The French Revolution has led to a reflection on a new configuration for the magistrature, which is both necessary and feared. An opposition was arising between a notion of independence and dependency of the magistrature. That very opposition is the essence of its lawfulness, by virtue of its design. Due to the failure of the election of judges, final attempt for the magistrature’s independence and legitimacy by people, it shifted to a submission to political power. The political authorities recruits, appoints, and recognizes magistrates in a discretionary way, by criteria of obedience to political power. There will be no real counter power to that discretionary nature, because of an illusionary immovability. Magistrature’s dependency led to that acknowledgement of failure. Gradually, starting in the late 19th century, some independence mechanisms appeared to control and restrain the political authorities’ domination over magistrature. However, this dependency left some marks on our current magistrature. The current appointment by the political authorities is bringing out, even symbolically, this dependency. Although, a set of coherent independence mechanisms was established, the appointment by the political authorities rekindles the ghosts of a dependent magistrature following orders. Despite those mechanisms, the political authorities still have a role within the magistrature. By keeping that appointment by the political authorities, we try and make the magistrature, which is by nature in a dependency setting, independent. It would seem that the appointment by the political authorities is the one thing that prevents the magistrates’ total and perfect independence. If the magistrates’ independence in a judicial matter is concretely achieved, it is still missing the unmistakable appearance of that independence. This absence is detrimental to the entire independence of the magistrature. Thus, to achieve the magistrates’ perfect independence, it is necessary to dedicate a real judicial power.