Among the countries which have experienced a political transition away from authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is usually considered as a model of both democracy and judicial review. Relying on an interpretive reading of jurisprudence, the present research however uncovers the double-edged way in which the Constitutional Court of Korea has discharged its role as guardian of the constitution. A critical analysis of constitutional jurisprudence indeed reveals how the court’s commitment to define and defend the post-transition constitutional order has translated into both liberal and illiberal outcomes. This ambivalent dimension of the court’s role has unfolded as the institution came to intervene in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the 1987 change of regime: reshaping the contours of enmity in the post-transitional period. Through the contentious issue of enmity, what has been put at stake in the constitutional arena is the very challenge of delineating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in South Korean democracy. in light of this task, constitutional justice has imposed itself as a paradoxical site, where the post-transitional disagreement about what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ has been both staged and interrupted.