This paper defends the theory of legal pluralism in Cameroonian-CEEAC (Economic community central African States) legal order and aims to demonstrate that the omnipresence of monism in this area is incapable of describing the real legal world and the law as it is. A preliminary question not always considered in the debate, regards the existence of legal pluralism or private ordering is why private actors issue norms? The paper begins by looking at a variety of reasons why private actors produce norms and discusses in detail the concepts of the hierarchy of norms and their legal validity. The paper points out the fact that public space faced crises of state institutions regarding separation of powers, parliamentary time, terrorism and secession. These crises drawn all the attention of public space and affect its normative reactivity in the sense of regulating new activities, social practices. This legal ordering sometimes produces ineffective and unintelligible norms. There is no doubt that a poorly design law and ineffective access to the law can affect economic activities. The emergence of private norms can be explained in two different ways. It could be argued that, confront to an inadequacy law, private actors decide to subject their activities to non-state law. Produce norms is therefore a unique opportunity to private actors to free themselves from the constraints of the legal insecurity since the inadequacy or lack of state law expose them to additional transaction costs. This paper doesn’t or never claimed complete autonomy from legal system. I shall conclude that far to compete with legal space, private ordering help to discipline private actors and to organize new activities. The paper tries to explain why Mobile Network Operators (MNO) produce mobile money norms and intends to demonstrate that an increasing number of mobile money rules issued by GSMA, and MNO can be found within a corpus of rules of legal orders. We will try to identify, among layers of legal corpus rules, legal norms which originally come from private ordering. One could observe that mobile money private norms had been recognized by public actors through legal transplants. Other question not always considered in the debate, regards the existence of private norms which had not been incorporated to the contents of positive law. The importance of private norms in the regulation of mobile money system is undeniable. The mobile money private norms are an important source of public legislation, they structure mobile money operators’ agreement. It is important to be aware of their existence of private norms which has not be incorporated on state legal orders. This paper also outlines the impact of technology, more specifically of mobile money on the financial landscape and above all, the access of non-banking players MNOs in the financial landscape. By its characteristics, mobile money is on the way to change landscape of financial inclusion for unbanked countries. A financial market has born or raised around mobile money and now, Bank and other financial institutions must compete with MNOs, owners of the Unstructured supplementary service Data: which is a critical platform required to provide mobile financial services and to enable mobile financial service operators to access potential mobile money clients or to send responses to clients and confirm transactions. This relatively new roles for MNOs generate competition issues particularly in the case where one MNO in dominant position on the voice market also plays an active role in providing mobile money services or mobile financial services. Finally, this paper aims to describe and explain the various normative interaction between a private ordering and a state order especially regarding pure theory of law. To do so, we study a high number of sector (lex mercatoria) where we can verify normative interaction between legal norms and private norms. We therefore manage to theorize this normative interaction.