (Bustikova 2009) and is evident in the party's logo. It represents an interesting version of nativism since it seeks to reconstitute the homogeneity of the nation-state, not by a process of exclusion, but by re-including into the national community parts of the populations abroad. In addition, Mudde (2000a, 19) states that SNS-slv's ‘xenophobic programme blamed all of the problems of contemporary Slovenia on ‘non-

Slovenes', i.e. people from other former Yugoslav republics, and called for the withdrawal of their citizenship and their expulsion on the grounds of their alleged criminal and mafia-style practice'. Therefore, we consider the SNS-slv as an ideologically nativist force and include it in our list, as other authors do (see Table 21). The movement gained some success after independence, but was never able to participate in a national government. In 2008, the party failed to elect any parliamentary members and has been out of the national parliament ever since.

## BULGARIA

Bulgarian *ATAKA* (Attack) has a clear political identity. Its leader, Siderov, is well-known for his anti-Semitic ideas and anti-Turkish racism (Genov 2010; Taşkın 2011, 108–9) and the party is widely considered to be a RRP (see Table 22). *ATAKA* party was born in 2005 as a political spin-off of Siderov's TV show and, surprisingly, obtained 8.1% of the votes. *Ataka*'s best result was in the 2006 presidential election when Siderov got through to the second round with 21.5% of the vote, before losing the final race. After that, the party steadily declined and although it still has a representation in the national parliament, it has no seats in the EP. In 2011, the *Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria* (National front for the Salvation of Bulgaria - NFSB) split off from *Ataka*; it is generally considered a 'clone formation' of the original party (Avramov 2015, 300). Thus, we include it in our study.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>ATAKA</b>	<i>ATAKA</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	Y	Bustikova (2009), Minkenbergl (2015)	Y	Consensus
<b>NFSB</b>	<i>Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Avramov (2015)	Y	Clone of <i>Ataka</i>

*Table 22 - RRP in Bulgaria.*

## HUNGARY

Hungary is home to the extremist *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (Jobbik - The movement for a better Hungary). Jobbik was founded in 2003 to unify several smaller nationalist groups and is usually labelled extremist because of its never fully clarified connections with the paramilitary group *Magyar Garda* (Hungarian Guard) (Petsinis 2015, 273). Jobbik campaigns against the Roma people, one of its favourite targets, denouncing the supposed resurgence of ‘Gypsy crimes’ (Vidra and Fox 2014). Due to its recent foundation (it contested its first election only in 2006), the literature is scant. However, Jobbik figures in all studies of concern Eastern European RRP (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Mudde 2014a; Minkenberg 2015), a choice with which we agree. In less than ten years, Jobbik gained quite strong electoral support: starting from 2.2% in 2006 and rising to 16.7% in 2010 to peak at 20.3% in the 2014 elections, although due to a new election law, it lost many of its parliamentary seats. Jobbik replaced another extremist movement, the *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* (Hungarian Justice and Life Party – MIEP) as the most important RRP in Hungary. The parties were allied for a short period between 2005 and 2006. The MIEP was active in the Hungarian political landscape for much of the 1990s, despite its clear neo-fascist appeal (Szayna 1993; Mudde 2000a). As of 2015, the parties have belonged to the opposition. The main Hungarian political party, *Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség* (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance), is more difficult to categorize (see Table 23). Fidesz under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's leadership has followed a path of progressive radicalization. This is reflected in Hungarian democracy, which has been labelled ‘democrature’ by the left-leaning media (Bozóki 2011; Robert 2001).

Academics initially avoided linking Fidesz (and Orbán) to the RRP family (Mudde 2005), but more recently and, according to Mudde, Fidesz ‘seems increasingly driven by a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism – hallmarks of RR ideology’ (Mudde 2015b). Orbán's critical position on multiculturalism has been moving towards a more radical approach in a bid to ‘spare Hungary from [multiculturalism]’ (Euractiv - AFP 2015). Thus, Fidesz (since 2015) should be included in our



Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>Fidesz</b>	<i>Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség</i>	-	N	-	-	-	N	Mudde (2015b), Minkenberg (2015)	Y (after 2010)	Radical turn : nativism, authoritarianism, populism
<b>MIEP</b>	<i>Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	Y	Mudde (2000a)	Y	Consensus
<b>Jobbik</b>	<i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	-	Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Mudde (2014b), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus

*Table 23 - RRP in Hungary.*

list. However, the timespan of its transformation is unclear and only the more recent literature places Fidesz in the RR category. Minkenberg (2015) notes that Orban's second government relies on ideological elements common to the Hungarian RR, which suggests 2010 was the start. The transformation process had already begun by 2010, but it was not until the 2010 election that the party can be categorized as a RRP.

## SLOVAKIA

Slovakia provides another case of an undiscussed RRP (see Table 24). The *Slovenska narodna strana* (Slovak National Party – SNS), founded in 1990, has direct links to the previous SNS, which was allied to the pro-facist Hlinka/ and Tiso Slovak people's party (Shepherd 2006). In 1994, the SNS entered into a centre-right coalition and, until 2002, achieved parliamentary representation. In 2006, the party regained access to the lower house, with 11.7% of the votes, forming an alliance with the then centre-left party SMER – SD; this is the only case in Europe of a left coalition governing with a RR party (Pirro 2014a, 251).<sup>14</sup> This choice failed to convince the party's electorate and the SNS lost

<sup>14</sup> The European Socialist Party reacted to this choice by suspending the SMER-SD and re-accepting its membership only after formal clarification and assurances that the government would pursue a pluralist and democratic agenda.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
SNS	<i>Slovenska narodna strana</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	Y	Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Mudde (2014b), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus

*Table 24 - RRP in Slovakia.*

much of its support; its vote halved in the 2010 national election and it failed to reach the national minimum threshold in the 2012 parliamentary election.

## ROMANIA

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
PUNR	<i>Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Sum (2010), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus
PRM	<i>Partidul Romania Mare</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	Y	Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Mudde (2014b), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus

*Table 25 - RRP in Romania.*

The literature usually identifies two Romanian RRP: the *Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor* (Romanian National Unity Party – - *PUNR* ) and the Romanian *Partidul Romania Mare* (Greater Romania Party - *PRM*). The *PUNR* generally is considered a RRP because of its strong anti-Hungarian nationalism and its authoritarianism (Sum 2010) and, based on the limited literature identified, we would agree with this. The *PRM*'s classification initially was debated and, because of its admiration for the previous Ceausescu regime, scholars disagreed about whether it is a RR or a neo-communist party (Hartleb 2009). However, the classification now seems straightforward with all the main authors considering the *PRM* as belonging to the RRP family (see Table 25). The *PRM*'s ideology relies strongly on its leader's charisma, and his depiction as a messianic and authoritarian father of the nation (Norocel 2010, 712), coupled with clear anti-Hungarian racism (Stewart 2007)

and ethnic nationalism. The PRM's best result occurred in 2000, when it won 19.5% of the vote; however, this was followed by a steady decline in support and in 2008, the party failed to gain a seat and has never recovered.

## POLAND

In Poland, classification of the *Liga Polskich Rodzin* (League of Polish Families – LPR) as a RRP is undisputed (Rafal Pankowski 2010, 112). Founded in 2001, the LPR ‘combines Polish nativism with orthodox Catholicism’ (Mudde 2007, 45). The LPR displays much stronger homophobia and anti-feminism than other RRP, and identifies ‘otherness’ and internal threats in ethnic as well as in sexual minorities (Shibata 2013, 11). The LPR enjoys strong support from the national orthodox radio station and fared well in the 2001 national election, winning 7.9% of the vote. It increased its share in the 2004 European election, with 15.9% and 10 elected Members of the MEPs. With the emergence of other RRP in Eastern Europe, support for the LPR declined in after 2004 and it disappeared from Poland's main political scene between 2007 and 2009. The classification of the other two Polish parties is more difficult. The *Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland – SRP) and *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice – PiS) are both included by Pankowski (2010) in his research on RR. However, some authors do not consider the SRP to be a right-wing movement (Dakowska 2010, 255). The SRP was a cartel rather than a real party, as proven by the division of its European Parliamentary group between the rightist Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) and the Socialist group. It has been described also as radical-populist (Szczurbiak 2004, 248); however, there is insufficient work in English to allow an informed decision and it is excluded from the analysis.

The PiS was led by the Kaczynski brothers and has been described as a conservative turned populist party (Markowski and Tucker 2010, 528; Mudde 2015a). However, the literature underlines the party's authoritarian turn once in power (Rovny 2016) as it ‘threw off its moderate sheep’s clothing

and went full force into radical right mode’ (Mudde 2016b). The PiS campaigned against the ‘Islamization’ of the country and proposed a referendum on a complete ban on immigration (Stevens 2016). Even more striking are some interviews with high-profile party members who identified a few ‘illnesses’ that were threatening the country, specifically ‘A new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians’(Cienski 2016). We conclude that at the party's core is a nativist view of Polish society, which was demonstrated when it came into power. We include the party in the analysis, for the period from 2009: after the disappearance of the LPR, the PiS moved towards further radicalization and deserves to be included in our study (Rafał Pankowski and Kormak 2013).

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
LPR	<i>Liga Polskich Rodzin</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	Y	Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Mudde (2014b), Minkenberg (2015)	Y	Consensus
PiS	<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i>	-	N	-	-	-	N	Pankowski and Kormak (2013)	Y (since 2009)	Radical turn
SRP	<i>Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	N		N	Not enough literature to decide

Table 26 - RRP in Poland.

## ESTONIA

Shortly after independence, Estonia's main radical party, *Eesti Rahvuslik Sõltumatus Partei* (Estonian National Independence Party – ERSP), became known mainly for its stark anti-Russian campaigns (Kasekamp 2003). The ERSP managed to form a coalition with other, less radical, right-wing parties in the first democratic elections in 1992. However, experience in government led quickly to a split by the most radical fraction, (*Eesti Kodanik – Estonian Citizen –EK*), leaving the ERSP to merge with its centre-right allies. ERSP splits were less successful than the original party was, and no major RRP emerged until the early 2000s, when the *Eesti Iseseivuspartei* (Estonian Independence party – EIP) was formed. However, it did not win any seats in the National Assembly (Auers and

Kasekamp 2009). The EIP's ideology is described as anti-globalist and the party accuses national politicians of having betrayed Estonia (Auers and Kasekamp 2015). To our knowledge, there is a large consensus on its classification as a RRP; thus, it is included in our study.

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>EIP</b>	<i>Eesti Iseseivuspartei</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Auers and Kasekamp (2009, 2015)	Y	Consensus
<b>EK</b>	<i>Eesti Kodanik</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Auers and Kasekamp (2009, 2015)	Y	Radical split from RRP
<b>ERSP</b>	<i>Eesti Rahvuslik Sõltumatuse Partei</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Y (until 1995)	Auers and Kasekamp (2009, 2015), Kasekamp (2003)	Y (until 1995)	Radical splits

Table 27 - RRP in Estonia.

## LATVIA

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
<b>TB</b>	<i>Nacionālā apvienība</i>	-	Y	-	-	-	-	Auers and Kasekamp (2013, 2015)	Y	Anti-Russian nativism and antisemitism

Table 28 - RRP in Latvia.

According to Auers and Kasekamp (2013), Latvian RRP did not achieve national relevance until 2010, mainly because of the contemporary presence of other, more moderate, populist right-wing parties. The situation changed in 2010 when the populist TB/LNNK joined *Visu Latvijai!* (All for Latvia! – VL!) in an electoral alliance. In 2011, they merged to form the *Nacionālā apvienība* (National Alliance – TB). According to Auers and Kasekamp (2013, 238) ‘the party ticks all the necessary boxes for a modern radical-right populist political party’. Indeed, the party shows strong signs of nativism because of its Russophobia and anti-Semitism (NA deputies participated in various commemorations of Latvian Waffen-SS veterans (Auers and Kasekamp 2015)). The party has been gaining increasing support since its creation and is represented in both the National parliament and

EP. In addition, the TB formed a coalition with centre-right parties in 2011 and it has been governing Latvia ever since.

## LITHUANIA

Party	Complete Name	Betz (1994)	Bruter and Harrison (2011)	Carter (2005)	Hainsworth (2008)	Ignazi (2003)	Mudde (2007)	Other sources	Cavallaro (2017)	Motivation
LTS	<i>Lietuvių tautininkų sąjunga</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Auers and Kasekamp (2015)	Y	Anti-Russian nativism and authoritarian nostalgia

*Table 29 - RRP in Lithuania.*

Lithuania lacked a sizeable RR movement until 2008, when the *Lietuvių tautininkų sąjunga* (Nationalist Union – LTS) joined the *Tėvynės sąjunga* (Homeland Union – TS) and gained three seats in parliament before leaving the TS in 2011 (Auers and Kasekamp 2015). The LTS is classified as a RRP by Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) and, according to Auers and Kasekamp (2015, 148), the party ‘can unequivocally be categorized as not just a populist, but an extreme right party’. Indeed, the party seems to fit our criteria because of its Russophobia and its authoritarian nostalgia: the party ‘explicitly styles itself as the successor of the ruling party of Smetona’s<sup>15</sup> authoritarian regime’ (Auers and Kasekamp 2015, 148). As such, it is included in our study.

## 1.4. CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, we justified and clarified the use of the term RR. We discussed the large body of theoretical literature, which defines RR to choose the definition of RR we use in our research: following Mudde’s (2007) ‘minimum definition’, we consider RRP as all those parties that have ‘nativism’ as a core feature of their ideology. Our choice finds support in the literature, which also

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<sup>15</sup> Anastas Smetona was President of Lithuania from 1926 to 1940 and his regime is described as authoritarian (Mann 2004) or fascist (Misiunas 1970).

adopts this definition albeit using different labels (see Table 3). RRP are often defined as authoritarian and populist parties: we consider these characteristics as identifying a subgroup, but not the whole party family. In particular, the ‘populist’ subgroup seems to gather the most successful RRP. As such, we consider authoritarianism and populism in the succeeding chapters where we develop (Chapter 3) and test (Chapter 4) our hypotheses about the economic impact of RRP: even though the. Relying on the vast literature on RRP, we derived a list of the European parties belonging to RR family over the 1991-2016 period covered by our study (see Section 1.3), which will be used in the empirical work of this PhD. Overall, Chapter 1 helps to delimit the range of our empirical work. It focuses on the features common to the RRP family. However, it should be noted that the radical RR family is not homogenous, either geographically or historically, in terms of results or political programmes. Studies of ideological differences emerged at the end of 1980s and offered various taxonomies of RRP, including, for some of them the analysis of their economic programmes. Since the interest in the present work is in the economic impact of RRP, examining ‘where RRP stand’ seems a logical direction. Since there is no straightforward answer to this question, the positioning of RRP on economic matters, their evolution, and the proper way to categorize them is discussed in Chapter 2.

## 2. A DIVIDED FAMILY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES' ECONOMIC POLICY AFTER 1990

### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous Chapter, we presented our definition of RRP and identified the parties to be included in this research. We concluded that RRP share a nativist ideology, while populism and authoritarianism, although important, characterize only a part of the successful RRP of the so-called 'third wave'. From the previous discussion, it derives that economic matters are not central in RR ideology. However, it is important to identify where RRP stand on these issues in order to properly theorize and assess the economic impact of RRP.

The relationship between RRP and economic policy is the subject of a large debate in political science and, to date, there is no consensus on where RRP stand (Rovny 2013). In most cases, the economy is considered as an instrumental issue to RRP (Mudde 2007). As such, the literature excludes economic matters from the definition of RRP and identifies nativism, populism, and authoritarianism as the core ideological features of RRP (Mudde 2007). To our knowledge, the only studies that try to integrate economic issues in the definition of Radical Right (RR) are Kitschelt (1997) and Betz (1994). They conclude that RRP mostly espouse neoliberal views, however such a conclusion has been contested by recent literature (De Lange 2007; Ivaldi 2015). Even though no



consensus emerges in the literature on the positioning of RRP on economic matters, this question has become a topical one as far as these parties have gained support during the economic crisis (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). Even in the absence of a common position, the study of the differences between RRP and of their evolution in terms of economic matters provides important insights on how RR economic impact might vary.

To our knowledge, no comprehensive framework has been proposed to compare the geographical and diachronic differences in RRP's economic positions. This chapter reconsiders the differences among RRP to enable comparison across countries and time. We compare RRP in two ways.

First, in line with the literature (De Lange 2007; Rovny 2013; Ivaldi 2013), we rely on party manifestos as the source of RRP's programmatic positions. These positions reflect the way RRP presents their programme at national elections. They correspond to the image they want to give of their ideological position.

Second, we study real political decisions made by RRP's representatives. Since they are rarely able to secure executive office, we focus on the decisions made in elected assemblies. In order to treat a European phenomenon while avoiding problems related to comparability among decisions made in national parliaments, we consider the votes made in the EP. This is in line with the perspective adopted in Hix et al. (2007) to study and compare the behaviour of parties from different European countries, but we will focus on RRP and, more particularly, their economic positioning.

Our work contributes to the literature on RRP's position on economic policy in three ways. To our knowledge, it is the first work which proposes a taxonomy of the differences between RRP (diachronically and geographically) specifically on economic aspects. Second, this is done using recent data, which allows us to highlight the effects of the crisis which started in 2007-2008 and in particular the importance assumed by economic issues in RRP programmes following the great

recession. Third, we propose an original methodology to explore and analyse manifestos' data, based on inductive analysis of transformed data, following Lowe et al. (2011) and Prosser (2014).

The Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2, presents a literature review of RRP's economic ideas, discusses their role at the EP, and derives our hypotheses. Section 2.3 develops the methodology. Section 2.4 describes the dataset. Section 2.5 discusses the results. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes and concludes.

## 2.2. ECONOMIC MATTERS AS A STRATEGIC RATHER THAN AN IDEOLOGICAL ISSUE: AN EVOLVING "WINNING FORMULA"

In this Chapter, we focus on (i) party manifestos and (ii) voting records to assess the unity, describe the differences, and discuss the available literature on the evolution of RRP's on economic matters. We also present the main hypotheses derived from this theoretical background.

While Section 2.2.1 provides a review of the literature on the economic positions of RRP's, Section 2.2.2 focuses more specifically on RRP's Euroscepticism and their activity at the EP.

### 2.2.1. ECONOMIC MATTERS AS A STRATEGIC RATHER THAN AN IDEOLOGICAL ISSUE: AN EVOLVING "WINNING FORMULA" AND THE RELATED HYPOTHESIS

There is a consensus that 'the economic program is a secondary feature in the ideologies of populist radical right parties' (Mudde 2007, 119). Rovny (2013) provided quantitative evidence from manifesto content analysis, voter surveys, and expert surveys in support of this thesis and concluded that RRP's do not actually compete with other political parties on the economic dimension and adopt strategic position blurring on economic issues to attract a larger audience. Besides, RRP's have been adopting different positions through the decades. According to Kitschelt (1995), RRP's attract support from various social strata, in particular the blue collar workers through nativism principles and the middle classes through neoliberalism. This combination has been described as the RRP's 'winning

formula'. Following Kitschelt, the choice of this political positioning distinguishes the emerging and successful 'third wave' RRP from other RRP subtypes, namely the welfare chauvinist parties, populist anti-statists and old fascists.

Kitschelt (2004, 10) revised his position at the beginning of the 2000s when he found that RRP were toning down 'their market liberal rhetoric so as not to alienate potential working class constituencies'. De Lange (2007, 429) empirically addresses the new 'winning formula' proposed by Kitschelt (2004), and compares three different RRP – the French FN, the Flemish VB and the Dutch LPF – and concluded that the FN and the VB held a fairly centrist position on economic questions in the new millennium', while the Dutch LPF was still neo-liberal in its economic proposal.

This shift goes even further than this 'centrist' appeal: Ivaldi (2015, 362) finds that the French FN has recently been moving towards a 'new leftist-agenda' that is 'increasingly framed by economic egalitarianism' and 'marked by the acceptance of state regulation and public services, and emphasizes income redistribution'. Thus, the FN is becoming close to what Kitschelt (1997) identifies as welfare chauvinism, that is, the 'combination of a left-wing position on the economic axis and a authoritarian/exclusionist position on the cultural dimension' (Ivaldi 2013, 14). Welfare chauvinism is also part of the True Finns programme (Keskinen 2016) and characterizes the Dutch radical right electoral constituency (De Koster, Achterberg, and Van der Waal 2013). Working on the Dutch VVP, Otjes et al. (2012) distinguishes different RRP's economic positions ('economic liberalism', 'economic egalitarianism', 'economic nationalism' and 'the deserving poor'), which go beyond the left-right scale. Therefore, it is clear that neoliberalism is no longer common to RRP across countries. This applies also to the centrist stance identified by De Lange (2007). Thus, when analysing RRP as a whole, we need to accept that, on economic matters, their differences do not only rely on a left/right economic scale, but should be considered in a multidimensional perspective.

The existence of different economic stances within the RRP family has been acknowledged by numerous authors including Ignazi (2003) and Mudde (2007). However, the literature emphasizes

that the economy is not the most important issue in RRP's political discourses. The many shifts in RRP's economic programmes rest on the instrumental nature of economic policy for these parties, which underlies their 'schizophrenic socioeconomic agenda' (Mudde 2007, 135). However, Rovny's work does not provide a mapping to interpret the diversity of RRP's. Moreover, some RRP's appear to be assigning more importance to economic issues in the most recent period and, specifically, following the subprime crisis. For example, Ivaldi (2014) finds that the FN paid more attention to economic issues in the 2012 election and 'has accentuated its nationalist anti-globalization stance while endorsing left-wing economic policies' (Ivaldi 2014, 14).

To what extent is the FN's evolution shared by other RRP's in terms of the increasing importance being given to economic issues and the shift towards left-wing economic propositions (a third 'winning formula' after neo-liberalism (in the early 1990s) and centrism (in the early 2000s))? The literature does not provide a clear answer to this question as it is limited to the salience of economic matters mainly during the period before the 2008 economic crisis (e.g. Rovny 2013), to cross-section analysis comparing countries at a given time (e.g. Ivaldi 2015, Otjes et al. 2012) or to diachronic studies considering a single country over time (e.g. De Lange 2007). Our research aims to provide a global analysis of the differences between European RRP's positions on economic matters through space and time.

As a consequence and particularly for manifestos, we derive from assumptions from the previous work concerning (i) the salience of economic matters (their importance with respect to the other issues) and (ii) the differentiation between RRP's economic positions, and (iii) their convergence, in particular towards a 'welfare chauvinist' stance.

Following Rovny (2013), we assume that, while it is true that economic issues are less relevant for RRP's than for other parties, there has been an absolute and a relative increase trend in their importance. We hypothesize that:

H1-M: *The salience of economic issues is overall lower for RRP than for other parties, but with a reducing gap.*

Finding support for this prediction would legitimate our research question insofar as this would mean that economic matters have become more important strategically for RRP.

In line with Otjes et al. (2012) and Ivaldi (2015)'s work, we also consider the differences between RRP's economic positions. In particular, from a diachronic perspective, we consider whether the switch from a neo-liberal to a 'welfare chauvinist' stance, identified by Ivaldi (2015) for the FN, is a common and unifying trend among European RRP in relation to economic matters since the 2008 crisis:

H2-M: *RRP's position on economic matters has significantly changed over time, in particular from pro-market in the 1990s to more pro-welfare stances in the 2000s.*

However, RRP might adopt different strategies between their public pledges and legislative action once elected. This is why we rely on both the analysis of RRP's public pledges (through our work on manifestos) and their voting behaviour (through our analysis of voting records at the EP).

### 2.2.2. RRP AT THE EP: DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF OPPOSITION AND RELATED HYPOTHESIS

Can we anticipate a specific behaviour at the EP, compared to the previous assumption developed for manifestos' analysis? Independently from economic matters, the literature highlights that the RRP's history at the EP is a story of division. While radical left parties achieved a sort of unity through the European United Left (GUE), RRP have rarely managed to form a single European party or a cohesive group at the EP. As Morris (2013, 70) argues, RRP's 'value systems – typically nativist in nature – often conflict with EU institutions and make it hard to work with other populist RR members of the MEPs.' Such a division remains true despite various attempts to unify the RR family since 1979.

RRPs tried to build a stable European federation, notably in 1997 (Euronat) and 2010 (the European Alliance for Freedom - EAF). However, so far they have failed, and during the 7th term, MEPs from RRP were divided among different European parties (Brack and Costa 2014): the ‘European Alliance of National Movements’ (AENM), the already cited EAF, the ‘Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy’ and, since we include the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) in our analysis, also the ‘Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists’ (AECR). These organizations however, are not ‘comparable to those of the main party families in terms of the degree of institutionalization, stability and comprehensiveness’ (Brack 2013, 91). The EAF, for example, presented itself as an ‘alliance of Members of the European Parliament,’ and not an alliance of parties. It also stressed the fact that ‘at the national level EAF members do not necessarily subscribe to the politics and beliefs of other members of the Alliance’ (EAF 2011).

MEPs belonging to RRP have mostly remained among the non-attached (NI). Unlike other national parliaments where non-attached members form their own group (often called ‘Mixed group’), the non-attached members at the EP are not recognized as such and thus have fewer rights than established parliamentary groups. For example they ‘are very unlikely to be elected to committee chairs or to be appointed rapporteurs on significant dossiers’ (Poptcheva 2014, 1). They have less speaking time than other groups and their representative at the Conference of Presidents, which normally decides the voting agenda, does not have the right to vote.

In 2009, the RRP were able to increase their representation in the EP, but were still unable to form a single group for the 7th term. MEPs from RRP either sit among the NI or are split across two groups: the European Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD), and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). Both the EFD and the ECR are considered as ‘Eurosceptic’ groups, though at a different level (Bressanelli 2012; Vasilopoulou 2017). The EFD group was formed in 2009, following the alliance between parties from two Eurosceptic groups from the previous term, the ‘Union for Europe of the Nations’ (UEN) and the ‘Independence/Democracy’ (IND/DEM) groups. Most of EFD

members are classified as hard Eurosceptic (Hobolt and de Vries 2016) and, during the 7th term, the UKIP was the party with the highest number of seats in the group. The genesis of the ECR group is rather different. The group was formed in 2009 as three parties split from the European People's Party (EPP): the British Conservatives, the Czech Civic Democratic Party, and the Polish PiS. During the 7th term, the British Conservatives represented the relative majority of the group and most parties in the ECR were classified as soft Eurosceptic (Hobolt and de Vries 2016).

The lack of a common group in the EP had a direct impact on the involvement of RRP in EU decision making. According to Mamadouh and Raunio (2003), RRP's activity in the EP has been quite limited. Analysing data from 1989 to 1999, they found that the RRP, despite representing 3.3% of the MEPs, was allocated 0.7% of the reports. These results were confirmed by other studies (Almeida 2012; Morris 2013). In particular, Almeida (2012) found that only 13 reports were allocated to RRP, and that RRP proposed amendments on only 17 draft reports. We may consider that the poor share of these MEPs among rapporteurs is related to the fact that they are not part of a party group, but sit among the non-attached. For Almeida (2012), the non-allocation of reports could also be understood as representing a cordon-sanitaire, preventing RRP from playing a role in the EP. However, Almeida (2012) highlights that their lack of activity also as co-legislators (i.e. the small number of amendments in which they participated) points also to a self-exclusion tactics by the RRP. This led Almeida to conclude that 'the RR pursues a paradoxical course of an extra-parliamentary opposition' (Almeida 2012, 150). This extra-parliamentary opposition is similar to the 'opposition of principle', proposed by Kirchheimer (1957) and adapted to the context of the EU by Mair (2007). According to Mair, the EU, as a polity, lacks the capacity to organize an opposition due to its depoliticisation. Therefore since 'we cannot organize opposition in the EU, we are then almost forced to organize opposition to the EU. To be critical of the policies promulgated by Brussels is therefore to be critical of the polity' (Mair 2007, 7). Thus, the RRP would seem to be following a pattern of opposition based on a decision to withdraw from any form of EU activity as a form of protest. However, this probably is

not true for all RRP, which might adopt different styles of opposition, based on their national context. Hobolt and de Vries (2016) distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties, according to their degree of opposition to the European integration process. Whereas most RRP fall under the ‘Hard Eurosceptic’ category, others such as the Greek LAOS or the Latvian TB are categorised as soft Eurosceptic. Similarly, Vasilopoulou (2009, 2011) distinguishes between three patterns of opposition: rejecting, conditional, and compromising. The rejecting category identifies ‘parties (e.g. the BNP) that are wholeheartedly against all aspects of European integration’ (Vasilopoulou 2009, 4); these parties criticize the mere existence of EU institutions and would oppose their actions even on topics they might agree on. The conditional category instead includes parties (e.g. the Austrian) that ‘tend to favour the creation of a Europe administered by an institutional framework resembling a confederation, namely intergovernmental cooperation without the presence or with limited power of supranational institutions’ (Vasilopoulou 2011, 233). The parties might therefore not oppose the EU on all matters and might even support those policies ‘deemed beneficial to the nation-state’ (Vasilopoulou 2011, 233). Finally, the compromising category consists of those parties (e.g. the Latvian TB) who, albeit opposing further integration, consider that ‘a degree of integration is necessary for the general prosperity of the state, particularly in the economic domain’ (Vasilopoulou 2011, 233).

The previous discussion highlighted the heterogeneity of RRP in terms of economic issues, as well as their lack of organization at the EP (where we wish to study RRP’s actual behaviour on economic matters). From this analysis and from Section 2.2, which highlighted that (so far) economic policy is considered by RRP to be a secondary issue, we derive a first hypothesis stating the lack of cohesion of RRP at the EP on economic matters:

*H1-P: RRP follow different strategies on economic matters at the EP.*

Additionally, we showed first the low degree of unity of RRP at the EP, testified by their divisions among different groups and their presence among the non-attached members. We may distinguish



two explanations for voting cohesion: convergence of views (i.e. parties share the same ideas) or on parties' coordination (i.e. parties have an agreement and vote together, finding a compromise on each document). Given the lack of a common group and the lack of organization of non-attached members, a low degree of unity on economic matters at the EP might exclusively depend on the lack of coordination. However, we expect higher cohesion on non-economic matters and especially on issues related to their core ideology, as proposed in Hypothesis H2-P:

*H2-P: RRP*s are more united on non-economic matters than on economic matters.

A second conclusion we derive from the literature is that the votes of RR representatives in the EP can be interpreted either as their real position on a given topic or as a pattern of opposition within the parliament. Among RRP

s, we expect a difference between those opposed in principle to the EU and which vote accordingly (Eurosceptic parties) and those more open to the EU construct. Beyond Hypotheses H1-P and H2-P (see above), we hypothesize that:

*H3-P: The main opposition among RRP*s on economic matters is related to the degree of their opposition to the EU.

However, as presented in Section 2.1, economic matters are instrumental and secondary issues, leading to different – often strategic – positions with this respect. Consequently, we expect to find such divergences between RRP

s on economic matters whatever pattern of opposition they adopt in the EP. We thus propose to test the following hypothesis, which, to our knowledge, has not yet been tested in the literature:

*H4-P: RRP*s take significantly different positions on economic issues beyond their degree of opposition to the EU.

## 2.3. METHODOLOGY: A SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARTY MANIFESTOS AND VOTING RECORDS

This Section addresses the question of how to analyse RRP's behaviours in relation to economic issues. In particular, Section 2.3.1 presents the different ways to analyse the dimensionality of politics and justifies our choice for a supply-side approach based on (i) party manifestos and (ii) roll call votes. Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3 discuss our methodological choices in the analysis of party manifestos and roll call votes respectively.

### 2.3.1. THE DIMENSIONALITY OF POLITICS BETWEEN SUPPLY-SIDE AND DEMAND-SIDE APPROACHES

Political scientists develop two main methodological approaches to analysing party differences and competition: a demand-side approach, which studies parties' positions according to voter preferences, and a supply-side approach, which focuses on what parties offer voters, either ideologically or in terms of programmes (Kriesi et al. 2008; Benoit and Laver 2006). Since our aim is to study differences in the economic programmes of parties in the RRP family, we favour a supply-side approach which can be categorised in three subgroups:

- Expert surveys: Following Castles and Mair's (1984) seminal work, these studies rely on scholars' judgements;
- Analysis of the voting behaviours (of elected representatives), that is, analysis of parliamentary activity (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007);
- Manifesto analysis, in particular through the MARPOR project (Volkens et al. 2015) and the Euromanifesto Study (Braun et al. 2016), which provide human-coded quantitative data on party manifestos content.

Expert surveys are used widely to analyse differences among parties. However, surveys introduce the non-negligible risk of reproducing the general views in the literature on the topic. Experts do not necessarily have first-hand knowledge on every party and mostly provide confirmation of the main literature. In the words of Mair (2001, 16):

‘being well-read, being well-informed, and being mainly intelligent and experienced observers, experts will base their judgements on a combination of often unconsciously imbibed sources such as past coalition behaviour, party programmes and ideology, and both mass and elite perceptions. Expert judgements are therefore not really an alternative to these other approaches [voting records and coded manifestos]; instead, they reflect a crude synthesis of these other approaches as filtered through the perceptions of a well-read and intelligent observer.’

Moreover, Kriesi et al. (2008) underline the difficulties facing experts who study secondary issues. This applies to the case of RRP’s positioning on economic matters, which is not a central tenant of their ideology. In addition, Kriesi et al. (2008) warn about the impossibility of knowing how experts form their own opinions: in other words, rather than a taxonomy of parties, they provide a taxonomy of the ‘received wisdom’ (Mudde 2007, 295). As such, it appears that rigorous analyses often rely on coded manifestos and parliamentary activities (i.e. voting records and parliamentary speeches).

Consequently, we chose to analyse (i) coded party manifestos and (ii) voting records. The analysis of coded party manifestos allows us to consider the period 1991 to 2014 for all European countries including Eastern European countries. This approach is widely used in the literature on RRP, even though not dealing specifically with economic matters – with very few exceptions. Norris (2005) studies the consequences of RRP on national political systems, Arzheimer (2009) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006) analyse the impact of the positions of other political competitors on voters’ support for RRP. Cole (2005) assesses the ideological differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ RRP. Also the already cited works by De Lange (2007), Rovny (2013) and Ivaldi (2014) rely similarly either on a

specific existing dataset or on the authors' self-codings. The analysis of RR voting records from a comparative perspective is a new approach. In the following Section we discuss the main approaches

### 2.3.2. THE ANALYSIS OF PARTY MANIFESTOS

This Section addresses the question of how to analyse RRP's programmes. Section 2.3.2.1 discusses the differences between approaches based on salience and confrontational approaches in the description of the political space. In Section 2.3.2.2, we present the operationalisations and inductive methods that will be used in the rest of this Chapter.

#### 2.3.2.1. SALIENCE OR CONFRONTATIONAL? DIFFERENT WAYS TO DESCRIBE THE POLITICAL SPACE

In this study, we use the dataset provided by the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), formerly the Manifesto Research Group and Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2015). This dataset provides information on the content of almost 4,000 political manifestos presented at national elections, covering 988 parties in 56 countries, not exclusively European. Data are hand-coded by dividing each manifesto into 'quasi sentences' or non-overlapping textual units which refer to a policy proposition. These units are classified into seven domains, each of which is split into policy categories (and eventually subcategories) for a total of 56 mutually exclusive items. The dataset reports the relative number of quasi sentences for each item in each manifesto, that is, count of mentions of a certain category divided by the total count of quasi-sentences.

The coding of the dataset follows a particular approach according to which parties do not compete on every issue, rather they 'differentiate themselves by emphasizing the issues on which their stances are most credible' (Lowe et al. 2011, 133); this emphasis is referred to as salience or valence. The MARPOR dataset counts the mentions of a certain issue, thus, providing a measure of the importance (salience) of the focal issue to a certain party.

This is in line with Budge's (2001, 82) idea that differences among parties 'consist of contrasting emphases placed in different policy areas' and, in particular, that all parties sustain a certain set of

undisputed issues. For example, 'MARPOR item 501 – Environment' provides us with information on a party manifestos' number of positive references to environmental policy, but does not include information on negative references. The assumption is that parties favouring environmental protection will refer frequently to it, while parties that oppose stricter environmental laws will probably not mention it.

The opposite approach, referred to sometimes as 'direct confrontation' (Dolezal et al. 2014), follows Downs's (1957) conceptualization of the political space. According to him, parties compete by presenting alternative policy options for each major topic. In our example, parties would compete on environmental policy by presenting clear alternative options, rather than emphasizing or de-emphasizing the issue. Other authors have also criticised the salience theory. For instance, Laver (2001) underlines that, in the phrase 'If we win the next election all bankers will be taken out and shot', what is relevant is the underlying positional idea, not its repetition throughout the manifesto. Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) show that, a political system includes both positional and salience issues. Also, political systems change over time and the type of competition over the same issue might be considered confrontational in an election and salient in another. Dolezal et al. (2014) tested various salience theory assumptions using data from the 2002, 2006, 2008 Austrian national elections. They found that most do not hold. However, they found support for the thesis that parties that 'own' an issue (such as Green parties and environmental policy) emphasize the topic in their programmes.

Despite the shortcomings highlighted in the literature in relation to salience-based data, the use of MARPOR is appropriate in our case for at least two reasons. First, the dataset is less strictly 'salience-based'. McDonald and Mendes (2001) pointed out that MARPOR codes a large array of categories in a confrontational way, providing both positive and negative items (e.g., item 406 – 'Protectionism: positive' and item 407 – 'Protectionism: negative'). Also, salience and confrontational approaches are not mutually exclusive inasmuch as they stress different aspects of political competition (Budge 2001). Thus, it is possible, through a simple operationalization, to reduce the 'salience approach' in

MARPOR data in order to take account also of the confrontational dimension (Gemenis 2013). Second, our research question deals in part with the salience of economic matters in RRP's programmes: before moving to a party position, we need to address the importance of economic issues for those parties. Salience is especially important for the present work, while the confrontational scale might be less relevant for RRP's in the context of economic issues. Moreover, the confrontations among positions is more difficult to handle since RRP's are characterized by 'schizophrenic agendas', which can include both free-market and state intervention positions.

In particular, we consider the confrontational operationalization by De Lange (2007) not to be the most relevant for our purpose. In her study, each RRP's programme is categorized into seven themes (such as 'welfare and social security', 'labour market'. etc.). If most of the statements indicate that a party favours state intervention in relation to a particular theme, this is assigned a score of -1. If most of the statements indicate that the party opposes state intervention in relation to that theme, then it is assigned a score of 1. If statements are ambiguous or if there are no references to the topic then the topic is assigned a score of 0. These scores are aggregated to obtain an index. However, this approach might be less appropriate in the context of our research question. We argue (i) that ambiguous stances and lack of interest should not be treated in the same way and (ii) that ambiguous stances cannot be added up, at least when studying RRP's. Indeed, if we accept De Lange's (2007) approach, the aggregation of the same number of pro-state and pro-market stances should be treated as a centrist stance. This applies to the FN in the 1990s when it favoured both total privatization of public assets and a ban on international trade (Bastow 1997). This reasoning overlooks the fact that the positions of FN on privatization and international trade are extreme rather than centrist.

For all these reasons, we compare the salience given to economic matters by each political family, relying on the MARPOR dataset. We also consider relevant operationalisations of the data in relation to our question.

### 2.3.2.2. INDUCTIVE METHODS FOR ANALYSING CODED MANIFESTOS

The operationalization of manifesto data has been the subject of major debate since the data transformation is aimed at producing one or multiple scales to describe the dimensionality of the political space. The literature proposes two main methodologies: inductive and deductive techniques (Prosser 2014).

Deductive techniques are based on a priori selection of components from which one or many indexes can be deduced. The best known example of a deductive technique is the RILE scale (Budge 1999), an unidimensional description of the policy space based on the difference between the sum of left and right quasi-sentences found in the MARPOR dataset, divided by the total number of quasi-sentences. Benoit and Laver (2007) developed a bidimensional scale to describe the left/right differentiation on both social policy and economic dimensions. Lowe et al. (2011, 131) proposed a ‘logit scale of position’, to restructure the dataset as if each additional reference to an issue had a decreasing marginal impact, before considering left/right differentiations. This decreasing marginal impact is supported by the Weber-Fechner law of psychophysics which suggests that ‘we should operate in proportions, not levels, and work with a logarithmic scale relationship between the underlying quantity and subjective estimations of it’ (Lowe et al. 2011, 130). RRP’s thus operate in a political space whose directionality can be deductively constructed using ‘common sense substantive judgements to sort the component variables of the scale’ (Benoit and Laver 2007, 100).

However, deductive techniques rely on the author’s judgment about the left/right categorization of each item of the database and might be too normative to understand the differences between RRP’s. As Rovny (2013, 19) argues, ‘RRP’s contest the structure of political competition’. This opinion is shared by Ivaldi (2015, 350) who considers policy dispersion to be an important feature of RRP’s since ‘those parties combine conflicting positions on the economic axis’. For example, Bastow (1997) highlights how the FN integrated strong elements of both economic liberalism and economic nationalism at the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Scales based on deductive approaches

lose this information where ‘left’ and ‘right’ elements can be present simultaneously in an economic programme. For instance, in trying to position the FN’s economic position on a unique left/right scale, Benoit and Laver (2007) found the FN was at the centre-right of the socio-economic ratio scale<sup>16</sup>, thus losing the information on the simultaneous presence of ‘left’ and ‘right’ elements in its programme.

Inductive techniques seek to identify latent dimensions and make fewer assumptions about the factors that make up this dimension and how they are related. Such techniques rely on exploratory statistics to obtain statistically significant dimensions (Sonia Alonso and Volkens 2012, 78–80). These methods are useful if there is some doubt about the relationship between the variables, as in our case.

#### Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

There are numerous exploratory techniques. Most researchers in the field favour Factor Analysis (FA) (Laver and Budge 1992) and, in particular, Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a widely used quantitative method to explore multidimensional issues. It is an unsupervised method, which identifies the dimensions that best explain the differences among individuals. PCA extracts independent (orthogonal) axes, based on linear combinations of the original variables. The first principal axis that emerges from the analysis maximizes the variance among individuals. Since it maximizes the variance that can be explained on a single axis, it can be considered the best summary information available from our dataset on a single dimension. The second principal axis provides the second best summary of the information available in our dataset with the constraint of independence of these principal axes (the differences explained by the second axis are not correlated with the differences explained by the first axis). Subsequent axes are built similarly. This allows identification

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<sup>16</sup> In Benoit and Laver (2007), the socio-economic position of the FN in 1993 and 1997 is, respectively, .32 and .17 on a scale from -1 (left) to +1 (right).



of the main differences among individuals, and enables a typology of individuals without prior assumptions about the data or their structure.

The literature warns about the limits of inductive techniques. Prosser (2014) points out that these methods applied to manifesto data usually find a rather high number of factors/components with low eigenvalues. While some authors decided to limit their choice to the first and sometime second component (Petry and Pennings 2006; M. J. Gabel and Huber 2000), the part of variance explained by the retained factors/components is often very low. According to Gemenis (2013) and Prosser (Aitchison 1986; Wold, Esbensen, and Geladi 1987), this problem is highlighted particularly by post-estimation tests such as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index and Bartlett's test of sphericity. The KMO test is a measure of sampling adequacy that compares the values of the correlations between variables and those of the partial correlations. It is computed as follows:

$$\frac{\sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ij}^2}{\sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ij}^2 + \sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} a_{ij}^2} \quad (2.1)$$

Where  $r_{ij}$  is correlation coefficient between variable  $i$  and  $j$ , while  $a$  is the partial correlation between the same variables. The measure thus indicates what portion of the variables' variance might be common variance, which is the portion of one variable's variance that is shared with other variables. The measure ranges from 0 to 1 and it is generally considered that a sample should produce results greater than 0.5 in order to have a satisfactory factor analysis (Kaiser 1970). Also for the sampling adequacy, the Bartlett's (1950) test of sphericity checks whether the observed correlation matrix is significantly different from the identity matrix. This is because, if the correlation matrix of the population from which the sample is drawn is an identity matrix, all the principal components will have the same eigenvalues, which makes it impossible to reduce the number of dimensions meaningfully.

Limitations related to sampling adequacy can be overcome by employing some easy data transformations. In particular, logarithmic transformation is acknowledged to be a good pre-treatment

for data before conducting PCA (Wold, Esbensen, and Geladi 1987; Aitchison 1986). In treating manifesto data in this way, the analysis is in line with Lowe et al. (2011) where each additional reference to a topic in the manifesto has decreasing marginal importance for the reader (and the authors).

Since it has been proven to improve the validity of manifesto data (Kim and Fording 1998), we retain this assumption when analysing the data. However, although we agree with the theory in Lowe et al. (2011), we use Prosser (2014)'s version of the log scale:

$$\theta^{(I)} = \frac{\log(S+1)}{\log(N+1)} \quad (2.2)$$

where  $S$  is the number of quasi-sentences on a given issue and  $N$  is the number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto. Prosser's transformation defines salience as a standardized index, ranging from 0 to 1, and allows easier comparison among saliences than does Lowe et al.'s (2011) operationalization.

Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, in order to test Hypothesis 1, we address the salience of economic issues by analysing the evolution of the log scale of salience presented above. We obtain two types of scales: (i) a scale of economic salience by aggregating all economic items and (ii) a specific scale of salience for each separate economic item. We test our sample using KMO and Bartlett's test of sphericity to verify sampling adequacy. Then, in order to check the validity of Hypotheses 2 we run a PCA of party programmes in election year  $t$  as individuals (so our individuals will not actually be the 'parties', but party's programmes in year  $t$ ), economic items as variables and the log scale of salience as the values within each cell in the table. This allows us to project the position of a party's programme in year  $t$  and in year  $t+n$  in order to compare the evolution of party's proposals through time. To ease interpretation, we apply normal Varimax rotation (Kaiser 1958), a common criterion for orthogonal rotation. Finally, we regroup RRP's programmes using Ward's clustering method (1963) on the same data. This method allows us to minimize the variance within

each cluster. We interpret these groups using the average position of each cluster on the factorial space identified by the PCA.

### 2.3.3. THE ANALYSIS OF ROLL CALL VOTES

This Section addresses the question of how to analyse RRP's behaviours in relation to economic issues and consequently how to test our three hypotheses. We define our methodology and justify the use of roll-call votes in Section 2.3.3.1. We present our choice of indexes to describe parties' behaviours in Section 2.3.3.2. The statistical tool used to analyse the data are described in Section 2.3.3.3.

#### 2.3.3.1. THE USE OF ROLL CALL VOTES AT THE EP AS A MEAN TO COMPARE NATIONAL PARTIES' POSITIONS

MEPs express their opinions in debates, draft reports and opinions, and then propose amendments and vote. However, unlike studies of rapporteurship and amendments on other groups (Almeida, 2012), the available material does not allow us to study RRP's activity. Most of the concerned MEPs have never presented an amendment or worked on an economic report. While voting is not compulsory, MEPs generally take part, which provides a larger set of information.

Nevertheless, this information is far from complete since individual EP voting records do not cover all documents. MEP voting is mostly based on show of hands or electronic, which do not record individual MEPs votes: in these voting procedures, only the overall result is registered. There is also a third option of Roll Call Votes (RCVs), where each MEP's preference is recorded. RCVs are the only source of information on individual MEPs' voting behaviour in the EP. Thus, to verify our hypotheses, we focus explicitly on RCVs data.

Since they provide democratic transparency, the EP is relying increasingly on RCVs, which have increased from 886 in the 1st term of the EP (EP1) to almost 7,000 out of 23,553 votes registered at the end of 7th term (EP7) (European Parliament 2014). This increase is due to two factors: First, technological innovations made Roll Call Votes less time-consuming: at the beginning, it was required to call each MEP, while today votes are electronically recorded. Second, following a Rules

of Procedure reform adopted by the EP in 2009, RCVs became mandatory for final votes on legislative documents since 2009. Previously, they were subject to requests from parliamentary groups or 40 MEPs.

RCV-analyses rely on the important assumption that voting behaviour does not differ significantly between recorded and non-recorded votes. While in some cases, such as the US Congress, this assumption holds due to the very limited number of non-observed votes, it might be less true for parliaments with larger numbers of non-recorded than recorded votes (Carrubba et al. 2006). Indeed, beyond the final votes on legislative documents, RCVs in the EP are hardly 'random' since they follow a specific choice made by the legislators for recorded voting. This might be to signal party positions (and show party's cohesion on the topic) and/or to strengthen party cohesion when it is lacking. Regardless of the strategy underlying the choice, according to Carrubba (2006, 701), RCVs samples are 'biased over-estimating inter-party group cohesion, mostly because party groups request RCVs for certain specific types of policies and are less concerned about others. For Hug (2012), it also lead to an overestimation of party cohesion as RCVs exert a sort of party pressure.

Hix, Noury, and Roland (2013) challenge Carrubba et al.'s (2006) findings as they compare voting behaviour in relation to mandatory and requested RCVs and find no significant difference (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2013). More important for our analysis, they find that this holds for all party groups, which allows us to focus on RRP and consider RCVs as relatively unbiased information in relation to cohesion issues.

In addition to the selection bias debate, other theoretical questions need to be addressed. First, do national parties matter in the EP? According to Hix (2002), although merged into transnational groups, national parties are still the main actors in the EP. Moreover, as we have seen, RRP are lagging behind in the Europeanization process. they have yet to establish a stable political group in the EP and are uncoordinated (Almeida 2012, 151). Therefore, studying the dimensionality of RRP's economic policies in the EP could provide a taxonomy that is valid at both the European and national

levels. To conclude, RCVs in the EP appears to be relevant for an empirical study of the political positions of each RRP.

The choice of focusing on the EP has three main consequences. First, strategies and behaviours with respect to parliamentary activity can differ among the parties: as such, our results will reflect RRP's strategies at the EP, and not only their programmatic stance on different topics. Second, the EP does not legislate on matters such as welfare and social spending which are important economic issues. Third, the EP is different from other national parliaments: (i) it is the elective body of a supranational institution and not a state (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006), (ii) some parties strongly oppose the existence of this institution (see Section 2.2.2). As a result, the political space of the EP is influenced by parties' positions on the European integration process. Consequently, parties at the EP may adopt positions which are different from those taken at the national level. We can then derive that the EP appears to have its own dimensionality. However, this is not independent from the dimensionality of politics at the national level and there are also important similarities between the attitudes at the EP and national parliaments: Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006, 509) find that the left-right cleavage<sup>17</sup> is the main dimension structuring the activity of the EP, just 'like all other democratic parliaments.' Otjes and van Der Veer (Otjes and van der Veer 2016) find that the left-right cleavage is still an important dimension at the EP on economic issues, despite the increase of the pro-anti integration cleavage. Moreover, we find an increased importance of a similar cleavage in different national contexts as well. In particular, different authors (Kriesi 2007; Kitschelt and Rehm 2015) highlight the emergence of a 'globalization' cleavage, which includes the pro-anti integration cleavage found at the EP. As a result, this part of the analysis focuses primarily on RRP's position on European economic integration.

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<sup>17</sup> However, the left-right cleavage at the EP, as in other parliaments, is not necessarily limited to economic issues. For McElroy and Benoit (2007, 21), at the EP, 'this dimensions is principally socio-economic in nature but also [incorporate] newer issues such as immigration and the environment'.

However we consider that such a discussion can be related with RRP's economic proposals, at least to a certain extent.

### 2.3.3.2. TWO WAYS TO MEASURE VOTING BEHAVIOURS: COHESION AND SUPPORT

RRPs' voting behaviour can be derived from individual votes in various manners. Here, we focus on two aspects: cohesion (do RRP's vote in a similar way?) and support (what topics do RRP's mostly support/oppose?). Party or group cohesion can be formalized using either the Rice (1928) Index or the Agreement Index (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005). The former is defined as follow:

$$RI_{ij} = \frac{|Y_{ij} - N_{ij}|}{Y_{ij} + N_{ij}} \quad (2.3)$$

where  $Y_{ij}$  and  $N_{ij}$  are the number of votes respectively in favour and against expressed by party  $i$  on document  $j$ . Therefore, the index goes from a minimum of 0, representing a perfect split between party MEPs, and 1 if all MEPs vote in the same way.

The Agreement Index varies slightly in that it includes abstentions among the possible choices; it is defined as follow:

$$AI_{ij} = \frac{\max\{Y_{ij}, N_{ij}, A_{ij}\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_{ij} + N_{ij} + A_{ij}) - \max\{Y_{ij}, N_{ij}, A_{ij}\}]}{(Y_{ij} + N_{ij} + A_{ij})} \quad (2.4)$$

where  $A_{ij}$  is the number of abstentions registered by party  $i$  on document  $j$ . This different formalization goes from 0 if MEPs are equally divided among the three options to 1 if all members of the party vote in the same way.

In order to assess the position of each party on a given vote, we propose an original Party Support Index (PSI), which provides information on the average party position (pro/anti) on a document and the valence of this opposition/support. We define PSI as the difference between positive and negative votes, divided by the total number of MEPs in the national party formalized as:

$$PSI_{ij} = \frac{Y_{ij,-N_{ij}}}{(Y_{ij,+N_{ij},+A_{ij},+M_{ij}})} \quad (2.5)$$

where  $M_{ij}$  is the number of MEPs who refrained from voting. The index ranges from -1 (all MEPs are present and vote against the proposal) to 1 (all MEPs are present and vote in favour of the proposal). However, in the case that an absolute majority is required, abstention, *de-facto*, equates with a ‘nay’ vote. Following Hix (2001), in the context of our PSI, and for the purposes of the succeeding analysis, we code an abstention in the case of a vote requiring an absolute majority as a ‘nay’.

These data can be analysed at an aggregate level (by economic policy area): we can thus derive, from the cohesion indexes, the degree of unity within each party and within the RR party-family at the EP. We can also compare the cohesion of RRP on economic matters with the cohesion on non-economic matters, in order to ascertain whether divisions are solely on economic policy or characterize RRP at the EP regardless of the topic.

In addition, from the PSI, we can derive the voting behaviour (support) by each RRP on the different areas. However, the same support (PSI) for an economic area may be obtained with very different voting patterns: a same PSI may be obtained with parties voting exactly in the same way and for parties voting very differently. In order to analyse the relative position of each party in the voting patterns (i.e. taking into account the similarities and differences between RRP for each vote), we rely on the analysis of all RCVs by using the inductive methods presented in Section 3.3.

#### 2.3.3.3. INDUCTIVE METHODS FOR ANALYSING THE DATA

In order to analyse the dimensions of politics, we develop an inductive approach aiming to derive ‘the best-fitting empirical representation of the policy space under investigation, using techniques of dimensional analysis to infer latent policy dimensions and then interpreting the substantive meaning of these dimensions in terms of relative locations of key political agents on these’ (Benoit and Laver 2006, 59). Despite such an approach might be considered as ‘a-theoretical’ (Benoit and Däubler 2015, 7), this critique does not apply to our study, since it is grounded in theory (see Section 2) and serves

as a confirmation, reconsideration or deepening tool of what other authors observed using other methods.

We rely on three methods developed in the literature, which, for our case, provide complementary insights and robustness to our results (i) NOMINATE, (ii) Ward's (1963) hierarchical and non-supervised clustering criterion, and (iii) additive trees. The use of NOMINATE provides with a robust and meaningful description of the dimensionality of RRP's parliamentary activity, while we rely on clustering methods and additive trees to identify and analyse the different groups of RRP's.

### NOMINATE

NOMINATE is based on the analysis of each MEP's votes. On the one hand, it allows to analyse more disaggregated data but, on the other hand, it introduces assumptions on MEP's rational behaviour. Compared to PCA, which makes no assumptions about the behaviours of MEPs, NOMINATE is a parametric method which assumes a MEP utility function and related rational behaviour. The aim of the method is to estimate the parameter of this utility function.

NOMINATE (Nominal Three-step Estimation), and the version used in this study, W-NOMINATE, are popular scaling methods developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 2001; 2011) to address the positions of politicians based on their votes, and the positions of the votes in the political space.

We apply the method to the sub-set of data on the RCVs on economic issues of MEPs in RRP's. This allows us to position the MEPs based on their choices on economic issues as opposed to all the issues addressed by the EP. This enables a focus on the differences between RRP's rather than all the parties in the EP.

However, this goes with some limitations. First, NOMINATE assumes that all votes are on the substance of the document. However, MEPs might vote strategically in favour of a document which, ideologically, they are opposed to (Spirling and McLean 2007). In particular, MEPs from RRP's, might decide to oppose documents proposed by the European Commission (EC) simply because this



institution authors them. Using NOMINATE, this would position them in the space occupied by MEPs who oppose the document on substantive grounds. Second, the meaning of NOMINATE dimensions is not immediate requires comparison with other measures interpret NOMINATE's dimensions (Hix 2001): we use correlations with PSI measures and cluster analysis to interpret the axes.

### *Hierarchical and non-supervised clustering analysis*

In order to regroup RRP's based on similar voting patterns, we rely on Ward's (1963) hierarchical and non-supervised clustering criterion. We interpret these groups using average PSI on each theme. Moreover, we project the groups obtained using W-NOMINATE in order to confirm the previous interpretation of the W-NOMINATE axes. Finally, we illustrate the voting patterns of these groups with documents selected as particularly representative of RRP's divisions at the EP on economic issues.

### *Additive trees*

Additive trees are a tool of data representation, developed for phylogenetic research. The use of additive trees allows us to: (i) check the robustness of our clustering analysis, and (ii) complete the analysis of the dimensionalities resulting from NOMINATE and hierarchical clustering.

This method allows one to analyse the distance (similarity) between two individuals (RRP's, here) including all the available information. This tool is of major interest because it allows a both rigorous and simple representation of the individuals (as the leaves of a "tree"). The original distance between these individuals can be easily read as the sum of branch segments separating them (Buneman 1971). In order to compute the tree distance between RRP's, we rely on a Neighbour Joining (NJ) algorithm, as developed by Saitou and Nei (1987) and implemented by Huson and Bryant (2005).

## 2.4. DATA SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION

In this Section, we discuss the data selection and describe the two datasets used in this Chapter. In particular, in Section 2.4.1 we identify the economic items included in the MARPOR dataset and present the main descriptive statistics. Section 2.4.2 discusses our choices in terms of economic matters at the EP, as well as presenting the list of RR MEPs, and briefly describes the data.

### 2.4.1. ECONOMIC ITEMS IN MARPOR DATASET

Our hypotheses are tested on a more recent version of the MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2015) than that used by Rovny (2013). This allows us to include Eastern European RRP in our analysis. The objective is not to analyse the competition among all the political forces, but rather to identify areas of RRP disagreement, and its importance. Thus, we focus only RRP and exclude other parties.

Among economic items, MARPOR includes two domains, which, clearly, are related to our work, domain 4 - 'Economy' and domain 5 - 'Quality of life'. However, not all items refer to policy stances. Some are generic and unspecified economy-related items such as item 408 - 'Economic Goals'. Others cover both economic and non-economic issues, such as item 411 - 'Technology and infrastructure' and item 501 - 'Environment'. Choosing the items that refer to the economy is vital since some entries cannot be considered economic policy. Including item 501 'Environment' because the coding description mentions public spending on environmental policies, would be misleading since item 501 obviously describes another policy dimension. Similarly, excluding item 701 - 'Labour groups: positive' because it is coded under a non-economic domain, would be wrong since it refers to positive judgments about trade unions.

We rely on Laver and Benoit (2007) to identify the set of variables for the economic dimension, but without making any assumptions about their relation to one another. On this basis, we build on their economic policy ratio scale to generate a new variable as the logarithm of the sum of all quasi-sentences of selected items divided by the logarithm of the total number of quasi sentences of the

Item	Mean	Std.Dev.	CV <sup>18</sup>	Min	Zero Counts <sup>19</sup>	Max
401 - Free Market	0.222	0.201	0.905405	0	37	0.684
402 - Incentives	0.286	0.214	0.748252	0	31	0.664
403 - Market Regulation	0.238	0.222	0.932773	0	43	0.69
404 - Economic Planning	0.062	0.13	2.096774	0	83	0.614
405 - Corporatism Mixed Economy	0.0219	0.0553	2.525114	0	92	0.248
406 - Protectionism : positive	0.118	0.175	1.483051	0	65	0.692
407 - Protectionism : negative	0.0361	0.0889	2.462604	0	88	0.544
408 - Economic goals	0.219	0.2	0.913242	0	39	0.611
409 - Keynesian Demand Management	0.0429	0.101	2.354312	0	88	0.439
410 - Economic Growth : positive	0.173	0.186	1.075145	0	46	0.694
411 - Technology and Infrastructure : positive	0.353	0.229	0.648725	0	21	0.717
412 - Controlled Economy	0.0983	0.15	1.525941	0	68	0.537
413 - Nationalisation	0.0625	0.127	2.032	0	82	0.553
414 - Economic Orthodoxy	0.207	0.201	0.971014	0	42	0.719
415 - Marxist Analysis	0.00467	0.0367	7.858672	0	106	0.351
416 - Anti-growth : positive	0.0775	0.132	1.703226	0	77	0.499
502 - Culture : positive	0.261	0.218	0.835249	0	34	0.624
503 - Culture : negative	0.29	0.192	0.662069	0	22	0.706
504 - Welfare State Expansion	0.407	0.214	0.525799	0	16	0.768
505 - Welfare State Limitations	0.143	0.179	1.251748	0	56	0.631
506 - Education : positive	0.345	0.211	0.611594	0	22	0.684
507 - Education : negative	0.0417	0.0962	2.306954	0	88	0.425
701 - Labour groups : positive	0.226	0.211	0.933628	0	40	0.655
702 - Labour groups : negative	0.0304	0.0808	2.657895	0	93	0.352

*Table 30 - Summary statistics of MARPOR items covering economic issues (domains 4 - 5 – 7) for RRP. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

manifesto. We therefore obtain an index of economic salience, or the importance of economic proposals in the party programme.

Table 30 summarizes the information on each variable in domains 4 and 5 for RRP. This allows us to identify the most important topics. The highest value for the policy importance index is for item 504 ‘Welfare State Expansion’, while neoliberal policies such as item 401 ‘Free Market’ and item 402 ‘Incentive’ are less frequent. There are more positive than negative references to protectionism, while the least important item is 415 – ‘Marxism’, which figures in only 2 of the 108 programmes analysed. A very limited place is left to item 413 – ‘Nationalisation’, however, items 412 –

<sup>18</sup> Coefficient of variation, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.

<sup>19</sup> Number of party's programmes with no references to the item.

‘Controlled Economy’ and 405 – ‘Corporatism’ appear rather close, thus this result might be a consequence of coding decisions.

## 2.4.2. ECONOMIC MATTERS AND MEPS’ SELECTION AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

This work relies on the voting records for the 7th term of the EP (years 2009 to 2014). We focus on the 7th term because it is the most recent term for which the complete dataset was available. Moreover, changes in parliamentary procedures (see 2.3.3) and thus resulting comparability issues, argue against the use of multiple terms.

COMMITTEE	POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY
<b>Budget (BUDG)</b>	‘1. the multiannual financial framework of the Union’s revenue and expenditure and the Union’s system of own resources; 2. Parliament’s budgetary prerogatives, namely the budget of the Union as well as the negotiation and implementation of interinstitutional agreements in this field;’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, IV.1 and IV.2</i> )
<b>Budgetary Control (CONT)</b>	‘the control of the implementation of the budget of the Union and of the European Development Fund, and the decisions on discharge to be taken by Parliament, including the internal discharge procedure and all other measures accompanying or implementing such decisions’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, V.1</i> )
<b>Economic and monetary affairs (ECON)</b>	‘the economic and monetary policies of the Union, the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union and the European monetary and financial system’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, VI.1</i> )
<b>Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)</b>	‘employment policy and all aspects of social policy including working conditions, social security, social inclusion and social protection’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, VII.1</i> )
<b>Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)</b>	‘coordination at Union level of national legislation in the sphere of the internal market and for the customs union’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, VIII.1</i> )
<b>International Trade (INTA)</b>	‘matters relating to the establishment, implementation and monitoring of the Union’s common commercial policy and its external economic relations’ ( <i>Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex VI, III</i> )

*Table 31 - Powers and responsibility of European Parliament Committees. Source: Rules of Procedure of the EP.*

To classify RRP according to their voting behaviour in the EP on economic issues, we identify economic matters within a dataset that was provided by Simon Hix.<sup>20</sup> We apply Hix’s (2013) 21 policy areas classification<sup>21</sup> and identify the documents from six areas: Budget, Budgetary Control,

<sup>20</sup> Simon Hix’s database was built using data collected by « Vote watch » available on the EP website. It has been used in different studies, such as Lelieveldt and Princen (2015) and Hix (2013).

<sup>21</sup> Policy areas refer to ‘the committee from which the report emerged’ (Hix 2013, 4) and represent the 20 EP committees plus the internal regulation of the EP.

Economic and Monetary Affairs, Employment and Social Affairs, Internal Market and Consumers Protection, and International Trade (see Table 31).

‘Budgetary Control’ documents can be considered a particular case. Since its creation by the Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970, the EP has wielded important scrutiny power and has overseen the proper implementation of the EU’s budgets (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). This should not be confused with budget amending power: budgetary control is applied ex-post and allows the parliament to express its approval of/disappointment with the Commission’s work. Therefore, data from the ‘Budgetary Control’ policy area are important in relation to pro/anti-EU dimension.

Areas related to production, such as agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing were excluded because of their technical (rather than economic) nature.<sup>22</sup> The choice to exclude these areas was based on a survey of the relevant votes, which confirmed that most were related to technical issues.

Our final dataset includes 2,652 votes related to economic matters during EP7 (2009-2014). The distribution of these votes across the economic policy area is presented in Table 32.

Theme/Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
<b>BUDG</b>	44	123	151	154	129	74	675
<b>CONT</b>	1	56	114	124	62	81	438
<b>ECON</b>	7	90	132	79	162	95	565
<b>EMPL</b>	13	40	43	24	155	161	436
<b>IMCO</b>	7	6	24	11	39	54	141
<b>INTA</b>	10	33	72	117	97	68	397
<b>Total</b>	82	348	536	509	644	533	2652

*Table 32 - Distribution of roll call votes by year and economic policy area during the 7th term of the EP. Source: author’s own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.*

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<sup>22</sup> These areas deal mostly with technical details that do we do not consider as relevant to understand the economic proposals of a political party. For example: the Industry Committee is responsible for the ‘application of new technologies’ as well as European space policy and the EURATOM treaty; the Agriculture and Rural Development Committee considers legislation on ‘veterinary and plant-health matters’ and the ‘improvement of the quality of agricultural products’; the Fisheries committee covers ‘applied fisheries research’.

‘Budget’ votes account for 25% of our sample and, if ‘Budgetary Control’ documents are included, more than 40% of the votes are budget-related, either in their formation/implementation or ex-post control. Among the remaining votes, the ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’ policy area is the most important. This is due to the fact that the 2009-2014 parliament had to deal with the Euro-zone crisis.

In order to ascertain the importance of RRP’s divisions on economic matters, we then compare our results in terms of cohesion with all other documents. In particular, according to different authors (Mudde 2007; Zaslove 2009; Afonso 2013), nativism is the key element of RR ideology. We expect RRP’s to converge on nativism-related matters, despite being divided in different parliamentary groups. We therefore identify the 133 documents dealing most clearly with migration policy and minority rights. These documents are used as benchmark to test RRP’s cohesiveness on economic policy.

We rely on our list of RRP’s, discussed in Chapter 1, to identify the RRP’s present at the 7th term EP (See Table 33). The choice of MEPs is also important because some particular cases emerged during the analysis of MEPs who resigned from their original parties without quitting the EP.<sup>23</sup> For this reason it is This selection is important since the methodology we use (NOMINATE) relies explicitly on MEPs’ behaviour. When one analyses political groups’ positioning, instead of MEPs’ positioning, it is done so assuming that MEPs do not change political group/national party during their mandate. As a rule of thumb, MEPs are considered to belong to a national party if they have spent more than half of their term under its banner. Overall, RRP’s account for 7% of total MEPs during the 7th term. The total number of seats in the EP has increased from 736 in 2009 to 754 seats following the 2011 amendment and to 766 after Croatia’s accession in 2013. Following the reforms, RRP’s gained two

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<sup>23</sup> Both NOMINATE results and our PSI calculations already take into account those MEPs who resign from the EP before the ending of their mandate. However, the calculations for NOMINATE are influenced by MEPs’ party classification since we obtain party positions as the average position of its MEPs, and these measures are the same for the whole term. For consistency reasons, we applied the same classification to our PSI calculations.

Country	Party	Acronym	Group	RRPs Seats	Country seats in 2009	Country seats in 2014
AT	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	FPÖ	NI	2	17	19
BE	<i>Vlaams Belang</i>	VB	NI	2	22	22
BG	<i>Ataka</i>	Ataka	NI/EFD	2	18	18
DK	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i>	DF	EFD	1	13	13
FI	<i>Perussuomalaiset</i>	P	EFD	1	13	13
FR	<i>Front National</i>	FN	NI	3	72	74
EL	<i>Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós</i>	LAOS	EFD	2	22	22
HU	<i>Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom</i>	JOBBIK	NI	3	22	22
IT	<i>Lega Nord</i>	LN	EFD/NI	9	72	73
LV	<i>Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” – „Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”</i>	TB	ECR	1	8	8
NL	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	PVV	NI	3	25	26
PL	<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i>	PiS	ECR	7	50	51
RO	<i>Partidul România Mare</i>	PRM	NI	3	33	33
SK	<i>Slovenská národná strana</i>	SNS	EFD	1	13	13
UK	<i>United Kingdom Independence Party</i>	UKIP	EFD	12	72	73
UK	<i>British National Party</i>	BNP	NI	2	72	73

*Table 33 - RRP seats and parliamentary group during the 7th term of the EP. Source: original compilation.*

seats: one each to PRM and PVV. UKIP, with 12 seats (11 after Andreasen joined the Conservatives in 2013) has the highest share among RRP. In 2009, it formed the EFD group together with the Italian Northern League (LN) and the LAOS. The EFD group accounts for six out of the 16 RRP seats represented at the EP, and 25 RRP seats (out a total of 32 for all RRP seats combined). As such, despite not being composed exclusively of RRP, this Eurosceptic group was, between 2009 and 2014, the main ‘home’ for right-wing radicalism (with the exception of the NI group).

## 2.5. RESULTS

In this Section, we discuss our empirical results. In particular, in Section 2.5.1 we examine the results of manifesto analysis. We distinguish between findings concerning the salience of economic policy (Section 2.5.1.1), and the description of RRP’s heterogeneity (Section 2.5.1.2). Results from RCV analysis are discussed in Section 2.5.2, distinguishing between results concerning RRP’s cohesion (Section 2.5.2.1) and the description of the intra-family dimensionality (Section 2.5.2.2).

<b>Party Family<sup>24</sup></b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std.Dev.</b>	<b>CV</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Radical Right</b>	108	0.673	0.198	0.294205	0	0.873
<b>Agrarian</b>	66	0.718	0.161	0.224234	0	0.878
<b>Christian democrat</b>	187	0.768	0.0888	0.115625	0.403	0.934
<b>Communist</b>	160	0.771	0.105	0.136187	0	0.905
<b>Conservative</b>	138	0.781	0.0767	0.098207	0.239	0.951
<b>Ecologist</b>	103	0.701	0.145	0.206847	0	0.866
<b>Ethnic-regional</b>	116	0.688	0.133	0.193314	0.198	0.856
<b>Liberal</b>	212	0.76	0.104	0.136842	0.167	0.898
<b>Special issue<sup>25</sup></b>	62	0.736	0.154	0.209239	0	0.898
<b>Social democratic</b>	243	0.784	0.106	0.135204	0	0.915

*Table 34 - Economic issues salience by party family 1990-2014 obtained after transformation of Prosser (2014). Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

## 2.5.1. RESULTS FROM MANIFESTO ANALYSIS

### 2.5.1.1. THE SALIENCE OF ECONOMIC POLICY FOR RRP: AN INCREASING TREND

Table 34 presents a comparison of our index of economic salience across different party families. Similarly to Rovny's (2013) findings but with more recent data, we find that RRP pay less attention to economic policy than do the other main political families, while the standard deviation is higher (suggesting that RRP differ in the importance they assign to the economy).

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<sup>24</sup> The categories are those provided by the MARPOR dataset.

<sup>25</sup> The 'special issue' category identifies parties with no clear ideological stance and interested by one issue only (e.g. the Dutch Party for the Animals).







Figure 5 - Average economic salience by party family 1990-2014. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.

Figure 5 depicts the historical evolution of economic salience for RRP compared to liberal, conservative, communist and social democratic parties. RRP show the strongest increase, starting from the 0.58 in 1990-1994, to the 0.74 in 2010-2014, although they still lag behind other major political families. In the 1990s, some parties (e.g., the Italian MSI in 1992, and the Croatian HDZ in 1995) make no reference to the economy while, after 2000, all RRP make reference to economic items in their programmes with an increasing number of the issues referred to. Figure 6 depicts the closing gap with other political families: in the early 1990s RRP included on average less than 6 economic items, rising to 8.6 in the 2000s, in line with the communist and liberal parties. The growing salience and dimensionality of economic matters holds for the items identified by Laver and Benoit (2007) and for all the categories in domains 4 and 5 of the MARPOR dataset<sup>26</sup>. It indicates a clear realignment of RRP with the other political families for the importance assigned to economic matters

<sup>26</sup> Here, the average number of items increased from less than 9, to 12, the largest increase for a party family.



*Figure 6 - Average number of Econ. Items by party family 1990-2014. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

through time, thus supporting Hypothesis 1-M. The data show that the standard deviation of salience has also been decreasing: we tested the decrease in standard deviation by applying Levene's test; it was significant at the 0.05 level. This appears to be preliminary evidence of a possible intra-family move towards convergence on the importance of economic issues. This is addressed in the following Section by exploring the dimensionality of RRP's economic policy.

#### 2.5.1.2. THE DIMENSIONALITY OF RR ECONOMIC POLICY

Table 36 reports the Eigenvalues and variance for each component. The first component describes 33% of the variance and, taken together, the four first dimensions explain 64% of the total variance. Table 35, instead, reports the loadings following Varimax rotation.

The main difference among RRP's on economic matters is described by the first component, which divides RRP's into pro-welfare and education expansion (items 504 and 506), and pro-'Market Regulation' (item 403). Interestingly, items 505 and 401 (free market and welfare state limitations)

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	3.915	2.352	0.326	0.326
2	1.563	0.431	0.13	0.457
3	1.133	0.101	0.0944	0.551
4	1.031	0.193	0.086	0.637
5	0.839	0.16	0.0699	0.707
6	0.679	0.023	0.0566	0.763

*Table 36 - Eigenvalues following PCA. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

Item	1	2	3	4
401 - Free Market		0.7877		
402 - Incentives		0.5669		
403 - Market Regulation	0.558			
404 - Economic Planning			0.7463	
406 - Protectionism : positive				0.9382
412 - Controlled Economy			0.7881	
413 - Nationalisation			0.6116	
414 - Economic Orthodoxy		0.611		
504 - Welfare State Expansion	0.8989			
505 - Welfare State Limitations		0.8113		
506 - Education : positive	0.775			
701 - Labour groups : positive				

*Table 35 – Loadings following Varimax rotation. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

do not load negatively onto this dimension. This means that RRP's might display pro and anti-welfare positions simultaneously. Thus, the first axis is an index of 'welfare' salience in each manifesto rather than a positional dimension, and it opposes RRP's that mention welfare against RRP's with no mention of welfare in their programmes.

'Free Market' (401), 'Welfare State Limitations' (505), 'Incentives' (402) and 'Economic Orthodoxy' (414) are positively correlated to the second dimension meaning that the second axis describes the importance given by the party to economic liberalism. This takes the form of welfare cuts or privatizations, but also tax breaks and policies favouring individual entrepreneurship.

The third component resembles what Singer (2013) calls the 'economic management' dimension. This refers to the salience of policies advocating a state-controlled economy and is represented by items 412 – 'Controlled Economy', 413 – 'Nationalisation' and 404 – 'Economic Planning'. Again,

there is no clear opposition to a free market; it is more of a salience indicator than a positional dimension. The fourth dimension is the easiest to interpret since one item, 406 – ‘Protectionism:




Figure 8 - Plot of component loadings, first two components. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.





Figure 7- Position of the four clusters identified by Ward's method on the intra-family economic policy space (Welfare and Economic Liberalism components). Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.



*Figure 9 - Position of the four clusters identified by Ward's method on the intra-family economic policy space (Economic management and Protectionism components). Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

positive' is strongly correlated to this component. Figure 8 depicts graphically the correlations between the variables and the components.

We also regroup RRP's manifestos using Ward's (1963) method. Looking at the dendrogram, we identify four classes. We interpret these classes looking at their position on the four dimensions found in the PCA (Figure 7 and Figure 9). The first class regroups the 'muting' RRP's, which are those programmes where the economic part is not particularly important, as argued by Rovny (2013). RRP's in the second class, instead, are characterized by the high salience level of free-market elements domestically and are protectionist when it comes to international trade. Therefore, we label them as 'neoliberal protectionist'. The third class, 'welfare' manifestos, regroups those programmes who include a large number of pro-welfare stances, while other elements are not particularly stressed. Finally, our fourth class, 'multiplying' identifies those RRP's that stress all economic items, in line with Mudde's (2007) 'schizophrenic agendas' and Rovny's 'blurring-by-multiplying' (2013) concepts discussed in Section 2.2.

To sum up, these findings indicate that RRP's differ mostly in the salience given to different dimensions of economic policy. In particular, our results show that differences between RRP's economic programmes are best described along four dimensions: 'welfare', 'economic liberalism', 'economic management' and 'protectionism'. Moreover, we can classify RRP's manifestos in four classes depending on their economic content: 'muting', 'neoliberal and protectionist', 'welfare', and 'multiplying'. These categories allow us to understand the evolution of RRP's economic proposals as we compare the positions of different party's manifestos at different time. In the following Section, we illustrate the evolution of RRP's on economic issues relying on different examples: (i) we compare the evolution of Western and Eastern European RRP's on the four dimensions identified by the PCA and (ii) we describe the evolution of three different RRP's as they moved from one class to another. We can describe the differences in RRP's economic positions over time relying on the first four components. We distinguish between East and West European RRP's and, for each component; we plot their average position over each five-year period (See Figure 10 and Figure 11). For welfare, both Western and Eastern European RRP's have moved steadily from relatively low levels of salience to higher levels, during the 20-year period under consideration. The increase has been faster in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and, especially, at the turn of the millennium.





Figure 10 - The evolution of RRP's economic proposals on 'welfare' (axis 1) and 'economic liberalism' (axis 2) components.

Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.



*Figure 11 - The evolution of RRP economic proposals on 'economic management' (axis 3) and 'protectionism' (axis 4) components. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

Overall, our findings highlight an increased interest in welfare by RRP (see Table 37). Moreover, the decrease in the standard deviation might be a sign of late-comer RRP adopting the position of more successful RRP: a jump on the bandwagon as analysed by Williams (2006). Overall, these results support our hypothesis H2-M: RRP have moved from pro-market stances in the 1990s to a pro-welfare position in the 2000s.

Years	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
1990-1994	27	-0.554	0.967	-1.739	1.2
1995-1999	23	-0.0116	1.069	-2.036	2.037
2000-2004	19	-0.0094	1.115	-2.099	2.037
2005-2009	20	0.269	0.775	-1.051	1.561
2010-2014	19	0.527	0.697	-1.547	1.214

*Table 37 - Welfare dimension (axis 2) - Summary Statistics by five-year period. Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.*

In the case of economic liberalism, Figure 10 shows that West European RRP have abandoned references to free market policy, while their Eastern counterparts moved towards more pro-market pledges following the financial crisis of 2008. This might be an indication that West and East European RRP hold different views about the culprits for the economic crisis. The results indicate that East European RRP stress free-market proposals more than do West European RRP. Figure 11 shows the relative stability of West European RRP concerning economic management and

protectionism, while East European RRP have increased their references to both these terms. East European RRP now seem to be consider all dimensions in their political programme, in line with Mudde's (2007) description of a 'schizophrenic' agenda. These results are also coherent with Rovny's (2013, 20) conclusions: he also finds that 'RRPs maintain a consciously opaque profile on economic issues'. However the strategy used by RRP to blur their position on economic matters seems to have changed. In particular, Rovny (2013) distinguishes three types of position blurring: (i) the muting of harmful issues, (ii) the multiplicity of position, (iii) and an incoherent position over time. While Rovny focused especially on the first type, our study show evidence that RRP have been evolving from a blurring-by-muting strategy to a blurring-by-multiplicity one.




Figure 12 - Dimensions of RRP Economic Salience: welfare (axis 1) and economic liberalism (axis 2). Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.






Figure 13 - Dimensions of RRP Economic Salience: economic management (axis 3) and protectionism (axis 4). Source: author's own calculations on MARPOR dataset.

All of these results thus confirm the evolution of the RRP's positions on economic matters, not only from pro-market to pro-welfare positions, but also by covering a high number of dimensions in the field. Consequently, we may consider these results as a confirmation of our Hypothesis H2-M.

These evolutions are difficult to represent for all RRP on a single graph, due to the large number of available parties and manifestos in the database. This is why we propose an illustration of these evolutions relying on three examples: the French FN, the Danish DF, and the Slovakian SNS. We have chosen these cases as they allow us to illustrate the four clusters identified in this Section.

Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the locations of these three major RRP's on our components. The French FN clearly moved towards pro-welfare positions. In the 1990s the party was on the 'negative' side of the first axis, while it is emphasizing the importance of redistribution in 2012. In relation to 'economic liberalism', the FN is more erratic: rather favourable to liberalism compared to the rest of the party family in 2012, it gives much less attention than previously to laissez-faire policy. FN shows no clear shift on the 'economic management' dimension or on protectionism. Thus, in 2012, compared to the other RRP's, the FN is a welfare-protectionist party with unclear views on economic liberalism. We catch the evolution of the French FN also looking at the clusters: FN manifestos during the 90s are classified as neoliberal, which is in line with the 'winning formula' highlighted by Kitschelt (1995). However, after 2007, party manifestos fall into the 'multiplying' category: free-market references are still present, but they are now coupled with other proposals in particular pro-welfare.

The Danish DF also shows an erratic pattern. On the welfare dimension, DF scores are negative for most of the time span except the 2011 and 2005 elections. However, welfare is not stressed in DF manifestos in the 2000s, thus, the interpretation is less clear than for the French FN. Concerning 'economic liberalism', the DF has experienced a decreasing trend in its salience. Thus, the DF has been characterized by a low-level of 'economic' salience in its programmes for much of its recent history: it is an example of blurring-by-muting as proposed by Rovny (2013). This conclusion is certified by our cluster analysis: manifestos proposed by the DF fall under the 'muting' cluster, apart from 2011 election when the party stressed pro-welfare statements.

In the period 1990-2012, the Slovakian SNS covered most of our policy spectrum, with both positive and negative scores for each dimension. Sometimes changes occurred in a rather limited amount of time. For example, the party in 1990 did not give much importance to any economic policies. In 1994, however, the party 'rediscovered' the economy and became pro-welfare and protectionist, and favoured free-market. Nowadays, the SNS occupies a central position for each component apart from

‘economic management’ where its negative score points to a loss in the importance of state control in the party’s ideology. The Slovakian SNS fall under various classes: as we saw, in 1990 election the SNS opted for a ‘blurring-by-muting’ strategy. During much of 1990s and until 2010, the party stressed different economic items, proposing an incoherent program and following a ‘blurring-by-multiplying’ strategy. Finally, more recent manifestos can be classified as ‘neoliberal’: similarly to what we saw for Eastern European RRP, the Slovakian SNS reacted to 2008 economic crisis by stressing the importance of neoliberal issues in its programme.

## 2.5.2. RESULTS FROM RCV ANALYSIS

### 2.5.2.1. COHESION WITHIN PARTIES, BUT LACK OF COHESION BETWEEN RRPs REGARDLESS OF THE TOPIC

#### *Cohesion in voting*

In terms of cohesion in voting, at a first glance the data supports our hypothesis H1-P. Indeed, there is a lack of cohesion between RRPs. Table 38 presents a summary of the means for Rice and Agreement indexes, as defined in Section 2.3.2.2.

<b>Party</b>	<b>RI</b>	<b>AI</b>		<b>Group</b>	<b>RI</b>	<b>AI</b>
<b>Ataka</b>	0.9	0.9		ALDE/ADLE	0.94	0.9
<b>BNP</b>	0.96	0.94		ECR	0.92	0.87
<b>DF<sup>+</sup></b>	1	1		EFD	0.49	0.48
<b>FN</b>	0.99	0.98		EPP	0.94	0.95
<b>FPO</b>	0.99	0.97		Greens/EFA	0.94	0.94
<b>JOBBIK</b>	0.9	0.83		GUE-NGL	0.86	0.8
<b>LAOS</b>	0.98	0.97		NI	0.38	0.4
<b>LN</b>	0.92	0.91		S&D	0.92	0.93
<b>P<sup>+</sup></b>	1	1				
<b>PiS</b>	0.96	0.95				
<b>PRM</b>	0.97	0.98				
<b>PVV</b>	1	1				
<b>SNS<sup>+</sup></b>	1	1				
<b>TB<sup>+</sup></b>	1	1				
<b>UKIP</b>	0.92	0.86				
<b>VB</b>	0.96	0.88				
<b>RRPs</b>	0.46	0.46				

<sup>a</sup>The party has just one MEP, which explains the perfect internal cohesion

*Table 38 - Cohesion Indexes for RRPs, European Groups, and non-attached members on Economic issues during the 7th term of the EP. Source: author’s own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.*

This lack of coordination is evident especially looking at the EFD group, to which most RRP's belong. The cohesion of the EFD group is similar to that of the non-attached members (NI), the most ideologically heterogeneous group in the EP. Conversely, cohesion within parties is relatively high, evidence of clear positions on economic issues. RRP's show high levels of internal cohesion with only three (Jobbik, UKIP and VB) below (but still close to) the 0.9 threshold. This holds whether or not we consider abstentions; both indexes provide similar results. In the case of Jobbik, UKIP and VB, the lower cohesion when taking into account abstention might indicate that when facing internal differences, the minorities within each movement preferred to abstain rather than opposing their parties.

A few differences emerge in relation to topics. UKIP ranges from a high level of unity (AI = 0.90) for budget-related topics, to a lower level for international trade (AI = 0.79). The pattern is similar for the Flemish VB although the difference is higher for internal market, while the FN shows strong internal cohesion on all issues. Finally, the student t-test indicates that the difference between the average cohesion of RRP's and other groups (with the exception of the non-attached members, which is mostly composed of MEPs from RRP's), is significant at the 0.01 level. This confirms our hypothesis H1-P.

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Agreement Index</b>	<b>Rice Index</b>
<b>Economic Policy</b>	0.46	0.46
<b>Non-Economic Policy</b>	0.46	0.46
<b>Migration policy and minority rights</b>	0.43	0.43

*Table 39 - Cohesion Indexes for RRP's on economic and non-economic issues during the 7th term of the EP. Source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.*

We assess whether this lack of cohesion derives from a lack of coordination or convergence by comparing the cohesion index on economic and non-economic matters. In fact, RRP's appear to be divided on every matter at the EP, not only on economic issues. The cohesion index for RRP's on all other documents is at the same level (Table 39). Moreover, if we focus on migration policy and

minority rights, the index becomes even lower. As such, RRP at the EP appear to be as divided on economic matters as on other topics. Thus, we reject our hypothesis H2-P: the lack of cohesion, already represented by the division in different groups, goes beyond economic policy and might be explained by a lack of coordination, rather than a lack of convergence of views.

We check the robustness of our results by alternatively removing and then adding in the three RRP whose affiliation to RRP has been discussed in Section 4.2. The AI for all RRP shows a slight increase, up to 0.5 when we exclude all of them or just the UKIP from our calculations, while it stays the same and even decreases if we remove the Finnish P or the Polish PiS. Our conclusions on RRP's lack of cohesion thus appear to be robust.

#### Behaviours in terms of support on economic matters

The previous Section supported the idea that RRP do not follow a common strategy at the EP, which results also in diverging voting preferences.

Party	BUDG	CONT	ECON	EMPL	IMCO	INTA	TOT
Ataka	0.13	0.11	0.23	0.13	0.38	0.2	0.17
BNP	-0.31	-0.08	-0.39	-0.33	-0.25	0.03	-0.24
DF	-0.19	-0.12	-0.07	-0.32	0.6	0.02	-0.1
FN	-0.1	-0.12	-0.13	-0.12	0.16	0.08	-0.07
FPO	-0.05	-0.12	-0.14	-0.12	0.23	0.19	-0.04
JOBBIK	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.2	0.17	0.06	0.12
LAOS	0.22	0.38	0.33	0.38	0.4	0.13	0.29
LN	0.13	0.28	0.23	0.04	0.46	0.19	0.19
P	-0.17	0.11	-0.13	-0.07	0.43	0.19	-0.01
PiS	-0.06	-0.11	-0.17	-0.22	0.29	-0.04	-0.09
PRM	0.27	0.37	0.39	0.49	0.3	0.31	0.36
PVV	-0.38	-0.27	-0.54	-0.66	-0.42	-0.37	-0.44
SNS	0	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.65	0.22	0.14
TB/LNKK	-0.04	0.08	0	0.02	0.14	-0.12	0
UKIP	-0.27	-0.16	-0.42	-0.38	-0.4	-0.24	-0.31
VB	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08	0.35	0.07	0

Table 40 - PSI values by RRP and by theme during the 7<sup>th</sup> term of the EP. Source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.

Group	BUDG	CONT	ECON	EMPL	IMCO	INTA	TOT
<b>EPP</b>	0.11	0.31	0.3	0.33	0.35	-0.04	0.21
<b>S&amp;D</b>	0.19	0.44	0.43	0.52	0.57	0.31	0.37
<b>ALDE/ADLE</b>	0.15	0.38	0.33	0.33	0.31	0.14	0.26
<b>Greens/EFA</b>	0.21	0.46	0.46	0.53	0.44	0.43	0.4
<b>EFD</b>	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	-0.05	0.17	0.03	0
<b>ECR</b>	-0.13	-0.11	-0.17	-0.26	0.2	-0.12	-0.14
<b>NI</b>	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	0.11	0.06	-0.01
<b>GUE-NGL</b>	0.15	0.21	0.06	0.14	0.31	0.37	0.18
<b>RRPs</b>	-0.05	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	0.22	0.06	0

*Table 41 - PSI values by RRP and by theme during the 7<sup>th</sup> term of the EP. Source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.*

In general, RRP have been the strongest opponents to economic proposals (see Table 40 and Table 41), together with the British Conservatives who are over-represented in the ECR group. In particular, UKIP and PVV with PSIs of -0.31 and -0.44 respectively, are the fiercest opponents of EU economic policy. However, some RRP are more sympathetic to the European economic integration process (LAOS and the Greater Romania Party - PRM). Overall, the differences among RRP are so great that the average PSI score is zero, as 'Soft' and 'Hard Eurosceptic' parties balance each other out on economic issues. The student t-test indicates that, with the exception of the NI, EFD and ECR (to which most RRP belong), the differences in the mean between RRP and other groups is significant at the 0.01 level.

Thus, in the context of the EP, RRP do not follow a common voting pattern on economic matters. This supports Hypothesis H1-P. However, the cohesion of RRP on other topics is low as well. RRP, regardless of the matter discussed, do not show a common strategy at the EP, at least in the period under analysis. Economic policy does not emerge as a less cohesive issue than other matters, as one could have expected based on the literature on RRP. However, with economic issues being particularly important following the 2008 economic crisis in particular in RRP's discourses, we still consider it to be important to focus on the differences RRP express on the topic at the EP. We

therefore proceed to describe and analyse the main differences RRP show in their voting patterns on economic matters.

### 2.5.2.2. DIVISION BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-EU PARTIES AND OPPOSITION BETWEEN LEFTIST AND RIGHTIST RRP POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

In relation to Hypothesis H3-P, the cohesion and support indexes provide some insights. Section 2.5.2.1 shows that there are important differences among RRP *vis-à-vis* their stance on the EU, exemplified by the juxtaposition between the Eurosceptic PVV and the (almost) Europhile LAOS. However, to support or reject hypotheses H3-P and H4-P we need to compare RRP's behaviours in relation to each vote, rather than looking at average cohesion or support indexes, theme by theme.

In order to analyse the differences within the RR family, we ran W-NOMINATE. In order to interpret the dimensions, we correlate the axes with PSI by each RRP on the different economic policy areas presented in Section 2.4.1 (Figure 14).





Figure 14 - The radical right economic space: average party position. Analysis of RRP's MEPs votes on economic matters using W-NOMINATE. Source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.

The Pearson's  $r$  correlation coefficient is significant at the .01 level for the first dimension in W-NOMINATE and total PSI on economic matters (-0.93). Since the correlation coefficient is negative, we conclude that parties who tend to vote 'nay' most of the time are at the high-end of the vertical axis, while parties who tend to vote 'yes' are on the low-end. Thus, we can conclude that the intra-family space is mostly divided for degree of Euroscepticism (in relation to economic matters), which supports hypothesis H3-P. The second W-NOMINATE dimension rather, is not significantly correlated with PSI scores on any area if we consider all votes. Therefore, we focused on final votes, as we consider them more salient. We found that the dimension is significantly correlated with PSI scores on International Trade (0.78) and Internal market (0.61), thus opposing free-market RRP's to protectionist RRP's, at least on final votes. The PSI on Budget, instead, is not significantly correlated (0.06). This is a partial confirmation of hypothesis H4-P: RRP's take significantly different positions on economic issues beyond their degree of opposition to the EU. In particular, this dimension recalls the left-right economic cleavage, a cleavage which appears to be more structured by the positions in favour - or not - of free market than by the relationship with welfare and public spending.



*Figure 15 - Dendrogram for hierarchical cluster analysis. source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch dataset.*

To extend our analysis of RRP's relative positions on economic issues, we built a classification, using Ward's (1963) method, of the parties using all the dimensions. Both the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F



Number of clusters	Calinski/ Harabasz pseudo-F index	Duda/Hart	
		Je(2)/Je(1)	Pseudo T-squared
2	2.37	0.8249	2.34
3	2.40	0.7260	2.26
4	2.40	0.4632	1.16
5	2.26	0.6138	1.89
6	2.22	0.6423	1.67

*Table 42 - Summary of cluster stopping rules. Source: Author's own calculations on VoteWatch data.*

index and Duda's index suggest a division in either 2 or 4 clusters (Table 42). The dendrogram (Figure 15) suggests the same. We decided to classify RRP's into four clusters as we consider this classification more informative. The four clusters obtained can be described using the available variables and the average PSI on final votes (see Table 43). These clusters closely resemble the three patterns of opposition (rejecting, conditional, and compromising oppositions) proposed by Vasilopoulou (2011) but applied to economic matters.

Clusters	Parties	BUDG	CONT	ECON	EMPL	IMCO	INTA	TOT
<b>Cluster 1</b> <b>Compromising</b>	Jobbik, PRM, LAOS	0.49	0.37	0.36	0.48	0.52	0.41	0.42
<b>Cluster 2</b> <b>Pro-Market conditional</b>	DF, P, PiS, TB, SNS	-0.19	-0.13	0.28	0.08	0.8	0.61	0.14
<b>Cluster 3</b> <b>Pro-Welfare conditional</b>	VB, Ataka, FN, FPO	0.29	-0.09	0.05	-0.04	0.26	0.06	0.09
<b>Cluster 4</b> <b>Rejecting</b>	UKIP, PVV, BNP	-0.73	-0.39	-0.66	-0.73	-0.58	-0.3	-0.56
<b>All RRP's</b>		-0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.03	0.32	0.23	0.05

*Table 43 - Average PSI according to the clusters (final votes only – 7<sup>th</sup> term of the EP). Source: Author's own calculations on VoteWatch data.*

In the light of the previous discussion, we identify Cluster 1 as the 'compromising' radical right: Jobbik, PRM, and LAOS, parties characterized by less Eurosceptic voting behaviour. They may be

divided on some matters, but all show positive support for much EU legislation on economic issues, in particular, budget and internal market. In some cases, such as the LAOS, the global PSI is at the same level as that of Europhile groups such as the Greens.

Clusters 2 and 3 are similar for all economic issue votes. They differ mainly in relation to final votes (rather than all RCVs). Meaning that these parties oppose the European integration, but might vote in favour of certain specific areas that appeal to their electorate, especially on final votes. Cluster 2 is the ‘pro-market conditional’ radical right: DF, P, PiS, TB, and SNS. These parties show lower levels of support for European economic integration compared to the parties in Cluster 1, and support specific issues. RRP in Cluster 2 are pro-market and opposed budgetary documents, while supporting documents favouring free trade, as shown by the extremely high PSI values on internal market and international trade. Their positive general PSI is based on their support for these policies and decreases substantially for economic and monetary affairs, falling to around zero for other themes.

Cluster 3 includes the ‘pro-welfare conditional’ radical right: LN, VB, Ataka, FN, and FPÖ. While their priorities do not emerge if we consider all documents, the final votes show a clearer pattern. On budget items and internal market, these parties not only do not oppose them but also show a level of support for EC actions, while not supporting (although not strong opposing) most of the rest. However, their support for internal market is less strong than Cluster 2 (and Cluster 1) which is further confirmation of Ivaldi’s (2015) work on the FN: in contrast to the former neo-liberal position, FN is now on the left-side of the spectrum, at least for public expenditure issues.

Finally, Cluster 4 regroups the ‘rejecting’ RRP: UKIP, BNP, and PVV. These parties oppose every document regardless of the theme. On some topics, such as international trade, opposition is less pronounced. However, no theme shows a positive PSI value.

With the exception of RRP from the ECR group (PiS and TB), which are all in the same cluster (‘pro-market conditional’), there is no correspondence between clusters and party groups. In

particular, members of the EFD group are scattered among all clusters, even among the ‘compromising’ RRP. RRP members sitting among the non-attached members are divided among different clusters as well. This seems consistent with the differences between non-attached members and party groups highlighted in Section 2.2.





Figure 16 - The radical right economic space: parties and clusters. Source: author’s own calculations on RRP’s MEPs votes on economic matters using W-NOMINATE.

Figure 16 shows the distance between parties, on all dimensions, using an additive tree. This representation confirms our choice of using four clusters, and helps us to identify the borders of the groups we identified. In particular, the use of an additive tree makes visible a cleavage between Eastern and Western European RRP that does not clearly appear neither in W-NOMINATE nor in our clusters. Indeed, we can easily identify the intermediate position of different Eastern European parties such as Jobbik, Ataka, and SNS: these parties are at the border of the respective clusters. Considering the low distance between Eastern European RRP, our results suggest the existence of common features among Eastern European RRP on which we need further research.

The four clusters can be projected onto the intra-family space obtained in NOMINATE (see Figure 17). Each of the clusters represents the vertex of one axis. This projection confirms our interpretation of the W-NOMINATE axis.



*Figure 17 - Additive Tree of RRP's PSI on economic matters, 7th term of the EP. Source: author's own calculations on VoteWatch data.*

We illustrate the voting patterns of these categories by looking at their PSI and cohesion on four documents (Table 44 and Table 45). We identified these documents relying on a survey of final votes as final votes have a stronger salience than votes on amendments. The first document concerns the ratification by the EP of the ‘Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin’ (PEM convention). The PEM convention replaced about 60 bilateral protocols on rules of origin in force in the pan-Euro-Med zone and extended the provisions of previous protocols to countries part of the European Union's Stabilisation and Association Process (EU's SAP). As the PEM convention is part of the ‘Barcelona process’, its final objective is the establishment of a free

trade area between the EU and different Mediterranean non-member countries. We consider it as a ‘free trade document,’ Consistent with the previous discussion, parties from the ‘pro-market conditional’ class supported the document during the final vote. Parties from the compromising class expressed their support, although at a lower level as most MEPs were absent or refrained from voting.

ID	Title	Theme	Date	Final result in the EP
1	Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: application EGF/2011/003 DE/Arnsberg and Düsseldorf - automotive industry in Germany	BUD	28.09.2011	+
2	Mobilisation of the EU Solidarity Fund: Spain (earthquake in Lorca) and Italy (Veneto flooding)	BUD	13.12.2011	+
3	Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin	INTA	16.02.2012	+
4	Monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area	ECON	12.03.2013	+

Table 44 - Case selection (final votes only – 7<sup>th</sup> term of the EP). Source: original compilation.

CLASS		Doc. 1	Doc. 2	Doc. 3	Doc. 4
P S I	Compromising	0.57	0.57	0.14	0.57
	Rejecting	-0.94	-0.83	-0.44	-0.78
	Pro-Welfare Conditional	0.94	0.89	-0.56	-0.83
	Pro-Market Conditional	-0.73	0.82	0.73	-0.09
C O H E S I O N	Compromising	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	Rejecting	1.00	0.91	0.83	0.90
	Pro-Welfare Conditional	1.00	1.00	0.88	0.83
	Pro-Market Conditional	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.81

Table 45 - PSI and AI of RRP clusters on selected documents (final votes only – 7<sup>th</sup> term of the EP). Source: author’s own calculations on VoteWatch data.

On the opposite, the groups we identified were rather unified; parties from the ‘rejecting’ and ‘pro-welfare conditional’ voted against the document.

Votes on the mobilization of funds represent an important part of all votes on budgetary matters at the EP (they represent 96 out of 675 budget-related votes in our sample). We identified two votes that depict the behaviour of parties belonging to the ‘rejecting’ and ‘pro-welfare conditional’ on this matter. The first concerns the mobilization of funds for five enterprises operating in the area of Arnsberg and Düsseldorf, in order to ‘provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns and to assist their reintegration into the labour market.’ RRP’s from the ‘compromising’ and ‘pro-welfare conditional’ clusters supported the document, despite some absent MEPs among the ‘compromising’ RRP’s. ‘Rejecting’ and ‘pro-market conditional’ RRP’s, instead, voted against the resolution; the former because of their opposition in principle to EU policies, the latter as a consequence of their ‘free market’ stances. The second vote concerns the mobilization of the ‘EU Solidarity Fund’ in favour of Spain and Italy, following the earthquake in Lorca and the flooding in Veneto. Even on matters of solidarity, parties in the ‘rejecting’ cluster voted against, while all other clusters supported the document.

Finally, RRP’s did not follow a common strategy on most of the legislation dealing with the Eurozone crisis, despite the importance of the topic. ‘The proposal for a regulation of the EP and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area’ provides a good illustration. It is part of the ‘Two-Pack’ legislation. The ‘Two-Pack’ ‘contributed to the Europeanization of economic governance by strengthening the monitoring processes of national economies at the European level through the Commission and the Council’ (Roger, Otjes, and van der Veer 2017, 7). As expected, RRP’s in the ‘rejecting’ cluster strongly opposed this legislation, as the ‘Two-Pack’ increased the power of European institutions on national states. RRP’s in the ‘pro-welfare conditional’ cluster also voted against, since the legislation concerned tighter controls on national budgets. On the other hand, also as expected from our classification, many RRP’s in the ‘compromising’ cluster, despite being usually classified as ‘Eurosceptic’ parties, actually supported one of the most important piece of

European legislation passed in the 2009-2014 period. Finally, RRP in the 'pro-market conditional' cluster abstained, apart from a single MEP belonging to the Finnish P.

Overall, the analysis of voting behaviours shows that RRP do not adopt a common strategy over economic matters at the EP, and are divided on these issues according to their degree of opposition to the EU and, to a lesser extent, along the old economic left/right cleavage. All the different 'eras' of radical right economic ideas are represented in the 7th term of the EP: the neoliberal 'winning formula' of Kitschelt (1995) in the 'pro-market conditional' cluster, the centrist economic position observed by De Lange (2007) represented by the 'compromising' RRP, and 'old-new' welfare-chauvinism (Ivaldi 2015; Kitschelt 1995).

Our analysis of a particular political arena shows the different strategies adopted by RRP *vis-à-vis* the EU on economic matters. Our results are similar to those in other works conceptualizing the existence of different types of parliamentary opposition such as those highlighted by Kirchheimer (1957), Mair (2007), and Vasiloupolou (2009, 2011). There is a handful of RRP that express strong 'opposition in principle' to the existence and role of the EP. UKIP, PVV and BNP used their votes on economic issues to stress their Euroscepticism regardless of the topic. Other RRP show more issue-related behaviour and support documents on certain topics, as in the case of the 'pro-market conditional' (DF, P, PiS, TB, and SNS) and 'pro-welfare conditional' (LN, VB, Ataka, FN, and FPÖ) RRP. However, the true extent of this policy-related opposition should be confirmed by a larger analysis not limited to votes: their 'opposition in principle' might be demonstrated by their non-participation in other EP activities and the hostility displayed in their speeches and political programmes. This would be a different kind of Euroscepticism since, in voting on certain topics, these parties channel their hostility. Finally, the 'compromising' (Jobbik, PRM, and LAOS) RRP are probably the most heterogeneous area as their main characteristic is their stronger support for documents discussed in the EP.

Party	Our Study	Vasilopoulou (2011)	Hobolt and de Vries (2016)	CHES Position on EU	CHES Left/Right Econ
Ataka	Pro-Welfare Conditional	Conditional	Hard Eurosceptic	1.5	1.4
BNP	Rejecting	Rejecting	N/A	1.2 (2010)	5.8
DF	Pro-market conditional	Conditional	Hard Eurosceptic	1.9	4.5
FN	Pro-Welfare Conditional	Rejecting	Hard Eurosceptic	1.2	5.9
FPÖ	Pro-Welfare Conditional	Conditional	Hard Eurosceptic	1.9	5.5
JOBBIK	Compromising	N/A	Hard Eurosceptic	1.2	4
LAOS	Compromising	Conditional	Soft Eurosceptic	3.3	5.3
LN	Pro-Welfare Conditional	Conditional	Hard Eurosceptic	1.1	7.3
P	Pro-market conditional	N/A	Hard Eurosceptic	1.6	4.1
PiS	Pro-market conditional	N/A	Soft Eurosceptic	3.8	3.1
PRM	Compromising	N/A	Hard Eurosceptic	N/A	N/A
PVV	Rejecting	N/A	Hard Eurosceptic	1.1	4.6
SNS	Pro-market conditional	N/A	Hard Eurosceptic	2.3	4.8
TB	Pro-market conditional	Compromising	Soft Eurosceptic	5.7	5.9
UKIP	Rejecting	Rejecting	Hard Eurosceptic	1.1	8.6
VB	Pro-Welfare Conditional	Conditional	Hard Eurosceptic	2.6	5.5

*Table 46 - Comparison between our study's results and main literature. Source: original compilation.*

Table 46 compares our results with the classifications from different other sources (Vasilopoulou (2011), Hobolt and de Vries (2016), and the scores collected by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker, De Vries, et al. 2015). In most cases, our results appear in line with their findings (even though they do not deal particularly on economic matters). Nevertheless, a few cases deserve to be addressed. Both the Romanian PRM and the Jobbik, which are classified by Hobolt and de Vries (2016) as ‘hard Eurosceptic’, in our classification are among the least Eurosceptic. This is a



consequence of their voting patterns as demonstrated by the PCA. Moreover, as underlined in Section 5.1, the PRM has a PSI score in line with that of the S&D group while the Jobbik, albeit less ‘compromising’, has a positive PSI score. An interesting result of our work is then that these RRP appear to have a parliamentary strategy different from their public discourse. Another interesting result arises when looking at our left-right dimension, which appears to be rather different from the scores of the left-right economic dimension of the CHES. The differences specifically concern those parties who fall into our ‘pro-market conditional’ group and were either members of the ECR group (namely the Polish PiS or the Latvian TB) or would join the ECR group in 2014 (such as the Danish DF and the Finnish P). Contrary to other RRPs, these parties managed to enter in a group with non-RR parties such as the British Conservatives. For those RRPs belonging to the ECR, our results indicate that they vote in line with their moderate colleagues. Once again, however, there is a difference between their position at home and the way they vote at the EP, which opens interesting perspectives for further research.

Our findings refer to the 7th term of the EP when the world economic crisis was the main topic of discussion. Looking at the composition of the 8<sup>th</sup> term of the EP, we can see that the non-Eurosceptic radical right almost disappeared in 2014 European Election. Table 47 shows that only the Hungarian Jobbik among the EU-open RRPs was able to win seats in 2014 European Election. At the same time, the ‘pro-welfare’ parties increased their representation in two countries (France and Austria). These parties also made an institutional step forward as they merged to form a single political group in the EP during the 8th term, the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENL). All parties in this cluster are now members of the ENL together with the PVV, the strongest rejecting party during the 7<sup>th</sup> term. Thus, if we apply our results to post-2014 European politics, we see a positive trend towards the ‘pro-welfare’ version RRPs’ nativist message. A pole, centred on the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ, might be emerging and attracting other parties. The ‘Rejecting’ and the ‘Condition Pro-Market’ clusters both made important gains in seats but these unevenly distributed as

part of these RPPs did not elect any MEP because of poor electoral results (the Latvian TB/LNNK, the Slovak SNS, and the British BNP). These elements alone are not proving that our hypothesis H4-P is verified. as we have no proof that the crisis led to the poor electoral results of ‘Compromising’ RPPs. However, our findings on RPPs behaviour are in line with the recent literature on the role of Euroscepticism as a determinant of RPPs support (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2012). Finally, since the pro-EU RPPs have disappeared, differences in the newly elected 8th term parliament will most likely occur along the left-right economic divide. Therefore, future research should focus on whether, with the birth of the ENL, the era of a shattered party family is coming to an end.

Party	Country	Clusters	Confirmed in 2014	Seats 7th term	Seats 8th term	Var
<b>UKIP</b>	UK	Rejecting	Y	12	24	12
<b>LN</b>	ITA	Pro-welfare conditional	Y	9	5	-4
<b>PiS</b>	POL	Pro-Market	Y	7	19	12
<b>FN</b>	FRA	Pro-welfare conditional	Y	3	23	20
<b>JOBBIK</b>	HUN	Compromising	Y	3	3	0
<b>PRM</b>	ROM	Compromising	N	3	0	-3
<b>PVV</b>	NLD	Rejecting	Y	3	4	1
<b>Ataka</b>	BUL	Pro-welfare conditional	N	2	0	-2
<b>BNP</b>	UK	Rejecting	N	2	0	-2
<b>FPO</b>	AUT	Pro-welfare conditional	Y	2	4	2
<b>LAOS</b>	GRE	Compromising	N	2	0	-2
<b>VB</b>	BEL	Pro-welfare conditional	Y	2	1	-1
<b>DF</b>	DEN	Conditional Pro-Market	Y	1	4	3
<b>P</b>	FIN	Conditional Pro-Market	Y	1	2	1
<b>SNS</b>	SVK	Conditional Pro-Market	N	1	0	-1
<b>TB</b>	LAT	Conditional Pro-Market	N	1	0	-1

*Table 47 - RPPs in terms 7 and 8 at the EP. Source: original compilation on VoteWatch data.*

## 2.6. CONCLUSION

This Chapter focused on RRP's positions on economic matters. We did so in two ways: (i) we explored the evolution of European RRP's economic programmes since 1990 and (ii) we analysed RRP's behaviour on economic matters at the EP during the 7<sup>th</sup> term.

Concerning the analysis of party manifestos, we distinguished between two main findings. First, we highlighted that, consistently with Rovny (2013) and Mudde (2007), economic issues are not at the core of RRP ideology and are less prominent in their manifestos than in those of other political families. We showed that RRP's have paid increasing attention to economic matters since the early 1990s. We found also that this 'discovery' of economic issues has a double nature, as RRP's increase both the place given to these issues in their manifestos and the number of economic topics addressed.

The second series of findings concerns the different positions on economic matters. PCA shows that four dimensions describe a large part of the differences among RRP's on economic issues. These dimensions describe the salience of 'welfare', 'economic liberalism', 'economic management' and 'protectionism' issues. These dimensions are similar to those proposed by Otjes et al. (2012) and used by Ivaldi (2014). Moreover, our analysis shows that RRP's can be divided into four categories when it comes to economic matters: 'muting', 'neoliberal', 'pro-welfare', and 'multiplying' RRP's. We used the examples of three different parties to identify different strategies and the evolution of RRP's along these axes. A blurring-by-muting strategy is one possible strategy, exemplified by the Danish DF (which was also the last RRP to present a manifesto (in 2001) with no references to economic issues). RRP's such as the Slovak SNS adopt what Mudde (2007) calls a 'schizophrenic agenda', building manifestos with strong references to both 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' economic policies and changing them over time. The French FN has followed a path similar to that analysed by Ivaldi (2013, 2014, 2015) moving towards a pro-welfare position and lowering its initial support for economic liberalism: as of now, the French FN falls under the 'multiplying' class as it combines elements from

the different dimensions described in this article. This pattern, in particular concerning the welfare dimension, is common to most RRP: although they might still disagree (for either strategic or ideological reasons) on the balance between State and Market, these forces appear to be moving towards a common welfare-chauvinist position.

Manifestos' analysis thus allowed us to obtain a taxonomy of RRP's economic proposals. To our knowledge, this is the first work which does so, on economic programmes, both diachronically and cross-country. Our work then allowed us to describe, classify, and compare the evolution of a large number of RRP at the same time, while previous research focused either on differences at a given time (De Lange 2007) or on the evolution of a single party (Ivaldi 2015).

Moreover, this Chapter also described RRP's patterns of opposition to the European integration process on economic matters. Using RCVs in the EP on all economic issues during the 7th term of the EP (2009-2014), we were able to analyse cohesion and the support of different categories of parties on economic and non-economic issues. This was made possible by the use of existing cohesion indexes and the introduction of an original party support index. Our results show that RRP do not follow a common strategy at the EP on either economic or non-economic issues. Even on migration policy and minority rights, RRP vote separately. At least within the framework of the EP, we can conclude that RRP act as a heterogeneous group of parties, independently of the salience of the different policy issues in their agendas.

This was also completed by an inductive analysis of RRP's different voting patterns using both parametric (W-NOMINATE) and non-parametric (clustering analysis and additive trees) methods, and illustrated with four representative votes. The results confirm our assumptions that division among RRP on economic issues is related to their degree of opposition to EU policy and, to a lesser extent, the old economic left/right cleavage. In addition, our analyses highlighted that Eastern and Western European RRP adopt somewhat different strategies.

In particular, these approaches converge in revealing that RRP can be regrouped into four clusters in relation to their voting on economic issues: (i) the 'compromising' RRP (Jobbik, PRM, LAOS) which, in their voting patterns, are clearly less Eurosceptic than the other three RRP clusters; (ii) the 'conditional - Conditional Pro-Market' RRP (DF, P, PiS, TB, SNS) whose support for the EU is conditional on the topic - they support free trade for instance; (iii) the 'pro-welfare conditional' RRP (VB, Ataka, FN, FPÖ) which support budget items and internal market, while being neutral or negative about other issues; (iv) the 'rejecting' RRP (UKIP, BNP, PVV), characterized by their opposition to all documents regardless of their theme.

Our results are in line with Mudde's (2007) analysis which shows that RRP positions on economic issues are heterogeneous, and is consistent with the absence of a common grouping of RRP within the EP. It is also coherent with the existence of different types of parliamentary oppositions, as theorized by authors such as Kirchheimer (1957), Mair (2007), and Vasiloupolou's (2011).

Due to the differences between the EP and national political systems, we cannot identify a common taxonomy between our results. However, our findings do indicate some common trends within the RR party family. First, RRP are still a divided family on economic issues. This is true whether we analyse party manifestos or voting records at the EP. Second, within this division there are some important trends towards convergence. The analysis of party manifestos highlighted that all RRP increased the salience of economic issues and there seems to be a trend, common to both Eastern and Western European RRP, towards pro-welfare positions. Similarly, in the analysis of RCVs, we saw that results from 2014 European election strengthened 'conditional pro-welfare' RRP, which also increased their coordination by forming a common group in today's EP. Third, RRP did not abandon free market positions, not even after 2008 economic crisis. References to free market decreased in the manifestos from Western European RRP but did not disappear, while Eastern European RRP increased their Conditional Pro-Market pledges. Similarly, at the EP, we were able to identify a

specific cluster of Conditional Pro-Market RRP, which contest the European integration process, but seem to accept both the single market and further liberalization of international trade.

Our work has, however, some limitations and many dimensions would need further examination. First, methodologically our results share the same limitations as previous studies on voting records at the EP: (a) votes are considered all equals, while some documents might be more informative than others, (b) part of the RCVs, as discussed, are requested by party groups in order to appear more cohesive. Second, as discussed in the Introduction, the EP has its own dimensionality and we cannot generalize our results to national political systems. However, diverging behaviours between the two deserve further research. Indeed, we show that RR voting strategies at the EP can be different from their public discourse in their own country, offering research perspective to understand and analyse these differences. Third, this chapter did not address the determinants of RRP's policy choices. Fourth, our results are for the 'supply side'; we do not tackle voters' perceptions of RR economic programmes. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, RRP have been undergoing a process of proletarianization (Arzheimer 2013), the relation between the change in RRP's electorate' and RRP's policy proposals would be a fruitful direction for future research.

Our findings indicate that RRP should not be treated as other parties in terms of economic impact: while other party families (supposedly) share a common view on economic topics, this is still not the case for RRP, despite a congering trend. As such, we argue that the economic impact of RRP will follow the main features of RR ideology analysed in Chapter 1. Indeed, the increasing importance of economics in RRP's positions indicate that economic policy might become instrumental for RRP in the realisation of their ideology. This reasoning, as well as RRP's increasing weight in political constituencies may lead RRP's positions to become a determinant of the economy.

# 3. THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE ECONOMY: A REVIEW OF MAINSTREAM THEORIES

## 3.1. INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters showed that RRP's share a nativist core ideology. We discussed the importance of economic matters in the RR ideology and proposed a taxonomy of RRP's according to their economic proposals and voting behaviours on economic matters. We underlined that RRP's are now paying more attention to economic policy than before. As such, the combination between their increased role in national political systems as well as their increased attention to economic matters justifies our analysis of the economic impact of RRP's. In Chapter 3, we provide a critical literature review of the political determinants of the economy as conceptualized in the field of mainstream economics.

We focus, in particular, on the so-called 'public choice' or 'political economics' school, which accounts for the largest and dominant work on this topic in economics (Shi and Svensson 2003; Potrafke 2016a). As a consequence, Chapters 3 and 4 aim to assess these theories' ability to explain the political determinants of the economy. Thus, we derive our hypotheses from this literature stream.

According to Persson and Tabellini (2004, 3): 'The general approach of this line of research is to explain deviations in observed economic policies from a hypothetical social optimum by appealing to specific incentive constraints in the decision problem of optimizing policymakers.'

Within this strand of work, we distinguish two conceptualizations of politics, that concern political competition and the way it is structured: opportunistic and partisan models:

- ‘Opportunistic models’: in these models, politics is characterized as a competition among politicians seeking to secure office. Before an election, the incumbents have an incentive to boost the economy, for example, by introducing an expansionary monetary policy<sup>27</sup>. This type of opportunistic approach is described as the ‘political business cycle’ (PBC) approach. The incumbents might also increase spending/decrease taxation, described as the ‘political budget cycle’ ‘’, in order to maximize their chances of being re-elected (Nordhaus 1975).
- ‘Partisan models’: in Partisan Theory (PT), political competition occurs among politicians seeking to maximize the utility of their voters with an ideological economic policy perspective. The underlying reasoning differs from the opportunistic model, which assumes that politicians try to satisfy as many people as possible. In partisan models, there is an ideological identification between voters and politicians. As such, there should be a difference between left-wing and right-wing governments in the policies they adopt once elected (Hibbs 1977).

The implementation of these conceptualizations is influenced, in turn, by:

- The ‘institutional conditions’, which include political institutions, understood as electoral rule, the form of government, and the political fragmentation. These conditions shape the way voters' interests are represented. In line with both opportunistic and partisan models, the institutional conditions lead politicians to favour certain policies over others in order secure

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<sup>27</sup> The literature is not explicit about the measures used and refers simply to fiscal and monetary instruments (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997).



office or satisfy their voters. Institutional features are important on their own (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002) or as the context in which opportunistic or partisan cycles emerge.

Chapter 3 reviews this literature in order to identify and discuss the main hypothesis related to our research question. The literature review builds on Palombarini (2001) and comments on the same political economy school. We present the theoretical assumptions of these conceptualizations as well as their empirical results are summarized. The relevance of this literature for studying RRP is assessed at the theoretical and empirical levels.

Section 3.2 discusses opportunistic models, with a specific focus on the debate over voter rationality. Section 3.3 reviews work on ‘partisan models’. Section 3.4 examines the institutional conditions, which are examined also in both the opportunistic and partisan models. Section 3.5 summarizes the main results and the main limits of the literature on the political determinants of the economy from the perspective of assessing the impact RRP.

## 3.2. OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS: POLITICAL BUSINESS AND POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLE

Early work examines the relationship between politics and economics as opportunism. The literature on opportunistic models focuses on politicians as independent and rational actors, characterized by individual utility functions, which mainly depends on their re-election. Politicians seek reconfirmation of their positions for as many terms as possible and are influenced only by those factors that have an impact on their electoral score. In order to maximize their chances of re-election, incumbent politicians can: a) temporarily inflate the state of the economy just before an election (the so-called political business cycle) and/or b) focus on particular expenditures in the pre-electoral budget and increase expenditure or reduce taxes (the ‘political budget cycle’).

Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively present the two models and the debate over voter rationality. The (ambiguous) empirical evidence on the two possible interpretations of opportunistic cycles is discussed in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 summarizes the contribution and limits of opportunistic models for research on RRP's economic impact and hypothesizes about a 'radical right budget cycle'.

### 3.2.1. THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE: OPPORTUNISTIC INCUMBENTS BOOSTING THE ECONOMY TO SECURE RE-ELECTION

The first opportunistic model was proposed by Nordhaus (1975). In his view, politicians have room to exploit inflationary policies before an election based on two assumptions. First, there is an exploitable short-run Phillips curve. Thus, expansionary policies will have the immediate effect of reducing unemployment and increasing the economic performance in the presence of moderate inflation. In the short run,<sup>28</sup> the trade-off between inflation and unemployment is formalized as :

$$\pi_t = f(u_t) + \lambda\pi_t^e \quad (3.1)$$

Where  $\pi_t$  is the inflation rate at time t,  $\pi_t^e$  is the expected inflation at time t,  $\lambda$  is a positive parameter indicating how voters react to past mistakes in their expectations<sup>29</sup>, and  $f(u)$  is a function of the

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<sup>28</sup> According to mainstream theory, in the long-run, the trade-off is described by a vertical curve, which nullifies the short-run gains. Thus, according to proponents of this interpretation, such as Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), there is a 'natural' level of unemployment (the NAIRU or Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) below which inflation can only increase with no change (in the long-run) to the rate of unemployment. The existence and relevance of the Phillips curve is the subject of debate among economists. E.g., post-Keynesian economists 'reject the vertical long-run Phillips curve and/or its associated single NAIRU. In addition, many are even skeptical about short-run trade-offs between GDP/capacity and inflation. There are two reasons for this. First, there is a large range of capacity utilization rates which are consistent with an absence of demand-led pressures, for reasons tied to the absence of decreasing returns over a large range of production levels. Second, it is believed that with 'coordinated wage bargaining a constant inflation rate becomes compatible with a range of employment levels, and the NAIRU as the short run limit to employment is no longer unique' (Kriesler and Lavoie 2007, 392). Thus, according to post-Keynesians, the Phillips curve is horizontal, not vertical or inclined. Note that the relevance of the long-run Phillips curve is discussed also in mainstream economics. The debate on adaptive expectations (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 1977) vs rational expectations (Alesina 1987; Rogoff and Sibert 1988) grew out of a larger debate in mainstream economics on the strength of the tendency of the economy to move towards NAIRU. See Guerrien (1996) for a summary of this debate.

<sup>29</sup> In other words,  $\lambda$  is a parameter that 'captures the size of today's reaction to past mistakes in forecasting. For example, a low  $\lambda$  implies that current expectations are almost identical to last period's inflation, regardless of past mistakes. The crucial point is that expectations depend only on past observations of inflation.' (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997, 18)

unemployment rate ( $u$ ). Some later works (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1993) reformulate Nordhaus' model to identify a trade-off between growth and inflation, rather than a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Thus, the traditional mainstream formulation of PBC could be read also as:

$$y_t = \bar{y} + \pi_t - \pi_t^e \quad (3.2)$$

where  $y_t$  is the rate of growth of the Gross National Product at time  $t$  and  $\bar{y}$  is the 'natural' rate of growth. The literature usually considers the two as equally valid formulations of Nordhaus's (1975) model, despite the original specification being directed exclusively to unemployment.

The second assumption states that an improvement in the economic situation will increase the politician's chances of re-election, at least in the short term. This follows from the fact that voters are




Figure 18 - Phillips Curve in opportunistic models. Source: Alesina et al. (1993)

assumed to be less informed than politicians about the consequences of policy-making. Just as in the case of the Phillips curve, politicians can exploit this informational asymmetry to stay in office.

Figure 18 shows graphically how the model works. In the short-run, the Phillips curve is negatively inclined (short-run Philipps curve - SRPC) and, according to Nordhaus (1975), politicians have the tools (fiscal and monetary policies) to move from a certain point A, to a point B, described by a higher level of inflation, but, also, a lower level of unemployment. After the election, higher inflation leads agents to expect higher inflation. According to Nordhaus (1975, 172), 'this higher expected rate of inflation leads unions and workers to escalate their wage demands by some fraction (that is, workers consider real wages rather than simply nominal wages). This also leads to a long-run relation which is steeper than the short-run'. In Figure 18, this is represented by a vertical Long-Run Phillips Curve (LRPC) in which the system is at point C, and employment is the same as before the election (point A), but inflation is higher.

However, if it were possible to exploit the SRPC to achieve an economic situation that the voters preferred, then one would expect a PBC near to an election as politicians try to manipulate the outcome of the election by means of expansionary measures. This simplistic vision of the relation between use of expansionary policy and politicians' chances of re-election relies on very strong assumptions:

1. There are no ideological differences among governments since all are interested only in securing office;
2. The voter preference function is influenced positively by growth, and negatively by inflation and unemployment'
3. The voter's time horizon is limited; voters put more value on recent events and tend to forget previous negative/positive economic performance;
4. The voter's utility function is perfectly known to competing political parties;
5. Voters' expectations about inflation are adaptive (but not rational):

$$\pi_t^e = \pi_{t-1} + \lambda(\pi_{t-1}^e - \pi_{t-1}); 0 < \lambda < 1$$

Thus the electors, according to Nordhaus (1975, 172), are 'ignorant of the macroeconomic trade-off'.

In other words, voters consider only the difference between expected and real inflation in one time period and do not consider the future effects of pre-electoral policy-making (Nordhaus 1975).

In line with Palombarini (2001), we argue that these assumptions limit analysis of the relation between political and economic systems in four ways:

First, the voter function is unique and stable across the whole period under consideration. However, as we will see in 3.1, it would seem likely that different social actors would have different functions for the trade-off between growth/unemployment and inflation. Moreover, the voter function is not necessarily stable since, in a long run analysis, the social composition of the electorate could change (e.g. more or less workers). Second, All governments (whether left or right-wing) 'face the same voters function and, therefore, take the same choices' (Palombarini 2001, 66), which is unlikely. Third, the model relies on a macro-economic framework in which politics can affect the economy only in the short-term; other economic frameworks consider the long-term impact. Fourth, incumbents are considered to be short-sighted: their horizon is limited to the next (national) election, while the political system might provide incentives for the long term. For example, in the US, there are checks and balances between the President and Congress.<sup>30</sup> Representatives are voted in every two years and Senators every six years, so the incumbent president must consider the effects of his/her choices in the mid-term elections.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> In the US it is possible to have different parties responsible for the executive branch (the president) and the legislative branch (Congress). This has been described as a 'divided government' and it significantly changes the way policy-making is implemented since it obliges the president to reach agreement over a large set of acts, with a hostile Congress (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997).

<sup>31</sup> The elections to renew the Congress that occur during a presidential term.

Some neo-classical scholars showed interests in the Nordhaus model since the existence of a political business cycle could lead to a distortion from the natural course of the economy in democratic countries, thereby producing undesirable fluctuations. Although several studies acknowledge Nordhaus's concerns about the consequences of PBCs, many (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1993; Torsten Persson and Tabellini 1991; Rogoff and Sibert 1988) disagree about the limited rationality of voters.

Persson and Tabellini (1991), and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) adapted Nordhaus's model as they (i) introduced the concept (and a measure) of competency and (ii) went from adaptive to rational expectations.

The idea of competency 'stresses the administrative abilities of the policymaker' (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, 2). Politicians differ in their ability to fulfil voters' goals and, thus, voters prefer competent to incompetent politicians. Voters can test the competency of a government by looking at the state of the economy and checking its previous record. However, competency is a politician characteristic that becomes known to voters only *ex-post*, while politicians are supposed to be fully aware of their own competency. Thus, the opportunistic cycle is then made possible by the presence of an information asymmetry that incumbent candidates can exploit.

Rogoff and Sibert (1988) also extend the idea of voter rationality: voters do not only incorporate information on past inflation, they take account of government competency, although with a lag. This changes the role of elections in the long-run, compared to Nordhaus's (1975) model: 'In the Nordhaus approach, elections are, from a purely economic perspective, just a cost; in these rational models of competence, elections do imply economic distortions but serve a useful purpose (choosing competent policymakers) explicitly accounted for within the model' (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997, 32)

Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) consider information asymmetry to be less important, since rational retrospective voters are (to an extent) able to weigh the roles of luck and competence in economic

policy by looking at annual growth. Consequently, in rational approaches, cycles are shorter than in Nordhaus's model, since voter expectations are fully rational and voters are more and more informed about policymakers after each period. Figure 1 shows that the neo-classical models (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Torsten Persson and Tabellini 1991) differ from Nordhaus (1975) in the time an economic system takes to move from point B to point C.

While both Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) agree with these two assumptions, they apply the reasoning to different economic concepts. Persson and Tabellini (1990) follow Nordhaus (1975) by analysing growth and inflation, while Rogoff and Sibert (1988) extend their focus to include government budgets, which has led to a new strand of the PBC literature - the political *budget cycle*.

### 3.2.2. THE POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLE: FROM MEASURES TARGETING GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES TO BUDGETARY MEASURES

Some authors (Torsten Persson and Tabellini 1991; Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988) have adapted the Nordhaus model by introducing the already discussed rationality of voters and moving the analysis away from economic outcomes to budgetary and fiscal measures. At the –the beginning, this model was an integral part of the ‘rational political business cycle model’ (RPBC), so the ‘rational’ critique to Nordhaus’ (1975) model of adaptive expectations. As of now, it is more common to separate it from the discussion on voters’ rationality. As such, the literature refers to it as ‘political budget cycle’, in order to stress the new set of dependent variables (Shi and Svensson 2003). In 2017 and in line with Alesina et al.’s (1993) classification, the RPBC refers exclusively to the models that insist on rational voters and a measure of competency (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Torsten Persson and Tabellini 1991). Political budget cycle, instead, describes models that test the impact of politics on fiscal and budgetary measures.

The RPBC and PBC models assume that political results are endogenously determined. That is, politicians know the voter's utility function, which is the same for all electors. Based on their level of competency, politicians have the power to signal their ability to maximize this function. Both models assume that elections are exogenously fixed, thus, governments cannot rush to an election if they want to gain or lose power. Thus, the results of an election depend only on the ability/competency of policy-makers. In their consideration of the political process, the two models differ only in the rationality of voters, not in the functioning of elections.

The reasoning is similar for the PBC, except for the adjustment variable politicians use to signal their competency. The situation remains one of informational asymmetry where politicians try to exploit their positions to increase their chances of being re-elected. However, in political budget cycles, the focus is more on the budgetary instruments that politicians can use to fulfil the demands of their constituencies. In the short time following the announcement of an election, the incumbent cannot affect the level of unemployment or the GDP growth rate, but they can increase or decrease a set of expenditures and/or revenues (public expenditure, government deficits and other budget-related variables).

Rogoff and Sibert (1988) consider their model – and thus its budgetary composition – to be independent of ideology, so government's goal is to provide a certain amount of public service  $G$ , exogenously fixed at:

$$G = \varepsilon + \tau + \Delta \quad (3.3)$$

where  $\varepsilon$  is government competency to provide the same public service at lower cost by limiting the waste,  $\tau$  is a lump-sum tax and  $\Delta$  is a seigniorage tax or, in other formulations, a budget deficit. Thus, in an election year we can expect higher values for  $\Delta$  and decreasing  $\tau$ .

Rogoff (1990) proposes a variation of this model by considering the composition of government expenditures instead of financing measures. Rogoff distinguishes between spending on goods and



services on the one hand, and investment on the other. According to Rogoff (1990), voters realize the level of public investment with a delay, which gives governments an incentive to focus on providing goods and services before an election.

### 3.2.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE PROVIDES AMBIGUOUS SUPPORT TO OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS

Evidence on the existence of opportunistic ‘business’ cycles is ambiguous. The empirical tests found no evidence of the existence of Nordhaus’s PBC (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1993). Some studies underline that only inflation seems to be linked to the election cycle (Alesina and Roubini 1992) with no increase in economic activity, which makes little sense since voters would have no incentive to support these measures. More recent evidence supports the existence of a PBC. For example, Grier (2008, 348) for the USA, Potrafke (2012) for the OECD countries and Klomp and De Haan (2013b) and Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) for African countries. These works find that these cycles are conditional on the political systems in place (electoral rules, number of major political parties, democratic maturity (see Section 3.4). However, in terms of the PBC, evidence of its existence is rather puzzling since the institutional conditions for the existence of a PBC are debateable.

The evidence on political budget cycles is more consistent. Alesina et al. (1997) perform a cross-section time series regression on a panel of 13 OECD countries and find that the public deficit is around 0.6% higher in election years. Schuknecht (1996) provides similar results from an analysis of a panel of 35 developing countries. In particular, he finds evidence of opportunistic public investment cycles, as these experience an increase around election years. Shi and Svensson (2003) analyse a panel of developed and developing countries between 1975 and 1995 and confirm the existence of PBC in all these countries, although they appear more important for developing countries. Other studies find more support for RPBC in developed countries (Tujula and Wolswijk (2007); Mink and De Han (2006).

There is some degree of consensus among scholars that future developments in this type of research should focus on the different types of expenditures composing the budget (Shi and Svensson 2003). For example, List and Sturm (2006) analyse the effects of political incentives on environmental policy. Their findings show that there are clear incentives for politicians to implement policies to attract voters even on secondary issues (i.e., those that affect rather small groups of people), where we would expect a more important role for lobbyists. Vergne (2009) focuses on the effects of the electoral cycle on the composition of the budgets in 42 different developing countries between 1975 and 2001. He finds that, in election years, there is a shift from capital expenditure to current expenditure (especially subsidies). In addition, some theorizations add other features to the analysis, such as the politician's 'reputation' (Martinez 2009), which can have a positive effect on reducing the incentives to misuse public funds before an election, thus, reducing the importance of the political budget cycle.

#### 3.2.4. THE LIMITS OF OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS AND THE HYPOTHESIS OF A RADICAL RIGHT BUDGET CYCLE

From a theoretical point of view, these studies focus on politics in the form of elections, and reduce political actors to office-seeking policymakers. This simplified view of politics is extended, although not directly criticized, in the partisan approaches we review in the next Section. A thorough discussion of the limits of cyclical approaches is provided in Palombarini (2001, 2000). Palombarini (2001, 2000) believes that both rational and non-rational opportunistic models deny the autonomy of government to pursue its own agenda. ). He argues that, in opportunistic models, politics is socially sterile and society is reduced to a pre-existing representative voter:

'The analysis is static, that is a political change – beyond the cyclical component – is the product of a change in individual preferences (either of voters or policymakers), not accounted for by the model. As such, the univocality of the relationship between agents' characteristics and political choice

exclude the influence of those features of the political system that are not directly derivable from individual preferences.’ (Palombarini 2001, 77)

According to his interpretation of these models, at the end of their term, incumbents must satisfy the will of the median voter or be ousted from power.<sup>32</sup> Politicians cannot decide not to satisfy the voters leaving no room for measures that might follow a longer-term plan. Moreover, these models do not take account of what might change the voter's utility function as this function is exogenously fixed. In other words, policymakers’ choices might have a long-term impact only because this choice will finally face budgetary constraints (e.g., in the case of augmented deficits).

Thus, opportunistic models do not have much to offer for our research for two main reasons. First, most formalized models limit competition between parties to two parties, which is never the case in European countries with strong RRP. Second, as already underlined in this review, opportunistic cyclical approaches do not account for ideological/programmatic differences among the political actors, whereas we question the role of ideology. However, at least concerning possible short-lived political budget cycles, we should not completely disregard the possibility of an impact of RRP on electorally motivated budget policies. Thus, we can theorize about a RR effect on the budget cycle. We argue that opportunistic cycles might occur either when RRP are in power or as a reaction to the presence of RRP

The literature on the consequences of RRP highlights that other political parties might react to the presence of strong RRP, especially right-wing parties (Pettigrew 1998; Camus 2011). According to Minkenberg’s (2002, 266) lengthy discussion of the French and German political systems, RRP produced ‘a growing polarization in the French case with some signs of a shift to the right and a

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<sup>32</sup> According to Palombarini (1999), the neo-classical formulation of cyclical approaches and some partisan (oligarchic, in his work) approaches, rely implicitly on the theorem of the median voter (A. Downs 1957). However, as Palombarini (1999) underlines, the fact that policymakers try to please voters with the same utility functions (such as in Nordhaus 1975) or adopt the position of the median voter does not change the balance of power.

general shift to the right in the German case with some signs of polarization'. Downs (2001) argues, in particular, that the co-optation of RRP issues, such as anti-immigration policies, concerns both the right and the left of the political spectrum. Van Spanje (2010) empirically tests Downs's assertion on a panel of 75 parties from 11 countries between 1990 and 2004 by means of cross-sectional hierarchical linear regression. He finds that the contagion effect goes beyond the right-side of the spectrum since it obliges parties on the left to adopt a (stricter) stance towards immigration. Alonso and Fonseca (2012) do not agree totally with these findings. They rely on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (now MARPOR) from 1975 to 2005 for 18 European countries, to compare the evolution in immigration policy of different party families. They find that the contagion effect applies only to the left-wing parties since right-wing parties would favour stricter anti-immigrant policies regardless of RRP's strength. Akkerman (2015) advises caution and provides evidence in support of a less generalized impact. He follows a 'fine-grained approach', that is, an analysis that differentiates between immigration control and integration, and compares party manifestos. According to Akkerman (2015), right-wing parties increase the salience of anti-immigration policy regardless of RRP's results. However, things change when you distinguish between right-wing Conservative parties and right-wing Liberal parties<sup>33</sup>. While right-wing Conservative parties would support stricter anti-immigration policies even in the absence of strong RR competitors, Liberal parties 'have moved most clearly rightwards with regard to asylum' (Akkerman 2015, 61) and non-worker immigrant rights as a reaction to RR electoral success. No effect, instead, is found on Social-democratic parties. Abou-Chadi (2016) find greater evidence of an impact of RRP's. He relies on a OLS pooled time-series cross-section models with a dynamic formalization of the dependent variable. He finds that the

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<sup>33</sup> Here, Akkerman (2015) uses the term 'Liberal' in the European way, indicating those parties that 'have a strong commitment to the free market and emphasize individual self-reliance'

success of RRPs provides an incentive for other parties to increase the salience of immigration in their programmes and to move to the right and to propose tighter controls.

Thus, despite the absence of consensus on the matter, there is enough evidence to justify the inclusion, in our research, of hypotheses related to the strength of RRPs and not exclusively their governing experience. In this opportunistic formalization of such an impact, incumbent parties try to appeal to different constituencies in order to secure office. In countries with large shares of RR voters, policymakers have an incentive, in election years, to mobilize resources for expenditures that might appeal to RR constituencies. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

OH - STR: In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we can expect, in an election year, larger expenditure on nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRPs' ideological profile.

### 3.3. PARTISAN MODELS: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AS A DETERMINANT OF THE ECONOMY

Some scholars try to imagine a more ideological role for politics than that described by opportunistic incumbents. These works are categorized as PT or partisan models, partisan approaches or partisan cycles. All assume that political actors are (also) driven by their ideology. This assumption is translated differently and the level of formalization varies. The most important debate, as in the case of opportunistic models, concerns the rational expectations of voters. This debate is summarized in Section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 presents the empirical results in the literature on this topic. The possible contribution of these studies to an assessment of the economic impact of RRPs is discussed in Section 3.3.3.

### 3.3.1. PARTISAN MODELS BETWEEN NON-RATIONAL AND RATIONAL VOTERS: THE HIBBS-ALESINA DEBATE

Contemporary with Nordhaus's (1975) model, Hibbs (1977) proposed an approach. According to Hibbs (1977, 1468), 'the macroeconomic policies pursued by left and right-wing governments are broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class defined core political constituencies'. He argues that voters from different constituencies have different utility functions concerning the trade-off between growth/unemployment and inflation.<sup>34</sup> According to Hibbs, partisan incentives refer to the pursuit of a certain type of policy rather than some other, and not just opportunistic incentives as in Nordhaus (1975).<sup>35</sup> Therefore, Hibbs (1977) assumes that politicians might have different preferences according to the social classes they wish to represent. According to Hibbs (1977, 1470), 'the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of lower income, blue-collar groups differ markedly vis-à-vis the unemployment/inflation trade-off from those of higher income, white-collar groups'. As political parties are built on this class cleavage, they should behave as the perfect representatives of their voters. Hibbs suggest that left-wing cabinets favour high inflation and low unemployment rates, and right-wing governments the reverse. In order to test his assumption, Hibbs formulated the unemployment rate as follows:

$$U_t = \frac{\beta}{1 - \delta L} G_{t-1} + \tau$$

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<sup>34</sup> Hibbs's (1977) hypothesis focuses, as in Nordhaus (1975), on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation and (Alesina 1987; Alesina and Sachs 1988) move the focus to the study of growth rather than unemployment.

<sup>35</sup> According to Hibbs, however, opportunistic and partisan models can co-exist: "The PBC and the PT are of course compatible; after all parties need to win elections in order to have the opportunity to implement their objectives. [...] Governing parties pursue their ideological preferences as long as they enjoy comfortable ratings in the polls" (Hibbs 1992, 362). Alesina et al. (1997, 267) agree, but argue that 'this SOMETHING WRONG HERE - WORDS MISSING? similar to those of the pure partisan model'. For this reason, while presenting the results from works relying on the hybrid model, we do not treat it.

where  $U$  represents the unemployment rate;  $G$  is the partisan variable, which is +1 during left-wing cabinets and -1 during right-wing administrations;  $\delta$  and  $\beta$  are parameters representing the effects of change in  $G$  on  $U$ ;  $L$  is a lag operator such that  $L^i U_t = U_{t-i}$ ;  $\tau$  represents the stochastic fluctuations in unemployment. In contrast to Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977) recognizes both the existence of exogenous factors that might limit policymakers in their exploitation of the Phillips curve, and possible lags in the effect.

Hibbs's (1977) results show that there are partisan effects in the case of the UK and US over the 1948 to 1972 period, and in the hypothesized direction: left-wing cabinets favour high inflation and low unemployment, and right-wing governments favour low inflation and high unemployment. This leads to a partisan cycle since the political parties are able to sustain and reinforce these economic policies for more than one term. Hibbs (1977) maintains that these results hold also over the long-term provided the party is re-elected, resulting in permanent differences between left-wing and right-wing. However, in Alesina's (1987) view, cycles can survive over the short-term only if voters act irrationally, that is, if voters form their expectations in an adaptive way as in the case of Hibbs's (1977) model.<sup>36</sup>

Alesina (1987) disagrees about the duration of this partisan cycle and proposes what has been described as Rational Partisan Theory (RPT). He re-works the model so that (i) voters are rational; he assumes that (ii) the actual distribution of voter preferences is unknown, but the likelihood of one party's victory is known; and (iii) that wages are not sticky. The inclusion of rationality has the strongest consequences since it leads to a remodelling of the relation between the short- and long-run Philips curves. While in Hibbs (1977), formalization of the Phillips curve is not addressed, it is central in Alesina (1987). The curve is formalized as follows:

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<sup>36</sup> However, note that, in Hibbs's (1975) model, voter expectations are left untreated.

$$y_t = \bar{y} + \pi_t - w_t \quad (3.4)$$

where  $w$  represents the growth rate of nominal wages,  $y_t$  is the rate of growth at time  $t$ ,  $\bar{y}$  is the natural rate of growth, and  $\pi_t$  is the inflation rate at time  $t$ . Since, according to Alesina (1987), nominal wages are fixed according to the expected inflation  $\pi_t^e$  because wage earners defend their real salaries, equation 3.4 can be rewritten as:

$$y_t = \bar{y} + \pi_t - \pi_t^e \quad (3.5)$$

In Alesina's (1987) model, voters form their expectations rationally: they expect left and right-wing cabinets to implement different policies, leading to two possible levels of post-electoral inflation, respectively  $\pi^L$  and  $\pi^R$ . As in Hibbs (1977), we assume that:

$$\pi^L > \pi^R \quad (3.6)$$

since left-wing parties favour lower unemployment at the price of higher inflation. Before an election, where there is uncertainty over the winner, their expectations will be an average of these two, weighted according to the winning probability ( $P$ ) of each party:

$$\pi_t^e = P\pi^R + (1 - P)\pi^L \quad (3.7)$$

Let us consider what would happen, in a political system where elections are held every other period, in the case of a left-wing coalition win. The coalition would then implement  $\pi^L$  to target a higher output level (and, thus, lower unemployment). Then, in the first period, we would have:

$$y_t = \bar{y} + \pi^L - \pi_t^e \quad (3.8)$$

Voters expectations have not yet changed at the time of the election, so for period  $t$  we would substitute 3.7 in 3.8:

$$y_t^L = \bar{y} + \pi^L - (P\pi^R + (1 - P)\pi^L) \quad (3.9a)$$

$$y_t^L = \bar{y} + P(\pi^L - \pi^R) \quad (3.9b)$$



Because of (3.6) this would lead to an increase in output. However, after the election, the winner is known. Therefore, if we assume that the election took place at time  $t$ , voters expected inflation after an election if the left-wing party wins, will change to adapt to the winning side:

$$\pi_{t+1}^e = \pi^L \quad (3.10)$$

Conversely, if we assume that the right-wing party wins, voters will set the expected inflation at:

$$\pi_{t+1}^e = \pi^R \quad (3.11)$$

while the output level would be set at :

$$y_t^R = \bar{y} - (1 - P)(\pi^L - \pi^R) \quad (3.12)$$

Since voters change their expectations and wages are not sticky, under left-wing governments, nominal wages increase since  $\pi^L$  is expected to be high. If we look at 3.4, we see that, in Alesina's (1987) model, an increase in nominal wages, leads to a decrease in the output growth  $y$ , since  $w_t$  is considered to have a negative impact on growth. After the first term when left-wing parties are able to boost economic growth, the economy tends towards equilibrium. This is shown analytically by substituting 3.10 in 3.8, which leads to:

$$y_{t+1}^L = \bar{y} + \pi^L - \pi^L \quad (3.13a)$$

$$y_{t+1}^L = \bar{y} \quad (3.13b)$$

The same applies in the case of a right-wing government, so that:

$$y_{t+1}^L = y_{t+1}^R = \bar{y} \quad (3.14)$$

Since expectations are aligned to government expected actions, voters counteract economic policies by, for example, in the case of a left-wing government demanding (and obtaining) higher wages, which almost immediately reduce the effects on output. The conclusions from Alesina's (1987) partisan cycles are similar to the conclusions drawn by neo-classical authors from Nordhaus: partisan

cycles (like PBC) exist, but, due to voter rationality, are shorter-lived than foreseen by traditional models.

Finally, note that the equivalence between voter preferences and party policies is less central in the literature succeeding Hibbs (1977) and shows a general preference for the term 'ideology' (Potrafke 2016a). Therefore, this suggests that the partisan approach (in either its traditional or rational version), in its general specification, 'examines the macroeconomic implications of electoral cycles when different political parties have different ideological and economic preferences' (Shi and Svensson 2003, 68), with no underlying necessary reference to social class.

### 3.3.2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Most empirical studies overlook the differences between the non-rational and rational versions of PT. However, Alesina et al. (1997) compare them and find that the rational version proposed by Alesina (1987) outperforms Hibbs's (1977) formulation, although the latter model remains significant. To our knowledge, the debate on the length of the cycle ended in the mid 1990s with no clear decision, and Potrafke (2016a) remarks that recent studies do not emphasize disentangling non rational and rational partisan theories. Studies tend to focus on the general formulation. So, does government influence the economy? We can identify four macro areas of research: economic outcomes (growth, unemployment, and inflation)' fiscal policy (size and composition of the budget) and other economic policies. Transversal to these studies, some work employs a hybrid opportunistic/partisan model, which deserves separate treatment.

Several studies provide support for a partisan impact on macro economic outcomes, with some *caveats* related to time and proper specification of ideology. Garrett (1998, 1995) and Garrett and Lange (2009) have conducted extensive research on the impact of globalization on partisan politics. Most of Garrett's work is related to the autonomy of national states in an era of global trade, with partisan divergences a minor area of investigation. Garrett and Lange (2009) conclude that partisan

divergences, in terms of unemployment and growth, decreased, but did not disappear during the 1990s. They also suggest that inflation is unrelated to partisan politics. Sakamoto (2008) considers the impact of government ideology on GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in 18 countries during the period 1961-2001. He relies on the political science literature (Armingeon et al. 2016) and classifies government into three categories: right, centre and left. He finds no significant impact on inflation or unemployment, but finds higher GDP growth under centre governments. Sakamoto divides the sample into two periods (1961-1981 and 1982-2001) and shows that, in 1982-2001, unemployment was lower under left-wing governments.

Osterloh (2012) , tests a different definition of party ideology relying on selected items from the MARPOR dataset (discussed in Chapter 2). He tests the impact of these items on GDP growth for 23 countries between 1971 and 2004. He finds that a party preference for free market items is a predictor of higher GDP growth rates. He uses the same sample with a definition of government ideology as left-wing or right-wing and finds no impact. He concludes, therefore, that

‘although it is found that party preferences for certain policy areas have a significant impact on economic performance, an impact of party ideology based on the party family approach cannot be detected. Hence, growth stimulating economic policy does not depend on the question whether a left-wing or right-wing party is in office. It rather seems to depend on the actual programmatic profile of the party’ (Osterloh 2012, 333).

Indeed, partisan models are not limited to outcomes. Budget size and budget composition are of major interest in these studies. Cusack (1997) provides evidence that left-wing governments increase government expenditure (as a share of GDP). He analyses data for 15 countries from 1961 to 1989. However, his results are challenged by Garrett and Mitchell (2001) and Bräuninger (2005): both of these works include post 1989 data and use slightly larger samples, and find no evidence of partisan effects on the size of total government spending. Hicks and Swank (1992) analyse social expenditure (as a share of GDP) for 18 countries over the period 1960-1982 and find that it is higher under left-

wing governments. Potrafke (2009) argues that partisan cycles began disappearing during the 1990s and finds no evidence of partisan effects on social expenditure for 20 OECD countries during 1980 and 2003. Since the evidence supporting the hypotheses is puzzling, some works include the opposition. Jensen and Seeberg (2015) argue that the emphasis placed by opposition parties on welfare in their programmes might influence government policy. They test this hypothesis on 23 countries during the period 1980-2007 using MARPOR data, and find that right-wing parties moderate their cuts to social expenditure if left-wing opposition parties emphasize welfare in their manifestos. They find no evidence of the reverse effect. Thus, they conclude that there is an ‘asymmetrical opposition-government response mechanism’ (Jensen and Seeberg 2015, 219). In other words, left-wing parties would have both opportunistic and partisan incentives to promote larger social expenditures. Right-wing parties, instead, have only opportunistic incentives that depend on the salience of social expenditures in opposition parties programmes. The importance of the opposition is underlined also by Solé Ollé (2003). He analyses tax rate choices for a sample of Spanish municipalities<sup>37</sup> during 1992 to 1999 and finds that ‘Tax rates are higher where past electoral margins are wider, where governments on the left are in charge, and in non-election years’ (Solé Ollé 2003, 709).

The literature also treats other non-budget related items. Belloc and Nicita (2012a, 2012b, 2011b, 2011a) provide an extensive analysis of the political determinants of privatization and liberalization in OECD countries. In particular, their results show that ‘Ideological cleavages affect the ‘structure’ of deregulation, i.e. the way in which liberalization and privatization are combined, rather than the decision to deregulate per se.’ (Belloc and Nicita 2011a, 4) since left-wing governments prefer to

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<sup>37</sup> Partisan models have been used recently to study local governments. Since our focus is on national politics, we do not include these works in this review. However, see (Delgado, Lago-Peñas, and Mayor 2015). Solé Ollé’s (2003) article is included since its conclusions on electoral margins, together with those of Krause and Mendez (2005) and Jensen and Seeberg (2015), in our view justify the choice to use partisan models to treat RRP despite their limited time in government.

liberalize markets with no or little privatization, while right-wing majorities opt for privatising state companies. According to the authors, most likely due to their ideology. Left-wing parties may show ‘a persistent aversion towards a full decentralized market economy and a political favour towards economic restructuring through incentives provided by competition’ (Belloc and Nicita 2011a, 18). Other studies analyse product market deregulation (Potrafke 2010) and show that right-wing parties implement more deregulatory policies than left-wing governments. Galasso (2014) obtains similar results in an investigation of product market deregulation and public ownership in 25 countries between 1975 and 2008: right-wing governments introduce less strict market regulation and public ownership.

Finally, according to Hibbs (1992) opportunistic and partisan models cannot be considered mutually exclusive, and it is common to find studies that test for both opportunistic cycles and partisan effects. Swank and Swank (1993) study the influence of the incumbent’s ideology on US budgets during 1966 to 1988. Their results show that ‘Republican administrations aim at reducing tax rates when election comes near, and Democratic administrations appear to be more concerned about unemployment and inflation in pre-election years than in post-election years’ (Swank and Swank 1993, 1020). These results are confirmed by Krause and Mendez (2005), who analyse 24 countries between 1974 and 2000. The authors add that, in an election year, economic policy is subject to ‘party-resemblance’, meaning that incumbents’ policies move towards those of the opposition in order to attract their electorate. Ohlsson and Vredin (1996) test the opportunistic and partisan models for revenue and expenditure, for Sweden during the 1968-1993 period. They find support only for partisan effects (revenue, expenditure and fiscal surplus are all lower with right-wing governments) and no evidence of an opportunistic cycle. Ohlsson and Vredin's (1996) results are in line with Grier (1987) and Haynes and Stone (1989) on the US. Thus, there seems not to be a consensus on the topic.

### 3.3.3. HOW TO STUDY RRPs' IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY?

In many respects, the partisan models might seem a good theoretical basis from which to develop our analysis. However, similar to the opportunistic models, there are some problems. According to Palombarini (2001), these models reject the '*specificity*' of politics. He identifies this specificity as 'the struggle for power'. Since political parties perfectly represent their constituencies and act according to voters' preferences, parties do not compete for political power. They do not modify their agendas nor do they adopt new strategies to attract new voters; the changes emanate from changes in the distribution of voters' preferences. Both Hibbs's (1977) and Alesina's (1987) models suffer from the same limitations.

However, the studies they triggered justify our research: whether in relation to the long-term (Hibbs 1977) or short-lived cycles (Alesina 1987), partisan politics seem to play a role in determining economic policies and outcomes. However, the literature focuses solely on differences between left-wing and right-wing parties. As we discussed, empirical research never addressed the impact of other political forces such as RRPs. We start by relying on the PT to develop additional hypotheses to the one developed in 3.2.4, which are tested in Chapter 4; the limits of these models are then furtherly addressed in Chapter 5. Although cabinet records for RRPs are fairly limited (see Ch. 1), a few examples of governments with RRP participation can be found in Europe. In line with more classical interpretations of the partisan model, we expect that RRPs participating in government will strive to implement economic policies that are aligned to their ideological features (see Ch. 1). In the review of the literature on partisan models, this might be related to both outcomes and economic policies and, in particular, budget size and budget composition:

PH-GOV: Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRPs are characterized by larger shares of their budget dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes, in line with RRPs' ideological profile.

It might be also that the impact of strong RRP is felt even if these parties are not part of a ruling coalition. This is an interesting hypothesis since the scholars have only recently begun to consider the role of opposition parties in relation to ‘party resemblance’ (although only before an election), ‘asymmetric opposition-government response mechanism’, and the influence of electoral margins. We suggest that party resemblance might apply throughout a parliamentary term if the RRP is strong:

PH - STR: In countries characterized by strong RRP we might expect larger shares of their budget dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies, and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profile, even when these parties do not have direct power.

Finally, Hibbs (1992) suggests that opportunistic and partisan models share some common ground inasmuch as opportunistic incentives may differ among parties. We have seen that the literature considers non-RR parties, but reaches no firm conclusions. Similarly, it might be that RRP as incumbents will try to influence their governing coalition to adopt policies that are more in line with the RR electorate. Thus, while in PH-GOV we consider that RRP exerts their influence all along their governing experience, literature suggests adding a hypothesis focusing exclusively on opportunistic behaviours by incumbent RRP in election year:

OH - GOV: When RRP are incumbents, we might expect, in the election year, an increase in national deficits and national expenditure due to RRP's populist appeal, and expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profile, followed by a re-adjustment in non-election years.

### 3.4. INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: THE RULES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ENHANCE/REPRESS PARTISAN AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOURS

Political parties do not compete in a vacuum as political institutions structure the system. Here we refer specifically to political institutions, understood as a bundle of ‘electoral rules and form[s] of government’ (Torsten Persson and Tabellini 2004, 25) shaping political competition.<sup>38</sup> As the debate on (R)PBCs and partisan determinants proceeded, the same authors started taking interest in the relation between the political system and the economy, with a particular focus on debt and public expenditure. These studies analyse differences among electoral systems, forms of government, political fragmentation and other features of the political system sometimes on their own (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002), sometimes in correlation with opportunistic and partisan approaches. Unlike previous approaches to the political determinants of the economy, these studies did not spark major theoretical debates such as those over voter rationality for opportunistic and partisan models. Rather, these works built on these earlier debates and complemented previous work by examining whether institutions play a conditional role limiting/enabling partisan and/or opportunistic cycles. Section 3.4.1 discusses the empirical results from this literature. Section 3.4.2 argues that, despite being less theoretically debated, the research on institutional conditions has some important shortcomings related to the analysis of RRP’s impact.

#### 3.4.1. IMPORTANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) predict that Proportional Representation (PR) systems favour larger government spending than majoritarian systems. This is based on the fact that under the majoritarian system, a party can win an election with only a fraction of the votes (theoretically, ‘50

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<sup>38</sup> Alesina and Passalacqua (2015) introduce budget institutions and the norms regulating in-government policymaking, such as Central Bank independence. However, the discussion concerning this particular form of institutional set-up is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a complete review of budget institutions see Alesina (2015).



percent of the votes in 50 percent of the districts' (Torsten Persson and Tabellini 2004, 25)). In proportional systems, the party must, as far as possible, win 50% of the total votes. Thus, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2004) consider that there is an electoral incentive in PR systems to propose broad-based benefits, meaning that policy benefits should be accessible by a larger segment of the population. They find evidence supporting this hypothesis across different studies. They extend their study from electoral rules to forms of government and find that 'presidential democracies are associated with smaller governments than parliamentary democracies' (Torsten Persson and Tabellini 2004, 42). They explain this difference as due to the relative weakness of veto-players in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary democracies: since the executive branch does not have to rely on a compact majority in the legislative branch, there are fewer incentives to maintain a large coalition, which, supposedly, will lead to an increased budget in order to satisfy multiple constituencies.

Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) analyse the impact of electoral rules. They find that in majority systems there is an increase in the purchase of goods and services, while PR systems<sup>39</sup> are more likely to see an increase in transfers. The purchase of goods and services represents geographically localized spending on items such as building schools, hiring police, etc. Transfers are based on policies that provide monetary benefits to all national citizens depending on their social status (e.g. unemployment benefits). The authors argue that, since voters are rational and forward-looking, they can anticipate which policy set will benefit them the most, and can vote for the candidate proposing it. The electoral rules modify voters' incentives to demand transfers or the purchase of goods and services. According to their model, majoritarian systems divide the country in a number of districts, each electing a candidate. In PR systems, instead, the whole country is considered as a single district. They argue

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<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) consider PR systems with just one national electoral district while a large number of countries adopting PR systems are divided in subnational electoral districts. These subnational electoral districts then appear to be closer to the Majoritarian system developed by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) than to PR systems.

that a parliament elected under a majoritarian system will be composed of members from different geographical allegiances, but the same social allegiance. In a parliament elected under a PR system, instead, representatives belong to a different social allegiance (each represented by a different party) and their geographical background is less relevant. Thus, they conclude, in a parliament elected under a majoritarian system rational voters, anticipating this outcome, will support those candidates proposing larger purchase of goods and service ‘in order to bias government expenditure on public goods toward their own constituency’ (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002, 610). The authors then conclude that spending on the purchase of goods and services is expected to be higher in majoritarian systems compared to PR systems. They test this hypothesis on a sample of 20 OECD countries between 1960 and 1994 as well as 20 Latin American countries between 1991 and 1994. The results for the OECD countries provide support for the idea that majoritarian systems favour the purchase of goods and services more than do proportional systems. They find only weak evidence of this effect for the Latin American countries.

In addition to considering electoral rules, several studies consider both political fragmentation and the maturity of the political institutions. Roubini and Sachs (1989) analyse the effects of coalition governments on fiscal deficits and find that coalitions are less efficient at reducing deficits because of their generally higher political instability and, thus, shortness of their ruling term. Roubini and Sachs's (1989) analysis relies on a discussion of the differences in deficit spending in 12 European countries over the 1961 to 1985 period and econometric tests of their main hypotheses. Their results are consistent with those in Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2004) and Alesina and Glaeser (2005) on more recent panels. Klomp and De Haan's (2013a) results are slightly different. They investigate 70 countries over the 1970-2007 period and find that political budget cycles are longer in one-party governments compared to coalition governments. Potrafke (2012, 3) considers the number of political parties in the political system and finds that: ‘in countries with two-party systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) [...] annual

GDP growth was higher before elections'. In other words, two-party systems are more likely to experience PBC. According to Potrafke, this is because in two-party systems, it is easier than in multiparty systems for voters to identify the party responsible for economic growth. Since voters in multiparty systems are unsure about who to blame/reward, politicians have fewer incentives to boost the economy before an election.

Gonzalez (2002) focuses on the national levels of democracy as a condition for opportunistic cycles. He tests his hypothesis on Mexico between 1957 and 1997. It should be noted that Gonzalez (2002) uses indexes of democracy taken from the political science literature to operationalize this concept, but does offer a different definition. He finds that, in Mexico, political budget cycles, measured as spending on infrastructure and transfers, are positively influenced by the degree of democracy. Since Mexico was ruled by the same party (the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* – PRI) for the whole of the period analysed, Gonzalez concludes that in strongly democratic governments (with a higher possibility of turnover in government), the PRI had a greater incentive to increase spending before an election in order to secure victory. Brender and Drezen (2005) provide similar results from an analysis of political deficit cycles (pre-electoral variations in the size of the government deficit) for 106 countries between 1960 and 2001. They distinguish between new and established democracies. They consider 'new democracies' are countries that were not democracies at the beginning of the analysis, that is, all those countries that became democracies after 1960. Their results show that new democracies are more prone to increase deficit spending before an election. These results are in line with those in Klomp and De Haan (2013b), which studies the impact of a broad set of political institutions on opportunistic and partisan effects on agricultural subsidies. Klomp and De Haan (2013b, 812) find that

'the effect of election and partisan cycles is conditional on the political system. In industrialized countries, the election effect is stronger under majoritarian systems than under proportional electoral systems, while in developing countries the election effect is stronger under proportional electoral

systems. In developing and emerging market countries, right-wing parties in proportional systems provide more support to the agricultural sector than right-wing parties in majoritarian systems, while in industrialized countries, right-wing parties in majoritarian systems spend more on agriculture than right-wing parties in proportional systems’.

### 3.4.2. CONDITIONS TO IMPACT OR CONDITIONS TO SUCCEED? CONCERNS OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RRPs AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Studies on institutional features complements the opportunistic and partisan models dealing specifically with electoral rules and government forms. The results of these studies are rather compelling and, within this literature, there is a greater consensus on the correlation between institutions and economic policy than found for opportunistic or partisan determinants. However, the interpretation of institutional conditions is more debated. In particular, according to Alesina and Passalacqua (2015), institutional studies suffer from the shortcoming that they consider institutions as exogenous while they are more likely to be endogenous. In other words, political institutions do not only shape economic policies and outcomes, they also depend on the same social structures that shape the demand for economic policy:

‘For instance, suppose that a parliamentary proportional system (generating a multiparty system with many veto players) was adopted because it was the only way to guarantee representation to very polarized and divided societies (across income, ideological, religious or ethnic lines). Those same characteristics of society might lead to certain choices of policies (spending, deficits, debt). Thus proportional representation and deficits would correlate but causality is called into question.’ (Alesina and Passalacqua 2016, 2118) .

As such, within the ‘political economics’ school there is a theoretical discussion on the role of institutional conditions (Alesina and Passalacqua 2016). Considering that this is the framework that we explored in this Chapter thus leads us to assess the extent of Alesina and Passalacqua’s (2016)

<b>Model</b>	<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Political determinant</b>	<b>Mechanism</b>	<b>Main works</b>
<b>Political Business Cycle</b>	Economic performances (inflation, growth, unemployment)	Election year	Politicians seek to maximize their utility being re-elected.	Nordhaus (1975), Persson and Tabellini (1990)
<b>Political Budget Cycle</b>	Budgetary variables	Election year	Politicians seek to maximize their utility being re-elected.	Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Alesina et al.'s (1993), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)
<b>Partisan Theory (PT)</b>	Budgetary variables	Government's ideology	Politicians seek to maximize their utility satisfying the demands of their social basis. It focuses on ideology in later studies	Hibbs (1977), Alesina (1987), Potrafke (2016)
<b>Institutional Effects</b>	Budgetary variables	Institutional features	Institutions modify the incentives for voters and politicians. They thus influence PBCs and Partisan effects.	Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000)

*Table 48 - Main features of mainstream economic approaches to politics. Source: original compilation.*

caveat in the case of RRP. In the 2000s, several published works questioned the impact of institutional factors on RRP's electoral results.<sup>40</sup> These studies analyse the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of RRP, in other words the features of the political system that affect the possibility of success or failure for RRP (Minkenberg 2013a). Most of this research focuses on electoral rules and the empirical evidence is ambiguous. Some studies find a significant and positive impact of proportionality on RRP electoral scores (Arzheimer and Carter 2006), others find a significant and negative effect (Veugelers and Magnan 2005) and some find no impact (Carter 2005b; Norris 2005). To our knowledge, the ambiguity in the literature on RRP does not allow us to reject Alesina's (2015) caveat since some political institutions might not be exogenous to RRP success. Thus, we do not develop specific hypotheses on the role of institutional conditions at this stage. However, we believe that political institutions might play a role: simply put, neo-classical models in this Chapter are not apt to treat the complexity of the relationship between political parties and political institutions at the same time. Thus, institutional conditions are discussed in Chapters 5, where we move away from neo-classical models to lay out the elements of a heterodox approach to the impact of RRP.

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<sup>40</sup> As for the opposite relation, we assess the literature on the influence of RRP electoral results on institutional features of the political system in Chapter 5.

### 3.5. CONCLUSION

The objective of this chapter was (i) to identify, within the mainstream literature, different frameworks for analysing politics as a determinant of the economy; and (ii) to identify, in particular, the possible impacts of RRPs, using these existing frameworks. Table 48 summarizes the main features of the approaches discussed in this chapter while Table 50 presents a summary of literature's main results. We have also shown that the various frameworks in the literature have important shortcomings. On the one hand, economics has downplayed the role played by these parties. On the other hand, some theoretical concerns arise. In particular:

- Opportunistic models (Nordhaus 1975; Roubini and Sachs 1989) provide a too narrow vision of the political actors: since they are opportunistic, politics becomes a determinant only when an election is imminent. Moreover, opportunistic models deny the 'autonomy' of politics (Palombarini 2001) since they are not autonomous in the definition of their strategies to secure re-election.
- Partisan models consider the effects of partisan differences in electoral and non-electoral periods. However, they negate the 'specificity' of politics (Palombarini 2001) and reduce political parties to a synthesis of the interests of their voters, while political competition is no longer represented as a struggle for power.
- Institutional conditions trigger less theoretical debate, but are in an unclear relationship with RRPs. Institutions' and RRPs' strengths are probably intertwined. Rather than being a condition for RRPs' economic impact, institutions seem to influence RRPs' chances of electoral success. Given the complex relationship between party politics and political institutions, we decided to focus on the first two models as basis for the econometric test, while we assess institutional conditions to our discussion in Chapter 5.

Despite doubts related to some of the theoretical arguments underlying critiques of the opportunistic and partisan models, we have identified four hypotheses, presented in

	<b>RRPs' political strength (STR)</b>	<b>RRPS are part of the government (GOV)</b>
<b>Opportunistic models hypothesis (OH)</b>	<p style="text-align: center;">OH-STR</p> <p><i>In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">OH-GOV</p> <p><i>When RRPs are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in lines with their ideological profiles.</i></p>
<b>Partisan models hypothesis (PH)</b>	<p style="text-align: center;">PH-STR</p> <p><i>In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">PH - GOV</p> <p><i>Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRPs are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRPs' ideological profiles.</i></p>

Table 49. These derive from the model we rely on (opportunistic/partisan) and the political variable we are interested in (RRPs' political strength/RRPs' part of the government). In the next Chapter, we: (i) discuss the econometric model that allows testing these hypotheses, (ii) identify and operationalise our dependent and independent variables, and (iii) present the results.

	<b>RRPs' political strength (STR)</b>	<b>RRPS are part of the government (GOV)</b>
<b>Opportunistic models hypothesis (OH)</b>	<p style="text-align: center;">OH-STR</p> <p><i>In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">OH-GOV</p> <p><i>When RRPs are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in lines with their ideological profiles.</i></p>
<b>Partisan models hypothesis (PH)</b>	<p style="text-align: center;">PH-STR</p> <p><i>In countries characterized by strong RRPs, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">PH - GOV</p> <p><i>Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRPs are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRPs' ideological profiles.</i></p>

**Table 49 - Matrix of hypotheses about RRPs' impacts.**

Study	Category	Results
Alesina et al. (1993)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	No evidence of the existence of Nordhaus's PBC. Some evidence of RPBC
Alesina and Roubini (1992)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	Evidence of RPBC on inflation
Grier (2008)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	Evidence of PBC - business (unspecified if RPBC or not) for US in terms of growth
Potrafke (2012)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	Evidence of PBC - business (unspecified if RPBC or not) for OECD countries
Klomp and De Haan (2013a)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	Evidence of PBC - business (unspecified if RPBC or not) for African countries
Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016)	Opportunistic models - Business cycle	Evidence of PBC - business (unspecified if RPBC or not) for African countries
Alesina et al. (1997)	Opportunistic models - Budget cycle	Evidence of opportunistic cycle on public deficit - OECD countries
Shi and Svensson (2003)	Opportunistic models - Budget cycle	Evidence of opportunistic cycle on government's budget size - stronger in developing countries
Tujula and Wolswijk (2007)	Opportunistic models - Budget cycle	Budget balances deteriorate markedly in election years - OECD countries
Mink and De Han (2006)	Opportunistic models - Budget cycle	Budget deficit increases in election year - EU countries
Vergne (2009)	Opportunistic models - Budget cycle	Shift from capital expenditure to current expenditure (especially subsidies) in election year - developing countries
Hicks and Swank (1992)	Partisan Theory	Social expenditure higher under left-wing governments - OECD countries
Cusack (1997)	Partisan Theory	Left-wing governments increase government expenditure- OECD countries
Garrett and Mitchell (2001)	Partisan Theory	no evidence of partisan effects on the size of total government spending- OECD countries
Bräuningner (2005)	Partisan Theory	no evidence of partisan effects on the size of total government spending -OECD countries
Sakamoto (2008)	Partisan Theory	1. no significant impact on inflation or unemployment 2. higher GDP growth under centre governments 3. unemployment was lower under left-wing governments until 2001 - OECD countries
Garrett and Lange (2009)	Partisan Theory	Partisan divergences, in terms of unemployment and growth, decreased, but did not disappeared during the 1990s - OECD countries
Potrafke (2009)	Partisan Theory	No evidence of partisan effects on social expenditure - OECD countries
Belloc and Nicita (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b)	Partisan Theory	Left-wing governments prefer to liberalize markets, while right-wing prefer to privatize - OECD countries
Potrafke (2010)	Partisan Theory	Right-wing parties implement more deregulatory policies - OECD countries
Osterloh (2012)	Partisan Theory	A party preference for free market items is a predictor of higher GDP growth rates - OECD countries
Galasso (2014)	Partisan Theory	Right-wing governments introduce less strict market regulation and public ownership - OECD countries
Jensen and Seeberg (2015)	Partisan Theory	Right-wing parties moderate their cuts to social expenditure if left-wing opposition parties emphasize welfare in their manifestos - OECD countries
Swank and Swank (1993)	Partisan Theory and Opportunistic cycles	In election year Republicans cut tax rates while Democrats decrease unemployment - US
Ohlsson and Vredin (1996)	Partisan Theory and Opportunistic cycles	Support only for PT and not for Opportunistic cycles - OECD
Krause and Mendez (2005)	Partisan Theory and PBC	In election year incumbents' policies move towards those of the opposition - OECD countries
Roubini and Sachs (1989)	Institutional features	Coalitions are less efficient at reducing deficits
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000)	Institutional features	PR systems favour larger government spending - OECD countries
Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)	Institutional features	Majority systems are more likely to increase the purchase of goods and services, PR systems are more likely to see an increase in transfers - OECD countries
Persson and Tabellini (2004)	Institutional features	Presidential democracies are associated with smaller governments than parliamentary democracies
Gonzalez (2002)	Institutional features	Level of democracy influences opportunistic cycles - Mexico
Brender and Drezin (2005)	Institutional features	Level of democracy influences opportunistic cycles - New democracies
Potrafke (2012)	Institutional features	GDP growth higher in countries with two-party systems - OECD countries
Klomp and De Haan (2013a)	Institutional features	Both institutional and partisan factors influence PBC
Klomp and De Haan's (2013b)	Institutional features	Opportunistic cycles longer in one-party governments compared to coalition governments

*Table 50 - Summary of Literature's main results. Source: original compilation.*



# 4. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES ACCORDING TO MAINSTREAM THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

## 4.1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 provided a critical discussion about the major theoretical economics models used to assess the effect of ‘politics’ on the economy, and some of the results in the literature. We identified in particular two main conceptualizations (opportunistic and the partisan models). The ‘opportunistic models’ (i.e. Political Business/Budget Cycle (PBC)) consider political actors as office-seekers (i.e. they maximize their utility function by being reelected). Thus, in these models, politicians facing re-election are driven mostly by opportunistic considerations and have incentives to boost the economic cycle or intervene in expenditures and revenues towards the end of their term in office (Nordhaus 1975; Roubini and Sachs 1989). In the ‘partisan model’, political actors are considered as policy-seekers (i.e. they maximize their utility by promoting policies close to their ideology). This model assesses the differences between left-wing and right-wing governments in terms of policy and performance (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1987). However, empirical works about these models show ambiguous results. Moreover, to our knowledge, they have never been specifically applied to RRP. This is why, in this chapter, we focus on RRP. In particular, we are going to test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3:

OH - GOV: When RRP are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in lines with their ideological profiles.

OH-STR: In countries characterized by strong RRP, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.

PH-GOV: Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRP are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profiles.

PH-STR: In countries characterized by strong RRP, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.

	<b>RRPs' political strength</b>	<b>RRPS are part of the government</b>
<b>Opportunistic models</b>	OH-STR	OH-GOV
<b>Partisan models</b>	PH-STR	PH-GOV

*Table 51 - Summary of hypotheses.*

As discussed in the Introduction, since 2000s, political science scholars have begun to assess the effects of RRP on political systems, moving from the causes of RRP success to its consequences (Mudde 2014b). In particular, the literature has tested whether RRP have been able to catalyse nativist attitudes against migrants and minorities; assessed the possible co-optation by non-RR parties of, in particular, immigration policy in their political programmes; and discussed the activities of RRP when in office and their possible indirect effects on policy-making. However, there is no consensus on the size of RRP impact on either policy-making or the political system (Mudde 2013).

Our research question is thus in line with this research stream which is addressing the consequences of RRPs' success since the beginning of 2000. However, most of these works focuses on the impact of RRPs on immigration (in terms of attitudes, proposals and policy) rather than on the impact on the economy (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). An originality of our research question relies on questioning this impact.

In what follows, we present and discuss the methodology and the economic variables chosen along with the operationalization of political variables. In particular, Section 4.2 presents the methodology, including the operationalization of our hypotheses, and discusses the model. Section 4.3 describes the dataset and Section 4.4 presents the results of our analysis. Section 4.5 summarizes our findings and highlights some limitations of our analysis, which are addressed in Chapter 5.

## 4.2. METHODOLOGY

In order to test our hypotheses on the impact of RRPs we perform a dynamic panel analysis on a sample of 27 countries between 1991 and 2014. In 4.2.1 we describe a dynamic panel analysis and present the opportunistic and partisan models; in 4.2.2 we present our choice of dependent variables and in 4.3.3 we discuss the different operationalisations of our political explanatory variables. We include both political and economic independent variables, and our main independent variable captures the strength of RRPs. The strength of a political party can be captured by various means and in 4.2.3 we propose a set of six indicators.

### 4.2.1. DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Early studies on opportunistic and partisan models (Alesina 1988; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997) use OLS regressions or OLS panel regressions, with the political covariate as independent variable and various variables for the economy (growth, unemployment, money supply, change in debt-to-GDP ratio, etc.) as dependent. These studies make use of panel data fixed effect models and include a dynamic component.

Panel data analysis is an extension of time-series and cross-section regression analysis, where individuals  $i$  are each repeated at different time  $t$ . In our model, the individuals are the countries. This is formalized as:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + x_{it}\beta + u_{it} \quad i = 1, \dots, N; t = 1, \dots, T \quad (4.1)$$

where  $y$  is the dependent variable,  $\alpha$  is a scalar,  $K$  is the number of explanatory variables,  $\beta$  is  $K \times 1$ ,  $x_{it}$  is the vector of the  $K$  values of the explanatory variables for the country  $i$  at date  $t$ ,  $u_{it}$  is the error component.  $u_{it}$  defined as:

$$u_{it} = u_i + v_{it} \quad (4.2)$$

where  $u_i$  denotes the unobserved effects for *individual*  $i$  and  $v_{it}$  is the idiosyncratic error term. The notation shows that  $u_i$  does not change across time, while  $v_{it}$  can change across both  $t$  and  $i$ . In order to proceed with the estimation, it is necessary to decide how to treat  $u_i$ . There are at least three ways proposed in the literature: fixed effects, random effects and between effects.

Fixed effects models treat  $u_i$  as a parameter which is estimated for each  $i$  with the remaining errors assumed to be stochastic with  $v_{it}$  independent and identically distributed. In random effects models,  $u_i$  and  $v_{it}$  are both in the error term and, as a consequence, are both considered to be independent of  $x_{it}$ . Empirical works on opportunistic and partisan models usually rely on fixed effects models. Fixed effects models are useful if some unobserved factors are expected to characterize a certain individual for the entire time span. In our case, since we are working with countries, we assume that  $\mu_i$  includes the country's cultural heritage, language and other country specific and time-invariant features.

Let us consider equation (4.1), as a fixed effects model. Then we would have:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + x_{it}\beta + \mu_i + v_{it} \quad (4.3)$$

This can be written in the form of a vector as:

$$y = \alpha + x \beta + Z_\mu \mu + v \quad (4.4)$$

We can then perform an OLS regression on (4) to estimate  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\mu$ . This model has two important consequences (Baltagi 2008; Wooldridge 2010): first, it focuses exclusively on the set of  $N$  countries being analysed and the results cannot be generalized to individuals not included in the panel. This is clear in macroeconomic analyses where the results would rarely be generalized to other countries not included in the panel. However, it is also fairly likely that a typical macro panel will contain most of the countries of interest and, thus, will be less likely to be a random sample from a much larger universe of countries (e.g., an OECD panel is likely to contain all of the OECD countries and not just a random sample of them). (Judson and Owen 1999, 3) Second, explanatory variables cannot be time invariant for all  $i$ . This is because we are estimating country-specific time-invariant effects. Let us consider the following example: we have a panel of  $N$  countries with  $N$  electoral laws, no country experienced a change in its institutional setting in the time span under consideration and we want to use electoral laws as an explanatory variable for GDP growth. Fixed effects are not appropriate since the effect of electoral laws, in this panel, are included in  $\mu_i$ . They could have been used if some countries in our panel had changed their electoral laws. For this reason, already underlined in Chapter 3, we decided not to include institutional effects in our econometric tests.

Another important matter, shared by both fixed and random effects models, is ‘the (auto-regressive) history’ (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997, 83) of the dependent variable. Indeed, there are cases where the values observed for a certain variable at time  $t$  depend on the values observed at time  $t-1$ . Therefore, an auto-regressive specification of this term is included. In other words, typical formalizations introduce a lagged version of the dependent variable as a regressor. For example, the empirical model tested in Alesina and Roubini (1992, 12) is:

$$y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 y_{t-1} + \alpha_2 y_{t-2} \dots \alpha_n y_{t-n} + \alpha_{n+1} \text{PDUM}_T + \varepsilon_t \quad (4.5)$$

where ‘ $y_t$  is the stacked vector of time series data on output growth for the countries in the sample, PDUM is a political dummy that captures the implications of the different theories’ and  $\varepsilon_t$  is the error term.

However, the specification of a lagged version of the dependent in a panel regression is far from free of consequences. Let us consider, instead, a general dynamic fixed effects model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha y_{i,t-1} + x_{it}\beta + u_{it} \quad i = 1, \dots, N; t = 1, \dots, T \quad (4.6)$$

We assume that the  $u_{it}$  follow a one-way error component model:

$$u_{it} = \mu_i + v_{it} \quad (4.7)$$

where  $\mu_i \sim \text{IID}(0, \sigma_\mu^2)$  and  $v_{it} \sim \text{IID}(0, \sigma_v^2)$  are independent of each other and among themselves' (Baltagi 2008, 135). It is clear that  $y_{it}$  is a function of  $u_i$ . However, also each of the lagged terms  $y_{i,t-n}$ . Thus, there is a problem of auto-correlation between the lagged regressor and the error term in the general model. In fixed effects models,  $\mu_i$  is not considered as an error term, but  $v_{i,t-n}$  is still correlated with  $y_{t-n}$  since, by construction, it is correlated with  $\bar{v}_i$ . We have seen that fixed effects models still assume that  $v_{it}$  is independent of  $x_{it}$ : this is still the case, but no longer for any  $t$ . Consequently, the estimates are inconsistent. The problem was highlighted first by Nerlove (1971) and given analytical expression by Nickell (1981). Nickell (1981) found that the fixed effects estimator is biased by  $O(1/T)$ . The longer the time-series (in terms of data points) is, the less the bias and, therefore, the more consistent the results are. Therefore, econometric literature suggests that, for studies with large  $N$  and small size  $T$ , should rely on different estimators.

In Alesina and Roubini (1992; 1997), the previous problem is less important. Their works rely on quarterly reported data, thus, their panel data are characterized by long-time series with more than 100 data points. As we have seen, the bias is  $O(1/T)$ , as such their panel is large enough to consider their results consistent.

In the present case, the situation is more complicated since our panel data span less than 25 years and only for some not all countries and economic variables. Judson and Owen employ Monte Carlo simulations to test the error in a large  $N$  sample ( $N=20$  and  $N=100$ ) over different time periods, up to

T = 30 and find that, in the case of T=30, there is an expected ‘estimate with a bias from 3% to 20% of the true value’ (Judson and Owen 1999, 8). We can conclude that the bias will be excessive especially since the literature offers alternative models which outperform the fixed effects estimator in the case of small size T. A review of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 shows that, among the papers adopting dynamic models other than a fixed effects estimator, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is the most frequently used. The Arellano and Bond estimator uses additional instruments, obtained by the variables of the model, by differencing the model equation under orthogonality conditions between lagged y and the error term  $v_{it}$ . In order to test the robustness of our results, we rely on the Arellano–Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. GMM estimators work under the hypothesis that idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), so first differenced errors are first-order serially correlated, while second order errors should not be correlated.<sup>41</sup>

Based on this discussion, we test the following regression model using Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator:

$$ECON_{i,t} = \beta POL_{i,t-1} + \sum_n \delta_n ECON_{i,t-n} + \sum_k \theta_k \mathbf{V}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (4.8)$$

where  $ECON_{i,t}$  is one of the economic indicators discussed in 4.3.2 in country i and year t,  $\mathbf{V}$  is a vector of control variables (discussed in 4.3.3),  $POL_{i,t-1}$  is the relevant political explanatory variable, and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is an error term. We test all political covariates with a one-year lag in order to account for possible endogeneity and reverse causality. For example it might be that it is not the strength of RRP

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<sup>41</sup> Arellano and Bond (1991) also suggest to include calculations of Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. However, as Mody and Murshid point out, ‘in finite samples the Sargan test statistics obtained from the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator often over-reject the null in the presence of heteroscedasticity. While standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity can be obtained, the distribution of the Sargan test is unknown in this case.’ In order to avoid heteroskedasticity, we run our model using the robust estimator, which does not allow us to compute the Sargan test (see *vce(robust)* under *xtabond* in STATA manual for further explications).

that determines the level of foreign people at risk of poverty, but rather that the high level of poverty among foreign people fuels support for RRP. The interaction and feedbacks between these two aspects may be producing a self-reinforcing vicious circle. Belloc and Nicita (2012b; 2014) propose the use of one-year lag for political covariates so as to reduce the risk of reverse casualty. The same equation is tested for opportunistic and partisan models: the difference between the two is in the operationalization of the variable POL.

Our model must also take into account differences of behaviours between group of countries and in particular those between Western and Eastern countries. We justify this choice on the basis of the differences between Eastern and Western European countries concerning the nature of RRP, the cleavages in their political systems, and the presence of already observed political business and budget cycles (Pirro 2014b, 2015; Minkenberg 2015). In particular, Pirro (2014b, 622) concludes that RRP in Eastern Europe 'do not embody a "silent counter-revolution" like the populist radical right parties of the West; rather, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe tap into a "post-communist syndrome" stemming from the disappointments of the transformation process.'

The political systems also present some important and persistent differences. Marks et al. (2006) argue that both systems have a common structure, but party competition works differently. Indeed, in both systems we can find two dimensions: one related to the Left/Right economic cleavage and the other, referred to as GAL/TAN, opposing Green / Alternative / Libertarian parties (GAL) to Traditionalist / Authoritarian / Nationalist parties (TAN) (Bakker, Edwards, et al. 2015). However, despite their similar party competition structures (i.e., dimensionality), 'the outcome could hardly be more different' (Marks et al. 2006, 169). The communist heritage strongly shaped the way leftist, nationalist and agrarian parties position themselves on these two dimensions so that, for example, while the radical left in Western Europe is left-wing economically and libertarian socially (Left-Gal), in Eastern Europe it is characterized by stark authoritarianism (Left-Tan). Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) address the impact of European integration on Eastern European political systems and find



that continuity trumps change, although there are valid reasons to expect convergence as the integration process continues. Following these conclusions, Rovny and Edwards (2012, 90) argue that ‘the discrepancies appear to be waning as the axes of competition in Eastern and Central European countries begin to mimic the overall pattern found in the West’. However, these discrepancies have not yet disappeared.

Moreover, also the literature on the opportunistic models addresses the matter. Hallerberg et al. (2002) find evidence of a political monetary cycle in Eastern European countries and not in Western European countries and argue that these cycles are impossible in Western European countries because of the mandatory independence of the Central Banks prescribed by EU treaties. These findings are confirmed by Brender and Drazen (2005), who study the differences in PBC between ‘new’ and established democracies, and by Németh (2014), who focuses exclusively on Eastern European countries. Since our panel includes also Eastern European countries, we need to take account of possible differences between East and West. We do this by testing our model on three different samples: one including all countries (ALL), a subsample with only Western European countries (WEST), and a subsample composed of only Eastern European countries.

Summarizing: we use Arellano and Bond's (1991) estimator to work with panels characterized by a limited number of periods. We test our hypotheses on three samples of countries: a complete sample of 27 European countries (25 OECD plus Romania and Bulgaria), a subsample composed of only Western European countries, and a subsample including only Eastern European countries. Our dependent variables are economic indicators that are related to the three core ideological features of RRP (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism). Our independent variables, instead, measure the importance of RRP in their own national political systems. In Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, we proceed by discussing the dependent (ECON) and independent (POL) variables. We then test our hypotheses in Section 4.4.

#### 4.2.2. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: MEASURES OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND OUTCOMES

In the previous Section we discussed the methodology we are going to use to test our hypotheses. As a reminder, we want to verify whether the strength of RRP has an impact on economic policy. We test whether there are opportunistic/partisan effects specifically related to RR ideological profile. For each model, we formulate two hypotheses: in hyp. OH – GOV and PH - GOV we focus on RR as ruling parties, in hyp. OH – STR and PH - STR we analyse the relationship between economic variables and RR electoral strength. However, our four hypotheses revolve around the ideological features discussed in Chapter 1 and identified by Mudde (2007): nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. These concepts are, clearly, not ready to be tested. We first need to find other indicators that act as proxies of RR ideology. Aim of this Section is to identify the best economic variables to capture the influence of each RRP's ideological core feature (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) on the economy.

##### 4.2.2.1. NATIVIST VARIABLES

Nativism is the fear of the foreign 'otherness', which threatens a country's homogeneity. It is used to refer to anti-immigrant stances and other forms of nationalism (Mudde 2007). Given the data at our disposal, we operationalized the nativist part of RRP's impact by focusing on the economic conditions of the migrant population and the country's economic openness. The literature analyses the influence of RRP on migratory policies (Mudde 2013) and the debate on the extent of RRP's impact. In the present work we focus on a broader set of outcomes related to the economic integration of migrants. The most appropriate way to test for a nativist impact on the economy would be to analyse data on transfers and access to social services for foreign-born citizens, and public expenditure on integration-related issues. However, these data are not available for a large part of our panel, but since nativism plays such a big role in RRP ideology, we include variables for the economic well-being of foreign populations and differences with the native population: the rate of activity and unemployment of

foreign-born citizens (ARF and UNEMPF) and nationals (ARN and UNEMPN), and the difference between nationals and foreign born citizens (DIFFARNF and DIFFRUNNF). We also include the mean and median incomes for nationals (MEANINCN and MEDINCN) and foreigners (MEANINCF and MEDINCF) and the respective ratio (RMEANNF and RMEDNF), and the poverty rate among foreign-born citizens and nationals (POVF and POVN) and the difference between the two (DIFFPOVFN). Economic openness exports (EXP) and imports (IMP) in each country divided by their respective GDPs. These measure are used in many of the studies cited in Chapter 3. Also, the effects on the balance of trade (BALTRADE) are tested.

#### 4.2.2.2. AUTHORITARIAN VARIABLES

Authoritarianism is ‘belief in a strictly ordered society’ (Mudde 2007, 23). It is a general label which encompasses law and order and a strong state (Mudde 2000b). We operationalize law and order as expenditure on security by central government (SEC) as a percentage of GDP. This expenditure on security does not include military expenditures. Indeed, there is a lack of agreement over whether militarism, that is, ‘the call for a strong army to protect the national interests’ (Mudde 2000b, 188) should also be included. Mudde (2007) highlights that, in some countries, where pacifism and neutralism are part of the national identity, RRP might not be proponents of militarism or have anti-militaristic appeal. Others (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Cole 2005), include militarism as a possible feature of the ‘new’ radical right (see Ch. 1). On the other hand, many studies make no reference to militarism (e.g. Art (2011), Carter (2005a), Ignazi (2003), (Minkenbergh 2015), Norris (2005)). Therefore, we do not include military spending in our analysis since it seems not to be an important issue for RRP.

#### 4.2.2.3. POPULIST VARIABLES

Populism is the most difficult concept to define. It represents the fight against political elites; we ask whether these elites might be influenced by the presence of strong RRP. For example, politicians

might decide to intervene in their supposed privileges or to adopt more expansionary policies. Expansionary policies, following the literature on opportunistic models, refer to central and general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (GEXP) and Government deficit/surplus as percentage of GDP (DEFICIT). We also include government spending on general services (GEXP). General services are political costs, which the RRP's contest. Also cultural elites are often a target of RRP's and many RRP's show a clear hatred for intellectuals (Mudde 2007, 67); we investigate whether this results in cuts to education (EDU) and culture (CUL) spending.

Table 52 summarizes the dependent variables included in our research according to the ideological feature to which they refer.

VARIABLE	YEARS	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
<b>NATIVIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>			
<b>UNEMPF</b>	1995-2014	Unemployment rate - foreign country of birth (%) [lfsa_urgacob]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>UNEMPN</b>	1995-2014	Unemployment rate - reporting country (%) [lfsa_urgacob]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	1995-2014	Difference between UNEMPN and UNEMPF	own calculations
<b>ARF</b>	1995-2014	Activity rate - foreign country of birth (%) [lfsa_argacob]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>ARN</b>	1995-2014	Activity rate - reporting country (%) [lfsa_argacob]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>DIFFARNF</b>	1995-2014	Difference between ARF and ARN	own calculations
<b>MEANINCF</b>	2003-2014	Mean income by broad group of citizenship - foreign country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_di15]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>MEANINCN</b>	2003-2014	Mean income by broad group of citizenship - reporting country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_di15]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>RMEANNF</b>	2003-2014	Ratio of MEANINCN on MEANINCF	own calculations
<b>MEDINCN</b>	2003-2014	Median income by broad group of citizenship - foreign country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_di15]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>MEDINCF</b>	2003-2014	Median income by broad group of citizenship - reporting country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_di15]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>RMEDNF</b>	2003-2014	Ratio of MEDINCN on MEDINCF	own calculations

<b>POVF</b>	2003-2014	At-risk-of-poverty rate <sup>42</sup> by broad group of country of birth - foreign country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_li32]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>POVN</b>	2003-2014	At-risk-of-poverty rate by broad group of country of birth - reporting country (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_li32]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	2003-2014	Difference between POVN and POVNF	own calculations
<b>IMP</b>	1991-2014	Imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP	Eurostat (2016)
<b>EXP</b>	1991-2014	Exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP	Eurostat (2016)
<b>BALTRADE</b>	1991-2014	Trade Balance - Difference between EXP and IMP as percentage of GDP	own calculations
<b>AUTHORITARIAN DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>			
<b>SEC</b>	1995-2014	General government expenditure by function (COFOG) as percentage of GDP - Security [gov_a_exp]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>POPULIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>			
<b>GEXP</b>	1995-2014	General government expenditure by function (COFOG) as percentage of GDP - Total [gov_a_exp]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>GSER</b>	1995-2014	General government expenditure by function (COFOG) as percentage of GDP - General Service [gov_a_exp]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>CUL</b>	1995-2014	General government expenditure by function (COFOG) as percentage of GDP - Culture [gov_a_exp]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>EDU</b>	1995-2014	General government expenditure by function (COFOG) as percentage of GDP - Education [gov_a_exp]	Eurostat (2016)
<b>DEFICIT</b>	1995-2014	Government deficit/surplus as percentage of GDP [gov_10dd_edpt1]	Eurostat (2016)

*Table 52 - List of dependent variables: code, description and sources.*

#### 4.2.3. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION, PARLIAMENTARY PRESENCE AND ELECTORAL RESULTS

In this Section, we discuss our choice of independent and control variables. Our explanatory variables are ‘political’, as they offer a measure of RRP’s importance in their own countries. We can

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<sup>42</sup> ‘The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers.’ (EUROSTAT 2017)

differentiate between the independent variables used to test partisan hypotheses and opportunistic hypotheses.

#### 4.2.3.1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN PARTISAN HYPOTHESES

As we have seen, partisan studies analyse differences between cabinets. RRP participation in national government has been limited. However, based on the few cases that exist, we also examine their influence once in power. We define a variable GOV which takes the value 1 for country  $j$  in time  $t$  if RRP's are part of a national government coalition for more than six months, in that country, at that time and even in cases of external support (such as the multiple DF with centre-right governments in Denmark), 0.5 if RRP's are part of the ruling majority for less than 6 months, and 0 otherwise.

This formulation covers only a handful of cases. In order to test the impact of RRP's, we include the strength of the RRP as a covariate. However, Minkenberg (2013a) highlights especially that their political impact depends on various factors beyond simply the share of the votes they receive. Political institutions (such as the electoral law), the agency of both RRP's and mainstream parties, and the balance of power (e.g. how strong other parties are) are a few of the conditions identified by the literature. Thus concept of political 'strength', can be operationalized in different ways and does not depend entirely on party's electoral scores.

The most straightforward measure of political strength is electoral results. The share of the votes obtained by a party is the most evident manifestation of its strength. It refers to the part of population that shares the RRP's views. However, elections are not held annually. Since it is impossible to reconstruct opinion polls for all the countries in the panel and for the entire period, we need to estimate RRP electoral strength between two election years. We identified two possible solutions: a fixed solution and a linear extrapolation. The first (RRP\_ES) considers, for non-election years, the share of votes obtained by the RRP in the most recent election. Therefore, it assumes that parties are stable. The second solution (RRP\_LIN), linearly extrapolates the values for non-election years in country  $i$

Level of RRP Strength	Electoral threshold	AND/ OR	In Parliament?	AND/OR	In Government?
<b>LOW/WEAK</b>	5% <	AND	NO	AND	NO
<b>MEDIUM</b>	≥ 5% < 10%	OR	YES	AND	NO
<b>HIGH/STRONG</b>	≥ 10%	X	Not Relevant	OR	YES

*Table 53 - Categories of countries according to RRP strength. Source: original compilation.*

as the sum of the share obtained by the relevant RRP (RRP\_VOTES) in the election at time t, and the number of years that have elapsed since the last election (c), multiplied by the ratio of the difference in the share obtained in the election in t+N and in t, and the number of years between these elections (N). It is formalized as follows:

$$RRP\_LIN_{i,t+c} = RRP\_VOTES_{i,t} + c \frac{RRP\_VOTES_{i,t+N} - RRP\_VOTES_{i,t}}{N} \quad (4.9)$$

Both formulations assume that the strength of a political party is described linearly by its election results. In order to consider other possible definitions of RRP strength, rather than percentages and logarithmically transformed both RRP\_ES and RRP\_LIN to obtain RRP\_LOG\_ES and RRP\_LOG\_LIN. Indeed, this transformation assumes that the strength of a political party is related to the share of the votes it obtains with decreasing marginal effects. To our knowledge, this idea has not been explored in political science.

Finally, the concept of political strength can be captured by several factors combined. Minkenberg (2013a) argues that the impact of RRP is dependent on the interaction between RRP and actors such as the State, other parties and civil society. Recreating these interactions (referred to as the 'political opportunity structure') in a single variable is not straightforward. For example, RRP\_ES and RRP\_LIN and their logarithmic transformation all consider the Italian LN in the early 2000s as 'weaker' than the French FN, since the Lega Nord struggled to achieve more than 4% in the 2001 legislative elections while the French FN was successful in 2002. However, following Minkenberg (2013), it could be argued that the Italian party was stronger politically since it was part of national government, with some important ministerial positions, while its French counterpart was behind the cordon sanitaire and unable to ally with any other party. As such, it is tempting to consider GOV as

a better indicator of political strength. However, by construction, GOV identifies only those RRP with cabinet positions and does not test for differences between non-governing RRP so that, for example, France and Spain would be treated the same along the entire period. We constructed a new index, RRP\_STR, composed of three classes (see Table 53), according to the party's electoral support, parliamentary presence and participation in a governing coalition:

- RRP\_STR\_LOW: countries and years where RRP scored less than 5% in the most recent national election, with no parliamentary representation and no participation in a ruling coalition (even as external support).
- RRP\_STR\_MED: countries and years where RRP scored between 5% and 10% in the most recent national election OR have parliamentary representation, but are not part of a ruling coalition (even as external support).
- RRP\_STR\_HIGH: countries and years where RRP scored more than 10% in the most recent national election OR are part of a ruling coalition (even as external support).

#### 4.2.3.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN OPPORTUNISTIC HYPOTHESES

In order to test for the presence of an opportunist RR cycle, we slightly modify the previous operationalization. Recall that the opportunistic hypotheses predict whether incumbent cabinets react to the presence of strong RRP by 'modifying' their economic policy in election years in order to adapt to the nativist, authoritarian and populist RRP ideology. The literature on partisan opportunistic models uses a dummy variable for the cabinet's ideology during an election period. For example, Grier (2008) identifies a FIRSTDEM dummy variable which 'equals 1 for the first eight quarters of each Democratic incumbent's term and 0 in all other periods' (Grier 2008, 341). The present work differs in two main ways from Grier (2008): a) the present work relies on yearly data and, therefore, quarter periodization cannot be used; b) RRP are rarely incumbents and we test the opportunistic behaviours by cabinets integrating RR. We do this by formalizing a RRP\_INCUMBENT dummy variable that equals 1 if it is an election year and a RRP is part of the incumbent coalition or gives



external support to an incumbent cabinet, and 0 otherwise. However, this does not include opportunistic behaviours by non-RR incumbents faced by strong RRP. A more appropriate way to analyse these behaviours would be to include opinion poll data and use the RRP's average expected share of the vote in the months before an election, as an explanatory variable. Unfortunately, no data on opinion polls for all the countries and the time span under consideration are available. Therefore, we have to rely on actual results. We assume that incumbent forces are aware of the electoral strength of RRP and react accordingly. Therefore, we formalize a SHOCK variable, which equals the share of votes received in the election at time  $t$  and 0 in non-election years. In each model, we include economic and political control variables in line with the relevant literature. Following Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Brender and Drazen (2005), we include the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, the previously defined measure of economic openness taken from the Eurostat database, the unemployment rate and the share of the population aged over 65 taken from Armingeon et al. (2016). We also include cabinet position on a left-right scale proposed by Armingeon et al. (2016). This index (GOVPARTY) is in line with Schmidt's (1996) indicator of party composition of government. This is measured as the share of cabinet seats held by leftist and non-leftist parties. GOVPARTY goes from 1 to 5 where 1 identifies fully right-wing cabinets, and 5 describes fully left-wing cabinets; the other values are presented in Table 54. Armingeon et al.'s (2016) calculation of cabinet composition is well-established in the political economy literature and provides the political variable for many of the works discussed in Chapter 2 (Brender and Drazen 2005; Belloc and Nicita 2012b; Potrafke 2016b).

Value and label	Description
'Hegemony of bourgeois parties'	Leftist parties hold no cabinet seat
'Bourgeois dominance'	Leftist parties hold between 1% and 33% of cabinet-seats
'Stalemate'	Leftist parties hold between 34% and 65% of cabinet-seats
'Social-democratic dominance'	Leftist parties hold between 66% and 99% of cabinet-seats
'Social-democratic hegemony'	Leftist parties hold 100% of cabinet-seats

*Table 54 - Indicator of government's composition values and meaning. Source: Schmidt (1996).*

### 4.3. DATA DESCRIPTION

In this Section we present our dataset, which covers 27 European countries (25 OECD countries plus Bulgaria and Romania), between 1991 (1995 for a large set of the variables) and 2014. Bulgaria, and Romania are included because they experienced an important rise of RRP during the mid of 2000s as discussed in Chapter 1. In particular, Section 4.3.1 summarizes our political variables, while Section 4.3.2 presents our economic variables.

#### 4.3.1. POLITICAL DATA

Political data are available for all countries and for the entire 1991-2014 period.<sup>43</sup> Data are collected from the World Bank DPI (Database of Political Institutions) data set (Beck et al. 2001) and from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016). The DPI is commonly used in opportunistic, partisan and institutional studies (Potrafke 2016b), and the ParlGov database is used in work on the impact of RRP (Abou-Chadi 2016; Rooduijn, Lange de, and van der Brug 2012).

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<sup>43</sup> Data in this Chapter only extend to 2014, because of limitations in economic data. See the Introduction of this Thesis for more recent data.





Figure 19 - Scatterplot of *RRP\_LIN* and *RRP\_ES* by country. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.


The RRP strength of the countries in our study differs widely. The evolution of electoral support for RRP in each state is presented graphically as scatterplots in Figure 19. Some countries (see Ch. 1) have not experienced strong RRP. For example, in Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, RRP have remained stable at below 1% of the voting share; in Germany, RRP were on the fringes of the political system until the emergence of the AfD. However, in the 2013 elections the AfD occupied a nonradical right platform so is not considered (Arzheimer 2015).

Variable	Description	Source
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR OPPORTUNISTIC MODEL</b>		
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	Dummy variable: 1 - RRP's part of incumbent coalition; 0 - otherwise	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), and own research
<b>RRP_STR_MED_ELECT</b>	Dummy: 1 - RRP's in country classified as 'medium' at time t and t is election year - 0 otherwise	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), Döring and Manow (2016), and own research
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH_ELECT</b>	Dummy: 1 - RRP's in country classified as 'strong' at time t and t is election year - 0 otherwise	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), Döring and Manow (2016), and own research
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	Share of votes received by RRP's in country at election in time t, if t is election year - 0 otherwise	Döring and Manow (2016)
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR PARTISAN MODEL</b>		
<b>GOV</b>	Are RRP's part of ruling coalition in year t? 1 - more than 6 months; 0.5 - less than 6 months; 0 - otherwise	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), and own research
<b>RRP_STR_MED</b>	RRP's in country at time t classified as 'medium'	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), Döring and Manow (2016), and own research
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	RRP's in country at time t classified as 'strong'	Own calculations on Akkerman(2012),Minkenberg (2013), Döring and Manow (2016), and own research
<b>RRP_ES</b>	Share of votes received by RRP's at closest election before year t	Own calculations on Döring and Manow (2016)
<b>RRP_LIN</b>	Linear variation of votes between closest elections prior to time t and closest election following year t	Own calculations on Döring and Manow (2016)
<b>RRP_LOG_ES</b>	Natural logarithm of RRP_ES	Own calculations on Döring and Manow (2016)
<b>RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	Natural logarithm of RRP_LIN	Own calculations on Döring and Manow (2016)
<b>CONTROL VARIABLES</b>		
<b>GDPGROWTH</b>	Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.	World Bank
<b>GOVPARTY</b>	Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index)	Armingeon et al. (2016)
<b>ELDERLY</b>	Population over 65, as a percentage of population.	Armingeon et al. (2016)

*Table 55 - List of independent and control variables: code, description and source.*




**Figure 20 - Average RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in ALL sample by year. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**




**Figure 21 - Average RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in WEST sample. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**

Figure 20 and depict the average evolution of RRP\_ES and RRP\_LIN and their dispersion. However since Western and Eastern countries follow different trends we treat them separately. Among Western European countries, we see an increase in support for RRP since the mid-2000s. This increased support follows the emergence of RRP in new countries as Greece, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the UK. This is confirmed by the annual decrease in the coefficient of variation of RRP\_ES and RRP\_LIN (see Figure 25). Thus, there seems to be a convergence rather than a progression in RRP's strength across Western Europe. Eastern and Central European countries experienced a surge in RRP presence at the beginning of 1990s, coinciding with the start of the transition from socialism. Despite a high volatility in their electoral support, RRP tend to lose this support mostly until 2008 economic crisis (Figure 22). In Western Europe, the financial crisis seems to have revived RRP and provoked




**Figure 22 - Average RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in EAST sample by year. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**




**Figure 23 - Coefficient of variation for RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in ALL sample by year. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**

a positive trend. However, in Eastern and Central Europe this tendency is not displayed: Figure 24 depicts the coefficient of variation for Eastern and Central European countries and shows a clear tendency towards more dispersion in the results, which contrasts with the picture for western European RRP.

A second confirmation of Western European RRP convergence to a mid-high level comes from our country classification based on RRP strength: Figure 26 and Figure 27 highlight RRP strengths (RRP\_STR) between 1991 and 2014. Again, we consider Western and Eastern European countries separately. In 1991, among the 19 Western European countries in our panel, RRP strength is ‘high’ for four countries (Switzerland, Austria, Norway, France) and ‘medium’ for another four countries (Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Belgium). In 2014, seven are classified as ‘high’ (Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Netherlands, France, Norway, Denmark) and five countries are classified as ‘medium’ (Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium, Greece, Sweden). Thus, four of the countries classified as “high” for RRP strength in 1991 have remained so despite some problems in Austria at beginning of the 2000s and in France in 2007. Between 1991 and 2014, Finland and Denmark moved from having weak to having strong RRP, in both cases supporting national governments since 2016. Among the Eastern European countries in our sample, only three had important RRP in 1991. These




**Figure 25 - Coefficient of variation for RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in WEST sample by year. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**



**Figure 24 - Coefficient of variation for RRP\_LIN and RRP\_ES in EAST sample by year. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.**



*Figure 26 - European countries according to the strength of national RRP in 1991. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.*



*Figure 27 - European countries according to the strength of national RRP in 2014. Source: calculus of the author on ParlGov data.*

are Romania, Poland and Slovakia, classed as strong-RRPs. In 2014, Hungary and Latvia had strong RRP and Bulgaria was classified as medium in terms of strength.

Experience of government among RRP is not frequent. In Western Europe, only six countries experienced cabinets that included a RRP or were supported in parliament by a RRP. These were Italy (1994, 2001-2006, 2008-2011), the Netherlands (2002, 2010-2011), Denmark, Austria (2000-2006), and the short experience of the Greek LAOS in from November 2011 to February 2012, plus Switzerland. This last country has an institutional framework that allows the SVP to always be included in the cabinet. Table 56 summarizes the records of RRP periods in office, the supporting coalitions and the cabinets' ideological positions, according to the Schmidt (1996) indicator of government composition (see Table 54) that we proceeded to calculate when necessary, This index indicates the number of ministries awarded to RRP and whether they were related to the economy (e.g., Finance, Budget, Treasury, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs). Since Switzerland's political system is so different from that in other European countries, we do not include it in Table 3. Table 3 shows first, that RRP in Western Europe secured cabinet positions in collaboration with centre-right parties (Schmidt index is equal to 1 for all cabinets except Papademos's Greek government which was a grand coalition). Second, in six out of eight cabinets, RRP occupied economy-related ministries. This is an interesting finding since, as discussed in Chapter 2, much of the literature on

RRP	Country	Cabinet	Years	Ministers	Econ Min	Coalition	Schmidt indicator
FPO	Austria	Schussel I	2000-2003	6	YES	OVP, FPO	1
FPO/BZO	Austria	Schussel II	2003-2007	3	YES	OVP, FPO (until 2005), BZO	1
LN-AN	Italy	Berlusconi I	1994	12	YES	FI-LN-AN-CCD-UdC	1
LN	Italy	Berlusconi II	2001-2005	2	YES	FI, AN, LN, UDC	1
LN	Italy	Berlusconi III	2005 - 2006	2	YES	FI, AN, LN, UDC	1
LN	Italy	Berlusconi IV	2008 - 2011	4	NO	PdL, LN, MpA	1
DF	Denmark	A.F. Rasmussen I	2001-2005	External	/	Venstre, DKF	1
DF	Denmark	A.F. Rasmussen II	2005-2007	External	/	Venstre, DKF	1
DF	Denmark	A.F. Rasmussen III	2007-2009	External	/	Venstre, DKF	1
DF	Denmark	L.L. Rasmussen II	2009-2011	External	/	Venstre, DKF	1
DF	Denmark	L.L. Rasmussen II	2015 - today	External	/	Venstre	1
LAOS	Greece	Papademos I	2012	1	NO	PASOK, ND, LAOS	3
LPF	Netherlands	Balkenende I	2002-2003	4	YES	CDA, LPF, VVD	1
PVV	Netherlands	Rutte I	2010-2012	External	/	VVD, CDA	1
ENIP	Estonia	Laar I	1992-1994	4	NO	I, ERSP, RM	2
NA	Latvia	Dombrovskis III	2011-2014	2	NO	V, RP, NA	1
NA	Latvia	Straujuma I	2014	2	NO	V, RP, NA, ZZS	2
NA	Latvia	Straujuma II	2014-2016	3	NO	V, NA, ZZS	2
LPR	Poland	Marcinkiewicz I	2005-2006	2	NO	PiS-SRP-LPR	2
LPR	Poland	Kaczyński	2006-2007	2	NO	PiS-SRP-LPR	2
PUNR/PRM	Romania	Văcăroiu I	1994-1996	4	NO	PDSR, PUNR	4
SNS	Slovakia	Mečiar I	1992-1994	3	YES	HZDS-SNS	1
SNS	Slovakia	Mečiar II	1994-1998	2	NO	HZDS-ZRS-SNS-RSS	2
SNS	Slovakia	Fico I	2006-2010	3	NO	SMER – SNS - HZDS	4

*Table 56 - RRP in office. Sources: Akkerman (2012), Minkenberg (2015) and own research.*

RRPs considers the economy a secondary issue for RRP and used only as an election strategy (Mudde 2007; Rovny 2013).

Table 56 shows that RRP asked for and obtained important economic ministries in Western Europe: Finance and Budget in Austria (Schussel I), Italy (Berlusconi I), and the Netherlands (Balkenende I), and Social Protection and Labour in Austria (Schussel I and II) and Italy (Berlusconi II and III). In Eastern Europe, despite a large number of RRP gaining power, only one was appointed to an economic ministry: the Slovak SNS during the first Meciar cabinet in 1992-1994 with Černák as Minister of the Economy. However, Černák led a moderate fraction of the SNS, which left the party in 1994 in order to establish a conservative movement similar to Western right-wing parties (Ramet



1999). Eastern and Western RRP differ also in their coalition allies. Western European RRP participated only in coalitions with right-wing parties, while Eastern European RRP allied with left-wing parties in the cases of Romania (the 'Red quadrilateral' supporting Văcăroiu's first cabinet) and Slovakia (Fico's first and third cabinets - this after the 2016 elections).

#### 4.3.2. ECONOMIC DATA

In this Section, we present and summarize the economic variables in our dataset. Table 57 presents the descriptive statistics based on the average values of our dependent variables according to the political classification of European countries based on their RRP strength.

##### Nativist variables

Countries with weak RRP are characterized by more exposure to international trade (TRADE) while the differences among countries with strong and medium-RRPs are smaller. The absence of a relevant RRP generally is associated with higher levels of both imports (IMP) and exports (EXP). In relation to economic performances, countries with high and medium strength RRP are richer as they have higher levels of mean and median income. However, how this well-being is divided among nationals and foreigners shows that countries with strong and medium RRP have higher levels of the foreign population at risk of poverty compared to nationals (DIFFPOVNF). Also, the ratio of national to foreign median income is higher in these countries than in countries with weak RRP (RMEDNF). The situation is similar for the unemployment and activity rates of nationals and foreigners: weak RRP are associated with higher levels of unemployment (and lower levels of activity) for both nationals (UNEMPN and ARN) and foreigners (UNEMPF and ARF), but the situation is worse for the latter ones (DIFFRUNNF and DIFFARNF). Our data then indicate that we then find stronger RRP in richer and more unequal countries. It should not be concluded, however, that these parties are unrelated to economic grievances since, at this stage, we are not looking at the evolution through time of such variables.

### Populist variables

At a first glance, when it comes to national budget, the differences relate mainly to whether the RRP is a recognized political actor or not. Countries classified as strong and ‘medium’ characterized by high and similar levels of government expenditures (GEXP), around 47% of the GDP), while in countries with low strength RRP government expenditures fall under 45% of the GDP). Those budget entries that we considered to be ideologically-related to RRP anti-intellectual populism, namely Culture (CUL) and Education (EDU), instead, seem not to follow a linear progression with the political strength of RRP as they peak in countries with medium strength RRP. Finally, on average, governments supported by RRP seem to run larger deficits than their non-RR counterparts, despite lower levels of government spending.

### Authoritarian variables

Surprisingly in the case of expenditure on security, countries with strong RRP show the lowest share (1.6% of the GDP). Indeed, a simple average does not tell us enough on the significance of such relation nor on its evolution. Moreover, it could be related to the relative weakness of RRP in Eastern European countries, where expenditures in security are higher.

The data on RRP government records are presented in Table 58. Cabinets with RR participation are characterized by lower levels of government spending (GEXP), although not on security (SEC).

This Section presented the descriptive statistics of both our dependent and independent variables and highlighted some stylized fact. RRP are today’s more widespread in both Western and Eastern Europe than in early 1990s, but their cabinet’s experience is still limited as there is, in different countries, a *cordon sanitaire* that prevents them from government. Countries with RRP are generally richer, but experience stronger divisions between native and foreign population.

Variable	RRP_STR_HIGH					²RRP_STR_MED					RRP_STR_LOW				
	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
<b>NATIVIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>															
UNEMPF	121	11.17	4.517	4.1	33.9	72	13.41	6.534	4.5	38.2	154	12.57	6.457	2.5	35.8
UNEMPN	123	5.752	2.919	1.9	23.6	74	7.469	4.321	1.8	26.5	169	8.311	5.037	1.3	24.3
DIFFRUNF	121	-5.406	2.638	-11.4	2.7	72	-5.935	3.746	-20.3	0.1	150	-3.952	3.171	-15.1	5.7
ARF	122	70.38	6.023	55.6	82.7	74	69.96	4.28	57.4	76.8	170	73.12	8.056	33.3	90
ARN	123	73.65	7.136	59.5	84.3	74	74.29	5.372	59.5	82.9	169	71.45	7.821	56.4	88.9
DIFFARNF	146	72.26	7.373	57.6	83.8	100	71.64	6.075	57.1	81.5	200	71.52	6.735	60.1	88.8
MEANINCF	92	19648	10194	4517	46765	70	13904	7293	1923	24541	116	14521	8986	2458	35396
MEANINCN	92	22865	11196	3794	48062	71	15939	8440	1604	29768	124	16054	10833	2404	43782
RMEANNF	92	1.164	0.178	0.683	1.562	70	1.148	0.218	0.627	1.576	116	1.171	0.205	0.513	1.66
MEDINCN	92	17009	9157	3455	39808	70	11561	5982	1540	20500	116	12457	7680	1982	29171
MEDINCF	92	20607	10287	3197	45009	71	14154	7577	1391	27879	124	14132	9798	2027	39861
RMEDNF	92	1.213	0.152	0.807	1.565	70	1.215	0.214	0.788	1.744	116	1.186	0.173	0.725	1.695
POVF	92	21.82	6.327	5.2	39.7	70	23.35	8.502	7.4	49.2	117	19.8	6.927	7.9	43.5
POVN	92	12.47	2.908	7.6	20.6	71	14.07	3.775	7.7	22.3	124	14.2	4.826	5.8	25.4
DIFFPOVNF	92	-9.353	6.443	-19.2	8.2	71	-8.949	9.026	-30.3	22.3	124	-4.487	8.733	-26	22.1
IMP	184	42.84	16.73	17.41	85.26	161	44.65	16.59	16.89	86.18	291	50.7	28.86	19.2	170.9
EXP	184	45.83	17.56	17.53	89.25	161	44.2	17.36	17.09	85.27	291	52.64	36.43	14.05	203.3
BALTRADE	184	88.67	33.86	35.02	171.2	161	88.86	33.49	33.98	171.5	291	103.3	64.94	35.51	374.1
<b>AUTHORITARIAN DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>															
SEC	136	1.632	0.451	0.9	3.2	127	1.896	0.511	0.5	3	228	1.722	0.508	0.7	3
<b>POPULIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>															
GEXP	136	47.94	6.84	32.1	59.4	127	47.05	5.872	33.6	56.8	228	44.49	7.102	31.1	65.5
GSER	136	7.296	2.646	3.1	15.4	127	7.032	2.555	3.3	15.1	228	6.27	2.535	2.7	17.9
CUL	136	1.123	0.308	0.5	1.9	127	1.198	0.336	0.6	2.2	228	1.397	0.716	0.3	3.8
EDU	136	5.575	0.986	3.2	8.1	127	5.441	1.045	3.1	7.4	228	5.441	1.366	2.7	8.6
DEFICIT	125	-2.258	3.229	-9.7	13.8	136	-3.206	3.803	-15.2	6.9	220	-2.619	4.231	-32.3	6

Table 57 - Summary of dependent variables by category of RRP's strength

VARIABLE	GOV = 1 or 0.5					GOV = 0				
	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
<b>NATIVIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>										
UNEMPF	34	9.838	5.207	4.700	33.90	313	12.52	5.937	2.500	38.20
UNEMPN	35	5.683	4.433	1.900	23.60	331	7.450	4.393	1.300	26.50
DIFFRUNNF	34	-4.109	1.909	-10.30	0.900	309	-4.966	3.337	-20.30	5.700
ARF	34	74.45	4.883	65.90	82.70	332	71.27	7.032	33.30	90
ARN	35	74.13	8.184	61.10	84.30	331	72.62	7.136	56.40	88.90
DIFFARNF	34	-0.615	5.721	-9.100	12.10	328	1.375	7.445	-14.40	30.60
MEANINCF	35	15663	12602	4517	46765	243	16120	8812	1923	43212
MEANINCN	35	17998	13549	3123	47696	252	18238	10471	1604	48062
RMEANNF	35	1.146	0.218	0.627	1.562	243	1.165	0.197	0.513	1.660
MEDINCN	35	13324	10624	2865	38949	243	13797	7753	1540	39808
MEDINCF	35	15908	12115	2605	42844	252	16255	9589	1391	45009
RMEDNF	35	1.182	0.160	0.873	1.565	243	1.205	0.180	0.725	1.744
POVF	35	19.71	7.639	7.200	39.70	244	21.59	7.225	5.200	49.20
POVN	35	14.42	3.882	8.200	20.60	252	13.50	4.126	5.800	25.40
DIFFPOVNF	35	-5.294	6.815	-19.10	10.20	252	-7.409	8.631	-30.30	22.30
IMP	71	46.73	16.08	18.64	85.26	565	46.92	24.07	16.89	170.9
EXP	71	48.31	16.58	21.94	83.50	565	48.56	29.16	14.05	203.3
BALTRADE	71	1.575	5.295	-10.65	12.12	565	1.647	8.383	-20.71	33.66
TRADE	71	95.04	32.23	40.58	168.1	565	95.48	52.81	33.98	374.1
<b>AUTHORITARIAN DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>										
SEC	48	1.921	0.422	1.300	3.200	443	1.723	0.507	0.500	3
<b>POPULIST DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>										
GEXP	48	44.51	7.263	32.10	53.80	443	46.28	6.837	31.10	65.50
GSER	48	6.662	2.676	3.100	14	443	6.761	2.602	2.700	17.90
CUL	48	1.038	0.335	0.500	2.100	443	1.295	0.568	0.300	3.800
EDU	48	5.048	0.952	3.300	8	443	5.525	1.205	2.700	8.600
DEFICIT	42	-3.738	2.506	-10.20	1.100	439	-2.591	3.974	-32.30	13.80

Table 58 - Summary of dependent variables by GOV

## 4.4. RESULTS

In the previous Section, we discussed the descriptive statistics of our sample, and the diffusion and strengths of RRP, We also discussed how these parties interact with our economic variables. In this Section, we test the statistical significance of the relation hypothesized in Chapter 3 and operationalized in this chapter in Section 4.3. Our opportunistic and partisan models of impact are presented separately. Given the large number of econometric tests, we summarized our results in Table 59. The reader will find a detailed version of our results in the Appendix.

### 4.4.1. RRPS AND OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS: NO RRP INCUMBENCY EFFECT, NO IMPACT ON NON-RR INCUMBENT PARTIES

#### 4.4.1.1. RRPS AS INCUMBENT FORCES: NO EVIDENCE OF RADICAL RIGHT OPPORTUNISTIC CYCLES.

Hypothesis OH-GOV refers to opportunistic models and states that ‘when RRP are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in lines with their ideological profiles.’ In our panel, we found few examples of incumbent RRP and even fewer incumbent RRP were able to secure re-election. Thus, our results might be biased by small sample size. However, the estimated model provides some interesting results. We test all the variables that are mentioned in Table 52, using the Arellano-Bond estimator, and find no significant relation between our variables and a RR incumbency in the ALL and EAST sample. So, we could not find any strong evidence suggesting that ruling coalitions including RRP engage in opportunistic behaviours. In the WEST sample, instead, two variables turned out to be significantly related to a RR incumbency: government expenditure on general public services (GSER) and government expenditure on culture (CULT) as a share of the GDP. In both cases, a RR incumbency is a significant predictor (at a 5% level) of a decrease in these expenditures. This is partially in line with our ‘populist’ specification of OH-GOV: as a reminder, we considered that RRP might be tempted to cut fundings

in sectors far from their ideology (cultural and statal elites, in this case), in particular before an election. This seems to be case in Western Europe, however, since other variables turned out to be not-significant, we are unable to say whether these cuts were used to fund other sectors more closely related to RR ideology (security expenditure, SEC, seems unaffected by a RR incumbency) or to other policy (neither the deficit nor the total government expenditure as a share of the GDP, GEXP, appear to be influenced by a RR incumbency).

#### 4.4.1.2. NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE HYPOTHESIS THAT RRP'S STRENGTH GENERATES OPPORTUNISTIC CYCLES BY NON-RR PARTIES.

Hypothesis OH-STR states that 'in countries characterized by strong RRP's, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.' We tested this hypothesis using the share of votes received by RRP's in election held at year  $t$  (SHOCK) as a proxy of RR strength as well as an assessment base on the political, and not just electoral, strength of RRP's (RRP\_ELECT\_MED and RRP\_ELECT\_HIGH). Our results do not support this hypothesis. Our model, used on all the variables discussed in Section 4.3.2, found almost no significant relation. These results are similar to the previous ones on incumbency: the share of votes received by RRP's in an election (SHOCK) is not significantly related to any of the variables in either of our samples, the only exception being government expenditure on culture (CULT) as a share of the GDP in the WEST sample. Regardless of RR incumbency, in Western Europe, RR electoral scores are a significant predictor of budgetary cuts to cultural expenditure in an election year. We can conclude that the econometric tests show weak evidence of an RR opportunistic cycle, in particular related to government expenditure on culture. However, as before, since all other variables turn out to be not significantly affected by RR incumbency or strength, we are unable to identify who 'benefits' from these budgetary cuts.

#### 4.4.2. RRPs PARTISAN IMPACT: EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC NATIVISM, WITH NO CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW THE IMPACT WORKS

##### 4.4.2.1. PH-GOV: 'NATIVISM' APPEARS THE MAIN CONSEQUENCE OF RRPs GOVERNMENTS IN THE WEST

Our hypothesis PH-GOV states that 'ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRPs are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes, in line with RRPs' ideological profile.' There is some evidence of a RR partisan impact on nativist variables. In particular, the lagged-GOV dummy is significant (at 5%) and negative for the difference in the rate of unemployment between nationals and foreign-born citizens (DIFFRUNNF). The negative relation means that foreign-born citizens' unemployment rates tend to be significantly higher compared to nationals' unemployment rates when RRPs are part of the government. We test the robustness of these results by disaggregating Western and Eastern European countries. The relation retains its significance for West European countries, but not East European countries. In particular, in the WEST sample, the rate of unemployment for foreign-born citizens (UNEMPF) is also significantly higher (at 1%) when RRPs are in power. In West European countries, participation in government of RRPs is expected to be followed by a 1.6-point increase in the foreign-born citizens' unemployment rate.

In Eastern Europe, instead, governments relying on support from RRPs show a significant (at 1% and 0.1% respectively) increase of imports and decrease of exports all along their mandate. This is somewhat different to what was expected: RRPs are considered protectionist parties (see Chapter 2) and we would have expected at least a decrease in imports. Ruling RRPs in Eastern Europe seem thus to favour domestic consumption, which is in line with our results, even though further research is needed to confirm this interpretation.

Finally, we find only support for our authoritarianism/populism specifications of PH-GOV. In particular, in our ALL sample, governments including RRPs show a significant (at 5%) decrease in

the expenditure on general public services as a share of GDP (GSER). As such, while there is no significant relation with other possible ‘populist’ variables (such as DEFICIT or GEXP), it seems that cabinets including RRP cut on executive and legislative organs. However, since the Eurostat variable actually includes also foreign aid as a general public service, we might be finding just another form of nativist impact. Concerning more specifically Eastern Europe, we find that countries ruled by coalitions including RRP significantly (at 1%) increase their expenditure on ‘security’, in line with the authoritarian specification of PH-GOV.

#### 4.4.2.2. PH-STR: WEAK EVIDENCE OF NATIVISM IN THE WESTERN LABOUR MARKETS AS WELL AS STRONG EVIDENCE OF CONSEQUENCES ON TRADE, BUT IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS FOR EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE.

As developed in the previous paragraph, partisan models usually are formulated regressing the economic variables against government ideology. This provides evidence supporting a nativist impact for some of the nativist variables (UNEMPF, DIFFRUNNF, IMP, EXP, BALTRADE) but not for some of the others and neither for the authoritarian or populist variables showed strong signs of RR impact. Since this lack of evidence might be due to the relative absence of RRP cabinets we move to RRP's electoral strength and hypothesis PH-STR, which states ‘in countries characterized by strong RRP, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power’. We test five specifications of party political strength; four are different mathematical transformations of RRP electoral scores and the fifth is an original classification of European countries according to RRP strength, understood as electoral score and integration into the political system (RRP\_STR\_HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW), as explained in Section 4.2.3. We test this last relation taking LOW as the base level and creating two dummy covariates for RRP\_STR\_HIGH and RRP\_STR\_MED.



In our ALL sample, countries with strong and medium RRP are characterized by higher rates of unemployment among foreign-born citizens (significant at 5% and 1% respectively). Thus, moving from no RRP participation to a RR parliamentary presence (or above 5% electoral score) is predicted to be followed by a 1.8 point increase in the unemployment rate of foreign-born citizens (UNEMPF). Also, the difference between native and foreign unemployment (DIFFRUNNF) is significantly related to our RRP\_STR\_HIGH and RRP\_STR\_MED variables. The relation between RRP and foreign-born citizens' unemployment finds additional support since both UNEMPF and DIFFRUNNF tested significantly for two of our electoral strength variables (RRP\_LIN and RRP\_LOG\_LIN). RRP\_LIN and RRP\_LOG\_LIN also appear significantly related (at 5%) to an increase in the poverty rate of foreign citizens.

When we disaggregate WEST and EAST, the results change. In Western Europe, the strength of RRP is significantly related to both UNEMPF and DIFFRUNNF. This would seem to indicate that RRP's electoral breakthrough, parliamentary presence and governing experience might be followed by an increased difference between natives and foreigners in the labour market to the detriment of foreigners. However, no other political variables are significant. As such, results on the 'strength' of RRP should be taken *cum grano salis*, as they are clearly dependent upon the specification we use. The results are similar for the variables for nationals such as ARN and POVN. In the EAST sample, instead, there is no evidence of a significant impact of RRP on labour market differences between natives and foreigners. This is not surprising given the few observations at disposal. The situation changes when we analyse RR impact on trade. As a reminder, we included trade-related variables in our analysis since RRP often support protectionist measures (see Chaptre 2). Our results show a complex relation. Analysis of the ALL sample shows a negative impact on exports and on the balance of trade in countries with strong RRP (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH), as well as a negative relation between RRP electoral scores (RRP\_LOG\_LIN) and and the balance of trade. However, if we disaggregate Western and Eastern Europe, we obtain contrasting results. In the WEST

sample, RRP electoral results are not significantly related. In the EAST sample, the relation works in the opposite direction than we expected, and is significant in various specifications (RRP\_LOG\_LING, RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH): the stronger the RRP, the higher the share of imports in GDP while the share of exports decreases, and consequently the balance of trade becomes more negative. These results are similar to those found for cabinets relying on RRP support (GOV).

#### 4.4.2.3. PH-STR: WEAK EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON 'POPULIST' VARIABLES.

Support for the authoritarian and the populist hypotheses is weak. We find weak support for 'populist' budgetary variables, as government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (GEXP – significantly related to RRP\_LOG\_ES at 5%, both in the ALL and WEST sample) and government expenditure on public services (GSER – only in the ALL sample) both decrease while RR electoral scores increase. In particular, concerning GSER, only RRP\_HIGH (and not RRP\_MED) is significantly related to a decrease in this expenditure. Since other of the specifications of RRP strength do not lead to significant results, it would seem that, concerning RRP strength, our results are probably not robust. We could not find any evidence in support of a relation between RRP and expenditure on security.

To summarize, overall our results seem to suggest that, although some nativism is present, its impact seems to depend on more than just electoral scores: parliamentary presence and participation in a coalition might have stronger impacts than electoral breakthrough. Good election results are required for party representatives to participate in national government, but the chances of a RRP becoming a member of parliament or assuming a position in the cabinet depends on each country's political and institutional system (See Chapter 5). RRP appear to have a stronger and neater impact when they strike an alliance with other parties and secure cabinet positions. If RRP electoral scores do not appear to be a significant predictor alone, they become significant when we include parliamentary participation and government's experience into our definition of 'strength. A proper

			TYPE OF IMPACT		
			NATIVIST	AUTHORITARIAN	POPULIST
SAMPLE : ALL	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	DIFFRUNF (-) UNEMPF (+) BALTRADE (-)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GSER (-)
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	UNEMPF (+) , POVFOR (+), DIFFRUNF (-), BALTRADE (+) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GEXP (-) depending on specification GSER (-) depending on specification
SAMPLE : WEST	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GSER (-) CUL (-)
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	CUL (-) (only SHOCK)
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	DIFFRUNF (-) UNEMPF (+)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	UNEMPF (+) , DIFFRUNF (-), IMP (-), and EXP (+) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GEXP (-) depending on specification
SAMPLE ; EAST	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	IMP (+) EXP (-) BALTRADE (-)	SEC (+)	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	IMP (+) EXP (-) BALTRADE (-) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact

Table 59 - Summary of the results by sample and hypothesis.

analysis of RRP's impact, therefore, needs to focus on these different steps rather than on sheer electoral scores.

## 4.5. CONCLUSION

Current literature on the ‘impact’ of RRP focuses mostly on their influence on voters’ preferences and party competition. Several studies show that the presence of a strong RRP affects policy-making, but they are related exclusively to migration policy and do not consider the economic consequences of RR ideology. In Chapter 4, we operationalized and statistically tested the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, relying on dynamic panel data models. Since RRP’s experience of government is limited, we tested the effect of RRP in opportunistic and partisan models by adding different specifications of their political strength. RRP’s political strength is measured by their voting score or according to our specific classification based on both electoral scores and integration in the political system (e.g., having parliamentary representation and/or supporting the national government). Finally, since there are valid reasons to consider Eastern and Western European countries as two different political-economic sub-systems, we ran the models on three different samples: one for all Europe, and two subsets for Western and Eastern European countries.

Results appears to be puzzling (see Table 59). Following opportunistic models, RRP seem to play a very minor role either as ruling actors or as possible threats to incumbent parties. We found almost no evidence of a RR influence on opportunistic cycle, the only exception being a decrease in government expenditure on culture in Western Europe. Such a decrease turned out to be significantly related to both a RR incumbency and RR electoral scores. Thus RR governing coalitions, as well as non-RR ruling parties in countries with strong RRP, appear to be a predictor of budgetary cuts to cultural expenditure. This is in line with our ‘populist’ specification: contemporary RRP, which are mostly populist parties (see Chapter 1), might see cultural elites as an enemy. As such, they have incentives to shift public funds from culture to other, more ideologically related, sectors. This appears to be the case also in countries with strong RRP, so that non-RR parties are actually influenced by the presence of a RRP. However, we were unable to find any significant relation with other budgetary variables: it appears to be budgetary cuts to culture, but we were unable to identify how these fundings

were then used. As such, with the exception of government expenditure on culture in Western Europe, we can dismiss hypotheses OH-STR and OH-GOV in all their specifications (nativist/authoritarian/populist).

Our partisan models provide more results. Again, robustness and model specification are important since most of the results, especially for budget-related issues, are not completely robust as different specifications lead to significant or not significant results. To summarize: we find more evidence of a degree of influence of RRP 'in government' (hypothesis PH-GOV), especially concerning the nativist specification. In particular, we find a significant and negative relationship between the presence of RRP in a ruling coalition and the difference in the rate of unemployment between nationals and foreign-born citizens (DIFFRUNNF). This relationship is no longer significant if we look at Eastern European countries. In Western European countries, instead, RRP strength is a predictor of increased unemployment among foreign-born citizens. Moreover, the distribution of unemployment between foreigners and natives favours natives, which seems to confirm the idea of a 'nativist' partisan effect. As RRP grow stronger, unemployment increases for those born in a foreign-country (and increases more than for natives). This increase chronologically follows the rise in RRP results or the election to power of RRP. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and will be discussed further in Chapter 5, the econometric models as well as the economic theories we relied on do not allow us to develop the mechanisms behind these relations.

We considered protectionist measures as well as related to RR nativist ideology. We obtain opposite results between Eastern and Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, RRP are a significant predictor of increased imports and decreased exports and viceversa in Western Europe. While results for Western European countries are as expected, findings concerning Eastern European countries show a more complex relationship that requires further analyses that go beyond the framework of this thesis. As a more general result, our results confirm that Western and Eastern European party systems have important differences and should be treated separately (Rovny and Edwards 2012).

The limited number of significant relations, the lack of explanations of the mechanisms behind the results we obtained, and the limitations of the current literature (see Chapter 3), led us to search for a new framework to analyse the relation between politics and economics. A first step in this direction is provided in Chapters 5.

# 5. THE NEO-REALIST APPROACH: A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE THE ECONOMY AS A PRODUCT OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

## 5.1. INTRODUCTION: NEO-CLASSICAL MODELS AND THE SPECIFIC GOALS AND AUTONOMY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the previous chapters, we test the impact of RRP on the economy under different specifications in the light of two neo-classical models: the opportunistic models (Nordhaus 1975) and the partisan theory (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1988). Our results in Chapter 4 show the lack of impact of RRP in the opportunistic models. Partisan models, however, provide significant results that are strongly dependent on the inclusion of RRP within the political system, and, to a lesser extent, on their electoral strength. As a reminder, in our analysis, we find a significant relation between the RRP's electoral strength and economic variables (in particular the difference between native and foreigners in terms of unemployment and trade-related variables), although it depended on the specification of the RRP's strength in use. A significant impact is also observed when RRP are part of national governments because, under cabinets with RR elements, the difference between native and foreigners in terms of unemployment is higher.

However, as discussed in Chapter 3, neo-classical approaches have important limitations in their interpretation of what ‘politics’ is. As argued by Palombarini (2001, 2000), neo-classical models suffer from serious limitations in their interpretation of the relationship between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’.

In particular, Palombarini (2001, 2000) maintains that neo-classical models cannot simultaneously deal with the ‘specificity of goals’ and the ‘autonomy of action’ of politics (Palombarini 2001, 74).

The specificity of the goals refers to separate goals and logic related to the political system. In other words, a political actor's goals differs from those of economic actors. Palombarini (2000, 2001), in line with other works, particularly those of Max Weber, argues that: ‘the aspiration to power constitutes its [politician’s] main goal, crucial to explain its action’ (Palombarini 2000, 100). The autonomy of action is respected when, in a model, ‘a) politics can influence the social dynamics and b) its action is not strictly determined by other subsystems’ (Palombarini 2000, 101). A theory of political economy should address and explain how the political system interacts with other systems (Palombarini 2001). Neo-classical models are not suited for recognizing the specificity of goals and autonomy of action at the same time, according to Palombarini (1999, 2001). On the one hand, opportunistic models recognize the specificity of politics because they see political competition as a struggle for power (Palombarini 2001). However, in doing so, neo-classical models disregard the autonomy of politics since they disconnect the political system from other subsystems (i.e. there is no interaction between the political system and the social structure). According to Palombarini (2001, 76), in opportunistic models, ‘the government can only adapt the point of view of the median elector, who chooses for it: the assertion of the specificity of politics implies the denial of its autonomy’. On the other hand, Palombarini (2001) argues that partisan models do not recognize the specificity of politics since the goals of political parties overlap with the goals of their constituencies. In other words, there is no difference in partisan models between a political organization and the fraction of society that it wants to represent.



To understand the potential impact of the input (the strength of RRP) on the output (the different economic policies and outcomes), we need to understand ‘how’ they are related, thus going beyond the correlations. Contrary to the partisan models, which assume a perfect match between constituency and party’s demands, our analysis needs to address the mechanism behind the relations tested in Chapter 4. Following Palombarini (1999, 2001), we need to consider the autonomy of action as well as the specificity of politics and enter the black box of the RRP’s political channel that connects social demands and economic outcomes. Within this channel lie the conditions for RRP to play a role in the determination of economic policy and consequently the economic outcomes. Following Amable and Palombarini (2005), we need to identify: (i) the different strategies RRP can follow in order to aggregate or integrate a Dominant Social Bloc (DSB) and (ii) the conditions RRP should meet in order to achieve a DSB. In this chapter, we lay the foundations for an analysis integrating all these aspects. We do so by: (i) justifying the need to go ‘beyond’ the supply side of politics by looking at voters’ attitudes and social blocs; (ii) presenting, and also (iii) enriching the ‘neo-realist’ approach given by Amable and Palombarini (2005); (iv) discussing the characteristics of the RR social bloc. We also (v) illustrate our theoretical contributions by relying on the strategy followed by the Italian Northern League to integrate the centre-right social bloc. Far from being definitive and consolidated, these contributions should be considered as the starting point for further research on the mechanisms through which RRP influence the economy.

The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 5.2, we review the impact of RRP on individual attitudes (in particular racial prejudice) and underline that economic theory consider racial prejudice as a possible determinant of (i) wages and unemployment on the labour market and (ii) redistribution and size of the welfare state. In consideration of the limitations of the models discussed in Chapter 3, in Section 5.3 we critically discuss an alternative, what we call the ‘DSB framework’, proposed by Amable and Palombarini (2005). This framework focuses on the social blocs behind political forces. Section 5.4 identifies the main social characteristics and political demands of RRP’s electorate in

Europe. In Section 5.5, we discuss the limitations of the Amable and Palombarini (2005) model in understanding RRP (and, more generally, political) impact on the economy: 1) it underestimates the relation with the supranational level and 2) it does not address the different types of ‘social power’, i.e. the ability of social classes to influence the socio-economic system which a social bloc can mobilize. We propose two amendments of the original model in order to overcome these limitations: (i) we rely on the literature in the field of international relations to assess the role of national states and how they interact with the supranational sphere and (ii) we address the different types of social power that social blocs can provide to political actors. Finally, in Section 5.6 we illustrate the amended framework by analysing the case study of the Italian LN and summarizing some general elements that are common to most RRP. We thus conclude that this new model can contribute to an original analysis and to further research on the actual and potential impacts of RRP on the economy.

## 5.2. BEHIND POLITICS: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

Going beyond the neo-classical framework (which considers the only supply side of the political determinants on the economy) this section aims to highlight the importance of integrating individual attitudes in our research, particularly racial prejudice.<sup>44</sup> In this other framework, the issue is no longer the political mediation or the role of political ideologies (as in partisan models). Approaches based on individual attitudes try to identify the extent to which these shape the economic system, with relatively little importance of which political force is in power (i.e. without parties’ mediation). The extent to which racial prejudice shapes the economic system has been studied in the literature. In particular, economic theory considers that racial prejudice might have an impact on (i) the labour

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<sup>44</sup> The literature shows and discusses various other determinants. For example, in the case of support for redistribution, it includes the level of inequality and the cultural and political factors (Alesina et al., 2001, Alesina and Glaeser, 2005), the economic regime (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, 15), the religious faith (Schleve and Stasavage, 2006), individuals’ labour market position (Guillaud, 2011), life conditions and social mobility (Benabou and Ok, 1998; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001; Sombart, 1906; Piketty, 1995; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009). However, in this work, we focus on racial prejudice as it is the determinant most directly associated with the core ideology of RRP.

market and (ii) redistribution.<sup>45</sup> However, while there seems to be a consensus on the fact that racial prejudice has major consequences for the economy, the proper model to interpret it is still debated. In this section, we show that (i) RRPs might contribute to the diffusion of racial prejudice in various forms (xenophobia, negative attitudes towards migration, etc.), (ii) racial prejudice might have an impact on the economy, either on the labour market or on redistribution policy, and (iii) the different models herein discussed are all incomplete or oversimplified in their analysis of the political determinants of the economy.

In particular, Section 5.2.1 discusses the impact of RRPs on individual attitudes, especially concerning nativism. Section 5.2.2 deals with the specific impact of racial prejudice, a key component of RRPs' ideology (See Chapter 1), on the labour market. Section 5.2.3 considers the influence of racial prejudice on the support for redistribution and presents an exception in this micro-founded literature on the political determinants of the economy, which aims to re-integrate the political parties to achieve an intermediate position between individual attitudes and economic policy (Roemer, Lee, and Straeten 2007). Finally, Section 5.2.4 summarizes the limitations of these approaches.

### 5.2.1. IMPACT OF RRPs ON RACIAL PREJUDICE AND VOTERS' ATTITUDES

In this Section, we aim to analyse the political determinants of racial prejudice and voters' attitudes, since we consider that the presence of RRPs might have an impact on voters' attitudes. However, discussing the impact of RRPs on voters' attitudes is not straightforward, since RRPs' electoral breakthroughs depend on voters' attitudes and feelings. In other words, one might mistake 'cause' for 'effect' since there is clear feedback between voters' positions and a party's score. For this reason, much of the early literature on RRPs analyses how attitudes and issues contributed to RRPs' success, rather than questioning how and whether these parties influenced people's opinions (Kitschelt 1995).

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<sup>45</sup> We refer to redistribution and welfare state interchangeably in this section.

Minkenberg (2001) provides a pioneering study of RRP's impact, including agenda-setting power. He provides a qualitative discussion of the political discourse and policy-making of four different RRP's (in Germany, Austria, France, and Italy). He concludes that the political impact goes beyond simple inclusion in the national government and depends on interactions with other actors and the focal country's institutional setting. He argues that in three of the four cases, 'the most substantive impacts were a change in cultural issues, a new Kulturkampf against the left, its allies and against foreigners' (Minkenberg 2001, 18). Schain (2002) analyses the French case based on a collection of opinion polls conducted between 1984 and 1997. He finds that '[the] issue priorities of voters changed after the breakthrough of the National Front, rather than before, and the change were very rapid'. The hypothesis that RRP's might generate (and also take advantage of) negative attitudes towards immigration finds support in other studies. In one of the first quantitative works, Semyonov et al. (2006) analyse the attitudes to foreigners in 12 European countries between 1998 and 2000 and report that negative attitudes are stronger in countries with strong RRP's. Sprague-Jones (2011) analyses the results of the 53<sup>rd</sup> Eurobarometer survey of 15 EU countries. He uses a hierarchical linear model to show that large RRP's are a better predictor of the gap in support of multiculturalism among European citizens, whether or not claiming a minority heritage, thus indicating that RRP's might exacerbate political debate and lead to a more polarized arena.

In other works, the results appears to be dependent on the type of RRP. Williams (2006) compares three cases (France, Germany, and Austria) and finds that the centrality of immigration in public discourse (operationalized as mentioned in newspaper articles) appears to be related to the rise in the FN in France, while this is not the case for other RRP's. She explains this difference by fact that the FN introduced the question of immigration in political debate in France and concludes that this type

of entrepreneurial RRP<sup>46</sup> wields some agenda-setting power, which is not available to all RRP. Wilkes et al. (2007) accuse Semyonov et al.'s (2006) results of overgeneralization; only RRP promoting 'cultural' racism (i.e. ethnopluralism, as discussed in Chapter 1) have a large impact, while those RRP characterized by 'classical' racism have a lower impact. Wilkes et al. (2007) support their findings in a study of 13 countries using a pooled regression model and data from the Eurobarometer surveys. They provide a classification of RRP according to the type of 'racism' promoted, following Carter's (2005a) classification. Also, Carvalho (2013), in an extended comparison between France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, finds only conditional support for the thesis of RRP's impact on people's attitudes to migration, that too mostly for the 1990s. He finds no evidence of this relation during the 2000s. Finally, Dunn and Singh (2011), in a multilevel model and using data from the 1999–2001 World Values Surveys for 29 countries, find no link between social intolerance and the proportion of parliamentary seats controlled by RRP.

The literature examines other issues and their interactions. In particular, Gómez-Reino and Llamazares (2013, 810) analyse 11 national cases using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on Chapel Hill Expert Survey data, Logit regression on ESS data; they then compare the results from these two analyses, and show that RRP managed to 'connect Eurosceptic attitudes to other core elements of their ideological discourse, such as their anti-immigration views and, at a more general level, their nationalist positions'.

To summarize, the literature results are rather ambiguous in their findings. On the one hand, there is no general consensus on the impact of the rise of RRP on voters' attitudes; on the other hand, there is enough evidence that RRP are, in some cases, able to lead to a more or less important change in

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<sup>46</sup> Williams (M. H. Williams 2006, 56) defines 'entrepreneur' parties as those who 'saw opportunities in the political party system of the mid- to late 1980s and aggressively sought strategies to position themselves to take advantage of the openings. These parties reformulated their platforms, introduced charismatic leaders, played to the media for publicity, adopted politically correct language to distance themselves from fascist rhetoric, and presented themselves in a new style that many authors have called populist.'

the political agenda, in particular on racial prejudice, negative attitudes towards migrants, and other forms of nativism. The mechanism is simple: RRP actively diffuse a nativist view of society in their propaganda, for either ideological reasons or political calculation. Depending on the context and the strategies adopted (M. H. Williams 2006), RRP might therefore contribute, if not to the diffusion of nativism, then at least to its salience. This conclusion should be read together with what is discussed in Chapter 3, as the literature underlines that the presence of RRP, in certain national contexts, might modify other parties' stance on immigration as well as on other issues.

In the field of economic theory, different authors underline that racial prejudice is a possible determinant of (i) wage and unemployment levels in the labour market and (ii) the size of welfare state and redistribution. In the following sections, we focus on the so-called 'economics of discrimination' to understand how the diffusion of racial prejudice, which might follow the rise of RRP in certain cases, can affect the economy.

### 5.2.2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PREJUDICE ON THE LABOUR MARKET

Neo-classical authors (Becker 1957; Arrow 1972) study the economic consequences of racism in their analysis of labour market discrimination.<sup>47</sup> Discrimination is usually defined as the phenomenon in which the 'personal characteristics of the worker that are unrelated to productivity are also valued on the market' (Arrow 1973, 3). The presence of discrimination in wages and employment is an important empirical contradiction of the neo-classical models. Indeed, in neo-classical models, differentials in wages should represent differentials in productivity, at least in a competitive labour market. However, neo-classical economists had already recognized the existence of discriminatory behaviours in the labour market in early 20th century (Edgeworth 1922). From the ensuing debate,

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<sup>47</sup>. Since RRP are characterized by a nativist ideology while their position on gender equality is less clear, we refer only to racial discrimination. However, the models discussed here apply to other forms of discrimination (sex, age, etc.) as well.

we identify two main models<sup>48</sup> used by neo-classical economics to analyse the economics of discrimination:

1. Taste-based discrimination: employers', workers', and customers' economic choices (e.g. for hiring a worker) are determined by preferences unrelated to productivity/wages/prices. In other words, an employer might 'prefer' to work with a white worker even if he demands a higher wage and has the same productivity as a black worker. These preferences contribute to determining the wage of equilibrium of the labour force;
2. Statistical discrimination: employers rely on an 'observable characteristic, race, as a surrogate for the unobservable characteristics which in fact cause the productivity differences' (e.g. the level of education). In the previous example, the employer does not 'prefer' to hire white workers but considers them more productive.

Radical<sup>49</sup> economists contest the validity of these models on various grounds and argue that 'economic theory must take account of the relationship between the variability of workers' efforts and racial inequality (Reich 1981), that both ceasing and continuing discrimination may be costly (Shulman, 1984), and that the economics of discrimination requires an alternative conceptualization of competition and accumulation (Williams, 1987; Mason, 1991)' (Mason 1994, 92).<sup>50</sup> In this section, we critically review neo-classical models of discrimination and their main radical critique.

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<sup>48</sup> We decided to focus on these two models after a survey of neo-classical literature on the subject. Indeed, within neo-classical models, one can find other models. For example, monopoly models (Aichian and Kessel 1962) highlight that 'majority' (white or male) employees can collude among them and with employers from their own group to receive higher wages, depending on their degree of unionization. However, they appear to extend taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination, rather than being an alternative. In both cases, the fact that employers 'collude' with majority workers or accept crowding minorities in low-paid jobs depend on either taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination.

<sup>49</sup> By radical economists, we refer to a heterogeneous family of authors 'who may variously describe themselves as post-Keynesian, Kaleckian, Marxian, radical political economists, institutionalist, Sraffian, classical, and post-classical' (Arestis and Sawyer 1994, xiii).

<sup>50</sup> Among the alternatives proposed by radical economists, Reich's (1981) model is, to our knowledge, the most commonly used one. Since the differences with other radical models would not add useful information to our discussion, we present only Reich's model as an example of radical critique of the neo-classical theory of economic discrimination.

These models offer an interesting, although incomplete, take on the mechanisms behind RRP's impact on the economy, as they show that the diffusion of racial prejudice has consequences on the functioning of the labour market.

#### 5.2.2.1. TASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION: RACIST BEHAVIOUR SHOULD DISAPPEAR IN A FREE AND COMPETITIVE LABOUR MARKET

Becker (1957) argues that racial differences between wages that are not explained by differences in productivity might be caused by a 'taste for discrimination'. In other words, 'if an individual has a taste for discrimination, he must act as if he were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others' (Becker 1957, 4). For example, a racist employer is willing to pay higher wages to white workers in order to avoid using black workers. In order to treat the matter mathematically, he develops the concept of 'discrimination coefficient' ( $d_i$ ), which indicates the non-monetary cost of employing a worker from a group. Taste-base discrimination models apply to both employees and consumers. However, the assumptions, reasoning, and consequences are rather similar. We focus on the employer's case as it is the simplest one.

Let us consider a labour market with two types of labour: B (black workers) and W (white workers). Discriminating employers prefer W to B. According to Becker (1957), a discriminating employer will hire someone from a non-preferred group (e.g. a black worker) instead of someone from a preferred group (e.g. a white worker) only if:

$$w_B = w_W - d_B \leq w_W \quad (5.1)$$

where  $w_B$  is the wage of B and  $w_W$  is the wage of W. Neo-classical models assume that at equilibrium, wage equals the marginal product of labour ( $MP_L$ ). If we consider the same productivity of B and W, it follows that:

$$w_B \leq w_W = MP_L \quad (5.2)$$



Thus, black workers are paid less than white workers and less than their marginal product, depending on the intensity of the discriminatory taste. Since the demanded quantity of L is proportional to  $MP_L$ , it also follows that there will be more unemployed black people.

Arrow (1972) provides a mathematical generalization Becker's model and criticizes its durability. Let us consider a labour market where the total labour force is:

$$L = W + B \quad (5.3)$$

These two factors of production are perfect substitutes and receive wages  $w_B$  and  $w_W$  respectively. However, employers have discriminatory preferences (i.e. they negatively evaluate B or positively evaluate W or both). Arrow (1972) assumes that, in the presence of racism, there is a trade-off between profits ( $\pi$ ) and discrimination (i.e. the composition of B and W workers that the employer wishes). In other words, employers seek to maximize a utility function  $U(\pi, B, W)$ . Considering an output function  $f(W+B) = f(L)$ , with capital as given, we can write profits as:

$$\pi = f(L) - w_B B - w_W W \quad (5.4)$$

In the presence of racism,  $w_B$  includes 'the price the employer is willing to pay, in terms of profits, for reducing his B labour force by one' (i.e. the discrimination coefficient (dB)). The discrimination coefficient dB in Arrow (1972) equals the negative of the marginal rate of substitution of profits for B labour and has a positive value (since the marginal utility of B for the employer is negative). Conversely, the coefficient of discrimination for W (dW) is considered to be negative:

$$d_B = -MR_{\pi, B} > 0 \quad (5.5a)$$

$$d_W = -MR_{\pi, W} \leq 0 \quad (5.5b)$$

Since neo-classical models assume that in equilibrium, the marginal product of a factor (labour, in our case) equals its cost, we can write the marginal product for B ( $MP_B$ ) and W ( $MP_W$ ) as:

$$MP_B = w_B + d_B \quad (5.6a)$$

$$MP_W = w_W + d_W \quad (5.6b)$$

Given equal productivity and since W and B are perfect substitutes, it follows that:

$$MP_W = MP_B = MP_L \quad (5.7)$$

$$MP_W = w_W + d_W = w_B + d_B = MP_B \quad (5.8)$$

$$w_W - w_B = d_B - d_W > 0 \quad (5.9)$$

In simple terms, the difference between wages paid to W and B depends on the difference between the coefficients of discrimination. If all employers have the same utility function  $U(\pi, B, W)$ , it follows that:

$$\pi = f(L) - MP_L L + d_W W + d_B B \quad (5.10)$$

In the absence of racism, thus:

$$\pi_o = f(L) - MP_L L \quad (5.11)$$

It follows that employers' loss in profits due to discrimination is determined by:

$$\pi - \pi_o = d_W W + d_B B \quad (5.12)$$

If we consider that employers' utility function  $U(\pi, B, W)$  in the presence of racism depends only on the ratio between B and W, then we have:

$$d_W W + d_B B = 0 \quad (5.13)$$

$$d_W W + w_W B - w_B B + d_W B = 0 \quad (5.14)$$

$$d_B B = -d_W W \quad (5.15)$$

$$\frac{B}{W} = -\frac{d_W}{d_B} \quad (5.16)$$

In other words, from the standpoint of the employers, the effects of racial prejudice reflects exclusively in a transfer from B to W workers and in no increase in profits (rather, the opposite). This, in turns, generates an increase in the wages of W and a decrease in the wages of B. He concludes that ‘it seems very difficult to construct a model in which employers gain in any obvious way; the gains to the whites appear to accrue to white workers primarily’ (Arrow 1972, 27).

However, not all employers share the same utility function, according to Arrow (1972). Some firms discriminate more than others. Equations 9 and 13 can be regarded as a pair of linear equations in terms of yield of W and B:

$$\frac{W}{L} = \frac{d_B}{(w_W - w_B)} ; \frac{B}{L} = - \frac{d_w}{(w_W - w_B)} \quad (5.17)$$

As already seen in Becker, it follows that more racist employers (i.e. those employers with the highest level of coefficient of discrimination ( $d_B$ ) will employ more W workers and, conversely, the share of B will be higher in less racist firms. It thus follows that racism has consequences on the size of the firm. Let us assume diminishing marginal returns for labour, another typical assumption in neo-classical models. It follows that the quantity of equilibrium of L for a racist employer will be lower than that for a non-racist one since  $MP_L$  is higher for more discriminating firms, under the assumption that  $MP_B = MP_L$ , as  $d_B$  is higher. Moreover, if  $MP_L$  is higher, it follows that the size of the labour force is smaller. Discriminatory firms are smaller, which has a further consequence on profits, since it means that discriminatory firms have access to smaller economy of scale. Arrow (1973, 8) concludes that: ‘discrimination is costly to entrepreneur and acts like a tax on him, since it shifts his demand for labour to the more costly component’.

However, neither Arrow’s (1972) nor Becker’s (1957) model can explain the persistence of racial discrimination in the long run. Indeed, according to neo-classical models, discrimination should disappear: ‘Under the usual assumption of constant (or increasing) returns to scale, competition would imply the elimination of all but the least discriminatory employers. If there are any non-discriminatory

employers, they would drive out the others' (Arrow 1998, 95). However, as Arrow argues (1998, 93), 'we have clear evidence that blacks were in the past excluded from a significant range of good jobs and from the purchase of housing and restaurant services. We have very strong evidence that these practices persist in some important measure'. Phelps (1972) argues that discrimination, instead of being 'taste-based', could derive from lack of information in the labour market. Thus, racial prejudice, rather than being a taste (i.e. an employer prefers W to B regardless of B's productivity), is used as an information regarding unobserved quality of individual workers (e.g. an employer considers B less productive than W, but would be willing to hire a B worker who has proved to be as productive as W).

#### 5.2.2.2. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL PREJUDICE AS A CHEAP SOLUTION TO LACK OF INFORMATION.

Let us consider an imperfect labour market where (i) there is scarcity of information about the productivity of L (i.e. employers do not know ex ante all the characteristics of the workers they are hiring) and (ii) the perceived average productivity between the types of labour is different. Acquiring information on each possible worker then becomes a cost. When this cost is sufficiently high, it becomes rational to hire W rather than B if the average productivity of W is higher than the average productivity of B. In other words, 'the employer who seeks to maximize expected profit will discriminate against blacks or women if he believes them to be less qualified, reliable, long-term, etc. on the average than whites and men, respectively, and if the cost of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive' (Phelps 1972, 659).

The model can be depicted as follows. Let us consider that employers can evaluate each of the qualifications ( $q_i$ ) of applicant  $i$  by the means of a test  $y_i$ , with an error  $\mu_i$  (normally distributed and with mean zero):

$$y_i = q_i + \mu_i \quad (5.18)$$

Let us suppose that skin colour is a known characteristic, observed along with test results. He requires a qualification:

$$q_i = \alpha + x_i + \eta_i \quad (5.19)$$

where  $\alpha$  is a constant,  $\eta_i$  a random variable normally distributed with mean zero, and  $x_i$  is the contribution of social factors that the employer believes to be race-related, so that:

$$x_i = (-\beta + \varepsilon_i)c_i \quad (5.20)$$

where  $\beta$  is a positive constant,  $c_i=1$  if the candidate is black and 0 otherwise, and  $\varepsilon_i$  is a random variable normally distributed with mean zero. Moreover,  $\varepsilon_i$  and  $\eta_i$  are independently distributed.

Then, we can rewrite (5.19):

$$q_i = \alpha + \lambda_i + z_i \quad (5.21)$$

$$y_i = \alpha + \lambda_i + z_i + \mu_i \quad (5.22)$$

where  $\lambda_i = \eta_i + c_i\varepsilon_i$  and  $z_i = \beta c_i$ . Test  $y_i$ , then 'can be used in relation to the race factor to predict the degree of qualification net of the race factor, the latter being separately calculable':

$$q'_i - z'_i = a_1 (y'_i - z'_i) + \mu_i \quad (5.23)$$

$$0 < a_1 = \frac{\text{var}\lambda_i}{\text{var}\lambda_i + \text{var}\mu_i} < 1 \quad (5.24)$$

In other words, if an employer considers that being black is statistically related to some sort of disadvantage, so that  $z'_i < 0$  for all black applicants, it follows that one might expect a lower degree of qualification  $q_i$  for blacks than whites, even if test  $y_i$  is equal. Thus, discrimination does not depend on an employer's taste for discrimination but on a prejudice about the efficiency of black workers. Aigner and Cain (1977) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982) expand Phelps's (1972) model by adding wages for black and white workers so as to reproduce the observed differences. Regardless of the mathematical formulization, their conclusions are similar: the lack of information on an individual's

productivity, the cost of acquiring information, and the existence of perceived differences in group productivity are considered as the main explanation for worker discrimination. England and Lewin (1989) propose to distinguish between ‘statistical discrimination’ and ‘error discrimination’: the former reflects real differences between groups, while the latter involves an incorrect evaluation. In both cases, individuals from minority groups who expose atypical qualifications (i.e. above the group average) suffer from discrimination since they discount the general negative opinion about their group.

Taste-based and statistical discrimination models are indeed similar in their outcomes; however, ‘the causes are different’ (Arrow 1972, 22). ‘Statistical discrimination’ resolves the main theoretical problem of taste-based neo-classical theories; as long as information is incomplete, there is discrimination, either ‘truly’ statistical or produced by an erroneous perception. Thus, statistical discrimination models consider market pressure insufficient for diminishing the wage/employment gap between groups because of imperfect information. On the other hand, statistical discrimination models fail to recognize the structural role of racial prejudice, as Arrow (Arrow 1972, 26) recognizes: ‘It is certainly a common view that in some sense racial discrimination is a device by which the whites in the aggregate gain at the expense of the blacks. Hence, the whole problem is to be interpreted as an exploitative relation. There is a stable relation here; the values inherent in discrimination uphold a structure that is profitable to those holding those values.’

In other words, according to radical economics, racial discrimination is not just a taste or a misperception. Rather, it is a strategy whose goal is to strengthen the advantages of whites over black people. Some authors (Reich 1981; Mason 1995) argue that such a strategy also strengthens the position of employers against that of workers, as racial prejudice generates a cleavage within the working class. Thus, these approaches criticize the previously discussed neo-classical models and argue that racism should be interpreted in terms of ‘divide-and-conquer’.

### 5.2.2.3. THE RADICAL CRITIQUE: RACIAL PREJUDICE AS A TOOL IN A DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER STRATEGY

Radical models of discrimination differ from neo-classical models in their analysis of the firm and workers-employers relation. As Reich and Devine (1981, 27) argue, ‘radical economists view the capitalist firm as a contradictory relation, with capitalists attempting to maximize their profits, and workers attempting to maximize their wage and their satisfaction from work without being fired. Collective action occurs, to be sure, but in a conflictive context, because workers and capitalists generally have conflicting objective’.<sup>51</sup> Following this assumption, Marxist and radical economists have developed three main alternative ‘divide-and-conquer’ models.

Neo-classical models fail to understand this conflictive context; it follows that the mechanisms and consequences of discrimination are different. In particular, a competitive labour market (Roemer 1979, 696) is not enough to erase discriminating agents, because in the presence of a conflict between employers and employees ‘a divide-and-conquer strategy is a competitive, profit-maximizing strategy for firms, which will result in discriminatory equilibria’. A divide-and-conquer strategy can be summarized as follows: ‘if black and white workers are mixed in certain proportions, racial discord is introduced in their ranks because of their particular psychologies, and their bargaining ability is consequently reduced. The firm can then lower the wages it is required to pay either group’ (Roemer 1979, 703).

Reich proposes a formulization of the previous discussion. Let us assume a labour market with two types of labour (L), W and B, which are perfect substitutes. All firms have a short-run production function  $f(LD) = LD$ , where LD is the labour actually performed. LD is defined as follows:

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<sup>51</sup> Moreover, Roemer (1979, 703) underlines that taste-based discrimination models are unacceptable even within neo-classical models as they go against a few assumptions underlying the neo-classical theory of the firm: ‘we should not posit firms as being invested with these irrational tastes. That is antithetical to both the Marxian and neo-classical notions of the firm as a profit-maximizing, capital-accumulating entity’.

$$LD = g(LP, BP), \text{ where } LP = L_W + L_B \text{ (5.25)}$$

where LP is the labour purchased, BP is the bargaining power of L, and  $L_W$  and  $L_B$  are the employment levels for W and B. It follows that, for firms, profits ( $\pi$ ) are defined as:

$$\pi = pf(LD) - w_W W + w_B B, \text{ where } w_W > 0 \wedge w_B > 0 \text{ (5.26)}$$

In the presence of racism among workers, BP can be defined as:

$$BP = h(R_w, R_q) \text{ where } R_w = \frac{w_W}{w_B}, R_q = L_W/L \text{ (5.27)}$$

In other words, the bargaining power of labour depends on the extent of wage and employment inequality,  $R_w$  and  $R_q$  respectively. Firms maximize their profits by choosing the levels of  $L_W$ ,  $L_B$ ,  $R_w$ , and  $R_q$ . ‘Discrimination then harms all workers by lowering the average wage rate and increasing profit; hence, workers have a class interest to unite across racial lines as capital continually seeks to divide-and-conquer workers in order to increase profit’ (Mason 1994, 92).

Roemer (1979), whose conclusions are similar to those of Reich (1981), proposes a micro-founded model of the divide-and-conquer strategy<sup>52</sup> where he focuses on reservation wages and shows that, even in markets where reservation wages are low, the outcome is a discriminatory equilibrium. In other words, even in the context of competitive labour market, firms maximize their profits by adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy. The outcome is the same as for Reich (1981): wages are lower for both white and black workers while firms experience higher profits. These conclusions are the opposite of taste-based and statistical discrimination models, where racism acts as a cost on employers (regardless of who displays discriminatory tastes) and white workers obtain higher wages. In radical models of racism, the final price of racism is paid by all workers, regardless of their race.

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<sup>52</sup> We do not dwell on the formulization of Roemer’s (1979) model as it provides no further insights that are useful to our analysis: assumptions, conclusions, and general approach are similar between Reich (1981) and Roemer (1979).



As Roemer (1979, 704) underlines, divide-and-conquer models still have some important limitations: ‘in a full Marxian or radical treatment, the present model would be a partial equilibrium analysis in this important sense! a complete analysis would inquire into what institutions and practices capitalist society are responsible for endowing workers with the h-curve psychology [i.e. racism]’. Indeed, divide-and-conquer models do not consider the role of political actors, either as a source of racial prejudice or as legislators (e.g. legislation on workplace discrimination also depends on the action of political parties). They provide part of the explanation: once we establish that RRPs have consequences on individual attitudes, we can argue that they favour divide-and-conquer strategies by employers. We consider this explanation as possible, yet incomplete. First, it focuses only on the labour market; this is an important part of economics, but not the only one. In our study, we include different government expenditures and, as discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the literature on RRPs focuses on the consequences of welfare state and redistribution. Second, in divide-and-conquer models, political parties seem to simply be the expression of a social group, with no strategies of their own. If we adopt the idea of autonomy and specificity of politics (Palombarini, 2001), we need to take into account the political strategy of RRPs (and other political parties). Once we explain how the ‘black box’ of political competition works, we can go back to these models and make a fruitful link.

Indeed, considering the analysis in Section 5.1, RRPs might have an impact on discrimination on the labour market. They are ideologically nativist parties and their goal is to convince the highest number of people of their own ideas. Within the frameworks reviewed in this section, they can be seen as contributing to increase the ‘taste’ for discrimination (‘I don’t like foreigners’), spread and justify ‘statistical’ discrimination (‘foreigners are lazy’), and act as a further factor of working class divisions (see Section 5.4) in divide-and-conquer models. However, all these models are somewhat incomplete. As discussed, taste-based discrimination models cannot explain the persistence of racial prejudice. Statistical discrimination models are limited in their understanding of the phenomenon since they do

not consider that erroneous views usually serve to justify exploitation. They are not ‘neutral’ and derive not simply from a lack of information, but from a social strategy. ‘Divide-and-conquer’ approaches provide more useful insights to our work, as they analyse racism as a strategy by economic actors. However, even they are limited for two main reasons. First, as other authors (Alesina et al., 2001; Roemer et al., 2007) point out, the economic consequences of racial prejudice go beyond the labour market. According to these authors, racial prejudice has a negative impact on individual support for redistribution, which in turns are important in justifying and maintaining redistributive policies across society, as they argue. Second, our focus is slightly different: we analyse the consequences of a political actor, namely RRP. Indeed, they might participate in a ‘divide-and-conquer’ situation, but it would be a mistake to reduce them to the political expression of a capitalist strategy. There is a specificity and an autonomy of the political system (see the introduction to this chapter) that should be taken into account when analysing the political determinants of the economy.

### 5.2.3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PREJUDICES ON INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION

In the previous section, we show that racial prejudice may be a determinant of wage and unemployment levels. However, economic literature (Alesina et al., 2001; Roemer et al., 2007) considers that racial prejudice might also have consequences on redistribution. Indeed, as Lipset and Bendix (1959) highlight, racial discrimination is a constraint on the development of solidarity ties across society. With no solidarity ties, the argument suggests that there is less demand for redistribution, which in turn reduces the size of the welfare state. Compared to the previous literature, these studies propose almost no mathematical formulization and focus on providing empirical evidence of the consequences of racism on individual support for redistribution. Moreover, the role of politics (i.e. political parties), is not considered. Individual attitudes directly reflect on redistribution with no political mediation. The study by Roemer et al. (2007) differs from these studies as it highlights the role of political parties in its analysis. In particular, Roemer et al. (2007) show that

even if racial prejudice does not modify individual support for redistribution, it can modify voting preferences and thus have an impact on the size of the welfare state.

#### 5.2.3.1. EFFECT OF RACIAL PREJUDICE ON THE INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Alesina et al. (2001) test the argument by Lipset and Bendix (1959) that racial prejudice is a major explanatory variable for public attitude towards redistribution. They analyse the effect of racial heterogeneity (operationalized as the percentage of African-Americans in a state) and anti-Black prejudice on the support for increased welfare. They use data from the US General Social Survey (covering the period from 1972 to the end of the 1990s) and find that the presence of African-Americans is a strong predictor of lower levels of support for redistribution. Racial prejudice appears also as a significant (but less important) predictor.

Using a covariance structure model on 1986 National Election Survey (NES), Gilens (1995) shows that among white Americans, racial stereotypes determine the level of support for the welfare state. Luttmer (2001), relying on a survey for 1972 to 1993, analyses this phenomenon at the neighbourhood level. He finds that support for public spending is lower for people living in districts with a high share of minorities on welfare. Although most studies in this field focus on the US, mainly because of its ethnic history, some scholars examine other contexts. Soroka et al. (2004) analyse data for Canada and find that, in contrast to the findings of Luttmer (2001) and Alesina et al. (2001), ethnic heterogeneity in Canada does not seem to be related to lower support for redistribution. Stichnoth (2012) analyses German data from 1997 and 2002 surveys. He finds that the local proportion of foreigners negatively affects natives' support for redistribution. Senik et al. (2009) focus on the perceived share of immigrants among natives using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). However, the association between perceived migration and support for redistribution is very weak. In the second part of their work, they consider the interaction between the perception of immigration and judgments about the effects of immigration: They show that the contemporary presence of perceived high levels of migration and negative judgements of immigrants have a negative impact on


the support for redistribution. However, they show that, on their own, individual attitudes to immigration are also a strong determinant.

Overall, the literature seems to agree that racial prejudice is a determinant of individual support for redistribution. If we consider that RRPs might spread racial prejudice (in various forms such as xenophobia, negative attitudes towards migration, etc.), we see a possible channel through which RRPs can influence the economy, similar to what we argue in Section 5.2.2. However, political systems are more complex in that political competition cannot be reduced solely to voters' attitudes. Roemer et al. (2007) propose a model that takes into account this critique and applies it to the specific case of racism and support for redistribution.

#### 5.2.3.2. ROEMER ET AL. (2007): HOW RACIAL PREJUDICE, INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION, AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM INTERACT.

As we have shown in the previous discussion, racial prejudice may reduce the support for redistribution policy. In the current section, we aim to highlight the political mechanisms explaining how RRPs, through factors such as racial prejudice and support for redistribution, may be a determinant of the economy. Among the studies relying on Alesina et al. (2001), the study by Roemer et al. (2007) is the only one which provides mechanism modeled around the action of political parties. Although they do not focus only on RRPs, their results provide some useful insights into the possible effects of RRPs on the economic system.

Roemer et al. (2007) focus on anti-immigrant sentiments in European countries and xenophobic attitudes towards minorities in the US within a formal two-dimensional political competition space, where political parties compete for voters' support over two issues: anti-immigrant sentiments and the size of the public sector (tax rate level in the US). They hypothesize that xenophobia (the first issue) can influence support for a larger public sector (higher marginal tax rate in the US) via two different effects:



*Figure 28 – Figure comparing Roemer et al.'s (2007) policy-bundle effect (PBE) and Alesina et al.'s (2001) anti-solidarity effect (ASE). Source: Author's own diagram.*

‘First, there is a direct effect which we call the anti-solidarity effect (ASE): to the extent that voters dislike immigrants, and believe that immigrants exploit the welfare state, they may desire to decrease the generosity of state benefits. A similar argument is put forward by Alesina et al. (2001) to explain large differences in welfare programs between the US and Europe: in the US, racism and prejudices against the Black minority may reduce the demand for redistribution expressed by white citizens. The second effect is indirect. Suppose that a voter is very xenophobic, although quite moderate on the issue of public sector size: she may vote for a xenophobic party if the immigration issue is sufficiently important for her, even if that party is more right-wing on the size of the public sector than she is. If there are many voters of this kind, then parties that want large cuts in the size of the public sector may gain large support. We call this the policy-bundle effect (PBE). It is a political portfolio effect, a consequence of the bundling of issues’ (Roemer and Van der Straeten 2006, 253).

In other words, because of the ASE, racist voters will oppose more welfare spending. The PBE, however, affects the choice of the vote but has no consequence on the support for redistribution. The

electorate may still desire more redistribution, but they will be keener to vote for an anti-redistributive (or less redistributive) party so long as these political movements share their anti-immigrant sentiments. The final effect of PBE and ASE in combination is that it defines a new political equilibrium, where the parties are driven to adopt less-redistributive stances, because voters either oppose redistribution (ASE) or choose to vote for less-redistributive parties because of their nativist attitude (PBE).

In order to test their hypotheses, Roemer et al. (2007) analyse four countries using a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) model, which is not country-specific. First, Roemer et al. (2007) identify the distribution of preferences among the electorate by relying on pre-election polls and considering two issues. In this particular case, the two issues are racial prejudice and the size of the welfare state. Parties compete on these two issues for support by proposing a set of policies. Each party's proposals are determined through a game in which two (internal) groups bargain, the militants (who wish to propose a policy that will maximize the average welfare of the party's constituency) and the opportunists (who want to win the election and thus represent more voters). In this way, it is possible to identify the system equilibrium, as represented by the parties' positions on two dimensions/issues. The impact of xenophobia on this political equilibrium is tested via counterfactual analysis. The authors then build the following model to assess the difference between PBE and ASE: (i) the PBE is calculated as the difference between the real demand for redistribution and a counterfactual demand for redistribution when the racist dimension is withdrawn from the model (i.e. only redistribution and not racism is an issue, but people are still racist); (ii) the ASE is calculated as the difference between the real demand for redistribution and a counterfactual demand for redistribution in the absence of racism (i.e. voters are not racist and the model estimates their racism-free support for redistribution). Their results are consistent with those of previous literature as they underline that xenophobia is generally a strong determinant of political attitudes to redistribution. Roemer et al. (2007) argue that xenophobic views are at the root of at least some differences between the US and the European

welfare state models. However, the results for the two different effects are less straightforward. Roemer et al. (2007) compute the ASE and the PBE separately via a counterfactual test. For the US, both are equally significant in the period of 1976–1992. For subsequent periods, according to Lee and Roemer (2006), moral values seem to replace racial politics with non-economic issues in a two-dimension model, at least for the 2004 elections. This means that xenophobic attitudes and support for redistribution are not good descriptors of the structure of political competition in the US in 2004. Rather, the electorate was divided on ‘moral’ issues such as abortion, women’s role in society, and homosexuality (Lee and Roemer 2005).

The pattern in European countries is quite different in France (for the 1988 and 2002 elections) and Denmark (for the 1999 and 2001 elections). Roemer et al. (2007) show a significant and positive ASE, while PBE is either insignificant or quite weak. In other words, in European countries, in contrast to the situation in the USA, xenophobia seems to reduce the number of people demanding more redistribution without increasing the number of people demanding more redistribution but voting for right-wing parties.

Roemer et al. (2007) assume that this is due to the presence of RRPs such as the French FN, which are supposedly between Left and Right on redistribution.<sup>53</sup> A counterfactual test in France in 2002<sup>54</sup> shows that in the absence of the FN, the final result would have been the same as the differences would not have been significant. On the one hand, the presence of the FN pushed the two main parties to the centre, the Left proposing less and the Right more redistribution than would have happened in a FN-free political competition. On the other hand, the existence of the FN modified the likelihood of an election win, favouring the right. In the absence of the FN, a more-redistributive Left would

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<sup>53</sup> However, this assumption relies on the idea that RRPs are, and always have been, pro-redistribution, whereas RRPs' ideas on the economy have changed a lot and are not the same across Europe (see Chapter 2).

<sup>54</sup> To our knowledge, the same test has never been performed in Denmark, despite the presence of a strong RRP such as the DF.

have had a higher chance of an election win or a neck-to-neck finish with a less-redistributive right. The authors estimate that the combined impact of these two effects (greater polarization on the issues and a closer-fought election had the FN not been there) is negligible. While xenophobia has an impact on redistribution policy (through ASE), RRP do not, PBE being negligible (at least in France in the context of the 1988 and 2002 elections).

The absence of PBE in the results of Roemer et al. (2007) for Denmark and France might also derive from the fact that the model was developed for two-party systems (i.e. the US) and two issues, while these political systems involve multiple political competitors, and RRP are independent actors that can hardly be reduced to a two-party competition. In the case of France and Denmark, the model is extended to three parties (Left, Right, and Extreme Right). However, due to the time-consuming nature of calculations, the policy proposals of the Extreme Right are fixed. In other words, Left and Right proposals are the results of an internal bargaining game, as discussed earlier, while the Extreme Right is 'a passive member' (Roemer and Straeten 2005, 102) that has no internal bargaining (its proposals are those of the 'militant' part) and no 'strategy' (its proposals do not depend on other parties' proposals). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, RRP's economic proposals are instrumental issues. There might be a strategic dimension in their determination. We need further research, but in the light of our results and recent literature, we cannot exclude the idea that RRP act strategically on economic issues (i.e. they take into account other parties proposals).

Moreover, Roemer et al. (2007) acknowledge that their work depends heavily on the issues considered (Lee and Roemer 2006). As additional divides emerge, the relevance of racial prejudice as a dimension of the political system changes. This applies to post-9/11 in the US, as Roemer and Lee (Lee and Roemer 2005) underline, but it is true also for European countries, where European integration is becoming even more important (M. Gabel and Hix 2002). Finally, Roemer et al. (2007) study RRP in just one country and across only two elections (1988 and 2002). Therefore, their



conclusions about the FN and the lack of a significant impact on the outcome (the size of welfare state at equilibrium) are hardly generalizable to other RRP.

Overall, this limited stream of the literature argues the existence of an impact of racial prejudice on individual support for redistribution and of an impact of both racial prejudice and individual support for redistribution on party politics, and thus potentially on economic policy-making. It also develops an original explanation of the possible mechanisms linking racial prejudice to economic policy-making by introducing political competition in a game theory framework. However, these impacts appear to be highly dependent on the national contexts (See the introduction to this dissertation) and do not explain the extent to which both racial prejudice and support for redistribution are also politically determined by RRP themselves.

#### 5.2.4. CONCLUSION: AN INDIRECT CHANNEL TO EXPLAIN RRP'S IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

In this section, we discussed how RRP can influence the economic system. Figure 28 provides a graphical representation of the different arguments developed in this section. In particular, in Section 5.2.1, we underlined that, according to political science literature, RRP might contribute to the diffusion of racial prejudice. Moreover, RRP might also act as proxies of the diffusion of racial prejudice, i.e. we expect RRP to be stronger in countries where racism, xenophobia, and nativist attitudes in general are stronger. We therefore hypothesized the existence of an 'indirect' channel of transmission between RRP and the economy through racial prejudice. Indeed, economic theory considers that racial prejudice might have an impact on (i) the labour market and (ii) redistribution policy.

In Section 5.2.2, we discussed the consequences of racial prejudice on labour market and present the main neo-classical models of discrimination: (i) taste-based discrimination and (ii) statistical discrimination. These models, however, fail to explain the persistence of discriminatory behaviours in the labour market and radical authors (Roemer 1979; Reich 1981) fail to understand the structural

dimension of racial prejudice. Roemer (1979) and Reich (1981) criticize neoclassical models and propose to treat racial prejudice as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy by capitalists to divide the working class and diminish its bargaining power. While this approach offers us some insights into the mechanism behind RRP's approach, it fails to consider the role of the political system, both in terms of political competition (how parties interact among each other and develop their own strategies) and government action (since there is no role for government legislation).

Section 5.2.3 focused on the consequences of racial prejudice on redistribution. In particular, we underlined that neo-classical authors consider the (negative) impact of the racial prejudice on individuals' support for redistribution on the one hand and the impact of individual support for redistribution on economic policy-making on the other hand. According to the latter, people express a demand for redistribution and politicians automatically translate the level of this demand into more or less redistributive policies. Therefore, by identifying the determinants of people's support for redistribution, we can identify the determinants of economic policy. In this section, we relied on Roemer et al. (2007) to go a step further. Indeed, they introduce the political competition between parties on different topics to provide a framework for analysing the mechanisms linking racial prejudice with economic policy-making. This approach also contributes to legitimize our research question as far as the extent to which nativist/xenophobic attitudes might shape the economy.

However, we consider that, in the framework given by Roemer et al. (2007), the strategies of political actors are bound by their constituency's individual preferences and do not properly take into account the autonomy of politics (Palombarini 2001). Moreover, Roemer et al. (2007) make strong assumptions about the political system. First, they model political competition based on only two parties, which does not reflect the reality in many European countries and is never the case in the presence of strong RRP's. In theory, the model could be adapted to a multi-party system, but this would increase its complexity and reduce the reliability of the estimates. Second, Roemer et al. (2007) consider political competition structured around two issues. However, Chapters 1 and 2 show that the number of

(economic and non-economic) issues in RRP programmes and ideologies is much larger. Finally, they ignore the possibility of other parties having an impact on other parties' programmes or on voters' attitudes. As seen in Chapter 3 and Section 5.2.1, the presence of RRPs in certain national contexts seems to have had an impact on both. We therefore need a different approach, one that would make fewer assumptions and allow a more realistic analysis.




Figure 29 - The possible impact of RRP through the diffusion of racial prejudice. Source: author's own diagram.

### 5.3. INTERPRETING THE ECONOMY AS AN OUTCOME OF THE POLITICAL REGULATION OF SOCIAL CONFLICT: THE DOMINANT SOCIAL BLOC - FRAMEWORK

In the previous section, we discussed different models that analyse the economic consequences of racial prejudice. We did so since the literature highlights that the presence of strong RRPs might help in the spread of nativist attitudes. Thus, the relationship between RRPs and racial prejudice is more complex, since this seems to be both a determinant and a product of RRPs' rise. Economic theory considers that racial prejudice might be a determinant of (i) wage and unemployment levels and (ii) redistribution policy. We critically reviewed the main models analysing these relations and concluded that, despite being able to provide insights on the mechanisms behind RRPs' impact, they either do not consider the political system or oversimplify it. Therefore, we proposed to assess RRPs' impact using a different framework, proposed by Amable and Palombarini (2005). In Section 5.3.1, we present the main ideas of the neo-realist approach developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005). In this approach, Amable and Palombarini develop a 'Dominant Social Blocs (DSB) framework' to analyse political economy, which we discuss in Section 5.3.2. Section 5.3.3 presents an application of this framework to the cases of Italy and France, with a special focus on their conclusions regarding the French FN. In Section 5.3.4, we discuss the limitations of this framework and propose two amendments, developed in Section 5.5.

#### 5.3.1. THE NEO-REALIST APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY: A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

What we label the 'Dominant Social Blocs (DSB) framework' is intended to be part of a larger work of rethinking political economy, which is a continuation of the 'neo-realist approach' (Amable and Palombarini 2005). This approach particularly insists on the rejection of the normative approach of

modern economics. According to Amable and Palombarini (2005), neo-classical economists and many heterodox scholars see economics as ‘a normative science that resorts to an analysis of reality only when to serve its function of determining the good policies, those that will serve the common interest against the particular ones’ (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 11). In other words, they consider contemporary economics as a science that is no longer interested in describing the functioning of the economy. Rather, its goal is to ensure the functioning of the economic system. Amable and Palombarini (2005) argue that this position is fallacious as it denies the conflictual nature of society by espousing the existence of a ‘common good’ (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 11), seeing conflict and politics only as deviations from the realization of the aforementioned common good.

Amable and Palombarini (2005), however, consider that the main focus of a renewed political economy should, however, be on how societies regulate conflict; they refuse the normative idea of a ‘common good’ that would satisfy all social expectations. Their starting point is a thorough critique of the public choice theory. This school of thought has re-introduced the ‘political’ dimension in the economic field, but within a poor framework: a) it is still much influenced by the neo-classical normative stance; b) it analyses the political in a static framework, independent of politics; c) it states the primacy of ‘economy’ over ‘politics’ (Palombarini 2000).

The neo-realist approach differentiates from the public choice theory in many ways. First, policies and institutions are seen as a temporary way to regulate social conflict. A neo-realist approach attempts to grasp the dynamic and bidirectional interaction between the political and the economy, where neither of the two moments stands before the other. Second, it broadens the field of analysis by taking into account the bloc-building process, which is a political process to produce institutional changes by regrouping different social groups. Third, it does not acknowledge normative ideas of distortion and economic equilibrium, instead prioritizing those of ‘social change and co-evolution of the political and the economy’ (Palombarini 1999, pp.3–4). A similar critique is then developed about the so-called ‘regulation theory’. Heterodox economists, according to Amable and Palombarini

(2005), have also refused to interpret economics as a ‘positive’, i.e. descriptive, analysis of social conflict, in favour of a ‘normative’ analysis of economic policy. In particular, this normative appeal has caused the regulation theory to ‘leave aside the analysis of the fundamental social relations and their mutations. The regulation theory has changed, in spite of its original project, into a purely economic theory different from other economic schools in their explanations of the phenomena that [the theory] decided to study, but accepting their methodological point of view: the conception of the economy as a separated social system. The mode of regulation therefore became that of the economy, but the concept was built to analyse the potential reproduction of a society [in italics in the original] and its power balance’ (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 248). Amable and Palombarini (2005) argue that social conflict and its regulation should be at the centre of the political economy.

### 5.3.2. THE DSB FRAMEWORK: FROM THE REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY TO THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

Building on the previous assumptions, Amable and Palombarini (2005) lay the foundations of a framework to analyse the formation of a socio-economic model<sup>55</sup>, (i.e. a set of institutions), laws, and practices characterizing the economy of a country. They argue that a socio-economic model is shaped by the interactions between social conflict and the formation of a stable economic system that we depict in Figure 30 and Figure 31. They argue that ‘from the viewpoint of the political economy of institutions, the stability of a model of capitalism depends on the stability of the social alliances that support the fundamental compromises on which the model rests’ (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini

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<sup>55</sup> Amable and Palombarini (2005) prefer to use a terminology more in line with the regulation theory and explicitly talk of mode of regulation of social conflict. In their successive works (Amable and Palombarini 2009; Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a), however, they use the term socio-economic model. The two seem to refer to the same idea: a social system where conflict is regulated through a set of institutions and policies. For mere chronological reasons, we have decided to use the most recent terminology.




Figure 30 - The DSB framework in Amable and Palombarini (2005). Source: Amable and Palombarini (2005, 268).

2012a, 1169). In order to analyse the formation of these social alliances (and relative compromises), they consider that social conflict can be considered through three spheres, ideology, political mediation, and institutions.

The sphere of ideology identifies the formation of a political demand, which is ‘the expected protection of a specific interest by the collectivity’ (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 221). Social alliances, also called social blocs, are constituted by a set of social categories. Each social category



expresses a social expectation or political demand (the two terms are used interchangeably). A political demand is not objectively defined by Amable and Palombarini (2004). For example, workers do not necessarily require the State to intervene for more safety in the workplace: their position on the matter depends on their ideology, by which Amable and Palombarini (2005) identify the perception and hierarchy of a social actor's interests. Workers might not consider occupational safety as a part of their own interest (perception) or they might decide that occupational safety is less important, in bargaining with other social categories, than other possible interests (hierarchy) leaving it to 'private risk' (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 221).

The sphere of the political mediation deals with the heterogeneity of the political demands, which generates a conflict between the different social alliances. The role of politics is to 'select the demands to which a political answer is provided' (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 241) by declaring which policies they want to implement or by actually implementing them, if in office. This is the sphere of political mediation. Actors in this sphere include not only political parties but also collective organizations such as trade unions, playing a role of political mediation or expressing a political demand. The process of selection of political demands is also a process of the formation of social alliances as actors in the sphere of political mediation decide which to satisfy and try to find a balance between diverging social expectations. They do so as they wish to obtain enough support from social categories to ensure the reproduction of the socio-economic model.

Ideology and political mediation do not interact in vacuum; they are limited in their outcomes by the sphere of institutions. According to Amable and Palombarini (2005), institutions are the 'rule of the games' that 'delimit and structure both the space of competition between social expectations and that of creation of a political offer'. Examples of institutions include the electoral rules (structuring political mediation) and the labour law (structuring the concurrence of social expectations). If the




Figure 31 - Political and Systemic crises in Amable and Palombarini (2005). Source: authors own diagram.

majority of social categories do not wish to change them or at least do not prioritize their reform in their political demand, the system is stable. However, as we see in the next few lines, institutions might lack the necessary support to reproduce themselves, which would lead to a specific type of crisis.

Coherent with Palombarini's (1999, 2001) critique of neo-classical models, Amable and Palombarini's (2005) model emphasizes the 'autonomy of action' of politics. Political actors are autonomous from the social groups they wish to represent; they do not immediately, completely, or necessarily translate the political demand of their supporting bloc in the political arena and may well adopt strategies to widen/change the composition of the supporting social bloc. There is a tension between the different agencies considered and the model underlines that it is not automatic for the actors involved to find a compromise. In this conflict, when social categories find a winning compromise, Amable and Palombarini (2005) identify the winning social alliance with the term 'Dominant Social Bloc' (DSB). This is defined as:

'the social alliance whose interests are protected by the public policy and which is sufficiently strong to politically validate such a policy' (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012b, 1169).

In a system, the conflict is regulated around the political demand of the DSB. This DSB, however, is only temporarily dominant. Difficulties in finding an equilibrium within the DSB itself might emerge because of the action of political mediation and may lead to two different types of crises, political and systemic. Political crisis is defined as 'a situation where there is no room for political mediation between social groups belonging to the dominant bloc within a given institutional structure'. Systemic crisis, on the other hand, identifies a situation 'in which political actors experience difficulties in finding some institutional change strategies in order to aggregate a social bloc that could become dominant' (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 6). The concept of 'systemic crisis' closely

resembles that of Gramsci's organic crisis.<sup>56</sup> In both systemic and organic crises, the key factor is the difficulty in building a new hegemonic (for Gramsci) or dominant (for Amable and Palombarini, 2005) bloc. Together with social groups, institutions play an important role and can, at the same time, be a limit for the goals of a DSB or their definition can become the goal itself. They represent a limit since institutions are 'the rules of the game' (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 241) and delimit the political space, define how social categories see their interests and demands, and finally influence the economic cycle. However, when institutions are no longer capable of satisfying the demands of the DSB, they cease to be simple rules and also become a goal. In order to build a DSB, social groups may find themselves in need of developing a new institutional setting.

### 5.3.3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-LIBERALISM IN ITALY AND FRANCE: AN APPLICATION OF THE DSB FRAMEWORK

The DSB framework finds its first application in the study of both the Italian and French crises. Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) explain that the institutional changes experienced by the two countries in the last decade result from a political strategy aiming at aggregating a new DSB on a neo-liberal programme. In order to do so, they first reconstruct the history of the Italian and French social blocs before the early 1990s crisis<sup>57</sup>. Then, the authors discuss the origins of the political crisis in each country (i.e. why DSB was no longer viable in the 1980s) and its transformation in a systemic

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<sup>56</sup> There is, however, one important difference: Amable and Palombarini focus on institutions and how these shape the social compromise. However, organic crisis is meant to identify a situation where the presence of features from the older (and almost dead) system is still able to postpone the birth of a new model (Burgio 2014, 253–54) with no reference to the institutional setting. Indeed, both 'systemic' and 'organic' crises see a lack of clear DSB, but Amable and Palombarini (2005) conceive this more as an institutional gridlock, while according to Gramsci, the lack of DSB results from an equality of strength that does not necessarily depend solely on institutions.

<sup>57</sup> The way Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012) identify social categories and define social expectations is not uniform throughout the text. Concerning the French case, the authors build on one of their previous quantitative (and qualitative) analyses (Palombarini and Guillaud (2006). The same does not seem to be true for the Italian case, where the only source to identify social groups (and their social requests) is previous socio-political studies. For the 2000s, however, Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012) identify social groups and their expectations by the means of a latent class analysis on opinion polls. We can identify in the work the first part, where socio-political groups composing the different social blocs are identified by their objective localization (i.e. *workers, rentiers, etc.*) and the second part where socio-political groups are identified by their expectations.

crisis (i.e. it is impossible to find a new DSB within the same institutional framework). In this section, we present the main findings for Italy and France, as well as the shared conclusions drawn by the authors from the two cases. While the authors do not focus specifically on RRP, we underline their main insights on the role of LN and the French FN in the systemic crises of Italy and France. In particular, for the French case, the authors underline the relationship between the rise of RRP and the emergence of a new cleavage in the EU. We summarize their findings from different studies (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a; Amable and Palombarini 2015, 2017) and argue that, despite providing useful insights in the analysis of RRP's impact, they suffer from some limitations.

### 5.3.3.1. ITALY

	Social groups	Political demands
<b>Dominant Social Bloc (DSB)</b>	Large industrial enterprises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Macroeconomic policy favouring competitiveness</li> <li>• State intervention in wage negotiations.</li> <li>• State intervention to support effective demand</li> </ul>
	SMEs and their employees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Macroeconomic policy-favouring competitiveness</li> </ul>
	<i>Classes assistées</i> , public servants, and state-owned enterprises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public transfers</li> </ul>
	Rentiers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High interest rate</li> <li>• Large supply of public debt titles</li> <li>• Development of financial markets</li> </ul>
<b>Excluded from DSB</b>	Employees in large enterprises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in real wages</li> <li>• Fight against unemployment</li> <li>• Social rights protection and extension</li> </ul>

*Table 60 - Social groups and political demands in 1980s Italy. Source: Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a)*

The crisis of the Italian DSB, according to Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a), is the consequence of the explosion of the Italian debt. However, the authors provide an exogenous explanation of the rise in the Italian debt, based on the expectations of the Italian DSB at the time. In particular, they argue that, in order to analyse the Italian crisis of early 1990s, one should analyse the contradictions in the political demands expressed by the different components of the Italian DSB at the time. Table X.X summarizes the groups and demands of the main social groups behind the Italian DSB in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the Italian government kept a high-interest-rate policy (i.e. a large offer of public debt) in place in order to (i) satisfy the *rentiers* class and (ii) finance social

transfers (demanded by the '*classes assistées*' and big enterprises) without raising taxes (as demanded by big enterprises, SMEs, and SME employees). However, since the mid-1980s, the rise in debt levels has generated a fracture between the *rentiers* (allied with public servants and *classes assistées*) and entrepreneurs. Indeed, high interest rates made credit access costlier for enterprises and helped in the diffusion of *rentiers* (it was more profitable to buy finance titles than invest in production), thus increasing the heterogeneity of the political demands. Moreover, the decision by the Italian government to enter the European Monetary System (ESM) moved Italy into a system of quasi-fixed exchange rates; it was no longer possible for the Italian government to favour business competitiveness through monetary devaluation. Thus, both big business and SMEs saw their interests threatened. The Italian DSB then lost the support of self-employed and small entrepreneurs (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 13). This contributed to the emergence of the Lega Nord. At the end of 1990s, as big business also revoked its support, the Italian DSB was definitely fractured and the so-called 'Italian First Republic' ended. What followed is a systemic crisis where neither of the two main political coalitions (centre-right and centre-left) managed to build a viable DSB.

In particular, the Italian centre-left failed to rebuild a progressive DSB during its government experience between 1996 and 2001. The Italian centre-left proposed a '*patto dei produttori*', an alliance between the so-called productive parts of the country, namely large enterprises, unionized and stable workers, and public servants. The '*patto*' had two phases: (i) a restrictive phase, where budgetary constraints were justified in order to join the Euro currency area and (ii) an expansionary phase, where the advantages of the single-currency area (i.e. lower interest rates on public debt) would lead to growth for all classes. The centre-left government never managed to get to the second phase, however, since the restrictive budgetary policy of the first phase disappointed part of its own social bloc (workers in particular). Moreover, changes in the Italian productive system had already weakened the role of big enterprises (i.e. SMEs saw an increase in their numbers) and trade unions

(since, because of centre-left labour market reforms, an increasing number of employees were in atypical jobs), the two main allies of the centre-left government.

The Italian centre-right relied on a ‘neo-liberal’ strategy. According to Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a), this is particularly clear in the case of Italian 2008 elections. Indeed, the centre-right social bloc was characterized by an alliance between small entrepreneurs and *rentiers*. Unable to find a compromise between the two classes acting on public debt, Berlusconi’s government found a compromise in the labour market: ‘the adjustment takes place on the labour market, via real wage flexibility and the dismantling of the Workers’ Statute’(Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 79).

As for the core of centre-left social bloc, it was now represented by intellectual professions and civil servants, and the strategy has the same ambiguities as during the 1996–2001 government. However, both social blocs are a minority (i.e. they are unable to assure an electoral victory to the political coalitions which they support). This is also due to a peculiar feature of the Italian case: workers seem to be equally divided among political coalitions, thus actually ‘disappearing’ from the definition of a DSB since they simply melt in the entire political spectrum. Moreover, the electoral volatility of popular classes (in particular atypical workers and the unemployed) made it possible for both coalitions to compete for their support. Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) identify, for the Italian centre-right, a two-level compromise. We have already discussed the first level, namely the alliance between enterprises, *rentiers*, and SMEs. This is the core of the neo-liberal social bloc. The second level comprises in particular atypical workers (especially from Southern Italy), who can accept reforms in the labour market (since they do not profit from labour market protection) in exchange for social transfers. However, the 2008 economic crisis made it impossible for the centre-right to satisfy the second level and the first level at the same time. The failure of centre-right neo-liberal strategy weakened Berlusconi’s position. In 2011, at the peak of Italian financial crisis, Berlusconi resigned and Mario Monti was called to lead a national unity government. According to

	<b>Social groups</b>	<b>Political demands</b>
<b>Right-wing bloc</b>	Self-employed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low taxation</li> <li>• Limits to social protection and redistribution policy</li> </ul>
	Associate managers (private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low taxation</li> <li>• State intervention to boost competitiveness</li> </ul>
	Farmers and rural society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public transfers and defence of the common agricultural policy</li> </ul>
<b>Contensted</b>	Employees and intermediate categories (private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social protection</li> <li>• Demand-side macroeconomic policy</li> <li>• Increase in real wages</li> </ul>
<b>Left-wing bloc</b>	Public servants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defence and extension of the public sector</li> <li>• Demand-side macroeconomic policy</li> <li>• Increase in real wages</li> </ul>
	Production workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demand-side macroeconomic policy</li> <li>• Increase in real wages</li> <li>• Nationalizations</li> <li>• Social protection and social rights</li> <li>• Protectionism</li> </ul>

*Table 61 - Social groups and political demands in 1980s France. Source: Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a)*

Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a), this outcome certifies the defeat of the centre-right neo-liberal strategy. A new strategy is now in place: the construction of a ‘bourgeois bloc’ around the moderate and pro-European components of both centre-left and centre right, unifying ‘entrepreneurs, managers and the skilled of both the private and public sector workers, professionals’ (Amable and Palombarini 2015, 12). The emergence of this strategy characterizes France’s political crisis as well.

### 5.3.3.2. FRANCE

Since the end of 1970s, France has been alternatively governed by two main blocs, the left-wing and the right-wing (Table 61). Industrial workers and public servants supported the left-wing coalition. These classes demanded more redistribution, a more rigid labour market, and other forms of government interventions in the economy (i.e. nationalization of some private companies). As for the right-wing coalition, they received the support of assistant managers, farmers, and different forms of self-employment (professionals, artisans, and shopkeepers). This social bloc demanded ceasing the programme of nationalization and lowering of taxes. According to Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a), the inability of either of these two opposing blocs to be re-elected is a symptom of the political crisis. In particular, both social blocs experienced major internal divisions. The left-wing bloc started to crumble during Mitterand’s presidency (1981-1995), following the rise in the levels of the external debt in the first phase of Mitterand’s government, the French Socialist Party



(PS) had two choices: ‘an expansive economic policy in order to contain the rise of unemployment, but accepting the risk of high inflation and getting out of the European Monetary System, or stay in the European Monetary System by relying on a deflationary policy to secure the parity of the franc and accepting unemployment’. These two options also represented two different political strategies: to either consolidate the left-wing bloc or find new alliances with the moderate part of the right-wing bloc. The PS chose to replace the left-wing social bloc with a new centre-left social alliance. This choice is confirmed by all successive Socialist governments, included Hollande’s government (Amable and Palombarini 2017, 2015).

The French right-wing bloc experienced a similar split. In particular, Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a, 45) highlight that the expectation of self-employed and associate managers (i.e. more liberalizations) ‘was not shared by middle and lower-classes of the private sector’. The tension between the demands of these two groups characterized Sarkozy's cabinet (2007–2012):

‘The attempt to reconcile the contradictory expectations of the independents, who demand a strong liberalization of the labour market, and private sector employees, which expect to keep a reasonably high level of social protection and/or employment protection, explains the apparently schizophrenic character of Sarkozy’s discourse’ (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 38).

Indeed, Sarkozy has tried to mediate between the two components of the centre-right bloc. On the one hand, he proposed to (i) reduce the taxation on overtime work and (ii) deregulate its use, to please the neo-liberal part of the centre-right bloc. On the other hand, he promised that the labour market deregulation would be accompanied by an increase in social security. However, the 2008 economic crisis hindered Sarkozy’s project and he lost to socialist candidate François Hollande in the 2012 Presidential election. As we saw, however, Hollande’s presidency followed the same choices as other socialist-led governments. As such, the political crisis persists. Within the context of this crisis, the authors highlight the emergence of a ‘bourgeois’ bloc in France. However, in their reading, this phenomenon is not the mere consequences of changes within the social blocs:

‘There is no unidirectional casualty that goes from social expectations, which are not compatible or incompatible ‘by nature’, to political action, whose role is not simply to adapt, passively, to the evolution of expectations. A social bloc is the product of a political project and its collapse can be explained by the emergence of an alternative political project. The collapse of the left-wing social bloc is then, in large part, the consequence of left-wing government’s political action.’

The EU is a major driver in explaining policy choices by Hollande’s cabinet in France according to Amable and Palombarini (2015, 2017). Indeed, the authors stress that the politicization of the EU is a direct consequence of the strategy led by the PS to modify its own social bloc. They underline that in 1980s and following governments, the PS decided to follow a pro-EU platform, which involved adopting restrictive measures and liberalizing the labour market, sacrificing the expectations of their popular base. They analyse the French Socialist Party’s (PS) strategy to form a new social bloc, which they refer to as ‘bloc bourgeois’, and argue that this new bloc revolves around two major dimensions: ‘(i) the continuation of European integration based on the independence of the central bank and fiscal conservatism and (ii) institutional reforms dictated by the neoliberal doctrine.’ (Amable and Palombarini 2015, 12). However, this strategy goes against the political demands expressed by the people who voted for the socialist candidate in the 2012 presidential elections. They find, by using OLS regressions on data from national post-electoral polls, that socialist electorate in 2012 had rather leftist expectations: socialist voters supported nationalization, disapproved further flexibility in the labour market, and opposed centre-right pension reform. The socialist electorate can hardly reconcile with the socialist government. At the same time, the ‘bloc bourgeois’ is partially shared with the French centre-right. This strategy, which goes back to the early 1990s according to Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a), therefore has one major consequence as it leaves the place for the creation of a new social bloc: the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc’. This bloc comprises the popular classes that once constituted both left-wing and right-wing coalitions: industrial workers, unemployed, SMEs, and

shopkeepers. The FN was among the parties that took advantage of the emergence of this bloc (see Figure 32):

‘In this theoretical framework, we can interpret the electoral success of the National Front. Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, it adopted a program that is in frontal opposition to the bloc bourgeois, based on euro exit, the rejection of European constraints on fiscal policy, and the defence of the French social model. The action of François Hollande and the project of the "new" FN, although strictly opposed, have this in common: they are attempts to build new social alliances that go beyond the right/left traditional axis.’




Figure 32 - Political competition in the 2017 French Presidential election. Source: Amable and Palombarini (2017, 141)

We can describe the 2017 Presidential election as a competition on two main axes<sup>58</sup>: a ‘left-right’ axis representing the role of the state in the economy and a ‘sovereignty’ axis representing the position on the European integration (Figure 32). The different solutions are summarized in Table 62. However, according to Amable and Palombarini (2017), the ‘bourgeois’ bloc is not electorally viable (it represented only 22% of the French electorate as a whole in 2012). It needs to (i) expand to a part of the anti-bourgeois and (ii) demobilize this bloc, as at a lower turnout, even the 22% of the electorate can be sufficient to win an election. Both things happened in the run-off of the 2017 Presidential election and Emmanuel Macron, the main representative of the ‘bourgeois’ bloc, secured the office.

Possible social alliances	Type of DSB project (political actor)
<b>A+B</b>	Bourgeois bloc (Emmanuel Macron, rightist part of the PS)
<b>C+D</b>	Anti-bourgeois/souverainist bloc (Marine Le Pen and part of Mélenchon supporters)
<b>A+C</b>	Left-wing bloc (Mélenchon and leftist part of the PS)
<b>B+D</b>	Right-wing bloc (Fillon)

*Table 62 - The strategies to compose a DSB in 2017 French Presidential election. Source: Amable and Palombarini (2017, 141).*

Albeit through a different mechanism, France and Italy find themselves in a similar situation: crisis of previous DSBs, failure of both centre-left recomposition strategies and centre-right neoliberal strategies, and emergence of a ‘bourgeois’ bloc.

Conclusion: RRP's impact depend on their ability to build a DSB; however, they have different electorates and strategies.

Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) conclude that the two cases present important similarities. On the one hand, they argue that the adoption of neoliberal reforms respond to a precise ‘strategy towards a new dominant social bloc’ (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 31). On

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<sup>58</sup> However, Amable and Palombarini (2017) underline that the two axes are meant to be just a description of a more complex situation. These summarize the main cleavages, but the political crisis is generative of new cleavages as well.

the other hand, ‘the social bloc strictly in favour of neo-liberal reforms is a minority in each country’ (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 41). Its expansion to form a DSB must include compromises on its economic program. However, this task has been made even harder in France by the economic crisis, while Berlusconi's government managed to use the crisis to make ‘neo-liberal reforms indispensable’ (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a, 36), decreasing labour costs by dismantling the national contract instead of dealing with the public finance crisis. In their analysis, Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) also point out the impact of the EU on the concrete possibility to build a leftist-bloc. This impact has been particularly strong in Italy, as far as the limits imposed by Maastricht for the deficit and the stock of national debt made it harder to recompose the leftist bloc on a common programme. In France, however, the EU acts less as a constraint, while its existence has become a major electoral cleavage within the leftist bloc itself. The different positions on the EU identify a pro-European ‘bourgeois bloc’ and a Eurosceptic ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc.<sup>59</sup>

At least in the French case, Amable and Palombarini (2015, 2017) see a strategy by an RR political actor (the FN) to enlarge its own social bloc to the rest of the ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc, in particular the left-leaning popular classes. This strategy has been made possible by the choices of the French PS, which was once the main political referent of (part) of those same classes. The final economic outcome then depends on those strategies which will be able to produce a new DSB. In other words, a political actor is able to influence the economic system if it is able to influence the process of creation of a DSB; the FN in France seems to have this possibility. However, the process of creation of an RR DSB presents many criticalities. As Amable and Palombarini (2017) underline that there is

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<sup>59</sup> Amable and Palombarini (2017) would re-label this bloc as ‘sovereignist’. However, we prefer to employ the ‘anti-bourgeois’ label as it transmits the idea of a more divided bloc. Indeed, the ‘bourgeois’ bloc was able to unify on the candidature of Emmanuel Macron in the second round of the 2017 French Presidential election. This was not the case for the ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc testified by the high level of abstention, invalid votes, and the refusal of the radical left candidate, Mélenchon to support Marine Le Pen.

a tension between the components of the '*frontiste*' bloc and FN's nativism may not be enough to avoid the bloc's disaggregation.

#### 5.3.4. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK RESPECTING THE SPECIFICITY AND AUTONOMY OF POLITICS

The aim of this Section was to define a framework able to overcome the limitations identified in the neo-classical literature (Chapter 3 and Section 5.2); this literature has largely been unable to analyse the mechanisms linking racial prejudice and economic policy-making and, more generally those linking the emergence of RRP's and the economy. Among the main limitations were also the oversimplified assumptions these models make. Indeed, neo-classical models fail to take into account either the autonomy of politics (i.e. the fact that political actors do not immediately, completely, and necessarily translate the political demand of a social bloc in the political arena) or the specificity of politics (i.e. the fact that actors in the political sphere might have goals different from that of other spheres).

This Section proposed to overcome these limitations by relying on the 'neo-realist' framework (Amable and Palombarini 2005). This framework theorizes and analyses empirically the role of social alliances and compromises, and particularly the constitution of Dominant Social Blocs (DSB), in the emergence, stability, and crisis of socio-economic models. Ideology, institutions, and political mediation appears to be the key dimensions of this process. This literature shows interesting results to apprehend the emergence of RRP's. Indeed, the analysis suggests that the LN and the French FN follow two different strategies and rely on two different social blocs. The LN is the junior partner in a centre-right alliance and represent SMEs interests as well as, geographically localized interests. The French FN, however, has been trying, with ambiguous results according to Amable and Palombarini (2017), to reunite the 'anti-bourgeois' bloc. Indeed, this bloc appears disunited on economic policy. On the one hand, SMEs and shopkeepers oppose EU international trade policy but support reforms

on labour market and demand. On the other hand, manual workers oppose further market liberalisation and oppose the EU not only because of its international trade policy, but also since they favour a more rigid labour market and more redistributive policy.

However, Amable and Palombarini (2017) only provide insights about the development of RRP as they focus on major coalitions. Indeed, the analysis hereby discussed is interesting inasmuch as it underlines the differences in terms of strategy and social bloc between two RRP (the LN and the FN). However, the literature underlines that there are important and increasing commonalities between RRP's electorates (Rydgren 2013). We argue that in order to assess the mechanisms behind the RRP's impact on the economy we first need to identify the common characteristics between different RRP, if they exist. Consequently, Section 5.4 will review specifically the literature on the social basis of RRP's electorate, focusing on the main social classes supporting RRP and on their political demand.

#### 5.4. THE SOCIAL BLOC SUPPORTING RRP: A HETEROGENEOUS ALLIANCE

##### WHERE WORKERS ARE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT, UNIFIED BY NATIVISM

As stressed in Section 5.3, economic policy is the product of a political regulation of social conflict. In order to understand the mechanisms of political regulation, we need to identify and discuss (i) the strategies at the disposal of the different political actors to form a DSB and (ii) the conditions for their success. However, similar to what Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) did in the Italian and French cases, in order to identify the possible strategies towards an RR social bloc, we first need to identify what social bloc currently supports the RRP. We focus on the on the social bloc behind RRP in this section and illustrate RRP's strategies in Section 5.6. According to Amable and Palombarini (2005), social blocs are characterized by a) the place occupied by social groups in the economic structure and b) a particular political demand (Amable and Palombarini, 2005). In order to identify the main characteristics of RR social bloc, Section 5.4.1 addresses the literature on the class

composition of the RRP's social bloc. In Section 5.4.2, we critically review the existing literature on the political demand of the RRP's social bloc. However, the literature presents some limitations, in particular concerning the most recent evolutions of the RR social bloc. We therefore investigate the class composition of post-crisis RR social bloc. In order to do so, Section 5.4.3 presents the data and the methodology used to ascertain the nature of RRP's social bloc and Section 5.4.4 illustrates our main results. Finally, Section 5.4.5 summarizes our conclusions.

#### 5.4.1. THE PROCESS OF PROLETARIANIZATION OF THE RR ELECTORATE COMPOSITION: ARE RRPS THE NEW WORKING CLASS PARTIES?

In order to understand the role of RRP's in the determination of economic policy, we need to both understand the composition of the RRP's social blocs and analyse their political demand. In this section, we analyse the composition. The political demand is considered in Section 5.4.2.

Kitschelt (1995) analyses the social composition of the RRP electorate in Germany, France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria at the beginning of the 1990s, using data from Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey. He finds that, in general, blue-collar workers and small business owners are (slightly) over-represented in RR electorates, although the Austrian FPÖ is an exception, having a minority of blue-collar workers.<sup>60</sup> Kitschelt also finds that people with lower levels of education are more likely to support RRP's than those with higher education. However, he argues that class support for RRP's is strongly mediated by individual attitudes. He controls for this by adding political attitudes to various issues (economic liberalism, authoritarianism, xenophobia, etc.) and finds that 'social background has very little impact on the decision to vote' (Kitschelt 1995, 279). Kitschelt's (1995) results are contested by Ivarsflaten (2005), who finds that small-business owners and workers have a higher propensity to vote for RRP's. Norris (2005) reaches similar conclusions from an analysis of data from

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<sup>60</sup> According to Kitschelt (1995), the Austrian exception is due to the FPÖ's anti-statist platform. See Chapter 2 for a discussion on RRP's economic programmes.



the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2002. In particular, she argues that RR voters ‘are disproportionately overrepresented both among the petite bourgeoisie (self-employed professionals, own-account technicians, and small merchants) and among the skilled and unskilled working class’ (Norris 2005, 147), while the relation with the unemployed is less clear and depends on the national context. However, according to other authors (Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2012; Arzheimer and Carter 2006), unemployed people are more strongly supportive of RRP.

Arzheimer and Carter (2006) analyse whether the inclusion of country-level factors modifies the social composition of RRP. They conduct their analysis in two steps. In the first, they consider only individual-level variables; in the second step, they add country-level variables. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) rely on data from 24 surveys of national elections in seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway) during 1984–2001. Their findings underline the relevance of gender: being male increases the odds of a voting for an RRP by 50%. The effect of education is less clear: individuals with a tertiary degree have a lower propensity to vote for an RRP. However, people with only secondary education are not significantly pro-RR; support for RR peaks among individuals with middle-school diplomas. Finally, in terms of class, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) find that the odds of voting for the RR are higher among manual workers, routine non-manual workers, and self-employed individuals. They control their results by including system-level variables such as the level of disproportionality,<sup>61</sup> the rate of unemployment, the number of asylum seekers, and the ideological position of the main (non-radical) right-wing party. Their results confirm the consistency of their previous results. Arzheimer and Carter (2006, 437) conclude that ‘it is obvious that independent of the socio-political context, the probability of an extreme right vote is about five to six times higher for the young male, primary-educated worker than for the middle-aged,

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<sup>61</sup> By the level of disproportionality, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) mean the level of over/under-representation of small/large political parties in a particular electoral system.

unclassified, university-educated female voter'. A study by Arzheimer (2009) extends the analysis by Arzheimer and Carter (2006) by including 18 EU countries over the 1980–2002 period, using data from Eurobarometer surveys. He confirms the findings of Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and concludes that 'groups who compete with immigrants for scarce resources and who have exhibited the highest level of xenophobia in the past (manual workers, younger voters, and the unemployed) show significantly more support for the [extreme right] than other groups. The gender gap is equally prominent' (Arzheimer 2009, 267).

According to Arzheimer (2013), RRP have undergone a process of 'proletarianization' or progressive importance of workers in the RRP electorate. Arzheimer (2013) provides empirical evidence of this process by using the same data as in Arzheimer (2009) to test the impact of time on the workers' propensity to vote for RRP. He finds that the composition of the RRP's constituency has evolved through time: the odds of a vote for an RRP among unemployed and retired individuals are stable, while they have increased for workers and decreased for farmers and business owners (combined in his analysis). Thus, he concludes that RRP, at least those in Western Europe, have been experiencing a process of transformation of their electoral profile with rising workers' support (Arzheimer 2013).

Arzheimer's (2013) results find some support in national studies. Cautrès and Mayer (2004) use factor analysis to model the movement of social classes in the French political system in the period 198–2002. Figure 1 depicts Cautrès and Mayer's (2004) results and shows clearly that the French working class has been moving towards the FN. These results are confirmed by Gougou (2015), who analyses the evolution of French workers' electoral preferences in the 1988–2012 period. He finds that workers have a higher propensity than other social classes to vote for the RR. However, if we split the French political system into three subspaces (left, right and RR), we find that the majority of French workers voted left in 2012. In other words, despite the growing importance of the FN among French workers, the French RR has failed to win more workers' votes than left-wing parties do.




Figure 33 - Changes in the vote by socio-professional group in France 1978-2002. Source: Cautrès and Mayer (2004, 154).

In addition, the importance of workers in the FN electorate should not be overstated: their weight only slightly increased from 25% of the FN electorate in 2002 to 30% in 2012. Thus, other constituencies comprise the largest part of the FN electorate. Also, conversely, the weight of the FN among workers as a whole should not be overstated, since they have a higher propensity than other classes to abstain (Gougou 2007). If we examine the 2012 results while also considering non-voting workers, we see that only 17% of French workers voted for the FN (Amable and Palombarini 2017). Therefore, we should be cautious about considering RRP as the new ‘workers’ parties’; workers are becoming more central to RR success as acknowledged in the literature and shown in Table 63, but within a heterogeneous social alliance. The RR has gained importance among workers, but still, in the best-case scenario, attracts the support of only one in five workers in France. Thus, the RRP social bloc is built around a specific fraction of the working class rather than the working class as a whole. In the next Section, we analyse the political demands expressed by RR voters, with a focus on worker voters.

<b>The class composition of RRP in Europe</b>		
<b>Research</b>	<b>Findings</b>	<b>Data</b>
<b>Kitschelt (1995)</b>	Blue-collar workers and small business owners are over-represented in RR electorate.	Eurobarometer Western European countries
<b>Ivarsflaten (2005)</b>	Small-business owners and workers have a higher propensity to vote for RRP	National election surveys in France and Denmark
<b>Norris (2005)</b>	RRPs are over-represented among petite bourgeoisie, skilled, and unskilled workers.	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Arzheimer and Carter (2006)</b>	Manual workers, routine non-manual workers, and the self-employed have higher odds of voting for RRP	National election surveys on Western European countries
<b>Arzheimer (2009)</b>	Manual workers, younger voters, and the unemployed	Eurobarometer on Western and Eastern European countries
<b>Arzheimer (2013)</b>	Proletarianization of RRP electorate	Eurobarometer on Western European countries
<b>Cautrès and Mayer (2004)</b>	French workers moving towards FN	French national election surveys
<b>Gougou (2015)</b>	French workers have been moving towards FN, but still not in the majority; within RR electorate they represent just 30% of the votes	French national election surveys

*Table 63 - The class composition of RRP electorate: review of literature's main results. Source: original compilation.*

#### 5.4.2. THE POLITICAL DEMAND OF RR ELECTORATE: NATIVISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM

Relying on the composition of the RR's electorate, the social bloc can now be analysed through its political demand. As discussed in Section 5.3, according to Amable and Palombarini (2005), a social bloc supports a political actor in order to realize its interests. We should not regard these social interests as a well-articulated political programme. The interests encompass the numerous values and attitudes on certain topics that are shared by social groups.

According to Kitschelt (1995, 276), support for RRP is 'embedded into a broader ideological syndrome that combines authoritarian and market-liberal orientations'. This syndrome includes but is not limited to anti-immigrant resentment and welfare chauvinism, which act as catalysts for RRP support. The contemporary presence of market-liberal orientations and welfare chauvinism is not paradoxical, as shown in Chapters 2 and 3. In other words, RRP voters are resentful, among other

things, towards migrants, whom they see as competing for welfare resources. If RR voters fail to preserve their privileged access to welfare, they will change their support to market-liberal (and even anti-welfare) parties just to oppose a redistribution towards non-natives.

However, if we distinguish between economic and non-economic forms of anti-immigrant attitudes, non-economic attitudes seem more relevant to our analysis. Rydgren (2008) uses the 2003 European Social Survey (ESS) data for six Western European countries to analyse the type of anti-immigrant attitudes that predict a vote for the RR. He differentiates between immigration scepticism (voters oppose further immigration) and xenophobic attitudes (voters consider other races and cultures to be inferior or dangerous) and finds that the former is a stronger predictor of an RR vote compared to the latter. He analyses the 'frames' supporting votes for RRP, which are the various issues that RR voters link to migration. He shows that immigration is linked by RR voters to criminality and is often associated with a cultural threat, while there is mostly a weak association with economic concerns (such as unemployment and redistribution). Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) develop a similar analysis, which distinguishes between economic and cultural threats as possible predictors of an RR vote. They analyse 11 European countries using data from the ESS (2002–2003 round) and find that cultural and ethnic threats are most strongly related to RR vote. At the class level, they find additional support for their thesis; even if perceived cultural threats are generally a stronger predictor than economic issues, the size of the impact of cultural threats changes between social groups. Manual workers are driven mostly by cultural grievances but are affected also by economic issues. Other social classes (especially socio-cultural specialists) are particularly affected by cultural grievance. Oesch (2008), using ESS data on five European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland) focuses exclusively on workers. He tests three hypotheses related to workers' propensity to vote for RRP:

1. Economic explanations: Workers support RRP as they consider themselves to be competing with migrants in the labour market/access to welfare.

2. Cultural explanations: Workers support RRP because they feel their identity is threatened by multiculturalism.
3. Alienation-related explanations: Workers support RRP to express their discontent with the political establishment (protest vote) or because they are alienated from society (i.e. they no longer belong to a trade union or other social organizations).

Oesch (2008) finds that, in all five analysed countries, cultural explanations are the strongest predictors of RR support among workers. In some countries (France, Belgium Norway), there is a level of protest voting. Therefore, Oesch (2008) concludes that workers' support for RRP is mostly driven by cultural rather than economic motivations. Other studies (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007) conclude that the predominance of cultural motivations allows RRP to succeed. As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the RR social bloc is rather heterogeneous and the economic interests of manual workers are not close to those of small-business owners. Kitschelt (1995) argues that, in the long run, this social alliance produces a re-alignment of the policy preferences of workers and other classes (specifically small-business owners). Ivarsflaten (2005) tests this hypothesis in the cases of France and Denmark. She finds that workers and small-business owners in both countries have different preferences in relation to the role of the state in the economy and that this difference is significant despite the presence of RRP. She argues that both classes find some common ground on non-economic issues. Exclusionism (i.e. negative attitudes towards migrants), disillusionment with politics, and Euroscepticism form a breeding ground for this social alliance.

Overall, it thus seems that economic attitudes are not a major driver of the RR vote. However, Euroscepticism is economy-related and is becoming increasingly important for explaining support for RRP. According to Lubbers and Scheepers (2007), Euroscepticism is a strong driver of 'extreme' voting preferences, favouring both the radical left and RR parties, as shown with data from the ESS. Their results show that Euroscepticism explains a rather limited part of the propensity to vote for an extreme party compared to other socio-cultural variables (such as nativism). Lubbers and Scheepers

(2007) sort the effect of socio-cultural variables by social class and show that the division among workers between radical left and RR parties depends strongly on the trade-off between nativist attitudes and economic concerns. Workers with radical nativist attitudes are more likely to vote for RRP, while workers in favour of state intervention in the economy are more likely to vote for radical left parties. The study by Werts et al. (2012), which also includes Eastern European countries, confirms these results. Werts et al.'s (2012, 200) findings show that Euroscepticism plays an increasingly important role and is the 'third-strongest socio-political determinant to explain radical right-wing voting', along with nativism and political distrust. Similarly, Song (2016), using data from the 2014 European Parliament Election Study and the Eurostat Database, finds that RRP were able to increase their appeal to also include non-nativist voters in 2014. In particular, voters with negative evaluations of the economy, anti-EU sentiments, and conservative views on redistributive policies are more likely to vote for RRP.

The importance of political distrust and populist attitudes generally varies from study to study. Norris (2005, 149) describes such attitudes as the 'politics of resentment', defined as 'a negative protest against the status quo, and hence an indicator of rising political disaffection with democratic politics'. Based on an analysis that employs both quantitative and qualitative methods, she concludes that RR voters do not *necessarily* express anti-establishment feelings. In countries where RRP have achieved participation in national cabinets, RR voters demonstrate more confidence in political institutions. Norris (2005, 162) concludes that 'at the simplest level, if people feel that the rules of the game allow the party leaders that they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that policymaking processes are responsive to their needs and to approve of the government's performance. If they feel that the party they prefer persistently loses, over successive elections, they are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with government.'

Her conclusions confirm those of Van der Brug et al. (2000) who analyse national polls in the 1994 EP election. They find that RR voters are as suspicious as other voters of political institutions. Thus, they conclude that RR voting is ideological rather than protest-driven and derives from voters adhering to the party stance on certain policies (mostly immigration), rather than from anti-establishment attitudes. However, Van der Brug and Fennema (2003), replicating their study on the 1999 EP election polls, find differences among countries and parties in the importance of political resentment so that two groups can be identified: RRP voters whose voters are ideologically-driven (such as the DF or the FPÖ) and RRP voters whose electorate is protest-driven (such as the French FN or the LN). The importance of political resentment is supported by Lubbers et al. (2002), who analyse the Eurobarometer data and find that both political dissatisfaction and anti-migration attitudes increase the chances of voting for an RRP. Similarly, Kessler and Freeman (2005) find that political dissatisfaction is a good predictor of support for RRP, based on data from five Eurobarometer surveys. Lampriano and Ellinas (2016) find that in Greece, institutional grievances or political distrust are better predictors of RRP support than economic and cultural grievances, which encompass anti-immigrant attitudes and authoritarianism. However, the authors recognize that their results are probably specific to the Greek case and that anti-immigrant attitudes remain a relevant issue for RR voters. Overall, these studies (summarized in Table 64) show that cultural dimensions (including nativism), Euroscepticism, and, to a certain extent, political distrust, are key drivers of the vote for RRP. Is this conclusion still true? In Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4, we complement these results by proposing our contribution to the analysis of the vote for RRP, relying on a set of more recent data. Relying on these data, Section 5.5 considers whether or not RRP have (or may have) an effect on economic policy-making.



The political demand of RR voters in Europe		
Research	Findings	Data
<b>Kitschelt (1995)</b>	Authoritarianism and market-liberal orientation	Eurobarometer on Western European countries
<b>Rydgren (2008)</b>	RR voters are characterized by immigration scepticism rather than xenophobic attitudes	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Lucassen and Lubbers (2011)</b>	RR voters see immigration as a cultural rather than economic threat.	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Oesch (2008)</b>	Workers support of RRP is mostly driven by cultural rather than economic motivations.	ESS on Western European countries.
<b>Ivarsflaten (2005)</b>	No realignment between workers and small-business owners' economic preferences. Common grounds on non-economic	National election surveys in France and Denmark
<b>Lubbers and Scheepers (2007)</b>	Euro scepticism is a strong driver of 'extreme' voting preferences.	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Werts et al. (2013)</b>	Nativism, political distrust, and Euro scepticism are the main features of RR voters.	ESS on Western and Eastern European countries
<b>Song (2016)</b>	RRP voters hold a negative evaluation of country's economic situation, anti-EU sentiments, and conservative views on	2014 European Parliament Election Study and Eurostat Database
<b>Norris (2005)</b>	RRP voters are not always anti-establishment. It depends on RRP strategies.	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Van Der Brug et al. (2000)</b>	RR voters are as distrustful of institutions as other voters.	National polls on 1994 EP election
<b>Van der Brug et al. (2005)</b>	RR vote is 'ideological' and not just 'protest'.	ESS on Western European countries
<b>Lubbers et al. (2002)</b>	Both political dissatisfaction and anti-migrant attitudes increase the chances of voting for RRP.	Eurobarometer on Western European countries
<b>Lampriano and Ellinas (2016)</b>	RR voters are moved by institutional grievances.	Authors-designed survey conducted in Greece

*Table 64 - The political demand of RRP's electorate: review of literature's main results. Source: original compilation.*

### 5.4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This Section proposes a methodology and presents a set of data with the aim of complementing the literature on the determinants of the votes for RRP with more recent data. Within this perspective, we rely on the European Social Survey (ESS), a survey conducted every two years that covers as many as 30 countries. We employ data from Round 7, conducted in 2014 and covering 20 countries. As clearly indicated in Table 63 and Table 64, the ESS is commonly used, mostly because it offers

‘comparable data across a large number of countries and with the appropriate measures of electoral support for various types of parties, including RRPs’ (Van Der Brug et al. 2013).

Since we are exclusively interested in RRPs, we discard from our analysis all countries that have no established RRP, which leaves us with nine countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.<sup>62</sup> Our dependent variable is formulized as a dummy that gets a value of 1 if the respondent declares his vote preference for an RRP in the last national election and 0 otherwise. Respondents who declare not to have voted are not included.

Since the ESS includes not social class but occupation<sup>63</sup>, the analysis of the social composition of RRP voters needs a further operationalization to measure social class. We rely on Oesch’s (2006) eight-class schema to operationalize social class. Oesch (2006) identifies eight different classes according to a respondent’s skills and income: socio-cultural professionals, technical professionals/specialist, managers, liberal professionals and large employers, service workers, production workers, offices clerks, small business owners, and farmers. Furthermore, we add the level of education, income, and age as control variables since they are all identified by the literature as having an effect on the propensity to vote for RRPs.

In order to analyse the political demand (i.e. the determinants of the votes for RRPs), we selected a series of variables to identify the political preferences of RRPs voters. This selection is based on the work of Bornschier and Kriesi (2013) (see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). In particular, in the ESS dataset, we rely on four items:

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<sup>62</sup> We excluded Germany due to extremely low numbers of people reporting their vote for the NPD. See Chapter 1 for a justification concerning the exclusion of AfD (in 2013) and Norway from this research.

<sup>63</sup> The ESS relies on ISCO-88 classification, identifying over 400 possible occupations.

- ‘imwbent: Immigrants make the country worse or better place to live’ represents voter’s position on immigration. It goes from 0 (‘immigrants make the country a worse place to live’) to 10 (‘immigrants make the country a better place to live’);
- ‘ptcpplt: Politicians care what people think’ is used to test the degree of populism and political distrust of each individual. It ranges from 0 (‘Not at all’) to 10 (‘Completely’);
- ‘eutf: European Union: European unification can go further or has gone too far’ allows us to cover Euroscepticism since, as we saw, it has become an important determinant of RRP’s vote (Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). This variable ranges from 0 (‘EU gone too far’) to 10 (‘EU should go further’).
- ‘gincdif: Government should reduce differences in income levels’ allows us to test RR electorate position on most economic matters. This variable ranges from 1 (‘Agree strongly’) to 5 (‘Disagree strongly’).

In order to test the effect of social class and political demand on the propensity to vote for RRP, we rely on a Heckman probit selection model. The Heckman selection model is specifically implemented for cases where a sample selection bias might occur. Our dependent variable is divided between voters of RRP and voters of other parties. It does not include people who declare that they did not vote. While ESS sample is randomly selected, we can assume that the choice to vote is not randomly distributed among the population. In other words, our sample might be biased. In order to correct this bias, Heckman (1979) proposes a two-step estimation model. The first step is the selection equation that, in our case, can be formulized as follows:

$$Y_1 = \alpha Z + \delta \quad (5.28)$$

where  $Y_1$  is a dichotomous variable that assumes the value 1 if the respondent voted and 0 if he did not vote.  $Z$  is a vector of independent variables,  $\alpha$  a coefficient, and  $\delta$  is the error term. The first step

is estimated by the means of a probit, thus obtaining the effects of the independent variables on the propensity to vote for RRP. The second step is the estimation model of interest, formulized as:

$$Y_2 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \rho\sigma\lambda(T - \alpha Z) + \delta' \quad (5.29)$$

where  $Y_2$  is a dichotomous variable identifying the vote for an RRP,  $X$  is a vector of independent variable,  $\beta_1$  its coefficient,  $\lambda(T - \alpha Z)$  is the inverse Mills ratio estimated from equation 5.1,  $T$  is a threshold,  $\rho$  is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to vote and unobserved determinants of propensity to vote for RRP, and  $\sigma$  is the standard deviation of RRP voting preferences. In the regression equation, the condition of  $Y_2$  (voted/not voted for RRP) is observed when  $Y_1$  (voted/not voted in general) is greater than some threshold  $T$ , and it is missing if  $Y_1 \leq T$ .

#### 5.4.4. RESULTS

Table 65 shows the results of our estimation model. Our findings confirm what is already indicated by the previous discussion. Even after controlling for the propensity to participate in the electoral process, production workers remain keener than other classes to vote for RRP. The effect remains despite the inclusion of the level of education, which in other studies neutralized the effect of class status. Moreover, service workers now appear to have a higher propensity to vote for RRP. This finding result is rather new in the study of the composition RRP. In particular, Bornschier and Kriesi's (2013) study, relying on the same model but older data, found no significant relation between service workers and the propensity to vote for RRP. It thus seems that the economic crisis helped RRP to spread in the lower social classes, which were previously not significantly keen to vote for them. On the other side, two classes show a significantly lower propensity to vote for RRP: socio-cultural professionals and self-employed professionals along with large employers. Socio-cultural professionals were already identified as particularly averse to RRP (Rydgren 2013), while the relative opposition of self-employed professionals and large employers appears to be a new finding.

	Model 1
<i>Vote for RRP</i>	
Income	0.003 (0.21)
Female	-0.082 (1.20)
Education level: Low	-0.118 (1.56)
Education level: High	-0.388*** (4.42)
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.210 (0.95)
Small business owners	-0.052 (0.41)
Technical (semi-)professionals	0.171 (1.39)
Production workers	0.369*** (3.40)
Clerks	0.166 (1.42)
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	-0.260* (2.11)
Service workers	0.440*** (4.16)
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-0.086*** (5.59)
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	-0.192*** (11.22)
Politicians care what people think	-0.056*** (3.64)
Government should reduce differences in income levels	0.002 (0.08)
Constant	-0.178 (0.93)

<i>Electoral participation</i>	
How much interested in politics	-0.416*** (16.93)
1bn.edulevel	-0.224*** (4.31)
3.edulevel	0.150** (2.97)
Income	0.074*** (9.50)
Satisfied with democracy	0.045*** (5.41)
Age	0.037*** (5.60)
Age (squared)	-0.000* (2.36)
Constant	-0.357* (1.99)
Athrho	0.505*** (3.37)
Rho	0.466
Observations	14,166
Censored observations	2952
Uncensored observations	8060

*Table 65 - Probit Heckman selection model: electoral participation and vote for RRP. Country's fixed effects not reported.*

*Source: author's calculation on ESS7 data. Significant at: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$*

Concerning gender, RRP's electorate does not appear significantly masculine, unlike what other studies indicate (Givens 2004; Harteveld et al. 2015). Finally, our results confirm those of Arzheimer and Carter (2006) as well as Bornschier and Kriesi (2013); if we control for political preferences, RRP's are disproportionately supported by people with a medium level of education. Opposition to immigration is, as expected, a significant predictor. It is also the strongest predictor, which confirms

that the main political demand of the RR social block is represented by harsher measures to contrast immigration.

The RR electoral block, however, is not characterized by only nativism. Our results indicate that other issues identified by the literature all play a role. RR voters are more Eurosceptic as people supporting the EU are less likely to vote for RRP, confirming the findings of Werts et al. (2012, 200). Moreover, RR voters are also less trustful towards the political class, indicating that RRP's populism is shared by their voters as well. Finally, the RR electorate does not appear to express a clear demand on economic matters: on the item 'Government should reduce differences in income levels', they do not significantly differ from other respondents. This is in line with existing literature: both RRP and RR electorate present a large bundle of positions on the economy, which is a secondary issue (see Chapter 2).

#### 5.4.5. CONCLUSION: MANUAL WORKERS AT THE CENTRE OF A LARGER SOCIAL ALLIANCE HELD TOGETHER BY NATIVISM

This review of work on RRP's electorate and our findings provide a picture of the RRP social bloc in terms of class composition and expectations. Features that are common to most of the literature are:

1. RRP are over-represented among (manual) workers, although they are not limited to this social group.
2. The social bloc supporting RRP expresses a political demand that is strongly nativist. Moreover, they also express high distrust towards the political elites and the EU.

Other social groups (farmers, small business owners, and sometimes unemployed individuals) are included in this alliance, although their relevance for the RR vote is debated. These groups are also labelled as the 'modernization losers' (Rydgren 2007, 147). According to Betz (Betz 1994, 32), modernization losers are the (self-perceived) victims of 'the economic restructuring and social and cultural individualization processes characteristic of the current transition from modern industrial to

post-industrial capitalism that have left a sizeable portion of the population of advanced Western democracies in an increasingly precarious situation. Unable to cope with the acceleration of economic, social, and cultural modernization, these people are its most prominent victims.’ Still, the importance of workers in the RR electorate should not lead to the conclusion that workers, as a class, identify with RRP. Rather, the data indicate that both skilled and non-skilled workers are less inclined to vote (as we saw in the case of France), and among those who vote we find their higher propensity to support RRP. A more accurate description would be that the RR social bloc is composed by a worker nativist fraction, i.e. a part of the working class that is driven mostly by resentment towards migrants and minorities. Our results indicate that, this fraction comprises a mixture of production and service workers.

While the literature disagrees about the relevance of class cleavages in the RR electorate, the importance of nativism (mostly in the form of anti-immigration attitudes) is sufficient for a consensus. More recently, Euroscepticism has become an important predictor of RR electorate, at least in Western Europe. The results in Chapter 2 show that Eastern European Europhile parties have disappeared; we can argue that Euroscepticism is becoming a strong predictor for Eastern European countries as well. Finally, there is no agreement on the importance of authoritarianism and populism, which seem to depend on the national political system (the inclusion of RRP in governing coalitions or not) or the national history. We showed in Chapter 1 that nativism appears to be a defining feature of RRP, while authoritarianism and populism (both core features of RRP according to Mudde, 2007) are less important. Our results, however, seem to indicate that populism, or at least political disaffection, is a significant predictor of voting for RRP.

We have therefore been able to identify, at the European level, the core components of RR social bloc and the demands they express. Recent research by Amable and Palombarini (2015) indicates that the FN is currently trying to build a DSB around the nativist fraction of the anti-bourgeois bloc. However, as of now, the party has still not been able to accomplish such a task. Other parties such as the LN



followed a different strategy by allying with centre-right parties. However, as we have seen in Section 5.3.3, this strategy also did not produce a DSB. Therefore, the following question is that of the conditions that RRP should meet in order to build or integrate a DSB. This question is all the more important since the participation in a DSB is a major potential driver of the political influence of RRP, including on economic matters. However, Amable and Palombarini's (2005) framework has some limitations. In the following Section, we discuss these limitations and propose to extend the DSB framework.

## 5.5. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE DSB FRAMEWORK IN ANALYSING RRP AND TWO AMENDMENTS TO OVERCOME THEM

In the previous Sections, we argued with Amable and Palombarini (2005) that economic policy is the result of a political regulation of social conflict. Social conflict originates from the diverging expectations or political demands expressed by social categories. Political parties mediate social conflict by selecting the political demands that they wish to satisfy. In exchange, social categories provide their support to these political actors. If the level of support is enough, the system is stable and the social bloc whose expectations are satisfied is 'dominant' (DSB). Similar to other political actors, RRP also participate in the process of formation of a DSB. In order to understand how RRP can influence the process of formation of a DSB, we propose to enrich the DSB framework. We start in Section 5.5.1 by addressing the main limitations of Amable and Palombarini's (2005) framework. In Section 5.5.2, we discuss the importance of national political systems in a globalized world and argue that the viability of a DSB is also influenced by supranational constraints and cleavages. Section 5.5.3 discusses the differences between social categories and argues that the viability of a DSB also depends on the different types of support, or 'social power' in our own terminology, which social blocs can mobilize. Finally, in Section 5.5.4, we link together the different parts and present our amended framework.

### 5.5.1. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE DSB FRAMEWORK: LACK OF INTEGRATION WITH THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL AND NEED TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SOCIAL CATEGORIES

As discussed in the introduction, one of the main limitations of neo-classical approaches is that they do not respect the ‘autonomy’ of politics. In particular, Palombarini (2001, 101) argues that the ‘autonomy’ of politics is respected when ‘its action is not strictly determined by other subsystems’, or (in our own terminology) levels.<sup>64</sup> We agree with his analysis; it is our reading, however, that the framework later developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005) could be improved by specifying how politics interacts with other levels. Indeed, political equilibria and DSBs do not form in a vacuum; they are also influenced by the balance of forces that structure other levels. In this section, we argue that (i) national political systems interact at a supranational level and (ii) social stratification influences the process of formation of a DSB, as social categories are not equal in their characteristics and leverage.

As we saw, France and Italy are characterized by a systemic crisis, as no new DSB has been constituted so far (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a). Among the possible DSB, Amable and Palombarini (2017, 2015) highlight the emergence of an ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc and a ‘bourgeois’ bloc. These are structured around a new cleavage: the reception or rejection of the austerity measures imposed by the EU. It is the product of the interaction between the national and the supranational level<sup>65</sup>. However, we argue that the DSB framework needs further specification in order to assess the influence of the supranational level on the formation of a DSB.

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<sup>64</sup> The term ‘subsystem’ closely recalls the functionalist sociology developed by Parsons (1991). Given our focus on conflict (Collins 1994), rather than structure, using the word ‘subsystems’ would be misleading and point to a functionalistic reading of society that we do not completely share. We prefer to employ a term with fewer theoretical implications: namely ‘levels’.

<sup>65</sup> In this work, the terms supranational and international are not synonyms. The term international refers to interactions between states and other actors present at the world level. The term supranational, however, refers to actors and processes that go *beyond* the actions of nation-states. At the international level, nation-states interact to produce certain outcomes (legislation, wars etc.) and have control of the institutions. In the supranational level, however, nation-states observe the outcome without intervening. Much of contemporary literature focuses on the interaction between the two: for example

The choice to focus on the national level follows a generally common approach within the regulation theory, referred to by Amable and Palombarini (2005). As Boyer (2015, 37) recognizes, ‘the regulation theory is encouraged to choose the nation-state as the starting point of the analysis’. However, the regulation theory also values the ‘form of insertion into the international regime’, i.e. ‘the set of rules that organize the nation state’s relationship with the rest of the world’. The analysis of the interactions between the supranational level and national economies then appears to be well-established within regulation theory, despite its focus on nation states. As such, we deem important to develop a framework to analyse the forms of insertion into the international regime also for the process of political regulation of social conflict. In particular, we agree with Lahille (2015, 24) that: ‘Political regulation should be conceived as a dialectical determination articulating the internal logics of conflict/compromise between social groups involved in a context of international powers whose influence varies depending on the mode of insertion of the state in the world order dynamic.’

Amable and Palombarini (2005, 2009) tackle the question of how their model relates to what Lahille (2015) calls the ‘world order dynamics’, and we label ‘supranational level’, but they do not integrate this dimension to their model. Indeed, according to Amable and Palombarini (2005), the political mediation is first within nation-states since, in order to build a DSB, actors in this sphere identify and satisfy the political demand of national social blocs. To be clear, we are not arguing that Amable and Palombarini (2005) deny the possible role of supranational pressures. The supranational level has a role to play and they offer a large set of possible ways that this influences national mediation:

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on the interactions between nation-states and the EU, as a body that depends on its members and is autonomous from them at the same time (Moravcsik 1999). We decided to use the term supranational level in this study, except when quoting other authors, since we are not proposing a framework to analyse how states interact. Instead, our focus is on how the national level is influenced by the supranational and international levels together. These two and how they interact with each other are, in this study, left in a black box and remain unexplained. We feel that the adjective supranational expresses better the idea of a passive approach to International Relation, as our study does.

‘The institutional change at supranational level also brings into balances between opposite interests, but, unlike what happens on the national level, it is necessary to take into account the major differences of access to this level. While the political arrangements of the national level formally suppose, at least in a democracy, an equality of access to the political system for all stakeholders, within the limits laid down in the framework of the national political compromise establishment, the compromises which are established at the supranational level make on the other hand an only very partial appeal to a legitimacy of democratic type. This legitimacy can be invoked when it is about the international level, because the concerned players are the governments. But every government looks for an internal support and will thus renew at the international level the requirements of support which weigh on him on the national level. The establishment of the international compromise will then depend on the relative power of the concerned governments. We can therefore consider that certain national compromises of less powerful countries on the international level are questioned by the arrangements established between governments, which will cause an institutional and internal political change. The social blocs of the "less powerful" countries can be destabilized by the strategies of the most powerful governments. On the other hand, certain actors can also get organized directly on the supranational plan and obtain so a bigger capacity of influence on the decision-making at this level; this is a resource which can possibly allow to overtake the limits of the national balance of forces by modifying the conditions in which the national compromise establishes itself’ (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 261).

Despite recognizing the variety of connections between nation-states and the supranational level, Amable and Palombarini (2009, 138) justify their choice to focus on the national level since ‘as long as the nation-state exists, the necessity for the political leadership to obtain national political support cannot be ignored’. From the previous discussion of the cases of Italy and France, we saw that in their application of the DSB framework, Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini (2012a) also mostly focused on the formation of political equilibria at the national level. Different authors (Hardt and Negri 2001;

Held 1995; Jessop 2001; Strange 1996), however, point out a modification or even disappearance of nation states.

In light of the previous discussion, we consider it necessary to develop the relationship between national political systems and the supranational level, since the balance of forces of the world's state systems might influence the process of formation of a DSB. We argue that Amable and Palombarini (2005) acknowledge the role of the supranational level, but fail to provide a framework to interpret this role. However, we work on a political actor that appears to have important ties with processes happening at the supranational level. As discussed in Section 5.3, RRP strategy, in some cases, focuses on the construction of an 'anti-bourgeois' bloc (Amable and Palombarini 2017) in reaction to the European integration process. Also RR electorate expresses a refusal of globalization and the 'modernization losers' are often identified as the core of RR social bloc (Beramendi et al. 2015; Rydgren 2007). Finally, in some cases, such as in Austria during the 2000-2005 period, the inclusion of RRP in the cabinet provoked important reactions by the international community. RRP appear closely connected with the supranational level in their strategies, electorate, and in the reactions they face. In order to proceed with our analysis, we need to address and outline the interactions between the supranational level and the national political systems.

Our second critique focuses on the differences between social blocs. In particular, we argue that the electoral validation of a DSB is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for the viability of a system. We saw that in Amable and Palombarini's (2005) DSB framework, social conflict is regulated once there is a stable DSB that is sufficiently strong to validate the economic policy pursued by the political system. A DSB is considered sufficiently strong when 'the political power associated with the groups whose expectations can be fulfilled by the political mediation is high enough to provide to the political system the support it needs' (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 242). According to Amable and Palombarini (2005), relations between the sphere of political mediation and the social blocs depend on the support that political actors are able to obtain, or to 'produce', in their terminology. They

produce support by presenting political strategies that appeal to the interests of the different social blocs, selecting the expectations to which they wish to answer. It is thus an exchange between actors in the two spheres that is at the heart of the regulation of social conflict. While the nature of this exchange is clear, i.e. defending a social actor's interests in exchange for its support, the nature of support is not. In a later work, Amable and Palombarini (2009, 131), apart from just electoral support, refer to 'the main criterion that political actors take into account is the ability of the different social groups to supply electoral and more generally political support in exchange for the satisfaction of their demands. Political actors, e.g. parties, need support in order to strengthen their position in the competitive field of partisan representation.' Therefore, we interpret (political) support as the set of resources (votes, for example) that a social bloc can offer and a political actor can use in the aforementioned struggle for power. However, social blocs are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively equal in terms of resources. Political equilibria are built on a social stratification; political actors are autonomous, but in the elaboration of their strategies, they need to account for the balance of forces between social categories. There are different interpretations of what matters in the study of social stratification, and it is beyond the scope of this study to summarize them all.<sup>66</sup> In particular, Palombarini (2001) identifies sociologist Max Weber as an important theorizer of the 'specificity' and 'autonomy' of politics. However, Weber states that the idea of an autonomous political sphere goes together with a complex social structure. According to Max Weber (2009), how a society is structured depends on the distribution of power across different groups. Power is defined as 'the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action' (Weber 2009, 180). Weber argues that societies could be thought as being composed of three different types of order: economic order, social order, and legal order. As a consequence, according to Weber, 'power can take a variety of forms'

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<sup>66</sup> The reader can find a comprehensive summary of the debate over the concepts of social stratification and, in particular, class in Wright (2005, 1997)


(Hurst, Gibbon, and Nurse 2016, 202). The distribution of power within each order generates different forms of social groups (classes, status groups, and parties, in Weberian terminology<sup>67</sup>). These groups are differentiated both between them (classes and status groups mobilize different forms of power) and within them (some classes are more powerful than others).

The difference between Amable and Palombarini (2005) and Weber lies in the recognition, according to Weber (2009), of different types of power that structure society along the economic, social, and legal orders. The Weberian legal order appears to be the focus of Amable and Palombarini (2005): it is the autonomous political sphere where political parties select which social interests should be defended. However, their idea of support might include other types of power (in economic and social orders). Moreover, according to Weber (2009), the different types of power are not always equal in structuring society and, according to the historical period under analysis, social power (in the economic order) and status/honour power (in the social one) might play a more important role. Social blocs should be differentiated according to both qualitative and quantitative assessment of their ability to influence the socio-economic system, which we label as ‘social power’. In order to understand the viability of RRP’s strategies to build a DSB, we need to understand how powerful an RR social bloc can be, as well as the different types of social power RR electorate can mobilize and what factors intervene in enhancing/limiting it.

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<sup>67</sup> Classes include all the people that are in the same ‘class situations’, which are ‘the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences, in so far as this chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order’ (Weber 2009, 180). Thus, classes are identified according to the market position of a certain group. They are not, however, communities; they ‘merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action’ (Weber 2009, 181). In other words, classes identify people who do not necessarily recognize each other as belonging to the same group. Status groups and parties, however, are communities. Status groups are determined by status situations, i.e. the appraisal of the honour of a certain group by the rest of society. Parties are identified according to the distribution of power within the legal order. They seek to acquire ‘social power, that is to say, toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be’ (Weber 2009, 194). Their definition, as discussed, is at the basis of Amable and Palombarini’s (2005) model: parties rely on ‘classes’ and ‘status groups’ to acquire social power just as political actors seek to obtain enough support from social blocs.

As we discussed in Section 5.3, economic policy is the result of the political regulation of social conflict. At this stage, our study focuses on the ability of RRP's to construct a DSB. In particular, we



*Figure 34 - The balance of forces in other levels contributes to the definition of national political equilibria. Source: author's own compilation.*

wish to assess (i) the different strategies that RRP's can follow in order to aggregate or integrate a DSB and (ii) the conditions RRP's should meet to build a DSB. In this section, we argue that Amable and Palombarini's (2005) framework presents some limitations that might hinder our understanding of RRP's' economic impact. In particular, we suggest developing the DSB framework's understanding of the interactions between politics and other levels (Figure 34). The balance of forces at other levels contributes to determining the expectations of social categories and the strategies of political actors and the outcomes. Notably, we identify supranational system and social structure as two key levels in the definition of political equilibria. We propose to expand Amable and Palombarini's (2005)



framework both ‘upwards’, by formulizing the relation between nation-states and supranational system, and ‘downwards’, by identifying the different types of social power that an RR social bloc can mobilize. These two amendments are presented and discussed in the following Sections.

#### 5.5.2. EXPANDING THE DSB FRAMEWORK UPWARDS: THE CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL

In this Section, we present the amendment concerning the supranational sphere. In Section 5.5.2.1, we briefly review the main works on the interconnection between supranational and national level and discuss the need to integrate it in the DSB framework. In Section 5.5.2.2, based on the previous literature and additional, we present a framework to analyse the relations between supranational processes/actors and the national level.

##### 5.5.2.1. THE CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF NATION-STATES AND THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR INCREASING INTERCONNECTIONS WITH THE WORLD.

As discussed in Section 5.5.1, the DSB framework identifies national political systems as the level at which political equilibria are determined. However, globalization, a process of ‘widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness’ (McGrew 2013), has generated a large debate concerning the transformation and eventual death of the nation state. The end of nation-states, however, is not a claim accepted by other International Relation scholars. In particular, McGrew (1998) summarizes the ‘globalization debate’ by identifying three positions: the ‘globalists’, the ‘sceptics’, and the ‘transformationalists’. While the globalists, such as Ōmae (1995), focus on the decline and eventual disappearance of nation-states due to globalization, the sceptics contest the very existence of globalization. Finally, ‘transformationalists’ treat globalization as an open-ended process: states still exist, but their role appears to be changing even though it is premature to claim their disappearance. In this section, we review the debate on the ‘end of the nation-state’ in order to

justify Amable and Palombarini's (2005) choice of focusing on the nation-states to analyse the building of a DSB.

Ōmae (1995) is among the first to stress that the growing interconnection at the world level is bringing forth the end of the nation-state. He offers four 'reasons (called the 'Is' as they all begin with letter I) to explain the decline in the relevance of the national level:

- Investments: These are now 'borderless', thanks to a decrease in the barriers to Foreign Direct Investment as well the rising opportunities in developing countries.
- Industry: The strategy of firms is now supposedly global and does not depend much on the intervention of national governments (such as subsidies).
- Information technology (IT): This is what makes possible the management of global firms. The development of the IT decreases the costs of cross-border cooperation, making the first two even more profitable.
- Individual consumers: Their preferences have become more globally oriented due to IT and they can now access a larger panel of products thanks to global investments and industry.

Ōmae (1995) compares these four Is to cholesterol, arguing: 'Nation states are political organisms, and in their economic bloodstreams cholesterol steadily builds up. Over time, arteries and the organism's vitality decays' (Ōmae 1995, 142). He further argues that nation-states should be considered as 'a transitional form of organization for managing economic affairs' and concludes that 'the nation state's organizational right to manage economic affairs fell victim of an inescapable cycle of decay'(Ōmae 1995, 141).

Ōmae's (1995) position is shared by different authors such Camilleri and Falk (1992), who argue that a consequence of growing interconnectedness is the shrinking of national sovereignty, i.e. the ability of nation-states to regulate their own economy. Strange (1996) comes to conclusions similar to those of Ōmae (1995) and Camilleri and Falk (1992), but broadens the relation between globalization and

nation-states. Globalization is not only an economic process; it curtails the action of national governments through three dimensions: technology, market, and politics. While technology and market recall Ōmae's (1995) work, politics adds a non-economic feature to globalization. In her model, Strange considers Trans-National Corporations (TNC) to have become a political and not just an economic actor, as they interact with both states and civil society, in particular in the field of labour relations, and sometimes 'their relations with governments [are] often less important than the negotiations they conduct with other firms' (Strange 1996, 57). Economic trade is not the only reason behind the decreasing importance of nation-states; the emergence of non-state actors as autonomous political authorities contributes as well. Finally, Negri and Hardt (2001) argue that the formation of a dominant collective capital in the world has led to a new form of sovereignty, the 'Empire', a 'large transnational corporations have effectively surpassed the jurisdiction and authority of nation-states [...] the state has been defeated and corporations now rule the earth!' (Hardt and Negri 2001, 306). Nation-states are dead and almost all of their functions have been moved up to supranational actors. The claims about the death of nation-states are contested on different grounds. Sceptics such as Hirst and Thompson (1996) analyse the trends in global economy and argue that the mobility of capital and the increase of trade have been very much exaggerated, to the point that today's globalization is not significantly different from other historical periods. Moreover, Hirst (1997) points out that free-trade, in order to work, requires management; otherwise, it is doomed to generate negative social reactions that would curtail economic openness. The necessity to regulate the international market, however, would lead to an increase rather than a decrease in the role of nation-states. Boyer (1996, 79) comes to similar conclusions: 'The state remains the most powerful institution to channel and tame the power of markets'. He supports his remarks by highlighting the limitations of the free market, as it still needs a proper institutional setting to work, which is what nation-states provide: 'Thus, at odds with conservative and pro-market ideologies, markets will never replace governments in making strategic choices, organizing solidarity over a given territory and still more in institutionalizing markets' (Boyer, Drache, and York University. University of Toronto. Innis College (Toronto) 1996, 81).

Most authors, however, seem to share the idea that the current situation is more complex: globalists are wrong inasmuch as they see the death of the nation-state before its time has come, while sceptics fail to recognize that globalization is producing important changes. ‘Transformationalists’ stress that globalization is an open-ended process and focus on the contradictions that it generates. Holton (2011) identifies four different dimensions that challenge the sovereignty of nation-states:

- The global economy: It comprises both the process of internationalization of markets (in particular capital markets) and multinational companies.
- Transnational bodies: They are regulatory bodies of political and economic conflicts, such as the World Trade Organization, the EU, and the United Nations.
- International law: It is the set of conventions, charters, and treaties ratified at the supranational level.
- Hegemonic powers and blocs: They are global superpowers (such as the United States) or alliances (the NATO or the former Warsaw Pact).

He then argues that, despite these challenges, national sovereignty still exists and recognizes the autonomy of national actors. In particular, Holton (2011) highlights that each shift towards a more globalized world is followed by national reactions. Nation-states react either directly by bargaining with non-state actors, or indirectly as national societies experience an increase in nationalist feelings. The outcome of this process is not set in stone and some nation-states are able to preserve their prerogatives.

According to Held (1995, 2004), however, what is threatened by globalization is not the nation-states but the Westphalian system, i.e. ‘the organization of humanity into sovereign, territorially exclusive nation-states’ (Held 2004, 129), which emerged in Europe after the peace of Westphalia in 1648. He argues so by conceptualizing nation-states not as containers but as space of flows. The conceptualization of states as containers, first advanced by Giddens (1985) and Taylor (1994, 1995), is a metaphor for the relation between states and territory; since states do not concretely exist, Giddens

(1985) considers them as entities containing power on a specific territory. According to Taylor (1994, 152), the establishment of a state is required to 'fill the container', i.e. to contain 'power, wealth, culture and society' within that territory. The globalization process is interpreted as a 'leak in the container' (i.e. the progressive loss of the accumulated 'power, wealth, culture and society'). Even if Taylor (1994, 1995) dismisses the claims about the end of the state, he sees the process of its deconstruction as happening and irredeemable. Held (2004) contests this view and argues that states are and always have been a space of flows, i.e. 'spaces permeated and transgressed by global and transnational flows and networks' (Held 2004, 130). If states are defined by the flows that pass through (but also around and across), it follows that they have always been embedded in an interconnected global system. The end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw these flows becoming more global, which is leading to a reconfiguration of the role of the state. Held (2004) concludes that nation-states are still alive. However, the international system in which the nation-states are embedded challenges nation-states to change.

Weiss (2003, 2005) also shares the idea that states are being transformed rather than replaced. In particular, she argues that from the viewpoint of democratic states, globalization is an enabling process and not merely a constraining one. In other words, the relation between state and society are getting closer, according to Weiss (2003, 2005). In this sense, analysing the interaction between global dynamics and national politics exclusively in terms of the limits posed by the superior level would be a mistake. For example, new actors might emerge thanks to trans-national networks, as it is the case for NGOs that, according to Weiss (2003, 2005), saw their role enhanced rather than diminished by globalization.

She concludes that the world is moving towards what she calls 'governed interdependence', which 'entails a variety of public-private partnerships and alliances, policy networks, information exchange, and self-regulation under the state's goal-setting auspices' (Weiss 2003, 86:308).

Indeed, globalization can also be seen in the development of private transnational networks. This has led some authors (Robinson and Harris 2000) to theorize the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, following the diffusion of transnational corporations and finance. Labour has also tried to organize at a supranational level (e.g. the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)). Also, common ‘continental’ actions have been taken by European trade unions such as the strikes on 14 November 2012 in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain or the Brussels demonstration of 4 April 2014 (Bieler and Erne 2014); hence, international networks should not be considered an exclusive prerogative of the richest countries. However, research on European trade unions underlines the weaknesses of organized labour at the international level (Erne 2008; Hyman 2015). As Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2015, 11) underline in their analysis of transnational solidarity in face of the crisis: ‘There has been an evident contradiction between a global economic crisis on the one hand, and trade union action that is essentially national or indeed sub-national in character.’ Moreover, sociological research on transnationalism, which is the intensity of individuals’ cross-border interaction and mobility, shows that individuals from lower social classes and with lower education are less prone to engage in transnational interactions (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2011). Gill (2016, 1) summarizes the different degrees of internationalization between higher and lower classes, opposing the ‘relative unity of Europe’s ruling class’ to the ‘relative fragmentation of subaltern forces’. Thus, globalization appears to be modifying not just the prerogatives of nation states but also the relation between the different social categories. As Jessop (2015, 197) argues, ‘in shaping state capacities, the world market also modifies the balance of forces within states.’

The changes in states’ prerogatives, the emergence of new actors, and the shifts in the balance of forces all reflect in national political systems as well. In particular, Kriesi et al. (2008) point out the consequences of globalization in six different countries, studying both voters’ preferences and party positions on a large set of issues from the 1970s to the early 2000s. They conclude that:

‘Despite the establishment of new transnational institutional architectures of political decision-making, the organization of politics remains firmly rooted within the national political systems and it is political parties that remain the most important actors in transforming citizens’ preferences into political programmes.’

However, globalization is affecting politics. In particular, Kriesi et al. (2008) find significant effects at three different levels: societal conflicts, political parties and party families, and national party systems. Societal conflicts are the different interests and views that shape a political system, also labelled as cleavages by Lipset and Rokkan (1967).<sup>68</sup> Kriesi et al. (2008) find that globalization does not change the structure of political conflict, which is still represented by a bi-dimensional space. Nevertheless, the meaning of cultural dimension is changing. While in the 1970s, cultural dimension was mostly represented by the debate on religion and secularization, nowadays it is structured by ‘new globalization issues, i.e. European integration and immigration’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 257). This confirms their ‘embedding hypothesis’ that ‘the issues pertaining to the integration-demarcation divide [another expression used to refer to globalization] are integrated into the already existing cultural divide’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 100). The analysis of parties and party families, however, attempts to focus on how political parties react to changes in societal conflicts. Kriesi et al. (2008) underline that we expect two possible changes at this level of analysis: 1) an ideological repositioning of established parties and 2) the emergence of new parties. Kriesi et al. (2008) find contrasting evidence of how established parties react to the new meaning of societal conflicts, depending on both the institutional setting and the emergence of new political parties. It is possible to identify three groups of countries according to how party families have changed:

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<sup>68</sup> In particular, Kriesi et al. (2008) rely on the four cleavages identified by Rokkan (1999), which are used as a benchmark to see whether, where, and how political conflict has been changing following globalization. As a reminder, Rokkan (1999) argues that the European political space is structured around four cleavages: centre/periphery, religion/secularism, rural/urban, and owners/workers. These four cleavages combine into a bi-dimensional space composed of a socio-economic dimension and a cultural dimension.

‘First, a group including France and the Netherlands, in which the transformation of politics was caused mainly by new parties (transformation from outside); second, countries like Austria and Switzerland in which transformative changes took place within established parties (transformation from within); and, thirdly, a group of countries including Germany and the UK, in which established parties managed to adapt and absorb the new political potential to a large extent without radically changing their ideological profiles (absorptive change)’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 331).

Cross-country variation is explained by three factors: the electoral system, the type of party organization, and party strategies, specifically towards RRP (i.e. do established political parties stigmatize, co-opt, or dismiss RRP?).

Finally, Kriesi et al. (2008) assess how the emergence of new cleavages, new parties, and new party families affect the national party systems in Western Europe. They find ‘strong evidence that the formation of new parties and party families has destabilized party systems in Western Europe’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 335). Changes are related to two dimensions: fragmentation (i.e. the number of relevant parties and the vote share of the two main parties) and polarization (i.e. the ideological distance between parties). Western European party systems have nowadays become more fragmented with an increase in the number of parties. However, in 2008, this increase was still considered rather low by Kriesi et al. (2008). Moreover, not all party systems experienced such transformations; both Switzerland and the UK appeared as fragmented in 2008 as in the 1970s. In terms of polarization, however, results are more consistent. According to Kriesi et al. (2008), polarization in Western European political systems has been increasing since the 1970s. However, such a polarization is not equal between the Left and Right poles: ‘the right pole of the ideological spectrum has been strengthened significantly. In Western Europe, the increasing polarization of party systems has mainly been a consequence of a strengthening of a new family of right-wing populist parties in the last two decades.’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 339) As a consequence, most national political systems now appear to be tripolar, as the competition is between a Left pole, ad Right pole, and a Radical Right



pole, a conclusion confirmed by recent literature as well (Oesch and Rennwald 2017). Kriesi et al. (2008) conclude that globalization has had an impact on national party systems at different levels. However, national actors and institutions have played an important role in shaping such a change.

In light of previous discussion, we conclude that nation-states are still a valid unit of analysis. We agree with Jessop that ‘the present future of statehood does not entail the end of the state as a distinctive form of the territorialization of political power, but there will be more complicated forms of multispatial meta-governance organized in the shadow of national and regional states’. We argue that Amable and Palombarini’s (2005) choice to consider the national level as a basis for their model is legitimate inasmuch as political systems are still nationals and react to globalization in different manners. Moreover, apart from the most radical fringes of the ‘globalist’ position, the vast majority of the revised literature highlights that nation-states still exist as autonomous entities. The states’ power may or may not be declining or transforming, but they have not yet disappeared. However, this section also highlights that there are important interconnections between nation-states and the supranational level. In particular, all three positions recognize that states are embedded in a larger system; even sceptics agree, even though they diminish the consequences or the novelty of globalization. Our position is efficiently summarized by McGrew and Lewis (2013, 5):

‘Politics within the confines of the nation-state, whether at the neighbourhood, local or national levels, cannot be insulated from powerful international forces and ramifications of events in distant countries. In the late twentieth century, politics can no longer be understood as a purely local or national social activity but must be conceived as a social activity with a global dimension’

Therefore, the following section attempts to amend Amable and Palombarini’s (2005) DSB framework by formulizing how the supranational level can interact with the process of formation and maintaining of a DSB.

#### 5.5.2.2. ACCOUNTING FOR THE EFFECTS OF SUPRANATIONAL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS: CONSTRAINTS AND POLITICAL POTENTIALS

In the previous section, we argued that Amable and Palombarini's (2005) choice of focusing on the national level is legitimate; however, national political systems are not insulated from supranational institutions and the balance of forces at the supranational level. It appears that supranational processes nowadays play an important role in the definition of a DSB. We therefore proposed an upward (since we connect national equilibria to an upper level of aggregation) amendment and theorize that, on each of the spheres (ideology, institutions, and political mediation) identified by Amable and Palombarini (2005), a proper analysis should be carried out for the interactions with the supranational level in terms of (i) constraints and (ii) political potentials.

##### *The supranational level in terms of constraint*

The 'constraints' category identifies the limits that the supranational level impose (or try to impose) on national actors, as stated by Gourevitch (1986). Relying on a comparison of policy responses to three international crises in five countries (France, Germany, Sweden, the US, and the UK), Gourevitch (1986) builds his model around four factors, which he considers as mediators of what he calls the 'policy dispute' (i.e. the conflict between social and political actors to impose their own policies on the government's agenda). These factors were the 'mechanisms of representation', which are the system of relations between social categories and political parties, the 'organization of the state', which comprises both the system of rules (such as the electoral law) and the institutions, the 'ideology' influencing each actor, and the 'international role of each state', considering both its diplomatic and military strength. Concerning the 'international level', Gourevitch (1986) argues that individual countries indeed have a large leeway in the way they react to international crises. Still, the international level 'presses on individual countries, and it does so through working on domestic actors' (Gourevitch 1986, 257). The pressure on and constraints to domestic actors push them to try to change national policies in a way that is at the same time able to defend their own interests and is

respectful of the international system. Thus, the first way the supranational level may interact with the nation-state is by constraining domestic actors.

These pressures play different roles according to the sphere, but always lead to a reduction of the possible outcomes for some actors. European treaties are a valid example of how supranational rules shape both the sphere of institutions and political mediation. Article 3 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (also known as Fiscal Compact), for example, states that ‘the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus’, thus becoming part of the ‘rules of the game’ or ‘institutions’, in Amable and Palombarini’s (2005) terminology. Reforming institutions is, from the point of view of political actors, costlier than implementing simple policy. In some historical periods, supranational pressures were so strong that not only policies but also actors were excluded from political mediation. It was the case in many communist parties in Western Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Levite and Tarrow 1983).<sup>69</sup> Finally, the supranational level might shape the political demands of social categories. Different authors (Jessop and Sum 2013; Sklair 2012; Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2007; Van der Pijl 1998)<sup>70</sup> underline the role of supranational networks in developing current ‘neoliberal hegemony’, which is ‘the claim of the superiority of the market mechanism and competition-driven processes’ (Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2007, 27). The diffusion of neoliberalist paradigms, such as the idea of ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA), to market economy, influences social categories, as some demands might appear as impossible and not

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<sup>69</sup> We are talking, here, of democratic and pluralist political systems. Indeed, similar limitations concerned Eastern European countries falling under the influence of the Soviet Union. In a few cases, the Soviet influence went so far as to censor the less soviet-enthusiastic positions within allied parties, as was the case for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring in 1968 (K. Williams 1997). However, these governments were hardly pluralistic, not to mention democratic.

<sup>70</sup> The genesis of cultural dominance of neoliberal paradigms does not seem to be the same for all cited authors. In particular, Plehwe et al. (2007) focus on intellectuals, Van der Pijl (1998) and Sklair (2012) talk of a transnational capitalist class including corporate and media elites, while Sum and Jessop (2013) provide a more comprehensive look at different actors. Regardless of the origins, they all agree on the existence of a cultural element that strengthens neoliberal hegemony.

expressed, as well as political actors, who judge some expectations as impossible to satisfy and thus avoid considering them.

The supranational system might intervene in the formation of a DSB by constraining political actors. To be clear, however, we are not suggesting that the supranational level *determines* the equilibria of national political systems. Indeed, national politicians still have the choice of building a strategy *against* these constraints; for example, nothing prevents a political party from modifying the rules regarding the independence of national central banks. However, supranational constraints should be seen as a supplementary cost for certain political strategies.

#### *The supranational level in terms of political potentials*

As shown in the Section 5.5.2.1, Weiss (2003) warns against theorizations between nation-states and globalization exclusively in terms of constraints and also considered political potentials. Her position seems to be supported by recent political research, such as that by Kriesi et al. (2008, 10), which shows how globalization generates ‘political potentials’, which are ‘conflicts, issues and issue-specific preferences in the electorate’.

Moreover, the supranational level might provide resources to those actors who have managed to build/integrate international alliances. Indeed, Held (2004) and Weiss (2003) also understand globalization in terms of networks and there is evidence that the ability to connect to the rest of the world is not the same for all involved actors (Gill 2016). We see in Chapter 4, for example, that RRP have so far failed to organize at the European level, while other parties have a significantly more established network on which they can rely (Almeida 2012). Networks might provide financial resources, as was the case for the Italian PCI after the Second World War (Drake 2004) and legitimacy (Ladrech 2002). We interpret legitimacy as the fact that a political actor or a political strategy is recognized as a viable option by social categories. For example, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN) tried, with no luck, to join the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) between the end of the

1990s and early 2000s. Since the Italian AN, as we saw in Chapter 1, was the heir to the neo-fascist MSI party, joining the EPP would have strengthened the legitimacy of AN's claim to be a moderate centre-right party before the Italian electorate. The interconnectedness at the supranational level also concerns social blocs or collective actors, as seen in Section 5.5.2.1. It follows that social blocs might be part of transnational networks; their actual capacity to influence the political equilibrium at the national level depends on their degree of internationalization.

To summarize, under the term 'political potentials', we include (i) resources that the supranational level provides to national actors (e.g. financial resources or legitimacy) and (ii) political cleavages directly or indirectly related to the supranational level (e.g. Euroscepticism/Support for European integration). Some broad supranational issues might be at play in more than one sphere at the same time. For example, the politicization of the European integration, on the one hand, has modified the perception of self-interests that social blocs hold; on the other hand, it obliges collective actors to organize around the new cleavage (Prosser 2015). Taking a position on such issues is, thus, an important strategy for most parties. We already discuss in Section 5.4 the importance of Euroscepticism for RR social bloc. Moreover, the EU also offered some institutions the opportunity and legitimacy to reform themselves. For example, European Treaties require member states to respect the independence of national central banks. The process of European construction provided national actors with the necessary legitimacy to apply such reforms, which eventually became constraints in the newly reformed institutional setting.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Moreover, it also contributed to blur the limits between 'institutions' as rule of the games and 'institutions' as organizations. Central bankers, in such a framework, play also a very 'political' role: they can now participate in the determination of a DSB, since other political actors have no formal power over monetary policy. As Adolph (2013, 10) argues: 'Central bankers are the most important political actors still veiled by the myth of bureaucratic impartiality. The myth has many sources, including fawning accounts of central bankers as oracles, but it draws sustenance from economists' eagerness to treat monetary policy as a purely technical problem with an optimal solution, downplaying or dismissing its distributive consequences. Not least, the myth of neutrality persists because central bankers have every reason to feed it – it is always easier to be considered above politics, whether or not one has a political agenda'

<b>Sphere</b>	<b>Constraints</b>	<b>Political potentials</b>
<b>Ideology</b>	The debate at the supranational level might delegitimize certain political demands (e.g. T.I.N.A.).	The <i>supranational level</i> modifies political demands. (e.g. Euroscepticism).
<b>Institutions</b>	International treaties might prevent the reform of certain institutions (e.g. EU Fiscal compact).	Institutions might belong to transnational networks, receiving legitimacy (e.g. European central banks). The supranational level might offer the opportunity/justification to reform institutions.
<b>Political mediation</b>	International treaties make certain strategies (e.g. large budgetary deficits within the EU now require the approval of the European Council) more expensive. It can also directly or indirectly hinder certain actors from reaching power (e.g. Communist parties in the immediate aftermath of WW II).	The supranational level modifies political cleavages, thus creating the room for new political strategies. (e.g. Euroscepticism) Political actors might belong to transnational networks, receiving resources and legitimacy.

*Table 66 - Interactions between the supranational level and the national level. Source: original compilation.*

The two categories hereby presented are not mutually exclusive. On the opposite, they interact between each other: in Europe, the constraints imposed by the EU probably strengthened the ‘political potentials’ of Euroscepticism. At the same time, the rise of Eurosceptic became an argument, for some moderate and Europhile politicians, to demand a loosening of budgetary constraints (for example, in the case of the Italian centre-left under Matteo Renzi's leadership, see Marino and Martocchia (2016) and Piccoli (2016)). Besides, constraints and political potentials are not the same in all countries: ‘just as globalization does not generate a single set of pressures that affect all states equally, there is no common response of all states to the multiple forms assumed by globalization.’ As such, and here we reconnect with Amable and Palombarini (2005), one should assess the relationship between national political systems and the supranational level, preferably at the country level. Table 66 shows the two ways in which the supranational level interacts with the national level in the identification of DSB through the three spheres identified by Amable and Palombarini (2005).

### 5.5.3. EXPANDING THE DSB FRAMEWORK DOWNWARDS TO ANALYSE SOCIAL POWER: RESOURCES, STRUCTURE, VOTES, AND ORGANIZATION

In Section 5.5.1 we argued that according to Amable and Palombarini (2005), the validation of a DSB is not exclusively electoral. However, in their case studies (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012a; Amable and Palombarini 2017), the authors do not actually focus on the differences between social categories outside the moment of electoral validation. In particular, we assume that social categories are not equal in the types of support they can provide to political actors before and after the elections. We argue that the idea of support needs to be further developed since, if we wish to understand the possible influence of RRP on the formation of a DSB, we need to assess the characteristics (and not only the demands) of a social bloc (and the social categories who compose it). These characteristics represent the ‘social power’ of a social actor (i.e. the ability of a social category to influence the socio-economic system). We therefore need to identify the different types of social power that can be useful to our research. We do so by discussing different theoretical approaches to the analysis of social conflict that, according to Amable and Palombarini (2005), also focus on the mediating role of politics. The discussion of these approaches leads us to expand the concept of political support provided by Amable and Palombarini (2005) towards a larger idea of social power, which is respectful of the differences between blocs in terms of resources, organization, structural power, and electoral power. We prefer to employ the term ‘social power’ rather than ‘political support’ because it makes clear that we are no longer exclusively focusing on the sphere of political mediation; the concept is broader and includes the social characteristics of the different social blocs as a way to understand the various political influences.

In Section 5.5.3.1, we present the main ideas behind the so-called ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’, an approach to analyse social conflict focusing on the resources gathered by social movements and on their degree of organization. Section 5.5.3.2, however, presents the idea of ‘structural power’, i.e. the capacity of a social class to influence the socio-economic system, given its position within the

sphere of production. We then conclude in Section 5.5.3.3 by summarizing these different approaches and deriving four types of social power (resources, structural/positional power, electoral power, and associational power).

#### 5.5.3.1. THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY: SOCIAL BLOCS DIFFER IN THE RESOURCES THEY CAN MOBILIZE AND IN THEIR DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION

Resources are an important explaining factor of collective action, that is ‘coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 8), in the ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’. This theory is at the core of a large school of political sociology thought that analyses the action of social movements according to the way these aggregate and organize resources (Neveu 2011).

A social movement ‘is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217). This is a large definition that sets social movements somewhere within the sphere of political mediation and that of ideology in our reading of Amable and Palombarini (2005). The ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’ argues that social movements are in competition among each other (and with other sectors and industries) to obtain different types of resources. The resources at stake differ according to the author who is writing. McCarthy and Zald (1977), for example, focus on the time and money that individuals can donate to the social movement. Etzioni (1968) classifies resources (assets in his terminology) into three categories: coercive (armed or psychological manipulation), utilitarian (money, services, and goods), and normative (moral obligations, trust).

Tilly (1978, 69) defines the mobilization process as ‘the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life’. He analyses the importance of the resources in this process by identifying a large set of possible resources such as ‘labour-power, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of other things, just so long as they are usable in acting on



shared interests'(1978, 7). However, he argues that this plurality of resources is misleading and proposes considering the mobilization level as the sum of the market value of the different assets under the control of a certain group, multiplied by the probability that these resources will actually be mobilized:

$$\text{Mobilization level} = \text{sum} \left( \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{market value} \\ \text{of factor of} \\ \text{production} \\ \text{nominally under} \\ \text{group control} \end{array} \right] \times \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{probability} \\ \text{of delivery} \\ \text{when called} \\ \text{for} \end{array} \right] \right)$$

However, resources provide only a part of the explanation of the mobilization process, according to Tilly (1978). In particular, he argues that the organizational level of a social movement depends on the 'catness' and 'netness' of a group:

$$\text{CATNESS} \times \text{NETNESS} = \text{ORGANIZATION}$$

The catness (also called groupness) indicates the strength of the common identity of a certain group, while the netness (also called inclusiveness) measures the density of the internal networks. Thus, according to Tilly, mobilization relies on two aspects: the resources a social movement can deliver and the strength of its identity and internal networks. The analysis in terms of resources proposed by Tilly (1978) underlines the differences between social categories, it does not deal with the social structure in which the social blocs are in play. As Weber (2009, 195) warns, 'it is impossible to say anything about the structure of parties without discussing the structural forms of social domination per se.' The following Section attempts to analyse the relationship between 'social power' and social structure, since we assume that the structure of RR electorate might pose important limits to the development of a DSB.

### 5.5.3.2. HOW SOCIAL STRUCTURE CAN INFLUENCE THE POWER OF A SOCIAL BLOC

In the previous Section, we concluded that in order to assess the ‘social power’ of a social bloc, we need to consider the resources that it can mobilize and its degree of organization (Tilly 1978). However, we argued that we need to consider that social blocs are part of a social structure, and this has consequences on their power. Wright (2000) also argues that in order to analyse the power of a certain class, we should take into account both its degree of organization (as seen in Tilly (1978)) and its position in the economic structure of society. The first is referred to as ‘structural power’ while the second is labelled ‘associational power’. Wright uses these concepts to analyse class struggle, which comprises ‘organized forms of antagonistic class practices’ (1997, 192), and class compromise, which indicates moments of truce and/or cooperation between supposedly opposing classes. In particular, he focuses on the impact of working class’s ‘associational power’ on the realization of capitalists interests (although he recognizes that ‘such structural power may itself influence associational power’ (Wright 2000, 962). He considers that class struggle is articulated in three spheres: ‘exchange’, ‘production’, and ‘politics’. The sphere of exchange ‘concerns, above all, the labour market and various other kinds of commodity markets’ (Wright 2000, 963), the sphere of production refers to the relation between workers and capital within a firm, while the sphere of politics indicates the state and the conflict over the policy-making process and its implementation. Each sphere is then characterized by a particular form of working-class organization (respectively labour unions, work councils, political parties). The strength of these working-class organizations, that is its capacity to realize working-class interests, is then the associational power of the working class.




Figure 35 - Relationship between working-class strength and capitalist class interests. Source: Wright (2000, p.960).

He then argues that relation between the associational power of the working-class and the capacity of the capitalist class to realize its own interests can be represented by a reverse-J curve (as shown in Figure 35). This relation describes the threats and improvements that an increase in working-class associational power poses to the capitalist class: on the one hand, the ‘increasing power of workers undermines the capacity of capitalists to unilaterally make decisions and control resources’; on the other hand, it ‘may help capitalists solve certain kinds of collective action and coordination problems’ (Wright 2000, 978). According to the shape of the relation between the associational power of the working class and the capacity of capitalists to realize their interests, we might find a negative or a positive class compromise. Negative class compromises represent a zero-sum outcome where the

antagonistic classes (workers/capitalists) both renounce something without actually cooperating. They simply ‘refrain from mutual damage in exchange for concessions on both sides’ (Wright 2000, 957). In positive class compromises, however, the two classes cooperate between them and produce a ‘positive-sum social pact’ (Wright 2000, 965), where both classes improve their life conditions.

We can illustrate the previous discussion by looking at positive class compromises within the sphere of politics, as this is most relevant to our research. In the sphere of politics, strong political parties of the left, which Wright (2000) assumes as the political representation of the working-class, are a threat to the realization of capitalist interests, since they favour more redistributive policies through higher taxation. Moreover, they also promote legislation to increase working-social power in the other two spheres (such as labour-market legislation or the obligation to include workers in the administration of the firm). At the same time, strong political parties of the left are required to establish a form of positive class compromise, as exemplified by the Swedish case:

‘Sweden, until the mid-1980s, is usually taken as the paradigm case: the social-democratic party's control of the Swedish state facilitated a set of corporatist arrangements between centralized trade unions and centralized employers' associations that made possible a long, stable period of cooperation and growth. The organizational links between the labour movement and the social-democratic party were critical for this stability, since it added legitimacy to the deals that were struck and increased the confidence of workers that the terms of the agreement would be upheld in the future. This made it possible over a long period of time for Swedish capitalism to sustain high capacity utilization, very low levels of unemployment, and relatively high productivity growth. State-mediated corporatism anchored in working-class associational strength in the political sphere played a significant role in these outcomes’ (Wright 2000, 983–84).

The actual establishment of a class compromise depends on not only the associational power but also the structural power across the three spheres (exchange, production, politics). The concept of structural power was further developed by Perrone (1984, 231), who used both the terms structural

and positional power, defined as ‘the varying amount of disruptive potential endowed upon workers by virtue of their different positions in the system of economic interdependencies.’ It is then a measure of the threat that workers pose to the functioning of the economic system, given their position, usually in the process of production. It assesses the amount of damage a company and interconnected companies (or a socio-economic model, in our analysis) would suffer if a certain category of workers were to go on strike. Following Perrone’s (1984) work, Wallace, Griffin, and Rubin (1989) analyse the positional power of American labour between 1963 and 1977 in terms of the damage a strike could have on supplying and receiving industries. They concluded that not all categories of workers pose the same troubles to a socio-economic model as ‘the mere threat of prolonged strikes in coal, automobiles, or steel sends tremors throughout the economy’ (Wallace, Griffin, and Rubin 1989, 212). Thus, and this conclusion is shared by Perrone (1984), structural or positional power is meant to be interpreted as a threat in order to reach a certain social compromise, which should prevent structural power from recurring.

Other approaches developed a different idea of structural power. As seen, Perrone (1984) focuses especially on the interconnectedness between industries (i.e. the fact that a strike in Industry X has an impact on Industries Y and Z). Bologna (1972) developed a concept of ‘technical composition’ that includes both the power derived from industrial interconnectedness (coal workers) and the power derived by the skills of German technicians and scarcity thereof (industrial workers). The two concepts are not antagonistic and are kept separated by Perrone (1984) and Wallace et al. (1989), in order to focus on one specific aspect (structural/positional power in this case). Still, both concepts identify a similar structural power, which is the ability of a social category to generate a damage on other actors through non-cooperative behaviours. In our research, we prefer to assimilate these two approaches under one single concept of structural/positional power.

In the previous two Sections, we argue that in order to analyse the formation of a DSB, we need to take into account the differences between social categories. Social categories are not equal; the

balance of forces among these actors contributes to determining the viability of political strategies. As a result, sheer numbers can win an election, but they might not be enough to form a DSB; hence, the ‘electoral power’ of a DSB is not enough to assess its viability. We propose to analyse social categories in terms of ‘social power’ (i.e. the ability of a social class to influence the socio-economic system). We rely on the literature to identify different types of ‘social power’, such as the resources a social category can mobilize, its degree of organization, and its structural power. In the following Section, we develop our own typology of social power based on the previous discussion.

#### 5.5.3.3. FOUR TYPES OF SOCIAL POWER: RESOURCES, STRUCTURAL POWER, ELECTORAL POWER, AND ASSOCIATIONAL POWER

Political support is a key variable in the DSB framework; it represents the resources provided by social categories to their political representatives in exchange for defending their interests. We showed in Section 5.3 that a socio-economic model is viable if it is able to produce enough support from social categories to reproduce itself (i.e. for the political actors sustaining this socio-economic model to stay in office). It also represents the power of a certain social category on the socio-economic system; therefore, we have decided to use the term ‘social power’ as a more proper label. Developing this concept is important since in order to understand whether a new DSB is forming around RRP, we need to assess the nature of its social power. We therefore proceed to identify different types of social power.

Notably, the ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’ focuses on the resources (financial support, rank-and-file, media, etc.) a social category can mobilize, as well as its degree of organization. A ‘small’ well-organized and resourceful social category is therefore more influential than a ‘large’ but disorganized and underprivileged one. However, Tilly (1978) goes beyond material resources to address the importance of social structure in terms of catness and netness. We argued that any analysis of the political sphere that would not take into account the stratification of society would be misleading. We also found similar conclusions in the works of Wright (2000) and Perrone (1984), who developed the

concepts of structural power. We argue that social blocs are not equal. They differ in terms of social power, which in turns depends on the resources a social bloc can mobilize, its position in the economic sphere, its electoral relevance, and its degree of organization. In this section, we present our definition of these four types of social power.

Following Tilly (1978), we define ‘resources’ (RES) as all the assets (especially financial support) that a certain social bloc can mobilize. However, unlike Tilly (1978), we do not include votes that represent a separated category. This choice seems justified to us, given that we focus on the political regulation of conflict in democratic states, where elections are a pivotal event. By the term ‘structural power’ (STRUCT), instead, we refer to the importance of a social class within the economic structure and its capacity to damage it by abstaining from cooperating (Wright 2000). We interpret structural power as a threat to the stability of the socio-economic model as it might disrupt the process of production and exchange of goods and services. Generally, political actors are willing to accommodate the interests of social categories that have a central role in the economic system; strikes by automotive workers (Perrone, Wright, and Griffin 1984) are valid examples of structural power in practice. The third component of social power, ‘Electoral power’, identifies the sheer number of votes that a certain social bloc can potentially mobilize. We also consider other ways of expressing this electoral power. Indeed, classes that have social alliances holding fewer resources and without a strong position within the economic structure can still exert their influence in the polls. However, as the sphere of political mediation is made of not only political parties (but also NGOs, trade-unions, etc.), we consider the associational power, as defined by Wright (Wright 2000, 962): ‘the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organizations’ and, similar to Tilly (1978), we consider it as an enhancer of other forms power. This means that a social bloc with important resources or representing a large set of the electorate, if not organized, would provide but a fraction of its potential political power if disorganized.

# SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEM

INTERACTS WITH THE DIFFERENT SPHERES OF THE NATIONAL SYSTEM IN TERMS OF:

- CONSTRAINTS
- POLITICAL POTENTIALS

- AMENDMENT DISCUSSED IN SECTION 5.5




Figure 36 - The amended DSB framework. Source: author's own diagram.



#### 5.5.4. CONCLUSION: AN AMENDED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS RRP'S IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

In the previous Sections, we discussed how we could overcome the limitations of neo-classical models in analysing RRP's relation with the economy. We agreed with Palombarini (1999, 2001) that neo-classical theorizations of the relation between politics and the economy do not respect the specificity and the autonomy of politics at the same time. We then presented and discussed the neo-realist approach given by Amable and Palombarini (2005). In particular, we focused on what we called the 'DSB framework', an analytical framework that considers economic policy as the result of a process of political mediation between conflicting social interests aggregated in social blocs. The focus of the analysis, then, is on the actors in the sphere of political mediation and their strategies to build a DSB by responding to the political demands of heterogeneous social categories. Actors in the sphere of political mediation obtain support by selecting the demands that they wish to satisfy. If the social bloc whose political demands are satisfied is not large enough, the system goes through a phase of crisis; otherwise, a DSB is formed. We find this framework suitable for analysing the economic impact of RRP's as it takes into account both the specificity and the autonomy of politics.

In this Section, we focused on the limitations of the DSB framework. On the one hand, we agree with Palombarini (2001) that political equilibria are not strictly determined by other levels. On the other hand, we argue that the balance of forces of these levels could still influence them. We identified two levels that influence the formation of a DSB: the supranational level and social structure. We therefore proceeded to extend Amable and Palombarini's (2005) DSB framework in two ways (Figure 36). First, we argued that (i) political equilibria are found within national political systems, but (ii) national political systems are influenced by the supranational sphere. We proposed to include in our analysis the effects of the supranational system on national political systems. The supranational system can interact with national political systems by generating either (i) constraints or (ii) political opportunities.

Second, we argued that social blocs are part of a social structure that generates differences between social categories. Social categories can mobilize different types of social power to support their political representatives. Amable and Palombarini (2005) focus on electoral power; however, the literature seems to propose other types as well. In particular, we identified three other types of social power, namely: resources, associational power, and structural power.

These amendments help us to understand the economic impact of RRP. As a reminder, Amable and Palombarini (2005) argue that economic policy is the result of social conflict. Politics mediates social conflict as political parties select the expectations to satisfy and try to build a DSB. RRP participate in this process as they try to build their own DSBs and influence the construction of other DSBs. Thus, in order to assess the economic impact of RRP, we need to understand (i) RRP's strategies to form a DSB and (ii) the conditions for their success. The framework developed in this Section integrates Amable and Palombarini's (2005) work and allows us to identify additional conditions and implications for RRP's strategies towards the construction of a DSB.

In the following Section, we provide a preliminary application of our framework, which would serve as the basis of future research on RRP's impact as well as on the political determinants of the economy. Indeed, a complete application of our framework would require a comparative research between more case studies. However, a comparative application of the DSB framework requires a thorough discussion of each national political system, which can hardly be accomplished in scope cadre of a thesis. Having established the theoretical basis of our approach, we consider it important to provide a first application to illustrate our methodology and to 'concretize' our framework. In particular, we provide a twofold illustration: (i) we present the common features of RRP presented in this thesis and (ii) we analyse a national case study, the Italian LN. As we argue in the next Section, the Italian LN is particularly interesting, since it has followed different strategies during the last three decades and is among the few RRP with a governing experience.

## 5.6. RRP AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF DSB: STRATEGIES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONDITIONS

In the previous Sections, we presented and discussed a neo-realist approach to the political determinants of the economy. Accordingly, we argued that economic policy is the product of the political regulation of social conflict. In order to interpret our results from Chapter 4 and assess the economic impact of RRP, we then need to understand how RRP intervene in this process of political regulation. Following Amable and Palombarini (2005), we interpreted political regulation as the process of definition of a DSB. In particular, we are interested in discussing (i) the strategies used by RRP to build a DSB and (ii) the conditions for these strategies to succeed. We then identified the main social categories supporting RRP and saw that, at the European level, the RR social bloc shares important commonalities in terms of class composition and political demands. Given the particularities of the RR social bloc, which seems to be increasingly built on the so-called ‘modernization losers’, we proposed a series of amendments to allow us a better understanding of the viability of an RR-DSB. In this Section, we provide an illustration of our framework and the insights it provides on the viability of the RR social bloc. We do so by summarizing the main results highlighted in this thesis and discussing the main findings of the literature concerning RRP (Figure 37). We focus in particular on Western European RRP: Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 highlighted that Eastern European RRP might have different strategies and impacts in terms of economic policy. Unfortunately, the lack of developed literature on Eastern European RRP, in particular on their electoral basis, does not allow us to further analyse them in detail. After discussing the main common elements of Western European RRP in general, we focus on a single RRP: the Italian LN. In other words, we move from the general category of ‘Western European RRP’, to the specificity of the Italian case, to show that even minor differences between RRP might lead to a substantial different assessment, given the national contexts.

# SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEM

## INTERACTION WITH RRP:

- CONSTRAINTS [WEAK LEGITIMACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND RISING OPPOSITION BY THE EU]
- POLITICAL POTENTIALS [2008 ECON CRISIS + GLOBALISATION GENERATED DEMAND FOR NATIVIST POLICIES. ALSO RISE IN EUROSCEPTICISM WHICH IS NOW A MAJOR DEMAND OF THE RR BLOC]




Figure 37 - The RR social bloc and its interactions with the different spheres. Source: author's own diagram.

We think that the LN is a good case study to illustrate our framework for two main reasons. First, the LN is one of the oldest RRP active in today's Western Europe.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, we are able to collect more data and retrace the evolution of LN social bloc and its actions, once elected. Second, as we discuss in further in Section 5.6.2, the Italian LN adopted a wide array of different strategies during the last 30 years. It allows us to illustrate the different strategies at play. Indeed, Italy also offers other RRP (the no-longer existing AN and the newly-born FdI), but we have decided to focus on the LN because it is the only RRP present along the whole period of our analysis. The reader can find a presentation of the LN in Chapter 1. As seen Chapter 1, the Italian AN went through a deep process of de-radicalization before merging with Berlusconi's FI in the PDL, while FdI has been in existence only since December 2012. In this Section, we first consider the three spheres in which social alliances and compromises are established in relation to RR. In Section 5.6.1, we discuss the sphere of ideology (i.e. we identify the RR electorate and its political demands). In Section 5.6.2, we illustrate RRP's strategy in the sphere of political mediation. Section 5.6.3 discusses the role of (economic and political) institutions in the rise of RRP. Then, we proceed with the analysis of RR's impacts by relying on our amendments of the original model: in Section 5.6.4, we present the political potentials and constraints placed on RRP by the supranational level. In Section 5.6.5, we provide some insights into the social power of RRP and conclude regarding the need to analyse deeper the class composition of RRP in order to understand the economic consequences of their rise.

#### 5.6.1. THE SPHERE OF IDEOLOGY: SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND POLITICAL DEMANDS

*European RRP appear to mobilize the support of a similar social bloc...*

In the sphere of ideology, we assess the political demands expressed by the RR electorate and its characteristics. We analysed both in Section 5.4, and identified the main commonalities in European

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<sup>72</sup> Curiously enough, the Italian LN is also Italy's oldest party to have a parliamentary representation as of 2017.

RR electorate. First, RRP are disproportionately supported by manual and service workers, farmers, and small-business owners. Second, RR is a heterogeneous social alliance unified by nativism, populism, and Euroscepticism. Nonetheless, it does not express a clear position on economic matters and the literature underlines that even migration is seen primarily as a cultural rather than an economic threat (Kitschelt 1995; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Mudde 2007; Oesch 2008). In the last decade, a nativist fraction of the working class has emerged as a central element of this alliance. According to Zaslove (2008, 185), ‘if we closely scrutinize the reasons why voters support radical right parties, keeping in mind how these same parties frame the issue of globalization, it becomes clear how and why the political message of radical right parties resonates with a small but significant portion of the electorate who demonstrate apprehension towards economic globalization, European integration, and immigration’. This reading is similar to the one proposed by Amable and Palombarini (2015; 2017) in their analysis of the French systemic crisis, discussed in Section 5.3.3. The FN social bloc, according to Amable and Palombarini (2015; 2017), represents the right-wing side of the anti-bourgeois bloc. However, this bloc is fractured on economic issues between social categories that favour domestic market liberalization (such as shopkeepers and small-business owners) and pro-redistribution social categories (production and service workers). Such a conclusion is actually similar to much of the literature on RRP as well (Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 1995). Moreover, data from ESS7 indicate that RR electorate is more fractured on economic matters than other issues. In addition, the importance of workers in the FN electorate should not be overstated: their weight only slightly increased from 25% of the FN electorate in 2002 to 30% in 2012. Thus, other constituencies comprise the largest part of the FN electorate. Also, conversely, the weight of the FN among workers as a whole should not be overstated, since they have a higher propensity than other classes to abstain (Gougou 2007). If we examine the 2012 results while also considering non-voting workers, we see that only 17% of French workers voted for the FN (Amable and Palombarini 2017). shows the average position of RR voters, by respondents’ class, on two of the issues picked in Section 5.4: ‘Government should reduce differences in income levels’ (higher values indicate respondents reject the statement) and

respondents' 'placement on the left-right scale'. There is indeed a certain degree of opposition within the RR electorate between anti-redistribution self-employed professionals and pro-redistribution service and production workers.




Figure 38 - Average answer of RRP voters by class. Source: author's calculations on ESS7 data.

It seems that the RR social bloc can keep its unity only as long as other issues, in particular immigration, remain salient. In political systems where nativism-related issues are not salient, RRP find it harder to satisfy both cores of their social bloc.

...but the LN case study shows that national contexts are still very diversified

What can be said more specifically of the LN? Bull and Gilbert (2001, 72) analyse the geographical distribution of LN electorate and identify 'a close link between the electoral success of the LN at the 1992 general elections and the model of localized industries or industrial districts which characterizes

the Lombard region'. This part of Italy, the so-called 'Third Italy' (Bagnasco 1977), is characterized by the presence of many small-business owners and artisans. Blue-collar workers are also present, but their working environment appears to be different, given the smaller size of enterprises.<sup>73</sup> Also, the LN successes are linked to the diffusion of the catholic sub-culture (i.e. zones where the DC was stronger) and the party achieves stronger results in rural areas (Biorcio and Vitale 2011).

Apart from the local context, we can also identify the main social characteristics of the LN electorate as well as its expectations. According to Beirich and Woods (2000, 142), while rather entrepreneurial at the beginning, the LN social basis in the 1990s 'has shifted to workers and artisans who feel threatened by forces beyond their control'. However, their analysis relies on data from a 1996 survey, when the LN ran separated from the Italian centre-right. Since the LN was part of the centre-right alliance in all other legislative elections, results might be an outlier. Indeed, a more recent analysis by Meret (2010) shows a different picture. The author analyses the class composition of LN electorate in 2008 election by means of logistic regression on the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) survey. She finds that production workers' propensity to vote for the LN is not significantly higher than that for other classes. Small-business owners and service workers, however, have significantly higher odds of voting for the LN. Thus, the Italian LN seems to be less of a 'workers party' than the typical RRP discussed in Section 5.4. Still, recent evolutions indicate important changes in the LN electorate. In particular, the 2013 election saw the emergence of a 'populist' competitor, the Five Star Movement, and the failure of the electoral experience of Mario Monti's 'Scelta Civica'. The LN also experienced an electoral backlash because of major scandals that hit party's leadership in 2012; it lost half of its score compared to 2008. Indeed, the 2013 election has profoundly modified the Italian political system, not only the LN. In order to understand the social bloc currently supporting the LN,

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<sup>73</sup> In particular, it is usually argued that employees in small enterprises, regardless of their actual task, are able to project themselves as future small-business owner (Bagnasco 1982).



we rely on data from 2008 and 2013 *ITANES* surveys. We describe the relationship between political parties and social blocs by the means of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis performed on three variables found in the 2013 survey: profession, level of education, and party voted in 2013 election. We have opted for these variables in light of the discussion in Section 5.4, which underlines the importance of education and social backgrounds as determinants for voting for a party. We obtain two main dimensions, which describe 67% of the variance.




Figure 39 - Social blocs and vote in 2013 Italian election. Source: author's own calculations on the *ITANES* 2013 survey.

The first dimension underlines the opposition between the least educated voters and highly educated voters, which is clearly linked to voters' profession as well. The second dimension, instead, seems more 'political' as it opposes centre-left voters and voters of the Five Stars Movement (M5S). Within this space, the LN electorate is close to the rest of the centre-right electorate and appears to be characterized by a low level of education. On the second dimension, however, the LN does not appear

to be particularly related to a specific social bloc. Indeed, the presence of an independent centrist candidate, the former Prime Minister Mario Monti<sup>74</sup>, crowded out the centre-right from small-business owners. On the other hand, centre-right parties and the LN are closer to retired people and homemakers than to other social categories. Following the change in leadership with the election of Matteo Salvini in December 2013, different surveys show that the LN has largely increased its electoral weight. Especially among workers. According to a survey conducted by Emanuele and Maggini (2015) for the *Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali* (CISE), the LN is the third most popular party among Italian manual workers (after the M5S and the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD)), collecting 20% of the preferences. It seems that the LN electorate started changing under Salvini's leadership, and the LN has been able to penetrate among production workers, similarly to other RRP. In terms of expectations, LN voters 'demonstrate support for a less intrusive state, lower taxes, and less fiscal pressure [...] however, importantly, Lega supporters were also very supportive of the welfare state' (Zaslave 2008, 184). Moreover, given the regional outlook of the LN, a federal reform of the Italian state also emerges as a particularly strong expectations in the LN electorate (Meret 2010). The LN strategy on economic matters closely follows the evolution of its electorate. We illustrate the main elements of this strategy in the next Section as we address the sphere of political mediation.

### 5.6.2. THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL MEDIATION

#### *Five main strategies (plus one) at disposal towards the construction of radical right DSB*

Within the sphere of political mediation, we analyse the strategies pursued by RRPs, i.e. 1) the party's programme, which tells us about the political demands a party wishes to defend, and 2) which

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<sup>74</sup> Monti's profile is important for understanding why part of the centre-right moved towards his proposal. Monti, who was the incumbent Prime Minister at the time, is an economist and a former dean of an elite private university in Milan (Bocconi). He was put in power following the 2011 Italian financial crisis and represented a strongly pro-EU and liberal option for the Italian electorate (D'Alimonte, Di Virgilio, and Maggini 2013).

alliances they wish to make in order to defend those interests. We argued in Chapter 1 that the RR ideological core is composed by nativism and, to a lesser extent, by authoritarianism and populism. In light of our previous discussion, the importance of nativism is evidently the link between RRP's supply- and demand-side politics. This appears to be confirmed by our results in Chapter 2, where we see that on economic policy, RRP's do not share a common position, despite signs of convergence towards a pro-welfare stance. Given this setting, what are the strategies at their disposal to build an RR DSB? Following Amable and Palombarini (2005), we identify RRP's strategy based on (i) the social bloc they want to establish (i.e. which social categories they target) and (ii) the expectations they aim to satisfy (e.g. do they emphasize the nativist part of their programme or do they focus on Euroscepticism?). Moreover, we also consider (iii) how RRP's interact with other non-RR political parties. As discussed in the introduction and in Part I, RRP's in some countries face a *cordon sanitaire* (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015) and are ostracized by other parties. It becomes important to consider whether a certain strategy is pursued in coordination with non-RR allies or by themselves. As of now, we can identify five main strategies (Table 67) depending on the radicalness of RRP's position on nativism and Euroscepticism, the social alliance they wish to establish, and their relationship with other political parties:

1. RRP's can undergo a process of moderation, becoming full-fledged moderate right-wing parties. Indeed, according to the inclusion-moderation theory, successful RRP's are expected to moderate their ideological outlook. This should happen because (i) 'the inclusion into the electoral game will have a moderating effect according to the Downsian logic of the median-voter theorem' (Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn 2016, 3) and (ii) inclusion into office should have a moderating effect. Indeed, one can find examples of such a strategy (the most notorious case is probably the Italian AN and another case of transition towards moderation often discussed is the Austrian FPÖ under Haider; however, the process failed and ended with a split in the moderate faction. See Chapter 1 for

discussion). In principle, it is an option still available for all RRP. However, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn (2016, 276), in their comparative analysis of nine Western European RRP, highlight that RRP ‘have overall remained radical in their positions on issues related to their nationalist ideology such as immigration, authoritarianism, and European integration.’ Although theoretically possible, we consider this strategy as not being currently in play. This is probably due to the opportunities generated by the 2008 economic crisis: the difficulties European economies have been facing have probably made it less electorally profitable for RRP to pursue this strategy.

2. They can play as anti-system forces and try to monopolize the anti-bourgeois bloc around them. This is possible in countries where EU membership is a particularly important issue (see Section 5.6.4). In this case, the strategy involves enlarging their own social bloc to social categories so far excluded as well as to maximize the turnout of those categories that already support them. We label this option the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’. Following Amable and Palombarini (2017), this strategy appears to have characterized French FN, at least until the 2017 Presidential election. Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 2, RRP appear to be converging towards a common welfare chauvinist stance. This is in line with all the strategies built around the construction of an anti-bourgeois bloc; in order to appeal to the left-wing ‘souverainist’ voters, RRP have been increasing the salience of welfare in their programmes. Thus, we consider this strategy to be the most common among Western European RRP.
3. They can become the ‘nativist’ pole of a centre-right coalition. This strategy depends on the possibility for RRP to cooperate with moderate right-wing parties. As the literature underlines, in a large part of Europe, there is a *cordon sanitaire* preventing RRP from integrating into a moderate right coalition (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015). Still, there are notable exceptions, such as the LN. We label this option the ‘centre-right bloc by

Strategy	Social bloc	Relationship with other parties	Moderation on Euroscepticism	Moderation on nativism
<b>Anti-Bourgeois bloc by construction</b>	Anti-bourgeois	Competition with radical left parties	No	No
<b>Anti-Bourgeois bloc by integration</b>	Anti-bourgeois	Cooperation with radical left parties	No	Yes (or nativist radicalization by radical left parties)
<b>Centre-right bloc by integration</b>	Centre-right	Cooperation with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	No
<b>Centre-right bloc by construction</b>	Centre-right	Competition with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	No
<b>Centre-right bloc by moderation</b>	Centre-right	Cooperation with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	Yes

*Table 67 - RRP strategies towards the achievement of a DSB.*

integration’. This choice, as we argue and show in Section 5.6.4, requires RRP to moderate their position on the European integration process.

4. On the other hand, RRP can try to unify the same centre-right social bloc without allying with moderate right-wing parties. Similarly to the previous discussion, RRP would moderate their antagonism towards the EU to appease the right-wing part of the ‘bourgeois’ bloc identified by Amable and Palombarini (2015, 2017), without moderating their nativism so as to keep the support of the nativist fraction of the working class.
5. Finally, RRP might try to ally with radical-left political parties. The cooperation between the two souls of the ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc seems very unlikely, given their strong differences on nativism, and would require the moderation of the RRP’s message on this topic or a shift towards nativism (or nationalism) by radical-left parties. To our knowledge, only two (possible) RRP might fall under this category. First, the Greek ANEL is indeed allied with radical-left SYRIZA and supports Tsipras’ government. However, as argued in Chapter 1, there is not enough literature in English to make a substantial conclusion on

the ‘radicalness’ of ANEL and we have opted to exclude it from the analysis. The second case is the Slovakian SNS. As we argue in the introduction to this section, however, given the differences highlighted in the rest of this thesis, we have decided not to deal with Eastern European RRP as they clearly present peculiarities in terms of economic strategies and impact on the economy. The cooperation with radical left parties does not appear to be in play.

Finally, there is another strategy in play, where RRP, however, do not actively take part, that of the ‘centre-right bloc by radicalization’. Centre-right parties might decide to stress nativist policies in their programmes in order to attract part of the RR social bloc without the need to ally with RRP.

Indeed, as argued in Chapter 2, RRP do not have a shared strategy; there are tendencies towards a common welfare-chauvinist position on economic policy, but we cannot generalize further. Each strategy should be seen at the national level, as its success also depends on other parties’ behaviours. To conclude, within the sphere of political mediation, RRP are nativist parties with no shared vision on economic policy. We identified five possible strategies in order to expand their social bloc. Out of these five strategies, only three seem to be in play.

#### *The LN between protest and government.*

Following the previous discussion, in order to identify the LN’s political strategy (and its evolution), we should focus on (i) whether the LN is moderating its nativist appeal, (ii) the evolution of the party’s economic platform, (iii) the relationship with other parties, and (iv) its position on the European integration process. In this Section we focus on points (i) to (iii), while we analyse LN’s position on the European integration process in Section 5.6.4, as we discuss the political opportunities generated by the supranational level.

As shown in Chapter 1, LN’s nativism is no longer disputed. Indeed, we need to remember that the targets of LN nativism are not just migrants but also Italian southerners (Bull and Gilbert 2001).

Indeed, as we discuss further in Section 5.6.3, the defence of Northern Italy interests versus the so-called '*Roma Ladrona*' (Pregliasco 2013), the Italian centrist state, represents an important element of LN political identity. During the 1990s, the LN started to enlarge its nativism to include foreigners and developed a strong degree of islamophobia (Ignazi 2003; Ruzza 2005), becoming more similar to the typical RRP considered in this study. Despite the party being in a centre-right coalition, we exclude the process of moderation of LN's nativism.

Concerning the LN's economic proposals, Figure 40 and Figure 41 reproduce the evolution of LN economic programme on the four dimensions found in the PCA analysis of party manifestos (see Chapter 2). Similarly to other RRP, the LN stressed the pro-welfare elements of its programme following the 2008 economic crisis. However, the party still dedicates an important part of its programme to pro-market policies. Consistent with our analysis in Section 5.6.1, pro-market policies cannot be left out since small-business owners are an important component of the LN electorate. On the other hand, the recent breakthrough among production workers is accompanied by a renewed pro-welfare position and also an increase in the 'economic management' dimension. Finally, the salience of 'protectionism' has been decreasing, mostly because the LN moved from opposing international free-trade to a stronger Euroscepticism (see Chapter 2). We can, therefore, conclude that the LN is converging towards the typical RRP in terms of both political demand (the proletarianization of its electorate) and political supply (the increased salience of welfare in its programme). However, the importance of pro-market elements and small-business owners is still higher for the LN than for other RRP.

We read this information together with LN alliances and summarize the strategies and electoral scores of LN in different years in Table 68. The LN has been pursuing a strategy of both 'centre-right DSB by integration' and a 'centre-right DSB by construction', depending on the periods. It first integrated Berlusconi's centre right coalition in 1994. However, it proved to be a rather fragile alliance during the 1990s, since the LN caused the end of Berlusconi's first government in 1994. After, the LN




Figure 40 - Evolution of LN on Welfare and Economic Liberalism dimensions. Source: Author's own graph calculations on MARPOR dataset.




Figure 41 - Evolution of LN on Economic Management and Protectionism dimensions. Source: Author's own graph calculations on MARPOR dataset.

followed a 'centre-right DSB by construction' strategy. The focus was to become the hegemonic



political actor in all of Northern Italy, not only in the ‘Third Italy’, by demanding the secession of *Padania* from the rest of the country. However, the economic outlook was still rather neo-liberal, which allows us to identify LN strategy as directed mostly towards the centre-right bloc. The LN then ran in the 1996 national election without allies and caused the defeat of the centre-right coalition (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). However, the experience was short-lived and the LN experienced heavy electoral losses in the 1996–2001 period. The ‘centre-right bloc by construction’ no longer seemed a viable option; the LN turned back to an alliance with Berlusconi’s centre-right in 2001. The alliance has been in place since then. Within this context, the LN appeared to be the nativist component of Berlusconi’s coalition and took part in two centre-right governments from 2001 to 2006 and from 2008 to 2011. This represents a specific case of the ‘centre-right by integration’ strategy, since the LN, together with FdI (another, smaller, RRP) is, according to the latest polls, ahead of Berlusconi’s *Forza Italia* (FI), the moderate right-wing party.

Year	Electoral score	Alliance with centre-right?	Government/Opposition
1992	8.65%	No	Opposition
1994	8.36%	Yes	Government (but left after six months)
1996	10.07%	No	Opposition
2001	3.94%	Yes	Government
2006	4.58%	Yes	Opposition
2008	8.30%	Yes	Government until November 2011, then opposition
2013	4.09%	Yes	Opposition

*Table 68 - Electoral scores and government participation by the LN 1992-2013. Source: Archivio Storico delle elezioni, Ministero dell’Interno.*

### 5.6.3. THE SPHERE OF INSTITUTIONS

#### *Institutional settings have an ambiguous influence on RRP’s electoral score*

In their work, Amable and Palombarini (2005) seem to focus specifically on economic institutions as the ‘rule of the game’. These are long-term economic features of the country (such as the rules governing the labour market), as opposed to short-term policies such as budget measures As seen in

Section 5.3, when a DSB cannot be reached by a current set of institutions, there is a systemic crisis and a new DSB needs to be found. In such a context, the definition of new institutions becomes the main objective of political actors. Unfortunately, there is not much literature on the influence of economic institutions on RRP's strength. To our knowledge, only Vlandas and Halikiopoulou (2016) analyse the matter. Starting from data of the 2014 EP election, they conclude that 'where labour market institutions offer greater protection from the risks and costs of unemployment, the far right is less likely to fare well electorally. Where, on the other hand, these less generous institutions, the risks and costs of unemployment are greater and the far right is more likely to increase its support' (Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2016, 24).

There is also another type of institution, however, which lay down the rules of political competition, such as the form of government and the electoral law. We label these as political institutions. The literature pays attention to the importance of political institutions in the rise of RRP's, which are analysed as part of the 'political opportunity structures' (POS) of RRP's.<sup>75</sup> The POS are 'specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others' (Kitschelt 1986, 58). Still, the results are rather ambiguous (Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006) and it is unclear which type of political institutions favour RRP's. Within the sphere of institutions, we can show an ambiguous effect of labour market and electoral laws on RRP's electoral strength. We are at present unsure about the influence imposed on RRP's by either economic or political institutions.

Institutions can also be the objective. A DSB can be built around the reform of the rules of the game. RRP's do not appear to have a clear and unified position on how they wish to modify the 'rules of the

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<sup>75</sup> In the study of RRP's, POS also include the openness of other actors, which, in our schema, fall under the sphere of political mediation. We review the influence of RRP's on other parties in Chapter 3, and here we focus on the role of political institutions in the sense of the legislative framework in which political parties act.

game' either. We have already discussed the lack of a clear direction in RRP's economic programme. As for non-economic institutions, 'a number of the major Western European right-wing populist parties express clear support for greater direct democracy' (Bowler et al. 2017, 4). However, their use seems to be rather instrumental (Mudde 2007) and RR voters do not actually express much support for this kind of reforms (Bowler et al. 2017). Although present in some RRP's, this type of reforms does not appear as a core tenant of the RR social bloc. Finally, some RRP's (such as the Italian LN or the Flemish VB) support/defend federal reforms of the state. However, RR federalism seems to derive from its nativist ideology (Passarelli 2013): non-native communities (the southerners for the LN and French-speaking Belgians for the VB) are held responsible for the misuse of national funds and/or are perceived as a threat to the native identity.

*The strategic, and never fully achieved, objective of the LN: a federalist reform of the Italian state.*

Concerning LN more specifically, the economic structure of Northern Italy and the electoral law strengthen LN's importance in the development of a centre-right DSB. We have already seen that according to Bull and Gilbert (2001), the particular economic structure of part of Northern Italy was instrumental in the rise of LN at the beginning of 1990s. Indeed, the LN pledged to defend the interests of Italian Northerners by either reclaiming Northern independence (strategies pursued during the mid-1990s) or promoting a federal reform of the Italian state. In particular, the LN campaigned for devolution at the beginning of the 2000s and moved towards fiscal federalism in 2006. By devolution, we refer to the process of transferring powers from the central state to sub-national administrations, such as the regions. The LN actually obtained the support of both Italian centre-right and centre-left in reforming the constitution on such matters. In particular, two constitutional reforms were aimed at transferring powers to sub-national administrations: first, in 2001, the centre-left government and then, in 2005, the centre-right together with the LN. However, this last reform was rejected by a referendum. The LN moved to fiscal federalism, i.e. a reform allowing sub-national administrations to keep a larger share of locally collected taxes as well as more flexibility in organizing expenditures.

A new reform for strengthening fiscal federalism was approved by the Italian Parliament in 2009, when the LN was a junior partner in Berlusconi's cabinet. However, according to Ambrosiano et al. (2016, 240), 'as a consequence of the crisis, the Italian system of government clearly moved in the direction of a re-centralization of policies'. Similar to the reform in the early 2000s, the LN realized its objective only in Parliament. The reforms were halted by the loss at the Referendum and because the newly emerging economic conditions demanded recentralization of the powers of the state.

Concerning the impact of political institutions, the main aid to the LN came through the different electoral laws adopted in the last 25 years. Between 1993 and 2005, Italy had a mixed system, the so-called *Mattarellum*: 75% of MPs were elected in first-past-the-post constituencies, while 25% of MPs were elected on a proportional basis, with a 4% minimum threshold. Since the LN voters are geographically concentrated, the centre-right had a strong incentive to ally with the LN in order to maximize the number of seats won in the Northern part of the country. Following Calderoli's reform in 2005, the new electoral system allocated 55% of the seats to the nationally most voted coalition (at the *Camera dei Deputati*) or on a regional basis (at the *Senato*). It favoured the construction of large coalition, since gaining just one vote more than other coalitions would provide a large majority. Political institutions played a rather favourable role for the LN as they made its votes essential for Berlusconi's centre-right coalition. Still, the LN faced important constraints, being a Eurosceptic junior partner in a non-Eurosceptic coalition, which we address in the next section.

#### 5.6.4. THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL

##### *RRPs and Euroscepticism: source of both potentials and constraints*

The supranational level offers important political potentials to European RRP. The first and strongest potential concerns the EU. EU membership and policies are increasingly important in national political systems (Prosser 2015; Meijers and Rauh 2016) as European countries have left the so-called era of permissive consensus (i.e. the period when the European integration was widely accepted and

not contested within its member states). According to Hooghe and Marks (2009, 7), after 1991, the EU became an issue and today, ‘public opinion on European integration is rather well structured, affects national voting and is connected to the basic dimensions that structure contestation in European societies.’ As discussed in Section 5.4, Euroscepticism is an important driver of RR voting. We have also shown in Chapter 2 that most RRP oppose EU policy at the EP, albeit following different patterns of opposition. Moreover, Amable and Palombarini (2017) also point out that the FN strategy to unify the ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc also revolves around a souverainist (i.e. Eurosceptic) message.

To what extent, however, can RRP satisfy the Eurosceptic part of their social bloc? Results from Chapter 2 show that RRP with governing experience (the Italian LN, the Greek LAOS, and the Danish DF) are less Eurosceptic in their parliamentary behaviour. This should not come as a surprise. It represents the big constraints imposed by EU membership on RRP so far: when they integrate a political coalition, they need to tune down their Euroscepticism on policy matters. For RRP pursuing a DSB-by-integration strategy, Euroscepticism becomes a secondary issue in government’s action (although, in the absence of strong competitors, it can remain an element of the party’s programme when an election is approaching).

Even RRP pursuing DSB-by-construction strategies are reconsidering their Euroscepticism, moving from hard to soft forms of contesting the European integration process<sup>76</sup>. The French FN tried to pursue an ‘Anti-bourgeois DSB by construction’ strategy by insisting on Euroscepticism, which culminated in an alliance with right-wing souverainist candidate Dupont-Aignan in the second round of the 2017 Presidential election. However, following its defeat in the second round, the FN started a process of revision of its Eurosceptic position (Faye 2017). This was not the first time that a major RRP moderated its position on the EU. In 2016, Austrian presidential election FPÖ candidate Norbert

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<sup>76</sup> See Chapter 2 for the differences between forms of Euroscepticism.

Hofer publicly denied that he wanted Austria to leave the EU (Hunter 2016). Interestingly, these changes in continental RRP positions happened after the 2016 British referendum on the EU membership, where the Eurosceptic position actually won. Apparently, RRP positions seem to consider that the social bloc behind the 'Leave' victory in Britain is not reproducible outside the United Kingdom.

This change in strategy is still in process as we write and we are unable to further analyse the reasons behind it, mostly because the outcome is still uncertain (i.e. we do not know the extent to which RRP positions will actually moderate their position on the EU). Here, we propose two non-mutually-exclusive explanations: (i) there are not enough political potentials related to Euroscepticism and (ii) supranational constraints and lack of international allies make Euroscepticism a risky strategy for the post-electoral viability of a DSB.

- i. The emergence of a universalist-particularist dimension, as proposed by Kitschelt and Rehm (2015), in Western European party systems might be overestimated. At least concerning Euroscepticism (one of the issues of this dimension), data show that the two poles (pro- and anti-EU) are not equally represented in European societies. According to the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2017b), more European people have a positive opinion of the EU than those with a negative opinion, Greece being the only exception. Thus, the political potentials created by the supranational level for RRP positions might not be enough to build a DSB around this cleavage.
- ii. RRP positions are rather stigmatized at the EU level and EU leaders publicly express their dislike for RR leaders. Notably, the President of the European Commission Juncker publicly supported moderate candidate Emanuel Macron against RR Marine Le Pen at the run-off of the 2017 French presidential election. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, RRP positions are far from being a unified political family at the European level. RRP positions are delegitimized by the EU. On the one hand, this might actually increase their support among Eurosceptic voters. On the other hand, EU stigmatization might scare away moderate voters and/or mobilize opponent voters. This

process might reinforce what we discussed in point a), also depending on the differential in the turnout rates of Eurosceptic and Europhilic voters.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, it would also have consequences on the post-electoral viability of a radical-right DSB; the ongoing Brexit negotiations are a good example. Various political observers point out that the Brexit negotiations are rather difficult for the British Government (Boffey, Rankin, and O’Carroll 2017). In particular, former EU negotiator Steve Bollock (2017) highlights that the lack of trust between the EU and the British government hinders the odds of a satisfying outcome for the UK: ‘Trust is key to a successful negotiation. Both sides must know that the other is negotiating in good faith.’ Thus, even a moderate right-wing government experiences trouble in negotiating its exit from the EU and faces difficulties in finding allies. It seems legitimate to hypothesize that the EU reaction would be even harsher in the face of an RR-led government. Moreover, the lack of a real ‘RR’ network at the European level would leave a Eurosceptic RR-led government with no ally among European governments. The reasoning stands irrespective of whether an RR-led government decides to leave the EU or to ask for a strong reform of EU institutions. Thus, RRP do not seem to be able to deliver on Euroscepticism, apart from a chaotic ‘exit’, which would probably result in a period of strong instability during the years of negotiation.

Overall, our contribution to the introduction of the supranational level in the model allows us to identify the potentials offered by this supranational level to RRP (as a reaction to the European integration process and Globalization). We argued that while this new cleavage offered RRP the opportunity to enlarge their electoral basis, political potentials offered by the supranational level, in particular the rise of Euroscepticism might not be enough to guarantee an electoral victory around

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<sup>77</sup> In the case of the ‘Brexit’ referendum, for example, the lower-than-expected turnout rate of Europhilic voters is among the factors that eventually led to a ‘Leave’ victory (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017)

this topic alone. Moreover, the supranational level also acts as a constraint to the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’ strategy (Figure 42); even in case of an electoral victory on such a platform, it seems unlikely that RRP’s will actually be able to deliver on a Eurosceptic platform, apart from a ‘chaotic’ exit. Finally, strategies built around the construction/integration of a centre-right bloc, by definition, require RRP’s to accept a compromise on their Euroscepticism, as they include social strata that support the European integration process.

### *The inconsistent Euroscepticism of the LN*

The LN offers an interesting example indeed. It has been a stable member of three different centre-right governments. Still, according to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013, 27), ‘the substance of Italy’s European policy was not substantially altered by the Northern League’s participation in government’. In fact, despite being classified as a ‘hard Eurosceptic’ party by Hobolt and de Vries (2016), the LN voted in favour of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. During the vote declaration, Roberto Cota, at the time Parliamentary leader of the LN, declared that the EU ‘touched its lowest level’ with the treaty, which was judged as a ‘deception’. Gianpaolo Dozzo, another MP from the LN, even declared that ‘the European Treaties, even this one [the Lisbon Treaty] on which we are going to vote, are illegible’, denouncing the distance between the ‘normal’ people and the EU. However, according to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013), the LN was forced to vote for the Lisbon Treaty (even though the support from LN’s MPs was not necessary for it to pass) because of coalition agreements with other centre-right forces.

The LN then opposed the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (also called ‘Fiscal Compact’) in 2012, when it was an opposition force. Still, the Fiscal Compact, in order to be ratified, required countries to adopt certain major reforms, such as the adoption of compulsory balanced budget limits. The Italian centre-right government at that time decided to add those limits to the Constitution with the approval of the LN






Figure 42 - Interactions between an 'Anti-bourgeois bloc by construction' strategy and the Supranational level. Source: author's own diagram.

during the first reading. However, the approval process ended in 2012, when Berlusconi's government was replaced by Monti's government, with the LN in the opposition. After supporting the reform during the first reading, the LN voted against the reform at the second reading. Thus, the Italian LN seems to have been quite clearly inconsistent in its Euroscepticism, at least until 2012.

The supranational level also plays a role in terms of international trade and migration. As we have highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, RRP are against immigration and most RRP support protectionism. One of the consequences of globalization is the progressive politicization of those issues (Kriesi et al. 2008) that generates political potentials for RRP to exploit. Still, the globalization process also constrains the actions of RRP, at least concerning international trade. Our results from Chapter 4 are rather clear: we did not find any significant impact of RRP on trade in Western Europe, which is also consistent with the limited number of instruments possessed by a European country in terms of international trade (Common Commercial Policy being exclusive competence of the EU (Meunier 2005)). In the case of the LN, this appears particularly evident in its failure to obtain protection for Italian products against Chinese concurrence (Verbeek and Zaslove 2014). Concerning migration, however, RRP face fewer restrictions (apart from intra-European mobility). The LN was able to obtain important reforms during its government participation, such as the 'Bossi-Fini' law on immigration in 2002 or the bilateral agreement with Libya in 2008, concerning the patrolling of the Sicily Channel (Verbeek and Zaslove 2014).

Thus, the LN seemingly confirms the general reading developed for Western European RRP. The relation between RRP and the supranational level is twofold. On the one hand, RRP are able to gain support as international issues become politicized (EU, international trade, and migration). At the same time, they seem to have been limited so far in their ability to satisfy their electorate on these matters. As long as the RRP's strategy to build a DSB is to integrate the centre-right bloc, as was the case for the LN in office, RRP will hardly be able to deliver on Euroscepticism or international trade: they will most probably turn to nativist policies.

### 5.6.5. THE SOCIAL POWER OF THE RADICAL RIGHT SOCIAL BLOC

*The strength of RRP among the 'modernization losers' originates from their weakness...*

In order to understand the viability of a DSB built around (or integrating) an RRP, we need to discuss the actual power of this social bloc. In Section 5.5.3, we identified four factors to assess social power: resources, structural power, electoral weight, and associational power. In this Section, we assess the social power for the Western European RRP's social bloc as it stands and how the development of RRP's affect the social power of the 'anti-bourgeois bloc'. As discussed in the previous sections, this strategy seems to be the one adopted by most RRP's now, as shown by the fact that Western European RRP's converge towards a welfare chauvinist position (see Chapter 2). The proper assessment of a bloc's social power would require on our part the development of specific indices to operationalize our concepts. However, as we argue in Section 5.5, such a task would fall way beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, we wanted to provide the reader with a preliminary assessment on this research. In this section, we briefly outline what political and sociological literature tells us concerning the 'modernization losers', without developing our analysis further.

As shown in Section 5.4, RR social bloc is often referred to as the 'modernization losers'. Indeed, the share of farmers and production workers has been experiencing a sheer decline in developed countries as their economies move from industry to services or to other countries (outsourcing). As argued by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 11):

'In all economically advanced nations, the tendency is for the proportion of the work-force in professional, administrative, and managerial occupations to rise, while the proportion in occupations at the lowest skill levels, both manual and non-manual, either remains stable or falls.'

The decline in numbers goes together with the weakening of class organization. An assessment of the associational power of a social bloc, within our framework, should be double. On the one hand, we are interested in the level of organization of the social categories composing the bloc *per se*. On the

other hand, we also need to look at the strategy a political actor puts in place to organize its social bloc. Concerning the first point, RR social bloc appears to be weak. As pointed out by Biezen and Poguntke (2014, 6): ‘in all but five countries, trade union density at the end of the first decade of the new millennium was lower than it had been in 1970 (or a decade later in the case of Spain and Portugal)’ and across OECD countries, the overall trade union density declined from 45% in 1980s to 30% in the 2000s (Hassel 2014). The associational power of this bloc seems, therefore, to be declining. Moreover, various studies identify a trade-off between individual support for RRP and Trade Union membership (Oesch 2008), although the matter is up for debate and recently Bornschier and Kriesi (2013) found that RRP might have been able to intercept voters from unionized workers as well. Still, RRP have little to no influence on trade unions. A few RRP have tried to set up their own trade unions, notably the FN. Andolfatto and Choffat (2015, 95) analyse the strategies of the FN on the matter and conclude: ‘the establishment of trade unions would be far from a priority of FN leadership as it remains mostly against trade-unions in reality’. It seems that a low associational power enhances RR penetration among manual workers. This should not come as a surprise: trade union membership is a powerful source of class identity. If we accept that class identity weakens cultural identity, then it follows that the development of trade unions is a strong disincentive to the development of nativist parties.

The situation is rather similar concerning structural power. According to Webster (2015, 2), labour structural power (with no distinction of branch nor skill) ‘has been weakened by neo-liberal globalization’. Pliven (2008), however, argues that the integration of workers in a global chain of production gives them new power to stop production at the global level. However, the lack of transnational unity definitely weakens the structural power of the labour (Brookes 2013) and the nativist ideology of RRP does not seem to favour the construction of transnational class-based alliances. Similar to associational power, as of now, we consider that structural power is declining for the bulk of RR social bloc.

Types of social Power	Level for RR social bloc in Western Europe
Associational power	Low: RRP's stronger among non-unionized workers
Electoral power	Rising: Country-dependent
Resources	Low: Possibly higher, but RRP's do not appear to mobilize the resources of their social bloc
Structural power	Declining: Harder to exploit the position in the global production process if there are no international networks.

*Table 69 - Types of social power and RR social bloc in Western Europe: a preliminary assessment. Source: original compilation.*

A social bloc can still provide resources to its political movement in terms of money or activists. As for the associational power we should split our analysis in two: (i) the resources a social bloc has at disposal and (ii) the success of a political actor in mobilising these resources. Concerning their financial resources, we do not expect ‘modernization losers’ to be particularly wealthy. However, there is strength in number. What is interesting is whether the RR social bloc actually provided financial resources to its parties. We have no information about donations to RRP's and cannot therefore judge the financial aid they receive from their electorate. Indeed, in his analysis on the relationship between RRP's and the Russian government, Klapsis (2015) points to a general lack of resources of RRP's.<sup>78</sup> Recently, a RR movement, the ‘Identitarian Movement’, launched a fundraising at the European level to support the so-called ‘Defend Europe’ operation, whose aim was to obstruct NGO vessels from rescuing migrants fleeing North Africa. According to their own website, they managed to crowdfund more than \$100,000, a remarkable sum. The combination of external aid and crowdfunding might, in the future, help RRP's financial situation. However, as it stands, we conclude that the RR social bloc still appears to be low, or at least not mobilized, in terms of financial resources.

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<sup>78</sup> Therefore, alongside possible ideological affinities, the need for funding would explain the Russophile stance of many Western European RRP's.

Concerning resources in terms of political membership, however, this has been steadily declining in West European countries and RRP do not appear to be any exception (Kitschelt 2004; Mair and Smith 2013). Thus, we can assume that resources are at an apparently low level, as RRP seem unable to transform electoral support in something more.

The final matter to be addressed is the electoral power. It has been widely discussed in this Thesis that the RR social bloc appears to become larger both in absolute and relative terms (see Section 5.4). However, the electoral power of the RR social bloc seems to us to be the most country-dependent type of social power. Further research should this consider it by means of *ad-hoc* case studies. In particular, depending on the electoral system, a particular geographical distribution could make the RR social bloc a necessary component of a viable centre-right DSB, thus increasing the bloc's electoral power.

Table 69 summarizes our argument. Overall, we can draw a preliminary conclusion: RRP's social bloc, alone, is socially rather weak. As we argue in Section 5.4, RRP aggregate the 'losers' of modernization on a nativist platform against foreigners and non-native people. This has two main consequences in terms of social power. First, there appears to be a trade-off between organizational power and the electoral development of RRP in the 'anti-bourgeois bloc': the development of class-based organizations counter the diffusion of RR nativism within the working class. Second, although more studies are needed, the RR social bloc might be losing its structural power as well, either because production is easier to delocalize or because structural power in the global chains of production requires transnational cooperation to be exploited. Given the lack of resources in terms of activists and funding, the native fraction of the working class and its allies in an RR social bloc (small-business owners and farmers, possibly extended to service workers) appears to be socially weak at a preliminary reading.

To a certain extent, this seems to be true even in the case of an 'anti-bourgeois bloc' united by RRP. First, the same considerations apply considering the associational power previously developed.

Second, a nativist ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc cannot include large parts of its own bloc; on the contrary, it identifies part of its own bloc as an enemy. Indeed, migrants and successive generations can also be found in the same occupations as native workers. The debate on the actual competition between native and foreign workers is long and complex (see Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2013) for a complete review). Here, we do not argue about the existence of such a competition. Simply put, some service and industrial workers will also be migrants or of foreign origins; a part of the possible components of the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc’, in terms of position within the economic structure, is thus excluded. An ‘anti-bourgeois bloc’ united by RRP’s would probably be characterized by a low level of social power. It follows that an ‘anti-bourgeois bloc’ united by RRP’s would not be a viable DSB.

*... but the LN illustrations reminds us that, in different national contexts, a RR social bloc can still be socially strong*

To what extent can our previous assessment of RR social bloc’s power be applied to the LN? As discussed in Section 5.6.1, the social bloc supporting the LN is not the exactly same as other RRP’s. In particular: (i) LN electoral score is strongly related to a certain type of industrial environment, the so-called Third Italy and relative industrial district, (ii) the LN fares better among small-business owners than other contemporary RRP’s, and (iii) the LN is geographically concentrated in the Northern part of the country (whereas most RRP’s, despite having a certain geographic dispersion, are national parties). Indeed, as discussed in Section 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, the LN under Salvini has been modifying its strategy: (i) the party now appears to be stronger than before among industrial workers and (ii) the LN is trying to attract voters beyond the limits of Northern Italy, in particular after the creation of a parallel movement called ‘*Noi con Salvini*’ (Us with Salvini - NS). However, as it stands, it would seem that the results of this strategy are yet to be seen and, at recent local election, NS obtained poor results in Central and Southern Italy (Borghese 2017). Thus, we decided to focus on

the historical core of the LN social bloc: the middle-class (small-business owners in particular) and SMEs' workers in the Northern Italian industrial district.<sup>79</sup>

In particular, according to Iuzzolino and Micucci (2011, 84) the industrial district is declining and we can assist to 'a progressive stop of the expansion of the district phenomenon in our country [Italy], already in the 90s and a slight decline in the early 2000s' and to a loosening of its relationship with the local community (Ricciardi 2013). Still, the decline appears to proceed at a slow pace. According to Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT 2015), industrial districts in 2011 still absorbed 66% of manufacturing employment and over one-third of the Italian employment as a whole. Moreover, according to Foresti (2016) Italian industrial districts are adapting to the international competition. In particular, it would appear that the best performing actors within industrial districts are medium rather than small enterprises. Consequently, it appears that industrial districts are changing: the average number employees is growing, as small enterprises aggregate.

The previous discussion highlighted the economic relevance of the social bloc supporting the LN. The analysis, as it stands, is still ambiguous: the Italian district is facing a slow decline and is going through major changes. However, within the Italian economic system, it still seems to have a strong structural power as it characterizes the Italian manufacturing sector. This appears as a major difference from other RRP: the social bloc that we identified in Section 5.4 as similar to most RRP, the union between nativist workers and other 'modernization losers', appears weak in most European countries. A compromise excluding RR social bloc could probably be found, if it was not for its electoral weight. In Italy, the same scenario seems unlikely: even at times of electoral weakness (e.g. after 2001 election, where the LN obtained only 4% of the popular vote) the LN was able to obtain important

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<sup>79</sup> As a reminder, the Italian industrial district is a particular form of industrial configuration. The fundamental characters of these systems are the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises, the marked specialization in the traditional productions of 'Made in Italy', the close relationship with local culture, and the presence of informal institutions in the local community (Bagnasco 1977, 1982).




political results for its own bloc (e.g. the federalist constitutional reforms discussed in Section 5.6.3, or the Bossi-Fini law which harshly regulated migration policy). As long as the LN remains one of the main political representatives of this bloc, at least part of its demands will probably be taken into account, even when its electoral weight decreases.

In order to assess the associational power of LN social bloc we look at: (i) the level of organization of the social categories supporting the LN and (ii) the strategy of the LN to organize its social bloc. Considering the organization of the social bloc per se, business owners associations have experienced a sharp decline in their memberships as well as in their influence (Salta 2014). Even if we extended our definition of ‘associational power’ to the local networks that characterize an industrial district, the assessment would be similar, as Italian small enterprises are now less embedded in their territory than before (Ricciardi 2013). Concerning industrial workers, the industrial district, in particular in the Italia North-East, has always been characterized by a low rate of unionisation (Bison 2013), and we might apply a similar reasoning to the one developed in the previous Section.

Concerning LN strategy to organize its social bloc, the party created two main organizations at beginning of 1990s: a trade union, the *Sindacato Padano* (Sin.Pa), and an organization for employers, the *Associazione Liberi Imprenditori Autonomisti* (ALIA). The ALIA lasted only until the mid-1990s, as its leader of the time decided to leave the LN and join a smaller Venetian pro-independence movement (Biorcio 2010). The Sin.Pa., instead, still exists. However, as Keating (2014, 325) underlines: ‘in spite of efforts by the Lega to form its own trade union, workers in northern Italy, while often voting for the Lega and its populist and anti-immigrant message, trust the Italian unions to defend their interests at the workplace’. Finally, in 2016, also the Sin.Pa. officialized its ‘divorce’. We can therefore conclude that, in both cases, LN strategy to organize its own social bloc failed.

In terms of financial resources, the LN social bloc appears to be wealthier than those of other parties. Indeed, the LN obtains its best results in the richest regions of Italy. Indeed, the LN managed to elect the governors of Lombardy and Venetia: respectively the first and third Italian region by GDP. The



*Figure 43 – Geographical distribution of LN electoral score in 2013 legislative election. Source: YouTrend (2013).*

two regions combined represent more than 30% of the Italian GDP (European Commission 2017a). Can the LN mobilize these resources? The party recently experienced some financial troubles (Turco 2017), which indicate, as for other RRP, a certain difficulty for the LN to capitalize on the economic conditions of its electorate. Concerning party membership, the assessment appears to be similar. Data on membership are, unfortunately, unavailable since 2013 (Bellotto 2017). In 2013 the party registered its lowest level in terms of members since 2002, however, compared to other Italian parties the LN membership has experienced a slower decline (Passarelli 2012).<sup>80</sup> Thus, in terms of resources, LN social bloc appears potentially stronger than other RRP and other Italian parties, although it faces difficulties similar to other RPPs in mobilizing them.

Considering the electoral power of LN social bloc, we need to stress once more that the core of LN electorate is not ‘nationally’ distributed (see Figure 43). This had a major impact in mid-1990s, as the LN decided to separate from Berlusconi’s centre-right: thanks to the Mattarellum, the LN was a kingmaker in most ‘Northern’ first-past-the-post constituencies. Similarly, the LN appears to be a

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<sup>80</sup> It is interesting to point out that, similarly to its electorate, LN members are especially drawn from employers and self-employers, which represent 37% of the LN membership (De Luca et al. 2014).

Types of social Power	Level for LN social bloc
Associational power	Low and declining: social categories are less organized and LN organizations all failed to organize the social bloc.
Electoral power	High: even at its lowest electoral success, the geographical concentration of LN social bloc makes it important to win the richest regions of the country.
Resources	Ambiguous: possibly high, but LN do not appear to mobilize the resources of their social bloc
Structural power	Declining, but still high: the industrial district is going through slow decline, but still represents the vast majority of the Italian manufacturing sector.

*Table 70 - Types of social power and LN social bloc: a preliminary assessment. Source: original compilation.*

major player in local elections in Northern Italy. Therefore, even if, electorally, the LN scored, on average, less than some of the RRP's discussed in this Thesis<sup>81</sup>, its geographical distribution increases the electoral power of LN social bloc. Indeed, on this point as well, we need to register that things might change in the near future. First, Salvini's strategy is to expand to the rest of Italy, becoming a national party. We still need to see if he is going to succeed and if he is going to keep its electoral core in Northern Italy as well. Second, as we write the Italian Parliament is discussing a new electoral law. The so-called Rosatellum reintroduces first-past-the-post constituencies, which would strengthen the electoral power of LN social bloc.

In our discussion, we presented a preliminary assessment of the LN 'social power'. Table 70 summarizes our argument. Despite sharing a similar ideology to other RRP's (see Chapter 1), the LN managed to aggregate a social bloc which appears much more powerful than the one analysed in the previous Section. In particular, the importance of the industrial district in Italy, despite its decline, increases the social power of the social categories composing the bulk of LN electorate. This illustration allowed us to stress the importance of developing a comparative case-study analysis: in most of this Thesis we underlined the fact that there is a converging trend between Western European

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81 E.g., the FN average electoral score at Presidential elections in the 1990-2017 period is 16%, DF average electoral score at legislative elections in the same period is 13.3%, the LN average electoral score at legislative elections instead is only 6.8%.

RRPs in terms of political supply (Chapter 2), electorate (Section 5.4), and, therefore, impact (Chapter 4). However, this convergence is far from being achieved: as this brief discussion the LN shows, minor differences (i.e. the LN being geographically concentrated, stronger than other RRP among small-business owners) might become major features if we move the focus to the national level.

#### 5.6.6. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION

As we argued at the beginning of this chapter, in order to understand the economic impact of RRP, we need to identify (i) the different strategies used by RRP in achieving a DSB and (ii) the conditions for these strategies to succeed. In this Section, we offered elements to understand these three points within our amended framework. In particular, we presented two illustrations: (i) a discussion on RRP in Western Europe, highlighting differences and commonalities and (ii) the case of the Italian LN. From the discussion of RRP in Western Europe, we identified five different strategies and argued that only three of them appear to be in play: the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’, ‘centre-right bloc by construction’, and ‘centre-right bloc by integration’. We argued, however, that the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’ strategy does not appear to be a viable option. First, Euroscepticism does not appear to be enough widespread to boost an electoral victory of RRP alone. Second, the constraints imposed by the supranational level and the weakness of RRP (and RR social bloc) at the supranational level make the pursuit of such a strategy extremely risky for RRP. Third, we argue that the conditions for an RR anti-bourgeois bloc are (i) the division of this bloc and (ii) its weakness (at least in terms of organization). RRP might be able to electorally unite the nativist part of the ‘modernization losers’; however, such a bloc does not appear to be able to become socially ‘dominant’. RRP are left with two possible strategies, both of which require enlargement towards the right-wing of the bourgeois bloc. In order to do so, RRP might need to tune down their Euroscepticism and focus on nativism.

A large part of this reading is confirmed by our illustration of the case of the LN. The LN is an interesting case as it has applied different strategies in these 20 years and actually participated in coalition governments. We highlighted that the LN is going through a process of renovation, as it is now stronger than before among industrial workers. The LN was not able to satisfy the Eurosceptic part of its electorate, while the party actually obtained something concerning its own nativism, in terms of either (failed) federalist reform (anti-Southerner nativism) or stricter controls on migration (anti-foreigner nativism). Indeed, in the absence of other political forces that could intercept these Eurosceptic voters, the LN could remain the main political referent of these social categories. However, the rise of another Eurosceptic force, the populist M5S, also signifies that the LN faces a competitor in its core electorate, which was undisputed until 2013.

In Section 5.6, we provided insights into how our framework could be used to extensively analyse the development of RRP and their impact on (economic) policymaking. It offered a preliminary application, as we wish to open the debate, and draws roadmaps for further research.

## 5.7. CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, we aimed to open the black box of RRP's impact on the economy. In other words, we tried to identify the mechanisms and explain how RRP might influence the economy. Indeed, our results in Chapter 4 point to a 'nativist' impact of RRP; however, neo-classical explanations seem limited in their understanding of the process.

In Section 5.2, we argued that RRP might favour the diffusion of racial prejudice within the population or could act as a proxy (i.e. the more widespread is racial prejudice, the stronger are RRP). The spread of racial prejudice might have economic consequences. Indeed, different streams of literature underline the possible effects of racial prejudice on the labour market and the size of welfare state. While this mechanism can definitely play a role in our analysis, we argue that this is only a partial explanation. In particular, we agree with Palombarini (2001) that a proper assessment of the

relationship between politics and the economy needs to respect both the ‘specificity’ and the ‘autonomy’ of politics.

In Section 5.3, we turned to the neo-realist approach developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005). In particular, we identified what we labelled the ‘DSB framework’ as the proper model to understand the mechanism behind RRP’s impact. According to Amable and Palombarini (2005), economic policy is the product of the political regulation of social conflict. Political forces (mainly, but not exclusively, parties) play an active role in the definition of economic policy as they decide which social categories should see their interests realized. The alliance of different social categories behind a common political force constitutes a social bloc. When a social bloc is strong enough to politically validate its interests, then the system is stable and we may speak of a ‘dominant social bloc’ (DSB). Following Amable and Palombarini (2005), we argued that in order to understand RRP’s impact on the economy, we need to identify (i) the strategies that RRP have at their disposal to unify a DSB and (ii) the conditions for their success. Similar to Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini’s (2012a) work, the starting point for an assessment of partisan strategies should be the identification of the social bloc supporting RRP in terms of both political demands and class composition. Amable and Palombarini (2017) offer some insights for the French FN, this party being supported by the nativist and right-wing part of what they call the ‘anti-bourgeois’ bloc. However, recent literature underlines important similarities among Western European RRP in terms of class composition and political demands (Rydgren 2013).

In Section 5.4, we discussed the class composition of RRP electorate in Western Europe. We did so in two ways: (i) by reviewing the existing literature on the RR electorate and (ii) by proposing an original empirical analysis. In particular, we relied on data from the seventh round of the ESS (2014) in order to identify the class composition and expectations of RR social bloc. Our findings, in line with previous literature (Oesch 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2017; Rydgren 2013), indicate that RRP appeal to production and service workers in particular. In terms of political demands, the RR

electorate expresses strong anti-immigration attitudes and is Eurosceptic, although there is no clear position on economic policy. We derived thus that the social bloc behind Western European RRP is a heterogeneous alliance, centred on the so-called ‘modernization losers’ and unified by nativism and Euroscepticism.

In order to assess the possible strategies for RRP to enlarge this social bloc, we proposed two ‘amendments’ to the DSB framework. In Section 5.5, we argue that the process of formation of a DSB within the political system is also influenced by the balance of forces at two other levels: (i) the supranational level and (ii) the social structure. In particular, the supranational system can influence the process of definition of a DSB by generating either (i) constraints or (ii) political opportunities, which depend on the form of insertion into the international regime of the states. Social structure is also important, since the validation of a DSB is not merely ‘electoral’. We proposed to integrate the DSB framework by assessing what we called the social power of a DSB. Social power is constituted by the ‘resources’ that social categories can provide to political actors (e.g. financial resources), the ‘associational power’ of a social category (i.e. its degree of organization), its ‘structural power’ (i.e. the power it derives from its position in the social structure), and its electoral power (e.g. the number of voters belonging to a certain category). According to our amended framework, RRP’s strategies should thus be assessed not only on their ability to secure an electoral victory, but also taking into account these other factors.

Having established the theoretical basis to assess RRP’s impact, Section 5.6 provided a preliminary application based on a discussion of different elements that emerge in this thesis. In particular, we provided an illustration of our model at two levels: (i) discussing the similarities between RRP in Western Europe and (ii) focusing on the particular case of the Italian LN. In our discussion, we identified five different strategies available to RRP in order to build a DSB. As of now, at least in Western Europe, only three strategies appear to be in play: the ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’, ‘centre-right bloc by construction’, and ‘centre-right bloc by integration’. However, the combined

illustration of the Italian case study and the general discussion highlights the limitations of these strategies.

The ‘anti-bourgeois bloc by construction’ does not appear to be viable to form a DSB because of the weakness of the RR social bloc, which by itself does not seem capable of becoming hegemonic. Indeed, none of the possible sources of social power is high with the only exception being its potential electoral power, at least in certain countries. However, as argued in Section 5.5, an electoral victory alone does not guarantee the viability of a DSB. Thus, in order for the DSB-by-construction strategy to succeed, RRP’s need to expand their own social bloc. For that, the most obvious path seems to be the unification of the anti-bourgeois bloc on a nativist and Eurosceptic platform. Indeed, there is a process of re-alignment of the Western European political systems, caused by globalization, which generates new cleavages and thus new political opportunities. RRP’s success seems to be related to such a realignment; we can conclude that globalization has generated important political opportunities for RRP’s. Still, our framework underlines that even this solution would actually not be enough: an anti-bourgeois bloc unified behind a nativist political actor would still express low structural and associational power. Indeed, the literature discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.6.5 highlighted that both the self-perceived decline in their conditions and the state of not being a member of a trade union are important predictors of working class support for RRP’s (although the latter appears more debated). In other words, RRP’s are strong among the anti-bourgeois because and as long as the anti-bourgeois bloc remains weak. Moreover, international constraints might increase the costs of this strategy. In particular, we identify two possible international constraints to the viability of a DSB-by-construction strategy, which focuses on hard Euroscepticism. First, political potentials created by the reaction to the EU and the process of globalisation might not be enough to win an election. Second, RRP’s are stigmatized and isolated (even from other RRP’s) at the European level. Therefore, an RR-led government would probably face a strong opposition from both European institutions and other European countries. The lack of allies would not facilitate the task of negotiated exit from the EU or



a 'souverainist' reform of the EU. We then consider an RR DSB based on the anti-bourgeois bloc' as a highly unstable outcome, which would soon re-collapse into a systemic crisis.

The 'centre-right bloc by integration' and the 'centre-right bloc by construction' strategies require RRP to renounce to their Euroscepticism, as discussed in Section 5.6.4. Thus, the more 'anti-bourgeois' part of RR social bloc would eventually leave. In order to keep as many voters within its own rank, RRP would then have to insist on nativist policies. Our results in Chapter 4 can also be interpreted with the previous reasoning: unable to deliver on other components of the political demands expressed by their social bloc, cabinets including RRP focus on migration policy and nativist policy in the labour market. On the one hand, they cannot deliver on most economic policies since their social bloc expresses incoherent demands in terms of state intervention, redistribution, and tax level (see Section 5.4). On the other hand, supranational constraints on non-RR parties make it extremely costly for moderate right-wing parties to accept a hard Eurosceptic solution. This seems particularly true in the case of the LN, which was not able to meet its commitments in terms of Euroscepticism because of coalition agreements and international constraints. We expect RRP integrating governing coalitions to try to satisfy their social bloc by favouring the position on the labour market of native workers. The lack of data does not allow us to verify this trend for redistribution policy as well; however, we consider the development of welfare-chauvinist policy (i.e. redistribution policies based on direct or indirect forms of national preference, so as to exclude the non-native part of the population) very likely.

Summarizing, the current chapter identified two channels of RRP's impact on the economy: (i) an indirect channel through the diffusion of racial prejudice and (ii) a direct channel as RRP's strategies influence the process of definition of a DSB. However, this original contribution still has some limitations which also open new research perspectives. First, our analysis focused on RRP, but in order to develop a complete political economy of RRP, we would need to include other political actors into the framework: as acknowledged by Amable and Palombarini (2017), centre-right parties

have the possibility to pursue a ‘centre-right bloc by radicalization’ strategy; they can integrate nativist elements in their programmes to attract RR voters. Consequently, further studies on the radicalization of moderate right-wing parties would be required. Second, in our analysis, we presented an illustration of our amended framework applied to the case of the Italian LN. However, as stated in Section 5.6, this remains a preliminary work to assess RRP’s impact on the economy: the development of different country case studies in a comparative perspective appear fundamental to validate extensively our approach. Third, while we lay down the theoretical basis of our amendments, the concepts developed in this chapter still need to receive proper operationalization. In particular, as we argue in Section 5.6, the development of specific indices to assess the social power of a social bloc goes beyond the scope of this thesis. In future research, the identification of specific measurements would vastly enhance the possibility of this framework.

# CONCLUSIONS

This research aimed to shed a light on the economic impact of RRPs in Europe. The consequences of the rise of RRPs represent a new stream of research in sociology and political science, often referred to as ‘the fourth wave’ of research on these parties (Mudde 2016a). Early studies on the impact of RRPs have focused on immigration policy (M. H. Williams 2006; Carvalho 2013), and only recently, a few authors have started questioning the consequences of RRPs on economic systems (Afonso 2014; Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). The increasing interest of scholars in the consequences of RRPs follows the rise of their electoral scores after the economic crisis (see Introduction and Chapter 4). As of now, RRPs have spread in Western Europe and represent the main right-wing political force in different countries, such as Italy, France, and Switzerland, while the main right-wing parties in some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Hungary, have undergone a process of radicalization that would fall under the RR party family. Therefore, our research question appears to be justified considering both current political events and the development of academic research. This conclusion summarizes the main contributions and results obtained within each chapter of research; it also highlights the research limits and perspectives.

## MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

### PART I


In Chapter 1, we presented the debate on the definition of RRPs. We identified ‘nativism’ as the common denominator to identify RRPs, where nativism is ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde (2007, 19). Beyond this core ideology, we clarified the importance of other features such as populism and authoritarianism. However, we argued that these features are not necessarily common to all RRPs.

In particular, populism represents only a subgroup of the RR party family, namely the ‘populist’ RR, which regroups the most successful RRP today (but not necessarily before the 1990s) (Zaslave 2009). Our theoretical definition allowed us to identify RRP in both Western and Eastern Europe and proposes an up-to-date list of RRP based on a large body of literature.

Our literature review also showed that economic matters are often considered as secondary issues for RRP. It appears, however, that these matters are gaining in importance in the political debate, especially since the 2008 crisis (Figure 44). However, RRP’s positions seem to be very different among those parties, even though our findings point towards the existence of a converging trend.

Chapter 2 aimed to measure and understand this heterogeneity of positions on economic issues among RRP. We have done so by looking at their political programmes (manifestos) over the 1990–2015 period and their voting records during the 7th term of the EP between 2009 and 2014. Our results confirm RRP’s heterogeneity on economic policies. An original contribution of this work is the description of this diversity on economic matters and the typologies we have derived. We have developed our taxonomy by relying on different statistical methods: PCA and Ward’s clustering criterion have been used to analyse both party manifestos and roll-call votes at the EP as well as NOMINATE on the latter set of data.

Concerning party manifestos, we have identified four clusters of RRP, depending on the salience of economic matters in their programmes and the included proposals. We have distinguished between blurring-by-multiplicity, blurring-by-muting, pro-welfare, and neo-liberal RRP. We have also highlighted an increase in the degree of unity for Western European RRP as most of them now focus on a welfare chauvinist proposal. At the same time, Western European RRP have decreased the



*Figure 44 - Average economic salience by party family 1990–2014.*

salience given to economic liberalism, although our results indicate that they have not completely abandoned it (Figure 46). In Eastern Europe, the process is slightly different. Eastern European RRP initially did not pay much attention to economic policies in general and progressively adopted a ‘blurring-by-multiplying’ strategy, as they now include a large share of both pro-market and pro-welfare stances in their programmes. As such, there seems to be a process of convergence between Eastern and Western RRP.

When we look at parliamentary behaviours (voting records) instead of political discourses (manifestos), our analysis confirms again that RRP are far from being a unified family on economic matters, and it highlights that RRP adopt different strategies on other topics as well. We identified two dimensions that describe the main voting differences between parties at the EP: the degree of Euroscepticism and their position on welfare and international free trade. We derived four clusters of RRP with respect to their behaviours on economic issues: ‘compromising’, ‘conditional pro-market’, ‘conditional pro-welfare’, and ‘rejecting’ RRP. Our results provided empirical evidence to Vasilopoulou’s (2009, 2011) theorization of different patterns of opposition to the EU among the RR.




Figure 46 - The evolution of RRP's economic proposals on 'welfare' (Axis 1) and 'economic liberalism' (Axis 2) components.




Figure 45 - Position of four clusters identified by Ward's method on the economic policy space.

We also highlighted a trend towards more unity as far as ‘compromising’ RRP are not re-elected, and the ENF group now reunites different ‘pro-welfare’ parties that were previously divided between the EFD and the NI. Moreover, pro-welfare RRP have also made substantial gains in terms of electoral scores in 2014 European elections, which may lead other RRP to follow the same path.

Finally, we concluded by underlining the commonalities between our findings on party manifestos and RCVs. First, in both cases, RRP emerge as a divided family on economic matters despite the increasing salience of economic issues in their respective manifestos. Second, ‘welfare’ is becoming more important for RRP: Pro-welfare stances are now common in RRP manifestos and pro-welfare parties have formed a single group at the EP. Third, RRP have not really abandoned market liberalism: references are still present in party manifestos and some parties at the EP support the construction of a freer international market.

## PART II

Findings in Chapter 2 provided further justifications to our study: since RRP have been increasing their focus on economic programmes, an analysis of their impact on economic matters appears particularly relevant. Still, our findings also showed that RRP do not share a common view on economic topics. As such, we argued that in order to assess RR impact on economic policy and performance, we need to derive our hypotheses from RR ideology. Having clarified RR heterogeneity on economic policy, in Part II we presented the models through which mainstream economics analyses the political determinant of the economy.

In Chapter 3, we reviewed the neo-classical models and identified two main models. The first type comprises opportunistic models, which consider politicians as office-seeker agents. These models focus on the election period and the related opportunistic behaviours by incumbent forces that wish to maximize their chances of re-election. The second type comprises partisan models, which consider politicians as policy-seeker agents. These models focus on the ideological differences between

political actors beyond the election year. We discussed the vision of politics behind these approaches and underlined their limits. Given their importance in modern economics, we decided to use them as our starting point and derived four hypotheses (Table 71) that have been tested in Chapter 4.

	<b>RRPs' political strength (STR)</b>	<b>RRPS are part of the government (GOV)</b>
<b>Opportunistic models hypothesis (OH)</b>	OH-STR <i>In countries characterized by strong RRP, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i>	OH-GOV <i>When RRP are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i>
<b>Partisan models hypothesis (PH)</b>	PH-STR <i>In countries characterized by strong RRP, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.</i>	PH - GOV <i>Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRP are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profiles.</i>

Table 49).

	<b>RRPs' political strength (STR)</b>	<b>RRPS are part of the government (GOV)</b>
<b>Opportunistic models hypothesis (OH)</b>	OH-STR <i>In countries characterized by strong RRP, we can expect in an election year larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i>	OH-GOV <i>When RRP are incumbents, we might expect in an election year an increase in government spending and/or in nation public deficit due to their populist appeal, expenditure on nativist/authoritarian policies, and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles.</i>
<b>Partisan models hypothesis (PH)</b>	PH-STR <i>In countries characterized by strong RRP, we might expect larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with their ideological profiles even when these parties do not have direct power.</i>	PH - GOV <i>Ruling coalitions that include or rely on RRP are characterized by larger shares of government spending dedicated to nativist/authoritarian/populist policies and economic outcomes in line with RRP's ideological profiles.</i>

**Table 71 - Summary of hypotheses.**

In Chapter 4, we have identified the main economic variables related to the three main features of contemporary RR ideology (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) and then proceeded to test our hypotheses by the means of a dynamic panel analysis conducted with the Arellano–Bond (1991) estimator. The tests of our hypothesis provided the evidence (Table 72) of a ‘nativist’ impact on the economy, while neither populist nor authoritarian economic variables seem to be affected by the presence of RRP. In particular, in Western European countries led by governments supported by coalitions that include RRP, we have observed a statistically significant increase in the rate of unemployment of foreign citizens. Moreover, we have observed an increase in the difference between the rate of unemployment of native and foreign workers. The relationship is less clear when we consider only the electoral strength of RRP, as it depends on the specifications used. Furthermore, our results have shown that RRP have different consequences in Eastern and Western Europe



concerning trade. In Eastern European countries, the presence of large RRP (whether in power or not) is followed by declining exports and rising imports. These findings are counter-intuitive since RRP are mostly protectionist parties, especially in Eastern Europe (see Chapter 2). It might be explained by other unobserved variables and would require further investigation to be properly explained. The relationship between foreign trade and RRP is less significant in Western European countries, where it has the expected signs: Countries with large RRP experience rising exports and declining imports.

Finally, we showed that beyond the technical limits of this statistical work, the main limitation of this approach comes from the fact that neo-classical models (and related hypotheses) are limited in their explanations of mechanisms behind the presence/absence of effects of RRP on economic policies and indicators of performances.

### PART III

The last part of this work (Chapter 5) aimed to propose an original and transdisciplinary framework by going beyond the neo-classical approach and offering perspectives for further research.

We started by arguing that RRP might favour the diffusion of racial prejudice within the population or could act as a proxy (i.e. the more widespread racial prejudice is, the stronger RRP are). The economic literature underlines that racial prejudice might have economic consequences on the labour market and the size of welfare state. As such, a possible way to analyse RR impact on the economy is to analyse this indirect channel, which does not consider the role of political mediation (e.g. the rest of the political system, other political parties, etc.). However, we argued that this is only a partial explanation.

			TYPE OF IMPACT		
			NATIVIST	AUTHORITARIAN	POPULIST
SAMPLE : ALL	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	DIFFRUNF (-) UNEMPF (+) BALTRADE (-)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GSER (-)
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	UNEMPF (+), POVFOR (+), DIFFRUNF (-), BALTRADE (+) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GEXP (-) depending on specification GSER (-) depending on specification
SAMPLE : WEST	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GSER (-) CUL (-)
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	CUL (-) (only SHOCK)
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	DIFFRUNF (-) UNEMPF (+)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	UNEMPF (+), DIFFRUNF (-), IMP (-), and EXP (+) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	GEXP (-) depending on specification
SAMPLE ; EAST	OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS	OH_GOV: RRP are incumbent in election year (0/1)	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		OH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS in election year	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact
	PARTISAN MODELS	PH_GOV: RRP part of national government (0/1)	IMP (+) EXP (-) BALTRADE (-)	SEC (+)	No statistical evidence of RR impact
		PH_STR: Electoral and political strength of RRPS	IMP (+) EXP (-) BALTRADE (-) depending on specification	No statistical evidence of RR impact	No statistical evidence of RR impact

Table 72 - Summary of results by sample and hypothesis.

We therefore presented a different framework, developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005). Within this perspective, economic policy is seen as the compromise between different social actors unified in a social bloc. Social blocs are actually ‘built’ by political parties, among others. These decide which

demands should be satisfied and thus which social bloc they wish to represent, once elected. If a social bloc is stable and strong enough, it is called the 'dominant social bloc' (DSB). From a theoretical point of view, we have extended Amable's and Palombarini's (2005) work by integrating both the international level, which provides opportunities and constraints to the construction of an RR DSB, and the social power of RRP's electorate, which has consequences on the viability of an RR DSB.

From the related empirical point of view, we have identified the RR social bloc by relying on the literature and derived that manual workers became the core of RRP's electorate comprising small business owners and farmers during the 1990s. However, the working class also went through a process of political demobilization and thus RRP's are hardly the political referent for most manual workers. Hence, we argue that RRP's cannot be considered as the 'working class party 2.0' (Arzheimer 2013), rather they represent a significant nativist and native faction of European manual workers. An original contribution comprises an econometric test on the ESS data covering 2014. Our results have shown that both manual and service workers have a higher probability to vote for an RRP than the other social classes. Thus, we conclude that European RRP's are supported by a heterogeneous social alliance, kept together by nativism and Euroscepticism, built around a nativist faction of the native working class.

The theoretical and empirical work in Chapter 5 leads us to consider the possible strategies that RRP's can undertake, depending on the conditions they face to build a DSB. We have identified five different strategies (see Table 73), and argued that most RRP's. We have taken the specific case study of LN as an illustration of our theoretical framework. In particular, we have focused on the opportunities and constraints that the international level provides both to RRP's. On the one hand, the politicization of the EU has made Euroscepticism an electorally profitable strategy. On the other hand, RRP's are still politically isolated as they show difficulties even in forming a group at the EP or organizing a common strategy (as seen in Chapter 2). We conclude that the possibilities for RRP's to satisfy the

Strategy	Social bloc	Relationship with other parties	Moderation on Euroscepticism	Moderation on nativism
Anti-Bourgeois bloc by construction	Anti-bourgeois	Competition with radical left parties	No	No
Anti-Bourgeois bloc by integration	Anti-bourgeois	Cooperation with radical left parties	No	Yes (or nativist radicalisation by radical left parties)
Centre-right bloc by integration	Centre-right	Cooperation with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	No
Centre-right bloc by construction	Centre-right	Competition with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	No
Centre-right bloc by moderation	Centre-right	Cooperation with moderate right-wing parties	Yes	Yes

*Table 73 - RRP's strategies towards the achievement of a DSB. Source: original compilation.*

demand of their electorate concerning the EU are extremely low. It is the case with the LN, which made important compromises on its Eurosceptic stance and even by voting in favour of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as well as part of the constitutional reforms required by the Fiscal Compact. An interpretation was that RRP's do not seem to be able to obtain more than nativist policies that do not contest the EU: this seems to find confirmation in the results obtained in Chapter 4.

However, a DSB cannot be stable by relying exclusively on its electoral validation. To be stable, a DSB needs to win the elections, but it should also be socially strong enough. This strength, namely the 'social power', is the ability of social classes to influence the socio-economic system. We have distinguished between four different forms of social power, namely 'resources', 'organizational power', 'structural power', and 'electoral power'. We have highlighted that the 'Anti-Bourgeois by construction' strategy, the main option in play for RRP's, mainly relies on electoral power. We have argued that this would probably lead to a weak social bloc with respect to other characteristics: (i) the main social categories behind RR social bloc do not seem to have many financial resources and RRP's have shown to have troubles in mobilising these resources; (ii) RRP's have failed to create strong

unions, and unionization might actually be a negative factor in a worker's propensity to vote for a RRP; (iii) the RR electorate is composed of the so-called 'modernization losers', which are social categories whose relative structural power have been (probably) declining over the last decades. Thus, in three out of four categories, RRP do not seem to have enough social power to form their own DSB even if they had to win the election by increasing the mobilization of their current social bloc. The way left to them seems to be the 'Centre right DSB by integration' strategy, where RRP represent the nativist part of a right-wing alliance. This was the case in Italy for Berlusconi's centre-right, and it is still relevant today. With our results from Chapter 4 within this framework, we stress that moderate right-wing parties might still have incentives in draining the RR electorate by adopting nativist policies. Therefore, we have identified a final possible strategy, namely the DSB-by-radicalization. Within this strategy, moderate right-wing parties radicalise themselves and adopt nativist policies. Thus, the RR-DSB gets incorporated in a moderate coalition, with no RRP to represent it, but rather fringes (in some cases, even the majority) of moderate right-wing parties.

#### LIMITATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

This work has various limitations, which represent perspectives for further research. A first perspective would depend on the analysis of the feedback effects of the economy on RRP: While in our research, we consider the effects of RRP on economic policies and outcomes, these latter dimensions may also fuel RR votes. For example, some studies show that people living close to migrants in difficult economic conditions tend to vote for RRP (Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Thus, social marginality rather than the sheer number of migrants should be considered as the main explanatory variable for RRP.

A second issue, independent of our theoretical choices, relies on the fact that RRP constantly change. Even while writing this Thesis, some RRP, such as the French FN or the Italian LN, have started a

new phase of transition. The politically chameleonic dimension of RRP's should lead to constant updates that can rely on the original analytical and theoretical grid proposed by us.

A third research perspective deals with the determinants of RRP's economic policy offer (e.g. country's economic performance, a change in the RR electorate, behaviour of other political parties, institutional conditions, etc.), which may also explain whether RR interest in economic matters would last or not.

A fourth issue might be the assessment of the actual payoff of this increase in economic salience and the shift to welfare chauvinism in terms of votes. It is unclear whether this new pro-welfare agenda has any impact on RRP's electoral scores. The actual usefulness of this new position is being debated even within RRP's, as indicated by the recent debate within the FN.

A fifth concern could be the reactions of other parties, especially those leaning to the left, to the new RR economic agenda. Indeed, the recent programmatic shift may have specific consequences on economic policies and outcomes that we were not able to cover in this work (e.g. non-RR parties might react in different ways when facing a welfare chauvinist RRP or a neo-liberal RRP).

A sixth concern deals with the extension proposed by us regarding the neo-realist approach developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005), which still needs to be enriched by empirical operationalization, far beyond the illustration we gave with the LN case study. Opinion polls still represent the best way to assess the actual and potential electorate power of a social bloc. Organizational power is best represented by union membership rates. However, as underlined by Italian workerism, in order to assess social power, we should also analyse day-to-day relations within the workplace (Alquati 1975), since a class could be organized even outside formal channels. Finally, the works by Perrone (1980; 1984) represent a useful starting point to operationalise a class-structural power. Such a work could be used to develop a strong and original analytical framework.

A seventh concern could be that our analysis underlines the fact that RRP's rely on a particular social bloc that revolves around a nativist faction of the working class. Thus, RRP's are 'movements of exclusion' (Rydgren 2005), but they are also movements of 'division' as they split the working class between a nativist (and native) part and the rest. Thus, part of their ability to build a DSB relies on an intra-class conflict between a native (and declining) working class on the one hand and a non-native workforce on the other. Still the nature of this intra-class conflict remains unknown, as most studies underline that cultural, and not economic, grievances fuel RR votes even among workers. However, despite the key role of nativist workers (Rydgren 2013; Oskarson and Demker 2015; Gest 2015), RRP's represent only part of the European working class, and even when they are able to obtain a relative majority of workers' votes (such as France if we look at the last presidential election), the low turnout rate of this class should refrain us from considering RRP's as 'working class parties'. In any case, it appears that the study of the nativist turn of European workers and its consequences is a major field for future research.

To a certain extent, the nativist fraction of the European working class reminds us of Count Ugolino della Gherardesca. This historical figure, depicted by Dante Alighieri in the XXXIII *canto* of his *Inferno*, suffered a major political loss after his rival faction won the government of Pisa in 1288. He was then sent to prison in 1289 to starve to death together with his children and grandchildren. Dante's reconstruction of Count Ugolino's last moment is ambiguous; it leads the reader to think that Ugolino della Gherardesca, at the end, devoured his own children moved by hunger (Borges 2001):

*Quivi morì; e come tu mi vedi,  
vid'io cascar li tre ad uno ad uno  
tra 'l quinto dì e 'l sesto; ond'io mi diedi,  
già cieco, a brancolar sopra ciascuno,  
e due dì li chiamai, poi che fur morti*

*Poscia, più che il dolor, poté il digiuno.*<sup>82</sup>

There are different similarities between Ugolino della Gherardesca and European working class (see Table 74). Indeed, European workers suffered a major political recession (Gest 2016; Evans and Tilly, 2017) with the neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s and subsequently shifted towards the centre of social-democratic parties (see Amable and Palombarini, 2012, for an analysis of France and Italy). *Reaganomics* and *Thatcherism* represented a strong defeat for the workers' movement<sup>83</sup> similar to the one suffered by Ugolino della Gherardesca in 1288. This 'new minority', to use Gest's (2016) label, was then progressively disconnected from power as it lost its political representatives. We, therefore, witness the rise of a nativist faction of the working class. Supporting RRP, this faction attacks the ideology and social achievements that characterized the workers' movements in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nativism, authoritarianism, and populism attack a part of the heritage of workers' struggles. Internationalism and workers' solidarity were a rallying cry all along the 20<sup>th</sup> century and represented important points for socialist and communist parties. Nativism buries class struggle as it elevates communitarian struggles above class struggle: An intra-class conflict replaces the one between the working class and capitalists. Populism and authoritarianism attack an important element of the political power of the working class: democracy. As such, political organizations and trade unions are seen as useless, even enemies, while the democratic system is 'rigged'<sup>84</sup> against them as they consider that only a strong man/woman can become the representative of popular will. Defeated and

---

<sup>82</sup> Translation:

'And there he died; and, ev'n as thou seest me,  
between the fifth day and the sixth I saw  
the three fall one by one; and, blind already,  
I gave myself to groping over each,  
and two days called them, after they were dead;  
then fasting proved more powerful than pain.' (Langdon 1921)

<sup>83</sup> We employ the terms 'working class' and 'workers' movement' using Tronti's (1971) interpretation. Thus, the term 'working class' indicates all wage labour (manual and service workers, unionized or not). The term 'workers' movement' instead indicates the organizations and movement that wished to represent the working class (socialist and communist parties, trade unions, etc.).

<sup>84</sup> Here we refer to famous expression used by Donald Trump all along his presidential electoral campaign.



<b>COUNT UGOLINO DELLA GHERARDESCA</b>	<b>EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS</b>
Suffered a major political loss in 1288	Suffered a major political loss in the 1980s
Was thrown out of power	Is disconnected from power and feels abandoned by its political representatives
Devoured its own children, moved by hunger	Attacks the ideology and social achievements of previous workers' movements. Nativism attacks internationalism and workers' solidarity, as well as the weakest part of the working class, namely non-native workers. Populism and authoritarianism attack democratic institutions as well as the political and social organizations of the working class (left-wing parties and trade unions).

*Table 74 - Nativist working class as a contemporary Count Ugolino della Gherardesca.*

being increasingly marginal (at least, this is how this faction perceives itself), it blames and figuratively ‘devours’ its ‘children’: the social achievements of the workers’ movement as well as the organizations and institutions that the working class contributed to build. *Poscia, più che il dolor, poté il digiuno*. There is one last similarity. Indeed, we do not know whether Count Ugolino actually ate his children as Dante willingly left his readers in suspense. Similarly, we do not know whether this form of ‘class cannibalism’ (the struggle between native and non-native elements of European working class) will become a major political factor in the years to come. Indeed, such a faction has always existed and grown stronger in moments of crisis.

As Silver (2003, 22) underlines, there is ‘an endemic tendency for workers to draw non-class borders and boundaries as a basis for claims for protection from the maelstrom’. Contemporary nativist workers are just the umpteenth Count Ugolino of working class history. This time, however, nativist demands of this class find their expression in large and established political parties that apparently accept the rules of democracy. Therefore, our analysis leads us to think that the answer to our research question, ‘Do RRP influence economic policies and economic performance?’, strongly depends on the strength and forms that the intra-class conflict within the so-called ‘modernization losers’ will take.

APPENDIX:  
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS  
FOR CHAPTER 4

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.414**	0.797***	0.778***	0.245*	0.422***	0.579***	0.629***	0.318*
	-0.134	-0.045	-0.06	-0.115	-0.09	-0.108	-0.146	-0.115
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	1.440*	-0.226	0.519	-1.687*	-0.665	-0.348	0.225	-0.417
	-0.553	-0.313	-0.381	-0.616	-0.521	-0.385	-0.225	-0.537
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.639*	-2.191	-2.165*	8.978**	5.265	4.131*	5.668*	-3.63
	-5.628	-1.733	-1.008	-2.983	-3.897	-1.874	-2.301	-3.811
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.321*	-0.051	-0.045	0.086	-0.1	0.007	0.036	0.143
	-0.138	-0.072	-0.072	-0.101	-0.118	-0.066	-0.06	-0.113
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.082	-0.221*	-0.340***	-0.096	-0.26	0.003	0.007	0.21
	-0.226	-0.099	-0.084	-0.12	-0.136	-0.05	-0.053	-0.126
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.279	0.003	0.008	-0.167	0.392	0.040***	-0.004	-0.113
	-0.508	-0.009	-0.004	-0.308	-0.264	-0.007	-0.005	-0.293
<b>Trade</b>	0.002	-0.016	-0.019	-0.006	0.016	0.006	0.009	0.004
	-0.026	-0.013	-0.012	-0.011	-0.014	-0.006	-0.007	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.119	0.012	0.002	0.1	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.2	0.7	0.502	0.142	0.812	0.37	0.465	0.675
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

Table 75 - Detailed Results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.625**	0.832***	0.016	0.793***	0.873***	-0.045	-0.189	0.522**
	-0.208	-0.068	-0.13	-0.121	-0.044	-0.113	-0.156	-0.137
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	1236.584	-167.06	-0.048	682.445	-126.862	-0.082	0.978	-0.348
	-1051.887	-219.664	-0.103	-644.09	-178.822	-0.101	-1.251	-0.285
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	736.643	4989.025*	0.751*	664.053	4389.095*	0.79	25.987*	2.73
	-4177.004	-2143.901	-0.296	-3010.569	-1715.979	-0.422	-9.778	-4.148
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-147.648	1.517	0.011	-62.828	26.214	0.008	-0.203	-0.128
	-121.929	-61.682	-0.007	-127.748	-78.208	-0.008	-0.33	-0.079
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-166.135	-299.802	-0.007	-176.873	-207.103	-0.004	-0.860**	0.187*
	-181.168	-150.28	-0.009	-120.853	-119.961	-0.008	-0.306	-0.071
<b>Share of elder people</b>	954.533*	-1.682	-0.054	-9.445	-0.502	-0.024	-0.645	0.020***
	-403.55	-2.016	-0.029	-384.2	-2.583	-0.021	-0.865	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	32.443	14.932	0	25.842	15.336	-0.001	0.018	0.008
	-20.441	-14.11	-0.001	-16.577	-14.892	-0.001	-0.038	-0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.011	0.019	0.128	0.013	0.067	0.027	0.031	0.128
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.497	0.958	0.309	0.163	0.383	0.989	0.474	0.673
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 75 (continued) - Detailed Results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.116	0.05	0.140*	0.565***	0.615***	0.428	0.777***	0.696***	0.650***	0.650***
	-0.142	-0.05	-0.053	-0.043	-0.084	-0.257	-0.038	-0.073	-0.068	-0.068
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	-0.896	0.517	-0.56	-1.600**	0.01	-0.907	-0.510*	0.024	0.023	-0.749
	-1.101	-0.315	-0.378	-0.519	-0.034	-0.509	-0.215	-0.036	-0.06	-0.5
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-21.603*	2.859*	-3.792*	-3.450*	-0.017	-2.553	-1.289	0.127	0.053	-0.437
	-8.183	-1.298	-1.41	-1.515	-0.166	-2.708	-1.131	-0.133	-0.329	-1.562
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.222	0.098	-0.146	-0.199	0.01	-0.11	-0.052	-0.004	0.012	-0.029
	-0.262	-0.105	-0.101	-0.18	-0.01	-0.162	-0.037	-0.008	-0.02	-0.105
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.938***	0.073	0.132	-0.155	-0.026*	-0.966***	-0.149*	-0.028	-0.071**	0.746***
	-0.247	-0.069	-0.076	-0.155	-0.012	-0.2	-0.059	-0.017	-0.023	-0.189
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.021	0.009	-0.008	-0.013	0.001	0.011	-0.002	0.002***	0.005**	-0.006
	-0.016	-0.005	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001	-0.012	-0.001	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.005	0.452***	0.495***	0.032*	0	-0.028	-0.006	0	-0.003	0.052***
	-0.035	-0.01	-0.012	-0.012	-0.001	-0.024	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.018	0.881	0.311	0	0.017	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.008
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.464	0.082	0.101	0.125	0.431	0.696	0.893	0.519	0.017	0.65
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 75 (continued) - Detailed Results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.407**	0.797***	0.778***	0.245*	0.422***	0.579***	0.629***	0.318*
	-0.138	-0.045	-0.06	-0.115	-0.09	-0.108	-0.146	-0.115
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	1.667**	-0.06	0.53	-1.853**	-0.489	-0.128	0.008	-0.457
	-0.517	-0.239	-0.299	-0.607	-0.526	-0.392	-0.26	-0.534
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.656*	-0.104	-0.885	8.995**	5.625	3.152	4.416	-3.286
	-5.766	-1.024	-1.475	-3.066	-4.24	-1.591	-2.706	-3.894
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.209*	-0.002	0.013	0.023	-0.008	0.069	0.067	0.076
	-0.099	-0.038	-0.049	-0.087	-0.109	-0.058	-0.055	-0.114
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.103	-0.293**	-0.376***	-0.097	-0.342*	-0.01	0.005	0.279
	-0.25	-0.095	-0.086	-0.136	-0.161	-0.057	-0.064	-0.141
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.048	-0.301	-0.303	-0.295	0.338	0.418*	0.177	-0.008
	-0.515	-0.165	-0.204	-0.303	-0.279	-0.182	-0.122	-0.321
<b>Trade</b>	-0.006	-0.017	-0.019	-0.005	0.012	0.003	0.005	0.007
	-0.03	-0.011	-0.015	-0.012	-0.015	-0.007	-0.005	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.105	0.005	0.01	0.098	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.006
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.174	0.344	0.253	0.141	0.979	0.196	0.308	0.625
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 76 - Detailed Results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.625** -0.208	0.832*** -0.068	0.016 -0.13	0.793*** -0.121	0.873*** -0.044	-0.045 -0.113	-0.189 -0.156	0.522** -0.137
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	721.493 -753.508	-32.46 -317.257	-0.024 -0.034	427.777 -507.437	-61.702 -354.722	0.015 -0.039	1.352 -2.477	-0.535 -0.314
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	11845.735 -8506.224	9492.655* -4440.089	0.357 -0.576	8384.367 -5379.687	6226.377 -4421.463	0.165 -0.505	17.96 -19.681	-3.328 -4.28
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-163.818 -169.376	28.962 -79.605	0.012 -0.01	-36.949 -165.265	36.085 -107.18	0.020* -0.009	0.188 -0.323	-0.088 -0.117
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-228.714 -197.448	-338.768 -163.407	-0.003 -0.008	-88.755 -101.249	-201.26 -143.909	-0.01 -0.013	-0.617 -0.389	0.141 -0.083
<b>Share of elder people</b>	691.228 -473.909	344.684 -484.18	-0.01 -0.022	214.548 -445.985	211.561 -380.407	0.015 -0.019	0.258 -0.846	0.540* -0.222
<b>Trade</b>	19.028 -28.28	9.75 -14.947	0 -0.002	12.269 -12.925	9.991 -18.079	0.001 -0.001	0.024 -0.059	0.022 -0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.022	0.039	0.058	0.029	0.087	0.121	0.562	0.029
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.503	0.933	0.59	0.165	0.488	0.11	0.219	0.761
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 76 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.116	0.05	0.140*	0.565***	0.615***	0.428	0.777***	0.696***	0.650***	0.650***
	-0.142	-0.05	-0.053	-0.043	-0.084	-0.257	-0.038	-0.073	-0.068	-0.068
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	-1.938	0.051	0.378	-0.422	-0.057	-0.985	-0.266	-0.003	0.01	-0.933
	-2.302	-0.358	-0.407	-0.372	-0.029	-0.741	-0.239	-0.018	-0.074	-0.568
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.117	1.393	-5.057*	-1.53	0.14	-5.403	-0.705	0.079	0.247	-2.905
	-17.972	-1.4	-1.882	-1.222	-0.142	-6.062	-0.521	-0.131	-0.455	-2.693
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.126	0.029	-0.025	-0.027	0.001	-0.239	-0.039	-0.002	0.008	0.053
	-0.256	-0.061	-0.073	-0.131	-0.009	-0.207	-0.041	-0.008	-0.019	-0.095
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.771*	0.089	0.125	-0.017	-0.024*	-0.925**	-0.165**	-0.011	-0.088***	0.837*
	-0.365	-0.109	-0.069	-0.152	-0.009	-0.255	-0.052	-0.008	-0.02	-0.302
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.027	-0.037	-0.233	-0.701	0.016	-0.314	-0.094	-0.005	-0.038	0.67
	-0.675	-0.248	-0.46	-0.338	-0.022	-0.583	-0.102	-0.013	-0.045	-0.544
<b>Trade</b>	-0.032	0.449***	0.493***	0.024*	0	-0.029	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.060**
	-0.064	-0.021	-0.016	-0.009	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.661	0.621	0.309	0.001	0.011	0.111	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.021
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.236	0.15	0.139	0.236	0.417	0.332	0.87	0.524	0.079	0.852
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 76 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.861	0.342	0.878***	-1.728	0.071	-0.448	0.262	-0.114
	-0.979	-0.232	-0.128	-1.443	-0.215	-0.367	-0.224	-0.222
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	0	0	1.019	0	0	0	1.194	0
	(.)	(.)	-0.674	(.)	(.)	(.)	-0.325	(.)
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-36.995	-32.560**	-9.492	27.067***	8.117	20.532	-1.609	6.472
	-25.075	-8.334	-4.851	-3.648	-4.576	-8.749	-3.621	-3.822
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.872	-0.926**	-0.516	0.239	-2.148**	-0.355	-0.198	1.863***
	-0.78	-0.234	-0.331	-0.879	-0.377	-0.156	-0.15	-0.309
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.627	0.134	-0.145	-0.093	0.801	0.109	0.065	-0.693
	-0.497	-0.192	-0.278	-0.39	-0.339	-0.106	-0.147	-0.508
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.617	0.018***	0.021*	2.735	4.286*	-0.001	0.003	-4.235*
	-1.994	-0.003	-0.007	-3.1	-1.264	-0.012	-0.006	-1.272
<b>Trade</b>	0.115	0.107	0.018	-0.278	-0.061	-0.011	0.033	0.043
	-0.158	-0.066	-0.025	-0.219	-0.048	-0.047	-0.021	-0.044
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.103	0.862	0.048	0.175	0.16	0.226	0.033	0.209
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.58	0.225	0.971	0.738	0.634	0.298	0.882	0.397
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 77 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINC NAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINC NAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.066	0.118	-0.146	-0.062	0.232	0.024	-0.041	0.009
	-0.324	-0.283	-0.273	-0.107	-0.262	-0.242	-0.219	-0.146
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	-222.943	-110.215	0.011	3.873	-90.327	-0.096	1.591	-0.204
	-1645.45	-136.828	-0.157	-652.076	-129.234	-0.146	-2.119	-0.313
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	760.724	9033.066***	1.255*	3215.836	7306.043***	1.248	27.105*	4.084
	-2269.542	-1302.217	-0.412	-2028.497	-909.36	-0.592	-10.46	-6.071
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	4.872	-40.517	0	-15.488	-32.17	0.002	-0.943	-0.244
	-214.125	-48.324	-0.018	-58.576	-44.152	-0.009	-0.628	-0.119
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	7.477	-176.350*	-0.021	-306.110*	-148.530*	0.013	-0.898*	0.227
	-239.576	-57.911	-0.022	-123.538	-50.846	-0.021	-0.363	-0.178
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1804.061*	-3.708*	-0.156	590.803*	-2.445*	-0.06	-0.73	0.021*
	-584.661	-1.201	-0.072	-223.761	-0.826	-0.045	-2.506	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-29.876	-9.92	0.001	-13.729	-6.749	-0.002	-0.01	0.007
	-24.89	-9.021	-0.002	-8.792	-6.841	-0.001	-0.062	-0.014
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.848	0.067	0.905	0.355	0.105	0.376	0.074	0.459
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.277	0.82	0.2	0.286	0.529	0.236	0.346	0.618
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 77 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.102	0.044*	0.111*	0.605***	0.406**	0.442**	0.285	0.247	0.233	0.233
	-0.211	-0.016	-0.041	-0.09	-0.101	-0.134	-0.127	-0.18	-0.143	-0.143
<b>Lagged GOV</b>	-1.947	0.864***	-1.085**	-1.980**	0.129**	-0.065	-0.322	0.109	-0.058	0.584
	-1.982	-0.144	-0.241	-0.427	-0.033	-0.318	-0.159	-0.034	-0.09	-0.5
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-22.818*	3.295	-3.026	-2.146	-0.116	-2.029	-1.363	0.254	-0.22	0.45
	-8.312	-1.616	-1.627	-1.316	-0.279	-2.066	-1.215	-0.232	-0.463	-1.735
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.766	0.139	-0.137	-0.239	-0.005	-0.085	-0.201	-0.026	0.056	-0.112
	-0.452	-0.199	-0.174	-0.262	-0.017	-0.187	-0.115	-0.014	-0.028	-0.165
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.907**	0.065	0.07	-0.396	-0.039	-0.807**	-0.201	-0.077	0.002	0.573*
	-0.231	-0.151	-0.113	-0.314	-0.03	-0.242	-0.141	-0.044	-0.069	-0.234
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.026**	0.006*	-0.008*	-0.010***	0.001	0.015	-0.008**	0.002*	0.004*	-0.007
	-0.006	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.05	0.446***	0.479***	0.024*	-0.002	-0.024	-0.016	0	0.001	0.032
	-0.075	-0.014	-0.02	-0.009	-0.002	-0.018	-0.011	-0.002	-0.004	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.05	0.362	0.257	0.025	0.051	0.121	0.068	0.035	0.01	0.146
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.361	0.23	0.326	0.306	0.329	0.999	0.854	0.652	0.051	0.749
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 77 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-GOV. Political variable: RRP's participation in government. Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.407**	0.750***	0.774***	0.25	0.437***	0.575***	0.548***	0.327**
	-0.135	-0.058	-0.042	-0.123	-0.08	-0.115	-0.131	-0.117
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.017	-0.008	-0.012	-0.019	0.016	0.047	0.023	-0.028
	-0.083	-0.024	-0.033	-0.06	-0.049	-0.03	-0.027	-0.044
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.891*	-2.089	-2.169*	7.856*	4.501	3.604	5.652*	-3.381
	-5.611	-1.79	-0.952	-2.919	-3.824	-1.967	-2.309	-3.936
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.375*	-0.042	-0.069	0.17	-0.088	0.019	0.029	0.164
	-0.145	-0.068	-0.069	-0.101	-0.117	-0.062	-0.06	-0.106
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.089	-0.225*	-0.335***	-0.092	-0.25	0.016	0.012	0.202
	-0.234	-0.098	-0.08	-0.115	-0.136	-0.053	-0.054	-0.127
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.347	0.003	0.008	-0.036	0.434	0.040***	-0.003	-0.078
	-0.491	-0.008	-0.004	-0.307	-0.255	-0.007	-0.005	-0.314
<b>Trade</b>	0.002	-0.016	-0.02	-0.005	0.017	0.007	0.009	0.003
	-0.025	-0.013	-0.012	-0.01	-0.013	-0.006	-0.007	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.12	0.011	0.004	0.097	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.217	0.708	0.529	0.157	0.864	0.295	0.489	0.715
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

Table 78 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.638**	0.896***	0.112	0.872***	0.875***	0.089	0.089	-0.08
	-0.183	-0.049	-0.279	-0.105	-0.033	-0.092	-0.092	-0.194
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-35.671	40.771	0.007	-24.843	27.418	0.003	0.372	0.105
	-59.747	-55.449	-0.004	-56.924	-44.98	-0.005	-0.2	-0.059
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1880.246	4428.251*	0.679*	1228.835	3984.553*	0.718	24.082*	1.596
	-3881.225	-2141.151	-0.3	-3093.184	-1666.238	-0.443	-9.894	-4.428
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-183.456	-1.617	0.01	-81.919	23.664	0.011	-0.247	-0.127
	-118.947	-65.942	-0.006	-113.711	-80.954	-0.006	-0.311	-0.077
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-152.63	-290.007	-0.006	-171.831	-199.989	-0.006	-0.826**	0.206**
	-180.731	-151.813	-0.008	-115.992	-119.372	-0.007	-0.294	-0.071
<b>Share of elder people</b>	875.412*	-1.627	-0.054	-30.288	-0.607	-0.023	-1.074	0.022***
	-381.183	-1.796	-0.03	-377.807	-2.352	-0.018	-0.943	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	29.668	16.313	0	24.073	15.98	0	0.028	0.012
	-21.35	-14.127	-0.001	-17.258	-14.928	-0.001	-0.04	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.013	0.018	0.232	0.015	0.065	0.042	0.036	0.111
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.457	0.985	0.247	0.15	0.396	0.899	0.438	0.935
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

*Table 79 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.177	0.177	0.105**	0.560***	0.403***	0.526**	0.710***	0.511***	0.480***	0.291***
	-0.177	-0.177	-0.029	-0.073	-0.101	-0.17	-0.117	-0.1	-0.113	-0.059
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.147	0.022	-0.053	-0.073	0.004	-0.085	-0.015	-0.001	0.003	0.016
	-0.209	-0.062	-0.047	-0.063	-0.004	-0.057	-0.03	-0.004	-0.009	-0.056
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-20.403*	2.897*	-3.789*	-3.288	-0.017	-2.714	-1.205	0.128	0.067	-0.731
	-8.498	-1.355	-1.479	-1.74	-0.172	-2.654	-1.096	-0.13	-0.345	-1.579
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.272	0.077	-0.127	-0.17	0.008	-0.046	-0.038	-0.004	0.01	-0.005
	-0.263	-0.104	-0.098	-0.179	-0.008	-0.149	-0.037	-0.008	-0.02	-0.104
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.883**	0.072	0.12	-0.165	-0.026*	-0.984***	-0.157*	-0.028	-0.071**	0.745***
	-0.246	-0.068	-0.074	-0.158	-0.012	-0.206	-0.059	-0.017	-0.023	-0.19
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.019	0.01	-0.010*	-0.019	0.001	0.009	-0.002	0.002***	0.005***	-0.004
	-0.017	-0.006	-0.005	-0.01	-0.001	-0.012	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.007	0.451***	0.498***	0.034**	0	-0.028	-0.005	0	-0.003	0.053***
	-0.035	-0.011	-0.01	-0.012	-0.001	-0.023	-0.006	-0.001	-0.002	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.023	0.755	0.32	0	0.015	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.459	0.079	0.098	0.117	0.448	0.486	0.625	0.518	0.017	0.848
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 79 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.398*	0.801***	0.763***	0.251	0.435***	0.582***	0.622***	0.335*
	-0.14	-0.044	-0.06	-0.125	-0.091	-0.111	-0.148	-0.119
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.026	-0.018	0.015	-0.016	-0.001	0.029	0.01	-0.008
	-0.081	-0.02	-0.031	-0.059	-0.05	-0.03	-0.028	-0.038
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.686	0.061	-1.017	7.643*	4.999	2.91	4.566	-3.293
	-5.708	-1.04	-1.446	-2.997	-4.131	-1.722	-2.719	-4.005
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.276*	0.004	-0.01	0.123	0.002	0.072	0.068	0.094
	-0.124	-0.038	-0.05	-0.095	-0.109	-0.058	-0.055	-0.104
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.116	-0.297**	-0.370***	-0.088	-0.337	-0.001	0.004	0.275
	-0.257	-0.093	-0.086	-0.13	-0.16	-0.06	-0.067	-0.143
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.143	-0.295	-0.305	-0.125	0.384	0.412*	0.156	0.022
	-0.496	-0.159	-0.2	-0.311	-0.263	-0.188	-0.118	-0.332
<b>Trade</b>	-0.007	-0.017	-0.019	-0.003	0.012	0.003	0.005	0.008
	-0.029	-0.011	-0.016	-0.011	-0.014	-0.008	-0.005	-0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.107	0.005	0.011	0.096	0.004	0.009	0.01	0.006
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.192	0.353	0.264	0.156	0.989	0.173	0.307	0.684
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

Table 79 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.593*	0.821***	-0.015	0.769***	0.868***	-0.044	-0.044	-0.266
	-0.215	-0.073	-0.14	-0.109	-0.047	-0.105	-0.105	-0.145
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-211.876	-165.077	0.005	-208.602	-108.159	0.005	0.386	0.140
	-90.981	-169.113	-0.007	-82.516	-124.361	-0.007	-0.411	-0.06
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	14916.149	11497.762*	0.314	11240.845	7190.274	0.073	10.682	-4.823
	-7582.374	-5218.702	-0.569	-5561.569	-4827.612	-0.512	-20.181	-4.509
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-165.576	71.543	0.012	-32.232	56.381	0.017	0.063	-0.07
	-162.058	-104.89	-0.009	-158.848	-115.894	-0.008	-0.326	-0.104
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-287.046	-398.706	-0.001	-144.56	-233.982	-0.008	-0.506	0.165*
	-230.233	-206.698	-0.008	-116.938	-161.613	-0.012	-0.368	-0.077
<b>Share of elder people</b>	926.075	556.259	-0.014	449.884	314.401	0.008	-0.398	0.391
	-622.795	-656.245	-0.026	-404.276	-467.638	-0.022	-1.331	-0.22
<b>Trade</b>	10.847	2.411	0	4.858	8.198	0.001	0.055	0.026*
	-22.866	-14.303	-0.001	-13.771	-19.108	-0.001	-0.063	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.027	0.041	0.092	0.038	0.088	0.127	0.963	0.033
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.5	0.923	0.59	0.15	0.476	0.107	0.166	0.722
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 79 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.482**	0.482**	0.141*	0.560***	0.629***	0.429	0.798***	0.695***	0.655***	0.319*
	-0.142	-0.142	-0.054	-0.045	-0.07	-0.258	-0.038	-0.072	-0.069	-0.116
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.345	-0.07	0.017	0.07	0	-0.075	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	0.031
	-0.376	-0.064	-0.04	-0.052	-0.003	-0.064	-0.019	-0.003	-0.007	-0.056
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-5.13	1.615	-5.001*	-1.792	0.129	-5.454	-0.646	0.09	0.259	-4.215
	-18.268	-1.39	-1.858	-1.123	-0.126	-5.991	-0.506	-0.131	-0.444	-2.837
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.064	0.019	-0.044	0.001	0.003	-0.183	-0.03	-0.001	0.007	0.083
	-0.271	-0.057	-0.07	-0.135	-0.008	-0.201	-0.04	-0.008	-0.02	-0.094
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.642	0.074	0.125	-0.01	-0.023*	-	-0.165**	-0.011	-	0.874*
	-0.355	-0.106	-0.07	-0.152	-0.009	0.929**	-0.052	-0.008	0.088***	-0.309
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.612	-0.027	-0.249	-0.677	0.011	-0.317	-0.093	-0.006	-0.04	0.733
	-1.072	-0.261	-0.464	-0.347	-0.02	-0.59	-0.095	-0.013	-0.043	-0.519
<b>Trade</b>	-0.056	0.452***	0.492***	0.023*	0	-0.03	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.063**
	-0.07	-0.02	-0.015	-0.01	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.602	0.697	0.339	0.001	0.01	0.114	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.02
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.2	0.141	0.139	0.229	0.482	0.345	0.894	0.524	0.08	0.908
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 79 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.856 <i>-1.005</i>	0.373 <i>-0.268</i>	0.779*** <i>-0.072</i>	-1.656 <i>-1.526</i>	0.055 <i>-0.178</i>	-0.444 <i>-0.375</i>	0.291 <i>-0.189</i>	-0.132 <i>-0.187</i>
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.592 <i>-2.888</i>	-0.428 <i>-0.24</i>	-0.119 <i>-0.152</i>	0.766 <i>-2.301</i>	-0.294 <i>-0.202</i>	0.052 <i>-0.209</i>	0.150 <i>-0.053</i>	0.372 <i>-0.348</i>
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-35.19 <i>-23.063</i>	-31.020* <i>-9.939</i>	-10.488* <i>-3.692</i>	24.425** <i>-5.873</i>	8.083 <i>-4.232</i>	20.394 <i>-8.874</i>	-2.379 <i>-3.298</i>	6.685 <i>-4.639</i>
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.848 <i>-0.863</i>	-1.015*** <i>-0.176</i>	-0.555 <i>-0.296</i>	0.233 <i>-0.798</i>	-2.258** <i>-0.396</i>	-0.345 <i>-0.194</i>	-0.213 <i>-0.159</i>	1.998** <i>-0.382</i>
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.648 <i>-0.534</i>	0.2 <i>-0.212</i>	-0.107 <i>-0.232</i>	-0.129 <i>-0.299</i>	0.859* <i>-0.311</i>	0.102 <i>-0.121</i>	0.106 <i>-0.129</i>	-0.766 <i>-0.495</i>
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.486 <i>-1.884</i>	0.018*** <i>-0.003</i>	0.019** <i>-0.005</i>	2.455 <i>-2.671</i>	4.512** <i>-1.107</i>	0 <i>-0.013</i>	0.008 <i>-0.006</i>	-4.509* <i>-1.264</i>
<b>Trade</b>	0.104 <i>-0.147</i>	0.11 <i>-0.058</i>	0.001 <i>-0.029</i>	-0.254 <i>-0.208</i>	-0.064 <i>-0.047</i>	-0.012 <i>-0.047</i>	0.034 <i>-0.017</i>	0.046 <i>-0.043</i>
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.12	0.717	0.052	0.094	0.177	0.21	0.029	0.229
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.676	0.244	0.86	0.22	0.695	0.295	0.835	0.368
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

Table 80 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.158	0.154	-0.215	-0.185	0.253	-0.029	-0.029	-0.036
	<i>-0.114</i>	<i>-0.272</i>	<i>-0.301</i>	<i>-0.223</i>	<i>-0.252</i>	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>-0.228</i>
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-138.599	-5.827	0.005	-54.643	7.237	-0.002	0.169	0.071
	<i>-94.143</i>	<i>-30.098</i>	<i>-0.008</i>	<i>-34.094</i>	<i>-28.148</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>-0.215</i>	<i>-0.092</i>
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1626.293	8907.786***	1.227*	3850.202**	6835.845***	1.186	27.992*	3.837
	<i>-1733.495</i>	<i>-1408.886</i>	<i>-0.444</i>	<i>-895.399</i>	<i>-1070.204</i>	<i>-0.606</i>	<i>-10.59</i>	<i>-6.072</i>
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	43.821	-41.62	-0.004	10.118	-29.875	-0.002	-0.925	-0.249
	<i>-85.447</i>	<i>-58.035</i>	<i>-0.012</i>	<i>-39.402</i>	<i>-51.942</i>	<i>-0.011</i>	<i>-0.557</i>	<i>-0.124</i>
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	20.452	-171.755*	-0.023	-299.308*	-149.436*	0.009	-0.885*	0.222
	<i>-240.159</i>	<i>-62.002</i>	<i>-0.021</i>	<i>-115.291</i>	<i>-56.58</i>	<i>-0.011</i>	<i>-0.365</i>	<i>-0.154</i>
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1908.752*	-3.714*	-0.158	700.913	-2.023	-0.06	-0.828	0.021**
	<i>-618.194</i>	<i>-1.329</i>	<i>-0.077</i>	<i>-347.632</i>	<i>-0.999</i>	<i>-0.049</i>	<i>-2.454</i>	<i>-0.006</i>
<b>Trade</b>	-41.033	-9.309	0.001	-21.248	-4.71	-0.001	-0.014	0.014
	<i>-21.95</i>	<i>-9.63</i>	<i>-0.002</i>	<i>-18.323</i>	<i>-7.239</i>	<i>-0.002</i>	<i>-0.077</i>	<i>-0.015</i>
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.628	0.072	0.76	0.411	0.116	0.7	0.083	0.399
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.427	0.853	0.253	0.33	0.558	0.229	0.351	0.301
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 80 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.038	0.038	0.092*	0.560***	0.410**	0.463*	0.293	0.235	0.23	0.213*
	-0.098	-0.098	-0.031	-0.071	-0.089	-0.155	-0.13	-0.199	-0.141	-0.089
<b>Lagged RRP_ES</b>	-0.105	0.165	-0.123	-0.168	-0.002	-0.095	-0.012	-0.007	-0.005	0.117
	-0.217	-0.102	-0.084	-0.106	-0.01	-0.121	-0.045	-0.008	-0.011	-0.079
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-24.483*	4.227	-3.68	-2.931	-0.127	-2.299	-1.369	0.202	-0.226	0.933
	-9.551	-2.116	-2.016	-1.906	-0.292	-1.112	-1.093	-0.217	-0.477	-1.56
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.719	0.138	-0.124	-0.211	0.001	-0.088	-0.197	-0.016	0.061	-0.128
	-0.431	-0.178	-0.169	-0.252	-0.017	-0.202	-0.124	-0.018	-0.036	-0.175
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.842**	0.103	0.011	-0.491	-0.033	-0.824**	-0.209	-0.071	-0.003	0.594*
	-0.249	-0.16	-0.109	-0.302	-0.027	-0.243	-0.147	-0.048	-0.061	-0.196
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.027**	0.012*	-0.013*	-0.019**	0.001	0.011	-0.009*	0.002*	0.004*	-0.003
	-0.008	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.009	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.072	0.439***	0.496***	0.037*	-0.002	-0.017	-0.015	0	0.001	0.028
	-0.077	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.002	-0.016	-0.011	-0.002	-0.004	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.06	0.207	0.233	0.027	0.043	0.118	0.063	0.052	0.01	0.148
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.368	0.202	0.292	0.308	0.288	0.89	0.65	0.731	0.044	0.59
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 80 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_ES). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.416**	0.746***	0.772***	0.262*	0.420***	0.567***	0.547***	0.319**
	-0.133	-0.058	-0.043	-0.12	-0.077	-0.117	-0.132	-0.114
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	0.1	0.013	0.019	-0.091	0.051	0.04	0.012	-0.03
	-0.084	-0.015	-0.021	-0.068	-0.046	-0.022	-0.024	-0.032
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.383*	-2.307	-2.268*	8.494**	4.47	3.799	5.725*	-3.371
	-5.633	-1.789	-0.939	-2.983	-3.788	-1.953	-2.322	-3.743
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.377*	-0.042	-0.063	0.174	-0.09	0.026	0.03	0.155
	-0.141	-0.068	-0.07	-0.098	-0.113	-0.06	-0.06	-0.105
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.086	-0.222*	-0.337***	-0.097	-0.249	0.006	0.007	0.207
	-0.235	-0.098	-0.081	-0.123	-0.133	-0.052	-0.052	-0.123
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.391	0.003	0.009*	-0.034	0.451	0.041***	-0.004	-0.075
	-0.496	-0.008	-0.004	-0.305	-0.251	-0.007	-0.005	-0.31
<b>Trade</b>	0.005	-0.016	-0.02	-0.007	0.018	0.006	0.008	0.003
	-0.025	-0.014	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.006	-0.007	-0.015
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.128	0.011	0.004	0.101	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.223	0.708	0.555	0.158	0.927	0.255	0.459	0.673
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 81 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.644**	0.900***	0.148	0.877***	0.878***	0.096	-0.063	0.148
	-0.183	-0.045	-0.292	-0.107	-0.03	-0.095	-0.216	-0.181
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	8.805	15.243	0	8.325	3.495	0.001	0.226**	0.01
	-59.059	-53.22	-0.002	-50.816	-37.229	-0.002	-0.078	-0.036
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1574.903	4493.079*	0.712*	983.965	4070.844*	0.733	24.884*	2.557
	-3882.032	-2188.218	-0.293	-2914.532	-1712.574	-0.424	-9.555	-4.136
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-192.708	13.039	0.012	-86.651	32.974	0.013	-0.152	-0.116
	-120.905	-63.797	-0.006	-116.175	-76.791	-0.007	-0.311	-0.08
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-148.374	-294.758	-0.007	-168.019	-202.873	-0.006	-0.888**	0.180*
	-175.12	-149.746	-0.009	-115.76	-119.613	-0.008	-0.313	-0.072
<b>Share of elder people</b>	826.135*	-1.737	-0.048	-66.157	-0.72	-0.021	-0.818	0.021***
	-374.67	-1.966	-0.029	-382.315	-2.331	-0.019	-0.85	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	30.359	14.814	0	24.918	15.326	0	0.016	0.009
	-20.787	-13.784	-0.001	-16.454	-14.879	-0.001	-0.039	-0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.013	0.017	0.204	0.014	0.063	0.036	0.023	0.134
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.453	0.974	0.265	0.16	0.384	0.884	0.444	0.952
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 81 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.148	-0.093	0.022	0.105**	0.424***	0.526**	0.711***	0.511***	0.478***	0.292***
	-0.181	-0.183	-0.018	-0.03	-0.093	-0.171	-0.116	-0.1	-0.115	-0.058
<b>Lagged RRPLIN</b>	-0.121	0.018	-0.045	-0.047	-0.002	-0.054	-0.014	0	0.002	0.001
	-0.08	-0.042	-0.036	-0.045	-0.005	-0.051	-0.024	-0.003	-0.008	-0.037
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-20.863*	2.920*	-3.880*	-3.432	-0.018	-2.761	-1.219	0.131	0.061	-0.736
	-8.263	-1.385	-1.486	-1.707	-0.163	-2.725	-1.102	-0.131	-0.341	-1.548
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.232	0.076	-0.128	-0.163	0.011	-0.069	-0.039	-0.004	0.011	-0.002
	-0.269	-0.106	-0.1	-0.181	-0.009	-0.149	-0.035	-0.008	-0.02	-0.1
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.926***	0.069	0.126	-0.147	-0.026*	-0.972***	-0.154*	-0.028	-0.071**	0.743***
	-0.247	-0.069	-0.077	-0.154	-0.011	-0.206	-0.059	-0.017	-0.023	-0.187
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.018	0.01	-0.008	-0.017	0.001	0.012	-0.002	0.002***	0.005**	-0.005
	-0.016	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009	-0.001	-0.013	-0.001	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.003	0.451***	0.499***	0.034*	0	-0.028	-0.005	0	-0.003	0.053***
	-0.036	-0.011	-0.01	-0.012	-0.001	-0.023	-0.006	-0.001	-0.002	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.021	0.739	0.238	0	0.015	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.452	0.083	0.103	0.12	0.412	0.488	0.599	0.513	0.016	0.852
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 81 (continue) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.408**	0.796***	0.754***	0.264*	0.424***	0.575***	0.626***	0.325*
	-0.138	-0.044	-0.06	-0.122	-0.089	-0.114	-0.147	-0.116
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	0.092	0.004	0.03	-0.088	0.022	0.033	0.004	-0.014
	-0.082	-0.015	-0.021	-0.067	-0.038	-0.025	-0.026	-0.025
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.156*	-0.175	-1.21	8.286*	4.921	2.996	4.481	-3.245
	-5.705	-1.108	-1.459	-3.053	-4.08	-1.701	-2.689	-3.831
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.281*	0	-0.005	0.129	-0.004	0.076	0.066	0.094
	-0.12	-0.038	-0.049	-0.091	-0.104	-0.056	-0.055	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.111	-0.291**	-0.368***	-0.093	-0.331	-0.008	0.005	0.275
	-0.258	-0.093	-0.087	-0.139	-0.158	-0.058	-0.062	-0.138
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.193	-0.293	-0.298	-0.12	0.399	0.422*	0.168	0.029
	-0.5	-0.163	-0.193	-0.307	-0.256	-0.189	-0.121	-0.333
<b>Trade</b>	-0.004	-0.017	-0.019	-0.006	0.013	0.003	0.005	0.007
	-0.028	-0.011	-0.016	-0.011	-0.014	-0.008	-0.005	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.115	0.005	0.012	0.1	0.004	0.008	0.009	0.007
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.198	0.342	0.264	0.157	0.954	0.147	0.306	0.657
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

Table 82 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.607**	0.831***	0.013	0.783***	0.866***	-0.028	-0.193	0.498**
	-0.205	-0.072	-0.139	-0.106	-0.05	-0.095	-0.175	-0.143
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	-86.731	-87.413	0.001	-67.203	-72.755	0.002	0.154	-0.039
	-49.894	-72.02	-0.003	-85.886	-49.915	-0.003	-0.149	-0.011
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	12284.322	10170.084*	0.372	8607.37	6741.857	0.132	14.282	-2.607
	-7831.155	-4684.426	-0.573	-5346.177	-4391.846	-0.486	-18.84	-4.344
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-216.704	43.295	0.014	-69.265	40.826	0.019*	0.129	-0.058
	-154.672	-86.472	-0.009	-156.589	-99.686	-0.008	-0.357	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-234.468	-363.472*	-0.003	-89.174	-216.941	-0.01	-0.587	0.131
	-200.466	-171.665	-0.008	-102.094	-144.01	-0.012	-0.371	-0.086
<b>Share of elder people</b>	714.159	387.01	-0.009	221.279	231.622	0.012	0.007	0.603**
	-534.167	-514.154	-0.023	-415.214	-393.902	-0.021	-1.007	-0.203
<b>Trade</b>	20.647	6.972	0	13.875	10.613	0.001	0.036	0.019
	-26.283	-13.943	-0.002	-14.512	-19.193	-0.001	-0.06	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.02	0.038	0.069	0.031	0.087	0.093	0.412	0.034
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.505	0.872	0.598	0.179	0.515	0.106	0.231	0.633
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 82 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.498**	-0.072	0.046	0.141*	0.635***	0.424	0.799***	0.695***	0.652***	0.316*
	-0.143	-0.17	-0.049	-0.053	-0.075	-0.259	-0.04	-0.073	-0.069	-0.116
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	-0.205	-0.059	0.014	0.068	-0.001	-0.08	-0.003	0.08	-0.004	0.053
	-0.149	-0.04	-0.032	-0.042	-0.002	-0.059	-0.017	-0.002	-0.006	-0.053
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-7.44	1.546	-4.982*	-1.81	0.14	-5.712	-0.621	0.08	0.262	-4.374
	-17.227	-1.403	-1.848	-1.117	-0.132	-6.024	-0.512	-0.133	-0.442	-2.822
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.005	0.01	-0.044	0.01	0.003	-0.196	-0.03	-0.002	0.008	0.085
	-0.316	-0.057	-0.071	-0.138	-0.008	-0.202	-0.04	-0.008	-0.019	-0.093
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.715	0.084	0.123	-0.016	-0.023*	-0.914**	-0.165**	-0.011	-0.088***	0.871*
	-0.347	-0.11	-0.069	-0.152	-0.01	-0.258	-0.051	-0.008	-0.02	-0.303
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.336	-0.037	-0.253	-0.675	0.01	-0.32	-0.095	-0.006	-0.041	0.767
	-0.802	-0.258	-0.458	-0.349	-0.021	-0.597	-0.096	-0.013	-0.043	-0.53
<b>Trade</b>	-0.043	0.452***	0.492***	0.023*	0	-0.029	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.063**
	-0.067	-0.02	-0.015	-0.01	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.239	0.742	0.353	0.001	0.011	0.115	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.239	0.14	0.139	0.228	0.487	0.381	0.884	0.522	0.073	0.966
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 82 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.863	0.396	0.785***	-2.505	0.075	-0.45	0.358	-0.113
	-0.889	-0.226	-0.083	-1.318	-0.204	-0.358	-0.228	-0.225
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	-3.839	-0.173	-0.059	10.546	-0.032	-0.006	0.063	0.009
	-10.244	-0.047	-0.107	-9.865	-0.032	-0.026	-0.041	-0.062
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-36.606	-32.369**	-11.097*	27.257**	7.649	20.503	-3.184	6.591
	-22.905	-7.456	-4.733	-5.834	-4.392	-8.759	-3.887	-4.12
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-2.411	-1.138**	-0.577	1.488	-2.197**	-0.363	-0.19	1.876**
	-2.348	-0.225	-0.361	-1.079	-0.418	-0.173	-0.173	-0.361
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.721	0.234	-0.125	-0.269	0.822	0.112	0.108	-0.699
	-0.718	-0.189	-0.245	-0.152	-0.343	-0.105	-0.123	-0.534
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.121	0.018***	0.022**	2.463	4.344*	-0.001	0.007	-4.250*
	-3.551	-0.003	-0.006	-1.631	-1.256	-0.012	-0.006	-1.283
<b>Trade</b>	0.11	0.120*	0.007	-0.354	-0.06	-0.011	0.032	0.043
	-0.194	-0.051	-0.026	-0.181	-0.048	-0.049	-0.021	-0.044
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.072	0.542	0.087	0.18	0.164	0.226	0.038	0.209
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.333	0.242	0.719	0.25	0.614	0.298	0.666	0.4
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 83 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.161	0.175	-0.124	-0.115	0.238	-0.044	-0.026	0.08
	-0.082	-0.271	-0.29	-0.201	-0.251	-0.153	-0.208	-0.096
<b>Lagged RRP_LIN</b>	-79.242	2.444	0.005	-26.175	3.942	-0.002	0.22	0.077
	-94.559	-26.964	-0.005	-36.413	-20.71	-0.001	-0.101	-0.053
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1281.577	8737.828***	1.234*	3487.788**	6901.937***	1.189	28.426*	3.666
	-1838.327	-1374.048	-0.402	-1039.265	-990.276	-0.6	-9.57	-5.9
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-3.629	-44.436	0.003	-15.939	-23.136	-0.004	-0.765	-0.199
	-117.291	-53.619	-0.013	-53.412	-45.608	-0.011	-0.608	-0.158
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	42.648	-169.628*	-0.025	-289.757*	-152.263*	0.01	-1.058*	0.181
	-234.42	-58.045	-0.02	-116.194	-51.271	-0.013	-0.394	-0.136
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1876.696*	-3.466*	-0.151	628.769	-2.085	-0.062	-0.923	0.023**
	-607.667	-1.507	-0.07	-338.127	-1.19	-0.051	-2.41	-0.006
<b>Trade</b>	-33.757	-8.572	0	-15.928	-5.188	-0.001	-0.014	0.013
	-19.812	-8.376	-0.002	-17.207	-6.164	-0.002	-0.066	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.809	0.063	0.976	0.549	0.098	0.749	0.086	0.372
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.4	0.937	0.24	0.32	0.598	0.227	0.335	0.246
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 83 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LIN). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.406*	0.747***	0.762***	0.229	0.412***	0.571***	0.533***	0.306*
	-0.145	-0.06	-0.04	-0.111	-0.079	-0.12	-0.135	-0.119
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-0.17	-0.128	-0.252	0.484	0.862	0.092	0.3	-0.754
	-1.05	-0.37	-0.357	-0.703	-0.715	-0.393	-0.345	-0.669
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.348	-1.891	-1.928	5.8	2.498	3.697	5.291*	-1.142
	-5.775	-1.836	-1.13	-3.574	-3.887	-2.654	-2.398	-4.276
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.383*	-0.045	-0.075	0.162	-0.102	0.024	0.033	0.178
	-0.143	-0.067	-0.065	-0.099	-0.114	-0.059	-0.06	-0.108
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.097	-0.226*	-0.334***	-0.071	-0.22	0.01	0.014	0.164
	-0.227	-0.101	-0.081	-0.109	-0.135	-0.054	-0.054	-0.129
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.392	0.003	0.007*	-0.002	0.481	0.041***	-0.003	-0.089
	-0.492	-0.008	-0.003	-0.31	-0.255	-0.007	-0.005	-0.347
<b>Trade</b>	0.002	-0.016	-0.02	-0.001	0.022	0.007	0.01	-0.004
	-0.024	-0.013	-0.013	-0.011	-0.012	-0.007	-0.007	-0.014
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.113	0.013	0.005	0.09	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.004
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.215	0.728	0.536	0.154	0.924	0.303	0.495	0.662
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 84 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.644** -0.18	0.884*** -0.056	0.15 -0.288	0.876*** -0.107	0.870*** -0.04	0.095 -0.093	-0.08 -0.193	0.171 -0.18
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	737.172 -818.817	982.54 -818.945	0.003 -0.046	353.614 -784.319	628.729 -760.747	-0.011 -0.046	5.036* -2.2	0.51 -0.757
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1442.036 -3761.722	4550.275* -1911.768	0.712* -0.293	956.167 -2790.089	4057.346* -1514.175	0.74 -0.417	25.982* -10.661	2.482 -4.254
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-206.156 -117.956	-1.655 -68.928	0.012 -0.006	-92.208 -114.473	23.18 -81.567	0.013 -0.006	-0.227 -0.331	-0.123 -0.083
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-143.251 -174.572	-280.423 -146.368	-0.007 -0.009	-163.808 -113.295	-193.944 -115.619	-0.006 -0.008	-0.840** -0.299	0.192* -0.078
<b>Share of elder people</b>	760.995* -367.204	-1.338 -1.833	-0.048 -0.028	-97.455 -400.075	-0.16 -2.419	-0.02 -0.019	-1.203 -1.02	0.022*** -0.004
<b>Trade</b>	32.762 -21.344	18.166 -14.719	0 -0.001	26.24 -17.499	16.968 -15.04	0 -0.001	0.029 -0.041	0.011 -0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.013	0.019	0.204	0.014	0.065	0.036	0.055	0.113
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.446	0.943	0.266	0.178	0.432	0.853	0.383	0.919
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 84 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.171	-0.11	0.024	0.088**	0.385***	0.504**	0.690***	0.511***	0.452***	0.292***
	-0.18	-0.18	-0.021	-0.03	-0.103	-0.173	-0.115	-0.101	-0.109	-0.059
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-1.195	0.654	-0.932*	-1.666**	0.045	-0.778*	-0.178	0.005	0.087	-0.041
	-1.885	-0.572	-0.447	-0.551	-0.039	-0.342	-0.088	-0.031	-0.088	-0.484
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-21.359*	2.942	-3.623*	-3.903	-0.037	-2.537	-1.112	0.128	0.075	-0.718
	-8.079	-1.481	-1.51	-2.302	-0.181	-2.512	-1.072	-0.138	-0.376	-1.657
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.257	0.063	-0.113	-0.128	0.004	-0.024	-0.033	-0.005	0.003	-0.001
	-0.272	-0.092	-0.094	-0.163	-0.006	-0.136	-0.038	-0.008	-0.018	-0.102
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.884**	0.083	0.069	-0.212	-0.025*	-0.983***	-0.160*	-0.027	-0.068**	0.742***
	-0.247	-0.065	-0.073	-0.164	-0.011	-0.208	-0.059	-0.017	-0.022	-0.191
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.018	0.012	-0.009*	-0.019*	0.001	0.011	-0.003	0.002***	0.005**	-0.005
	-0.018	-0.007	-0.004	-0.008	-0.001	-0.013	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.006	0.446***	0.508***	0.045**	0	-0.026	-0.006	0	-0.004	0.053***
	-0.036	-0.012	-0.01	-0.014	-0.001	-0.023	-0.007	-0.001	-0.003	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.032	0.54	0.424	0	0.013	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.452	0.072	0.088	0.112	0.494	0.451	0.641	0.523	0.03	0.857
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 84 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.393*	0.794***	0.766***	0.231	0.406***	0.580***	0.625***	0.306*
	-0.149	-0.048	-0.066	-0.113	-0.09	-0.116	-0.148	-0.121
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-0.374	-0.175	-0.034	0.511	0.898	0.135	-0.146	-0.727
	-1.047	-0.341	-0.399	-0.707	-0.759	-0.369	-0.409	-0.659
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-10.65	0.254	-0.835	5.464	2.88	2.748	4.822	-0.888
	-5.717	-1.029	-1.379	-3.644	-4.022	-2.477	-3.334	-4.189
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.288*	-0.002	-0.011	0.116	-0.016	0.078	0.065	0.113
	-0.122	-0.036	-0.042	-0.093	-0.103	-0.054	-0.052	-0.107
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.127	-0.297**	-0.377***	-0.065	-0.299	-0.003	-0.001	0.229
	-0.247	-0.097	-0.088	-0.124	-0.157	-0.064	-0.073	-0.141
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.196	-0.292	-0.306	-0.086	0.418	0.424*	0.18	0.024
	-0.494	-0.157	-0.202	-0.315	-0.265	-0.181	-0.117	-0.382
<b>Trade</b>	-0.007	-0.017	-0.019	0.001	0.018	0.003	0.004	-0.001
	-0.027	-0.011	-0.015	-0.011	-0.013	-0.008	-0.006	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.099	0.007	0.013	0.089	0.004	0.009	0.009	0.008
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.189	0.374	0.272	0.152	0.905	0.171	0.323	0.617
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 85 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*



	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.598*	0.809***	0.005	0.773***	0.869***	-0.022	-0.227	0.443**
	-0.211	-0.079	-0.143	-0.11	-0.045	-0.112	-0.183	-0.135
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-2344.322	-2348.647	0.051	-2729.674	-1182.787	-0.011	0.012	1.069
	-1574.732	-2271.753	-0.072	-2324.865	-1782.554	-0.075	-3.654	-0.609
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	15594.236	13140.513	0.304	12377.855	7549.078	0.168	16.564	-5.074
	-9676.883	-6440.692	-0.571	-7239.619	-5723.29	-0.528	-20.576	-4.745
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-235.197	24.587	0.015	-94.165	27.653	0.019*	0.112	-0.047
	-158.723	-84.001	-0.009	-154.221	-93.619	-0.008	-0.376	-0.109
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-306.734	-432.745	-0.002	-178.085	-243.754	-0.01	-0.582	0.171
	-206.111	-217.601	-0.008	-127.34	-163.255	-0.012	-0.397	-0.083
<b>Share of elder people</b>	951.885	678.933	-0.015	530.654	328.023	0.014	0.125	0.429
	-479.205	-704.148	-0.025	-514.529	-490.987	-0.023	-1.195	-0.226
<b>Trade</b>	10.178	-0.808	0	2.268	7.468	0.001	0.032	0.027*
	-27.601	-15.886	-0.002	-14.815	-19.529	-0.001	-0.062	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.031	0.049	0.066	0.047	0.09	0.108	0.689	0.031
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.496	0.996	0.588	0.143	0.458	0.101	0.231	0.667
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 85 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.443**	-0.155	0.039	0.144*	0.631***	0.404	0.798***	0.674***	0.646***	0.318*
	-0.135	-0.182	-0.041	-0.054	-0.069	-0.257	-0.035	-0.074	-0.067	-0.115
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	0.009	-0.699	0.313	0.896	-0.002	-1.046*	-0.065	-0.04	0.036	-0.235
	-2.996	-0.804	-0.379	-0.576	-0.051	-0.405	-0.108	-0.033	-0.078	-0.671
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-10.224	2.874	-5.528*	-3.276*	0.137	-3.925	-0.44	0.19	0.16	-3.222
	-18.518	-1.995	-2.126	-1.502	-0.14	-6.251	-0.617	-0.163	-0.302	-4.098
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.016	0.01	-0.035	0.011	0.003	-0.175	-0.031	-0.001	0.009	0.093
	-0.361	-0.063	-0.071	-0.138	-0.006	-0.202	-0.042	-0.007	-0.019	-0.098
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.713	0.04	0.141	0.01	-0.023*	-0.943**	-0.168**	-0.012	-0.087***	0.854**
	-0.367	-0.08	-0.073	-0.154	-0.009	-0.267	-0.053	-0.008	-0.02	-0.287
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.148	-0.009	-0.265	-0.668	0.011	-0.168	-0.093	-0.005	-0.032	0.728
	-0.935	-0.283	-0.468	-0.37	-0.021	-0.569	-0.107	-0.014	-0.041	-0.534
<b>Trade</b>	-0.041	0.450***	0.492***	0.027*	0	-0.036	-0.004	0	-0.004	0.060**
	-0.067	-0.022	-0.016	-0.01	0	-0.024	-0.004	0	-0.003	-0.015
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.695	0.866	0.332	0.002	0.01	0.161	0.003	0.01	0.006	0.02
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.233	0.135	0.141	0.234	0.485	0.332	0.899	0.513	0.079	0.92
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 85 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.846	0.337	0.776***	-1.092	0.015	-0.428	0.255	-0.202
	-0.833	-0.23	-0.078	-1.703	-0.142	-0.39	-0.209	-0.143
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-16.645	1.862	-0.548	13.716	-4.304	0.77	1.414	7.136
	-8.007	-7.674	-0.965	-14.731	-3.189	-4.158	-0.653	-5.595
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-29.74	-32.874**	-11.543	19.804*	9.251	20.253	-0.73	5.392
	-24.154	-8.294	-5.421	-7.252	-3.917	-9.456	-3.206	-5.422
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.627	-0.909**	-0.524	0.232	-2.207***	-0.347	-0.238	1.947***
	-0.817	-0.242	-0.299	-0.544	-0.34	-0.19	-0.153	-0.292
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.645	0.122	-0.152	-0.178	0.830*	0.105	0.088	-0.741
	-0.664	-0.198	-0.24	-0.208	-0.315	-0.119	-0.117	-0.475
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.99	0.018***	0.021**	2.136	4.311**	0	0.007	-4.243**
	-2.255	-0.003	-0.006	-1.907	-0.982	-0.013	-0.004	-0.727
<b>Trade</b>	0.113	0.105	0.006	-0.201	-0.054	-0.012	0.034	0.029
	-0.166	-0.063	-0.026	-0.182	-0.045	-0.049	-0.018	-0.029
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.257	0.817	0.075	0.121	0.204	0.085	0.026	0.266
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.916	0.228	0.783	0.379	0.757	0.274	0.926	0.329
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 86 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.198	0.161	-0.087	-0.21	0.272	-0.04	-0.036	0.046
	-0.124	-0.288	-0.281	-0.252	-0.255	-0.158	-0.216	-0.127
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-1296.136	-15.742	0.062	-513.378	119.293	-0.029	1.734	0.905
	-771.462	-254.1	-0.047	-344.339	-220.514	-0.031	-1.267	-0.737
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	268.322	8825.645***	1.280*	3457.920*	6813.075***	1.162	30.261*	4.397
	-2147.815	-1337.922	-0.47	-1250.734	-949.634	-0.578	-9.951	-6.149
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	74.595	-43.129	0	17.451	-32.832	-0.002	-0.918	-0.263*
	-82.657	-62.386	-0.013	-43.671	-56.355	-0.011	-0.569	-0.11
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	32.56	-171.642*	-0.023	-290.044*	-144.497*	0.01	-0.965*	0.224
	-236.8	-66.798	-0.019	-117.069	-58.338	-0.012	-0.412	-0.168
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1963.892*	-3.632	-0.152	721.298	-1.741	-0.06	-0.852	0.023**
	-656.437	-1.653	-0.075	-397.997	-1.34	-0.048	-2.437	-0.006
<b>Trade</b>	-41.768	-8.893	0	-21.363	-4.246	-0.001	-0.013	0.017
	-23.019	-9.32	-0.002	-19.49	-7.062	-0.002	-0.07	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.959	0.071	0.977	0.582	0.121	0.77	0.095	0.387
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.47	0.856	0.252	0.335	0.85	0.228	0.342	0.198
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 86 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.046	-0.107	0.049*	0.074*	0.382**	0.468*	0.289	0.25	0.214	0.178
	-0.127	-0.222	-0.019	-0.025	-0.104	-0.154	-0.132	-0.182	-0.138	-0.108
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_ES</b>	-1.423	1.186**	-0.973**	-1.339***	0.053	-0.292	-0.06	-0.002	-0.022	1.023
	-1.567	-0.324	-0.223	-0.268	-0.06	-0.674	-0.211	-0.047	-0.029	-0.551
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-25.513*	5.074*	-4.527*	-4.615*	-0.068	-2.198	-1.395	0.218	-0.266	1.377
	-8.717	-2.085	-1.987	-1.987	-0.327	-1.38	-1.2	-0.231	-0.481	-1.76
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.745	0.091	-0.11	-0.188	-0.011	-0.115	-0.196	-0.021	0.061	-0.172
	-0.461	-0.17	-0.16	-0.233	-0.021	-0.263	-0.125	-0.016	-0.032	-0.193
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.863**	0.143	-0.025	-0.472	-0.035	-0.836**	-0.211	-0.073	-0.001	0.579*
	-0.256	-0.14	-0.092	-0.274	-0.031	-0.237	-0.149	-0.045	-0.066	-0.235
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.024*	0.007	-0.009*	-0.014**	0.001	0.014*	-0.008**	0.002*	0.005*	-0.006
	-0.009	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.001	-0.006	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.065	0.431***	0.509***	0.048*	-0.002	-0.018	-0.015	0	0.001	0.032
	-0.076	-0.014	-0.013	-0.016	-0.003	-0.017	-0.012	-0.002	-0.004	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.053	0.11	0.252	0.022	0.036	0.122	0.066	0.036	0.01	0.176
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.361	0.199	0.27	0.302	0.318	0.928	0.639	0.74	0.039	0.59
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 86 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_ES). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.415**	0.747***	0.774***	0.268*	0.419***	0.571***	0.542***	0.313*
	-0.132	-0.057	-0.04	-0.123	-0.079	-0.114	-0.132	-0.118
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	1.014	0.114	0.001	-0.800*	0.502	0.134	0.136	-0.397
	-0.525	-0.196	-0.215	-0.286	-0.426	-0.177	-0.207	-0.331
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-14.711*	-2.47	-2.215*	10.250**	3.576	3.607	5.586*	-2.283
	-6.217	-1.836	-1.011	-3.251	-3.667	-1.879	-2.323	-3.632
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.331*	-0.037	-0.068	0.139	-0.068	0.028	0.033	0.138
	-0.145	-0.069	-0.07	-0.106	-0.112	-0.06	-0.059	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.066	-0.220*	-0.335***	-0.108	-0.246	0.01	0.007	0.193
	-0.238	-0.098	-0.081	-0.129	-0.133	-0.05	-0.052	-0.122
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.384	0.003	0.008*	-0.038	0.431	0.041***	-0.003	-0.07
	-0.496	-0.008	-0.004	-0.315	-0.235	-0.007	-0.005	-0.326
<b>Trade</b>	0.008	-0.016	-0.02	-0.01	0.019	0.007	0.009	0.001
	-0.026	-0.014	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.006	-0.007	-0.015
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.122	0.01	0.004	0.094	0.003	0.006	0.004	0.005
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.216	0.692	0.538	0.154	0.917	0.296	0.474	0.657
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 87 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.647**	0.899***	0.158	0.878***	0.879***	0.091	-0.068	0.156
	-0.182	-0.047	-0.298	-0.106	-0.032	-0.099	-0.214	-0.181
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	315.048	281.89	0.17	119.826	199.516	0.013	1.714*	0.107
	-454.39	-400.484	-0.017	-387.187	-288.726	-0.022	-0.662	-0.308
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1634.265	4593.565*	0.707*	1061.855	4073.764*	0.728	26.041*	2.561
	-3826.718	-2046.196	-0.291	-2880.984	-1637.47	-0.427	-9.531	-4.117
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-179.763	20.66	0.012	-83.161	39.327	0.013	-0.125	-0.11
	-125.028	-69.53	-0.007	-119.183	-78.738	-0.007	-0.324	-0.08
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-149.055	-294.035	-0.007	-170.32	-201.924	-0.006	-0.875**	0.182*
	-175.792	-148.931	-0.009	-116.237	-118.807	-0.008	-0.312	-0.073
<b>Share of elder people</b>	793.060*	-0.811	-0.048	-73.73	0.037	-0.021	-0.837	0.021***
	-368.31	-2.284	-0.029	-379.623	-2.492	-0.019	-0.861	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	29.638	14.739	0.1	24.678	15.15	0.1	0.013	0.009
	-20.436	-13.692	-0.001	-16.308	-14.759	-0.001	-0.038	-0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.013	0.017	0.204	0.014	0.063	0.032	0.024	0.129
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.457	0.997	0.271	0.161	0.396	0.884	0.424	0.936
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 87 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.156	-0.103	0.02	0.093**	0.407***	0.520**	0.703***	0.511***	0.471***	0.292***
	-0.181	-0.179	-0.018	-0.029	-0.101	-0.171	-0.11	-0.099	-0.108	-0.058
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-0.729	0.476	-0.613	-0.949**	0.015	-0.414	-0.118	-0.002	0.037	0.017
	-0.61	-0.381	-0.303	-0.328	-0.023	-0.305	-0.064	-0.019	-0.064	-0.261
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-21.537*	3.082*	-3.870*	-3.918	-0.018	-2.614	-1.139	0.131	0.077	-0.747
	-8.137	-1.45	-1.436	-1.979	-0.17	-2.616	-1.08	-0.134	-0.354	-1.595
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.216	0.078	-0.133	-0.167	0.008	-0.067	-0.039	-0.004	0.008	0.01
	-0.279	-0.104	-0.099	-0.178	-0.008	-0.145	-0.036	-0.008	-0.019	-0.098
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.913***	0.073	0.089	-0.182	-0.026*	-0.981***	-0.157*	-0.028	-0.070**	0.741***
	-0.247	-0.068	-0.075	-0.166	-0.011	-0.206	-0.058	-0.017	-0.022	-0.189
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.016	0.01	-0.007	-0.016	0.001	0.012	-0.002	0.002***	0.004**	-0.004
	-0.017	-0.006	-0.004	-0.009	-0.001	-0.013	-0.001	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.002	0.448***	0.506***	0.043**	0.1	-0.026	-0.005	0.1	-0.004	0.053***
	-0.036	-0.012	-0.009	-0.013	-0.001	-0.023	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.025	0.483	0.189	0	0.015	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.447	0.078	0.095	0.119	0.434	0.453	0.619	0.513	0.018	0.851
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 87 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.407**	0.795***	0.764***	0.271*	0.423***	0.578***	0.631***	0.322*
	-0.137	-0.044	-0.06	-0.126	-0.089	-0.11	-0.143	-0.119
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	0.974	0.106	0.136	-0.795*	0.383	0.093	-0.02	-0.37
	-0.51	-0.195	-0.223	-0.28	-0.443	-0.173	-0.266	-0.337
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-14.457*	-0.415	-1.199	10.060**	4.18	2.877	4.429	-1.95
	-6.227	-1.268	-1.466	-3.36	-3.95	-1.621	-2.771	-3.684
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.234	0.005	-0.003	0.093	0.012	0.08	0.065	0.075
	-0.127	-0.039	-0.045	-0.102	-0.103	-0.054	-0.053	-0.104
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.091	-0.288**	-0.371***	-0.105	-0.327	-0.005	0.007	0.259
	-0.262	-0.094	-0.085	-0.146	-0.157	-0.057	-0.064	-0.136
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.182	-0.293	-0.303	-0.128	0.37	0.429*	0.175	0.042
	-0.501	-0.167	-0.2	-0.319	-0.243	-0.182	-0.12	-0.355
<b>Trade</b>	0	-0.017	-0.018	-0.008	0.015	0.003	0.005	0.004
	-0.029	-0.011	-0.016	-0.012	-0.014	-0.008	-0.005	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.109	0.004	0.012	0.093	0.005	0.009	0.009	0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.19	0.335	0.259	0.153	0.939	0.171	0.32	0.624
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 88 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent</b>	0.620**	0.844***	0.026	0.782***	0.874***	-0.059	-0.203	0.493**
	-0.211	-0.068	-0.139	-0.116	-0.045	-0.087	-0.161	-0.15
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-469.61	-494.707	0.008	-623.832	-344.416	0.038	1.613	-0.265
	-504.07	-653.07	-0.023	-542.66	-443.87	-0.027	-0.932	-0.134
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	11814.62	9716.861	0.377	8773.758	6352.676	0.096	13.277	-2.572
	-8325.9	-4715.9	-0.564	-5553.7	-4372.4	-0.478	-18.692	-4.339
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-234.095	20.903	0.014	-97.384	27.713	0.021*	0.198	-0.067
	-165.97	-84.895	-0.009	-158.74	-96.096	-0.008	-0.37	-0.107
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-233.202	-367.924	-0.003	-102.909	-218.604	-0.009	-0.554	0.125
	-206.65	-177.76	-0.008	-104.38	-144.73	-0.012	-0.368	-0.088
<b>Share of elder people</b>	659.48	352.588	-0.008	240.395	206.444	0.009	-0.059	0.600**
	-513.69	-495.6	-0.024	-420.03	-379.06	-0.021	-1.005	-0.204
<b>Trade</b>	21.952	7.467	0.1	14.273	11.217	0.001	0.036	0.02
	-27.016	-14.3	-0.002	-14.242	-19.545	-0.001	-0.06	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.021	0.035	0.067	0.033	0.085	0.094	0.415	0.032
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.502	0.864	0.592	0.198	0.509	0.111	0.377	0.58
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 88 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.493**	-0.113	0.042	0.144*	0.650***	0.423	0.802***	0.690***	0.653***	0.323*
	-0.15	-0.153	-0.045	-0.053	-0.071	-0.255	-0.036	-0.074	-0.068	-0.12
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-1.784	-0.366	0.282	0.526	-0.019	-0.656*	-0.09	-0.011	-0.003	0.28
	-0.926	-0.376	-0.231	-0.347	-0.032	-0.294	-0.078	-0.019	-0.043	-0.48
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-7.441	2.109	-5.453*	-2.592	0.177	-4.638	-0.367	0.107	0.259	-4.634
	-17.41	-1.471	-2	-1.365	-0.138	-6.248	-0.652	-0.165	-0.384	-3.471
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.096	0.006	-0.026	0.017	0.003	-0.209	-0.034	-0.002	0.008	0.097
	-0.325	-0.063	-0.073	-0.14	-0.008	-0.205	-0.044	-0.008	-0.019	-0.093
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.684	0.066	0.138	0.001	-0.024*	-0.927**	-0.168**	-0.011	-0.088***	0.869**
	-0.353	-0.097	-0.073	-0.153	-0.009	-0.261	-0.052	-0.008	-0.02	-0.296
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.393	-0.025	-0.256	-0.666	0.011	-0.243	-0.091	-0.005	-0.037	0.706
	-0.794	-0.264	-0.467	-0.362	-0.021	-0.563	-0.106	-0.013	-0.043	-0.509
<b>Trade</b>	-0.042	0.451***	0.492***	0.027**	-0.001	-0.032	-0.004	0.1	-0.003	0.064**
	-0.066	-0.021	-0.016	-0.009	-0.001	-0.022	-0.004	-0.01	-0.002	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.385	0.746	0.286	0.001	0.013	0.121	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.393	0.152	0.145	0.239	0.567	0.349	0.891	0.513	0.068	0.935
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 88 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	1.184	0.417	0.761***	-1.81	0.073	-0.448	0.333	-0.117
	-1.027	-0.209	-0.084	-1.444	-0.209	-0.356	-0.242	-0.234
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-21.698	-1.499	-0.667	8.446	-0.144	-0.089	0.531	-0.136
	-22.209	-0.417	-0.877	-11.936	-0.392	-0.216	-0.379	-0.823
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-10.994	-30.689**	-11.452	20.345	7.988	20.535*	-3.057	6.37
	-43.073	-6.481	-5.576	-9.507	-4.606	-8.624	-3.913	-4.119
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-2.618	-1.159**	-0.58	0.448	-2.175**	-0.368	-0.179	1.838**
	-1.638	-0.23	-0.349	-0.775	-0.418	-0.172	-0.174	-0.388
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.588	0.224	-0.1	-0.039	0.81	0.114	0.09	-0.684
	-0.301	-0.186	-0.27	-0.401	-0.348	-0.107	-0.117	-0.547
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.112	0.018***	0.021*	2.724	4.315*	-0.001	0.008	-4.208*
	-2.84	-0.003	-0.007	-3.053	-1.274	-0.012	-0.006	-1.287
<b>Trade</b>	0.06	0.120*	0.003	-0.285	-0.061	-0.01	0.034	0.044
	-0.228	-0.05	-0.027	-0.22	-0.048	-0.049	-0.022	-0.044
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.079	0.556	0.077	0.139	0.162	0.227	0.04	0.203
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.109	0.239	0.797	0.198	0.623	0.297	0.735	0.401
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 89 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.287*	0.164	-0.162	-0.154	0.237	-0.032	-0.032	-0.01
	-0.123	-0.309	-0.273	-0.268	-0.27	-0.147	-0.205	-0.107
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-917.811	-2.844	0.027	-284.507	-1.99	-0.022	1.751	0.868
	-787.72	-240.06	-0.036	-348.18	-177.12	-0.013	-1.149	-0.446
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1062.237	8813.943***	1.297*	3424.660*	7054.002***	1.166	29.877*	4.221
	-1839.3	-1418.5	-0.474	-1169.9	-944.13	-0.588	-9.678	-5.752
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	18.628	-44.083	0	-20.362	-26.397	-0.003	-0.786	-0.194
	-126.23	-54.899	-0.013	-58.44	-45.815	-0.011	-0.572	-0.147
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	86.377	-170.960*	-0.024	-272.202*	-150.124*	0.012	-1.115*	0.15
	-220.98	-61.446	-0.019	-114.76	-50.798	-0.013	-0.404	-0.131
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1981.207*	-3.59	-0.157	669.494	-2.314	-0.061	-0.895	0.026***
	-654.97	-2.452	-0.075	-411.26	-1.865	-0.05	-2.491	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	-38.495	-8.781	0.001	-17.428	-5.522	-0.001	-0.017	0.014
	-20.988	-8.26	-0.002	-19.3	-6.047	-0.002	-0.062	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.543	0.046	0.79	0.772	0.086	0.952	0.087	0.108
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.427	0.892	0.254	0.327	0.474	0.23	0.329	0.112
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 89 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.01	-0.114	0.033	0.082*	0.403**	0.479*	0.293*	0.253	0.214	0.223*
	-0.107	-0.209	-0.022	-0.029	-0.096	-0.149	-0.127	-0.181	-0.136	-0.085
<b>Lagged RRP_LOG_LIN</b>	-0.722	0.956*	-0.852**	-0.963**	0.024	0.119	0.004	0.007	-0.004	0.242
	-1.108	-0.302	-0.224	-0.25	-0.031	-0.482	-0.138	-0.038	-0.043	-0.284
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-25.218*	5.219*	-4.667*	-4.366	-0.085	-1.426	-1.275	0.238	-0.236	0.648
	-9.298	-2.226	-2.037	-2.006	-0.306	-1.593	-1.083	-0.255	-0.513	-1.657
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.664	0.111	-0.116	-0.215	-0.006	-0.2	-0.207	-0.023	0.058	-0.105
	-0.438	-0.189	-0.176	-0.265	-0.016	-0.217	-0.128	-0.016	-0.03	-0.178
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.905*	0.114	-0.015	-0.453	-0.036	-0.833**	-0.214	-0.073	-0.001	0.614*
	-0.296	-0.167	-0.09	-0.318	-0.029	-0.232	-0.145	-0.045	-0.067	-0.247
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.023*	0.004	-0.006	-0.011**	0.001	0.013*	-0.008**	0.002*	0.004*	-0.008
	-0.008	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.074	0.432***	0.511***	0.050*	-0.002	-0.024	-0.016	0	0.001	0.029
	-0.078	-0.013	-0.012	-0.016	-0.002	-0.017	-0.011	-0.003	-0.004	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.057	0.068	0.086	0.022	0.044	0.117	0.067	0.034	0.01	0.155
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.365	0.227	0.303	0.321	0.303	0.964	0.663	0.775	0.04	0.621
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 89 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_LOG\_LIN). Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.407**	0.757***	0.797***	0.237	0.431***	0.580***	0.523***	0.312**
	-0.144	-0.056	-0.05	-0.134	-0.081	-0.115	-0.137	-0.109
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	1.787	0.36	0.317	-2.060*	0.231	-0.078	0.347	-0.124
	-0.871	-0.672	-0.482	-0.986	-0.698	-0.411	-0.368	-0.696
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	3.145**	0.477	1.004	-3.536*	0.877	0.076	0.601	-1.105
	-1.048	-0.702	-0.48	-1.327	-0.861	-0.513	-0.414	-0.888
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-13.874	-2.335	-2.086	10.674*	4.326	3.799*	5.886*	-3.281
	-6.828	-1.845	-1.065	-4.231	-3.98	-1.748	-2.33	-3.891
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.327*	-0.034	-0.05	0.112	-0.081	0.023	0.036	0.154
	-0.121	-0.056	-0.062	-0.088	-0.11	-0.06	-0.059	-0.105
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.042	-0.218*	-0.350***	-0.144	-0.251	0.007	0.004	0.199
	-0.253	-0.098	-0.09	-0.161	-0.137	-0.05	-0.053	-0.126
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.358	0.004	0.008	-0.087	0.448	0.041***	-0.005	-0.084
	-0.498	-0.008	-0.005	-0.302	-0.249	-0.007	-0.005	-0.311
<b>Trade</b>	0.004	-0.016	-0.019	-0.01	0.017	0.007	0.009	0.002
	-0.028	-0.014	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.006	-0.007	-0.015
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.091	0.005	0.002	0.049	0.002	0.006	0.005	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.202	0.674	0.502	0.1	0.914	0.306	0.44	0.601
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

Table 90 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH).

Sample: ALL. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.661*** -0.171	0.895*** -0.046	0.197 -0.246	0.894*** -0.096	0.876*** -0.033	0.278 -0.226	-0.084 -0.213	0.142 -0.186	-0.095 -0.19
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	1127.236 -1717.38	460.399 -401.436	0.026 -0.157	1608.064 -821.874	499.301 -247.62	-0.151 -0.157	0.844 -1.558	-0.296 -0.385	0.139 -2.164
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	1527.518 -1893.607	45.491 -417.801	-0.04 -0.174	1667.726 -788	171.923 -243.553	-0.181 -0.159	1.197 -1.459	-0.53 -0.28	-0.679 -1.999
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	698.34 -4203.168	5153.867* -2195.015	0.752* -0.313	335.648 -2780.561	4491.917* -1734.51	0.801* -0.373	26.245* -9.708	2.714 -4.193	-20.759* -8.654
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-217.431 -117.168	9.215 -61.151	0.013 -0.007	-83.114 -111.981	31.672 -77.676	0.011 -0.007	-0.21 -0.327	-0.122 -0.081	0.243 -0.272
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-126.313 -173.955	-286.442 -148.874	-0.006 -0.009	-141.651 -122.091	-194.28 -118.892	-0.006 -0.01	-0.844** -0.303	0.183* -0.072	0.942*** -0.244
<b>Share of elder people</b>	888.397* -395.245	-1.775 -2.028	-0.044 -0.027	9.5 -381.738	-0.519 -2.611	-0.024 -0.02	-0.701 -0.872	0.020*** -0.003	0.02 -0.015
<b>Trade</b>	31.871 -20.391	14.652 -14.232	-0.001 -0.001	25.03 -16.468	15.035 -14.938	0 -0.001	0.016 -0.039	0.008 -0.009	-0.006 -0.036
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.012	0.019	0.106	0.021	0.065	0.033	0.038	0.151	0.023
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.458	0.965	0.328	0.269	0.39	0.9	0.477	0.692	0.462
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145	145

*Table 90 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: ALL. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*



	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.019	0.095**	0.501***	0.406***	0.519**	0.668***	0.502***	0.467***	0.290***
	-0.019	-0.026	-0.065	-0.089	-0.169	-0.115	-0.096	-0.111	-0.06
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	0.996	-1.382**	-1.973**	0.079	-0.307	-0.064	-0.06	0.105	-0.305
	-0.661	-0.442	-0.685	-0.058	-0.828	-0.107	-0.039	-0.116	-0.69
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	0.85	-1.338**	-2.295**	0.041	-1.2	-0.648**	-0.028	0.091	-0.214
	-0.531	-0.428	-0.646	-0.068	-0.755	-0.207	-0.036	-0.115	-0.658
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	2.903	-3.710*	-4.348*	-0.029	-2.811	-1.496	0.149	0.062	-0.76
	-1.461	-1.543	-2.023	-0.178	-2.625	-1.119	-0.129	-0.362	-1.604
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.083	-0.138	-0.185	0.007	-0.066	-0.037	-0.002	0.008	-0.006
	-0.104	-0.097	-0.178	-0.009	-0.14	-0.035	-0.008	-0.02	-0.1
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.077	0.084	-0.186	-0.023*	-0.952***	-0.133*	-0.029	-0.068**	0.733***
	-0.064	-0.068	-0.156	-0.01	-0.203	-0.056	-0.018	-0.022	-0.186
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.01	-0.008	-0.016	0.001	0.011	-0.003*	0.002***	0.005**	-0.004
	-0.006	-0.005	-0.01	-0.012	-0.012	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	0.452***	0.502***	0.041**	-0.004	-0.026	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.054***
	-0.011	-0.011	-0.013	-0.001	-0.023	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.463	0.155	0	0.013	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.008
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.07	0.08	0.109	0.513	0.728	0.896	0.565	0.014	0.819
<b># of observations</b>	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

*Table 90 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: ALL. Significant at: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001*

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.397*	0.784***	0.758***	0.238	0.439***	0.588***	0.635***	0.317**
	-0.146	-0.045	-0.062	-0.138	-0.086	-0.112	-0.146	-0.109
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	1.027	-0.367	-0.315	-1.966	-0.316	-0.19	-0.203	0.262
	-0.876	-0.338	-0.346	-1.211	-0.603	-0.476	-0.543	-0.718
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	2.336*	-0.246	0.094	-3.440*	0.02	-0.178	0.028	-0.618
	-1.076	-0.402	-0.405	-1.535	-0.674	-0.605	-0.699	-0.91
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-13.073	-0.059	-0.911	10.492*	5.132	3.137	4.451	-3.285
	-6.773	-1.04	-1.456	-4.493	-4.208	-1.501	-2.714	-3.954
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.253*	-0.005	-0.014	0.089	-0.002	0.074	0.063	0.096
	-0.112	-0.035	-0.045	-0.092	-0.106	-0.054	-0.053	-0.106
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.078	-0.294**	-0.378***	-0.146	-0.341*	-0.012	0.002	0.275
	-0.28	-0.096	-0.092	-0.184	-0.161	-0.058	-0.067	-0.139
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.173	-0.295	-0.305	-0.15T1	0.393	0.417*	0.157	0.025
	-0.508	-0.166	-0.197	-0.313	-0.246	-0.187	-0.127	-0.335
<b>Trade</b>	-0.005	-0.017	-0.018	-0.009	0.012	0.003	0.005	0.006
	-0.03	-0.01	-0.015	-0.014	-0.015	-0.007	-0.005	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.089	0.006	0.011	0.052	0.004	0.01	0.009	0.006
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.157	0.341	0.242	0.088	0.931	0.184	0.299	0.56
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

Table 91 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH).

Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.614*	0.838***	-0.007	0.795***	0.875***	0.018	-0.211	0.515**
	-0.216	-0.072	-0.14	-0.118	-0.047	-0.12	-0.179	-0.143
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	-593.897	-1246.43	-0.023	150.576	-495.984	-0.052	-1.615	0.105
	-1018.8	-1046.7	-0.049	-1301.3	-671.59	-0.053	-1.045	-0.54
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	-1251	-2473.68	-0.016	-130.576	-1384.62	-0.066	-1.434	-0.043
	-1040.8	-1288.5	-0.061	-1550.7	-794.18	-0.068	-1.904	-0.509
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	11286.63	9336.632	0.397	7666.607	6118.632	0.168	17.541	-2.96
	-8459.2	-4678.2	-0.578	-5805.3	-4473.8	-0.505	-20.316	-4.39
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-200.838	56.292	0.014	-61.646	51.435	0.019*	0.112	-0.051
	-151.46	-93.526	-0.009	-159.41	-105.63	-0.008	-0.379	-0.107
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-235.11	-360.771	-0.004	-71.915	-204.551	-0.012	-0.641	0.134
	-212.14	-177.82	-0.009	-116.38	-146.65	-0.014	-0.422	-0.094
<b>Share of elder people</b>	720.371	395.852	-0.011	195.628	238.224	0.012	0.076	0.584*
	-536.9	-514.04	-0.023	-421.44	-394.14	-0.022	-1.027	-0.211
<b>Trade</b>	20.372	6.34	0	14.461	9.22	0.001	0.03	0.02
	-26.098	-14.307	-0.001	-14.214	-18.631	-0.001	-0.06	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.023	0.039	0.08	0.031	0.087	0.059	0.706	0.03
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.515	0.867	0.592	0.171	0.517	0.088	0.193	0.667
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

*Table 91 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.113	0.041	0.141*	0.563***	0.633***	0.414	0.770***	0.687***	0.635***	0.317*
	-0.183	-0.046	-0.053	-0.046	-0.07	-0.253	-0.027	-0.072	-0.065	-0.115
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	3.474	-0.86	0.115	0.998	0.006	-1	-0.19	-0.06	0.159	-0.28
	-1.495	-0.978	-0.613	-0.73	-0.045	-1.075	-0.196	-0.032	-0.096	-0.939
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	2.939	-1.518	0.434	0.959	-0.013	-2.063*	-0.642**	-0.045	0.077	-0.361
	-1.81	-0.994	-0.612	-0.766	-0.054	-0.768	-0.211	-0.044	-0.12	-1.027
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.656	2.082	-5.019*	-2.212	0.127	-5.312	-0.531	0.12	0.163	-3.72
	-18.761	-1.497	-2.063	-1.236	-0.123	-5.947	-0.688	-0.151	-0.453	-2.796
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.013	0.015	-0.041	0.01	0.003	-0.193	-0.031	-0.001	0.007	0.091
	-0.343	-0.059	-0.076	-0.136	-0.008	-0.19	-0.04	-0.007	-0.02	-0.099
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.817*	0.063	0.125	0.006	-0.023*	-0.917**	-0.161**	-0.012	-0.085***	0.857*
	-0.387	-0.097	-0.071	-0.149	-0.009	-0.258	-0.047	-0.008	-0.02	-0.299
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.216	-0.004	-0.251	-0.696	0.013	-0.229	-0.094	-0.003	-0.03	0.723
	-0.835	-0.269	-0.472	-0.357	-0.022	-0.552	-0.104	-0.014	-0.046	-0.52
<b>Trade</b>	-0.037	0.451***	0.492***	0.025**	0	-0.029	-0.004	0	-0.004	0.062**
	-0.067	-0.022	-0.016	-0.008	0	-0.021	-0.004	0	-0.003	-0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.758	0.732	0.317	0.001	0.01	0.136	0.003	0.012	0.006	0.02
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.163	0.149	0.145	0.244	0.445	0.375	0.992	0.545	0.103	0.919
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

*Table 91 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.869	0.366	0.896***	-3.123*	0.172	-0.527	0.286	-0.065
	-1.179	-0.242	-0.121	-0.956	-0.195	-0.478	-0.22	-0.399
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	0.17	-2.057	0.525	9.237	-3.555	1.218	1.106	1.692
	-8.587	-1.273	-1.459	-2.402	-3.872	-1.941	-0.475	-7.167
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	0	-5.378	1.890	0	-5.955	1.643	1.443	2.799
	(.)	-2.217	-0.816	(.)	-6.363	-2.96	-0.651	-11.988
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-36.375	-36.253***	-7.647	51.338**	-1.622	23.058	0.223	10.652
	-43.457	-6.278	-5.62	-8.698	-13.416	-11.068	-4.356	-20.011
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.83	-1.531**	-0.401	2.308**	-3.062*	-0.12	-0.111	2.3
	-2.711	-0.354	-0.338	-0.443	-1.064	-0.468	-0.193	-1.969
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.615	0.336	-0.246	-0.666	1.065	0.047	0.021	-0.817
	-0.965	-0.21	-0.284	-0.32	-0.477	-0.147	-0.16	-0.936
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.653	0.020***	0.017*	2.146	5.045**	-0.004	0.001	-4.602*
	-3.484	-0.003	-0.007	-0.876	-1.142	-0.017	-0.008	-1.819
<b>Trade</b>	0.115	0.130**	0.018	-0.415*	-0.068	-0.017	0.027	0.048
	-0.169	-0.032	-0.026	-0.128	-0.037	-0.045	-0.022	-0.045
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.121	0.129	0.073	0.252	0.291	0.137	0.031	0.217
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.333	0.346	0.575	0.259	0.548	0.288	0.799	0.378
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

Table 92 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH).

Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.131	0.165	-0.223	0.015	0.283	0.094	-0.041	-0.001
	-0.271	-0.277	-0.255	-0.103	-0.26	-0.345	-0.221	-0.17
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	-1310.82	11.807	0.133	145.643	55.163	-0.093	2.473	0.231
	-709.53	-145.45	-0.119	-513.69	-110.64	-0.15	-1.396	-0.741
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	-18.674	17.566	0	488.099	41.677	-0.155	2.132	-0.412
	-1575.9	-182.43	-0.161	-661.16	-166.82	-0.16	-1.941	-0.456
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-415.195	8412.807***	1.419*	2346.663	6991.530***	1.232	28.890*	4.308
	-2503.5	-1217.4	-0.598	-1782.9	-926.63	-0.557	-9.895	-6.066
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	38.662	-48.567	-0.004	-11.51	-36.933	-0.004	-0.793	-0.24
	-112.91	-48.667	-0.019	-50.367	-43.199	-0.013	-0.597	-0.122
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-56.538	-168.308*	-0.017	-337.84	-142.865*	0.021	-0.951*	0.246
	-337.04	-55.504	-0.032	-163.5	-48.668	-0.031	-0.314	-0.188
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1714.746*	-3.186*	-0.148	556.697*	-2.216*	-0.058	-0.688	0.020*
	-532.32	-1.032	-0.071	-183.27	-0.812	-0.051	-2.623	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-22.437	-8.209	0	-9.044	-5.356	-0.002	-0.018	0.005
	-12.082	-8.569	-0.002	-11.299	-6.48	-0.002	-0.069	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.19	0.085	0.391	0.05	0.119	0.869	0.081	0.605
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.251	0.875	0.311	0.294	0.369	0.208	0.356	0.732
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

*Table 92 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.103	0.028	0.097*	0.533***	0.409***	0.459**	0.283	0.246	0.211	0.222*
	-0.217	-0.024	-0.03	-0.082	-0.082	-0.118	-0.126	-0.176	-0.134	-0.082
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_MED</b>	-2.35	1.547*	-1.399**	-1.585**	0.102	0.745	0.09	-0.055	-0.052	0.023
	-1.585	-0.524	-0.374	-0.478	-0.087	-0.876	-0.344	-0.088	-0.133	-0.875
<b>Lagged RRP_STR_HIGH</b>	-2.455	1.086	-1.326*	-2.028***	0.043	0.322	-0.378	0.02	-0.043	0.978
	-2.006	-0.582	-0.437	-0.367	-0.119	-0.873	-0.265	-0.05	-0.104	-0.928
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-24.267*	4.272	-4.153	-3.839	-0.119	-1.075	-1.456	0.231	-0.254	0.691
	-7.892	-2.324	-2.139	-2.353	-0.285	-2.059	-1.157	-0.25	-0.47	-1.558
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.652	0.161	-0.163	-0.274	-0.005	-0.182	-0.19	-0.023	0.06	-0.14
	-0.411	-0.2	-0.179	-0.258	-0.022	-0.184	-0.1	-0.016	-0.031	-0.138
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.963**	0.109	0.037	-0.404	-0.028	-0.790**	-0.157	-0.081	-0.003	0.536*
	-0.241	-0.167	-0.097	-0.287	-0.031	-0.202	-0.122	-0.05	-0.068	-0.23
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.028**	0.005	-0.007	-0.012**	0.001	0.011	-0.009**	0.002*	0.005*	-0.006
	-0.006	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.006	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.052	0.447***	0.495***	0.042	-0.002	-0.032	-0.016	0	0.001	0.03
	-0.074	-0.012	-0.019	-0.022	-0.002	-0.018	-0.011	-0.002	-0.004	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.061	0.07	0.095	0.021	0.039	0.085	0.06	0.028	0.008	0.143
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.372	0.219	0.306	0.314	0.391	0.929	0.83	0.877	0.057	0.845
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 92 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: PH-STR. Political variable: RRP's electoral strength (RRP\_STR\_MED and

RRP\_STR\_HIGH). Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.409**	0.748***	0.773***	0.246*	0.432***	0.574***	0.549***	0.326**
	-0.135	-0.057	-0.041	-0.119	-0.08	-0.112	-0.133	-0.116
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-0.162	-0.264	-0.018	0.013	0.086	-0.101	0.072	0.181
	-0.398	-0.255	-0.188	-0.304	-0.259	-0.222	-0.148	-0.269
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.739*	-2.15	-2.212*	7.646*	4.607	3.884*	5.707*	-3.878
	-5.529	-1.73	-0.915	-2.994	-3.888	-1.811	-2.315	-3.793
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.383*	-0.048	-0.068	0.166	-0.085	0.02	0.029	0.16
	-0.144	-0.068	-0.068	-0.101	-0.114	-0.06	-0.06	-0.106
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.09	-0.222*	-0.334***	-0.088	-0.256	0.007	0.008	0.212
	-0.233	-0.099	-0.081	-0.119	-0.136	-0.05	-0.054	-0.124
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.384	0.003	0.008	-0.034	0.457	0.041***	-0.004	-0.064
	-0.498	-0.008	-0.004	-0.317	-0.246	-0.007	-0.005	-0.292
<b>Trade</b>	0.002	-0.016	-0.02	-0.005	0.016	0.007	0.009	0.005
	-0.025	-0.013	-0.013	-0.011	-0.014	-0.006	-0.007	-0.016
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.12	0.011	0.004	0.098	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.213	0.614	0.517	0.159	0.833	0.355	0.414	0.715
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 93 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*



	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.637**	0.901***	0.137	0.878***	0.880***	0.116	-0.077	0.148
	-0.187	-0.049	-0.284	-0.108	-0.032	-0.089	-0.215	-0.181
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	675.504	228.623	-0.035	305.035	157.739	0.2	0.645	-0.206
	-827.49	-259.335	-0.029	-522.628	-172.501	-0.017	-0.605	-0.198
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1500.424	4760.101*	0.734*	968.759	4193.936*	0.743	26.517*	2.626
	-3869.327	-2127.835	-0.29	-2985.967	-1701.706	-0.418	-9.656	-4.128
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-169.669	9.081	0.01	-77.485	30.807	0.011	-0.219	-0.124
	-118.103	-61.104	-0.006	-120.216	-79.291	-0.007	-0.329	-0.081
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-169.063	-304.701	-0.007	-174.163	-209.225	-0.007	-0.863*	0.187*
	-174.428	-152.414	-0.008	-119.592	-121.81	-0.008	-0.312	-0.073
<b>Share of elder people</b>	834.185*	-1.722	-0.049	-58.244	-0.55	-0.018	-0.698	0.020***
	-363.967	-1.968	-0.028	-376.392	-2.527	-0.019	-0.859	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	31.842	15.473	0	25.145	15.705	0.01	0.017	0.008
	-20.718	-14.088	-0.001	-16.603	-15.111	-0.001	-0.038	-0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.011	0.016	0.172	0.012	0.061	0.029	0.033	0.137
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.418	0.971	0.234	0.148	0.38	0.892	0.486	0.811
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 93 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.148	-0.108	0.023	0.107**	0.418***	0.533**	0.708***	0.511***	0.485***	0.290***
	-0.181	-0.178	-0.019	-0.03	-0.109	-0.168	-0.115	-0.1	-0.113	-0.058
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-0.337	-0.043	0.193	0.022	-0.007	-0.419	-0.195	-0.015	-0.031	-0.378
	-0.475	-0.212	-0.263	-0.542	-0.025	-0.309	-0.107	-0.029	-0.074	-0.518
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-21.641*	2.833*	-3.745*	-3.255	-0.015	-2.458	-1.191	0.131	0.058	-0.67
	-8.374	-1.327	-1.458	-1.623	-0.167	-2.718	-1.126	-0.132	-0.329	-1.606
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.245	0.076	-0.124	-0.167	0.01	-0.088	-0.042	-0.005	0.011	-0.005
	-0.271	-0.106	-0.1	-0.181	-0.01	-0.153	-0.036	-0.008	-0.02	-0.099
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.925**	0.073	0.124	-0.158	-0.026*	-0.973***	-0.152*	-0.027	-0.071**	0.748***
	-0.252	-0.069	-0.076	-0.157	-0.012	-0.202	-0.059	-0.017	-0.023	-0.19
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.021	0.01	-0.009	-0.016	0.001	0.011	-0.002	0.002***	0.005**	-0.005
	-0.016	-0.005	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001	-0.012	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.004	0.452***	0.495***	0.032*	0.001	-0.03	-0.006	0.001	-0.003	0.053***
	-0.036	-0.01	-0.012	-0.013	-0.001	-0.024	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.024	0.762	0.282	0	0.017	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.47	0.083	0.098	0.122	0.434	0.577	0.615	0.488	0.017	0.798
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 93 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.401**	0.797***	0.769***	0.247	0.428***	0.578***	0.631***	0.328*
	-0.139	-0.044	-0.061	-0.12	-0.09	-0.11	-0.144	-0.118
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	0.145	-0.16	0.07	-0.165	-0.093	-0.123	-0.033	0.226
	-0.325	-0.281	-0.156	-0.322	-0.19	-0.219	-0.152	-0.277
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.639	-0.088	-0.853	7.552*	5.122	3.107	4.404	-3.556
	-5.616	-1.022	-1.416	-3.078	-4.163	-1.6	-2.639	-3.848
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.278*	-0.003	-0.01	0.117	-0.002	0.074	0.065	0.099
	-0.12	-0.036	-0.05	-0.095	-0.104	-0.057	-0.055	-0.105
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.117	-0.292**	-0.377***	-0.084	-0.339*	-0.007	0.007	0.28
	-0.255	-0.094	-0.086	-0.132	-0.16	-0.057	-0.064	-0.138
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.177	-0.301	-0.307	-0.131	0.39	0.431*	0.173	0.042
	-0.499	-0.164	-0.199	-0.322	-0.251	-0.183	-0.124	-0.32
<b>Trade</b>	-0.006	-0.017	-0.019	-0.003	0.012	0.003	0.005	0.008
	-0.028	-0.011	-0.015	-0.012	-0.014	-0.007	-0.005	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.109	0.005	0.012	0.098	0.004	0.01	0.009	0.007
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.199	0.304	0.267	0.163	0.954	0.214	0.314	0.67
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 94 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINCNAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.628**	0.864***	-0.048	0.801***	0.884***	-0.038	-0.203	0.506**
	-0.213	-0.075	-0.134	-0.121	-0.049	-0.104	-0.163	-0.137
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	625.184	240.403	-0.032	342.01	154.849	0.01	0.287	-0.063
	-1224.2	-367.13	-0.036	-714.62	-253.64	-0.018	-0.32	-0.155
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	10896.64	8507.184	0.404	7705.827	5626.047	0.15	16.472	-2.947
	-8476.4	-4802	-0.588	-5642.4	-4546.1	-0.49	-19.388	-4.332
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-186.805	54.044	0.012	-51.961	51.992	0.019*	0.106	-0.054
	-153.2	-82.833	-0.009	-165.86	-106.52	-0.009	-0.382	-0.11
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-234.843	-358.324	-0.001	-85.572	-213.783	-0.01	-0.585	0.13
	-202.01	-172.53	-0.008	-106	-146.34	-0.012	-0.38	-0.087
<b>Share of elder people</b>	608.41	273.231	-0.008	167.247	157.096	0.013	0.162	0.566*
	-504.78	-486.91	-0.023	-420.74	-377.02	-0.021	-0.952	-0.203
<b>Trade</b>	22.748	6.681	0.01	14.198	10.767	0.001	0.029	0.02
	-28.135	-14.083	-0.002	-14.141	-19.167	-0.001	-0.059	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.019	0.033	0.053	0.029	0.082	0.118	0.536	0.03
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.464	0.908	0.514	0.145	0.471	0.102	0.239	0.696
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

*Table 94 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.506**	-0.155	0.05	0.141*	0.636***	0.436	0.795***	0.697***	0.654***	0.317*
	-0.137	-0.166	-0.05	-0.054	-0.077	-0.259	-0.041	-0.072	-0.067	-0.115
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-0.147	0.067	0.068	-0.399	-0.035	-0.367	-0.140*	-0.041*	-0.066	-0.154
	-0.352	-0.185	-0.165	-0.288	-0.022	-0.418	-0.063	-0.017	-0.077	-0.522
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-10.298	1.395	-4.990*	-1.649	0.128	-5.434	-0.641	0.08	0.252	-3.87
	-17.925	-1.393	-1.867	-1.143	-0.135	-6.01	-0.523	-0.131	-0.448	-2.839
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.009	0.028	-0.047	-0.013	0.002	-0.2	-0.031	-0.002	0.007	0.087
	-0.344	-0.056	-0.074	-0.13	-0.008	-0.198	-0.041	-0.008	-0.019	-0.096
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.72	0.089	0.123	-0.014	-0.023*	-0.921**	-0.164**	-0.01	-0.088***	0.865*
	-0.362	-0.109	-0.069	-0.152	-0.009	-0.255	-0.051	-0.008	-0.02	-0.3
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.143	-0.035	-0.241	-0.693	0.014	-0.338	-0.094	-0.004	-0.036	0.723
	-0.765	-0.253	-0.459	-0.342	-0.021	-0.586	-0.107	-0.013	-0.045	-0.526
<b>Trade</b>	-0.04	0.449***	0.493***	0.025**	0	-0.03	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.062**
	-0.067	-0.021	-0.016	-0.008	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.704	0.612	0.354	0.001	0.01	0.098	0.003	0.013	0.007	0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.244	0.15	0.141	0.232	0.431	0.403	0.87	0.463	0.063	0.861
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 94 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: WEST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.816	0.308	0.809***	-1.737	0.092	-0.495	0.329	-0.116
	-1.024	-0.219	-0.086	-1.432	-0.219	-0.306	-0.204	-0.238
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-0.853	-0.83	-0.124	0.99	1.456	1.499	0.701	0.082
	-1.557	-0.396	-0.722	-0.618	-0.607	-0.3	-0.406	-0.785
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-37.259	-32.156**	-9.152	26.016***	6.439	18.737	-3.513	6.389
	-25.574	-8.892	-4.49	-3.096	-5.007	-9.382	-4.509	-4.466
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.873	-0.917**	-0.536	0.262	-2.100**	-0.364*	-0.213	1.866**
	-0.78	-0.227	-0.332	-0.876	-0.424	-0.135	-0.172	-0.331
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.62	0.122	-0.097	-0.096	0.797	0.12	0.096	-0.693
	-0.498	-0.195	-0.263	-0.404	-0.341	-0.087	-0.132	-0.509
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.553	0.018***	0.019*	2.606	4.059*	-0.001	0.007	-4.248*
	-1.998	-0.003	-0.006	-3.112	-1.333	-0.011	-0.007	-1.396
<b>Trade</b>	0.113	0.103	0.003	-0.269	-0.047	-0.002	0.037	0.044
	-0.158	-0.067	-0.024	-0.219	-0.049	-0.047	-0.019	-0.051
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.106	0.938	0.114	0.185	0.154	0.192	0.025	0.21
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.652	0.211	0.772	0.573	0.442	0.233	0.486	0.407
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 95 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.085 <i>-0.109</i>	0.181 <i>-0.224</i>	-0.145 <i>-0.281</i>	-0.081 <i>-0.179</i>	0.28 <i>-0.21</i>	-0.02 <i>-0.139</i>	-0.07 <i>-0.19</i>	0.01 <i>-0.14</i>
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-655.529 <i>-391.83</i>	-14.987 <i>-169.97</i>	0.02 <i>-0.023</i>	-293.236 <i>-287.77</i>	-11.242 <i>-150.95</i>	0.014 <i>-0.025</i>	1.59 <i>-1.996</i>	-0.064 <i>-0.649</i>
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	158.154 <i>-2595.4</i>	8628.161*** <i>-995.73</i>	1.281* <i>-0.45</i>	3073.117* <i>-1062.2</i>	7030.941*** <i>-629.01</i>	1.198 <i>-0.647</i>	28.620* <i>-11.122</i>	4.08 <i>-6.045</i>
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-7.975 <i>-122.98</i>	-51.759 <i>-48.489</i>	0 <i>-0.013</i>	-21.427 <i>-55.676</i>	-39.787 <i>-41.616</i>	-0.001 <i>-0.012</i>	-0.823 <i>-0.563</i>	-0.237 <i>-0.121</i>
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	45.731 <i>-224.14</i>	-165.483** <i>-46.879</i>	-0.022 <i>-0.021</i>	-284.958* <i>-111.27</i>	-143.008* <i>-44.063</i>	0.008 <i>-0.011</i>	-0.989* <i>-0.33</i>	0.218 <i>-0.186</i>
<b>Share of elder people</b>	1948.262* <i>-614.98</i>	-3.374* <i>-1.051</i>	-0.16 <i>-0.076</i>	664.21 <i>-359.56</i>	-2.205* <i>-0.701</i>	-0.065 <i>-0.056</i>	-1.045 <i>-2.256</i>	0.021* <i>-0.006</i>
<b>Trade</b>	-38.691 <i>-19.4</i>	-8.71 <i>-8.843</i>	0.001 <i>-0.002</i>	-19.016 <i>-18.093</i>	-5.77 <i>-6.438</i>	-0.001 <i>-0.002</i>	-0.004 <i>-0.056</i>	0.008 <i>-0.017</i>
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.558	0.097	0.804	0.89	0.127	0.679	0.114	0.608
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.395	0.706	0.259	0.299	0.356	0.222	0.356	0.373
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 95 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0	-0.129	0.043*	0.107*	0.414**	0.477**	0.292*	0.254	0.226	0.228*
	-0.14	-0.19	-0.018	-0.04	-0.103	-0.138	-0.129	-0.183	-0.143	-0.088
<b>RRP_INCUMBENT</b>	-1.391	-0.357	0.658	0.984	0.062	-0.278	0.011	0.1	0.159	-0.555
	-1.889	-0.768	-0.754	-1.896	-0.073	-0.617	-0.351	-0.094	-0.134	-1.216
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-25.367*	3.336	-2.973	-2.27	-0.124	-1.702	-1.292	0.212	-0.197	0.324
	-9.507	-1.707	-1.541	-1.355	-0.281	-2.018	-1.219	-0.244	-0.476	-1.906
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.687	0.143	-0.141	-0.232	-0.001	-0.174	-0.208	-0.022	0.056	-0.092
	-0.424	-0.197	-0.177	-0.265	-0.016	-0.161	-0.118	-0.016	-0.028	-0.174
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.981**	0.096	0.008	-0.493	-0.038	-0.828**	-0.214	-0.075	-0.009	0.618*
	-0.27	-0.172	-0.129	-0.335	-0.029	-0.241	-0.147	-0.046	-0.066	-0.234
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.028**	0.007*	-0.009**	-0.013***	0.001	0.014	-0.008**	0.002*	0.004*	-0.007
	-0.007	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.06	0.445***	0.484***	0.033	-0.002	-0.021	-0.016	0	0.001	0.031
	-0.079	-0.014	-0.02	-0.017	-0.002	-0.019	-0.011	-0.002	-0.004	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.079	0.422	0.224	0.024	0.049	0.123	0.068	0.029	0.01	0.139
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.362	0.229	0.309	0.307	0.329	0.986	0.632	0.863	0.031	0.636
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 95 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-GOV. Political variable: RRP as incumbent forces. Sample: EAST.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.409**	0.749***	0.774***	0.245*	0.429***	0.570***	0.551***	0.316*
	-0.134	-0.058	-0.042	-0.118	-0.081	-0.113	-0.133	-0.117
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	0.898	-0.105	-0.012	-0.117	-1.182	0.263	-0.01	2.446
	-1.619	-0.847	-0.596	-1.195	-0.809	-0.811	-0.527	-0.708
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.912*	-2.169	-2.213*	7.657*	4.834	3.879*	5.708*	-4.114
	-5.514	-1.757	-0.927	-2.981	-3.903	-1.817	-2.311	-3.844
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.379*	-0.043	-0.068	0.167	-0.085	0.021	0.029	0.147
	-0.143	-0.069	-0.069	-0.103	-0.115	-0.06	-0.06	-0.101
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.086	-0.223*	-0.335***	-0.088	-0.257	0.007	0.008	0.212
	-0.231	-0.098	-0.081	-0.121	-0.135	-0.05	-0.053	-0.123
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.373	0.003	0.008	-0.034	0.457	0.041***	-0.004	-0.082
	-0.493	-0.008	-0.004	-0.311	-0.242	-0.007	-0.005	-0.287
<b>Trade</b>	0.002	-0.016	-0.02	-0.005	0.016	0.007	0.009	0.006
	-0.025	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.014	-0.006	-0.007	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.123	0.011	0.004	0.099	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.004
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.222	0.7	0.535	0.161	0.94	0.279	0.458	0.714
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 96 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (SHOCK). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.629**	0.904***	0.173	0.867***	0.881***	0.113	-0.084	0.156
	-0.178	-0.049	-0.281	-0.105	-0.032	-0.089	-0.207	-0.182
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-4022.2	1532.822	0.26	-1168.62	365.468	0.104	4.642	0.186
	-2943.8	-1271.1	-0.149	-1587.4	-446.03	-0.076	-3.458	-0.855
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1688.78	4558.962*	0.694*	1030.813	4128.075*	0.738	26.379*	2.656
	-3850.3	-2084.5	-0.284	-2877.8	-1683	-0.417	-9.687	-4.109
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-169.056	1.632	0.011	-79.7	26.849	0.012	-0.24	-0.119
	-115.51	-61.114	-0.006	-112.78	-78.532	-0.006	-0.312	-0.082
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-140.146	-297.912	-0.008	-166.751	-206.343	-0.007	-0.845*	0.180*
	-169.89	-149.12	-0.008	-114.91	-120.62	-0.008	-0.305	-0.072
<b>Share of elder people</b>	898.997*	-1.337	-0.049	-41.079	-0.192	-0.02	-0.786	0.020***
	-358.73	-1.781	-0.028	-359.22	-2.612	-0.019	-0.877	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	28.429	15.41	0	23.983	15.302	0	0.021	0.009
	-19.722	-14.618	-0.001	-16.195	-14.891	-0.001	-0.039	-0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.014	0.015	0.172	0.017	0.062	0.037	0.036	0.138
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.469	0.861	0.403	0.186	0.376	0.923	0.509	0.968
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 96 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: ALL. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.156	-0.115	0.024	0.106**	0.416***	0.534**	0.712***	0.511***	0.484***	0.293***
	-0.182	-0.173	-0.019	-0.03	-0.11	-0.169	-0.114	-0.099	-0.113	-0.059
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-2.681	-0.262	0.186	-0.516	0.101	0.796	-0.302	-0.005	0.032	-2.494
	-3.078	-0.601	-0.549	-0.926	-0.104	-1.12	-0.581	-0.128	-0.16	-1.71
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-21.440*	2.828*	-3.746*	-3.227	-0.018	-2.506	-1.173	0.13	0.056	-0.65
	-8.214	-1.326	-1.457	-1.628	-0.167	-2.736	-1.135	-0.132	-0.329	-1.585
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.262	0.077	-0.127	-0.168	0.01	-0.084	-0.039	-0.004	0.012	0.004
	-0.258	-0.106	-0.1	-0.181	-0.009	-0.153	-0.035	-0.008	-0.02	-0.096
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.914***	0.074	0.124	-0.154	-0.027*	-0.980***	-0.154*	-0.028	-0.071**	0.746***
	-0.244	-0.069	-0.075	-0.155	-0.012	-0.203	-0.058	-0.017	-0.023	-0.189
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.02	0.009	-0.009	-0.017	0.001	0.012	-0.002	0.002***	0.005**	-0.005
	-0.016	-0.005	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001	-0.012	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.003	0.452***	0.495***	0.031*	0	-0.03	-0.006	0	-0.003	0.052***
	-0.037	-0.01	-0.012	-0.013	-0.001	-0.024	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.027	0.741	0.284	0	0.016	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.009
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.476	0.081	0.098	0.118	0.503	0.48	0.642	0.522	0.018	0.767
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 96 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: ALL. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.401**	0.797***	0.766***	0.247	0.426***	0.577***	0.632***	0.319*
	-0.139	-0.044	-0.063	-0.119	-0.091	-0.109	-0.144	-0.119
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	0.524	-0.081	0.359	0.27	-1.397	0.102	-0.064	2.529
	-1.471	-0.901	-0.538	-1.167	-0.546	-0.691	-0.46	-0.638
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-11.696	-0.118	-0.909	7.414*	5.278	3.087	4.398	-3.787
	-5.606	-1.043	-1.484	-3.06	-4.18	-1.599	-2.635	-3.911
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.281*	0.001	-0.012	0.12	0.003	0.076	0.065	0.084
	-0.121	-0.038	-0.049	-0.096	-0.105	-0.055	-0.054	-0.1
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.111	-0.292**	-0.375***	-0.083	-0.340*	-0.008	0.007	0.281
	-0.255	-0.094	-0.088	-0.136	-0.159	-0.055	-0.063	-0.138
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.173	-0.295	-0.308	-0.121	0.395	0.428*	0.17	0.029
	-0.494	-0.163	-0.202	-0.314	-0.248	-0.179	-0.123	-0.307
<b>Trade</b>	-0.006	-0.017	-0.019	-0.003	0.012	0.003	0.005	0.008
	-0.029	-0.011	-0.015	-0.012	-0.015	-0.007	-0.005	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.11	0.005	0.013	0.099	0.004	0.01	0.009	0.008
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.197	0.34	0.277	0.161	0.892	0.17	0.306	0.676
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 97 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (SHOCK). Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.617**	0.864***	0.034	0.778***	0.883***	-0.048	-0.205	0.513**
	-0.204	-0.075	-0.126	-0.116	-0.048	-0.111	-0.175	-0.138
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-4728.17	732.081	0.203	-2140.47	-110.545	0.059	3.367	0.35
	-3250.9	-1406.1	-0.139	-1742.4	-559.6	-0.059	-2.504	-0.732
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	12616.63	8344.614	0.314	8743.585	5749.772	0.128	15.053	-2.955
	-7226.5	-4744.2	-0.544	-5433.6	-4483.7	-0.494	-19.293	-4.308
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-187.048	42.998	0.012	-52.951	50.061	0.019*	0.071	-0.054
	-139.34	-83.035	-0.008	-146.86	-106.88	-0.008	-0.35	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-213.935	-350.158	-0.003	-88.051	-212.752	-0.01	-0.573	0.128
	-199.9	-168.64	-0.008	-99.46	-145.69	-0.012	-0.376	-0.086
<b>Share of elder people</b>	659.691	253.198	-0.009	190.346	155.769	0.013	0.122	0.565*
	-505.3	-483.07	-0.021	-384.6	-377.72	-0.02	-0.956	-0.204
<b>Trade</b>	17.504	8.158	0	12.378	10.429	0.001	0.037	0.021
	-23.353	-14.996	-0.001	-12.78	-19.178	-0.001	-0.06	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.025	0.032	0.072	0.039	0.085	0.139	0.58	0.03
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.551	0.939	0.777	0.205	0.496	0.1	0.137	0.645
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 97 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.513**	-0.169	0.05	0.140*	0.633***	0.437	0.801***	0.699***	0.653***	0.318*
	-0.138	-0.176	-0.05	-0.054	-0.077	-0.259	-0.041	-0.073	-0.067	-0.115
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-2.342	-0.604	0.746	-0.147	0.026	0.441	0.374	-0.221*	-0.213	-0.452
	-2.731	-0.689	-0.785	-1.048	-0.083	-1.377	-0.293	-0.079	-0.201	-1.213
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-10.013	1.415	-4.999*	-1.673	0.129	-5.501	-0.663	0.085	0.257	-3.726
	-17.966	-1.381	-1.865	-1.161	-0.135	-5.999	-0.511	-0.128	-0.446	-2.815
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.035	0.028	-0.049	-0.006	0.003	-0.199	-0.03	-0.001	0.009	0.086
	-0.323	-0.056	-0.075	-0.131	-0.008	-0.2	-0.041	-0.008	-0.02	-0.094
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.728	0.088	0.123	-0.014	-0.023*	-0.923**	-0.165**	-0.01	-0.088***	0.861*
	-0.363	-0.109	-0.07	-0.152	-0.01	-0.255	-0.052	-0.008	-0.021	-0.301
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.165	-0.033	-0.245	-0.691	0.011	-0.338	-0.088	-0.004	-0.037	0.701
	-0.767	-0.253	-0.462	-0.342	-0.021	-0.591	-0.107	-0.013	-0.045	-0.523
<b>Trade</b>	-0.042	0.449***	0.493***	0.025**	0	-0.03	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.061**
	-0.066	-0.021	-0.016	-0.008	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.795	0.592	0.306	0.001	0.01	0.1	0.003	0.011	0.007	0.02
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.179	0.148	0.139	0.233	0.477	0.341	0.915	0.547	0.076	0.903
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 97 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.783	0.298	0.807***	-1.557	0.07	-0.591*	0.347	-0.141
	-0.796	-0.243	-0.084	-1.29	-0.223	-0.233	-0.213	-0.264
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	9.074	3.742	-0.316	-3.801	-1.575	4.242	2.523	4.48
	-12.99	-5.055	-4.131	-9.851	-5.185	-3.053	-2.351	-3.087
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-40.865*	-35.467**	-10.764*	27.579**	8.751	19.881*	-1.882	4.757
	-14.348	-7.821	-4.461	-5.244	-4.367	-8.199	-4.922	-4.595
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.628*	-0.937**	-0.551	0.203	-2.149**	-0.385*	-0.264	1.880***
	-0.594	-0.201	-0.341	-0.856	-0.368	-0.12	-0.182	-0.298
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.499	0.129	-0.146	-0.065	0.803	0.109	0.132	-0.702
	-0.3	-0.193	-0.25	-0.384	-0.331	-0.09	-0.125	-0.492
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-1.253	0.019***	0.023*	2.72	4.327*	-0.004	0.005	-4.392*
	-1.49	-0.003	-0.007	-3.088	-1.27	-0.008	-0.008	-1.313
<b>Trade</b>	0.153	0.118	0.01	-0.269	-0.066	-0.003	0.028	0.056
	-0.111	-0.064	-0.022	-0.215	-0.048	-0.049	-0.024	-0.049
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.135	0.981	0.111	0.176	0.162	0.182	0.038	0.216
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.238	0.219	0.713	0.085	0.714	0.288	0.445	0.381
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 98 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (SHOCK). Sample: EAST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.048	0.165	-0.168	-0.138	0.26	-0.058	-0.084	0.004
	-0.036	-0.221	-0.233	-0.189	-0.208	-0.153	-0.19	-0.105
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-6804.62	479.446	0.651	-2646.43	383.469	0.429	9.58	0.44
	-3518.6	-881.29	-0.344	-2079.5	-652.65	-0.26	-19.74	-3.001
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-996.949	8668.911***	1.395*	2944.963*	6934.982***	1.289	29.675*	4.125
	-3374	-929.23	-0.567	-1101.7	-539.7	-0.664	-12.867	-5.882
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-40.703	-42.927	0.003	-24.013	-32.485	0.003	-0.757	-0.239
	-109.4	-49.583	-0.016	-54.125	-45.242	-0.01	-0.599	-0.142
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	56.34	-172.769*	-0.027	-284.902*	-150.901*	0.004	-1.005	0.216
	-213.41	-55.843	-0.019	-114.53	-51.329	-0.009	-0.525	-0.17
<b>Share of elder people</b>	2112.163**	-3.408**	-0.189	775.780*	-2.084**	-0.089	-1.129	0.021**
	-578.91	-0.966	-0.09	-327.26	-0.625	-0.063	-2.672	-0.006
<b>Trade</b>	-38.566*	-8.458	0.002	-20.719	-5.36	0	-0.017	0.009
	-12.861	-7.699	-0.003	-16.723	-5.342	-0.002	-0.076	-0.014
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.221	0.106	0.874	0.505	0.134	0.453	0.11	0.532
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.416	0.926	0.311	0.298	0.432	0.218	0.366	0.38
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 98 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.004	-0.144	0.049*	0.103*	0.402**	0.479**	0.301	0.274	0.24	0.230*
	-0.105	-0.189	-0.016	-0.043	-0.109	-0.143	-0.14	-0.184	-0.147	-0.083
<b>RRP_SHOCK</b>	-6.067	2.211	-1.171	-2.973	0.592	-0.257	-1.193	0.523	0.48	-4.265
	-16.146	-1.302	-1.545	-2.9	-0.316	-3.825	-1.109	-0.381	-0.767	-2.413
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-25.184*	3.173	-2.91	-2.223	-0.13	-1.751	-1.254	0.213	-0.181	0.268
	-10.195	-1.705	-1.672	-1.399	-0.285	-1.993	-1.22	-0.237	-0.476	-1.852
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.643	0.142	-0.138	-0.236	-0.007	-0.125	-0.2	-0.022	0.056	-0.091
	-0.423	-0.2	-0.178	-0.265	-0.016	-0.18	-0.12	-0.018	-0.026	-0.169
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.921**	0.096	0.022	-0.449	-0.04	-0.837**	-0.202	-0.075	-0.008	0.629*
	-0.256	-0.18	-0.12	-0.322	-0.03	-0.244	-0.142	-0.047	-0.067	-0.237
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.028**	0.007*	-0.009**	-0.013***	0.001	0.014	-0.009**	0.002**	0.004*	-0.008
	-0.007	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.075	0.444***	0.485***	0.031	-0.001	-0.02	-0.016	0	0	0.031
	-0.079	-0.013	-0.02	-0.015	-0.002	-0.019	-0.01	-0.002	-0.004	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.078	0.202	0.204	0.022	0.05	0.13	0.066	0.076	0.011	0.128
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.363	0.252	0.333	0.324	0.988	1	0.788	0.463	0.052	0.511
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 98 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (SHOCK).

Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.412**	0.745***	0.773***	0.258*	0.442***	0.574***	0.543***	0.317**
	-0.11	-0.057	-0.043	-0.095	-0.07	-0.112	-0.133	-0.103
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH_ELECT</b>	0.202	-0.021	0.232	0.051	0.497	0.061	-0.046	-0.461
	-0.422	-0.116	-0.209	-0.359	-0.361	-0.128	-0.137	-0.297
<b>RRP_STR_MED_ELECT</b>	1.543	-0.283	-0.478	-1.315	-0.93	-0.038	0.318	1.019
	-1.261	-0.277	-0.357	-1.057	-0.537	-0.206	-0.223	-0.476
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.676*	-2.176	-2.022*	8.257*	4.897	3.859*	5.743*	-4.043
	-5.403	-1.75	-0.926	-3.138	-3.906	-1.826	-2.307	-3.751
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.365*	-0.048	-0.079	0.164	-0.114	0.02	0.033	0.182
	-0.141	-0.069	-0.069	-0.104	-0.116	-0.06	-0.061	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.057	-0.227*	-	-0.103	-0.236	0.008	0.006	0.205
	-0.234	-0.097	0.335***	-0.137	-0.135	-0.052	-0.053	-0.127
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.295	0.003	0.008	-0.112	0.412	0.041***	-0.004	-0.005
	-0.49	-0.009	-0.004	-0.293	-0.261	-0.007	-0.005	-0.307
<b>Trade</b>	0.001	-0.015	-0.021	-0.002	0.016	0.007	0.009	0.003
	-0.025	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.014	-0.006	-0.007	-0.015
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.098	0.01	0.002	0.078	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.195	0.696	0.505	0.142	0.967	0.341	0.445	0.735
<b># of observations</b>	224	241	305	220	238	241	305	234

*Table 99 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (RRP\_STR\_MED\_ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH\_ELECT). Sample: ALL.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.639**	0.898***	0.139	0.880***	0.883***	0.113	-0.114	0.138
	-0.175	-0.047	-0.271	-0.095	-0.034	-0.154	-0.224	-0.184
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH ELECT</b>	1215.252	83.991	-0.054	636.787	59.175	-0.057	-0.438	-0.348
	-1082	-761.96	-0.062	-677.8	-732.37	-0.076	-0.946	-0.232
<b>RRP_STR_MED ELECT</b>	409.188	206.101	-0.008	746.459	261.155	0.003	1.178	-0.045
	-434.84	-504.59	-0.026	-287.8	-416.41	-0.023	-0.703	-0.309
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	1955.539	4848.201*	0.702*	1049.759	4234.346*	0.741	26.690**	2.469
	-3425.8	-2030.5	-0.277	-2528.1	-1559.9	-0.405	-9.505	-4.326
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-197.526	3.277	0.011	-89.332	23.947	0.012	-0.251	-0.117
	-133.26	-62.762	-0.007	-120.89	-79.315	-0.007	-0.319	-0.079
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-120.07	-291.767	-0.008	-141.469	-195.594	-0.006	-0.792*	0.179*
	-169.72	-144.28	-0.008	-116.01	-115.77	-0.008	-0.292	-0.071
<b>Share of elder people</b>	778.113*	-1.477	-0.047	-29.255	-0.154	-0.018	-0.602	0.020***
	-361.69	-2.167	-0.03	-377	-2.526	-0.019	-0.889	-0.003
<b>Trade</b>	22.845	14.613	0	18.804	14.634	0	0.017	0.011
	-20.687	-16.279	-0.001	-17.131	-17.174	-0.001	-0.038	-0.01
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.023	0.017	0.181	0.024	0.062	0.041	0.025	0.112
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.547	0.872	0.301	0.206	0.336	0.818	0.486	0.752
<b># of observations</b>	138	145	138	138	145	138	141	145

Table 99 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH ELECT). Sample: ALL.

Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.129	0.024	0.106**	0.571***	0.424***	0.533**	0.717***	0.511***	0.478***	0.289***
	-0.176	-0.02	-0.03	-0.076	-0.107	-0.169	-0.11	-0.1	-0.112	-0.058
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH ELECT</b>	0.134	0.523	-0.312	-0.557	-0.049	-0.341	-0.107	-0.014	0.024	-0.151
	-0.859	-0.177	-0.174	-0.428	-0.047	-0.327	-0.105	-0.021	-0.052	-0.42
<b>RRP_STR_MED ELECT</b>	-0.201	0.187	-0.232	-0.185	-0.018	-0.206	-0.191	-0.009	0.077	0.256
	-0.869	-0.244	-0.163	-0.272	-0.027	-0.453	-0.188	-0.018	-0.046	-0.401
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-22.011*	2.878*	-3.803*	-3.316	-0.013	-2.516	-1.111	0.13	0.049	-0.76
	-8.35	-1.359	-1.48	-1.674	-0.16	-2.735	-1.063	-0.131	-0.333	-1.607
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.249	0.077	-0.127	-0.165	0.01	-0.078	-0.04	-0.004	0.012	0.004
	-0.261	-0.106	-0.1	-0.18	-0.01	-0.153	-0.036	-0.008	-0.02	-0.098
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.901***	0.087	0.117	-0.167	-0.028*	-0.992***	-0.162**	-0.028	-0.069**	0.754***
	-0.235	-0.07	-0.075	-0.157	-0.012	-0.209	-0.058	-0.017	-0.023	-0.191
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.021	0.010*	-0.009	-0.016	0.001	0.012	-0.002	0.002***	0.005**	-0.004
	-0.017	-0.005	-0.005	-0.008	-0.001	-0.012	-0.001	0	-0.001	-0.007
<b>Trade</b>	-0.004	0.451***	0.497***	0.033*	0	-0.029	-0.006	0	-0.003	0.053***
	-0.037	-0.011	-0.011	-0.013	-0.001	-0.024	-0.006	-0.001	-0.002	-0.012
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.029	0.459	0.22	0	0.017	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.012
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.467	0.083	0.092	0.116	0.54	0.365	0.595	0.529	0.073	0.766
<b># of observations</b>	145	472	472	472	363	363	363	363	363	346

Table 99 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH ELECT). Sample: ALL. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ARNFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.404**	0.794***	0.764***	0.261*	0.443***	0.578***	0.631***	0.318**
	-0.114	-0.044	-0.063	-0.096	-0.08	-0.11	-0.146	-0.103
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH ELECT</b>	0.145	-0.047	0.01	0.06	0.312	-0.042	0.002	-0.43
	-0.399	-0.127	-0.145	-0.348	-0.33	-0.122	-0.138	-0.305
<b>RRP_STR_MED ELECT</b>	1.579	-0.236	-0.355	-1.338	-0.895	0.024	0.051	0.988
	-1.241	-0.261	-0.323	-1.046	-0.521	-0.176	-0.187	-0.463
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-12.561*	-0.109	-0.811	8.040*	5.246	3.079	4.418	-3.746
	-5.464	-1.045	-1.494	-3.212	-4.16	-1.617	-2.682	-3.832
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.264*	-0.005	-0.019	0.116	-0.026	0.078	0.065	0.126
	-0.12	-0.036	-0.048	-0.1	-0.108	-0.058	-0.055	-0.103
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-0.079	-0.297**	-0.379***	-0.1	-0.323	-0.01	0.005	0.274
	-0.259	-0.094	-0.086	-0.154	-0.159	-0.058	-0.064	-0.142
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.085	-0.306	-0.316	-0.205	0.347	0.432*	0.164	0.11
	-0.49	-0.166	-0.201	-0.292	-0.266	-0.185	-0.13	-0.332
<b>Trade</b>	-0.007	-0.016	-0.018	0	0.013	0.003	0.005	0.006
	-0.029	-0.01	-0.015	-0.012	-0.014	-0.008	-0.005	-0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.087	0.005	0.011	0.078	0.003	0.009	0.01	0.006
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.17	0.328	0.274	0.143	0.899	0.164	0.313	0.686
<b># of observations</b>	213	227	259	209	225	227	259	221

*Table 100 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only (RRP\_STR\_MED ELECT and*

*RRP\_STR\_HIGH ELECT). Sample: WEST.*

*Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*

	<b>MEANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEANINC NAT</b>	<b>RMNINF</b>	<b>MEDIANINCFOR</b>	<b>MEDIANINC NAT</b>	<b>RMDINF</b>	<b>POVFOR</b>	<b>POVNAT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.627**	0.864***	-0.033	0.779***	0.889***	-0.041	-0.213	0.540**
	-0.21	-0.071	-0.151	-0.12	-0.048	-0.116	-0.164	-0.141
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH ELECT</b>	714.212	-159.507	-0.004	410.569	-182.38	0.005	0.594	-0.126
	-983.77	-860.42	-0.032	-636.15	-813.08	-0.022	-1.018	-0.248
<b>RRP_STR_MED ELECT</b>	119.041	161.353	0.019	77.922	156.372	-0.026	1.36	0.303
	-535.73	-711.5	-0.03	-503.17	-614.08	-0.026	-0.925	-0.345
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	9985.394	8534.483	0.399	7524.791	5595.81	0.179	15.087	-2.93
	-8679.8	-4645.4	-0.58	-6152.1	-4470.6	-0.495	-19.117	-4.398
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-182.871	46.72	0.013	-49.318	51.24	0.019*	0.097	-0.054
	-160.5	-78.799	-0.009	-161.59	-99.984	-0.008	-0.366	-0.105
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-198.853	-347.137*	-0.002	-75.567	-208.818	-0.011	-0.522	0.133
	-191.42	-164.52	-0.008	-108.27	-137.63	-0.013	-0.362	-0.087
<b>Share of elder people</b>	528.18	307.321	-0.005	137.509	198.392	0.008	0.191	0.630**
	-499.95	-506.89	-0.023	-437.17	-418.29	-0.024	-0.997	-0.199
<b>Trade</b>	20.442	7.404	0	13.942	10.093	0.001	0.026	0.019
	-26.398	-16.219	-0.002	-13.182	-20.514	-0.001	-0.058	-0.011
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.03	0.038	0.072	0.04	0.085	0.155	0.319	0.033
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.528	0.895	0.585	0.102	0.48	0.15	0.286	0.677
<b># of observations</b>	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

Table 100 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH ELECT). Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.197	0.052	0.139*	0.563***	0.628***	0.437	0.796***	0.694***	0.650***	0.315*
	-0.179	-0.05	-0.053	-0.042	-0.078	-0.26	-0.042	-0.072	-0.065	-0.114
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH_ELECT</b>	-0.371	0.309	-0.214	-0.752	-0.002	-0.024	0.027	0.008	0.005	-0.083
	-1.174	-0.169	-0.157	-0.484	-0.013	-0.268	-0.068	-0.011	-0.029	-0.461
<b>RRP_STR_MED_ELECT</b>	-1.057	0.213	-0.137	-0.212	0.036*	0.379	0.08	0.008	0.066	-0.045
	-0.915	-0.215	-0.298	-0.337	-0.016	-0.684	-0.127	-0.014	-0.024	-0.324
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-9.702	1.365	-4.986*	-1.701	0.114	-5.554	-0.698	0.077	0.231	-3.712
	-18.318	-1.402	-1.897	-1.264	-0.137	-6.001	-0.554	-0.132	-0.445	-2.866
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-0.001	0.024	-0.049	0.006	0.003	-0.192	-0.029	-0.002	0.009	0.084
	-0.334	-0.056	-0.076	-0.123	-0.008	-0.202	-0.042	-0.008	-0.019	-0.1
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.675	0.099	0.117	-0.036	-0.023*	-0.924**	-0.163**	-0.01	-0.088***	0.858*
	-0.354	-0.112	-0.072	-0.158	-0.01	-0.258	-0.051	-0.008	-0.02	-0.296
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.09	-0.039	-0.231	-0.695	0.013	-0.342	-0.092	-0.006	-0.036	0.705
	-0.875	-0.253	-0.459	-0.351	-0.022	-0.578	-0.11	-0.013	-0.044	-0.524
<b>Trade</b>	-0.038	0.448***	0.494***	0.026**	0	-0.03	-0.004	0	-0.003	0.061**
	-0.065	-0.022	-0.016	-0.008	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0	-0.002	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.716	0.399	0.271	0.001	0.011	0.095	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.019
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.339	0.144	0.127	0.223	0.556	0.312	0.948	0.515	0.109	0.982
<b># of observations</b>	99	322	322	322	258	258	258	258	258	215

Table 100 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED\_ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH\_ELECT). Sample: WEST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>UNEMPF</b>	<b>UNEMPN</b>	<b>UNEMPT</b>	<b>DIFFRUNNF</b>	<b>ARF</b>	<b>ARN</b>	<b>ART</b>	<b>ANFD</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	0.861 <i>-1.131</i>	0.393 <i>-0.249</i>	0.802*** <i>-0.086</i>	-1.728 <i>-1.667</i>	0.074 <i>-0.224</i>	-0.45 <i>-0.385</i>	0.412* <i>-0.146</i>	-0.112 <i>-0.244</i>
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH_ELECT</b>	0 (.)	-2.430 <i>-0.717</i>	1.159 <i>-0.81</i>	0 (.)	-0.468 <i>-0.452</i>	-0.096 <i>-0.379</i>	-0.233 <i>-0.445</i>	0.173 <i>-0.826</i>
<b>RRP_STR_MED_ELECT</b>	0 (.)	0 (.)	-0.856 <i>-1.071</i>	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0.885 <i>-0.478</i>	0 (.)
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-36.995 <i>-28.954</i>	-32.518** <i>-8.392</i>	-8.851 <i>-5.263</i>	27.067** <i>-4.212</i>	7.639 <i>-4.741</i>	20.501 <i>-9.452</i>	-1.383 <i>-4.676</i>	6.637 <i>-4.414</i>
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-1.872 <i>-0.901</i>	-1.117** <i>-0.242</i>	-0.541 <i>-0.266</i>	0.239 <i>-1.015</i>	-2.194** <i>-0.456</i>	-0.363 <i>-0.183</i>	-0.236 <i>-0.179</i>	1.880** <i>-0.386</i>
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.627 <i>-0.574</i>	0.23 <i>-0.205</i>	-0.22 <i>-0.252</i>	-0.093 <i>-0.45</i>	0.822 <i>-0.374</i>	0.113 <i>-0.114</i>	0.213 <i>-0.123</i>	-0.701 <i>-0.578</i>
<b>Share of elder people</b>	-0.617 <i>-2.302</i>	0.018*** <i>-0.003</i>	0.020* <i>-0.008</i>	2.735 <i>-3.58</i>	4.343* <i>-1.376</i>	-0.001 <i>-0.013</i>	0.004 <i>-0.008</i>	-4.254* <i>-1.406</i>
<b>Trade</b>	0.115 <i>-0.183</i>	0.12 <i>-0.056</i>	-0.003 <i>-0.027</i>	-0.278 <i>-0.253</i>	-0.06 <i>-0.052</i>	-0.011 <i>-0.053</i>	0.035 <i>-0.017</i>	0.043 <i>-0.048</i>
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.103	0.569	0.136	0.175	0.163	0.226	0.027	0.21
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.58	0.242	0.669	0.738	0.613	0.297	0.538	0.399
<b># of observations</b>	11	14	46	11	13	14	46	13

*Table 101 - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only (RRP\_STR\_MED\_ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH\_ELECT). Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$*



	MEANINCFOR	MEANINCNAT	RMNINF	MEDIANINCFOR	MEDIANINCNAT	RMDINF	POVFOR	POVNAT
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.007 -0.134	0.199 -0.202	-0.185 -0.232	-0.107 -0.114	0.298 -0.194	0.027 -0.225	-0.116 -0.239	-0.01 -0.108
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH_ELECT</b>	1397.24 -1230	191.01 -117.63	-0.078 -0.113	854.51 -516.93	167.066 -80.154	-0.12 -0.131	1.054 -1.216	-0.441 -0.385
<b>RRP_STR_MED_ELECT</b>	-442.269 -528.76	-85.271 -166.07	0.023 -0.059	-218.453 -156.99	-25.884 -141.75	-0.003 -0.042	1.373 -0.974	-0.027 -0.499
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-333.458 -2780	8816.266*** -966.42	1.299* -0.54	3033.655 -1434.7	7049.472*** -518.1	1.201 -0.644	28.557* -11.073	3.62 -6.644
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	-79.796 -183.87	-58.328 -48.131	0.003 -0.019	-61.148 -79.526	-48.103 -40.509	0.005 -0.022	-0.979 -0.641	-0.215 -0.115
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	-71.463 -340.17	-172.936** -52.311	-0.017 -0.028	-342.205 -182.13	-147.751* -47.182	0.013 -0.019	-0.850* -0.298	0.236 -0.165
<b>Share of elder people</b>	2101.041* -653.89	-3.270* -1.155	-0.178 -0.091	851.362 -394.88	-1.992* -0.772	-0.093 -0.081	-0.36 -2.91	0.021* -0.006
<b>Trade</b>	-46.31 -26.828	-10.188 -8.117	0.002 -0.003	-28.625 -19.877	-6.625 -5.457	0.001 -0.003	-0.048 -0.1	0.01 -0.017
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.29	0.15	0.985	0.334	0.161	0.363	0.129	0.477
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.222	0.43	0.176	0.286	0.299	0.191	0.4	0.896
<b># of observations</b>	39	46	39	39	46	39	42	46

Table 101 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED\_ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH\_ELECT). Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

	<b>DIFFPOVNF</b>	<b>IMP</b>	<b>EXP</b>	<b>BALTR</b>	<b>SEC</b>	<b>GEXP</b>	<b>GSER</b>	<b>CUL</b>	<b>EDU</b>	<b>DEFICIT</b>
<b>Lagged dependent variable</b>	-0.161	0.044*	0.103*	0.590***	0.446***	0.467**	0.277*	0.242	0.231	0.230*
	-0.227	-0.017	-0.042	-0.103	-0.086	-0.142	-0.116	-0.197	-0.149	-0.082
<b>RRP_STR_HIGH ELECT</b>	-1.024	-0.107	-0.272	-0.688	-0.171	-0.561	-0.462	-0.066	0.047	0.031
	-0.414	-0.715	-0.562	-0.852	-0.158	-0.423	-0.258	-0.07	-0.157	-0.256
<b>RRP_STR_MED ELECT</b>	-1.533	0.499	-0.372	-0.119	-0.06	-0.835	-0.468	-0.087	-0.003	0.533
	-0.966	-0.233	-0.21	-0.331	-0.042	-0.525	-0.289	-0.049	-0.09	-0.545
<b>GDP per capita (log)</b>	-27.163*	3.42	-3.239	-2.544	-0.156	-1.703	-1.522	0.207	-0.177	0.28
	-9.723	-1.759	-1.609	-1.538	-0.253	-2	-1.175	-0.245	-0.453	-1.903
<b>Lagged govparty</b>	0.764	0.15	-0.154	-0.244	-0.011	-0.195	-0.221	-0.024	0.057	-0.094
	-0.447	-0.199	-0.175	-0.262	-0.017	-0.176	-0.115	-0.018	-0.027	-0.165
<b>GDP growth (log)</b>	0.878**	0.124	0.002	-0.465	-0.041	-	-0.254	-0.08	-0.006	0.632*
	-0.19	-0.164	-0.123	-0.317	-0.028	0.927**	-0.156	-0.05	-0.067	-0.22
<b>Share of elder people</b>	0.029**	0.006*	-0.009**	-	0.001	0.014	-	0.002*	0.004*	-0.008
	-0.008	-0.002	-0.003	0.013***	-0.001	-0.006	0.008**	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005
<b>Trade</b>	0.077	0.444***	0.487***	0.034	-0.001	-0.021	-0.014	0	0	0.032
	-0.085	-0.014	-0.02	-0.016	-0.002	-0.02	-0.011	-0.002	-0.003	-0.018
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR1</b>	0.095	0.161	0.26	0.027	0.052	0.131	0.043	0.068	0.007	0.137
<b>Arellano-Bond test for AR2</b>	0.407	0.193	0.257	0.271	0.584	0.678	0.947	0.547	0.029	0.435
<b># of observations</b>	46	150	150	150	105	105	105	105	105	131

Table 101 (continued) - Detailed results for Chapter 4 econometric tests. Hyp: OH-STR. Political variable: RRP's strength in election year only

(RRP\_STR\_MED ELECT and RRP\_STR\_HIGH ELECT). Sample: EAST. Significant at: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AECR	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AN	Alleanza Nazionale
ATAKA	ATAKA
BNP	British National Party
BZÖ	Bundnis Zukunft Österreichs
CD	Centrumdemocraten
CP	Casa Pound
DF	Dansk Folkeparti
E2000	España 2000
EAF	European Alliance for Freedom
EANM	European Alliance of National Movements
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
EFD	European Freedom and Democracy Group
EIP	Eesti Iseseivuspartei
EK	Eesti Kodanik
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
ERSP	Eesti Rahvuslik Sõltumatuse Partei
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
FdI	Fratelli d'Italia
FEJ	Falange Española de la JONS
FI	Forza Italia
Fidesz	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség
FN	Front National (France)
FNb	Front National (Belgium)

FNi	Forza Nuova
FNs	Frente Nacional
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet
GUE	European United Left
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica
HSP	Hrvatska stranka prava
Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom
LAOS	Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos
LD	La Destra
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin
LTS	Lietuvių tautininkų sąjunga
MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
MIEP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja
MNR	Mouvement National Republicain
MSI	Movimento Sociale Italiano
NA	Nacionālā apvienība
ND	Ny Demokrati
NF	National Front
NFSB	Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria
NI	Non-attached members of the European Parliament
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
P	Perussuomalaiset
PDL	Popolo della libertà
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
PNF	Partito Nazionale Fascista
PNR	Partido Nacional Renovador
PRM	Partidul Romania Mare
PS	Parti Socialiste (France)
PUNR	Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor

PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid
REP	Republikaner
RR	Radical right
RRP	Radical right party
S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SD	Sverigedemokraterna
SF	Sinn Féin
SNS	Slovenska narodna strana
SNS-slv	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka
SRP	Samobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei
TB	Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” – „Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”
TL	Lega dei Ticinesi
UEN	Union for Europe of the Nations
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
VB	Vlaams Blok/Belang
XA	Chrysi Avgì



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## **ABSTRACT**

This PhD Thesis discusses the actual and potential impacts of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) on the economy and assesses these impacts – quantitatively and qualitatively – by considering the economic policy and performances of 27 European countries.

We start discussing the different definitions of RRP (Chapter 1) and their position on economic issues (Chapter 2). We derive an original taxonomy of RRP positions on economic matters confirming the heterogeneity between RRP. In Chapter 3, we critically review the literature on the political determinants of the economy and identify three conceptualisations of the ‘political’ in neo-classical economics: opportunistic, partisan, and institutional models. Chapter 4 tests our main hypotheses by using a dynamic panel data model. Results show no significant and robust evidence in support of an impact on authoritarian (e.g. security) and populist (e.g. deficits) indicators. We find evidence in support of a nativist impact, different in Eastern and Western European countries. In Eastern Europe, RRP electoral scores, as well as their inclusion in a ruling coalition, are a significant predictor of increased imports and decreased exports. In Western Europe, RRP strength and presence in a ruling coalition are a significant predictor of increasing gap in unemployment rates between native and foreign workforce.

In order to understand the mechanisms behind our results, Chapter 5 proposes an original contribution to Amable and Palombarini (2005)’s neo-realist approach. We argue that economic policy is the result of the political regulation of social conflict and illustrate our framework with the case study of the Italian Lega Nord.

**Keywords:** Comparative politics, Radical right parties, Political Economy, Party manifestos, Neo-realist approach.

## **RESUME**

Cette thèse porte sur les impacts réels et potentiels des partis de droite radicale (PDR) sur l'économie et évalue ces impacts - quantitativement et qualitativement - en considérant la politique économique et les performances économiques de 27 pays européens.

Nous commençons par discuter les définitions de pdr (chapitre 1) et leur position sur les questions économiques (chapitre 2). Nous en déduisons une taxonomie des positions de ces partis sur les questions économiques et confirmons l'hétérogénéité entre les PDR sur ces questions. Le chapitre 3 résume la littérature sur les déterminants politiques de l'économie, dont nous tirons nos hypothèses. Le chapitre 4 teste ces hypothèses à l'aide d'économétrie sur des données de panel. Nous montrons que la présence de PDR semble avoir des effets sur l'économie mais différent en europe de l'est et de l'ouest. En europe de l'est, les scores électoraux des PDR, ainsi que leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir sont significativement liés à l'augmentation des importations et de la diminution des exportations. En europe de l'ouest, leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir est lié à l'accroissement de l'écart entre les taux de chômage de la main-d'œuvre autochtone et étrangère.

Afin de comprendre les mécanismes qui sous-tendent nos résultats, le chapitre 5 propose une contribution originale à l'approche néo-réaliste d'amable et palombarini (2005). Nous soutenons que la politique économique est le résultat de la régulation politique des conflits sociaux et illustrons notre point de vue avec l'étude de cas de la ligue du nord italienne.

**Mots-clés** : Politique comparée, Droite radicale, Extreme droite, Economie politique, Programmes des partis politiques, Approche néo-réaliste.