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Modélisation par la théorie des jeux des échanges de prévisions dans un réseau d'entreprises

Abstract : The object of our study is a basic echelon of a decentralized supply chain. This echelon is made of a customer facing a random market demand and a supplier in charge of an intermediary product stock. The actors are bound by a linear wholesale contract. The customer is closer to the market and will have a better understanding of the demand. The customer can share its private information on forecasts with the supplier. The forecasts of market demand are binary: high demand or low demand. Thus the information is asymmetric, because the customer was initially better informed, but also imperfect because this information is only an approximate estimate of the actual orders of the final market. We study several models of supply chains (make-to-stock supply chain model on mono- and multi-period, make-to-stock supply chain model on mono-period) and we use two scientific approaches: non-cooperative game theory and methodology of experimental economics.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, March 20, 2013 - 9:40:19 AM
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  • HAL Id : tel-00802540, version 1


Natallia Taratynava. Modélisation par la théorie des jeux des échanges de prévisions dans un réseau d'entreprises. Autre. Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Saint-Etienne, 2009. Français. ⟨NNT : 2009EMSE0034⟩. ⟨tel-00802540⟩



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